--.

ib

Reprinted from
Studies in the Social History of China and South-East Asia
edited by J. Ch'en & N. Tarling
Cambridge University Press, 1970

-:-.

J~

BY WANG GUNGWU

For the past few decades, a great deal of attention has been paid to the
relations between China and other Asian countries and probably the
most frequently discussed problem of China's traditional relations has
been the maritime expeditions of Cheng Ho to the Indian Ocean during
the years 1405-33. Because of the prominence of these expeditions, they
have often been seen as the only significant feature of China's relations
with South-east Asia during this period. This paper attempts to show
that there are other important questions about China-South-east
Asia relations which have been neglected in the past, It also attempts to
compare China's policies towards South-east Asian countries with its
activities elsewhere and to arrive at some assessment of the relative
importance of South-east Asia to China. For this purpose, I have
chosen the reign of Emperor Yung-lo (1402-24), the emperor who
sent Cheng Ho to the Indian Ocean six times and who received
missions from more foreign peoples and countries than any other
emperor in China's history. And by South-east Asia, I refer to the
area presently so called, covering both the mainland and island
countries.
It should, however, be borne in mind that many levels of relationships between the Chinese and various groups of South-east Asians
had been developing for several centuries before the Ming dynasty
(1368-1644). By the T'ang dynasty (618--sJ06), the Chinese were already
aware of the great trading centres on the coasts of the Gulf of Siam and
the Java Sea. Missions from these areas reached China throughout the
seventh and eighth centuries and there were many more during the
Northern Sung dynasty (960-1126), especially during the later half of
the tenth and the first half of the eleventh centuries. After the fall of the
Northern Sung, however, few missions were received until after the
conquest of South China by the Mongols in 1276. The successors of
the Mongols, the Chinese rulers of the Ming dynasty, therefore, inherited a long tradition of increasingly close relations with South-east
375

~
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WANG GUNGWU

Asia. But, before the Ming dynasty, such relations were mainly unofficial or semi-official and confined to the economic centres of South
China. Imperial participation in either trade or even tribute was spasmodic and opportunistic. Rarely may initiatives be traced back to any
of the Chinese rulers. The emperors received foreign missions and then
responded or not more or less as they were advised to do by their
ministers.
Thus for the long centuries from the early T'ang dynasty, it is not
meaningful to discuss Chinese relations with South-east Asia during
any single reign. Only the spectacular invasion of Java during Kubilai
Khan's reign in 1292 and the missions sent out to the region by the
first Ming emperor, Hung-wu (1368-98), can be identified with a
particular emperor and neither of these can compare with the sustained
efforts by Yung-lo to keep relations with South-east Asia open and
meaningful. In fact, Yung-lo was the first Chinese emperor to allow so
much attention to be paid to South-east Asia and to take initiatives
which determined the pattern and nature of China's relations with the
countries of the region. This is significant because imperial initiatives
had long been crucial in China's foreign relations; therefore the absence
of positive steps to encourage official relations with South-east Asia
before Yung-lo marks out the importance ofYung-lo himself as the key
figure in the extraordinary developments of the early fifteenth century.
For this reason, there is special justification for the study of one reign
in this essay. As will be shown later, China's involvement in Southeast Asian history during the period 1402-24 was very much the product of the emperor's personal interest.
Confucian historians always emphasized the role and the archetype of
the Emperor at the expense of the individuality and unorthodoxy of
each emperor. Clear pictures ofeach emperor as a person, as an autocrat
or a despot, or even as a weakling or a fun-loving playboy, are very
rare. This was particularly true when the emperor was the founder of
the dynasty and the historians had to write during the reigns of his
descendants. Although Yung-lo was not the founder of the Ming
dynasty, his usurpation of the throne in 1402 from his nephew (his
elder brother's son) led to the founding of his own line of emperors.
His temple-title of Ch'eng-tsu emphasized a degree of equality with his
father as founder of the imperial house. Thus the official history of

