PALMQUIST - Tree.25. Power and The Boundary of Politics

D1 staweb.hkbu.edu.
hk
https://www.readability.com/articles/hctqlsbf
staffweb.hkbu.edu.hk
D1
41 min read original
25. Power and the Boundary of Politics

by Stephen Palmquist (stevepq@hkbu.edu.hk)
Here in Part Three we have been learning that philosophy deals not only
with abstract theoretical issues relating to metaphysics, epistemology,
logic, and language usage, but also with more concrete practical issues,
such as those relating to science and morality. The philosophy of science
and moral philosophy are both major branches of philosophy: they provide
the basis for applying philosophy to more practical issues relating to
specific sciences or specific ethical situations. In this and the following
lecture I want us to consider one further branch of the tree of philosophy,
political philosophy. There are actually a number of other fields of
philosophical inquiry that might be included in Part Three, if we had time.
But for our purposes a discussion of political philosophy can serve as an
adequate way of completing our study of how to apply philosophical
thinking in our search for wisdom.
Many of the philosophers we have already studied had much to say about
political philosophy. For example, the main point of Plato's longest and
most systematic book, called Republic, is to set out a rational plan for the
ideal political system. However, many aspects of his proposal appear to
modern readers to be too unrealistic and/or outdated to be considered very
seriously. The suggestion that philosophers ought to be trained to serve as
kings, for instance, is an idea that has rarely, if ever, been put into practice.
One of the reasons Plato's political philosophy seems so distant from our
own ways of thinking about politics is that modern political thought is
rooted to a large extent in the quite different ideas put forward by his star
student. Aristotle's book, Politics, also contains some examples whose
1 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
D1 staweb.hkbu.edu.hk
relevance is limited to the ancient Greek city-states, where the political

