A time-honored, long-established, philosophically-defensible, secular humanism, situated in a

nonfoundational semiotic pragmatism, can anthropometrically inventory ecocentric, biocentric and

anthropocentric scalar interests for moral considerability, variously weighing their moral significance,
prioritizing conflicting principles, weighing competing values and adjudicating competing interests.
Due to our collective radical finitude and reality's hypercomplexity, values will inevitably compete and
principles will unavoidably conflict. That which is good, in and of itself, intrinsically, affects goods
beyond itself, instrumentally.
In a value pluralism, we variously calibrate physiocentric, ecocentric, biocentric (sentient) and
anthropocentric (sapient) values. We can extend intrinsic value, pluralistically, but, at the same time, can
deny that it necessarily confers moral significance.
Within pragmatism, value categories are inescapably anthropo[i]metric[/i], as humans are the measurers.
As measur[i]ers[/i], humans can survey intrinsic values from [i]eco[/i]-foci, [i]bio[/i]-foci and
[i]anthropo[/i]-foci apart from anthropo[i]centric[/i] concerns. Within pragmatism, humans wouldn't serve
as the sole [i]measures[/i] of value. Intrinsic and instrumental values wouldn't be conceived as mutually
exclusive but, instead, as axiologically intertwined. Moral agency, alone, wouldn't establish moral
patiency. Moral considerability would not, alone, establish relative moral significance or weigh scalar
interests.

One practical upshot of this approach would be the continued prioritization of

anthropocentric concerns vis a vis human flourishing over biocentric and ecocentric
interests, consistent with all established humanisms. All things otherwise equal, however,
morally significant nonanthropocentric values and interests would not be violated and
would, instead, be advanced, outside of those contexts that would require their sacrifice.
The definition of human flourishing would need to be worked out in terms of essentials
and nonessentials, sustenance and luxury, higher and lesser goods, and defensible degrees
of end-products, by-products and waste-products.In such an approach, anthropocentric
and nonanthropocentric interests should converge to a greater degree, realizing
sustainability and diversity as values on many levels, in many ways, much more often,
than in those paradigms that don't recognize intrinsic values outside of anthropcentric
concerns.
An aesthetic teleology would remain integral to this pragmatic humanism, so, ontological
densities would resolve competing interests anthropocentrically. Anthropomorphic telic
projections of intentionality onto merely ententional systems, or of purposefulness onto
merely purposive systems, would remain illegitimate category errors, [i]fallacies of
misplaced aboutness.[/i] So, too, would anthropomorphic projections of emergent
anthroposemiotic interests, values and concerns onto merely zoosemiotic, phytosemiotic,
biosemiotic, ecosemiotic and physiosemiotic systems.

Finally, a pragmatic humanism inherently relies on valuing agencies to realize logical,

aesthetical and ethical values, so would recognize [i]being[/i] but not [i]value[/i] in any
putative reality lacking consciousness.
Under any circumstances, metaphysics, even without category errors, remains
epistemically inert morally.

A good example of a bad example:

A wrongly conceived application of the Principle of Maximum Entropy:

1) commits the fallacy of aboutness
2) facilely conflates teloi (teleomatic, teleonomic and teleodynamic)
3) employs an anthropomorphic interpretation of ententionality, investing it with intentionality
4) treats logical semiotic conceptions as metaphysical structures in an onto-semiotic
5) over-interprets probabilities as in/determinisms
6) over-interprets a phenomenological taxonomy as an explanatory account
7) treats epistemic states also as ontic states
8) employs conflations of otherwise distinct entropic conceptions (boltzmann, shannon and darwinian)
9) overgeneralizes conceptions of information from theoretic sciences to metaphysical heuristics
10) invests non-negotiated, dogmatic concepts (entropic intentionality) with coercive normativity
(logically, aesthetically and ethically)
11) renders pragmatism incoherent, denying its inherent anthropocentric humanism
12) employs a rule-governed normativity, necessary for ententionally, but without a meaning-constituted
normativity, necessary for intentionality
"Forget your perfect offering / There is a crack in everything / That's how the light gets in." ~ Leonard
Cohen's Anthem