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China and South-east Asia

1402-24

Yung-Io is mainly one ofan emperor ofgreat personal courage, a skilled

warrior and strategist, shrewd and stern and yet a lover of the common
people. There are examples of his benevolence, of his wisdom and of
his successful appointments of ministers and generals. But only between
the dry and discreet lines can we also see his arbitrariness, his restlessness, his extravagance, his suspicious nature and his political manipulations.
His was a most eventful reign, yet the records succeed in making it
less remarkable than it was. His was a strong and direct personal rule,
yet it would be difficult to point to the events in which his feelings and
calculations can be fully known. We are presented with long memorials
and edicts but not shown how the decisions were made. We know that
the senior ranks of the bureaucracy were weak after the wholesale
executions, banishments and retirements following Yung-Io's usurpation, but we are not told how he made use of the scholar and eunuch
cadres whom he personally selected to help him govern the empire.
Most exasperating of all, we have several lists of the innumerable
foreign missions to his court and notes on many decisions about what
to do with them, but we are never given details about their significance
to China, to the dynasty or to Yung-lo himself.
It is with this background in mind that we can understand why the
events of his reign, especially the Cheng Ho expeditions, have been so
puzzling for historians. All the speculation about what they mean has
been handicapped by the lack of explicit statements of purpose. Hence
the many attempts to explain China's policy towards South-east Asia
and the Indian Ocean countries in terms of Yung-Io's whims and
fancies, of Chinese expansionism and imperialism, and of the natural
extension of the Chinese world order. None of these explanations is
satisfactory in the light of the timing of the outward-looking policies
and of the withdrawal into isolationism after 1435. It is significant that
Yung-Io's policies towards the various Mongol confederations,
towards Tibet, towards various kinds of Jurchen tribes, towards
Korea and Japan, towards the numerous different peoples of Southwestern China, Burma and Laos and towards various countries in
South-east Asia have never been seriously studied by those modern
historians who have written on the spectacular voyages of Cheng
Ho's fleets to the coast of East Africa. Instead, the scholars who have
dramatized the expeditions have often likened them to the salt-water
377

W ANG GUNGWU

imperialism of the West in later centuries. Hence there is the tendency

to interpret the Cheng Ho expeditions ominousl y in terms of past and
future Chinese designs on South-east Asia.
But the facts do not support such an interpretation and it is necessary
for us to be reminded that a more authentic picture of China's relations
with South-east Asia in the fifteenth century is possible. This can be
achieved by examining the reign of Yung-lo more closely. In this way,
we can try to see what Yung-lo really intended, under what conditio ns
he decided to send Cheng Ho and other missions to South-east Asia,
what else he had to worry about, what he actually ordered to be done
to South-east Asian countries, and, not least, how typical Yung-lo's
decisions were in the context of Chinese history.
Let me now begin with the highligh ts of Yung-lo's reign. 1 He
started inauspiciously. Having been passed over by his father in 1398,
he had refused to accept his nephew' s rule. Within months of his
nephew 's accession, he had resisted the new emperor's authority and
started a civil war. For three years, from the middle of 1399 to the
middle of 1402 , the civil war dominated all events. Then on 17 July
1402, after defeating his nephew's army and capturing the capital of
Nanking, he ascended the throne. Even this was inauspicious as his
nephew's body could not be found and there was much speculation
thr ough out the empire that his nephew, the legitimate emperor, had
escaped and was in hiding. The repercussions of his accession were
great. The court lost some of the ablest senior officials and no one could
really be trusted apart from his loyal army officers and his eunuchs. The
government had to be re-established afresh.
His first acts were to reaffirm his father's policies and argue that his
nephew's advisers had perverted those policies. He promoted the
remaining officials and appointed unknown new men to supervise them
as well as the provinces and the border military regions. He handpicked seven young scholars to be his private secretaries and, with their
help, was able to rule directly and personally. He then rewarded all his
loyal supporters with noble titles, promotions, grants and cash gifts. 2
On 22 August, five weeks after his accession, he received his first
mission, a mission from a minor chieftain in Yunnan in South-west
I

M ing T'ai-tsung Shih-Iu (or Yung-lo Shih-lu), photolithographic edition, T aipei, 1962,
hereafter abb reviated as Y LSL, vols. 9 to 14; Ming Shih (hereafter MS), chuan S-7;
M ing T 'ung-chien (Peking, 19S9), chuan 14-1 8.
YL SL , chuan 9 B-I2A; M ing T'ung -chien, pp. S90-611.

