Professional Documents
Culture Documents
of social work. The Editorial Committee consisted of Paul T. Beisser (St. Louis),
Gertrude Springer (Boston), Florence Hollis (New York City), Chair
social reform, has always been an integral and often a decisive element in social
work practice as a whole. From the early days of the charity organization and
settlement movements in England, down to the mental hygiene and public
welfare movement of our own time, there has never been a moment when
professionally conscious social workers have been content wholly to separate
their day-to-day service of particular individuals and groups from some measure
of responsibility for controlling or preventing some of the broad social factors
that caused, complicated, or intensified the problems with which they dealt. And
the reason, I believe, is that there is no possibility of such separation in fact. In
accepting responsibility for administering particular services, social workers
accept, also, the inherent obligation to see that those services find their mark, so
far as possible, in the lives of those that seek and use them. The special
knowledge and skill and discipline upon which the professional character of our
whole function rests are directed precisely to that end. Otherwise it would be
empty pretense. But suppose, in that effort, we discover circumstances beyond
the immediate control of ourselves or our clients which frustrate or obstruct the
full and fruitful use of our service? That cannot absolve us from our inherent
responsibility to make our service available and useful in fact, as well as in
theoretical purpose. And how can we discharge that full responsibility without
undertaking somehow to help in removing the obstructions that confront us and
our clients? And what is this but social action?
In affirming this basic concept that social work, as a profession, necessarily
involves and includes social action as a professional function, we are brought
close to an answer for our second question, as to the nature and scope of that
responsibility. Social work is not the whole of social welfare enterprise. It is not
the exclusive custodian or captain of social progress. The social welfare, in a true
sense, is the common ultimate objective of every social institution; it is the
characteristic aim of many parts of our modern culture. Social work cannot
possess, it can only share, that objective. We have learned through experience the
essential practical value, as well as the theoretical validity, of a limited and
defined function as the basis of our direct professional service to clients. We
know that we need that limitation as the focus of our own development in skill
and knowledge, and as the solid framework that sustains and sanctions our
helping process. We know that the client needs it, too, among other reasons, in
order that he may know whether the service we offer meets his need, and whether
he can use it with satisfaction and success. The same principle applies with equal
force to that secondary aspect of our task which concerns our participation in
helping the community effect broad change in itself. We need to know the limits
within which we can truly help, as a basis for the development of our own skill
and the formulation of our own criteria of the validity of change. The community
needs to know the area of our special. knowledge and capacity, as the basis of its
discriminating acceptance and use of our help.
What, then, defines the province within which, as a profession, we carry
responsibility for social action? It cannot be bounded once and for all, by the
range of the human problems with which it is concerned, in terms of the aspects
of human living with which those problems are identified. One decisive
characteristic of social work as a total professional field is the fact that there is no
problem of human living in society which is not likely, appropriately, to come
within the orbit of some of its professional practitioners. Problems of health,
work, play, education, of family life, parenthood, childhood, of every social
relationship within which people must find theirplace, are grist to our mill. Yet,
obviously, that cannot mean that our specific professional capacity and
responsibility extend to the understanding and treatment of all the infinite
ramifications of human life as a whole, or of any of these problems in their
entirety.
There is, however, one focal point to which all our professional services do
converge, whose specific significance sets off our tasks from every other part of
social welfare enterprise. That is our concernwith the actual impact of any or all
of these problems upon the individual life, and the way in which human beings
face and meet these. problems, and thus attain, through social relationships, their
mastery overthem. We do not know, for instance-we have no way to find out
through our own professional service or training what constitutes a good and
complete health program in any community, in terms of the technical
components of such a program. We do know and we must know, because we are
responsibly helping people to face their health problems as factors in their social
adjustment, what stands in the way of the maintenance of health and the full use
of health resources. We know the effect upon individual people of inadequate or
inaccessible health resources, inadequate provision for meeting the economic
hazards of illness, inadequate appreciation and, therefore, inadequate provision
of integrated treatment, of the interacting physical, social, and emotional factors
of illness. We knowsome of the conditions, mechanisms, and processes that are
prerequisite for the attainment of recognized standards of health. With respect to
these aspects of the communitys health problem we have a clear professional
responsibility to make our help available, not only in the realization, but also in
the formulation of its own health standards and health program.