systems were early forerunners of modern democracies; yet the main issues
it raises are of timeless interest, transcending their original historical
context in their applicability. Hence, we shall use today's lecture to take a
close look at this classic text in political philosophy.
Aristotle regarded politics not merely as an optional field of philosophical
inquiry, but as an essential task for any philosopher, because "man is by
nature a political animal" (AP 1253a(37)). In Politics Aristotle attempted to
determine what constitutes the "best" city. (The Greek word for "city",
incidentally, is polis, from which we derive the word "politics".) This
required him not only to discuss what its particular characteristics would
be, but also to analyze the general nature of a city and the different political
systems ("politeiai") that can be used to govern a city. But politeiai include
not only specific governmental structures, but also "the way of life of a city"
in general (1295a(133)). Although his analysis is by no means the last word
on the subject, an examination of Aristotle's ideas can provide a good
sampling of the various ways of drawing the boundary that defines possible
political systems.
Aristotle began his study of politics by claiming that "every city is some
form of partnership ... for the sake of some good", and that the political
philosopher's task is that of "investigating what the city is composed of" (AP
1252a(35)). He then pointed out that families and business relations are
also examples of partnerships exhibiting something like politics on a lower
level. A partnership between several families gives rise to a village, and a
partnership between several villages gives rise to a city. The partnership
that makes up a city therefore requires certain agreements between
"similar persons, for the sake of a life that is the best possible" (1328a(209)).
Aristotle never suggested that such partners must be similar in every
respect, but that both unity and diversity must exist between the partners
in different respects: "a city tends to come into being at the point when the
partnership formed by a multitude is self-sufficient" (1261a-b(55-57)). The
purpose of a city, therefore, is
not [to be] a partnership in a location and for the sake of not committing
injustice against each other and of transacting business. These things must
2 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
necessarily be present if there is to be a city, but not even when all of them
are present is it yet a city, but [the city is] the partnership in living well both
of households and families for the sake of a complete and self-sufficient life.
(1280b(99))
Anyone who can participate actively in the political partnership that makes
up a city is qualified to be a "citizen". Thus Aristotle defined a citizen as
anyone who can hold a government office: "Whoever is entitled to
participate in an office involving deliberation or decision is ... a citizen in
this city; and the city is the multitude of such persons that is adequate with
a view to a self-sufficient life" (AP 1275a-b(87)). Sharing in the political
partnership of the city requires the citizen not only to be a capable
decision-maker, but also to be a person who is willing to abide by decisions
made by others. For Aristotle stressed (1277b(92)) that "the good citizen
should know and have the capacity both to be ruled and to rule, and this
very thing is the virtue of a citizen-knowledge of rule over free persons
from both [points of view]."
In this sense monarchies, where only one person rules, have no citizens; in
fact, they technically have no city and no politics either, inasmuch as there
is no partnership between equals for the purpose of ruling and being ruled.
This is why Aristotle sometimes contrasted monarchies with what we
would call "republican" (i.e., non-monarchical) political systems: only the
latter are politeiai in the strict sense of the word (though he sometimes
used this term loosely to refer to monarchies as well), so republican
systems occupied his primary attention in Politics.
One of the most interesting aspects of Aristotle's political philosophy is
that, in the course of his discussion, he developed a systematic framework
consisting of six possible types of political system. They are distinguished
by the different source of authority and power that characterizes each.
After asserting that "the authoritative element" in a political system must
"be either one or a few or the many", he explains the difference between
"correct" political systems and their "deviations" (AP 1279a(96)): "when the
one or the few or the many rule with a view to the common advantage, these
political systems are necessarily correct, while those with a view to the
private advantage of the one or the few or the multitude are deviations."
3 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
The names Aristotle assigned each of these six systems are as follows. The
correct form of monarchy is called a "kingship". (In ancient Greek monos
means "alone" or "single"; archos means "ruler". The suffix "-cracy" comes
from kratos, meaning "power".) The correct form of "rule by the few" is
"aristocracy", meaning the power is held by the best (aristos) people. And
"polity" is the correct form of majority rule, though Aristotle also used this
term to refer in a general way to all political systems. Since he sometimes
contrasted politeiai with monarchy, Aristotle in this context probably
intended politeiai to be interpreted in this narrow sense; as such, his claim
was that all non-monarchical systems (i.e., all republics) can be called
polities. In Nicomachean Ethics (NE 1160a), he avoided the equivocal use of
"polity" by referring to this third correct political system as "timocracy",
meaning power held by those who own property (timema). Moreover, he
explicitly stated that this term is to be preferred to the term "polity", even
though the latter is the more common of the two terms. However, this brief
account of timocracy is difficult to distinguish from oligarchy (see below);
so I shall adopt the usage given in Politics in spite of its possible ambiguity.
Aristotle also described deviations from each of the three basically positive
forms of political system:
Deviations from those mentioned are tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from
aristocracy, democracy from polity. Tyranny is monarchy with a view to the
advantage of the monarch, oligarchy [rule] with a view to the advantage of
the well off, democracy [rule] with a view to the advantage of those who are
poor; none of them is with a view to the common gain. (AP 1279b(96))
Let's now examine each of these six political systems in a bit more detail.
In his discussion of kingship, Aristotle was careful to point out that there
are several different kinds of kings. The main distinction is between those
whose authority transcends the law and those who must themselves obey
the law. A political system where the "so-called king" rules "according to
law" is not a true kingship; such a king is more like a "permanent general"
(AP 1287a(113)). A kingship in the true sense of the word is an "absolute
kingship", where "one person has authority over all matters ..., with an
arrangement that resembles household management" (1285b(110-111)). In a
kingship, "the best political system is not one based on written (rules) and
4 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
laws", because a good king will be able to judge fairly according to the
circumstances of each specific situation, being guided by the general
principles of the law, even though his judgment need not be determined by
them (1286a(111)). As Aristotle put it in AP 1284a(106-107): "If there is one
person so outstanding by his excess of virtue-or a number of persons ...-...
such persons can no longer be regarded as a part of the city.... [For] they
themselves are law." He then pointed out that "ostracism" is the inevitable
fate for such persons "in the deviant political systems" (1284b(108)), even
though in "the best political systems ... persons of this sort will be
permanent kings in their cities."
Although kingship is technically the best political system, Aristotle
preferred aristocracy for several reasons. There is always a danger that the
one man holding all the power will turn bad, so that the best system would
degenerate into the worst (i.e., tyranny). The only protection against such a
man being overcome by his own selfish desires is for him to accept the rule
of law; thus "it is laws-correctly enacted-that should be authoritative", not
persons (AP 1282a-b(103)). The nature of law is such that it protects people
against the ever-present danger of being corrupted by their own appetite,
for as Aristotle explained (1287a(114)): "One who asks law to rule ... is held
to be asking god and intellect alone to rule, while one who asks man adds
the beast. Desire is a thing of this sort; and spiritedness perverts rulers and
the best men. Hence law is intellect without appetite."
Another problem with kingship in Aristotle's mind is that there is likely to
be more than just one good man in most cities, so the good men who are not
allowed to rule may not be satisfied with the inequality between themselves
and the king. Such an unjust situation is almost inevitably resolved by
replacing the king with an aristocracy, where all the rulers are good men
(AP 1286b(112)). (They cannot be good women because, according to
Aristotle, women are not even be allowed to become citizens!) Hence,
Aristotle suggested that, ironically, the less power a king has (i.e., the less he
is like a true king), the longer he will be able to preserve his rule
(1313a(173)).
An "aristocracy ... is in some sense an oligarchy" (oligos means "few"), since
in both types of political system "the rulers are few" (AP 1306b(159)). The
5 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
difference is that, unlike a typical (i.e., deviant) oligarchy, where the rulers
are chosen merely "on the basis of wealth", the rulers in an aristocracy are
chosen "in accordance with virtue" (1273a (82)). (When property ownership
is the type of wealth used as one of the main qualifications for choosing who
is given the power and authority to rule in an oligarchy (see e.g., 1279b(96)),
the system could also be called a timocracy. One way of accounting for the
potential ambiguity between the terms "oligarchy" and "timocracy" would
be to note that a timocracy would be a polity if the amount of property
required to be a citizen is very low, whereas it would be an oligarchy if the
amount is high, since only a few people would then be wealthy enough to be
citizens.) Oligarchy is usually bad for a city, because there is no guarantee
that the rulers will be virtuous (e.g., by looking after the welfare of the poor)
just because they are rich. An aristocracy, by contrast, is by definition (in
Aristotle's sense of the word) a political system where the few men who are
given the power and authority to rule will, being virtuous, look after the
interests of those who are not members of the ruling class.
The distinction Aristotle devoted the most attention to in Politics is
between the two extreme forms of non-monarchical government, oligarchy
and democracy. This is probably because these two systems are the ones
found most frequently in real historical cities, both in ancient Greece and in
modern times. For example, he said "law may be oligarchic or democratic"
(AP 1281a(100)), in the sense that "in democratic political systems the
people have authority, while by contrast it is the few in oligarchies"
(1278b(94)). In AP 1279b-1280a(96-97), he explained:
oligarchy is when those with property have authority in the political
system; and democracy is the opposite, when those have authority who do
not possess a [significant] amount of property but are poor ... What makes
democracy and oligarchy differ is poverty and wealth: wherever some rule
on account of wealth, whether a minority or a majority, this is necessarily
an oligarchy, and wherever those who are poor, a democracy. But it turns
out ... that the former are few and the latter many ...
Whereas "the defining principle of aristocracy is virtue" and "that of
oligarchy is wealth", the defining principle of democracy is "the majority
[i.e., the poor] having authority" (1310a(167)).
6 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
Democracy is a political system where a partnership between the "common