[quote=John Deely]What distinguishes the human being from the other animals is that only
human animals come to realize that there are signs distinct from and superordinate to every

particular thing that serves to constitute an individual in its distinctness from its surroundings.
[/quote]
Humanism, properly considered --- not only takes account of our anthroposemiotic
differentiations from other biosemiotic and pansemiotic realities, but --- norms our efforts to
subdue our animality out of which our [i]sapience[/i] extends, such efforts including our
education, cultures and traditions. Humanism, thus conceived, attends to peircean thirdness to
realize authentically human values. Humanism [i]is[/i] pragmatism, perceiving that which
humans attend to and attending to that which interests humans, including our existential
concerns, which lead us to forced, vital and live options. Pragmatic humanisms turn attentively
to the accumulated wisdom of educational, cultural and traditional realities (habits, tendencies,
3ns).
An authentically pragmatic humanism retrieves wisdom --- neither ahistorically nor uncritically
---from humanism's classicist, renaissance, enlightenment and existential expressions (yes, even
overcoming Heidegger's critiques) and presents as a nonfoundational, fallibilist, postmodern
humanism. It requires only our semiotic, phenomenological taxonomy with only a vague modal
ontology and shared vague conceptions of human values such as truth, beauty, goodness, unity
and freedom. It doesn't require a systematic architectonic or metaphysic.
This humanism remains unapologetically and thoroughgoingly anthropocentric, almost
axiomatically so, axiologically secured by the time-honored, long-established, and ubiquitously
shared evaluative dis-positions and normative pro-positions of humankind's diverse communities
of value-realizers.
I say ironic because this is over against any indefensible anthropo[i]morphic[/i] pansemiotic,
which onto-extrapolates human intentionality to other forms of [i]aboutness[/i]. I'm sympathetic
to a pansemiotic and physiosemiotic view, but properly nuanced by an emergentist stance that
remains ontologically vague and tentative, hence, deontologically modest.
------------------------------------------------[quote=Tommi Vehkavaara]Thus, the excess vagueness of the adopted metaphysical concepts
and doctrines, that makes them incapable of explaining (or even describing) anything, is another
pitfall that should be avoided (if biosemiotics is going to be a science). The third pitfall is that we
may be drifted to pronounce unnecessarily strong metaphysical statements (as in
[b]physiosemiotics[/b]). As such they are often either simply false or even if true, so weekly
justified (if justified at all) that others do not have much reasons to become convinced of their
truth. The proclamation of unnecessarily strong statements is strategically unwise if weaker
claims are sufficient for making biosemiotics. The fourth pitfall is that we are driven to believe
our metaphysical convictions as a doctrine, not as the hypotheses or ends but as the principles or
starting points.Limitations on applying Peircean semeiotic. Biosemiotics as applied objective
ethics and esthetics rather than semeiotic, Journal of Biosemiotics, 2005, Volume 1, Number 1,
pp. 269-308 [/quote]Per the [i]fallacy of misplaced aboutness[/i],we avoid any facile conflation
regarding ententional and intentional teloi. While both are [i]rule-governed[/i], only the latter are
[i]meaning-constitutive[/i]. Intentionality relates to significance, relevance and interests, beyond

