Professional Documents
Culture Documents
192123
That on or about May 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being then an anesthesiologist at the Ospital ng Maynila, Malate, this
City, and as such was tasked to administer the anesthesia on three-year old
baby boy GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO, represented by his mother, MA. LUZ
GERCAYO, the former having been born with an imperforate anus [no anal
opening] and was to undergo an operation for anal opening [pull through
operation], did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and
neglect to use the care and diligence as the best of his judgment would dictate
under said circumstance, by failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels
of anesthesia administered to said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO and using
100% halothane and other anesthetic medications, causing as a consequence
of his said carelessness and negligence, said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO
suffered a cardiac arrest and consequently a defect called hypoxic
encephalopathy meaning insufficient oxygen supply in the brain, thereby
rendering said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO incapable of moving his body,
seeing, speaking or hearing, to his damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.14
The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, but was
transferred to the RTC pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369 (The
Family Courts Act of 1997),15 where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01190889.
Judgment of the RTC
On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical
injuries,16 decreeing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused DR.
FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor as minimum to ONE
(1) YEAR, ONE (1) MONTH and TEN (10) DAYS of prision correccional as
maximum and to indemnify, jointly and severally with the Ospital ng Maynila,
Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella, private complainant Luz Gercayo, the
amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is
hereby CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.17
Upon motion of Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella to reconsider their solidary
liability,18 the RTC excluded them from solidary liability as to the damages,
modifying its decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Dr. Fernando
Solidum, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month and
ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum and to indemnify jointly and
severally with Ospital ng Maynila, private complainant Luz Gercayo the
amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary
damages and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is
hereby cancelled.19
In short, the lower court has been left with no reasonable hypothesis except to
attribute the accident to a failure in the proper administration of anesthesia, the
gravamen of the charge in this case. The High Court elucidates in Ramos vs.
Court of Appeals 321 SCRA 584
In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find
a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid
of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can
determine the proper standard of care.
Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would
not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference
of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not
only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is
appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the
particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under
the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert
medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur
is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions,
by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
Decision of the CA
On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr.
Solidum,20 pertinently stating and ruling:
The case appears to be a textbook example of res ipsa loquitur.
xxxx
x x x [P]rior to the operation, the child was evaluated and found fit to undergo a
major operation. As noted by the OSG, the accused himself testified that preoperation tests were conducted to ensure that the child could withstand the
surgery. Except for his imperforate anus, the child was healthy. The tests and
other procedures failed to reveal that he was suffering from any known ailment
or disability that could turn into a significant risk. There was not a hint that the
nature of the operation itself was a causative factor in the events that finally led
to hypoxia.
The lower court has found that such a nexus exists between the act
complained of and the injury sustained, and in line with the hornbook rules on
evidence, we will afford the factual findings of a trial court the respect they
deserve in the absence of a showing of arbitrariness or disregard of material
facts that might affect the disposition of the case. People v. Paraiso 349 SCRA
335.
The res ipsa loquitur test has been known to be applied in criminal cases.
Although it creates a presumption of negligence, it need not offend due
process, as long as the accused is afforded the opportunity to go forward with
his own evidence and prove that he has no criminal intent. It is in this light not
inconsistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the modified decision of the lower court is
affirmed.
SO ORDERED.21
Dr. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion on
May 7, 2010.22
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
Dr. Solidum avers that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IN UPHOLDING THE
PETITIONERS CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME CHARGED BASED
ON THE TRIAL COURTS OPINION, AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF
THE FACTS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL. ALSO, THERE IS
A CLEAR MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS WHICH IF CORRECTED,
WILL RESULT TO THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PETITIONER.
FURTHER, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
SAID DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT, AS THIS BREACHES
THE CRIMINAL LAW PRINCIPLE THAT THE PROSECUTION MUST
PROVE THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE INFORMATION BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF ITS
PRESUMPTIVE CONCLUSION.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE
PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR (sic) WHEN THE DEFENSE
WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT THERE IS NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE
PART OF THE PETITIONER, AND NO OVERDOSING IN THE
APPLICATION OF THE ANESTHETIC AGENT BECAUSE THERE
WAS NO 100% HALOTHANE ADMINISTERED TO THE CHILD, BUT
ONLY ONE (1%) PERCENT AND THE APPLICATION THEREOF,
WAS REGULATED BY AN ANESTHESIA MACHINE. THUS, THE
APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR (sic)
CONTRADICTED THE ESTABLISHED FACTS AND THE LAW
APPLICABLE IN THE CASE.
III.
a given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the requirement of
proof of culpable negligence against the party charged. It merely determines
and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof, and helps the
plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and
only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and
not readily available.27
The applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence
cases was significantly and exhaustively explained in Ramos v. Court of
Appeals,28 where the Court said
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus,
res ipsa loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the
harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of
negligence as the cause of that harm. The application of res ipsa loquitur in
medical negligence cases presents a question of law since it is a judicial
function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter
of law, permit a given inference.
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits
to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from
the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with
because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that
the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such
matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that
are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by
anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill
and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been
treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However,
testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external
appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may
be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur
is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper
proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the
court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard
of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting
injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised,
an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily
required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When
the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus
between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained
while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to
produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to
res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and
ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered
by him.
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following
situations: leaving of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an
operation, injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not
under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the body when
another part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a patients jaw was
under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the
patient plaintiff was under the influence of anesthetic, during or following an
operation for appendicitis, among others.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been
measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical
negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to
show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a
rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously
applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally
restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a
matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of
professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due
care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to
secure results, and the occurrence of something more unusual and not
ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual
procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a
physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific
treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why
any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific
treatment did not produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not
available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of
an operation or treatment was not accomplished. The real question, therefore,
is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or
unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond
morning of January 9 the patient was restless, and at 1:30 a.m. Dr. Brigham
examined the patient. His inspection of the patient's air passage revealed that
it was in satisfactory condition. At 4:15 a.m. Dr. Brigham received a telephone
call from the hospital, advising him that the patient was having respiratory
difficulty. The doctor ordered that oxygen be administered and he prepared to
leave for the hospital. Ten minutes later, 4:25 a.m., the hospital called a
second time to advise the doctor that the patient was not responding. The
doctor ordered that a medicine be administered, and he departed for the
hospital. When he arrived, the physician who had been on call at the hospital
had begun attempts to revive the patient. Dr. Brigham joined him in the effort,
but the patient died.
The doctor who performed the autopsy concluded that the patient died
between 4:25 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. of asphyxia, as a result of a sudden, acute
closing of the air passage. He also found that the air passage had been
adequate to maintain life up to 2 or 3 minutes prior to death. He did not know
what caused the air passage to suddenly close.
xxxx
It is a rare occurrence when someone admitted to a hospital for the treatment
of infectious mononucleosis dies of asphyxiation. But that is not sufficient to
invoke res ipsa loquitur. The fact that the injury rarely occurs does not in itself
prove that the injury was probably caused by someone's negligence. Mason v.
Ellsworth, 3 Wn. App. 298, 474 P.2d 909 (1970). Nor is a bad result by itself
enough to warrant the application of the doctrine. Nelson v. Murphy, 42 Wn.2d
737, 258 P.2d 472 (1953). See 2 S. Speiser, The Negligence Case Res Ipsa
Loquitur 24:10 (1972). The evidence presented is insufficient to establish the
first element necessary for application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The acute
closing of the patients air passage and his resultant asphyxiation took place
over a very short period of time. Under these circumstances it would not be
reasonable to infer that the physician was negligent. There was no palpably
negligent act. The common experience of mankind does not suggest that
death would not be expected without negligence. And there is no expert
medical testimony to create an inference that negligence caused the injury.
Negligence of Dr. Solidum
In view of the inapplicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court next
determines whether the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum for
criminal negligence.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.32Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing
or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by
reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act.33
Dr. Solidums conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure to
monitor and properly regulate the level of anesthetic agent administered on
Gerald by overdosing at 100% halothane. In affirming the conviction, the CA
observed:
On the witness stand, Dr. Vertido made a significant turnaround. He affirmed
the findings and conclusions in his report except for an observation which, to
all intents and purposes, has become the storm center of this dispute. He
wanted to correct one piece of information regarding the dosage of the
anesthetic agent administered to the child. He declared that he made a
mistake in reporting a 100% halothane and said that based on the records it
should have been 100% oxygen.
The records he was relying on, as he explains, are the following:
(a) the anesthesia record A portion of the chart in the record was
marked as Exhibit 1-A and 1-B to indicate the administration at
intervals of the anesthetic agent.