people" (dmos) determines how power and authority are distributed in the
city. It is therefore characterized by a type of "freedom" that involves "being
ruled and ruling in turn" (AP 1317a-b (183)). Such an arrangement of
reciprocal ruling among equals "is law" (1287a(113)). As with most of the
other political systems, Aristotle discussed several varieties of democracy,
including the type where "the people become a monarch", in the sense that
"the many have authority [over the law, though] not as individuals but all
together" (1292a(125-6)). In the narrow sense of a political system (i.e., as
excluding monarchies), "a democracy of this sort is not a political system.
For where the laws do not rule there is no political system."
Aristotle warned that the best political system for a given city cannot be
determined in advance: any of the systems (except tyranny) may end up
being the most appropriate, once the specific situation is taken into
consideration. Thus, for example, he admitted that sometimes a kingship
will be the best system for a city, even though in general "to have law rule is
to be chosen in preference to having one of the citizens do so" (AP
1288a(115-116)). Polity, the political system Aristotle thought is most often
to be preferred, is midway between aristocracy and democracy. Yet even in
the case of polity, he granted that "there is nothing to prevent another
political system being more advantageous for certain [cities]" (1296b(136)).
Polity is a political system based on the "golden mean" (see e.g., NE 1106a1109b(65-75)), Aristotle's famous principle telling us always to avoid
extremes; in this case it tells us that "the middling sort of life is best" for
both the city and the individual (AP 1295a(133)). In other words, polity is a
political system where the "middle class", as we would now call it, forms a
majority of people who have the power and authority to rule in a way that
mixes elements of the other three republican systems. The mixture
Aristotle had in mind involves a combination of democracy and oligarchy
(the two extremes) in such a way that their extreme elements will cancel
each other out: a polity requires "a mixture of ... the well off and the poor"
(1293b-1294b(129-132)). But it might also mix elements of aristocracy and
oligarchy, as when a polity requires "a law distributing offices on the basis
of merit [as in aristocracy] to those who are well off [as in oligarchy]"
(1288a(116)). When we read Aristotle saying that the best sort of oligarchy
7 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
"is very close to so-called polity" (1320b(190)), we must assume this good
oligarchy is actually an aristocracy. For aristocracy and polity are the good
"means" between the bad "extremes" of oligarchy and democracy.
With this in mind, we can now map the relations between the four
republican (non-monarchical) political systems, by using either a simple
flow chart (as in Figure IX.1a), or a 2LAR cross (as in Figure IX.1b) based on
the following two underlying questions: (1) Are there only a few rulers? and
(2) Is the system good (i.e., "correct")?
(a) As a Flow Chart (b) Mapped onto the Cross

Figure IX.1: Four Forms of Republican Political System
These maps help us see why Aristotle sometimes virtually equated polity
with aristocracy (e.g., AP 1286b(112)): these systems, as the "means", are
good for most cities, while democracy and oligarchy, as the "extremes", are
bad.
The remaining political system in Aristotle's framework is "tyranny".
Technically this is the opposite of (i.e., deviation from) kingship. Yet
Aristotle also called it "the extreme form of democracy", and added that
some forms of oligarchy and democracy are "tyrannies", divided among
many persons (AP 1312b(172)). He explained the relation between tyranny
and the other two deviant political systems as follows:
8 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
Kingship accords with aristocracy, while tyranny is composed of the

ultimate sort of oligarchy and of democracy-hence it is composed of the two
bad political systems and involves the deviations and errors of both of
them....
.... Having wealth as its end comes from oligarchy ..., as does its distrust of
the multitude.... From democracy comes their war on the notables ... (1310b1311a(168-169))
He then explained why kingship is not worth the risk of tyranny:
Kingships no longer arise today; if monarchies do arise, they tend to be
tyrannies. This is because kingship is a voluntary sort of rule ..., but
[nowadays] there are many persons who are similar, with none of them so
outstanding as to match the extent and the claim to merit of the office.
(1313a(173))
If we now add the two forms of monarchy to the four forms of republican
political system, we can put all six systems together in the form of a circular
flow chart, enabling us to see the entire framework at a single glance.
Figure IX.2: Aristotle's Six Forms of Political System

In his discussion of political revolutions, Aristotle argued that, although
each system can change into virtually any other system, they tend to
9 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
"undergo revolution more frequently into their opposite than into a

political system of a neighboring sort" (AP 1316a-b(179-80)). In other
words, a revolution is more likely to be influenced by the internal logic of
the relation between different political systems than by the empirical factor
of what type of system is in effect in a neighboring city.
In AP 1286b(112) Aristotle described more fully how the progression of
political systems, as represented by the arrows in Figure IX.2, typically
works itself out in real historical situations: political systems normally
start out as kingships, pass over into aristocracies or polities, degenerate
into oligarchies, fall into the grips of a tyranny, and are liberated from
oppression by a democracy. Even though moving from an aristocracy to a
democracy does "harm to the political system" (1270b (76)), he regarded
democracy as the almost inevitable political system, inasmuch as it serves
as the best protection against tyranny. Yet Aristotle hoped this historical
fact could be overcome by reason, so that the least extreme of the truly good
systems, polity, can become a reality, even though it had rarely existed in
the past. This progression can also be mapped onto a 6CR triangle (with a
few extra arrows added) by placing the three "good" systems on an upwardpointing triangle and the three
10 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
"bad" systems on a downward-pointing

Figure IX.3: Aristotle's Framework as a 6CR
triangle, as in Figure IX.3 (cf. Figure V.8). The
lines pointing upward to polity are dashed in
order to represent the difficulty of
implementing a transition to this ideal
system.
Aristotle's helpful summary of his framework
for political systems in Book VIII, Chapter 10
of Nicomachean Ethics adds several additional points worth mentioning in
conclusion. Here kingship is treated as the
best option, for any truly good king will
always have the best inter-
ests of his subjects in mind. Since he has absolute power and authority over
all the people, no one will be able to prevent the king from putting his good
will into practice. Even though an aristocracy consists of the "best" men, it
is not as good as kingship, because it is more likely that a few bad men will
infiltrate the aristocracy and corrupt the intentions of the otherwise good
rulers. And when all property owners are allowed to influence the way laws
are formed and rights are distributed among the citizens, such corruption
becomes even more likely.
Aristotle compared the relationship between the citizen and the city in
these three good political systems to three types of family relationships. In
kingship the king is like a father and the citizen is like a son. In aristocracy
the ruling class is like a husband and the other citizens are like a wife. And
in timocracy (or polity) the relationship between property owners is like
that between siblings. But just as family relationships are not always
harmonious, each of these political systems can be perverted, thus giving
11 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
rise to tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy, respectively.

