Professional Documents
Culture Documents
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the 2003 Supreme Court ruling that upheld the
University of Michigan law school's affirmative action policies, 65
corporations filed amicus curiae briefs endorsing the school's admission
policies that discriminate against white applicants. [1] The 1991 Civil Rights Act,
a major intensification of affirmative action enforced by the federal
government, was also endorsed by large corporations. Not only corporations
but also and even more obviously the major political leaders of the country
and the major cultural voices either explicitly approve of affirmative action
and denounce anyone who opposes it, or refuse to resist or question it.
Similarly, most of the leading authorities in the United States what is
popularly called the "Establishment," including political, media, academic,
and business leadership circlesoppose publicly displaying or honoring the
Confederate flag and other symbols of the white American heritage (the Custer
battlefield at Little Big Horn, the celebration of Columbus Day, the playing of
"Dixie," etc.) and support non-white demands for the removal or
transformation of such symbols. Large businesses, foundations, and
universities are in the forefront of mandatory "sensitivity training,"
multiculturalist indoctrination, and efforts to portray white racial and cultural
identity as a source of pathology, extremism, repression, and violence, and to
instill feelings of guilt for white, European, Christian civilization and
achievements. Some years ago the Budweiser company sponsored a series of
advertisements that helped popularize and legitimize various myths of
Afrocentric propaganda, such as the claims that the Semitic Carthaginian
general Hannibal, various kings of ancient Egypt, and the last Macedonian
queen of Egypt, Cleopatra, were all Negroesclaims known to be
preposterously contrary to historical fact. No company of that scale in recent
times has ever sponsored analogous ads glorifying the Confederacy or the
white exploration and conquest of North America or white contributions to
science, scholarship, and letters or any other achievement of whites, even by
means of more or less accurate history, let alone by outright lies. In 2000,
Wal-Mart and most other large corporate food chains ceased selling a
barbecue sauce locally manufactured by South Carolina businessman Maurice
Bessinger, on the grounds that Mr. Bessinger's restaurant in Columbia, South
Carolina displayed the Confederate flag and distributed pamphlets that
supposedly justified Southern slavery. Spokesmen for Wal-Mart claimed that
Mr. Bessinger's sauce was dropped because their chain did "not condone
slavery in any way"although at the same time, as Business Week (October 2,
2000) disclosed, Wal-Mart was selling women's apparel known to have been
manufactured by slave labor in Communist China.
One could continue indefinitely the catalogue of how large corporations and
their executives, the federal and larger state and urban governments and their
leaders, and the major academic, intellectual, artistic, entertainment,
publishing, and journalistic institutions and personali-tiesthe dominant
culture of the United Statesconsistently support anti-white causes and
promote the myths, claims, and interests of nonwhites at the expense of
whites.
The conventional accusation against the American Establishment from the
political left is that it is "racist" and fosters "white supremacy" in order to
perpetuate the domination and exploitation of the nonwhite peoples of this
country and the world by the largely white ruling class. That accusation is so
brazenly contrary to the anti-white policies, rhetoric, and behavior in which
the most powerful forces in American society consistently engage that it
not been a significant force prior to its invention but became and remained a
power-yielding technology around which dominating social groups and
conquering societies centered for thousands of years afterwards.
If a social force is efficient at wielding power or control over other people, then
the group that controls the social force and other groups with which it is allied
will constitute a "ruling class" (Mosca's term) or "elite" (Pareto's term), and
classical elite theory assumes that normally a ruling class or elite will exercise
power mainly for its own benefits and in its own interests. It should be
understood that the control of "the state" or the formal apparatus of
government is only one means and the state itself only one instrument by
which a ruling class exercises power, and the extent to which a particular
ruling class will rely on the state depends on its interests and the kinds of
social forces it controls. It will also make use of economic and cultural power
based on its control of economic forces, or what Marx called the "instruments
of production and exchange" (land, capital, technology, industrial plants,
commerce, financial institutions, etc.), as well as cultural forces that
essentially regulate the production and dissemination of information, values,
and ideas within a society (in pre-modern societies, this means principally
religion, but also the production of art, literature, music, scholarship, science,
and entertainment through publishing, education, journalism, broadcasting,
film, etc.). The power of a ruling class or elite is therefore not merely political
power in the narrow sense of control of the formal state, elected and
appointive offices, the administrative agencies, and the instruments of force
(the armed forces and law enforcement services) but is structuralimbedded
in the structure of the society it rules. A ruling class will usually tend to rely on
one or another particular segment of the social structurethe state, the
The truth is that they answer a real need in man's social nature; and this need,
so universally felt, of governing and knowing that one is governed not on the
basis of mere material or intellectual force, but on the basis of a moral
principle, has beyond any doubt a practical and a real importance. [4]
One of the major differences between the theory of elites and simpleminded
conspiracy theories is that the latter almost always postulate hidden groups of
conspirators who do not believe in the ideas they use to gull and manipulate
the masses. In elite theory, political formulas tend to become ideologies that
take on a life of their own and push behavior of their own accord, without
conscious or deliberate fraud or calculation of interests by those who accept
them.