(b) the clinical abstract A portion of this record that reads as follows
was marked Exhibit 3A. 3B Approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes
through the operation, patient was noted to have bradycardia (CR =
70) and ATSO4 0.2 mg was immediately administered. However, the
bradycardia persisted, the inhalational agent was shut off, and the
patient was ventilated with 100% oxygen and another dose of ATSO4
0.2 mg was given. However, the patient did not respond until no
cardiac rate can be auscultated and the surgeons were immediately
told to stop the operation. The patient was put on a supine position
and CPR was initiated. Patient was given 1 amp of epinephrine initially
while continuously doing cardiac massage still with no cardiac rate
appreciated; another ampule of epinephrine was given and after 45
secs, patients vital signs returned to normal. The entire resuscitation
lasted approximately 3-5 mins. The surgeons were then told to
proceed to the closure and the childs vital signs throughout and until
the end of surgery were: BP = 110/70; CR = 116/min and RR = 20-22
cycles/min (on assisted ventilation).
Dr. Vertido points to the crucial passage in the clinical abstract that the patient
was ventilated with 100% oxygen and another dose of ATSO4 when the
bradycardia persisted, but for one reason or another, he read it as 100%
halothane. He was asked to read the anesthesia record on the percentage of
the dosage indicated, but he could only sheepishly note I cant understand the
number. There are no clues in the clinical abstract on the quantity of the
anesthetic agent used. It only contains the information that the anesthetic plan
was to put the patient under general anesthesia using a nonrebreathing
system with halothane as the sole anesthetic agent and that 1 hour and 45
minutes after the operation began, bradycardia occurred after which the
inhalational agent was shut off and the patient administered with 100%
oxygen. It would be apparent that the 100% oxygen that Dr. Vertido said
should be read in lieu of 100% halothane was the pure oxygen introduced after
something went amiss in the operation and the halothane itself was reduced or
shut off.
The key question remains what was the quantity of halothane used before
bradycardia set in?
The implication of Dr. Vertidos admission is that there was no overdose of the
anesthetic agent, and the accused Dr. Solidum stakes his liberty and
reputation on this conclusion. He made the assurance that he gave his patient
the utmost medical care, never leaving the operating room except for a few
minutes to answer the call of nature but leaving behind the other members of
his team Drs. Abella and Razon to monitor the operation. He insisted that he
administered only a point 1% not 100% halothane, receiving corroboration
from Dr. Abella whose initial MA in the record should be enough to show that
she assisted in the operation and was therefore conversant of the things that
happened. She revealed that they were using a machine that closely
monitored the concentration of the agent during the operation.
the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. In the recent
case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et. al., this Court stated
that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed
training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same
field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his
patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any
other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the
same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert
testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the
profession but also that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls
below such standard. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved
in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge,
it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support
the conclusion as to causation.
xxxx
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of
negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as
well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of his
patient. In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc., where the attending
physician was absolved of liability for the death of the complainants wife and
newborn baby, this Court held that:
The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence beyond
reasonable doubt because the circumstances cited by the CA were insufficient
to establish that Dr. Solidum had been guilty of inexcusable lack of precaution
in monitoring the administration of the anesthetic agent to Gerald. The Court
aptly explained in Cruz v. Court of Appeals35 that:
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown
that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and
the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it consists,
cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury
complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."
norms or standards established by his profession; (b) the breach of the duty by
the physicians failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of
care; (3) the causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close and causal
connection between the negligent act or omission and the resulting injury; and
(4) the damages suffered by the patient.36
In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the patient
against unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as standards of care, set the
duty of the physician to act in respect of the patient. Unfortunately, no clear
definition of the duty of a particular physician in a particular case exists.
Because most medical malpractice cases are highly technical, witnesses with
special medical qualifications must provide guidance by giving the knowledge
necessary to render a fair and just verdict. As a result, the standard of medical
care of a prudent physician must be determined from expert testimony in most
cases; and in the case of a specialist (like an anesthesiologist), the standard of
care by which the specialist is judged is the care and skill commonly
possessed and exercised by similar specialists under similar circumstances.
The specialty standard of care may be higher than that required of the general
practitioner.37
The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct of a
physician sued for negligence or malpractice may be measured, and it does
not depend, therefore, on any individual physicians own knowledge either. In
attempting to fix a standard by which a court may determine whether the
physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient, expert
medical testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is required. The
judge, as the trier of fact, ultimately determines the standard of care, after
listening to the testimony of all medical experts.38
Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical
qualifications in anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial court on what
standard of care was applicable. It would consequently be truly difficult, if not
impossible, to determine whether the first three elements of a negligence and
malpractice action were attendant.
Although the Prosecution presented Dr. Benigno Sulit, Jr., an anesthesiologist
himself who served as the Chairman of the Committee on Ethics and
Malpractice of the Philippine Society of Anesthesiologists that investigated the
complaint against Dr. Solidum, his testimony mainly focused on how his
Committee had conducted the investigation.39 Even then, the report of his
Committee was favorable to Dr. Solidum,40 to wit:
Presented for review by this committee is the case of a 3 year old male who
underwent a pull-thru operation and was administered general anesthesia by a
team of anesthesia residents. The patient, at the time when the surgeons was
manipulating the recto-sigmoid and pulling it down in preparation for the
anastomosis, had bradycardia. The anesthesiologists, sensing that the cause
thereof was the triggering of the vago-vagal reflex, administered atropine to
block it but despite the administration of the drug in two doses, cardiac arrest
ensued. As the records show, prompt resuscitative measures were
administered and spontaneous cardiac function re-established in less than five
(5) minutes and that oxygen was continuously being administered throughout,
unfortunately, as later become manifest, patient suffered permanent
irreversible brain damage.
In view of the actuations of the anaesthesiologists and the administration of
anaesthesia, the committee find that the same were all in accordance with the
universally accepted standards of medical care and there is no evidence of
any fault or negligence on the part of the anaesthesiologists.
Dr. Antonio Vertido, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, was also presented as a Prosecution witness, but his testimony
concentrated on the results of the physical examination he had conducted on
Gerald, as borne out by the following portions of his direct examination, to wit:
FISCAL CABARON Doctor, what do you mean by General Anesthetic Agent?
WITNESS General Anesthetic Agent is a substance used in the conduction of
Anesthesia and in this case, halothane was used as a sole anesthetic agent.
xxxx
Q Now under paragraph two of page 1 of your report you mentioned that after
one hour and 45 minutes after the operation, the patient experienced a
bradycardia or slowing of heart rate, now as a doctor, would you be able to tell
this Honorable Court as to what cause of the slowing of heart rate as to Gerald
Gercayo?
WITNESS Well honestly sir, I cannot give you the reason why there was a
bradycardia of time because is some reason one way or another that might
caused bradycardia.
ATTY. COMIA I noticed in, may I see your report Doctor, page 3, will you kindly
read to this Honorable court your last paragraph and if you will affirm that as if
it is correct?
A "The use of General Anesthesia, that is using 100% Halothane probably will
be contributory to the production of Hypoxia and - - - -"
A Well, because it was an operation, anything can happen within that situation.
ATTY COMIA And do you affirm the figure you mentioned in this Court Doctor?
FISCAL CABARON Now, this representation would like to ask you about the
slowing of heart rate, now what is the immediate cause of the slowing of the
heart rate of a person?
WITNESS Well, one of the more practical reason why there is slowing of the
heart rate is when you do a vagal reflex in the neck wherein the vagal
receptors are located at the lateral part of the neck, when you press that, you
produce the slowing of the heart rate that produce bradycardia.
Q 100%?
Q I will show you doctor a clinical record. I am a lawyer I am not a doctor but
will you kindly look at this and tell me where is 100%, the word "one hundred"
or 1-0-0, will you kindly look at this Doctor, this Xerox copy if you can show to
this Honorable Court and even to this representation the word "one hundred"
or 1-0-0 and then call me.
xxxx
A Well that is a possibility sir, I mean not as slowing of the heart rate, if there is
a hypoxia or there is a low oxygen level in the blood, the normal thing for the
heart is to pump or to do not a bradycardia but a to counter act the Hypoxia
that is being experienced by the patient
ATTY. COMIA Doctor tell this Honorable Court where is that 100, 1-0-0 and if
there is, you just call me and even the attention of the Presiding Judge of this
Court. Okay, you read one by one.
(sic).
Q Now, you made mention also doctor that the use of general anesthesia
using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications probably were
contributory to the production of hypoxia.
A Yes, sir in general sir.41
ATTY. COMIA Im asking you, just answer my question, did you see there
100% and 100 figures, tell me, yes or no?
WITNESS Im trying to look at the 100%, there is no 100% there sir.
ATTY. COMIA Okay, that was good, so you Honor please, may we request also
temporarily, because this is just a xerox copy presented by the fiscal, that the
percentage here that the Halothane administered by Dr. Solidum to the patient
is 1% only so may we request that this portion, temporarily your Honor, we are
marking this anesthesia record as our Exhibit 1 and then this 1% Halothane
also be bracketed and the same be marked as our Exhibit "1-A".