As we have seen, kingship is the most risky option, because "the worst is
that which is the opposite to the best." When choosing a political system, we
must therefore keep in mind that when we aim at a particular system, we
might end up with its opposite instead. This is why, as we have seen,
Aristotle elsewhere defended polity (i.e., timocracy) as the safest option:
even if it slips into democracy, the negative effect on the average citizen is
kept to a minimum, since democracy is "the least bad" of the three bad
political systems. In a "majority rules" system the will of the majority is
likely to be adversely influenced by the selfish motives of the many bad
people who live in any society, though in some cases this will be balanced by
the good motives of the virtuous people. In the next lecture I shall suggest a
rather surprising way of breaking through the boundary of politics as
defined by Aristotle's system. We shall then conclude Part Three by
considering what type of political system is wisest for modern western
societies as we enter the third millennium.
27. Theocracy: The Ultimate Breakthrough
We hear so much these days about how wonderful democracy is that it
probably came as quite a shock for you to learn in the previous lecture that a
philosopher as great as Aristotle regarded it as a bad system! Why do people
believe democracy is so good? Most of you are probably thinking: "because
it gives us maximum freedom." But this myth is highly questionable. What
democracy gives its citizens is power and authority to elect officials and
enact laws. If Aristotle is right, the net result is likely to be bad, because the
good men will probably be in the minority. And in that case, these good men
will be unable to exercise enough control to implement truly wise policies
for the city. The stories of Socrates and Jesus provide two good examples of
how the majority tends to make the wrong decision, for they were both
sentenced to death as a direct result of something like a democratic vote.
Despite the many differences between these two events (e.g., Socrates
defended himself at length, whereas Jesus remained silent before his
accusers), there is a basic similarity. In both cases the majority of the
people allowed to voice their opinions felt it would be better for the city to
have these men executed.
12 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
With this in mind, let's examine more closely how Aristotle's three pairs of
political systems differ in the level of freedom they offer to their citizens. It
is often said that there is no such thing as unlimited freedom: indeed,
freedom is normally defined by reference to some limitations, such as the
self-imposed limitations of loyalty to an authority, or obedience to laws. So
the question here is, how does each type of political system set up a
boundary defining the citizen's freedom? A king requires a high level of
loyalty from his subjects, to the extent that they cannot properly be called
"citizens" at all; but in return a good king gives his subjects a high level of
freedom. Their daily lives need not be encumbered by excessive laws as long
as they remain loyal to the king. The ruling class in an aristocracy requires a
more moderate level of respect and loyalty, but offers in return only a
moderate level of freedom. More laws are needed to keep the lower classes
under control, and these laws restrict the freedom of all citizens. Finally, in
a polity (or timocracy), and even more so in a democracy, the level of
freedom for the citizens is actually at a comparatively low level-despite the
common belief to the contrary. Why? Because in these systems there is little
or no need for the citizen to be loyal or respectful to fellow citizens; so
instead, a complex network of laws must be instituted in hopes of
preventing the stronger citizens from mistreating the weaker ones.
In a polity or a democracy the laws take away freedoms and replace them
with rights. Aristotle's framework of political systems clearly reveals that
such a sacrifice of freedom is the price that must be paid by those who wish
to minimize the risk of tyranny. For a system boasting a higher level of
freedom can quickly change into its opposite, offering little or no freedom
to the citizens, but promoting injustice and oppression of a type that is
unlikely to occur in a democracy. (This inverse relationship between
freedom and risk is a key component of the table given in Figure IX.6,
summarizing the Aristotle's six basic types of political system, plus the two
new extremes we will examine today.) As we shall see in Lecture 27,
Aristotle's terminology is now somewhat outdated. Nevertheless, by
providing a clear framework for understanding how political systems
operate (whatever we call them!), he has demonstrated how loyalty to those
in power forms the boundary that enables political systems to make freedom
possible for their citizens.
13 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
This paradox, that higher degrees of freedom are possible only by sacrificing
more and more of our rights to a higher power, is closely related to another
problem-one that is actually a fairly common theme among political
philosophers. Indeed, many introductory philosophy courses would devote
most or all of the lecture(s) on political philosophy to a discussion of this
other problem, produced by the conflict between freedom and equality. Both
freedom and equality are typically regarded as ideals that ought to
characterize a good (and today that usually means a "democratic") political
system. Yet if everyone were totally free to do as they pleased, then there
would be a great deal of inequality: the strong would tend to overpower the
weak; the rich would tend to deprive the poor; the powerful would tend to
disregard the powerless; etc. Such an extreme state of having no ruler (and
no rules) is called "anarchy". By contrast, a state of total equality between
everyone could come about only by taking away the freedom of the people
involved. B.F. Skinner's famous novel, Walden Two, gives a good example of
this option. The ideal society he imagined is one where psychological
conditioning is used to determine the relationships between everyone, so
that the people live in a state of harmonious equality, even though they have
no freedom.
There are two fundamentally different ways of responding to this problem
of the conflict between freedom and equality. The first is to attempt a
compromise. This is the option taken by democratic political systems (i.e.,
by "republics", to use Aristotle's term [see Figure IX.1]) . There are, of
course, many different ways of conceiving how that compromise can best
be made. For example, socialists do so by tightening governmental control
of the economy, thus reducing the level of inequality by reducing the level of
freedom, whereas libertarians do so by loosening such governmental
controls and trusting in a natural economic force that will regulate the
changing levels of both freedom and equality.
The second response to this problem is to refuse to compromise, on the
grounds that what is needed is a breakthrough. This is the option taken by
utopian political systems. For example, in its original, Marxist form,
communism is a political philosophy that claims it is possible to have a
society where individuals enjoy the highest degree of both freedom and
equality. Karl Marx (1818-1883) believed work is the most important factor
14 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
giving meaning to a person's life, for we are what we do. Marx saw that in
the capitalist societies of his day most workers were alienated from the
product of their labor by the greedy entrepreneur, who used the workers as
objects, as a means of making money. If only the people would stand up and
revolt against this and other evils perpetrated by capitalism, he proclaimed,
a new society would be ushered in. Marx's vision of this society of perfect
communion between people was one where everyone would give work
"according to their ability" and take the products of labor "according to
their need". Unfortunately, the twentieth century gave us ample proof that
the character and motivations of the people who revolt against injustice
simply are not as pure as Marx dreamed they would be. Communism as a
political system has failed for precisely the same reason that Marx believed
capitalist-style democracy had failed: in both cases the more people try to
take freedom and justice into their own hands, the more they ironically
become slaves of the injustice they themselves have created!
There are numerous other models for utopian societies; but today I shall
focus special attention on one alternative to communism that is rarely
acknowledged as a viable political system, even by those who are supposed
to believe in it. This is the vision of a utopia quite different from Marx's
communist state or Nietzsche's Superman; for it is a vision of the purpose of
the earth as determined and controlled not by people breaking through the
alienating limits of a life-denying outlook, but by God breaking through the
hardened shell of human hearts. Most religious people believe not only that
God exists and that we can somehow communicate with God, but also that
God has a plan for this world-a plan whose ultimate fulfillment cannot be
thwarted by any counter-efforts on the part of humanity. Some religious
people believe this plan is confined to a "spiritual" realm, and that in the
"material" realm of (for example) economics and politics, human systems
can function quite apart from this divine plan. However, the deepest (and
most philosophically-minded) religious thinkers have always affirmed that
such an artificial distinction is illegitimate. If there is a God with a plan,
then this plan relates just as closely to the political activities of entire
societies as it does to the personal activities of any individual within a given
society.
The best name for the idea that God's rule applies not only to the operation
15 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
of divine power in human hearts, but also to its operation in the courtroom
and the market-place, is "theocracy" (with theos meaning "God" and kratos
meaning "power"). Unfortunately, this term has often been used in the past
to refer to a deceptively similar idea that is actually quite opposed to
theocracy in its pure form. Traditionally a political system has been called a
"theocracy" if a religious group (such as a church) regards itself as God's
mouthpiece on earth, so that whatever policies the leaders formulate must
be accepted by the people as direct commands from God. In order to
distinguish this traditional usage from what I believe to be the proper
meaning of "theocracy", I have coined the term "ecclesiocracy" to refer to
any political system where the power is wielded by the leader(s) of an
"assembly" (ekklesia) of religious people. Typical examples of ecclesiocracy
would be the nation of Israel during the period following Ezra and
Nehemiah (i.e., after returning from Babylonian exile), most of southern
Europe during the time of the Holy Roman Empire, and the city of Geneva
during the latter part of John Calvin's life.
The reason it is so important to distinguish between ecclesiocracy and
genuine theocracy is that, although the latter is really a vision of the
"kingdom of God on earth" that religious people ought to be regarded as the
best of all possible political systems, the former is a perversion of this
ultimate ideal that fools many sincere believers. Moreover, as we learned
from Aristotle, the perversion of an ultimately good system would be an
ultimately bad system. Ecclesiocracy perverts theocracy by replacing God's
autonomous rule in the heart of each individual with a religious version of
one of the humanly-rooted political systems. This means one or more
human beings end up wielding power over the ordinary members of the
religious assembly, using the name of God as an authenticating guarantee.
Yet this is the tragedy of human religion: that in trying to lead other people
to God many religious believers end up blocking other people from receiving
the very spiritual power they believe they are promoting. Indeed, this
happens whenever one person imposes a set of standards upon another
person, claiming that God only works in this particular way, so that
everyone who does not conform to this particular conception of "God's
Way" will be rejected by God.
Among the many problems with this all-too-common attitude to religious
16 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
beliefs is that it assumes we human beings can actually grasp God;