The theory of elites as formulated by Mosca and Pareto can easily be
illustrated by the example of medieval and early modern European and British
society. In that society, political, economic, and cultural power was largely in
the hands of the feudal and post-feudal aristocracies that controlled the land,
which yielded both economic wealth and political and military power through
the system of feudalism and institutions derived from feudalism. The power of
the European and British aristocracies of this era, from the Middle Ages down
to the Industrial Revolution, was mainly based on control of the land, its
agricultural wealth, and the cultural and political system that reflected and
supported landed power.
The dominant ideology or "political formula" of the period was expressed in
the doctrine of what was later called the "Great Chain of Being," a theory of the
universe that derived from Plato and justified hierarchy both in nature and
society. It is found throughout the literature and thought of the era. [5] Only
when the social force of land ownership and the wealth and power it produced
was displaced by the rise of a different social force in the form of industrially
and commercially based wealth and power in the nineteenth century did the
older aristocracies of Europe and Britain begin to decline and be replaced by a
new elite, based on industrial, commercial, and financial wealth.
It is a basic tenet of the classical theory of elites that all human societies have
elites, that there is really no such thing as political or social equality or
"consent of the governed," and that what is called "democracy" in any literal
sense is largely an illusion. As James Burnham wrote in describing the role of
elites and ruling classes in human society:
From the point of view of the theory of the ruling class, a society is the society
of its ruling class. A nation's strength or weakness, its culture, its powers of
endurance, its prosperity, its decadence, depend in the first instance upon the
nature of its ruling class. More particularly, the way in which to study a nation,
to understand it, to predict what will happen to it, requires first of all and
primarily an analysis of the ruling class. Political history and political science
are thus predominantly the history and science of ruling classes, their origin,
development, composition, structure, and changes.[6]
Political scientist James Meisel argued that an elite must exhibit what he
called the "Three C's: Consciousness, Coherence, and Conspiracy." This is a
helpful but also perhaps confusing formula, especially its third term. He
meant that all the "members of an elite are alert to their group interest or
interests; that this alertness is in turn caused or affected by a sense, implicit or
explicit, of group or class solidarity; and last, that this solidarity is expressed
in a common will to action.[7]These traits may be said to establish the common
identity and unity of the elite or ruling class, but the elite must not only be
"alert" to its interests as a group and conscious of itself as a group, but also
able to make its interests prevail over those of other, competing groupsi.e.,
to possess actual power. In other words, the two essential characteristics of an
elite/ruling class are what may be called Unity andDominanceunity in that
it needs to cohere around its interests and to agree on what its interests are
and (in general) how to pursue them, and dominance in that it must be able to
make its interests prevail over those of rival groups.
Many social theorists in the Western world today argue that the kind of
unitary ruling class that Mosca and Pareto described is no longer really
possible in the kind of advanced industrialized society that prevails in the
West and that there are too many competing power centers for unitary elites
like the old British and European aristocracies to develop and endure. These
theorists mainly support the idea of what they call "strategic elites," a number
of different elites within the same society that may control power in certain
domains but actually compete with and against each other and through their
conflict create what is essentially political freedom. Thus, elites in such
institutions as corporations, unions, and government exist but are said to be
largely separate and distinct and supposedly compete against each other, as do
the different political parties and their elites, as well as other institutions in
the economy, politics, and the culture.[8] However, while there are obvious
structural differences between contemporary elites today and those of preindustrial societies, this version of elite theory, often called the "pluralist
model," tends to exaggerate the differences among the "strategic elites" and
the degree to which they compete or conflict with each other. It also tends to
minimize the similarities among "strategic elites" and the common interests
they share in excluding from power any groups or social forces with
antagonistic interests, ideologies, and agendas. In other words, in my view, the
basic error of the "pluralist," or "strategic elite," school is that it
underestimates the unity of the American ruling class. Remarks such as
George Wallace's line in 1968 that "there's not a dime's worth of difference"
between the Republican and Democratic Parties, the term "Republicrat" as a
colloquialism for the indistinguishability of the two parties, and the wisecrack
that what American politics needs is not a "third party" but a second party all
reflect the perception among the politically alienated of the essential unity of
the two major political vehicles of the American ruling class.
