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Performanceappraisalanddisciplinaryaction:
Thecasefor
Freedland,Mark.InternationalLabourReview 132.4 (1993):491.

Abstract
Inadditiontobeingasystemdesignedtoenableworkerstoachievetheirfullpotential,performance
appraisal(PA)isdesignedtoenableemployerstoapplynegativesanctionstothosewhofailtoachievea
levelofperformancesatisfactorytotheemployer.ThedisciplinaryaspectofPAisexaminedandanumber
ofdimensionsofpossiblelegalcontroloverabusivebehavioronthepartofemployersinrelationtothis
systemareconsidered.ThepotentialofPAsystemstooperateascontrolsystemsisclearlyindicatedwhen
theyareusedtoassessperformancerelatedpay.Itisalsoimplicitlyindicatedwhentheyprovidethebasis
fordecisionsaboutpromotion,aboutrenewaloffixedtermemployment,oraboutrequirementsfor
continuingtraining.Adisciplinarydecisionorpracticemaybedefectiveintermsof:1.thecriteriaused,2.
theprocessemployed,or3.thesanctionsapplied.Basesoflegalcontrolmaybegroupedinthefollowing
way:1.controlsbaseduponindividualrightsandthecontractofemployment,2.controlsbasedon
collectiverightsandfreedomofassociation,and3.controlsupondiscriminationinemployment.

FullText
Performanceappraisal(PA)isnotjustasystemdesignedtoenableworkerstoachievetheirfullpotential.
Itisalsoasystemdesignedtoenableemployerstoapplynegativesanctionstothosewhofailtoachievea
(sometimesarbitrary)levelofperformance,satisfactorytotheemployer.Moreconsideration,therefore,
needstobegiventothisdisciplinaryaspectofappraisalsystems.(2)Thisarticleseeks,precisely,to
examinethisaspectofperformanceappraisalandtoconsideranumberofdimensionsofpossiblelegal
controloverabusivebehaviouronthepartofemployersinrelationtothissystem.
Thetermperformanceappraisalisusedinthisarticletorefertosystemsfortheevaluationbyemploying
enterprisesoftheperformanceofindividualworkersintheirjobs,andoftheirgeneralcareerdevelopment.
Suchsystemsmaybeusedforanumberofdifferentpurposes:(3)theymaybeusedtodetermineor
influencedecisionsaboutpromotion,orperformancerelatedpay,orretraining,orevendismissal.Onthe
otherhandtheymaybeusedinalessspecificwayasastartingpointforcounsellingindividualworkers
abouttheircareerdevelopment,oradvisingthemaboutthemoreefficientperformanceoftheirworkor
howtheycancontributetotheachievementofthegoalsoftheenterprise.Indeed,itisimportantto
realizethatenterprisesmaysetupPAsystemswiththegeneralaimofimprovingmanagement,but
withoutanycommitmenttousingthesystemfordefinedspecificpurposestotheexclusionofother
purposes.
Moreover,aPAsystemchangesinthecourseoftimeforexample,fromacounsellingfunctiontoapay
determiningfunction.TheconceptofPAisthusnotafunctionspecificoneandweshallseethatthis
createsambiguitieswhichcanbethesourceofabusivebehaviour.
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DISCIPLINARYSYSTEMS?
TounderstandthewaysinwhichPAsystemscangiverisetoabusivebehaviouritisusefulandrevealing
tothinkaboutmanyPAsystemsasdisciplinarysystems.Theterm"disciplinary"ishereusedtomean,
"concernedwiththesecuringandmaintainingofcontroloverbehaviour,especiallywithaviewto
achievinganorderedpatternofbehaviour".(4)TocharacterizePAsystemsasdisciplinaryis,ofcourse,to
issuesomethingofachallengetothewaythatthosesystemsarenormallypresentedbytheirproponents.
Indeed,PAsystemsareoftenpresentedasliberatingfortheworkerswhoaresubjectCothem,inthat
theyhelpthoseworkersunderstandandfulfiltheirhiddenpotential.Theremaybetruthinthiswayof
lookingatthingsitmayevenbesystematicallytrueofallreputablePAsystems.Nevertheless,thismode
ofpresentationdoesunderstateorevenhidethecharacteristicofPAassystemthroughwhichemploying
enterprisesexertcontrolovermembersoftheworkforce.
ThepotentialofPAsystemstooperateascontrolsystemsisclearlyindicatedwhentheyareusedtoassess
performancerelatedpay.Itisalsoimplicitlyindicatedwhentheyprovideabasisfordecisionsabout
promotion,aboutrenewaloffixedtermemployment,oraboutrequirementsforcontinuingtraining.It
maybethoughtboldtoassignadisciplinaryfunctiontosuchcontrolsystemsbutinsofarasPAsystems
providefortakingdecisions(sometimesagainsttheinterestsoftheemployee)onthebasisofclose
surveillanceandcontinuingevaluationoftheemployee'sperformanceorbehaviour,theyareprecisely
disciplinaryincharacter.ThisisespeciallytruegiventhatPAsystems,inpractice,oftenevolvefrom"soft"
selfdevelopmentalorcounsellingfunctionstowardsincreasingly"hard"andultimatelycoercivefunctions
suchasthatofrestrictingpay,withholdingcareeradvancement,ordenyingrenewalofemploymenton
thegroundsofadverseappraisalresults.
BythusidentifyingPAsystemsashavingadistinctdisciplinarydimension,wecanadvancetowardsan
understandingofhowtheymaygiverisetoabusivebehaviouronthepartoftheemployer.Adisciplinary
decisionorpracticemaybedefectiveintermsof:
(a)thecriteriausedor
(b)theprocessemployedor
(c)thesanctionsapplied.
GiventhatthedisciplinarydimensionofPAsystemsisgenerallyoverlooked,andusuallyconcealedbehind
adiscourseofselfdevelopment,itcanreadilybeseenhowabusivebehaviourcanresultfromthe
ambiguitiesofPAsystemsandfromunclearthinkingaboutthem.Thismightbethecase,forinstance,ifa
PAsystemusedcriteriaandemployedaprocesswhichwouldbequiteappropriateontheassumptionthat
therewerenosanctionsassociatedwithanegativeappraisal,butwhichwouldbecomeinappropriateas
soonassanctionscameintoplayif,forexample,thePAsystemcompelledtheemployeetoidentifyand
pointouthisorherownshortcomingsinawaythatheorshewouldbeunwillingtodoifitprejudiced
chancesofpromotionorenhancedpay.
DIMENSIONSOFCONTROL
Thusfar,wehaveidentifiedwhatPAsystemsare,inwhatsensetheyhaveadisciplinarydimension,and
howinageneralsensetheymaygiverisetoabusivebehaviouronthepartofemployers.Wecanfocus
moreclearlyonthosethreesetsofissuesbyconsideringactualandpossiblebasesforthelegalcontrolof
abusesofpowerexercisedthroughPAsystems.Itwillbefoundusefultogroupthesebasesoflegalcontrol
inthefollowingway:
(a)controlsbaseduponindividualrightsandthecontractofemployment
(b)controlsbasedoncollectiverightsandfreedomofassociationand