A Yes, sir.
Q And that is one of the risk of that major operation is that correct?
A That is the risk sir.42
xxxx
ATTY. COMIA Doctor, my attention was called also when you said that there
are so many factors that contributed to Hypoxia is that correct?
WITNESS Yes, sir.
Q I remember doctor, according to you there are so many factors that
contributed to what you call hypoxia and according to you, when this Gerald
suffered hypoxia, there are other factors that might lead to this Hypoxia at the
time of this operation is that correct?
WITNESS The possibility is there, sir.
Q And according to you, it might also be the result of such other, some or it
might be due to operations being conducted by the doctor at the time when the
operation is being done might also contribute to that hypoxia is that correct?
A That is a possibility also.
xxxx
ATTY. COMIA How will you classify now the operation conducted to this
Gerald, Doctor?
WITNESS Well, that is a major operation sir.
Q In other words, when you say major operation conducted to this Gerald,
there is a possibility that this Gerald might [be] exposed to some risk is that
correct?
A That is a possibility sir.
Q And which according to you that Gerald suffered hypoxia is that correct?
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately
exempt him from civil liability.1wphi1 But we cannot now find and declare him
civilly liable because the circumstances that have been established here do
not present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did
not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent
showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the
manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily
the cause of the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerard.
Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on
the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not
rest on speculation but on competent evidence.
Liability of Ospital ng Maynila
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we
have to address the unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of
expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr.
Solidum. The decree was flawed in logic and in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is
deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the
offense charged.48 It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could
have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum
for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an
artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts
thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment
against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that the RTC
and the CA overlooked. We deem it important, then, to express the following
observations for the instruction of the Bench and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence,
its fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the outset. The R TC
and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no
person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in
which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary
liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions
for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied
with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng
Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry."
The term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or
business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in
industry.49 However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not
engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and
humanitarian work.50Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged
in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital
ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald.
Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital. And,
thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an
employee (which did not happen here), the execution against him was
unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 20,
2010; ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P. Solidum of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to serious physical injuries; and MAKES no pronouncement on costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 191240
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Upon their arraignment, respondentand his brother Ramon pleaded not
guilty4 to the offense charged.
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
Petitioner Cristina B. Castillo testified that she is engaged in real estate
business, educational institution, boutique, and trading business. 5 She met
respondent through a common friend in December 2000 and became close
since then. Respondent had told her that his friends, Jinggoy Estrada and
Rudy Fernandez, were engaged in the freight and remittance business and
that Jinggoy even brought him toHong Kong and Singapore to promote the
former's business.6 Petitioner eventually met respondents brother and
manager, Ramon Salvador, to whom she volunteered to financially help
respondent in his bid for the Vice-Mayoralty race in Mandaluyong. 7 It was also
in the same meeting that they talked about the matter of engaging in a freight
and remittance business.8 Respondent enticed petitioner to go to Hong Kong
to see for herself the viability of such business and Ramon suggested to use
respondents name to attract the overseas contract workers. 9
In March 2001, petitioner and her husband, together with respondent and a
certain Virgilio Calubaquib wentto Hong Kong and they witnessed respondents
popularity among the Filipino domestic helpers.10 In April 2001, the same
group, with Ramon this time, went to Bangkok where respondents popularity
was again shown among the overseas Filipinos.11 In both instances,
respondent promoted their prospective business. In both trips, petitioner paid
for all the travelexpenses and even gave respondent US$10,000.00 as pocket
money for the Hong Kong trip and another US$10,000.00 for the Bangkok
trip.12 Her accountant introduced her to a certain Roy Singun who is into the
freight and money remittance business.13 In August 2001, respondent initiated
a trip to Palau, to observe Singuns business thereat to which petitioner
acceded.14 Petitioner paid for the travel expenses and even gaverespondent
US$20,000.00.15 In October 2001, she and respondent had a training at
Western Union at First World Center in Makati City.16
As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent and since she trusted
him very much as heeven acted as a father to her children when her
annulment was ongoing, she agreed to embark on the remittance business. In
December 2001, she, accompanied by her mother, Zenaida G. Bondoc
(Zenaida), and Ramon, went to Hong Kong and had the Phillip Salvador
Freight and Remittance International Limited registered on December 27,
2001.17 A Memorandum of Articles of Incorporation and a Certificate of
Incorporation were issued.18 They also rented an office space in Tsimshatsui,
Kowloon, Hong Kong which they registered as their office address as a
requirement for opening a business in Hong Kong, thus, a Notification of
Situation of Registered Office was also issued.19 She agreed with respondent
and Ramon that any profit derived from the business would be equally divided
among them and thatrespondent would be in charge of promotion and
marketing in Hong Kong,while Ramon would take charge of the operations of
business in the Philippines and she would be financing the business. 20
The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still raising the amount of
US$100,000.00 as capital for the actual operation.21 When petitioner already
had the money, she handed the same to respondent in May 2002 at her
mothers house in Las Pias City, which was witnessed by her disabled halfbrother Enrico B. Tan (Enrico).22She also gave respondent P100,000.00 in
cash to begiven to Charlie Chau, who is a resident of Hong Kong, as payment
for the heart-shaped earrings she bought from him while she was there.
Respondent and Ramon went to Hong Kong in May 2002. However, the
proposed business never operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kongfor
three days. When she asked respondent about the money and the business,
the latter told her that the money was deposited in a bank. 23 However, upon
further query, respondent confessed that he used the money to pay for his
other obligations.24 Since then, the US$100,000.00 was not returned at all.
On cross-examination, petitioner testified that she fell deeply in love with
respondent and was convinced thathe truly loved her and intended to marry
her once there would beno more legal impediment; 25 that she helped in
financing respondents campaign in the May 2001 elections. 26 As she loved
respondent so much, she gave him monthly allowances amounting to
hundreds of thousands of pesos because he had no work back then. 27 She
filed the annulment case against her husband on November 21, 2001 and
respondent promised her marriage.28 She claimed that respondent and Ramon
lured her with sweet words in going into the freight and remittance business,
which never operated despite the money she had given respondent. 29 She
raised the US$100,000.00 by means of selling and pawning her pieces of
diamond jewelry.30
Petitioner admitted being blinded by her love for respondent which made her
follow all the advice given by him and his brother Ramon, i.e., to save money
for her and respondents future because after the annulment, they would get
married and to give the capital for the remittance business in cash so as not to
jeopardize her annulment case.31 She did not ask for a receipt for the
US$100,000.00 she gave to respondent as it was for the operational expenses
of a business which will be for their future, as all they needed to do was to get
married.32 She further testified that after the US$100,000.00 was not returned,
she still deposited the amount of P500,000.00 in respondents UCPB bank
account33 and also to Ramons bank accounts.34 And while respondent was in
the United States in August 2003, she still gave him US$2,000.00as evidenced
by a Prudential Telegraphic Transfer Application35 dated August 27, 2003.