Moreover, classical elite theory does not deny that different groups and
sections within a unitary ruling class can disagree, compete, or conflict with
each other, sometimes even to the point of waging civil war. The English Wars
of the Roses of the fifteenth century, the English Civil War of the seventeenth
century, and indeed the American War for Independence of the late eighteenth
century are all instances of violent conflicts that originated and largely
remained within the elites of the day. Such conflicts occur when different
sections of a unified ruling class come to disagree on what their interests are
or on how to pursue them, with the result of social breakdown and internal
war.
Although most mainstream social scientists in the United States today would
not endorse it, classical elite theory is useful in answering the question "who
rules America," and its main application to American society, the theory of the
managerial revolution as developed by James Burnham, was concerned to
deal with that very question.
other organizations that were immense in size, scale, and technical complexity
and dwarfed their institutional ancestors of the declining capitalist era.
"Management" in the sense of the body of technical and managerial skills that
enabled these large, complex organizations to exist and function constituted a
"social force," control of which enabled the formation of a new elite.
These mass organizations are far more powerful with respect to society than
most of the older, smaller scale, and simpler ones, and within them, managers
possess the real power because only they possess the skills by which the new
mass organizations can be directed and operated. With respect to corporations
in the economy, the stockown-ers, no matter how concentrated their
ownership of company stock may be, simply do not and cannot perform the
necessary managerial and technical functions on which the corporation
depends, unless they make a special effort to acquire the needed managerial
skills through education and training, and not all that many stockowners from
the old capitalist upper class do so. As business historian Alfred D. Chandler,
Jr., who substantiated much of Burnham's analysis of modern managerial
corporations, writes, although "wealthy families...are the beneficiaries of
managerial capitalism," there is "little evidence that these families make basic
decisions concerning the operations of modern capitalistic enterprises and of
the economy in which they operate," and "members of the entrepreneurial
family rarely became active in top management unless they themselves were
trained as professional managers.[12] As historian Geoffrey Barraclough
described the emergence of these new forces in the economy:
The new industrial techniques, unlike the old, necessitated the creation of
large-scale undertakings and the concentration of the population in vast urban
agglomerations.... The small-scale family businesses, which were typical of the
first phase of industrialism, [did not possess] the means to finance the
installation of new, more complicated and more expensive machinery [or
indeed the skills to manage it on the necessary scale].[13]
But the managers are by no means confined to the corporate elite; those
possessing technical and managerial skills are also dominant within the state
itself as the managerial bureaucracy and the mass cultural institutions, and
thus they become an increasingly unified and dominant class, relying on the
same managerial skills and sharing a common perceived interest and a
common mentality, worldview, and ideology.
The major common interest that unites the managerial class is its need to
extend and perpetuate the demand for the skills and functions on which its
power and social rewards depend. The managers pursue that interest by
seeking to ensure that the mass organizations they control, which require the
skills and functions that only the managers can provide, are preserved and
extended. Large corporations must displace and dominate small businesses. A
large, centralized, bureaucratic state must displace and dominate small,
localized, and decentralized government. Mass media and communications
conglomerates and mass universities must displace and dominate smaller,
local newspapers, publishers, colleges, and schools. Moreover, the elites that
controlled these older and smaller institutions must also be displaced as the
ruling class of the larger society and their ideology and cultural values
discredited and rejected.