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(c)controlsupondiscriminationinemployment.
INDIVIDUALRIGHTSANDTHECONTRACTOFEMPLOYMENT
TheargumenthereisthatinsufficientattentionhasbeengiventotheneedtocontrolPAsystemswith
regardtotheirimpactuponworkers'individualrightsandtheindividualcontractofemployment.Interms
ofourearlieranalysiswecanseethattheintroductionormodificationofaPAsystemmayaffectthe
criteria,theprocess,orthesanctionsoftheemployer'sdisciplinarysystem.Inthatsense,thePAsystem
hasadirectbearingupontheemployee'sindividualrightsandupontheindividualcontractofemployment.
Yet,becausePAsystemsare,aswehaveobserved,oftenintroducedwithouttheirfunctionsbeing
preciselyidentifiedordefined,thisimpactisoftenconcealed.Itmustberelativelyuncommonforthe
introductionofaPAsystemtobepresentedbytheemployer(orindeedcontestedbytheemployee)asa
modificationoftheindividualcontractofemployment.Yetthat,insubstance,ispreciselywhatitmaybe.
Forinstance,anemployerintroducingaPAsystemwhichisimmediatelyorsubsequentlyusedasabasis
forperformancerelatedpayawardsisclearlyengagedincontractualnormmakingatthepointwherethe
criteriaandprocessofthesystemareformulated.
ThereisanassociatedissueconcerningtheconfidentialityoftheassessmentsproducedbythePAsystem.
Veryoften,asanaturalconsequenceoftheambiguityornonspecificityofaPAsystem,thereisafailure
toidentifyorresolvetheconfidentialityissueswhichwillinevitablypresentthemselvesoncethePAsystem
emergesashavingadisciplinaryrole.Thoseissuesshould,itissuggested,beaddressedfromtheoutset.
Nationallegislationconcernedwithdataprotectionmaybehelpfulinrestrictingoutsideaccesstoappraisal
informationandgivingindividualemployeeslegalrightsofaccesstothatinformation.Butsuchlegislation
islikelytorelateonlytoinformationheldoncomputers,andisalsolikelytobeorientedtowardsthe
problemsofcomputerdatastorageofpersonalinformation,ratherthantowardsthemorespecific
problemsofconfidentialityandaccesstoappraisaldata.Ingeneral,itiscrucialtotheinterestsof
employeesthatitshouldbeclearfromtheoutsetwhattheyareacceptingintermsofthepurposesfor
whichappraisalevaluationscanbeused,towhomtheinformationcontainedinthemcanbedisclosed,and
forhowlongitremainsaccessibleforthosepurposesandtothosepersons.Thereisarealriskthatthe
presentationofPAsystemsasprocessesfortheselfdevelopmentoftheemployeemayobscuretheir
operationasaprocessofconfidentialevaluationoftheemployee,capableofcontributingtosubstantiveor
disciplinarydecisionsaffectingtheemployee.
Itissimilarlyimportanttodrawattentiontothe,generallyunremarked,continuouscontractingfunction
whichPAsystemsmayhave.Thatistosay,aperformanceappraisaloftenoperatesasapartial
renegotiationofthecontractofemployment,orastheimpositionofapartiallyreformulatedcontractof
employment.ThiscanreadilybedemonstratedinrelationtothePAmethodwhichoperatesthroughthe
settingofobjectivesandcomparisonwiththeiroutcome.Underthissystem,theemployeeandhisorher
manageragreeobjectivesatthebeginningoftheappraisalperiod.Thesubsequentappraisalisbasedon
howfartheseobjectiveshavebeenmet.(5)Theestablishmentofobjectivesisakindofcontractmaking,
andtheappraisalisthusamonitoringofcontractcompliance.EveninPAsystemswhicharenotovertly
designedintermsofmanagementbyobjectives,thereisgenerallyastrongelementofjobdescription,
whichhasasimilarnormativefunction.(6)
Thesepotentiallyadverseeffectsupontherightsandcontractualpositionoftheindividualemployeeare
mattersrequiringlegalcontrol.Thequestionwhicharisesiswhatformshouldormightthatcontroltake?
Proceduresfortheinterpretationandenforcementoftheindividualcontractofemploymentarelikelyto
offeronlyweakandpartialcontrols.Remediesforunjustdismissalmaybeimportant,butevenwhenthe
conceptsofdismissalordischargeareextendedbyconceptsofconstructivedismissalorofnonrenewalof
fixedtermemployment,controlbythesemeansisdependentupontherehavingbeenaterminationof
theemploymentrelationshipinquestion.Perhapsthebestwayforwardinthisareawouldconsistin
recognizingthatPAsystemscomewithinthepolicy,thoughnotusuallywithinthespecificrequirements
of,theemployees'righttoreceiveinformationontheconditionsapplicabletotheircontractor
employmentrelationship,suchasthatlaiddownundertherecentEuropeanCommunityDirectiveon"An
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employer'sobligationtoinformemployeesoftheconditionsapplicabletothecontractoremployment
relationship".(7)InrelationtoPAsystems,therighttoinformationneedstobesufficientlywelldeveloped
andspecifictoensurethatemployeesarenotmisledbytheequivocalorevasivepresentationofthose
systemswhichmayconcealtheirnormativeanddisciplinaryeffects.
COLLECTIVERIGHTSANDFREEDOMOFASSOCIATION
AnydiscussionofthelegalcontrolofPAsystemsintermsofindividualcontracts,individualrightsandthe
needforinformationtoindividualemployeeswouldbeincompleteifitdidnotalsoconsidertheparallel
issuesarisingatthecollectivelevel.Firstly,justasithasbeenarguedthattheintroductionof,or
assumptionof,anewfunctionforaPAsystemmayamounttoachangeinthetermsofanindividual