Take another example: We do not know, nor can we conceivably learn-as a part
of. our own professional study and practice-all that must go into the organization
and operation of an adequate and satisfying economic system. But we do know
the impact of economic factors of life upon individual human beings and groups,
and we know the problems that people face in the actual process,of adjusting to
these fundamental realities of social living, because we have been responsibly and
studiously engaged in helping people through that actual process. We do know,
therefore, not only the fact, but the meaning to real people of inadequate income,
of internittent employment and unemployment; we know the meaning to the
individual of real work, of creative, free, self-respecting participation in the
economic process and in the determination of his own working conditions. This
does not entitle us to prepare or to endorse a detailed blueprint of a total reform
of the economic system. It does obligate us to contribute of our special knowledge
and our professional judgment to the formulation of acceptable criteria of the
validity of economic arrangements, and to exert our influence toward the
introduction into our economic structure of those mechanisms and processes that
make it possible for people continuously to find positive satisfactions, through
sound relationships, in all their working life.
The province of professional social work, then, either in its direct service or in its
social action, does not encompass the total life problem of anybody, not the whole
of any problem. We are concerned with social process-the impact of social
structure and policy upon individuals, and the process by which people are
enabled to meet and master the problems this impact presents.
It is obvious, if this be true, that the responsibility of social work for social action
is both an individual and a collective responsibility. It cannot be entirely
separated from individual practice; it cannot be wholly entrusted to a special
group of workers charged exclusively with the specific set of tasks involved in
social action; it cannot be delegated by each of us to a few chosen representatives
of all of us. Each of us carries a dual responsibility: first, to perform with all the
competence and faithfulness we can muster the particular services which are
entrusted to us by the particular agency with which we are identified; second, to
contribute steadily of our understanding and skill, derived from this experience,
to help the community constructively to relate its institutions and arrangements
and services to the fundamental needs of human beings as these are disclosed in
our service relationships. No one of us can know all about all these needs; each of
us can and must know a part, and each of us must be responsible, therefore, for
contributing his own part to the larger whole.
There are four kinds of relationship within which this responsibility must be
defined and controlled, if professional standards are to be discovered and upheld.
There is the client-worker relationship; the agency relationship; the relationship
to the profession as a whole; and the relationship with other organized forces of
social change and control in the larger community
It seems clear that the client-worker relationship must be held clear for service,
and for service only. Any use of that relationship for the attairment of any goal
other than that to which it is dedi cated in advance-the service of a particular
need upon which the agency has offered help, through the worker-is a betrayal of
the clients confidence, of the agencys purpose, and of the workers professional
obligation. The process of service itself, by helping to discover and release
strength and energy in clients, which they may ultimately turn, along with others,
if they choose, toward, the conscious change of social policies that affect them,
may, it is true, indirectly promote social change. But this must always remain one
serve that useful purpose, with courage, with foresight, with consistent
determination, in social action, is one of the solemn obligations professional
workers accept with their membership in the association.
Here again there are prerequisite conditions that must be observed and
maintained. The association unites professional workers around one basic
interest-the discovery, progressive development, and consistent use of the
highest professional standards of service. It is concerned with the actual
performance of social workers, through the acceptance and enforcement of such
standards. Its members are not asked to check their religious, their political, even
their economic and social convictions and differences at the door. They are asked
to join in support of certain common standards of performance, whatever other
differences may divide them. The usefulness of the association as an instrument
of social action is necessarily limited by that primary functional concern with
professional standards. Even within this area of interest, its practical usefulness
depends upon the degree of its actual internal agreement. It is foolhardy and
dangerous for the association to presume or pretend to speak for the whole
profession upon any issue, even those affecting or affected by professional
standards, when actually professional agreement does not exist. It is sound
principle and serviceable practice that have led the association usually to limit its
undertakings in social action to those that, after study and discussion by the
whole membership, command the convinced support of a clear majority.