theocracy, by contrast, assumes only that to follow God's plan a person
must be willing to be grasped by God. And this usually means being ignorant
of God's Way until the moment it is actually revealed in your own heart. I
believe this "pure" form of theocracy is presented throughout the Bible (and
in the Scriptures of many other world religions, though not in such a pure
form) as an actual political system. The difference between theocracy and
all other political systems (including ecclesiocracy) is precisely in the fact
that theocracy alone renounces all rights of human beings to govern
themselves, acknowledging God as the only true governor. In this sense
theocracy can be called a "non-political political system", provided we
understand that his phrase must be interpreted using synthetic logic. The
political philosophy called anarchy (i.e., "no ruler") actually shares with
theocracy the notion that people only perpetuate injustice when they try to
use laws to govern themselves; however, since it rejects all rule, it cannot
properly be called a political system as such. Viewed from the perspective of
someone who does not believe in God, theocracy would be hard to
distinguish from anarchy. The difference, of course, is that theocrats
believe in a common guiding principle that unites everyone together
inwardly, whereas anarchists are left with nothing but infinite diversity and
an irresolvable struggle between opposing wills.
In the Bible, as in other religious literature, the kingdom of God is presented
as something that comes suddenly, invading the realm of human justice
with a divine justice that can neither be predicted nor comprehended in
human categories. This divine invasion is primarily directed toward the
human heart; yet, as the New Testament makes clear in many ways, a
person's response to this change should not be merely interior, but should
revolutionize every aspect of the person's life. Jesus' suffering in particular
should be seen as a thoroughly political kind of suffering, directly related to
his radical rejection of any human means of achieving
17 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
justice on earth. The message of the cross and

Figure IX.4:
resurrection is a theocratic message: only when we die
God's Transvaluato human ways of governing ourselves will we allow
tion of Values
God to permeate us with a new life characterized by
divine justice. The contrast between this notion and
that of Nietzsche's Superman suggests that we can call
this way of resolving the problems of human injustice
"God's transvaluation of values". The way God's justice
breaks through all forms of human justice (including
those upheld by supporters of ecclesiocracy), imparting
a new meaning to words like "equality" and "rights", is
depicted in Figure IX.4.
Many of the implications of theocracy
as a political system are too complex to be discussed here. However, I will

mention one of the most significant implications: it rejects the idea, so
often taken for granted in modern western culture, that we have rights,
such as the rights to "life, liberty, and happiness". In place of this
assumption it claims that human rights should never be regarded as
anything other than gifts from God. Only if we recognize that we have no
rights of our own, and that we therefore owe absolute loyalty to God, will we
be given absolute freedom. In the Bible this freedom is not just spiritual, but
also thoroughly political. Theocracy is therefore the direct opposite of
democracy; for the latter emphasizes human rights in return for strict
limitations on our freedom. Yet theocracy does not require the destruction
of other systems. On the contrary, it can coexist with any of Aristotle's six
systems (even democracy). For the freedom it offers starts in the human
heart, and loosens our attachment to any and all of the limited, man-made
political system under whose control we live.
18 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
The fact that theocracy is described most often in the Bible in terms of a
kingdom suggests it is most properly viewed as a type of monarchical
political system, rather than a republican one. Indeed, if we consider
theocracy and its perversion, ecclesiocracy, together with Aristotle's two
forms of monarchical political system, kingship and tyranny, we can depict
their relationship as a perfect 2LAR, arising out of the two questions: (1) Is
the system a religious one? and (2) Is the system good (or "correct")? Just as
theocracy is a religious form of kingship (regarding God as the king),
ecclesiocracy is a religious form of tyranny. The same two maps used in
Figure IX.1 to describe the relations between the four republican political
systems can therefore be used to map the relations between the four
monarchical political systems:
(a) As a Flow Chart(b) Mapped onto the Cross