Petitioners mother, Zenaida, corroborated her daughters testimony that she
was with her and Ramon when they went to Hong Kong in December 2001 to
register the freight and remittance business.36 She heard Charlie Chau, her
daughter's friend, that a part of his office building will be used for the said
remittance business.37 Enrico Tan, also corroborated her sister's claim that she
handed the money to respondent in his presence.38
Respondent testified that he and petitioner became close friends and
eventually fell in love and had an affair.39They traveled to Hong Kong and
Bangkok where petitioner saw how popular he was among the Filipino
domestic helpers,40 which led her to suggest a remittance business. Although
hesitant, he has friends with such business.41He denied that petitioner gave
him US$10,000.00 whenhe went to Hong Kong and Bangkok. 42 In July 2001,
after he came back from the United States, petitioner had asked him and his
brother Ramon for a meeting.43 During the meeting, petitioner brought up the
money remittance business, but Ramon told her that they should make a study
of it first.44 He was introduced to Roy Singun, owner of a money remittance
business in Pasay City.45 Upon the advise of Roy, respondent and petitioner,
her husband and Ramon went to Palau in August 2001. 46 He denied receiving
US$20,000.00 from petitioner but admitted that it was petitioner who paid for
the plane tickets.47 After their Palau trip, they went into training at Western
Union at the First World Center in Makati City.48 It was only in December 2001
that Ramon, petitioner and her mother went to Hong Kong to register the
business, while he took care of petitioners children here. 49 In May 2002, he
and Ramon went back to Hong Kong but deniedhaving received the amount of
US$100,000.00 from petitioner but then admitted receipt of the amount
of P100,000.00 which petitioner asked him to give to Charlie Chau as payment
for the pieces of diamond jewelry she got from him, 50 which Chau had duly
acknowledged.51 He denied Enricos testimony that petitioner gave him the
amount of US$100,000.00 in his mothers house.52 He claimed that no
remittance business was started in Hong Kong as they had no license,
equipment, personnel and money to operate the same. 53 Upon his return to the
Philippines, petitioner never asked him about the business as she never gave
him such amount.54 In October 2002, he intimated that he and petitioner even
went to Hong Kong again to buy some goods for the latters boutique. 55 He
admitted that he loved petitioner and her children very much as there was a
time when petitioners finances were short, he gave her P600,000.00 for the
enrollment of her children in very expensive schools.56 It is also not true that he
and Ramon initiated the Hong Kong and Bangkok trips. 57
Ramon testified that it was his brother respondent who introduced petitioner to
him.58 He learned of petitioners plan of a remittance business in July 2001 and
even told her that they should study it first.59 He was introduced to Roy Singun
who operates a remittancebusiness in Pasay and who suggested that their
group observehis remittance business in Palau. After their Palau trip, petitioner
decided to put up a similar business in Hong Kong and it was him who
suggested to use respondents name because of name recall. 60 It was decided
thathe would manage the operation in Manila and respondent would be in
charge of promotion and marketing in Hong Kong, while petitioner would be in
charge of all the business finances.61 He admitted that he wentto Hong Kong
with petitioner and her mother to register said business and also to buy goods
for petitioners boutique.62 He said that it was also impossible for Chau to offer
a part of his office building for the remittance business because there was no
more space to accommodate it.63 He and respondent went to Hong Kong in
May 2002 to examine the office recommended by Chau and the warehouse of
Rudy Fernandez thereatwho also offered to help.64 He then told Chau that the
remittance office should be in Central Park, Kowloon, because majority of the
Filipinos in Hong Kong live there.65 He concluded that it was impossible for the
business to operate immediately because they had no office, no personnel and
no license permit.66 He further claimed that petitioner never mentioned to him
about the US$100,000.00 she gave to respondent, 67 and that he even traveled
again with petitioner to Bangkok in October 2002, and in August 2003. 68 He
denied Enricos allegation that he saw him at his mothers house as he only
saw Enrico for the first time in court.69
On April 21, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision,70 the dispositive portion of
which reads: WHEREFORE, accused PHILLIP SALVADOR is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime ofEstafa under Article 315, par. 2 (a) of
the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
sentence of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prisyon (sic)
correctional (sic)maximum as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal maximumas maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in
the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$100,000.00) or
its equivalent in Philippine currency. With respect to accused RAMON
SALVADOR, he is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. SO ORDERED. 71
Respondent appealed his conviction to the CA. The parties filed their
respective pleadings, after which, the case was submitted for decision.
On February 11, 2010, the CA rendered its Decision reversing the decision of
the RTC, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision of Branch 202 of
the RTC of Las Pias City, dated April 21, 2006, is hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE and accused appellant PHILLIP R. SALVADOR is ACQUITTED of
the crime of Estafa.72
Petitioner files the instant petition onthe civil aspect of the case alleging that:
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONVICTING THE RESPONDENT
SO THAT EVEN IF THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED TO ACQUIT HIM IT
SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST RETAINED THE AWARD OF DAMAGES TO THE
PETITIONER.73
We find no merit in the petition.
To begin with, in Manantan v. CA,74 we discussed the consequences of an
acquittal on the civil liability of the accused as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil
liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is
not the author of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the
door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator
of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act
oromission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the question,
and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds
other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule
the case, which of the conflicting findings is more in accord with law and
justice.79 Such is the case before us.
In discrediting petitioners allegation that she gave respondent US$100,000.00
in May 2002, the CA found that: (1) petitioner failed to show how she was able
to raise the money in such a short period of time and even gave conflicting
versions on the source of the same; (2) petitioner failed to require respondent
to sign a receipt so she could have a record of the transaction and offered no
plausible reason why the money was allegedly hand-carried toHong Kong; (3)
petitioners claim of trust as reason for not requiring respondent to sign a
receipt was inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous transactions
with him; and (4) petitioners behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated
against her was inconsistent with the actuation ofsomeone who had been
swindled.
We find no reversible error committed by the CA in its findings.
Petitioner failed to prove on how she raised the money allegedly given to
respondent. She testified that from December 2001 to May 2002, she was
raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as the capital for the actual operation of
the Phillip Salvador Freight and Remittance International Limited in Hong
Kong,80 and that she was ableto raise the same in May 2002. 81 She did so by
selling82 or pawning83 her pieces of diamond jewelry. However, there was no
documentary evidence showing those transactions within the period
mentioned. Upon further questioning on cross-examination on where she got
the money, she then said that she had plenty of dollars as she is a frequent
traveler to Hong Kong and Bangkok to shop for her boutique in Glorietta and
Star Mall.84 Such testimony contradicts her claim that she was still raising the
money for 5 months and that she was only able to formally raise the money in
May 2002.
There was also no receipt that indeed US$100,000.00 was given by petitioner
to respondent.1wphi1 Petitioner in her testimony, both in the direct and cross
examinations, said that the US$100,000.00 given to respondent was for the
actual expenses for setting up the office and the operation of the business in
Hong Kong.85 She claimed that she treated the freight and remittance business
like any of her businesses;86 that she, respondent, and the latters brother even
agreed to divide whatever profits they would have from the business; 87 and
that giving US$100,000.00 to respondent was purely business to her.88 She
also said that she kept records of all her business, such that, if there are no
records, there are no funds entrusted89 . Since petitioner admitted that giving
the money to respondent was for business, there must be some records
ofsuch transaction as what she did in her other businesses.
In fact, it was not unusual for petitioner to ask respondent for some documents
evidencing the latter's receipt of money for the purpose of business as this was
done in her previous business dealings with respondent. She had asked
respondent to execute a real estate mortgage on his condominium unit 90 for
the P5 million she loaned him in August 2001. Also, when petitioner gave
respondent an additional loan of P10 million in December 2001, for the latter to
redeem the title to his condominium unit from the bank, she had asked him to
sign an acknowledgment receipt for the total amount of P15 million he got from
her.91 She had done all these despite her testimony that she trusted
respondent from the day they met in December 2000 until the day he ran away
from her in August 2003.92
Petitioner insists that she did not ask for any acknowledgment receipt from
respondent, because the latter told her not to have traces that she was giving
money to him as it might jeopardize her then ongoing annulment proceedings.
However, petitioner's testimony would belie such claim of respondent being
cautious of the annulment proceedings. She declared that when she and her
husband separated, respondent stood as a father to her
children.93 Respondent attended school programs of her children,94 and
fetched them from school whenever the driver was not around. 95 In fact, at the
time the annulment case was already pending, petitioner registered the freight
and remittance business under respondents name and the local branch office
of the business would be in petitioner's condominium unit in Makati. 96 Also,
when petitioner went with her mother and Ramon to Hong Kong to register the
business, it was respondent who tookcare of her children. She intimated that it
was respondent who was insistent in going to their house.
Worthy to mention is that petitioner deposited the amount of P500,000.00 to
respondent's account with United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in July
2003.97 Also, when respondent was in New York in August 2003, petitioner
sent him the amount of US$2,000.00 by telegraphic transfer.98 Petitioner's act
ofdepositing money to respondent's account contradicted her claim that there
should be no traces that she was giving money to respondent during the
pendency of the annulment case.
Petitioner conceded that she could have either bought a manager's check in
US dollars from the bank orsend the money by bank transfer, but she did not
do so on the claim that there might be traces of the transaction. 99However, the
alleged US$100,000.00was supposed to be given to respondent because of
the freight and remittance business; thus, there is nothing wrong to have a
record of the same, specially since respondent had to account for the valid
expenseshe incurred with the money.100
The testimony of Enrico, petitioner's brother, declaring that he was present
when petitioner gave respondent the US$100,000.00 did not help. Enrico
testified that when petitioner filed the instant case in September 2004, another
case was also filed by petitioner against respondent and his brother Ramon in
the same City Prosecutor's office in Las Pias where Enrico had submitted his
affidavit. Enrico did not submit an affidavit in this case even when he allegedly
witnessed the giving of the money to respondent as petitioner told him that he
could just testify for the other case. However, when the other case was
dismissed, it was then that petitioner told him to be a witness in this case.
Enrico should have been considered at the first opportunity if he indeed had
personal knowledge of the alleged giving of money to respondent. Thus,
presenting Enrico as a witness only after the other case was dismissed would
create doubt as to the veracity of his testimony.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated
February 11, 2010, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30151, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 175256
xxxx
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
PERLAS-BERNABE,
**
DECISION
SO ORDERED.8
Factual Antecedents
Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review assailing the separate
Decisions of the Second and Seventeenth Divisions of the Court of Appeals
(CA) on the above issue.
