PICART vs. SMITH, JR.

G.R. No. L-12219

March 15, 1918
STREET, J.:
FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding
on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way
across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a
horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the
bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to
him that the man on horseback before him was not observing
the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning
signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the
apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony
closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge
instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this
was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over
to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided
it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the
machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the
horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony
was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the
right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued
to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of
speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the
defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to
escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed
in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened
and turned its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the
limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off
with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died. The
plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several
days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from
liability Picart has appealed.
ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise
to a civil obligation to repair the damage done

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a

particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation
before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence
and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as
to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a
given situation must of course be always determined in the
light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in
the particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee
harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the
duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that
harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of
the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms,
the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence
in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a
prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have
foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently
probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against
its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the
present case we think that negligence is clearly established. A
prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in
our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was
pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have
foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable
consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law
imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the threatened
harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free
from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in
planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have
already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case the
problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of
the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the
negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the
plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances
the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid
the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the
other party.

Cangco vs manila railroad

HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and
judgment is here rendered that the Picart recover of Smith
damages
YES

On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila

Railroad Co (MRC). He was an employee of the latter and he
was given a pass so that he could ride the train for free. When
he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from his
seat even though the train was not at full stop. When he was
about to alight from the train (which was still slightly moving) he

accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed

to notice due to the fact that it was dim. This caused him to
lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm was
crushed by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He
was dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent
in piling the sacks of watermelons. MRC raised as a defense
the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he failed to exercise
diligence in alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to
stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for
damages.
HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing
down is a common practice and a lot of people are doing so
every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and
agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for
him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act
would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also
ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as
there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the
liability of employers under Article 2180 and their liability for
breach of contract [of carriage]:

PLDT vs. CA
Facts: On July, 30, 1968, respondent spouses Esteban had their
jeep ran over a sand of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of
its underground conduit system. Respondent Antonio Esteban
failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered
because of the creeping darkness and the lack of warning light
or signs. Respondent spouses suffered physical injuries and
their jeeps windshield was shattered. PLDT alleged that the
respondents were negligent and that it should be the
independent contractor L.R. Barte and Company which
undertook said conduit system to be the one liable.The latter
claimed to have complied with its contract and had installed
necessary barricades.
Issue: WON PLDT and L.R. Barte and Co. are liable.
Ruling: Private Respondents negligence was not merely
contributory but goes to the very cause of the accident, hence
he has no right to recover damages for the injuries which he
and his wife suffered. Private respondent cannot recover
notwithstanding the negligence he imputes on PLDT
considering that he had the last clear chance, to avoid the
injury. One who claims damages for the negligence of another
has the burden of proof to show existence of such fault or
negligence causative thereof.

CHINA AIR LINES, LTD., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

JOSEPAGSIBIGAN, PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC. and ROBERTO
ESPIRITU, respondents.