Figure IX.5: Four Forms of Monarchical Political System
Figure IX.5a shows how ecclesiocracy is the extreme form of theocracy, just
as oligarchy is the extreme form of aristocracy. Moreover, just as kingship
degenerates into tyranny, theocracy degenerates into ecclesiocracy when
the role appropriate only for a divine being is usurped by human beings. In
this sense, ecclesiocracy is the root form of all tyranny, because its
oppression is spiritual as well as physical.
By putting the 2LAR cross here in Figure IX.5b together with its republican
19 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
correlate in Figure IX.1b, we can now construct a perfect 3LAR. The three
questions that give rise to the complete set of eight possible political
systems are: (1) Is the system monarchical? (2) Is the system either
religious or ruled by a few people? (3) Is the system good (or "correct")?
These eight systems could be mapped onto a double cross (i.e., a pair of
concentric crosses, with one rotated at a 45 angle from the other). But
instead of drawing such a complex figure here, I have provided a more
detailed summary of the relationships between the eight systems in the
table given in Figure IX.6. This table lists the eight types of political system
from the best to the worst, together with the 3LAR component
corresponding to each. The second column provides a simple description of
how the name for each system is derived from some key Greek word
referring to its source of political power. The third and fourth columns
compare the levels of risk, freedom, and rights provided by each system.
And the fifth column summarizes and expands
20 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
Figure IX.6: Eight Basic Types of Political System

Aristotle's analogy between the citizen-state relationship and the
relationship between various members of a family.
The truth or falsity of theocracy is not something that could ever be
demonstrated by any philosophical or scientific proof. Rather, it must be
accepted as a "myth", in the special sense introduced in Lecture 3, as a truth
that is so true that it cannot even be questioned by those who live their lives
by its guiding light. This does not mean there is no reason for believing in
theocracy. On the contrary, upon stepping into the myth, a person will
discover God breaking into their life in real, concrete experiences, whose
validity can hardly be doubted. But for this reason-that is, because
theocracy can be validated not by science and the love of wisdom, but only
by experience and the wonder of silence-I shall refrain from discussing this
religious point of view any further at this point; instead we shall return to
the topic of religious experience in Week XI.
27. Wisdom on the Boundary: Ideas vs. Ideology

If we now take a step back and look at the variety of solutions we have
considered to the problem of finding the best political system, we might
easily become discouraged. Indeed, the same could be said for most of the
other topics we have discussed, especially here in Part Three. Without a
doubt, the theme I have come across most frequently in reading students'
insight papers has been the idea that philosophical questions have "no
definite answers"; and this is sometimes used as evidence for the view that
the realities such questions refer to are either nonexistent or irrelevant to
real life. However, I hope I have demonstrated by now that both of these
views are incorrect. Far from finding no definite answers to the questions
we have been considering, we have usually found many definite answers!
For good philosophers seek definite answers, just as much as natural
scientists do; the problem, of course, is that philosophers are unable to
attain the level of agreement reached by natural scientists, because
philosophical questions are concerned with ideas, rather than empirical
objects. In other words, the problem raised by the experience of coming face
21 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
to face with a reality we are necessarily ignorant of is usually not the

problem of having nothing to say about it; on the contrary, the problem is
that we have many, apparently conflicting things to say about it. The task of
the philosopher, therefore, is to seek to fit each part of the puzzle together
in such a way that the true aspects of each answer can be recognized for
what they are. Philosophers who regard the love of wisdom as an essential
part of their task will never be satisfied with a single, supposedly
all-encompassing answer; yet this is not because they doubt such an answer
exists, but because they have seen a glimpse of its awesome reality!
The alternative to loving wisdom "on the boundary" between our knowledge
and our recognized ignorance is to single out a single idea or set of ideas and
raise it to the level of absolute truth. When this happens, those who claim to
possess this "truth" typically regard it as their duty to share this gospel (the
"good news" that absolute truth can be knowable!) with others who remain
in the dark. Unfortunately, this goal is all too often taken to the extreme of
forcing others to "agree" with the single definite answer that is being taken
as absolutely true. As a result, a set of philosophical ideas that may have a
wealth of insight to offer us is transformed into a political ideology, the very
antithesis of good philosophy. An ideology, as I am using the term, is any set
of ideas-often very insightful ones when viewed objectively, outside their
political (mis)application-that is presented in such a way that the
"believers" regard themselves as having a monopoly on the truth. That is,
when a person denies at the outset the very possibility of other legitimate
perspectives, an ideology is sure to be at work. An ideology is a
well-developed system of thought that is not only treated as a myth by those
who "live in" it, but is forced on those who do not wish to accept the myth as
it stands.
The twentieth century could well be called "the century of ideology".
Ideology in politics produced the east-west divide, reaching its climax
during the Cold War years, when the terms "Marxist" and "Capitalist"
seemed almost to define "evil" to those standing on the other side. In the
realm of morals, the various sorts of religious fundamentalism that cropped
up around the world illustrate the dangers of ideology better than any other
single example. Whenever people would rather kill those who disagree with
their ideas than dialogue with them, an ideology is sure to be operating. But
22 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
ideology operates just as powerfully, though less obviously, in the sciencesespecially the social sciences, where the differences between (for example)
behaviorists and depth psychologists are often so vast that no dialogue
whatsoever is possible. Rather than seeking out genuine insights wherever
they may be found, those under the control of an ideology will be unwilling
even to consider that other approaches to their field might be legitimate.
And even the natural sciences are not totally immune to the power of
ideologies, though scientists tend to excuse themselves by usingterms such
as "paradigms" to account for their irreconcilable differences. The point is
that, if we learn any lesson from the twentieth century, it should be ideology
backfires. To quote from the last book of the Bible: "those who live by the
sword die by the sword" (Revelation 13:10).
With this in mind, I would like to warn against turning theocracy into an
ideology, an "ism" that might be treated as a final solution to all humanity's
problems. If someone who has tasted theocratic freedom refuses to return
to the boundary of political reality by recognizing that not everyone accepts
the theocratic vision, then such a person will risk turning a system of
potentially insightful ideas into a frightening ideology: theocracy will
degenerate into ecclesiocracy. In this final lecture of Part Three I want us to
explore the challenges of living wisely with in the real world. The key to
doing so, I believe, is to be confident enough to uphold our ideas as ideals to
live by, yet humble enough to resist the temptation to turn them into an
ideology.
In discussing various branches of applied philosophy here in Part Three, we
first considered the question of causality that arises in the philosophy of
science. Hume's view of "habit" is a definite answer: it defines his idea of
how we come to feel that objects and events are governed by a power of
necessary connection. Kant's argument that the "law of causality" is
necessary for the very possibility of experience is a definite answer to the
same question. These contrasting ideas were not put forward as mere
opinions, as if Hume were saying he preferred to live in England rather than
Scotland, and Kant were responding that he would prefer Scotland, because
his grandfather had lived there; these men were expressing views they
believed everyone who wishes to think philosophically ought to affirm as
true. In this case these two definite answers to the same question appear to
23 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
contradict each other, though there may be some way of viewing both as
correct. For example, we could regard Hume's answer as correctly
describing what we can discover by limiting ourselves to the empirical
perspective, while Kant's describes what we discover by also adopting the
transcendental perspective.
Next we considered moral philosophy and the question of right action. Once
again, we saw how Kant, Mill, and Nietzsche each proposed a definite
answer to this question; yet their answers came out looking very different.
Likewise this week, when considering political philosophy and the nature
of right government, we saw that Aristotle had six definite answers; yet
subsequent philosophers have proposed still other alternatives that
Aristotle never imagined. When such inevitable conflicts of ideas arise
between different philosophers, we should not infer that such questions
must, in fact, have no answer at all. On the contrary, we should take it as a
challenge, to determine which of the definite answers is the most adequate
and/or to show how two or more of these answer can be true
simultaneously, each in its own unique way. In doing the latter we will not
only be establishing a set of justifiable perspectives within which
knowledge (i.e., science) can arise; we will also be practicing the art of
loving wisdom, and thereby guarding against the danger of such ideas being
misused as ideologies.
In light of this distinction between wisely respecting the perspectival basis
of all insightful ideas and foolishly raising one set of ideas to the absolute
status of an ideology, let us devote the remainder of this lecture to an
examination of what political philosophy best suits the real world as it now
exists, at the dawn of the third millennium A.D. Without a doubt, the
political ideology that "won" the twentieth century's battle of ideologies is
democracy. Despite the bad press democracy has had from many
philosophers, from Aristotle down to Nietzsche, nearly everyone in modern
western society now regards it as the "correct" political system-perhaps the
least questioned of all our cultural myths.
Kant is often regarded as one of the ideological founders of modern liberal
democracy. Half of his book, Metaphysics of Morals (1797), and several
influential essays written toward the end of his life, defend a system of
24 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
universal human rights as enforced by a "league of nations"-an idea that has