China and South-east Asia

1402--24

China. A week later, as the last resistance to his rule was broken in
Shantung province, he sent his first mission abroad. This was to Korea
announcing his accession to the throne. Six days later, on 4 September,
he sent a monk with his edict of accession to Tibet with rich gifts.
About three weeks later, he sent missions to the various Mongol
leaders.' Then on 3 October, he ordered envoys to go to the following
countries:
An-nan (Annam)
Hsi-yang (South India)
Liu-Chi'u (Ryukyu)
Hsien-lo (Siam)
Chao-wa (Java)
Su-men-ta-la (Samudra)
Jih-pen (Japan)
Chan-ch'eng (Champa)
Significantly, he left policy instructions to the Ministry of Rites for
these overseas countries, which read as follows:
During the reign of T'ai-tsu, when the various foreign countries sent
missions, they were all treated with sincerity. Those who came with native
produce to trade were all allowed to do so; and those who in ignorance broke
the regulations were all generously pardoned-all this in order to care for
those who came from afar. Now that the Four Seas are one family, it is the
time to show no outer-separation (shih wu-wai). Let those missions which
sincerely come with tribute do so freely. You should explain this to them so
that they know my desire.s
The next day, Yung-lo had occasion again to lay down policy on
places overseas. This was in connection with the return of Chinese
envoys, presumably sent during his nephew's reign, from the 'southeast' islands who reported that Chinese adventurers were collaborating
with the natives there in acts of piracy. Yung-lo immediately ordered a
mission to go there again bearing the following edict:
To like good and dislike evil is common to men. To do evil because one is
forced to does not mean one's nature [is bad]. In the past you have run away
because you feared punishment or because of poverty and starvation to live
among the various foreign peoples and have joined them in plunder in order
to save your lives. The coastal defence forces not only were not helpful and
sympathetic but also treated you harshly. Although you may regret [what
you have done], you are unable to show this. We are very concerned about
this.
We specially sent someone with our edict to inform you thus. Those
foreigners should all return to their respectivelands, those who wish to come
to court should be generously treated and sent home. Those Chinese who
I YLSL, lOB, 5a-II,

sb.

379

YLSL, I2.A ,7 a

W A NG GUNGWU

escaped to and hid in [foreign] lands are all pardonedfor their past wrongs to
enable them to return to their original occupations and become loyal subjects
again. If they are still stubborn and refuse to reform because they rely on
distance and remoteness, then we will order our forces to exterminate them.
It will be too late to regret then. 1
After this, Yung-lo sent envoys to the Urianghai in Western
Manchuria, to various other Mongol tribes inviting trade, and to a
place as far away as the Muslim state of Samarkand. In early 143, there
were further missions to Korea and Siam as well as Tibet and also, on
4 March, the first of the important missions to open 'diplomatic'
relations with the most powerful of the Mongol confederations under
the Tartar Great Khan. 2
Thus within nine months of his accession, Yung-lo had sent successive missions to all the countries which mattered to his empire. But
there was an important difference between those he sent to overland
countries and those to countries overseas. The reasons for overland
relations were obvious and no explanations were thou ght necessary.
Only with the overseas missions were instructions given, instructions
which emphasized the value of friendly trading relations and also
touched upon the question of stopping Chinese part icipation in
piratical activities. It is not surprising that, durin g the next few months,
a comprehensive plan for grain transportation by sea to Peking and
Manchuria was drawn up and there appeared many references to shipbuilding, to piracy between the Yangste mouth and Fukien, to the
conditions of the Yangtse ports, to the establishment of a Bureau of
Maritime Trade and even to a typh oon near Canton.!
I have discussed elsewhere the events leading to the major missions
to Malacca and the Ind ian Ocean of 25 August, 1 October and 28
Oc tober 1403.4 That they were follow-ups of the decisions of late 1402
and early 1403 pertainin g to overseas relations there can be no doubt.
What needs to be added here is that these events must be seen in the
context of a series of decisions about foreign relations in all directions,
both overland and overseas. The areas which preoccupied Yung-lo
[ 'YL SL , 12A, 9a-b. Cf. Hun g-wu' s policy of prohibiting private overseas travel, which
2

Yung-lo re-affirmed on 30 July , 1402.

MS, 5, 8a- b; 6, 1a- b.
YL SL, chuan 18-27.
W ang Gungwu, The Op ening of relations between China and Malacca, 1403-5', in
M alayan and Indonesian Studies, ed. by J. Bastin and R. Roolvink, Oxford, 1964, pp.
87- 104.