any
sheer
quantity
of
information
or
rule-governance.[quote=Ahti-Veikko
Pietarinenn]Normativity has to do with rule-governed, meaning-constitutive practices and
activities, because logic as a normative science is, according to Peirce, one of the most purely
theoretical of purely theoretical sciencesWhy is the Normativity of Logic Based on Rules?
[/quote]In the continental view, epistemology remains inherently [i]anthropocentric[/i]. In the
analytic view, ontological specificity remains unnecessary. A pragmatic, semiotic realism can
adopt both stances. A taxonomy of vague phenomenological conceptions suffices, ontologically.
It provides those implicit, indispensable metaphysical presuppositions (modal ontological logic)
required for an axiological epistemology. Those presuppositions require only provisional
closures or methodological stipulations, not ontological commitments.In the normative sciences,
while ethics and logic depend, in principle, on aesthetics, they won't collapse into hedonism if,
phenomenologically, we properly redescribe pleasure and pain.[quote=Richard K. Atkins]As
Peirce notes, his theory is exactly contrary to hedonism, which locates normativity in the feeling
of pleasure. In contrast, Peirces conception of normativity is grounded in the struggle for a state
of pleasure.This is the agreement of the faculties of understanding and imagination in reaching
determinate concepts by which to subsume (and hence understand) nature.The normative
sciences bridge phaneroscopy and metaphysics by bringing the struggle between the ego and the
non-ego into an aesthetic state of quietus, or agreement. Aesthetics recognizes the state of quietus
to be what is admirable in itself. This is determined by the very nature of judgments and the
mutual interdetermination of the ego and the non-ego. The science of ethics strives to bring the
ego and the non-ego into a state of quietus in conduct. The science of logic strives to bring the
ego and the non- ego into a state of quietus in thought.<------ LambruscoE snipped here ------>Is
not pleasure by definition a feeling?In reply, the feeling is, indeed, consequent on reaching a
state of quietus. However, the feeling is only an epiphenomenon, a symptom, or an
accompaniment of the achievement of quietus. Conceivably, one could reach a state of quietus
(i.e. a state in which the struggle between the ego and the non-ego is minimal) but this state not
be accompanied by a feeling of pleasure. On the Peircean account, the person would still be in a
pleasurable state, even if he does not feel the pleasure. The feeling of pleasure is the icing on the
cake it is an indicator that one has reached a state of quietus. However, the pleasure itself is
the state in which quietus is reached. It is this state that grounds normativity, not the feeling that
accompanies reaching this state.[i]The Pleasures of Goodness: Peircean Aesthetics in Light of
Kants Critique of the Power of Judgment[/i][/quote]The intentional teloi of human experience
are grounded in our relationships to value-rich ecological objects or [i]affordances[/i] and are
attenuated by intensely pro-social feelings, all within our pragmatic interests, which, due to our
radical finitude, can compete, one value vs another, and conflict, one individual vs another vs
even the common good, requiring various sacrifices.[quote=Ursula Goodenough and Terrence
Deacon]We have our virtues neither by nor contrary to our natures. We are fitted by our natures
to receive them. If brains are amazing, the human brain is flat-out astonishing. .... No doubt
about it: Our symbolic minds allow us to access mental experiences, like mathematics, aesthetics
and spiritual intuitions, that we have every reason to believe are novel, unique to the human.
...But we suggest that it is also of utmost importance that we not lose track of our mental