significantly influenced the subsequent development of western political
systems, including what we now call the "United Nations". However, what
Kant meant by "rights" is actually quite different from what we nowadays
mean when we use this word. For him our "rights" must arise out of the
concept of right action:
Every action is right which in itself, or in the maxim on which it proceeds, is
such that it can coexist along with the freedom of the will of each and all in
action, according to a universal law. (SR 45)
That is, an external act (as governed by the domain of politics) can be right
only if it can coexist with the free (right) acts of all other individuals. This
principle is not only the basis for a Kantian theory of rights, but also lies at
the foundation of theocracy! Unfortunately, Kant's understanding of human
rights is often taken out of its proper context and used to make rights-based
democracy into a political ideology.
If we were to use Kant and other influential modern philosophers as the
basis for constructing an updated version of Aristotle's framework of
political systems, it would look quite different. The main distinction would
be between "democratic" and "totalitarian" systems (instead of
"republican" and "monarchical"); socialists and libertarians would represent the "extreme" forms of democratic systems, while liberals and conservatives would represent the "mean" forms (cf. Figures IX.1 and IX.5). In
this system "democracy" takes on a far more sophisticated meaning than it
had for Aristotle. Yet our use of "democratic" and Aristotle's use of
"republican" both refer to types of federal system, whereby the people agree
(at least implicitly) to abide by a certain political structure in the hope of
maximizing mutual freedoms without depriving essential rights. Likewise
and by contrast, our use of "totalitarian" and Aristotle's use of
"monarchical" are both akin to the feudal system, whereby local and/or
national monopolies of land ownership operate without allowing
widespread participation in political decision-making.
The philosopher generally recognized as having put forward the most
sophisticated defence of modern liberal democracy is John Rawls (1921-).
His classic book, A Theory of Justice (1971), proposes two essentially
25 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
Kantian principles as a theoretical foundation:

First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b)
attached to positions and offices open to all. (TJ 60)
These principles guarantee equal rights and equal opportunity, respectively, to all citizens. Governments should use the first principle as a guide
for assigning a basic set of rights, such as "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness" (as in the U.S. Bill of Rights), to all persons, regardless of their
race, religion, sex, etc. Rawls' own examples of such rights include the right
to vote, to own property, to speak freely, etc. The second principle likewise
requires governments to insure that positions such as political offices and
high paying jobs (or any paid employment, for that matter) are open to all
persons without discrimination that is unrelated to their suitability for the
position. The second principle is an attempt to preserve a sense of justice in
spite of economic and social inequalities by defining "injustice" as
inequalities that are not to everyone's mutual benefit.
A considerable portion of Rawls' book is devoted to clarifying and
qualifying these two basic principles of justice. Among the numerous points
made in this regard are that basic political rights cannot be traded for social
or economic advantages, that one person's (or group's) misfortunes cannot
be excused by appealing to another person's (or group's fortunes (as a
utilitarian politics might allow), that the principles apply to the way
institutions are to be structured but not necessarily to the way we treat any
specific person(s) known to us in real-life situations, and that policymakers must consider the rights and opportunities of past and future
generations just as much as those of the present generation.In a word,
Rawls defined justice as "fairness", arguing that governments are
responsible to look after the less fortunate members of society. His position
sparked such a huge debate that we cannot even begin to consider the pros
and cons in this introductory course, except to say that the chief opponents
of such a position are libertarians (e.g., Robert Nozick), who argue that
governmental intervention deprives people of their basic liberties, and
26 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
communitarians (e.g., Alasdair MacIntyre), who argue that different