380

China and South-east Asia

1402-24

were the various Mongol centres, the western and southwestern frontier
regions of Tibet, Yunn an, Burma, Laos and Annam, and the whole
length of the southern and eastern coasts where trade and piracy had
been hardly distinguishable since the Fang Kuo-chen rebellion in 1348.
This brings us now to the most important development which
involved China with what we call South-east Asia during the early
years of Yung-lo's reign. I refer to the Chinese embroilment in the
affairs of Annam (now North Vietnam);' This had begun with Yunglo's sending an envoy to Annam on 3 October 1402 and Annam's
responding with its mission of 21 April 1403. Suspecting that a
usurpation had taken place during the past four years when the Tran
dynasty came to an end, the Ministry of Rites called for an investigation
and on 5 May 1403 a special envoy was sent to report on the Annam .
succession.
On what basis was such an investigation called? What right did
Yung-lo have to question the letter sent to him by the new ruler of
Annam? We observe that the new ruler is recorded as calling himself
Temporary Chief Administrator (ch'uan-li kuo-shih) and 'memorializing' (chou) that he be recognized with a grant of title (jimg -chueh). Does
this mean that Annam genuinely considered itself a vassal state (or submitted to China, kuei-shun) and accepted Yung-lo's right to investigate
the legitimacy of its new ruler?
The investigation turned out to be a long-drawn affair in which
Yung-lo first recognized the new king and then withdrew recognition
when a surviving heir of the Tran royal house explained that a
usurpation had taken place. He pardoned the usurper and sent back the
rightful heir and, when the heir was murdered, was drawn into open
conflict with Annam. For three years, from April 1403 to April 1406,
elaborate negotiati ons about the succession took place. Then came the
final break and preparations for war began in May. By November, the
first campaign was fought in Annam. Twenty main crimes (tsui) against
the usurper were listed as reasons for the campaign. It is interesting to
list them here:

(I) For the murder of the Tran King who was properly recognized
by China.
I

M ing Shih Chi-shih pen-ma, chuan 22, also Li Cheng-fu, Chun-hsien Shih-rai chih
An-nan, Shanghai, 1945, pp. 142-6 , provide short accounts. D etails are found in Y LSL,
chuan 2oA-53.

38r

WANG GUNGWU

(2) For the massacre of the Tran royal family.

(3) For not using the chinese calendar and for using his own
reign-period.
(4) For ill-treating the Annamese people (with details).
(5) For changing his own surname from Li to Hu.
(6) For deceiving the Ming emperor about his usurpation.
(7) For bluffing the Ming emperor and resisting Ming missions.
(8) For murdering the legitimate Tran heir.
(9) For taking Chinese tribal territory at Ning-yuan chou.
(10) For killing the tribal chief's son-in-law and related crimes.
(I I) For disturbing the peace among other border tribes.
(12) For taking Ssu-ming fu territory and only returning parts of it.
(13) For inciting the tribes of Hsi-ping chou against the emperor.
(14) For invading Champa territory during the king's mourning
period.
(15) For taking four chou from Champa and sacking them.
(16) For taking over one hundred elephants from Champa and some
territory.
(17) For forcing Champa, a vassal (fan-ch'en) of China, to use
Annam seals and ceremonial dress instead of Chinese ones.
(18) For invading Champa because it acknowledged China and not
Annam.
(19) For capturing Chinese and Cham envoys at one of the Cham
ports.
(20) For insulting China by sending a criminal as envoy. I

One of the key words in the declaration of war appears to be that

Annam was mi-mi, or 'very closely related'. For it is in this context
that the crimes can be seen as heinous. I have listed them fully to show
what vassalage to China meant at the time. The first eight may be
described as moral and ideological issues, the next five as security
matters, the five after that as Annamese aggression against another
vassal, and the final two as personal insults to the emperor.
There are thus four groups of issues which purported to have
aroused Yung-lo to take strong action. From his point of view, it may
well be argued that there was extreme provocation. From the point of
view of the country attacked, the list reveals the extent to which Chinese
claims to suzerainty denied freedom and independence of action to the
1

YLSL, Go, rb-aa.