The managerial revolution therefore consists in the protracted social and
political process by which the emerging new managerial class displaces the old
ruling class of traditional capitalist or bourgeois society. On the institutional
come to be known as "liberalism," and the main ideology of the old capitalist
elite, which came to be known as "conservatism." The political fulfillment of
the managerial revolution occurred in the early twentieth century, with a
strong start under Woodrow Wilson but really culminating under Franklin
Roosevelt in the New Deal and World War II era, and the struggle for social
power between the new managerial liberalism and the old capitalist
conservatism is evident in the political and cultural literature of the midcentury. The advertisements carried by virtually all conservative or right-wing
magazines of the 1950s and 1960s were almost always from smaller, locally
based, and individually owned and operated enterprises. The ads carried by
the liberal or what soon became the "mainstream" magazines of the era were
almost always from the Fortune 500 or similar large, managerially controlled
companies.
The conservatism of that era emphasized states rights, the power of Congress
over that of the presidency, loyalty to and identity with the nation and national
interest rather than international or global identities, and the interests of
smaller, privately owned and operated companies against larger, managerially
controlled corporations. It also championed traditional religious and moral
beliefs and institutions, the importance of the patriarchal family and local
community, and the value of national, regional, racial, and ethnic identity, as
well as the virtues of the capitalist ethichard work, frugality, personal
honesty and integrity, individual initiative, postponement of gratification.
It is quite true that most businessmen, including the big businessmen of the
rising managerial corporations, opposed the New Deal and hated Franklin
Roosevelt intensely, but there were also a good many big businessmen even in
the New Deal era who supported Roosevelt and the New Deal. Political
Act, the National Recovery Act, the Wagner Act, free trade policies, and the
Glass-Steagall Act.
Like any new elite, the managerial class needed a political formula that
expressed and justified its group interests against those of its older rivals in
the capitalist elite. What has come to be known as "liberalism" performed that
function for the new class, although it has been known under other names as
well ("modernism," "progressivism," "humanism," and what Burnham himself
called simply "New Dealism).[15] Managerial liberalism justified the
enlargement and centralization of the state under executive rather than
congressional leadership, the primacy of the central rather than state and local
government, regulation of the economy by the central state, a foreign policy of
global interventionism and international organization rather than the
nationalism and isolationism favored by the older capitalist class, and the
development of a new culture that claimed to be more "progressive," more
"liberated," more "humanistic," and more "scientific" and "rational" than the
culture defined by the older social and moral codes of traditional capitalism.
The managerial ideology also demonized the old elite and its institutions and
values as "obsolete," "backward," "repressive," "exploitative," and "narrowminded."
There was therefore an increasingly significant cultural and ideological schism
between the new elite and the old and their respective adherents. The old elite
was more or less rooted in traditional social institutions, which both served its
material interests and reflected its formulas and values. It passed on its
property and wealth, the basis of its power, through inheritance, and therefore
it had a strong vested interest in maintaining both property rights and what
are today called "family values." The family indeed, as well as the local
community, religious and ethnic identities, and the cultural and moral codes
that respected and legitimized property, wealth, inheritance, social continuity,
the personal virtues that helped people acquire wealth and property, and small
governments that lacked the power to threaten these things, all served as
power bases for the traditional elite and as major cultural and ideological
supports for its interests.