principles of justice arise out of different communities and therefore
cannot be generalized so neatly.
From a Kantian perspective, the major problem with such attempts to
defend a socialist version of liberal democracy is the tendency to assume
that "society" (i.e., government) bestows rights and opportunities onto
people. Kant defended a more individualistic view, whereby each person (in
the form of a "noumenal self") bestows or fails to bestow these rights (along
with corresponding duties) on himself or herself-a difference Rawls
himself acknowledges (TJ 257). This is a problem because it tends to shift
responsibility away from persons and toward institutions, thereby tending
to make individuals feel like insignificant "cogs" in the social "machine".
Indeed, for many political theorists nowadays, the responsibility for
bestowing and protecting rights is regarded as being the role of an
international political body, the United Nations. That this way of defending
democracy is essentially ideological is evident from the fact that the
ultimate goal of most such proponents is one-world government. Kant
himself regarded this as a desirable stage in the development of human
political history; but only if those in positions of power remain aware that
the power resides not in the institutions but in the people themselves,
without whom there would be no rights to bestow.
Virtually all proponents of democracy as a prelude to one-world
government unfortunately tend to ignore an aspect of Kant's theory that
was crucial to his overall vision: that democracy is merely a stage in the
long-term development of the human race's political evolution. The ideal
goal we ought to see all political structures as pointing toward, in Kant's
view, is something very similar to what I have called "theocracy". Kant
looked forward to a day when all outward forms of control people impose on
each other (i.e., all "coercion", whether political, religious, or ideological in
any other way) will give way to a world wherein every person lives freely
and responsibly according to their own awareness of the moral law within
them. This can happen, of course, only when the human race learns once
and for all that the most important virtues in life -the philosophical virtues
of truth, goodness, and beauty-cannot be imposed on others by fiat; rather,
we should encourage each person to use their own reason to decide for
27 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
themselves what is true, good, and beautiful. This, he thought, is an

essentially religious vision, yet it is religion without any outward,
ideological form that will cause it to clash with other ideologies. This
conception of a moral religion, a way of experiencing the meaning of life
without forcing an ideology onto others who may not be open to it, can come
about only when religion and politics merge. Kant referred to this merger as
the "kingdom of ends" in his moral theory and as "the kingdom of God on
earth" in his theory of religion. The latter is such a significant (and often
grossly misunderstood) part of Kant's philosophy that I shall devote two
lectures to the subject in Week XI.
The way forward from democracy, if we take into consideration this wider
context of Kant's political vision, is to begin doing away with the common
assumption that morality can be legislated. The more democracies can
move toward anarchy (i.e., fewer laws, and eventually no laws), the better
off we will be. For one thing, this will give people the opportunity to be
genuinely moral, rather than just "politically correct". In the current
situation in most western countries, the majority of people don't care much
about being moral because they have come to believe that the government
legislates morality; this leads to the mythical belief that, as long as I am a
"law abiding citizen", I am morally good. But as Kant's arguments
demonstrate, legal (external) goodness does not necessarily coincide with
moral (internal) goodness. Ironically, legal systems that try to enforce
so-called "moral" laws end up taking awaythe potential praiseworthiness of
the citizens' good actions.
Has the human race developed to the stage where all outward political
forms can simply vanish in the near future? Obviously not! That this ought
to be our ultimate goal is the grain of truth in Marxist ideology. But to
attempt to implement such policies in the short term would not be a step
forward, but a grave setback to humanity's political development-as the
twentieth century's experiment with Marxism so poignantly illustrated.
Instead of trying to force the goal ("peace on earth") through ideological
coercion, our aim should be to seek to implement political structures that
have an in-built self-negating form-i.e., structures that discourage by their
very nature anyone who would seek to raise them to the status of ideology.
The more this happens, the more human beings will learn to trust their own
28 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
inner principles above the feeble attempts of politics to determine right and
wrong by external means. Perhaps the single most important lesson we can
learn from our study of wisdom here in Part Three is that, as we live in
waiting for the day when human beings can live in peace without outward
political structures, we must welcome differences of opinion rather than
resisting them. The more we can incorporate the idea that "opposition is
true friendship" into our understanding of political reality, the closer we
will come to bringing the entire human race to a deep awareness of wisdom
on the boundary.
QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER THOUGHT/DIALOGUE

1.A. What is power?
B. Where does law come from?
2.A. Is anarchy ("no ruler") a political system?
B. Is absolute freedom possible?
3.A. How can God have a "kingdom" on earth?
B. Would philosophers make good kings?
4.A. Do human beings have any inborn rights?
B. Is anything in the world really fair?
RECOMMENDED READINGS
1. Aristotle, The Politics, Book 4, Ch. 2 (AP 1289a-b).
2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII, Ch. 10 (NE 1160a-1161a).
3. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, tr. G. Bull (Harmondsworth, Middlesex:
Penguin Books, 1961).
29 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35
4. Antoine de Saint-Exupry, The Little Prince, tr. Katherine Woods (New

York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1943).
5. Stephen Palmquist, Biblical Theocracy: A vision of the biblical foundations for a Christian political philosophy (Hong Kong: Philopsychy Press,
1993).
6. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, tr.
Samuel Moore (Moscow: Progress Press, 1952[1888]).
7. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, ?1, "Two Principles of Justice" (TJ
60-65).
8. Stephen Palmquist, "'The Kingdom of God is at Hand!' (Did Kant really
say that?)", History of Philosophy Quarterly 11 (1994), pp.421-437.
border=0 height=62 width=88>
Original URL:
http://staffweb.hkbu.edu.hk/ppp/tp4/top09.html
30 de 30
15/12/2015 20:35

PALMQUIST - Tree.25. Power and The Boundary of Politics

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

PALMQUIST - Tree.25. Power and The Boundary of Politics

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

D1 staweb.hkbu.edu.

25. Power and the Boundary of Politics

relevance is limited to the ancient Greek city-states, where the political

Democracy is a political system where a partnership between the "common

(a) As a Flow Chart (b) Mapped onto the Cross

Kingship accords with aristocracy, while tyranny is composed of the

Figure IX.2: Aristotle's Six Forms of Political System

"undergo revolution more frequently into their opposite than into a

"bad" systems on a downward-pointing

rise to tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy, respectively.

beliefs is that it assumes we human beings can actually grasp God;

justice on earth. The message of the cross and

as a political system are too complex to be discussed here. However, I will

(a) As a Flow Chart(b) Mapped onto the Cross

Figure IX.6: Eight Basic Types of Political System

27. Wisdom on the Boundary: Ideas vs. Ideology

to face with a reality we are necessarily ignorant of is usually not the

universal human rights as enforced by a "league of nations"-an idea that has

Kantian principles as a theoretical foundation:

communitarians (e.g., Alasdair MacIntyre), who argue that different

themselves what is true, good, and beautiful. This, he thought, is an

QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER THOUGHT/DIALOGUE

4. Antoine de Saint-Exupry, The Little Prince, tr. Katherine Woods (New

You might also like