G.R. No. 45985 May 18, 1990

FACTS: Jose Pagsibagan, General Manager of Rentokil (Phil.)
Inc. purchased an airline ticket for Manila-Taipei-Hong KongManila with Philippine Airlines which at that time was a sales
and ticketing agent of China Air Lines. His plane ticket
indicated that he is booked on CAL CI Flight No. 812 to depart
from Manila for Taipei on June 10, 1968 at 17:20 hours (5:20
p.m.) as issued by PAL, through its ticketing clerk defendant
Roberto Espiritu. One hour before his flight, Pagsibagan was
informed that Flight No. 812 bound to Taipei had already left at
10:20. PAL employees made appropriate arrangements for the
former to take the next flight to Taipei the following day, to
which he arrived around noontime. Jose Pagsibagan filed a
complaint for damages, alleging further the negligence
of Roberto Espiritu.PAL on its defense alleges that its ticketing
office through Roberto Espiritu asked for confirmation from
CAL before issuing the ticket to Mr. Pagsibagan, which CAL
confirmed. Defendant China Air Lines, for its part,
disclaims liability for the negligence and
incompetence of the employees of PAL. Moreover, CAL
avers that it had properly notified PAL of the flight schedule.
Trial Court ruled that PAL and its employee shall
indemnify Pagsibagan. However, the complaint is
dismissed with respect to CAL.
ISSUE: Whether or not CAL shall be rendered liable.
HELD: NO. T h e r e i s i n d e e d n o b a s i s
whatsoever to hold CAL liable on a
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana
.
As herein before stated, the court
a quo absolved CAL of any liability for fault or negligence. This
finding was shared by respondent court when
it concluded that defendant CAL did not contribute
to the negligence committed by therein defendantsappellants PAL and Roberto Espiritu. Respondent Pagsibigan
insists that CAL was barred from proving that it observed due
diligence in
thes e l e c t i o n a n d s u p e r v i s i o n o f i t s e m p l o y e e s .
This argument is obviously misplaced. CAL is
n o t t h e employer of PAL or Espiritu.
Norman Gaid vs People of the Philippines
(Simple Negligence)
Norman Gaid was charged with reckless imprudence resulting
to homicide driving a passenger jeep and running over and
killing Michael Dayata. Gaid was driving his jeep along a 2lane road near the Laguindingan National HS, and students
were coming out of it. Dayata was siting near a store on the left
side of the road, and hailed Gaids
jeep. Neither the driver nor the conductor see anybody hail the
jeep. Next thing the witness saw, Dayatas feet were pinned to
the rear wheel of the jeep, lying down on the ground. The first
hospital where he was rushed was closed; the second
pronounced him dead on arrival.
HELD:
NOT LIABLE. The prosecution was not able to establish
that the proximate cause of the victims death was
petitioners alleged negligence
. In this case, the courts below zeroed in on the fact that
petitioner did not stop the jeepney when he felt the bouncing of
his vehicle, a circum-stance which
the appellate court equates with negligence. Petitioner

contends that he did not immediately stop because he did not

see anybody go near his vehicle at the time of the incident. In
an American case,
Hernandez v. Lukas
, a motorist traveling within the speed limit and did all was
possible to avoid striking a child who was then six years old
only. The place of the incident was a neighbourhood where
children were playing in the parkways on prior occasions. The
court ruled that it must be still proven that the driver did not
exercise duecare.
The evidence showed that the driver was proceeding in
lawful manner within the speed limit when the child ran
into the street and was struck by the drivers
vehicle. Clearly, this was an emergency situation thrust
upon the driver too suddenly to avoid.
If at all again, petitioners failure to render assistance to the
victim would constitute abandonment of ones victim
punishable under Article 275 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, the omission is not covered
by the information. Thus, to hold petitioner criminally liable
under the provision would be tantamount to a denial of
due process
Simple negligence.
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The
elements of simple negligence:(1) that there is lack of
precaution on the part of the offender; and(2) that the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not
clearly manifest. The standard test in determining whether a
person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this: could a
prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence
is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If
so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that
course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous
results, and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed
by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
MERCURY DRUG CORP. v. BAKING
GR. No. 156037, May 28, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: (Proximate Cause) Sebastian M.

Baking went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical checkup. After undergoing an ECG, and several examininations, Dr.
Sy found the respondents blood sugar and triglyceride were
above normal. The doctor then prescribed two medical
prescriptions- Diamicron for the blood sugar and Benalize for
his triglyceride. Respondent then proceeded to Mercury Drug
Alabang to buy the prescribed medicines. The sales lady
misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for
Dormicum. Thus what was sold was Dormicum, a potent
sleeping tablet. Unaware of the wrong medicine, he took one
pill on three consecutive days. On the third day he took the
medicine, he met an accident while driving his car. He fell
asleep while driving. He could not remember anything about
the collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting the tablet he took,
respondent went back to Dr. Sy who was shocked after finding
that what was sold was Dormicum instead of Diamicron. He
filed the present complaint for damages against petitioner. The
trial court favored the defendant which was affirmed by the CA
hence this petition.
ISSUE: Is petitioner negligent, and if so, is the negligence was
the proximate cause of the accident?
HELD: YES. Art. 2176 provide the requisites of negligence: 1.
damage suffered by the plaintiff, 2. fault or negligence of the
defendant, 3. connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the
plaintiff. It is generally recognized that the drugstore business
is imbued with public interest. Obviously, petitioners
employee was grossly negligent in selling the wrong
prescription. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter
of life and death for a buying patient, the said employee should
have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should
have verified whether the medicine she gave respondent was
indeed the one prescribed by the physician. Petitioner contends
that the proximate cause of the accident was respondents
negligence in driving his car. Proximate cause is that cause,
which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred Proximate cause is
determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined
consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had
petitioners employee been careful in reading the prescription.
Without the potent effect of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was
unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car,
resulting in collision. Petition DENIED.