382

China and South-east Asia J 402-24

vassal state. One may well ask whether any of the above' crimes' could
be applied to other countries in South-east Asia as well.
Before I try to answer that, let me return to what Yung-lo's policies
were towards foreign countries in other parts of Asia. Annam was
certainly one of the main problems of his reign. Even after the usurper
was eliminated, national leaders emerged one after the other to challenge
Chinese rule. This troubled Yung-lo throughout his reign and the
country was finally abandoned in 1428 to the great Annamese national
hero, Le Loi, who had fought ten years for his country's independence.
The other three major external matters were the Wako pirates raiding
the Chinese coasts from the Liaotung and Shantung peninsulas down
to the southern provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung; the naval
expeditions of Cheng Ho to the Indian Ocean; and the revival of
Mongol power to the north. Of these latter three, it is interesting to
note that two had to do with the ocean and problems of coastal defence
while only one was an overland problem. Yet it was soon clear to
Yung-lo that, while Wako attacks were frequent and Cheng Ho's
expeditions were expensive, his real problems were in the north. It was
there that the empire was vulnerable and it was to the north that he
went, in 1409-10 and 1413-16 and the third time in 1417, never to
return to Nanking. With the new year in 1421, the capital was permanently shifted to Peking. I
'
Many historians have remarked on this move of capital and its
consequences to Chinese interests in South-east Asia, including Annam.
On the one hand, there were good historical and geographical reasons
for the move northwards. On the other, in less deterministic terms,
Yung-lo himself was much more at home at Peking where he had been
a young man for over twenty years before his accession. At Nanking,
he felt strange and helpless. At Peking, he was the soldier-emperor,
leading his armies to the steppes, hunting Mongols, returning home
victorious and satisfied each time. Also, it was manifest that, unlike
most other people on China's borders, the Mongols would never accept
the Chinese world order, however nicely that order was dressed. They
recognized only force as the decider of events. It was necessary for
Yung-lo to keep the Mongols fragmented, to divide them whenever a
new leader appeared and, therefore, to stay close to the Great Wall alert
and ready to fight, bribe and cajole them to weakness. From the time he
I

MS, 6, 7b- 1oa ; 6, 12a-7, 3b; 7, 4b and 7 a.

WANG GUNGWU

became emperor, Yung-lo was personally on campaign in Mongolia for

five months in 1410, for six months in 1414, for five months in 1422,
four more months in 1423 and was on his fifth campaign in 1424 when
he died at Yu-mu at the age of 64. On three of these campaigns, he won
not able battles, but none of them was decisive. 1 The Mongols remained
the chief enemy for another 180 years.
It is with this in mind that we can better picture the place of the sea
in Yung-lo's calculations. The Wako pirates were not a serious threat
to the empire, but their attacks disrupted the transportation of grain
by sea from the Yangtse to the military centres in Peking and Manchuria. Curbing the W ako was therefore part of the defence of the
northern land frontiers. Similarly, strengthening the fleet also became a
funct ion of imperial defence in the north. Although the fleets were so
strong that most of the ships could be away on expedition without
endangering the defence of the coasts, Cheng Ho's expeditions could
be seen as an extension of the sea power needed for imperial security.
But in so extending itself, that power became a major factor in China's
relations with overseas coun tries.
In Yun g-lo's lifetime, the major expeditions were sent six times, in
1405-7, 1407-9, 1409-II, 1413-15, 1417-19 and 1421-24 (Cheng Ho
himself returned in 1422).2 Their importance for relations with Southeast Asia cannot be doubted. This was indeed a considerable show of
power at a time when there was no other power to stand up to it. Yet
it is clear that the expeditions were not directed at South-east Asia.
They were sent with diplomatic and trading functions to the countries
further west and sailed through the Straits of Malacca to get there. Onl y
three parts of the region were directly affected, the north coast ports of
Java, the newly established entrepot of Malacca and the kingd om of
Samudra at the northern end of the island of Sumatra. Less directly,
the Chinese-d ominated port of Palembang survived awhile as an outpost of Chinese trading interests, but this was not vital to the Cheng
Ho fleets, which found a safer haven at Malacca to await the change of
monsoons.
I have shown elsewhere that the expeditions were important for
I
2

MS, chuan 6 and 7.

The 1407-9, 14 9-11 expediIions have been carefully reconstructed by J.J.1. Duyvendak in T 'oung P ao; see also Cheng Ho-sheng, Cheng Ho I- shih Hui-pien, Shanghai,
1948. Both authors have also examined the confused dates of the 1421-24 expediIion in
YLSL.