evolutionary antecedents. ... Any perspective on the human condition that brushes this fact aside
is an incomplete perspective, --indeed, we would say that it is an impoverished perspective. ...
Given that we have evolved from an intensely social lineage, we are uniquely aware of what it
feels like to be pro-social, and it is this awareness of what it feels like to be moral -- this moral
experience -- that undergirds and motivates the actions of a moral person.? From Biology to
Consciousness to Morality by Ursula Goodenough and Terrence Deacon, Zygon D 03; 38(4):
801-819 [/quote][quote=Joshua Johnson]Consider it this way: Shannon entropy is often used to
measure the amount of information in an object, by calculating the degree of randomness
contained within any given string of information. Very random strings may have more Shannon
entropy than very structured strings, since it is difficult to predict the appearance of new bit of
information in a random string. But, even though long random strings could have more
information than very short well structured strings, they may not be very relevant or interesting.
Without a capacity to decide the relevance or structure of various interpretations, the sheer
number of interpretations tells us very little about the significance of the object at hand.<-----LambruscoE snipped here ------>J.J. Gibson theorizes affordances as ecological features which
enable or constrain an animal by virtue of their invariances. He distinguishes them from the
phenomenal theory of gestalt psychology, in so far as affordances are not dependent upon the
observer, but are invariant features of the environment:The [b]theory of [i]affordances[/i][/b] is
a radical departure from existing theories of value and meaning. It begins with a new definition
of what value and meaning are. The perceiving of an affordance is not a process of perceiving a
value-free physical object to which meaning is somehow added in a way that no one has been
able to agree upon; it is a process of perceiving a value-rich ecological object. Any substance,
any surface, any layout has some affordance for benefit or injury to someone. Physics may be
value-free, but ecology is not. (Gibson)[i]Full Spectrum Aesthetics: Process Ontology,
Normativity,
and
Speculations
on
the
Category
Theoretical
Approach[/i]http://joshuaj.net/cat/marginalia/full-spectrum-aesthetics-process-ontologynormativity-and-speculations-on-the-category-theoretical-approach/
[/quote][quote=Marco
Stango]Aesthetics, then, deals with habits of feeling evaluated under the category of nobility (cf.
Parker 2003) or absolute admirability. The puzzling aspect of Peirce's treatment of aesthetics is
that esthetics is taken to deal with both the normative habits of feeling and the Summum Bonum
itself. Between the normative habits of feeling and the normative ultimate ideal there is an
immediate and essential link. In fact, on the one hand, Peirce states that since ethics asks to
what end all effort shall be directed, that question obviously depends upon the question what it
would be that, independently of the effort, we should like to experience, that is the essential
question of aesthetics (CP 2.199). On the other hand, Peirce admits that the moralist merely
tells us that we have a power of self-control, that no narrow or selfish aim can ever prove
satisfactory ; and for any more definite information, as I conceive the matter, he has to refer us
to the esthetician whose business it is to say what is the state of things which is most admirable
in itself regardless of any ulterior reason (EP 2: 253). The first quotation shows that esthetics
aims to fix the good habits of feeling, while the second quotations makes clear that its object is
extended to the definition of the nature of the Summum Bonum. As we know from the previous

chapter, Peirce found that the ultimate normative ideal of human life, its Summum Bonum, is
the development of concrete reasonableness in the world.Agency and Normativity: A Study in
thePhilosophy of Peirce and Dewey [/quote][quote=Donald Gelpi]Esthetics measures other
goods against supreme excellence and formulates a normative account of the kinds of habits one
needs to cultivate in order to appreciate supreme goodness and beauty. An esthetic perception of
supreme goodness engages the heart rather than the head. In other words, it engages that
appreciative insight into the identity of the good and the true which humans call the beautiful.
Esthetics puts order into the human heart and psyche by teaching it to appreciate those realities
and values that make life ultimately worth living. Esthetic insight grasps affectively and
simultaneously reality's goodness and truth.Esthetics also gives an ultimate orientation to the
other two normative sciences of ethics and of logic. Ethics studies the kinds of habits of choice
one must cultivate in order to live for the ultimately beautiful. Logic teaches one to think clearly
about reality so that one can make realistic choices that lead one to the appreciation and
enjoyment of ultimate beauty, goodness, and truth. In other words, in Peirce's understanding of
normative thinking both ethics and logic serve the ultimately beautiful as their end.
[/quote]Aesthetically, we distinguish imitation or mimesis, expressivism and instrumentalism.
Ethically, we distinguish the deontological, aretaic (virtue) teleological and
(consequentialistic).Regarding our vague conception of [i]beauty[/i], we approach aesthetical
value realizations 1) intrasubjectively, through formalism or essentialism in art; 2)
intersubjectively, through expressivism or emotionalism in art; 3) intraobjectively, through
mimesis and imitationalism in art; and 4) interobjectively, through art as
instrumentalism.Regarding our vague conception of [i]truth[/i], we approach noetical value
realizations 1) intrasubjectively, through virtue epistemology; 2) intersubjectively, through a
semiotic, community of inquiry; 3) intraobjectively, through correspondence; and 4)
interobjectively, through coherence.Regarding our vague conception of [i]goodness[/i], we
approach ethical value realizations 1) intrasubjectively, through aretaic or virtue ethics; 2)
intersubjectively, through contractarian ethics; 3) intraobjectively, through deontological ethics;
and 4) interobjectively, through teleological or consequentialistic ethics.