Lily Lims (Lim) Petition for Review1 assails the October 20, 2005
Resolution2 of the Second Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138, which ruled on
the above issue in the affirmative:
Due to the filing of the said civil complaint (Civil Case No. 5112396), Charlie
Co filed the instant motion to dismiss [Lily Lims] appeal, alleging that in filing
said civil case, Lily Lim violated the rule against forum shopping as the
elements of litis pendentia are present.
Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags from FRCC on
a staggered basis. She successfully withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and sold
back some of the withdrawal authorities, covering 10,000 bags, to Co.
The first and second elements of the crime of estafa [with abuse of confidence
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)] for which the accused is being charged and
prosecuted were not established by the prosecutions evidence.
Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining
37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter
with Co and Borja, who explained that the plant implemented a price increase
and would only release the goods once Lim pays for the price difference or
agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained
that the withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price
fluctuations. Lim sought legal recourse after her demands for Co to resolve the
problem with the plant or for the return of her money had failed.
xxxx
Contrary to Law.
In view of the absence of the essential requisites of the crime of estafa for
which the accused is being charged and prosecuted, as above discussed, the
Court has no alternative but to dismiss the case against the accused for
insufficiency of evidence.15
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to
Evidence is GRANTED, and the accused is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
of estafa charged against him under the present information for insufficiency of
evidence.
Insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned, however, set this case
for the reception of his evidence on the matter on December 11, 2003 at 8:30
oclock [sic] in the morning.
SO ORDERED.16
After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the Pasig City RTC also
relieved Co of civil liability to Lim in its December 1, 2004 Order.17 The
dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered holding the
accused CHARLIE CO not civilly liable to the private complainant Lily Lim.
SO ORDERED.18
Lim sought a reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that she has
presented preponderant evidence that Co committed estafa against her.19
The trial court denied the motion in its Order 20 dated February 21, 2005.
On March 14, 2005, Lim filed her notice of appeal 21 on the civil aspect of the
criminal case. Her appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 and raffled
to the Second Division of the CA.
xxxx
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
BREACH OF CONTRACT
30. Charlie Co committed and is therefore liable to deliver to Lily Lim 37,200
bags of cement. If he cannot, then he must pay her the current fair market
value thereof.
31. FR Cement Corporation is also liable to deliver to Lily Lim the amount of
cement as indicated in the Withdrawal Authorities it issued. xxx FR Cement
Corporation has no right to impose price adjustments as a qualification for
honoring the Withdrawal Authorities.
32. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borja as the original holders/
assignees of the Withdrawal Authorities repeatedly assured Lily Lim that the
same were valid and would be honored. They are liable to make good on their
assurances.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
33. Charlie Cos acts of falsely representing to Lily Lim that she may be able to
withdraw the cement from FR Cement Corp. caused Lily Lim to incur expenses
and losses. Such act was made without justice, without giving Lily Lim what is
due her and without observing honesty and good faith, all violative of the law,
more specifically Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Such willful act was also
made by Charlie Co in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy, in violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
34. FR Cement Corporations unjust refusal to honor the Withdrawal
Authorities they issued also caused damage to Lily Lim. Further, FR Cement
Corporations act of withholding the 37,200 bags of cement despite earning
income therefor constitutes as an unjust enrichment because FR Cement
Corporation acquired income through an act or performance by another or any
other means at the expense of another without just or legal ground in violation
of Article 22 of the Civil Code.
35. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borjas false assurances that Lily Lim
would be able to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags of cement caused Lily
Meanwhile, the Manila RTC denied Cos Motion to Dismiss in an Order 31 dated
December 6, 2005. The Manila RTC held that there was no forum shopping
because the causes of action invoked in the two cases are different. It
observed that the civil complaint before it is based on an obligation arising
from contract and quasi-delict, whereas the civil liability involved in the appeal
of the criminal case arose from a felony.
Co filed a petition for certiorari, 32 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, before
the appellate court. He prayed for the nullification of the Manila RTCs Order in
Civil Case No. 05-112396 for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.33
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No.
93395
The CA Seventeenth Division denied Cos petition and remanded the civil
complaint to the trial court for further proceedings. The CA Seventeenth
Division agreed with the Manila RTC that the elements of litis pendentia and
forum shopping are not met in the two proceedings because they do not share
the same cause of action.34
The CA denied35 Cos motion for reconsideration.36
Co filed the instant Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No.
179160.
In G.R. No. 179160, Lim prays for the denial of Cos petition. 49 In G.R. No.
175256, she prays for the reversal of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
85138, for a declaration that she is not guilty of forum shopping, and for the
reinstatement of her appeal in Criminal Case No. 116377 to the CA. 50
In G.R. No. 179160, Co prays for the annulment of the CA Decision and
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, for a declaration that Lim is guilty of
forum shopping, and for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-112396. 41
Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance
and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the
criminal case for estafa?
In G.R. No. 175256, Co prays for the affirmation of the CA Decision in CA-G.R.
CV No. 85138 (which dismissed Lims appeal from the trial courts decision in
Criminal Case No. 116377).42
Lily Lims arguments
Lim admits that the two proceedings involve substantially the same set of facts
because they arose from only one transaction.43 She is quick to add, however,
that a single act or omission does not always make a single cause of
action.44 It can possibly give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of
the offender (1) ex delicto or civil liability arising from crimes, and (2)
independent civil liabilities or those arising from contracts or intentional torts.
The only caveat provided in Article 2177 of the Civil Code is that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission. 45 Because
the law allows her two independent causes of action, Lim contends that it is
not forum shopping to pursue them.46
She then explains the separate and distinct causes of action involved in the
two cases. Her cause of action in CA-G.R CV No. 85138 is based on the crime
of estafa. Co violated Lims right to be protected against swindling. He
represented to Lim that she can withdraw 37,200 bags of cement using the
authorities she bought from him. This is a fraudulent representation because
Co knew, at the time that they entered into the contract, that he could not
deliver what he promised.47 On the other hand, Lims cause of action in Civil
Case No. 05-112396 is based on contract. Co violated Lims rights as a buyer
in a contract of sale. Co received payment for the 37,200 bags of cement but
did not deliver the goods that were the subject of the sale. 48
Issue
Our Ruling
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give
rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender 51 - (1) civil
liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,52 and (2) independent civil liability, that
is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings.
The independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from
the act or omission complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the
Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort 53). It may also be based on
an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated
independently from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the
Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries").
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or
omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently
intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto
is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense.54 If the action for the civil liability
ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action,
its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal
action.55 The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court
hearing the criminal action declares that "the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist."56
On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the
criminal action and may be pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31
and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter. (Emphasis supplied.)
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil
liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two
types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the
rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.57 As explained
in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip:58
One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the instant
case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent
civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution
based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action
based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no
bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of
action, i.e., culpa contractual.
In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the
estafa cases against the offender did not amount to forum-shopping. The
essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to
secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by [the offended party]
arose from the same act or omission of [the offender], they are, however,
based on different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on
culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa
contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case
because the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal action.59
Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources
of obligations are authorized by law to proceed independently of each other,
the resolution of the present issue hinges on whether the two cases herein
involve different kinds of civil obligations such that they can proceed
independently of each other. The answer is in the affirmative.
The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted
together with the criminal action.60
On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations contained in
the complaint,61 is a civil action arising from a contractual obligation and for
tortious conduct (abuse of rights). In her civil complaint, Lim basically alleges
that she entered into a sale contract with Co under the following terms: that
she bought 37,200 bags of cement at the rate of P 64.00 per bag from Co;
that, after full payment, Co delivered to her the withdrawal authorities issued
by FRCC corresponding to these bags of cement; that these withdrawal
authorities will be honored by FRCC for six months from the dates written
thereon. Lim then maintains that the defendants breached their contractual
obligations to her under the sale contract and under the withdrawal authorities;
that Co and his co-defendants wanted her to pay more for each bag of cement,
contrary to their agreement to fix the price at P 64.00 per bag and to the
wording of the withdrawal authorities; that FRCC did not honor the terms of the
withdrawal authorities it issued; and that Co did not comply with his obligation
under the sale contract to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to Lim. From the
foregoing allegations, it is evident that Lim seeks to enforce the defendants
contractual obligations, given that she has already performed her obligations.
She prays that the defendants either honor their part of the contract or pay for
the damages that their breach has caused her.
Lim also includes allegations that the actions of the defendants were
committed in such manner as to cause damage to Lim without regard for
morals, good customs and public policy. These allegations, if proven, would
constitute tortious conduct (abuse of rights under the Human Relations
provisions of the Civil Code).
Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations arising from
contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in the estafa case involves only the
civil obligations of Co arising from the offense charged. They present different
causes of action, which under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and
independent"62 from each other. Both cases can proceed to their final
adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177
of the Civil Code.63
65 before the Regional Trial Court (Capas RTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac,
Branch 66,[3] assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the
MCTC dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim
in the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a
criminal case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file
the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend
that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the
crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be an
aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident. They maintain
that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed
independently of the criminal action.Finally, they point out that Casupanan was
not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict
but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the
criminal case.
file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs
order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper
remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises
the legal question of whether there is forum-shopping since they filed only one
action - the independent civil action for quasi-delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of
forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94.The
MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal [5] that the dismissal was with
prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without
prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly
states it is with prejudice.[6] Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with
prejudice, the same is deemed without prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal,
being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an order dismissing an action without
prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a
special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that
where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, to secure a favorable judgment. [8] Forum-shopping is present
when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of
action and reliefs sought.[9] However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant
case because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil
action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by
preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault
or negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can file
a separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules
that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these
articles.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before
the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the accused.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1,
2000 and now provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before
the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
xxx
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under
the 1985 Rules, the offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the
right to bring such action. Otherwise, such civil action was deemed impliedly
instituted in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided
as follows:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed instituted with
the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the
crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted, and may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the
criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a
waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on
these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions
based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of
the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil
Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil action deemed
instituted in the criminal action.[10]
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to
file a separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such
right in the criminal action before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also,
the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate
civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the
civil action may be consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation
under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from
the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code.[11]
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil
action, if reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after final
judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If the separate civil action was
filed before the commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still
pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final
judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule applied only to the
separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to
independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, which could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the
criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
continues this procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted,
the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on
the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal
action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the
same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action
in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already
adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal
action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present
additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and
decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of
the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the
separate civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon
the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits
the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action
to recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are
not the offended parties in the criminal case, can file a separate civil action
against the offended party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000
Rules provides as follows:
SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil
action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended
1985 Rules, expressly allows the offended party to bring an independent civil
action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In
no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file
an independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused.Section 3 of
the present Rule 111 expressly states that the offended party may bring such
an action but the offended party may not recover damages twice for the same
act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111
refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs.
Cantos[12] where the Court held that the accused therein could validly institute
a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the
criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his Answer
with Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the
absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted
civil actions and the necessary consequences and implications thereof.
Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court should confine itself to the criminal
aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court
further ruled that the accused may file a separate civil case against the
offended party after the criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance with
the new Rules which may be promulgated. The Court explained that a crossclaim, counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only
unnecessarily complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the
criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the
2000 Rules precisely to address the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero.Under this
provision, the accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or thirdparty complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision states that
any cause of action which could have been the subject (of the counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil
action. The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his counterclaim in
a separate civil action which shall proceed independently of the criminal action,
even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the
criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without
reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the
prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil
Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the
civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before
the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or
omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasidelict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can
proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement
or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasidelict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the
offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some
instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another
case against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same
act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed
in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the
counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This
is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any
counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal
case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim
against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action
for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to
run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can
avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the
accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to
recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of
law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
L.
DECISION
On the same day, the city fiscal filed with the same court another
information against the two (2) accused for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22, arising from the issuance of the same check.[4]
On January 11, 1990, both accused were arraigned before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 5,[5] Butuan City, where they pleaded not guilty to both
informations.
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal of accused Martin L. Romero and
Ernesto C. Rodriguez from the Joint Judgment[1] of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2, Butuan City, convicting each of them of estafa under Article 315, par.
2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to PresidentialDecree No. 1689,
for widescale swindling, and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and to jointly and severally payErnesto A. Ruiz the amount
of one hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00), with interest at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) per annum, starting September 14, 1989, until fully paid,
and to pay ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), as moral damages.
On October 25, 1989, Butuan City acting fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, an Information against the two (2)
accused for estafa,[2] as follows:
That on or about September 14, 1989, at Butuan City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being the
General Manager and Operation Manager which solicit funds from the general
public for investment, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping
one another, by means of deceit and false pretense, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously deliberately defraud one Ernesto A. Ruiz by
convincing the latter to invest his money in the amount of P150,000.00 with a
promise return of 800% profit within 21 days and in the process caused the
issuance of Butuan City Rural Rural [sic] Bank Check No. 158181 postdated to
October 5, 1989 in the amount of One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1,200,000.00) Philippine Currency, that upon presentation of said check to
the drawee bank for payment the same was dishonored and that
notwithstanding repeated demands made on said accused to pay and/or
change the check to cash, they consistently failed and refused and still fail and
refuse to pay or redeem the check, to the damage and prejudice of the
complainant in the aforestated amount of P1,200,000.00. [3]
In the service of their sentence, the accused pursuant to R.A. 6127, shall be
credited for the preventive imprisonment they have undergone (PP vs.
Ortencio, 38 Phil 941; PP vs. Gabriel, No. L-13756, October 30, 1959, cited in
Gregorios Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, P. 178, Seventh Edition,
1985).[8]
On March 31, 1993, accused filed their notice of appeal, which the trial
court gave due course on April 5, 1993. On March 16, 1994, this Court ordered
the accused to file their appellants brief.
Accused-appellants filed their brief on October 30, 1995, while the
Solicitor General filed the appellees brief on March 8, 1996.
During the pendency of the appeal, on November 12, 1997, accused
Ernesto Rodriguez died.[9] As a consequence of his death before final
judgment, his criminal and civil liability ex delicto, were extinguished.[10]
Complainant Ernesto A. Ruiz was a radio commentator of Radio DXRB,
Butuan City. In August, 1989, he came to know the business of Surigao San
Andres Industrial Development Corporation (SAIDECOR), when he
interviewed accused Martin Romero and Ernesto Rodriguez regarding the
corporations investment operations in Butuan City and Agusan del
Norte. Romero was the president and general manager of SAIDECOR, while
Rodriguez was the operations manager.
SAIDECOR started its operation on August 24, 1989 as a marketing
business. Later, it engaged in soliciting funds and investments from the
public. The corporation guaranteed an 800% return on investment within
fifteen (15) or twenty one (21) days. Investors were given coupons containing
the capital and the return on the capital collectible on the date agreed upon. It
stopped operations in September, 1989.
On September 14, 1989, complainant Ernesto A. Ruiz went to
SAIDECOR office in Butuan City to make an investment, accompanied by his
friend Jimmy Acebu, and SAIDECOR collection agent Daphne Parrocho. After
handing over the amount of one hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00)
to Ernesto Rodriguez, complainant received a postdated Butuan City Rural
Bank check instead of the usual redeemable coupon.The check indicated
P1,000,200.00 as the amount in words, but the amount in figures was for
P1,200,000.00, as the return on the investment. Complainant did not notice the
discrepancy.
When the check was presented to the bank for payment on October 5,
1989, it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds, as evidenced by the check
return slip issued by the bank. [11] Both accused could not be located and
demand for payment was made only sometime in November 1989 during the
preliminary investigation of this case. Accused responded that they had no
money.
Daphne Parrocho,[12] testified that on September 14, 1989, complainant,
with his friend Jimmy Acebu, approached her to invest the amount of
P150,000.00 at SAIDECOR. As she has reached her quota, and therefore, no
longer authorized to receive the amount, she accompanied them to the office
of SAIDECOR at Ong Yiu District, Butuan City. Accused Ernesto Rodriguez
accepted the investment and issued the check signed by him and Martin
Romero.
For their defense, accused Martin Romero [13] testified that on September
14, 1989, he issued a check in the amount of P1,200,000.00 corresponding to
the total of the P150,000.00 investment and the 800% return thereon. He
claimed that the corporation had a deposit of fourteen million pesos
(P14,000,000.00) at the time of the issuance of the check and four million
pesos (P4,000,000.00) at the time SAIDECOR stopped operations. Romero
knew these things because he used to monitor the funds of the corporation
with the bank. He was not aware that the check he issued was dishonored
because he never had the occasion to meet the complainant again after the
September 14, 1989 transaction. He only came to know about this when the
case was already filed in court sometime in the second or third week of
January 1990.[14]
In this appeal, both accused did not deny that complainant made an
investment with SAIDECOR in the amount of P150,000.00. However, they
denied that deceit was employed in the transaction. They assigned as errors:
(1) their conviction under P.D. 1689 due to the prosecutions failure to establish
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) the trial courts failure to consider
the joint stipulation of facts in their favor. [15] There is no merit in this appeal. We
sustain accused-appellants conviction.
Under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315, as amended by R.A. 4885, [16] the
elements of estafa are: (1) a check was postdated or issued in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time it was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds
to cover the check; (3) damage to the payee thereof. [17] The prosecution has
satisfactorily established all these elements.
Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to
deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of
legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidences justly reposed, resulting in
damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is
taken of another.[18] It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which
human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one individual to
secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of
truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way
by which another is cheated.[19]
Deceit is a specie of fraud. It is actual fraud, and consists in any false
representation or contrivance whereby one person overreaches and misleads
another, to his hurt. Deceit excludes the idea of mistake. [20] There is deceit
when one is misled, either by guide or trickery or by other means, to believe to
be true what is really false.[21] In this case, there was deception when accused
fraudulently represented to complainant that his investment with the
corporation would have an 800% return in 15 or 21 days.