contractofemployment,soitmayalsodepartfromthetermsofacollectiveagreementorareplace
certaincollectivebargainingstructures(e.g.forpaydeterminationorfortakingdecisionsaboutpromotion,
trainingorredundancy).Secondly,theneedforemployeestoreceiveclearinformationaboutthecriteria,
processandfunctionsofaPAsystemarisesatthecollectiveaswellastheindividuallevel.Wherenational
legislationrequiresemployerswhorecognizetradeunionstodiscloseinformationtothemforthepurposes
ofcollectivebargaining,thatrequirementmightextendtoinformationaboutthecriteriaandoperationofa
PAsystemifthatsystemisusedinconnectionwithpaydeterminationorotherdecisionswhicharethe
subjectof,ordirectlyrelevantto,thecollectivebargainingprocess.(8)
Thevalueandeffectivenessofsuchcontrolsmay,however,belimited.
TheintroductionorupgradingofaPAsystemmayitselfformpartofaprocessofindividuationofthe
employmentrelationshipandofmarginalizationofcollectivebargainingorconsultationmechanisms.Such
aprocessmaygoasfarasencroachinguponthefreedomoftheindividualworkertobelongtoatrade
unionortobecoveredbythecollectivebargainingprocess.Thisfreedomofassociationdimensionofthe
individuationoftheemploymentrelationshiphasbeenunderconsiderationrecentlyintheUnitedKingdom
courtsinthelinkedappealsinthecasesofAssociatedBritishPortsv.PalmerandAssociatedNewspapers
Ltd.v.Wilson(9)whereitwasheldthatexistingUKlegislationprotectingthefreedomofassociationofthe
individualemployeewasviolatedwhereanemployerofferedpayincreasestoindividualemployeesas
incentivestosignnewpersonalcontractsofemploymentunderwhichtheywouldnolongerhavetheright
tounionrepresentationorthebenefitofcollectivebargaining(althoughthesedecisionshavenow,in
effect,beenoverturnedasaresultofanamendmenttotheTradeUnionReformandEmployeeRightsAct
1993).
ItistobeexpectedthatPAsystemswillfigureprominentlyinthissortofmovetopersonalcontracting,
andwheretheydoso,theremaybedifficultissuestoresolveastohowfartheactualaimofthePA
systemisthedecollectivizationoftheemploymentrelationship.IntheAssociatedBritishPortscase,for
instance,theemployersarguedthattheirpurposewastogivemanagementtheopportunityto
discriminateovertermsofpay,infavourofthosewhowereoutstandinglydedicated.If,asmightwellbe
thecase,aPAsystemwascreatedwithaviewtodecidingwhichemployeeswereoutstandinglydedicated,
thoseissuesoftherelationshipbetweenpersonalcontractingandfreedomofassociationwouldcertainly
focusuponthePAsysteminquestion.ThisdiscussionofthecollectivedimensionoflegalcontrolofPA
systemsistoaconsiderableextentspeculativewemoveontoanareawheretherehasbeensignificant
actuallegalimpactuponPAsystems.
PASYSTEMSANDDISCRIMINATIONLAW
Discriminationlaw,whetherconcernedwithsexdiscriminationnorwithracialdiscrimination,hasin
generalprovidedmuchthemostsignificantcontrolupontheoperationofPAsystems(intheUnited
States,agediscriminationargumentshavealsobeendeployedincasesconcerningPAsystems).(10)
TextbooksonhowtoensurethelegalityofPAsystemsgenerallyturnouttobeconcernedwithmaking
surethattheiroperationwillbeheldtobenondiscriminatory.(11)Itisimportanttobeclearaboutwhatis
beingcontrolledhere.TheprimaryobjectiveistocontrolthedecisiontowhichthePAsystemcontributes,
ratherthanthePAsystemitself.Thatistosay,theemployee'scomplaintwillrelateprimarilytothedenial
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ofpromotion,ortheterminationofemployment,orthewithholdingofmeritpay,andonlysecondarilyto
thePAsystemwhichprovidedsomeorallofthedatauponwhichsuchadecisionwasreached.The
complaintwillallege,forinstance,thatthedenialofpromotionrepresentedanactofdiscriminationagainst
theemployeedeniedpromotion,eitheronthebasisofsexorofethnicity.Goodexamplesareprovidedby
twoUScasesinvolvingPAsystems:Nordv.UnitedStatesSteelCorporation,(12)whereafemalesales
serviceemployeechallengedherdenialofpromotiononthegroundofsexdiscrimination,andWatsonv.
FortWorthBankandTrust,(13)whereablackbanktellerchallengedherdenialofpromotiononthe
groundofracialdiscrimination.
However,althoughthecomplaintmaynotbedirectedtowardsthePAsystem,itmaybethatwheresuch
asystemhasbeenused,itmovesstraighttothecentreoftheargument,tothepointwhereitbecomes,
inasense,theprimaryfocusofthecomplaint.Thiscomesaboutinthefollowingway:inadeveloped
systemofantidiscriminationlaw,particularlyinsystemswhichhaveadoptedorfollowedtheUSapproach,
discriminationtendstobeidentifiedeitherintermsofdirectdiscriminationonthegroundof"the
prescribedfactor"(i.e.sexorrace),orintermsofindirectdiscrimination(i.e.practiceshavinganadverse
impactonagroupidentifiedbyreferencetotheprescribedfactorandnotbeingjustifiableongroundsnot
relatedtotheprescribedfactor).Employersgenerallyrespondtotheexistenceofantidiscrimination
legislationbyensuringthattheycannotbeaccusedofdirectdiscriminationtheyeschewcriteriadirectly
basedon,orrelatedto,theprescribedfactor.Inthesecircumstances,discriminationclaimshavetobe
framedintermsofindirectdiscrimination.Theythereforedependuponidentifyingpracticeshavingadverse
impactandlackingnondiscriminatoryjustification.PAsystemsmaywellbeidentifiableinthosetermsand
sobecomethefocusofdiscriminationclaims.
Thereisadifficultyinthisanalysiswhichitisimportanttoresolveforthefurtherdevelopmentofthe
argument.Thisisthattheanalysisinthepreviousparagraphcouldresultinanemployerbeingpenalized
foradoptingaformalPAsysteminsteadoftakingtherelevantdecisionsonsuchthingsaspromotionson
thebasisofwhollyinformalandunsystematizedprocedures.Thispenalizationwouldoccurifthecourts
concludedthattherewasnothingwhichtheycouldidentifyasadiscriminatorypracticeintheabsenceofa
PAsystemwithformallyidentifiedcriteriaofoperation.Thiscouldmeanthatunsystematic,subjectiveand
evenarbitrarydecisionmakingbecameeasiertodefendagainstallegationsofsexorracediscrimination
thansystematicdecisionmakingbasedonidentifiedcriteria.
Thisdifficultywastosomeextentaddressed,thoughnotentirelydispelled,inthedecisionoftheUS
SupremeCourtintheFortWorthBankcasereferredtoabove.Theemployer'spromotiondecisionswere
basedonaninformalandsubjectivePAsystemreliancewasplacedonsupervisors'recommendations
which,althoughsystematizedtotheextentofbeingmadeonappraisalforms,wereorganizedaccordingto
subjectivecriteriaofassessmentsuchasfriendlinessandsupervisor/coworkerrelations.TheSupreme
Courtaddressedthedifficultyreferredtoabovebyrejectingthecontentionthatadisparateimpactor
indirectdiscriminationclaimcouldnotbebroughtagainstasubjectiveandinformalsysteminthewaythat
itcouldbemadeagainstaformalandobjectivesystem.
Atthesametime,theSupremeCourtwasconcernedtoavoidgivingwhatitregardedasincentivesto
employerstomodifynormalandlegitimatepracticesbyintroducingquotasorpreferentialtreatmentin
favourofparticulargroups.Inpursuitofthatconcern,theCourtemphasizedthehighstandardsofproof
necessarytomakeoutadisparateimpactclaim.Evenmoresignificantly,itaffirmedthatthepolicyof
leavingpromotiondecisionstotheuncheckeddiscretionoflowerlevelsupervisorsshouldnotitselfgiverise
toanyinferenceofdiscriminatoryconductcontrarytoTitleVIIoftheCivilRightsAct1964.Itisnot
necessaryorappropriatetopursueherethequestionofwhetherthatisanappropriaterestrictionupon
thescopeofantidiscriminationlegislation.Itis,however,importanttoappreciatethatsuchadoctrine
doeseffectivelylimittheextenttowhichantidiscriminationlegislation,beingsoconstrued,reallygetsto
thecoreoftheproblemofcontrollingPAsystems.
Nevertheless,evenifsignificantrestrictionsremainupontheabilityofdiscriminationlegislationtodeal
withthelegalcontrolofPAsystems,itisclearthatithasbeenthemostsuccessfulpointofentryintothe
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wholesetofissuessurroundingtheircontrol.Infact,discriminationlegislationhashadasufficientimpact
uponPAsystemstoraisethequestion:whatarethefundamentalprinciplesaccordingtowhichthose
systemsshouldbecontrolled?
THEPRINCIPLESOFCONTROLOVERTHEDISCIPLINARYFUNCTIONSOFPASYSTEMS
ThepresentdiscussionoflegalcontrolsoverPAsystemssuggestscertainprinciplesaccordingtowhichthat
controlmightbeexercised,suchastheprinciplesof:(a)transparencyand(b)objectivity.Althoughtheir
applicationisinsomedegreeusefulandconstructive,furtherprinciplesneedtobearticulatedifadequate
controlistobeexercisedoverPAsystemsfromadisciplinaryperspective.Thiscanbestbedoneunderthe
headingof:(c)thedignityandautonomyoftheemployee.
THEPRINCIPLEOFTRANSPARENCY
ThecaselawoftheEuropeanCourtofJusticeconcerningtheapplicationoftheECEqualPayDirective
providesamostinterestingillustrationofthecontroloftheworkingofaPAsystemaccordingtothe
principleoftransparency.(14)Itisworthexaminingitinalittledetail.TheDanfosscaseconcernedthe
interpretationoftheEqualPayDirectiveoncertainquestionsreferredtotheEuropeanCourtofJusticeby
aDanishindustrialarbitrationtribunaladjudicatingunderDanishlawonwhetherthepaysystematthe
Danfossundertakingwasdiscriminatoryagainstwomen.(15)Thepaysysteminquestionwasconstructed
onthebasisofpaygradingdeterminedbyjobclassification.Withineachgrade,therewasprovisionfor
additionalpaymentstoindividualstobeawardedonthebasesoftheemployee'svocationaltraining,
seniorityand"flexibility".Theapplicationofthecriterionof"flexibility"intheoperationofthePAsystem
wasusedtodeterminetheawardofmeritorperformancerelatedpay.
TheEuropeanCourtresortedtotheprincipleoftransparencytocontrolthediscriminatoryoperationofthe
Danfosspaymentsystemaccordingtothefollowingreasoning:astatisticalsurveyrelatingtoareasonably
largenumberofDanfossemployeesshowedasignificantdifferencebetweentheaveragepayofmaleand
offemaleworkerswithintherelevantpaygrades.TheCourtruledthatwheretheapplicationofapayment
systemischaracterizedbyatotallackoftransparency,andwhereloweraveragepayforfemaleworkers
hasbeenestablished,theburdenofproofisontheemployertoshowthatthepaypracticeisnot
discriminatory.IfthisparticularpaymentsystemlackedtransparencyandtheDanishindustrial
arbitrationcourtultimatelyheldthatitdid(16)thatlackoftransparencywasinpartduetothe
"flexibility"criterion,thelawfulnessofwhichtheEuropeanCourtwentontoconsidermorefullyaccording
toreasoningwhichisverysignificantforourpresentargument.
Inordertodecideuponthelawfulnessthatisthefreedomfromunlawfuldiscriminationofthe
flexibilitycriterion,theCourtidentifiedanambiguityattheheartofthatcriterionasitwasbeingusedin
thiscase.TheCourtnotedthat:"Inordertoapplythecriterionofflexibilitytheemployerwouldmakean
overallassessmentofthequalityofworkcarriedoutbyhisemployees.Forthispurpose,hewouldtake
intoaccount,inparticular,theirzealatwork,theirsenseofinitiativeandtheamountofworkdone."(17)
IntheviewoftheCourtthereweretwopossibilitiesastothewayinwhichtheflexibilitycriterionwasthus
beingapplied:
(1)thattheflexibilitycriterionwasbeingusedtorewardthequalityofworkcarriedoutbytheemployee
and
(2)thatitwasbeingusedtorewardtheadaptabilityoftheemployeetovariableworkschedulesandplaces
ofwork.
Theoutcomedifferedaccordingtowhichofthosetwoalternativesapplied.IntheviewoftheCourt,the
firstuseoftheflexibilitycriterionhadtobeunlawfullydiscriminatoryifitsapplicationwassystematically
unfavourabletowomenbecauseitwasinconceivablethattheworkcarriedoutbyfemaleworkerswould
generallybeofalowerqualitythanthatcarriedoutbymaleworkers.Sinceaqualitytest,fairlyapplied,
couldnotconceivablyyieldaresultwhichwasgloballyunfavourabletowomen,theexistenceofsucha
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resultcouldonlybebecausethetesthadbeenappliedinanabusivemanner.Thesecondusemightor
mightnotbeunlawfullydiscriminatory,accordingtowhethertheemployercouldobjectivelyjustifyitsuse
byshowingthatadaptabilitywasofimportancetotheperformanceofthespecificdutiesentrustedtothe
workerconcerned.Thelackoftransparencyofthispaymentsystemconsisted,inlargemeasure,inthe
factthattheemployeehadnowayofestablishingwhichofthosetwoalternativesappliedandtherefore
whethertherewasunlawfuldiscriminationgoingonornot.
Thisanalysissuggeststhattheprincipleoftransparency,whilevaluableinexposingsomecrucial
ambiguitiesinthePAsystembeingusedinthatcase,dependedforitseffectivenessuponthefurther
principlethatunequaltreatmentofmenandwomenmustbeabusiveunlessitcanbeobjectivelyjustified.
Thissuggeststhattheprincipleoftransparencyasusedherewasmorecloselytiedtothecontrolofa
certaintypeofgroupdiscrimination,namelysexdiscrimination,thanmightonthefaceofitappear.This
indicatesthatifwearetomakeheadwayinourexaminationofPAsystemsfromthedifferentperspective
oftheircontrolasdisciplinarysystems,wemustpursuefurtherthenotionof"objectivity"asaprinciple
whichmaybeofmoredirectutilityforourpurposes.
THEPRINCIPLEOFOBJECTIVITY
ThroughoutthediscussionofPAsystemsanddiscriminationlawwefindthatobjectivityisputforwardasa
majorgoalorrequirement,andthereforeasatestoftheircontrol.Preoccupationwithobjectivityasa
criterionoflegitimacyforPAsystemsisalsoevidentinwritingsonthesubjectinpersonnelmanagement,
industrialrelationsor,latterly,humanresourcemanagement.Thefollowingsectionisconcernedwiththe
questions:Whatdoesobjectivitymean?Isitenforceable,orevenattainableinrelationtoPAsystems
viewedfromadisciplinaryperspective?.Itwillbearguedthatobjectivitymaybeunattainableand,evenif
itwere,itmightnotbeasadequateaprincipleforthecontrolofPAsystemsasisoftensupposed.
ThereisanextensiveliteratureofcriticismofPAsystems.(18)Oneofthemajorstartingpointsisan
article,nowregardedasaclassicofitskind,publishedbyDouglasMcGregorin1957entitled"Anuneasy
lookatperformanceappraisal".(19)Oneofthemajorconcernsofmuchoftheliteratureonappraisal
systemsistoidentifyandstigmatizethenonobjectivecharacteristicsofparticularPAsystemsandto
suggestsuperiorones.Averyusefulcatalogueofthemainappraisaltechniqueswhoserelativemeritsare
thusdebatedisprovidedbytheACASAdvisoryBookletonEmployeeAppraisal:(20)
Rating:anumberofemployeecharacteristicsareratedonascalewhichmayrangefrom"outstanding"to
"unacceptable".
Comparisonwithobjectives:employeesandtheirmanagersagreeobjectives.Theappraisalisbasedon
howfarthoseobjectiveshavebeenmet.
Criticalincidents:theappraiserrecordsincidentsofemployees'positiveandnegativebehaviourduringa
givenperiod.
Narrativereport:theappraiserdescribestheindividual'sworkperformanceinhisorherownwords.
Behaviourallyanchoredratingscales(BARS):agroupofratingscalesaredevelopedwhicharecustom
madeforeachjob.
Notsurprisinglyperhaps,thesimpleratingmethodwouldgenerallybeperceivedasthemostsubjectiveof
these,whiletheBARSmethodwouldbeseenasthemostobjectiveandprecise.(21)
ThesearchforobjectivityinPAsystemshasalsoledtotheidentificationofanumberofwellknown
"distortions"intheappraisalprocess(22)suchasthe"haloeffect"(23)whichoccurswhereanassessment
ononecriterioninfluencesassessmentsonothercriteriaortheDoppelgangereffect(24)wherebythe
appraiserrespondsfavourablytoperceivedsimilaritieswiththeappraisee.Thosewhohaveidentifiedsuch
"distortions"havenodoubthopedtoachievegreaterobjectivityinappraisalbyeliminatingthese
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subjectivefactors.Furthermore,therehasbeenelaborateconsideration,especiallyinthecontextof
discriminationissues,ofhowtovalidateperformanceappraisalsbydemonstratingtheircompliancewith
externalcriteriaofobjectivitysuchasthosederivedfromjobanalysis.(25)Inapowerfulargument
developedinhisrecentarticle,(26)KeithGrintchallengedthewholenotionthatPAsystemscanbemade
objectivebytechniquesofthesekinds.Hisargumentisthat,atafundamentallevel,theidentityofthe
individualperson,andthereforeoftheindividualworker,isnotasingleobjectivefactbutaseriesof
imagesdifferentlyconstructedbydifferentspectators.Sohecontendsthat:
Theimpossibilityofbeingabletoreducethecomplexnatureofanyindividualtoaseriesofscalesonatick
listofcharacteristicsorbehavioursstronglysuggeststhatthequestshouldbeabandonedratherthan
refinedyetmore.(27)
Heseekstoshownotmerelythatthesearchforobjectivityisfruitless,butthatitcanhaveadverse
consequencesfor,heargues,insituationswhererivalconstructionsoftheidentityoftheindividual(in
otherwordsrivalwaysofappraisingtheindividual)competewitheachother,itisnotthateveryone's
interpretationsareasgoodaseveryoneelse's,butthat"themostpowerfullyresourcedrenderingofreality
istheonethatprevails[...]anddelegitimatesallalternatives".Thismeans,hesays,that:
Essentially,itisnotusuallywhattheappraisedthinkshastranspiredwhichaccountsforhisorher
subsequentrewardpackage,itiswhattheappraiserthinksthatnormallycarriesmoreweightandwith
theweighttherewardorthepunishment."(28)
SowestarttoseehowaPAsystemwhichmight,byconventionalstandards,bejudgedan"objective"one
mayinfactprovidethebasisforasubjectivedisciplinarysystemsustainedbysuperiorityofresources
ratherthanbythesuperiorityoftheevaluationswhichitproduces.
KeithGrintgoesontoconcludethatmanyoftheproblemsofPAsystemsmightbereducedoreven
eliminatedifdownwardappraisalofsubordinatesbysuperordinateswerecombinedwithupwardappraisal
ofsuperordinatesbysubordinates.(29)Heputsforwardupwardappraisalnotasbeingmore"objective"
thandownwardappraisalforinhisviewobjectivityisanillusorygoalanywaybutasbeing,atleast,
moredemocraticorparticipative,andsoabetterwayofmakingPAsystemsworkinanintegrativeway.As
anargumentaboutindustrialdemocracy,thatviewperhapsgoesbeyondthescopeofthepresentpaper,
thoughitdoesservetopointupthedisciplinaryconnotationsofdownwardappraisalsystemsby
contrastingthemwiththemoreempoweringeffectsofupwardappraisals.Italsoleadstothequestionof
theinadequacyof"objectivity"asabasisforthecontrolofPAsystems,whichweshallnowseekto
advanceonestagefurther.
ThusfarwehavelookedatargumentssuggestingthatobjectivitymaybeanunattainablegoalforPA
systems,andthattheillusionofobjectivitymay,attheextremes,evenhelptosustainarbitrarybehaviour
byemployers.OnecanalsoargueforadeepersetofmisgivingsabouttheclaimsofPAsystemstobe
inherentlyobjective.Inafamousworkofindustrialsociologypublishedin1974,AlanFoxdevelopeda
notionoftrustdynamicsinworkrelations.(30)Hecontrastedtwotypesofworkrolepatterns,thelow
discretionsyndromeandthehighdiscretionsyndrome,andsoughttodrawattentiontothedangersofa
lowtrustdynamicinworkrelations:thatisadynamictowardshighlyprescribed,lowdiscretionworkroles
playedoutinanatmosphereofgrowingmutualdistrustbetweensubordinatesandsuperordinates.(31)
ItisveryinterestingfromourpresentpointofviewthatAlanFoxdescribesthefundamentalfeatureofthe
lowdiscretionsyndromeasbeingthat:
Theroleoccupantperceivessuperordinatesasbehavingasiftheybelievehecannotbetrusted,ofhisown
volition,todeliveraworkperformancewhichfullyaccordswiththegoalstheywishtoseepursuedorthe
valuestheywishtoseeobserved.Their"behaviour",inthiscontext,referstothewaysinwhichthey
design,forexample,histaskrulesandthesupervisory,inspection,andothercontrolsystemswhich
governhim.
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Wherethatsyndromeprevails,hegoesontosay,"Notonlyarethejobactivitiesthemselvesspecifically
defined:theincumbentisalsosubjectedtoclosesupervisionand/orhedgedaboutwithimpersonalrulesor
proceduresdesignedtocheckandmonitorhisperformance".(32)Inhisargument,thelowdiscretion
syndrometendstobringaboutthedeprofessionalisationofprofessionalworkroles,approximatingthemto
theworkrolesofrankandfileproductionworkers.(33)
Inreadingthisdescriptionofthelowdiscretionsyndromeandofthemechanismsassociatedwiththat
syndrome,itishardnottoseesomeperformanceappraisalsystemsbeingportrayed.Itisimportant,
however,nottooverstatethispoint.MostPAsystemsarearticulatedorpresentedinsuchawayasto
suggestthattheyaimtocreateahightrust,notalowtrust,syndrome.Nodoubtmanyofthose
formulatingandoperatingsuchsystemsaregenuinelyconcernedwiththeempowermentandself
developmentoftheindividualworker,andmaybesuccessfulinusingthesystemstothoseends.
Nevertheless,AlanFox'slineofargumentdoesshowhowaPAsystemmay,inpractice,haveadisciplinary
functionandarepressiveeffect.Moreover,hisargumentsuggeststhatthemoreaPAsystemattemptsto
be"objective",themoreitmayapproximatetotheimpersonalprocedureswhichcharacterisethelow
discretionsyndromeaswherecrudenumericalperformanceindicatorsarepreferredtomoreevaluative
criteriabecausetheyareeasiertoapply.
Thereare,then,reallimitationsupontheadequacyoftheprincipleofobjectivityasabasisforcontrolling
thedisciplinaryeffectsofPAsystems.However,theforegoingdiscussionalsosuggeststhepossibilityof
otherprinciplesofcontrolbaseduponthedignityandautonomyoftheindividualworker.Thesewillbe
examinedinthenextsubsection.
THEPRINCIPLESOFTHEDIGNITYANDAUTONOMYOFTHEINDIVIDUALWORKER
Ithasbeenarguedintheprecedingsubsectionsthattheprinciplesoftransparencyandofobjectivitydo
notofferapanaceafortheillsofPAsystems.Itwouldclearlybeoverambitioustoarguethatprinciplesas
generalas"thedignityandautonomyoftheindividualworker"mightsucceedwhereothersappeartofail.
Nevertheless,thedignityandautonomyprinciplesmayatleastidentify,moreaccuratelythanother
principles,therealproblemsofcontrollingthedisciplinarydimensionsofPAsystems,andmaybeginto
suggestwaysforwardtothelegalregulationofPAsystems.
Anexcellentaccountoftheprinciplesofthedignityandautonomyoftheindividualworkerisgivenby
HughCollinsinhecontextofthelawofterminationofemployment,wherehearguesthattheseprinciples
provideabasisforunderstandingthesenseinwhichthelawshouldbeseekingtoupholdjobsecurity,and
hencetobringaboutjusticeindismissal.(34)Inhisargument,therighttodignityisinfringedbyactsor
omissionswhichfailtotreatindividualswithconcernandrespect,forexamplebyfailingtocomplywith
standardsofproceduralfairness.Ontheotherhand,thereisnodisrespectfortheindividualwherethe
employer'sactionisarationalexerciseofdisciplinarypowerwhichisnecessarytosupportefficient
production.(35)
Pursuingasimilarapproachwithregardtototheideaofautonomy,HughCollinsarguesthatit"suggests
aroleforthelawtopromotesocialstructuresatworkthroughwhichtheopportunitiesforpeopletobring
meaningtotheirlivesthroughworkareenhanced."Forhim,thevalueofautonomyliesinitsabilityto
introducetheruleoflawintotheworkplacedisciplinarycode.Heinsists,forexample,thatthecodeshould
bepublishedandmadeavailabletoemployeesandthatitshouldbeimpartiallyapplied.Therightto
autonomyisinfringed,hemaintains,bydisciplinaryrulesoractionswhicharenotjustifiedbytheneedto
secureefficientcoordinationofwork.Ontheotherhand,liketheideaofdignityatwork,theideaof
autonomydoesnotextendtogivingtheindividualworkerapropertyrightinhisorherjob.(36)
Asthusarticulated,theseideasof"dignity"and"autonomy"areveryhelpfulinidentifyingthegoals
whichemploymentlawmightappropriatelypursueinrelationtoperformanceappraisalsystems.Theideas
alsoindicatewaysinwhichperformanceappraisalmaybesaidtobeabusivelyemployedwhereitfailsto
respectandupholdthedignityandautonomyoftheindividualworkerwithoutanyadequatejustification
forsodoing.Infact,manyoftheactualorpotentialabusesofPAsystemswhichwehaveexaminedinthe
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courseofthispapercanusefullyberegardedasencroachmentsuponthedignityandautonomyofthe
individualworker.Thiswouldbethecase,forinstance,wherePAsystemsoperatetoalterthecontractual
rightsorexpectationsofindividualemployeeswithoutitbeingclearthatthisiswhatishappeningor
wheretheuseofaPAsysteminvolvesafailuretorespecttheconfidentialityofinformationaboutthe
employeeorfailstoallowtheemployeeaccesstoinformationheldabouthimorherorwherePAispart
ofapatternofemploymentrelationswhichrestrictsthefreedomoftheindividualemployeetoassociatein
atradeunionortoenjoytheprotectionofcollectivebargainingorwhereaPAsystemfailstorespectthe
individualityoftheemployeebytreatingherorhimassimplyamemberofagroupwhichisdisfavoured,
whetherthatgroupisdenotedbygender,ageorethnicity.
TheprinciplesofrespectforthedignityandautonomyoftheindividualworkeralsohelpthescrutinyofPA
systemsfromaperspectivewhichseesthemasdisciplinarysystems.Thisisimportantsincetheabuseof
disciplinarypowersisacrucialcaseoffailuretorespectindividualdignityandautonomy.Theideasof
dignityandautonomyworkwell,moreover,asprinciplesofcontroloverthedifferentdimensionsofPA
systems,seenintheirdisciplinaryaspect,whichwedistinguishedearlieroninthisarticleas"criteria",
"process"and"sanctions".Thustheprinciplesofdignityandautonomyasserttheimportanceinturnof
clearlydeclaredcriteria,dueprocessandproportionalityofsanctions.
Finally,however,thekeycontributionwhichthoseprinciplescanmaketoourunderstandingoftheneed
forlegalcontroloverabusesofperformanceappraisalistoilluminatethecentralironyorparadoxthatPA
systems,whichclaimtoempoweranddeveloptheindividualemployee,mayattimesoperatesoasto
underminethedignityandcurtailtheautonomyoftheindividualatwork.Anyoneconcernedwiththe
establishmentoftheproperroleofemploymentlawwhowishestoseeemploymentlawoperatinginthe
contextofabroadgeneralconcernwithhumanrightsattheworkplacewouldseethisasamatter
requiringseriousandsustainedattention.
1ThisarticlearisesoutofapaperpreparedfortheILOconcerningworkplacedisciplinaryrulesand
proceduresintheUnitedKingdomM.R.Freedland:Workplacedisciplinaryrulesandprocedures:National
pageronthesituationintheUK(Geneva,ILO,unpublished,May1991).
2Ibid.,para.9.2.
3Compare,forinstance,thesectiononAppraisalSchemesintheEmploymenthandbookoftheUK
Advisory,ConciliationandArbitrationService(London,ACAS,1990)onp.6,especiallythepassageheaded
"Whyhaveanappraisalscheme?".
4Cf.thefollowingdefinitionsof"discipline"inthesecondeditionoftheOxfordEnglishDictionary:"a.The
ordermaintainedandobservedamongpupils,orotherpersonsundercontrolorcommand[...]b.Asystem
ormethodforthemaintenanceoforderasystemofrulesforconduct."
5Advisory,ConciliationandArbitrationService,Advisorybookletonemployeeappraisal(London,ACAS,
1988),p.14.
6Thus,forinstance,theACASAdvisoryhandbookonemployeeappraisal:"Ajobtitleandabrief
descriptionofthemainobjectivesanddutiesofthejobshouldfeatureatthebeginningoftheemployee
appraisalform.Thejobdescriptionshouldbeagreedbetweenthemanagerandtheemployeeandshould
estimatethepercentageoftimetakenupwitheachoftheduties.Thejobdescriptionshouldhelp
appraiserstofocusattentionontheemployee'sperformanceatworkandtoavoidassessingcharacter"
(op.cit.,p.13).
7Directive91/533/EC:OJNo.L288/32,18.10.91seealsoJonClarkandMarkHall:"TheCinderella
directive?Employeerightstoinformationaboutconditionsapplicabletotheircontractoremployment
relationship",inIndustrialLawJournal(London),Vol.21,No.2,June1992,pp.106118.
8CompareACAS(1988),op.cit.,p.33.
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9UnitedKingdomCourtofAppeal,30Apr.1993.
10See,forinstance,EEOCv.SandiaCorporation639F.2d600(10thCir.1980)Misrettav.Sandia
Corporation649F.2d1383(10thCir.1981).Theauthorisindebtedfortheseexamples,andformany
otherinsights,toanextremelyinformativearticlebyCarynBeckDudleyandGlennMcEvoy:"Performance
appraisalsanddiscriminationsuits:Docourtspayattentiontovalidity?",inEmployeeResponsibilitiesand
RightsJournal(London),No.4,1991,p.149.
11Compare,forexample,T.A.Basnight,andB.W.Wolkinson:"Evaluatingmanagerialperformance:Is
yourappraisalsystemlegal?",inEmployeeRelationsLawJournal(NewYork),No.3,1977,p.240Martin
andBertol:"Thelegalramificationsofperformanceappraisal:Anupdate",inibid.No.17,1991,p.257.
12758F.2d1462(11thCir.1985).
13108S.Ct.2777(USSupremeCourt,1988).
14ECCouncilDirective75/117,OJ4519,10.2.75
15NandelsogKontorfunktionaerernesForbundiDanmarkv.DanskArbejdsgiverforening,inIndustrial
RelationsLawReports(London)532(1989).
16SeeKirstenPrecht:"DanfossintheDanishCourts",inIndustrialLawJournal(London),VI21,No.4,
Dec.1992,p.323.
17IndustrialRelationsLawReports,No.532,1989,p.536,para.18.
18SeeespeciallyKeithGrint:"What'swrongwithperformanceappraisals?Acritiqueandasuggestion",in
HumanResourceManagementJournal(London),Vol.3,No.3,Spring1993,pp.6177,andthematerials
therecited.
19HarvardBusinessReview(Harvard,Connecticut),MayJune1957,pp.8994.
20ACAS(1988),op.cit,p.12.Theextractquotedhereisasummaryofafulleranalysiswhichappears
elsewhereinthebook.
21Cf.ibid.,pp.1216.
22SeeKeithGrint,op.cit.,atp.63.
23ThisisattributedtoJ.P.Guilford:Psychometricmethods(NewYork,McGrawHill,1954).
24ThisisattributedtoK.N.WexleyandG.A.Yukl:Organisationalbehaviourandpersonnelpsychology,
(Homewood,Illinois,RichardD.Irwin,1977).
25SeeBeckDudleyandMcEvoy,op.cit.atpp.1545.
26"What'swrongwithperformanceappraisals?"(op.cit.).
27Ibid.,p.5.
28KeithGrint,op.cit.,p.69.
29Ibid.,pp.7075.
30AlanFox:Beyondcontract:Work,powerandtrustrelations(London,FaberandFaber,1974).
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31Ibid.:seeespeciallyChapter1:"Discretion,statusandrewardsinwork".
32Ibid.,p.26.
33Ibid.,pp.2930.
34HughCollins:Justiceindismissal(Oxford,ClarendonPress,1992),esp.Chapter1:"Harshbutfair".
35Ibid.,pp.1617.
36Ibid.,pp.1921.
*MarkFreeland,FacultyofLaw,UniversityofOxford.
CopyrightInternationalLabourOffice1993

Details
Subject

Regulation
Performanceappraisal
Employmentpractices
Employers
Discrimination
Discipline

Classification

6100:Humanresourceplanning
4310:Regulation

Title

Performanceappraisalanddisciplinaryaction:Thecase
for

Author

Freedland,Mark

Publicationtitle

InternationalLabourReview

Volume

132

Issue

Pages

491

Numberofpages

16

Publicationyear

1993

Publicationdate

1993

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Year

1993

Publisher

InternationalLabourOrganization,representedbythe
InternationalLabourOffice(ILO)

Placeofpublication

Geneva

Countryofpublication

Switzerland

Publicationsubject

LaborUnions,
BusinessAndEconomicsLaborAndIndustrialRelations,
OccupationsAndCareers

ISSN

00207780

Sourcetype

ScholarlyJournals

Languageofpublication

English

Documenttype

PERIODICAL

Accessionnumber

00789190,01793206

ProQuestdocumentID

224006418

DocumentURL

http://search.proquest.com/docview/224006418?
accountid=31434

Copyright

CopyrightInternationalLabourOffice1993

Lastupdated

20150223

Database

ProQuestResearchLibrary

Copyright2015ProQuestLLC.Allrightsreserved.TermsandConditions

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