community, not religion, not traditional cultural and moral codes, not ethnic
and racial identities, and not even the nation-state itself. Indeed, such
institutions merely get in the way of managerial power. They represent
barriers against which the managerial state, corporations, and other mass
organizations are always bumping, and the sooner such barriers are leveled,
the more reach and power the organizations, and the managerial elites that
run them, will acquire. Corporations depending on mass production and mass
consumption need a mass market with uniform tastes, values, and living
standards that will buy what consumers are told to buy; diverse local, regional,
class, and ethnic identities impede the required degree of uniformity. The
same is true for the state and the mass obedience it requires and seeks to
instill into the population it governs and for the mass cultural organizations
and the audiences they manipulate.[16] Journalist David Rieff has pointed to the
similarities in interests and worldview between "noted multiculturalist
academics," supposedly on the political left, on the one hand, and corporate
officers, supposedly on the political right, on the other:
Far from standing in implacable intellectual opposition to each other, both
groups see the same racial and gender transformations in the demographic
makeup of the United States and of the American work force. That non-white
workers will be the key to the twenty-first-century American labor market is a
given in most sensible long-range corporate plans. Like the multiculturalists,
the business elite is similarly aware of the crucial role of women, and of the
need to change the workplace in such a way as to make it more hospitable to
them. More generally, both CEOs and Ph.D.'s insist more and more that it is
no longer possible to speak in terms of the United States as some fixed,
sovereign entity. The world has moved on; capital and labor are mobile; and
with each passing year national borders, not to speak of national identities,
become less relevant to consciousness or to commerce. [17]
In the 1970s, Zbigniew Brzezinski noted the emergence of what he called
"transnational elites" throughout the developed world:
Today we are again witnessing the emergence of transna-tional elites, but now
they are composed of international businessmen, scholars, professional men,
and public officials. The ties of these new elites cut across national boundaries,
their perspectives are not confined by national traditions, and their interests
are more functional than national.... The creation of the global information
grid, facilitating almost continuous intellectual interaction and the pooling of
knowledge, will further enhance the present trend toward international
professional elites and toward the emergence of a common scientific
language.... This, however, could create a dangerous gap between them and
the politically activated masses, whose "nativism"exploited by more
nationalist political leaderscould work against the "cosmopolitan" elites. [18]
The late Christopher Lasch made a similar point about the "managerial and
professional elites," though he denied that these elites constituted "a new
ruling class":
Their fortunes are tied to enterprises that operate across national boundaries.
They are more concerned with the smooth functioning of the system as a
whole than with any of its parts. Their loyaltiesif the term is not itself
anachronistic in this contextare international rather than regional, national,
or local. They have more in common with their counterparts in Brussels or
Hong Kong than with the masses of Americans not yet plugged into the
network of global communications.[19]
Imperial Japan, and the New Deal United Statesmistakenly in the case of the
first twoas the "nuclei" of the three managerial "super-states" of the future),
and
Everywhere, men will have to line up with one or the other of the super-states
of tomorrow. There will not be room for smaller sovereign nations; nor will
the less advanced peoples be able to stand up against the might of the
metropolitan areas. Of course, polite fictions of independence may be
preserved for propaganda purposes; but it is the reality and not the name of
sovereignty about which we are talking.[22]
Just as the managerial ruling class rejects independent nationhood and
national sovereignty as organizational forms, so it will also reject ideologies
such as nationalism that justify and reflect national sovereignty,
independence, and identity, as well as any ideology or belief that justifies any
particular group identity and loyaltynational, regional, racial, ethnic,
cultural, or religious. The managerial class therefore tends to disengage from
the nation state as well as from these other identities. Its interests extend
across many different nations, races, religions, and cultures and are
transnational and supra-national, detached and disengaged fromand
actually hostile toany particular place or group or set of beliefs that supports
particular identities.
Hence, the managerial elite has a proclivity toward as well as a material
interest in adopting and promoting ideologies of universalism, egalitarianism,
cultural relativism, behaviorism, and "blank slate" environmental
determinism. As Rieff writes:
If any group has embraced the rallying cry "Hey, hey, ho, ho, Western culture's
got to go," it is the world business elite...for businessmen, something more is
at stake than ideas. Eurocentrism makes no economic sense in a world where,
within twenty-five years, the combined gross national product of East Asia will
likely be larger than Europe's and twice that of the United States. In such a
world, the notion of the primacy of Western culture will only be an
impediment to the chief goal of every company: the maximization of profits. [23]
Indeed, the social engineering and social reconstruction policies that have
always been closely associated with managerial structures in the state, the
economy, and the culture depend on ideological rationalizations that seek to
justify the idea that an innate human nature does not exist, that sexual and
racial differences are merely "social constructs" and products of the social
environment, and that scientifically informed "management" can engineer
both human society and human beings themselves. As intellectual historian
Donald Atwell Zoll wrote, the environmentalist thesis,
at its simplest level, contended that (1) man's nature and his subsequent
behavior was largely, if not totally, determined by his experiences in
confronting his immediate environment; and (2) prospects for improving
human behavior, social relation-ships, and society in general rested upon
"reconstructions" and modifications of his environment as the controlling
factor.... On the one hand, the resources of social science were seen as a
response to more or less explicit social problems such as crime, poverty,
mental illness, or the reform of political institutions. In yet another context,
social engineering saw as its object the construction of a model society. [24]
need of the new elite to formulate a new ideology or political formula and
reconstruct society around it provides an explanation of why the dominant
authorities in these countries today continue to support the dispossession of
whites and the cultural and political destruction of the older American and
Western civilization centered on whites and of why they not only fail to resist
the anti-white demands of non-whites but actively support and subsidize
them. These policies on the part of the new elite are not the result of
"decadence" or "guilt" but of the group interests of the elite itself, imbedded in
and arising from the structure of their power and position and rationalized in
their consciousness by the political formula of managerial liberalism. It is in
the interests of the new elite, in other words, to destroy and eradicate the older
society and the racial and cultural identities and consciousness associated with
it (not race alone, but also virtually any distinctive traditional group identity
or bond, cultural, biological, or political). To those ("conservatives") who
continue to adhere to the norms of the older society, of course, managerial
behavior appears as decadence, degeneracy, cowardice, appeasement,
pandering, or guilt, but what is an evil, misguided, or suicidal pathology to the
"conservative" forces who are still shaped by the older codes and institutions
in fact reflects the interest and the health of the forces centered around the
creation and control of the new society. The interests of the managerial elite,
in other words, are antagonistic to the survival of the traditional racial and
institutional identity of the society it dominates.