Upon receipt of the money, accused-appellant Martin Romero issued a
postdated check. Although accused-appellant contends that sufficient funds
were deposited in the bank when the check was issued, he presented no
officer of the bank to substantiate the contention. The check was dishonored
when presented for payment, and the check return slip submitted in evidence
indicated that it was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the check was dishonored
without any fraudulent pretense or fraudulent act of the drawer, the latters
failure to cover the amount within three days after notice creates a rebuttable
presumption of fraud.[22]
Admittedly (1) the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds as
evidenced by the check return slip; (2) complainant notified accused of the
dishonor; and (3) accused failed to make good the check within three days.
In the recent case of People vs. Priscilla Balasa,[25] this Court held that a
transaction similar to the case at hand is not an investment strategy but a
gullibility scheme, which works only as long as there is an ever increasing
number of new investors joining the scheme. It is difficult to sustain over a long
period of time because the operator needs an ever larger pool of later
investors to continue paying the promised profits to early investors. The idea
behind this type of swindle is that the con-man collects his money from his
second or third round of investors and then absconds before anyone else
shows up to collect. Necessarily, these schemes only last weeks, or months at
most, just like what happened in this case.
the amount of P150,000.00 is the medium of the period of the complex penalty
in said Section 1, that is, sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years. This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance
with the rules therefor and not merely imposable as a general prescription
under the law, shall be the maximum range of the indeterminate sentence.
[33]
The minimum thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any period of the
penalty next lower in degree, which is, prision mayor.
To enable the complainant to obtain means, diversion or amusements that
will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings undergone by him, by reason of the
failure of the accused to return his money, moral damages are imposed
against accused-appellant Martin L. Romero in the amount of twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00).[34] To serve as an example for the public good, exemplary
damages are awarded against him in the amount of fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00).[35]
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the
appealed judgment. The Court hereby sentences accused-appellant Martin
Romero to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, to indemnify Ernesto A. Ruiz in the amount of one
hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00) with interest thereon at six (6%)
per centum per annum from September 14, 1989, until fully paid, to pay twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as moral damages and fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00), as exemplary damages, and the costs.
SO ORDERED.
SYNOPSIS
Appellants Romero and Rodriguez, General Manager and Operation Manager,
respectively, of Surigao San Andres Industrial Development Corporation
(SAIDECOR), were charged with widescale estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 based on a complaint filed by Ernesto A. Ruiz, a radio commentator.
SAIDECOR, engaged in solicitation of funds and investments from the public,
guaranteed an 800% return on investment within fifteen (15) or twenty one (21) days.
Appellants issued postdated a check in the amount of One Million Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00) Philippine Currency, but when presented, was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. The trial court, after joint trial, acquitted
appellants of violation of BP 22 but convicted them of Estafa for widescale swindling.
The trial court held that the crime was committed by a syndicate and sentenced
appellants to life imprisonment. Hence, this appeal. During the pendency of the
appeal, appellant Rodriguez died.
The appealed decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court but modified the
penalty to an indeterminate one for failure of the prosecution to establish that the
corporation was a syndicate as defined under the law. The Court found that deception
was employed on Ruiz by appellants and entered into a Ponzi scheme where appellant
fraudulently represented that Ruiz investment would have an 800% return in 15 or 21
days. It is sometimes called a pyramid scheme because a broader base of gullible
investors must support the structure as time passes.
Death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability ex delicto. However, the claim for civil liability survives if based on
a source of obligation other than delict.
within three days. Presumption of deceit remained since accused failed to prove
otherwise. Complainant sustained damage in the amount of P150,000.00.
3. MERCANTILE LAW; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW; RULE THAT
AMOUNT IN WORDS PREVAIL OVER AMOUNT IN FIGURE, NOT
APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. -- Accused-appellant relies on the fact that
there was a discrepancy between the amount in words and the amount in figures
in the check that was dishonored. The amount in words was P1,000,200.00,
while the amount in figures was P1,200,000.00. It is admitted that the
corporation had in the bank P1,144,760.00 on September 28,1989, and
P1,124,307.14 on April 2, 1990. The check was presented for payment on
October 5, 1989. The rule in the Negotiable Instruments Law is that when there
is ambiguity in the amount in words and the amount in figures, it would be the
amount in words that would prevail. However, this rule of interpretation finds no
application in the case. The agreement was perfectly clear that at the end of
twenty one (21) days, the investment of P150,000.00 would become
P1,200,000.00. Even if the trial court admitted the stipulation of facts, it would
not be favorable to accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; ESTAFA; ELEMENTS. -- Under paragraph 2 (d) of Article
315, as amended by R. A. 4885, the elements of estafa are: (1) a check was
postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time it was
issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to
the payee thereof.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. -- In this case, there was deception when accused
fraudulently represented to complainant that his investment with the corporation
would have an 800% return in 15 or 21 days. Upon receipt of the money,
accused-appellant Martin Romero issued a postdated check. Although accusedappellant contends that sufficient funds were deposited in the bank when the
check was issued, he presented no officer of the bank to substantiate the
contention. The check was dishonored when presented for payment, and the
check return slip submitted in evidence indicated that it was dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the check
was dishonored without any fraudulent pretense or fraudulent act of the drawer,
the latter's failure to cover the amount within three days after notice creates a
rebuttable presumption of fraud. Admittedly (1) the check was dishonored for
insufficiency of funds as evidenced by the check return slip; (2) complainant
notified accused of the dishonor; and (3) accused failed to make good the check
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings undergone by him,
by reason of the failure of the accused to return his money, moral damages are
imposed against accused-appellant Martin L. Romero in the amount of twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00). To serve as an example for the public good,
exemplary damages are awarded against him in the amount of fifteen thousand
pesos (P15,000.00).
THIRD DIVISION
FRANCISCO MAGESTRADO,
Petitioner,
(MeTC) of Quezon City. Pertinent portions of the information are hereby quoted as
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the (1) Resolution [1] dated 5
March 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 entitled, Francisco
Magestrado v. Hon. Estrella T. Estrada, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court, Branch 83 of Quezon City, People of the Philippines and Elena
M.
Librojo,
which
dismissed
petitioner
Francisco
Present:
- versus -
the Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for
Magestrados
Petition
forCertiorari for being the wrong remedy; and (2) Resolution[2] dated 3 May 2001 of
the same Court denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
follows:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1997, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and knowingly make an untruthful statement under
oath upon a material matter before a competent officer authorized to
receive and administer oath and which the law so require, to wit: the
said accused subscribe and swore to an Affidavit of Loss before
Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City, per Doc. No. 168,
Page No. 35, Book No. CLXXIV of her notarial registry, falsely
alleging that he lost Owners Duplicate Certificate of TCT No. N173163, which document was used in support of a Petition For
Issuance of New Owners Duplicate Copy of Certificate of Title and
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as
LRC# Q-10052 (98) on January 28, 1998 and assigned to Branch 99
of the said court, to which said Francisco M. Mag[e]strado signed
and swore on its verification, per Doc. 413 Page 84 Book
No. CLXXV Series of 1998 of Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of
Quezon City; the said accused knowing fully well that the
allegations in the said affidavit and petition are false, the truth of the
matter being that the property subject of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. N-173163 was mortgaged to complainant Elena M. Librojo as
collateral for a loan in the amount of P 758,134.42 and as
a consequence of which said title to the property was surrendered by
him to the said complainant by virtue of said loan, thus, making
untruthful and deliberate assertions of falsehoods, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Elena M. Librojo.[4]
The case was raffled to the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 43, where it was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 90721 entitled, People of thePhilippines v. Francisco
Magestrado.
[3]
On 30 June 1999, petitioner filed a motion [5] for suspension of proceedings based on
against petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which was
a prejudicial question. Petitioner alleged that Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, a case for
recovery of a sum of money pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 84, and Civil Case No. Q-98- 34308, a case for Cancellation of Mortgage,
Delivery of Title and Damages, pending before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 77,
must be resolved first before Criminal Case No. 90721 may proceed since the issues in
the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal
action.
On 14 July 1999, MeTC-Branch 43 issued an Order[6] denying petitioners motion for
suspension of proceedings, thus:
Acting on the Motion for Suspension of Proceedings filed
by the [herein petitioner Magestrado], thru counsel, and the
Comment and Opposition thereto, the Court after an evaluation of
the same, finds the aforesaid motion without merit, hence, is hereby
DENIED, it appearing that the resolution of the issues raised in the
civil actions is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
Hence, the trial of this case shall proceed as previously
scheduled on July 19 and August 2, 1993 at 8:30 in the morning.