There is, of course, danger in this concept of the limitation of association
responsibility. Endless study, aimless talk, may become an easy refuge from the
perils involved in clear conviction and decisive action. The boundary between
intelligent discretion and unconfessed cowardice is sometimes difficult to draw,
but we must depend upon a growing, vital sense of true professional
responsibility to protect us against yielding to ignoble fears.
We can also depend upon vigorous individual and group action, supplementing
united association effort; for, just as the individuals professional responsibility
for social action is not completely absorbed into agency function, so the
individuals responsibility is not completely submerged in the professional group.
Upon the same basis rests the validity of individual and group action of
professional workers in the political arena, where many social issues come
inevitably to final settlement. It is perfectly obvious that a social agency,
dedicated to a specific service, about which, alone, its sponsors and its supporters
are united, cannot ethically or practically expend its energies or resources to ends
not directly related to that service. Its social action must be, confined to the
interpretation of its own experience, in terms of chosen objectives, accepted
principles and incontestable facts, commended on their merits, as factors in the
determination of community policy affecting its service. It cannot take
responsibility for measuring the relative importance of this aspect of public
policy, as compared with others, as decisive factors in a political contest. It would
be wholly inappropriate for an agency, therefore, to espouse a particular party
cause or candidate.
The professional association is in a somewhat similar position. It is united upon
objectives and principles, on the basis of professional standards. In all but the
rarest instances, it cannot command the judgment of its members, or bring them
to agreement, as to the relative weight to be assigned to these agreed concepts, as
compared with other issues involved in a political campaign, nor as to the relative
capacity and determination of opposing candidates to carry these concepts to
realization in public policy. It would be utterly inappropriate, it seems to me, for
the association, as such, to throw its influence in behalf of one or another party or
candidate in a political contest in which other than strictly social issues were at
stake.
Does the same set of limitations bind the individual professional worker? To
answer that question in the affirmative seems to me to threaten the integrity both
of the individual and of the profession as a whole. The individual not only can but
must exercise his judgment as to the relative weight of issues at stake; he must
make a final choice, as a citizen. If, in his honest and considered judgment, social
issues are paramount, and if his choice is made between parties or candidates on
the basis of their position on these problems and of their relative capacity and
determination to solve those problems by measures that conform with
professional principles, must he stifle those convictions, remain silent, and refuse
to make his judgment as a social worker available to anybody else? And because
the professional group as a whole is prevented by its collective responsibility and
function from direct participation on the political level, must social work have no
voice at all in the moment of decision? The individual must, if he is true to his
own professional responsibility, remain free to act as an individual beyond the
level of agreement of all his colleagues. It is that freedom, that personal
obligation of the individual to be an independent creative unit, which is the
essence of professionalism. It is likewise the source of the progress and
achievement of the profession as a collective whole.
It is of special consequence to the profession of social work that this freedom
should be conserved and protected. It is of the nature of professional social work
practice that the individual practitioner shall not be completely free in the
performance of a specific service. He is, and must be, the representative of a
social agency, bound to operate within its policies, which cannot always express
his own highest ideals of service since they must incorporate, also, the differing
viewpoints of nonprofessional sponsors and supporters. He is protected against
the loss of professional integrity, in this complete identification with agency, by
his active and responsible participation in the development of agency policy, on
the one hand, and by his membership in the professional association, where
standards are sustained, on the other. If, however, his identification either with
agency or with association limits or nullifies his independence as a professional
person in the realm of social action in pursuit of professional objectives, then he
has no further means of protecting his professional integrity-the fulfillment of his
own sense of professional responsibility. His independence even as a citizen is
qualified and limited.
There is risk in this individual freedom which we affirm-risk to the individual, to
the agency, and to the profession. But that risk is as nothing compared to the
danger of placing social workers and their profession under the suspicion that
any considerations other than honest conviction and the analyzed outcomes of
their study and experience can determine the part they shall play in decisive
struggles for the realization of social ideals. The perfect pattern of political action
affecting social work would be achieved, I firmly believe, only when every