The emergence of the managerial elite promotes the dispossession and even
the destruction of whites in the United States in two major ways. First, as this
essay has tried to argue, it does so directly because the structure of managerial
interests and power is in conflict with any strong sense of racial as well as with
may occur, and such conflicts may eventually destabilize the managerial elite
or even displace it from power as a new social forcenon-white racial
consciousness and the energies it mobilizeschallenges the social force of the
managerial class. As historian Paul Gottfried comments, "Hispanic racialists,
Third World patriarchs, and Mexican irredentists will likely eat up the present
regime, if given the demographic chance.[33]
But there is little sign of an emerging white racial identity capable of
challenging either the managerial power structure, its anti-white universalist
ideology and agenda, or the direct racial threat whites face from non-white
and anti-white enemies. The new elite and its non-white allies have weakened
or destroyed the belief systems, moral values , cultural legacies, and social
bonds and institutions that made whites conscious of who and what they are
and sustained within them a determination to survive and prevail. Until such
mechanisms can be rebuilt, there appears to be little prospect of whites
overcoming or even adequately recognizing the threats and challenges they
face today, and those mechanisms cannot be rebuilt as long as the managerial
elite remains in power, as long as its universalist and egalitarian ideology
remains the dominant political and cultural formula, and as long as the antiwhite allies of the elite share power with the elite. What whites must
recognize, if they wish to survive at all, is that the forces that have destroyed
their civilization are the same forces that rule its ruins and whose rule brought
it to ruin. Not until those forces are themselves displaced from power will the
whites of the future be able to recover the legacy their ancestors created and
left for them.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Ibid., p. 71.
5.
6.
7.
James H. Meisel, The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the
"Elite(Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 4. See also
Geraint Parry, Political Elites (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 31ff., for the
"unity" of an elite.
8.
9.
10.
Ibid.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Thomas Ferguson, "Industrial Conflict and the Coming of the New Deal:
The Triumph of Multinational Liberalism in America," in Steve Fraser and Gary
Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 9. Ferguson sees the conflict over the
New Deal as being centered in Morgan (anti-Roosevelt) vs. Rockefeller (proRoosevelt) groups.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
National Identity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), pp. 267 and 26372 passim.
21.
22.
Germany and Japan would be victorious in World War II. The existence of such
managerial regimes as those of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan and their use
of ideologies of extreme racial hegemony and nationalism suggests that not all
forms of managerial dominance are necessarily wedded to ideologies of
universalism, egalitarianism, and environmentalist determinism. But of course
Germany and Japan lost the war, and the form of managerial power they
represented did not survive, raising the possibility that their brief existence may
have been merely an anomaly.
23.
specific goal of corporate managers, but for the elite in general the major
consideration, as with any ruling class, is perpetuation of power and position.
24.
Human Nature (New York: Viking, 2002), p. 19. This book helps expose the
ideological and pseudoscientific roots of environmentalist theory. See also Carl
N. Degler,In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism
in American Social Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991),
especially chapter 8, for the political and ideological motivations of
environmentalist social theory.
26.
27.
Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), p.
244.
28.
Roots of the Consumer Culture (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976),
p. 83.
29.
30.
32.
33.