Again, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration [11] but this was denied by
RTC- Branch 83 in an Order[12] dated 21 December 2000.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari[13] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 63293. Petitioner alleged that RTC Judge Estrella T. Estrada
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying the Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, and in effect
sustaining the denial by MeTC-Branch 43 of petitioners motion to suspend the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721, as well as his subsequent motion for
reconsideration thereof.
On 5 March 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed[14] the Petition in CA-G.R.
SP No. 63293 on the ground that petitioners remedy should have been an appeal from
the dismissal by RTC-Branch 83 of his Petition for Certiorari in Q-99-39358. The
Court of Appeals ruled that:
Is this instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 the
correct and appropriate remedy?
We rule negatively.
The resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, as in the
instant petition, may be appealed x x x under Section 10, Rule 44 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not by petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the same rules. Thus, the said rule provides:
Section 10. Time for filing memoranda on special cases. In
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus
cases, the parties shall file in lieu of briefs, their respective
memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from
receipt of the notice issued by the clerk that all the evidence, oral and
documentary, is already attached to the record x x x.
respondent and public respondent People of the Philippines insist that an ordinary
appeal was the proper remedy.
We agree with respondents. We hold that the appellate court did not err in
dismissing petitioners Petition for Certiorari, pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2 of the
[16]
in a
Revised Rules of Court (and not under Rule 44, Section 10, invoked by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution dated 5 March 2001).
Hence, petitioner comes before us via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
The correct procedural recourse for petitioner was appeal, not only because
RTC-Branch 83 did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners
1.
2.
Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 but also because RTC-Branch
action, so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In other words, the
83s Order of dismissal was a final order from which petitioners should have appealed
in accordance with Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.
An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending
order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower court. Au contraire, an interlocutory
order does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something to be done as
regards the merits of the latter.[18] RTC-Branch 83s Order dated 14 March
2001 dismissing petitioners Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358
finally disposes of the said case and RTC-Branch 83 can do nothing more with the
case.
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
petitioner should have availed himself of before the Court of Appeals: an ordinary
therein when declared by the Revised Rules of Court to be appealable. The manner of
appeal or a petition for certiorari. Petitioner claims that he correctly questioned RTC-
Branch 83s Order of dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-9939358 through a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Private
Certiorari generally lies only when there is no appeal nor any other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy available to petitioners. Here, appeal was available. It was
adequate to deal with any question whether of fact or of law, whether of error of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion or error of judgment which the trial court
might have committed. But petitioners instead filed a special civil action for certiorari.
We have time and again reminded members of the bench and bar that a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court lies only
when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.[19]Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a
special civil action for certiorari.[24] As this Court held in Fajardo v. Bautista[25]:
Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final
order, and hence a proper subject of appeal, not certiorari. The
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive. Accordingly, although the special civil
action of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is
available, it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would
be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a
party from the injurious effects of the order complained of, or where
appeal is inadequate and ineffectual. Nevertheless, certiorari cannot
be a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, where such
loss is occasioned by the petitioners own neglect or error in the
choice of remedies.
judgment despite the availability of that remedy,[20] certiorari not being a substitute for
lost appeal.[21]
Branch 83 denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his Petition
emphasized that the perfection of appeals in the manner and within the period
for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358; hence, he had until 18 January
permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect
2001 within which to file an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Petition
an appeal renders the decision of the trial court final and executory. This rule is
for Certiorari filed by petitioner on 19 February 2001 with the Court of Appeals
founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but
cannot be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. As petitioner failed to file a timely
is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
appeal, RTC-Branch 83s dismissal of his Petition for Certiorarihad long become final
the provisions of the law. Neither can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of
and executory.
technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial justice. While every
litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of
his cause, free from constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within
For this procedural lapse, the Court of Appeals correctly denied outright the
Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner before it.
Moreover, there are even more cogent reasons for denying the instant Petition
on the merits.
did nothing upon receipt of the amount of P100,000.00 from petitioner. In fact,
petitioner was even charged with perjury before the Office of the City Prosecutor, all
because of Mr. Gazmin, Jr.s wrongdoing.Petitioner further alleged that he discovered
the existence of a spurious Real Estate Mortgage which he allegedly signed in favor of
harps on the need for the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721
private respondent. Petitioner categorically denied signing the mortgage document and
it was private respondent who falsified the same in order to justify her unlawful
resolved in Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 (for cancellation of mortgage) and Civil Case
withholding of TCT No. N-173163 from petitioner. Thus, petitioner prayed for:
No. Q-98-34349 (for collection of a sum of money) which are pending before other
trial courts.
For clarity, we shall first discuss the allegations of petitioner in his complaint
in Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 (for cancellation of mortgage) and that of private
respondent in her complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 (for collection of a sum of
money).
Sale prepared by private respondent. Upon signing the Deed of Sale, he noticed that
the Deed was already signed by a certain Cristina Gonzales as attorney-in-fact of
vendor Spouses Guillermo and Amparo Galvez. Petitioner demanded from private
respondent a special power of attorney and authority to sell, but the latter failed to
present one. Petitioner averred that private respondent refused to deliver the certificate
of title of the land despite execution and signing of the Deed of Sale and payment of
the consideration.Petitioner was thus compelled to engage the services of one Modesto
Gazmin, Jr. who agreed, for P100,000.00 to facilitate the filing of cases against private
respondent; to deliver to petitioner the certificate of title of the land; and/or to cancel
the certificate of title in possession of private respondent. However, Mr. Gazmin, Jr.,
Civil Case No. Q-98-34349,[26] on the other hand, is a complaint for a sum of
money with a motion for issuance of a writ of attachment filed by private respondent
against petitioner on 14 May 1988 before RTC-Branch 84. Private respondent alleges
that petitioner obtained a loan from her in the amount of P758,134.42 with a promise
to pay on or before 30 August 1997. As security for payment of the loan, petitioner
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage covering a parcel of land registered under
TCT No. N-173163. Petitioner pleaded for additional time to pay the said obligation,
to which respondent agreed. But private respondent discovered sometime in February
1998 that petitioner executed an affidavit of loss alleging that he lost the owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163, and succeeded in annotating said affidavit on
the original copy of TCT No. N-173163 on file with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City. Private respondent further alleges that she also discovered that petitioner filed a
petition for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 with the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as LRC Case No. Q-10052. Private
respondent demanded that petitioner pay his obligation, but the latter refused to do
B.
[Petitioner] prays for such further relief in law, justice and equity.
be determined.
Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to
cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil
case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in
the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question
burden of making out the justice and wisdom from the departure from the beaten truck
lay heavily on the petitioner, less an unwilling litigant is compelled to wait upon the
outcome of a controversy to which he is a stranger. It is, thus, stated that only in rare
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal
circumstances will a litigant in one case is compelled to stand aside, while a litigant in
responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is
another, settling the rule of law that will define the rights of both is, after all, the
no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case,
parties before the court are entitled to a just, speedy and plain determination of their
[30]
Neither is there
case undetermined by the pendency of the proceedings in another case. After all,
a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
procedure was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
[31]
administration of justice.[34]
As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on
sound discretion, and upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action
the basis of a prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the
pleadings in the civil cases are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case
especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in
such that the resolution of the issues in the civil cases would also determine the
every court to control the disposition of cases on its dockets with economy of time and
effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second
action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are
settled, the second action should be stayed.[32]
A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that Civil Case No. Q-9834308 pending before RTC-Branch 77, and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, pending
before RTC-Branch 84, are principally for the determination of whether a loan was
obtained by petitioner from private respondent and whether petitioner executed a real
court to control the disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its time and
estate mortgage involving the property covered by TCT No. N-173163. On the other
effort, those of counsel and the litigants. But if proceedings must be stayed, it must be
hand, Criminal Case No. 90721 before MeTC-Branch 43, involves the determination
conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts. It bears stressing that
request for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163.
whether or not the trial court would suspend the proceedings in the criminal case
before it is submitted to its sound discretion.[33]
It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed
independently of each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will
not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for
perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution of a real estate
United States Supreme Court aptly declared in Landis v. North American Co., the
the
instant
petition
is DISMISSED for
lack
of
merit. Accordingly, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43, is hereby
directed to proceed with the hearing and trial on the merits of Criminal Case No.
90721, and to expedite proceedings therein, without prejudice to the right of the
accused to due process. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED
Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings
before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the
victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would
have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Trial Court
DECISION
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005[3] holding that the
CARPIO, J.:
pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that
The Case
warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held
that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by
Before the Court is a petition for review [1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of
respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioners
other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil
action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the
to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even
criminal action. In this case, the Information [7] for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30
if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be
August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the
immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged
stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case
acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The
No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served
Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is
summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005. [8] Respondents petition[9] in
that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November
2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals
case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the
decision.
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of
marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in
Civil Case Must be Instituted
the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In
short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner
could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged