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ABSTRACT
Despite its importance in the global system, the literature provides lit-
tle guidance on how treaty-making emerged as a well-accepted prac-
tice. In either assuming the appropriateness of treaty-making (and then
analysing design) or treating treaties as strategic choices in the pursuit
of gains (without analysing how treaties came to be a way to pursue
gains), the current literature discounts the emergence and evolution
of treaty-making. This lacuna contributes to a biased view of treaty-
making as the epiphenomenal result of specific, ahistorical factors,
rather than as a patterned, historical practice. We contend that the evo-
lution of the practice of treaty-making is significant for questions of
design/compliance, the future of multilateral interaction and global
order. In addressing this concern, we pursue two linked goals. The first
is self-consciously descriptive. We introduce a dataset of multilateral
treaties that provides a novel picture of treaty-making across time,
space and issue-areas. The second goal is explanatory. We develop and
test a social constructivist and path-dependent explanation for the
patterns of treaty-making evident in the data, especially 150 years of
exponential growth, the spread of treaty-making across multiple issues
and the diffusion of the practice across the world.
Keywords: increasing returns; multilateral treaties and treaty-making;
path dependence; social constructivism
Introduction
We begin with the broadest picture of multilateral treaty activity over the
past 400 years. Figure 1 presents the number of multilateral treaties signed
each year from 1595 to 1995, and immediately challenges traditional wis-
dom. Those who assume that multilateralism has increased over time are
correct, yet the explosion of treaty-making in the past 150 years is quite dra-
matic. Exponential growth is notable for nearly the entire period, and
not just following the Second World War, as is conventionally argued.
Furthermore, while multilateralism as a mode of interaction might well
have suffered political attacks from the 1980s, multilateral treaty signings
peaked in the 1960s and, following a decline, levelled off in the 1980s and
enjoyed a mild resurgence in the 1990s. Beyond challenging conventional
wisdom about how much multilateral treaty-making there is and how it is
distributed over time, Figure 1 also casts doubt on four common conjec-
tures about multilateral treaty-making: that it should be related to crises,
demographic shifts in the international system, alterations in (mainly eco-
nomic) connectivity and hegemonic influence.
First, there is no evidence that multilateral treaty-making is a crisis-
driven activity or that as crises fade into historical memory our propensity
to make treaties declines. Certainly, the two world wars were followed by
increased treaty activity, but what is remarkable is how the post-war pat-
terns return to the trajectories of the pre-war eras. Multilateral treaty-
making does not appear crisis-driven so much as crisis-interrupted. Even with
the slate wiped clean by the events of 1918 and 1945, and the opportunity to
remake the international system, states returned to the practice and prior
trajectory of multilateral treaty-making.
Second, we might be concerned that the number of multilateral treaties
would increase as the number of sovereign states rises. This relationship is
not a certainty. It could be that states that are new to the system, especially
the relatively small ones that emerged from decolonization from the 1950s
to the 1970s, and again after 1989, would tend to join existing agreements or
follow more powerful states into new agreements, as opposed to sponsoring
their own. Assuming that additional states would nonetheless tend to
increase the number of agreements, this might provide an explanation for
some of the increase noted in Figure 1. Figure 2 casts doubt on the efficacy
of using demographic shifts to explain treaty-making over time, showing
that there is a complex relationship between the number of states in the sys-
tem and the number of treaties signed. We may see a threshold effect or
even an inversion, but the signing of multilateral treaties is no simple func-
tion of the addition of new actors to the global system. Bivariate regression
results (Model 1 in Table 1) appear to support a more direct relationship,
but when the post-war period is controlled for, as in Model 2 in Table 1, the
relationship between the number of states in the system and treaties signed
disappears.2
A third argument concerns the increase in treaty-making that might
emerge from an increase in the interaction of nation-states. Assuming that
treaties emerge at least in part from the discovery of collective problems,
160
140
120
100
80
60
20
0
1596 1616 1636 1656 1676 1701 1 721 1 74 1 1 761 1781 1801 1821 1 841 1 861 1 881 1901 1 921 1941 1961 1981
FIGURE 1
Multilateral Treaties Signed Per Year 1596–1995
189
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190
160
140
120
100
80
60
20
0
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 43(2)
FIGURE 2
Size of International Community and Treaty Signings
Note: Figure 2 provides data for this relationship from 1816 to 1995, the period within which we could obtain reliable data on the number of independ-
ent states in the international system on an annual basis. We obtained the data at: http://weber.ucsd.edu/~kgledits/statelist.html
(accessed January 2006). See Gleditsch and Ward (1999).
DENEMARK AND HOFFMANN: MULTILATERAL TREATY-MAKING 191
and the search for collection solutions, the more interdependent states
become, the more incentives for treaty-making we might expect. Increasing
trade, important both in its own right and as the most generally agreed-
upon surrogate measure of interdependence, does not appear to explain the
rise of multilateral treaties. Figure 3 contrasts the growth of international
trade with multilateral treaty signings over a period of 40 years that
includes both increases and decreases in treaty behaviour. The figure casts
doubt on the ability of (trade-based) interdependence to explain treaty-
making patterns. Models 3, 4 and 5 of Table 1 also question the efficacy of
explaining the growth of treaty-signing with traditional markers of interde-
pendence. While trade is a significant variable in all three models, it has the
wrong sign, indicating that increasing trade volume is correlated with a
decrease in the number of treaties signed per year. There is no simple rela-
tionship between interdependence and treaty-making.
Finally, those who portray multilateralism as a post-Second World War
phenomenon driven by the hegemony of the US are at best only partially cor-
rect (Martin, 1993; Ruggie, 1993b; Ikenberry, 2001). While multilateral treaty-
making surged in the 20 years following the Second World War, this is
remarkable not for its novelty but rather for how it fits within a pattern of
accelerating multilateral treaty-making that began a century prior. Figure 1
casts suspicion on any suggestion that the incidence of multilateral treaties
ought to rise or decline with any given distribution of power. Treaty-making
did not suffer with the decline of the British (circa 1885 to 1910), nor enjoy
unusual increases with the rise of the US (circa 1945 to 1955).With the excep-
tion of the largest and most disruptive wars, treaty-making continues apace.3
This lack of apparent impact between hegemony and treaty-making is
interesting given the prevalence of suggestions about such a link. Not all of
the arguments are consistent. Dominant powers, especially those dedicated
to representative forms of rule, are suggested to facilitate more agreements
(Keohane, 1984; Ikenberry, 2001). Alternatively, such powers may eschew
agreements given problems of group size and their lack of a need for col-
lective support (Oye, 1986; Taylor, 1987). Or their decline might provide
incentives for others to engage in increased cooperation (Krasner, 1982;
Keohane, 1984; Hasencleaver, 1997). Certainly, as Ruggie (1993b) contends,
‘American hegemony’ was important, but the existence and promulgation
of multilateral treaties from 1850 to 1945 appears to have had a profound
effect on the manner in which the emergent US sought to order the global
system.4 What the data force us to consider is that hegemony may affect
multilateral treaty-making less than the acceptance of the practice of
treaty-making influences hegemonic behaviour. In the case of hegemony
and the establishment of a multilateral treaty system, the traditional causal
arrow may have to be reversed (Jönsson and Hall, 2005).
TABLE 1
Regression Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Parameters (1816–1995) (1815–1995) (1950–1995) (1950–95) (1950–95)
The dependent variable for Models 1–4 is the number of treaties signed per year. For Model 5 the dependent variable is the number of trade
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 43(2)
and economics related treaties signed per year. The independent variables are operationalized as follows: States number of states in the
international system in each year; Post-war Dichotomous dummy variable (1 1945–1995; 0 1816–1945); Trade World export/import vol-
90 160
80
140
70
120
60
100
50
80
40
60
30
40
20
10 20
0 0
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
FIGURE 3
Multilateral Treaties and Export Levels
*Exports (total world merchandise export volume) are measured as a percentage of 1995 levels. The source data are drawn from the World Trade
Organization at: http://www.wto.org/English/res_e/statis_e/its2004_e/its04_appendix_e.htm (accessed January 2006).
193
194 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 43(2)
The central notion of social constructivism is that actors and their social con-
texts are mutually constitutive. The behaviours of actors help create their
social context (rules, meanings, institutions), that social context shapes actor
identities, perceptions and wants, which are then translated into subsequent
behaviours. We posit that the accelerating adoption of multilateral treaties
as a mode of international cooperation in the early to mid-nineteenth cen-
tury altered the global social context. Multilateral treaty-making was intro-
duced as a way to deal with a growing set of transnational issues. Increasing
use of this instrument reinforced its appropriateness and states began to ori-
ent their domestic structures, behaviour and expectations to this practice.
Multilateral treaty-making became the accepted way to deal with trans-
national issues, and came to constitute how states conceived of appropriate
interactions.
This broad understanding is incomplete. It fails to provide insight into
why and how states might come to conceive of multilateral treaty-making
Once multilateral treaty-making was deemed the right response in the late
nineteenth century, a certain path was chosen. Increasing returns to this
institution solidified the choice and the practice moved, in the parlance of
normative dynamics, from emergence to internalization (Finnemore and
Sikkink, 1998). Once chosen, continued use of a given practice alters expect-
ations such that it eventually achieves the enviable state of being simply
taken for granted.
The increasing returns that drive path dependence are expected in sys-
tems exhibiting four characteristics (Pierson, 2000). First, start-up costs and
the costs of switching institutions are high. It is expensive or difficult to
establish institutions in the system, or to change them once established.
Second, learning effects are significant. There are steep learning curves
Treaties, multilateral and otherwise, have been in use for millennia (Beckman,
1996; Cohen and Westbrook, 2000). Multilateral treaty-making exploded in
the latter half of the nineteenth century and grew exponentially through the
1960s. The puzzle we address is why this form of global interaction flowered
at this time, and with this pattern. The growth and dominance of multilate-
ral treaty-making as a solution to the problems generated by transnational
interactions began with a specific confluence of changes in the material
environment, ideational context and distribution of power resources of the
global system.
Regarding the material context, Murphy (1994) claims that the emergence
of multilateral practice is inextricably tied to the development of the global
capitalist system. As capitalist industry outgrows the physical boundaries of
the nineteenth and early twentieth century state, capitalist interests express
a preference for republican forms of government where they might have a
chance to counteract both the power of entrenched privilege and the pol-
icies of sovereigns bent on territorial aggrandizement rather than prosperity.
norms into the global sphere was the catalyst for the multilateral order as
evidenced by the initiation of universal conferences, the proliferation of
treaties, and the formation of international courts. Keene (2007) observes a
similar ideational shift in the dominant legal discourses of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries that also facilitated increasing use of international
legal mechanisms.
The hallmarks of the multilateral practice that Reus-Smit analyses are
the most crucial multilateral agreements that set the parameters of inter-
national law and its adjudication. He (1997, 1999) provides an in-depth
analysis of The Hague Conferences of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the founding conference for the
United Nations. In tying the emergence of multilateralism to ideational
concerns, Reus-Smit provides additional elements to Murphy’s primarily
material account and significant evidence for the existence of a multilateral
order that extends beyond the temporal boundaries of material incentives.
He claims that the norms of procedural justice that flow from ‘the moral
purpose of the state’ constrained institutional choices by shaping both cog-
nitive horizons and the range of legitimate actions. In the modern case, legis-
lative norms led the international community (or at least the dominant
states within it) to advance multilateral forms of interaction.
Ikenberry (2001) reminds us that powerful actors have a significant role
to play in the emergence of multilateral treaty-making as a potentially dom-
inant practice, and his account of its emergence diverges sharply from both
Reus-Smit and Murphy. For Ikenberry, multilateral order, or ‘constitutional
order’ as he describes it, is a potential solution for the problem that hege-
mons face at the end of major wars: how to institutionalize their advantages.
He (2001: 4) argues: ‘Major postwar junctures are rare strategic moments
when leading or hegemonic states face choices about how to use their newly
acquired power.’ A constitutional order is one of the choices, and it has sig-
nificant advantages in that it allows the new hegemon to show restraint and
cope with the mistrust that accompanies asymmetric power. By institutionally
binding itself into a multilateral order, the hegemon is able to achieve ‘buy-
in’ by smaller powers and institutionalize a durable, advantageous inter-
national order.
Different hegemons may institute different post-war orders, and
Ikenberry attributes the choice to the extent of power disparities and
fidelity to democracy (the more unilateral, the more readily a hegemon can
cement its preferred order, while more democratic hegemons can more
readily lock-in a constitutional order). While Ikenberry sees ‘hegemonic
establishment of constitutional orders’ and we observe a relatively un-
broken dynamic of interaction through multilateral treaty-making, his
reminder of the role of material power in reinforcing multilateralism is
well-taken.
The emergence in the 1850s of multilateral treaty-making as a potentially
dominant practice resulted from a confluence of material, ideational and
distribution of power factors. Industrialization altered the needs of power-
ful actors, providing a drive toward cooperative international interaction
at the same time that a new set of values favouring legislative justice and
reciprocity within dominant states was being externalized into the inter-
national community. These forces combined to build powerful momentum
behind the practice of multilateral treaty-making.
What we see in the mid to late nineteenth century is the critical juncture
that Mahoney (2000: 513) urges those pursuing path-dependent arguments
to seek. A number of contingent forces led to the emergence of multiple
multilateral institutional possibilities — most notably public unions, multi-
lateral conferences, systems of arbitration and multilateral treaty-making.7
What we observe in subsequent decades is the growing dominance of mul-
tilateral treaty-making as the increasing returns to this institutional practice
reinforce its legitimacy and generate positive feedback. States orient them-
selves toward making multilateral treaties, altering their organizational
structures and shifting domestic resources. Their actions reify the appropri-
ateness of multilateral treaty-making and the practice spreads over time,
across space and to varied issues.
The secondary literature on multilateral treaty-making confirms the
plausibility of the social construction through the increasing returns argu-
ment. The hallmarks of increasing returns — high start-up and switching
costs, learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations — are
evident in observers’ accounts of the multilateral treaty system. A brief dis-
cussion of each characteristic of increasing returns reveals how multilateral
treaty-making spread and came to be a dominant institutional feature of
world politics.
Both the start-up and switching costs of cooperation via multilateral treaty
are high. Murphy (1994) notes that it was only under the extreme pressure
applied by those defining the new economic system (both its dominant fig-
ures and popular sectors) that sovereigns altered their tendency to seek
aggrandizement through territorial conquest and moved toward a system
that facilitated increased wealth.This required extensive and carefully crafted
cooperative agreements. The social movements that emerged behind these
changes were costly to establish and difficult to decommission. Ikenberry
(2001) makes similar claims about the establishment of constitutional orders
and highlights the ‘stickiness’ of a system founded on multilateral treaties and
organizations. In addition, as multilateral treaty-making grew in legitimacy,
the costs of switching to a different interaction mechanism grow as well.
Once multilateral interactions became more frequent, it grew difficult to
alter the form or nature of that behaviour. Conferences may have had sig-
nificant advantages, but the agreements that emerged and lasted the longest
were those posed as contracts negotiated by experts, ratified by legislatures
and/or signed by sovereigns. Eventually the need to expand and update
cooperative agreements increased beyond the ability, willingness or neces-
sity of leaders and their vast entourages to travel. Once this happened, it
was difficult to even conceive of an alternative form for the updating and
further codification of binding agreements. These first movements changed
the cost of future choices. Adopted early on, it would have been quite diffi-
cult to prospect for, prove the value of and convince others to adopt differ-
ent norms. Norm-destroying wars of the sort that gave birth to modern
Europe after 1815 were few in number, and even before 1918 the tendency
was to settle them with the same mechanisms (conferences and treaties)
that had come to dominate international relations in the century prior.
Learning effects emerge quickly in the cooperative environment of con-
ferences and multilateral treaty-making. Not only are sovereigns satisfied
with what they have created, but also we see the almost immediate growth
of an international civil service staffed by what Murphy (1994) calls ‘public
systems builders’ with generic skill sets. Additional officials and bureaucracies
emerge to cope with the new activities. Specialists, and the agreements they
negotiate, eventually eclipse the conferences themselves.
What is generally observed is the emergence of a stratum of experts co-
evolving with the practice of multilateral treaty-making. As these public
system builders become more expert in the handling of a given issue area
at a conference or in the drafting of a treaty, expertise and cosmopolitan
experience become associated with the ability to navigate the great confer-
ences and create or service the important treaties that emerged. Murphy
(1994) traces this process through the nineteenth century and into the twen-
tieth. Sacriste and Vauchez (2007) illuminate how a heterogeneous popula-
tion of international lawyers came to define international law and alter the
orientation of states towards international law and treaty-making in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Finnemore (2003) observed
similar dynamics in the politics of military intervention, where the disciplin-
ary growth of international lawyers led to a reinforcement of ideas about
the rule of law in the international system. Ikenberry (2001: 66) records the
same kind of support for the constitutional order, noting that:
[I]nstitutions are not just agreements, they are also interstate processes that
require state officials to engage in ongoing interaction with other states. This
requires state bureaucracies be organized in particular ways — with mandates,
missions and routines.
This trend tracks nicely with how Boli and Thomas (1999) and Barnett and
Finnemore (2004) describe a longer-term trend toward the acceptance of
rational-legal norms. Indeed, what emerges around the institution of multi-
lateral treaty-making is what Adler (2005) describes as a ‘community of
practice’. States and their agents come to expect multilateral interaction
and are geared toward multilateral treaty-making. In this way, multilateral
treaty-making structures state practices and is in turn the result of those
practices.
The end result of learning effects is that multilateral treaty-making gains
its own momentum as participation comes to be understood and advocated
by state functionaries as the composition of acceptable practice. Other com-
munities of experts follow suit. Murphy (1994: 112) notes that once great
powers began to interact in characteristic ways, ‘Governments and private
associations regularized their own work to match …’ Experts in solving the
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
1596 1616 1636 1656 1676 1696 1716 1736 1756 1776 1796 1816 1836 1856 1876 1896 1916 1936 1956 1976
100
90
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70
60
50
40
10
0
1596 1616 1636 1656 1676 1696 1716 1736 1756 1776 1796 1816 1836 1856 1876 1896 1916 1936 1956 1976
203
Communication and Tr anspor tation
204
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
1596 1616 1636 1656 1676 1696 1716 1736 1756 1776 1796 1816 1836 1856 1876 1896 1916 1936 1956 1976
Environment
25
20
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 43(2)
15
20
15
10
45
40
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30
25
20
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0
1596 1616 1636 1656 1676 1696 1716 1736 1756 1776 1796 1816 1836 1856 1876 1896 1916 1936 1956 1976
FIGURE 4
205
these states start signing treaties devised in the West, they began to negoti-
ate treaties on their own and host the negotiations and signings.10 There
were serious concerns in much of the Third World about Western imperial-
ism and neo-colonialism, but this did not appear to impact on the adoption
of (typically Western) multilateral treaty-making as a generic form of
interaction.
In a report on how recently independent states viewed the instruments of
international law, Abi-Saab (1962: 100) pointed out that such states ‘do not
easily forget that the same body of international law that they are now
asked to abide by, sanctioned their previous subjugation and exploitation’.
Even so, these states readily accepted treaty-making as a means of inter-
action with the global community (Abi-Saab, 1962; Sinha, 1965; Akintoba,
1996). International law and multilateral treaty-making served a purpose
for newly independent states because they define what it is to act like a
state. As Akintoba (1996: 21) notes ‘this need to communicate and trade
invariably makes necessary resort to the system of law originally created by
Western states for regulating interstate relations’.
This adoption or socialization demonstrates either learning effects or
coordination effects, depending on one’s perspective on the autonomy of
non-Western states. If one takes seriously the de jure sovereignty of states
in the periphery, and considers them to be autonomous actors with inde-
pendent initiative, then Figure 5 demonstrates the learning effects of
increasing returns. As states enter the international community, they find a
system of international interaction in place with its experts, diplomats and
the other technologies of multilateralism. States adopt this practice as part
of the process of becoming ‘modern’ (Finnemore, 1996).
On the other hand, if one questions the autonomy of peripheral states,
focusing on the lack of de facto sovereignty in some areas, coordination
effects appear to be driving this extension of multilateral treaty-making.
This interpretation recalls that increasing returns are evident when benefits
from a given practice increase to the extent that more participants adopt
them. From this perspective, it is in the interests of the West to incorporate
emerging actors into the extant multilateral order. Of course, both perspec-
tives are likely implicated in explaining Figure 5. States outside the West
have had varying levels of autonomy and thus varying abilities to ‘choose’.
In either case, our argument anticipates the spread of multilateral treaty-
making evident in Figure 5.
120
100
80
60
40
0
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 43(2)
1648 1668 1688 1708 1728 1748 1768 1788 1808 1828 1848 1868 1888 1908 1928 1948 1968 1988
FIGURE 5
Number of Treaties Signed in Western States and Non-Western States in Each Year
DENEMARK AND HOFFMANN: MULTILATERAL TREATY-MAKING 209
diffused around the globe, the sites where most of the treaty-making takes place
have altered only slightly. Figure 6 presents data on the top five locations for
treaty-making (where the most treaties are signed) in six different periods of
global politics.The identities of the top locations for multilateral activity remain
notably consistent over 400 years.
This geographical consistence demonstrates the functioning of adaptive
expectations. Not only do states adapt their actions to fit the expectation of
multilateral treaty-making, but they also adopt specific expectations of
where treaty-making will take place. Table 2 reinforces this finding by fur-
ther illustrating the continuity. Thirty cities could conceivably fill our six dif-
ferent ‘top five’ lists. We find only fifteen. Eight of those fifteen appear only
once, and seven of those eight appear only during the two short wartime
periods. This leaves a list of only seven cities that serve as the top treaty-
signing locations over a period of four centuries.
Going a step further in collaboration with geographer Herman van der
Wusten, we analysed the development and persistence of urban specializa-
tion in treaty negotiations. As early as the period from 1782 to 1849, we note
the focus of ‘Vienna in state relations…. London in others’. Although some
specializations emerge by issue-area, like Berne in the area of communica-
tion treaties, ‘those places that lack any specialization receive conferences
concerned with a wide variety of issues’ like London, Paris and Brussels
(van der Wusten et al., 2007). Once a particular location becomes an estab-
lished site of multilateral activity, this alters the way actors view appropri-
ate places to negotiate. These adaptive expectations are driven by a number
of factors, including learning and coordination effects. The cities in the top
five thus remain pre-eminent centres for treaty-making for long stretches of
time, beyond any rationale they may have had for being an early primary
location for negotiations in the first place.
Establishing Plausibility
600
1596–1849 1850–1914 1915–1918 1919–1938 1939–1945 1946–1995
500
400
300
200
0
t
ue on na ris urg aris gue don sels ton don vsk res vre olm eva aris don ton gue don deo ton rlin cow eva sels aris don nna
ag nd ien Pa rsb P Ha on us ing on P on ing Ha on evi ing Be os en us P on e
e
H Lo V te e L r h L t -L ito ha Ha ckh en
c e o G L nt h M G Br L Vi
e h B a s s B u L t L sh e
o as
Th P T W re S W
a Th
M W
. B
St
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 43(2)
City of Signature
TABLE 2
Top Places for Treaty-Making
Number of
Place of Signature Eras in Top 5
London 6
Paris 4
The Hague 3
Washington 3
Vienna 2
Brussels 2
Geneva 2
St. Petersburg 1
Montevideo 1
Moscow 1
Berlin 1
Stockholm 1
Bucharest 1
Le Havre 1
Brest-Litovsk 1
Conclusion
Treaties have long been a staple of global interaction, and this has been even
truer for the last century and one half. Their exponential increase since 1850
has been interrupted, but not generated, by global crises. The exponential
increase cannot be attributed to the growing number of actors, interdepend-
ence or hegemony. A plausible explanation rests with constructivism/path
dependence/increasing returns. Such an explanation is consistent with major
material, ideational and power distribution treatments of international
organization and cooperation. The constructivist explanation is supported
empirically by the replication of patterns across issue-areas, across political
and geographic contexts, and in terms of the uncanny consistency with which
certain cities serve as the locus of treaty signings.
These insights differ from those that could be generated by more trad-
itional, small-n, treatments of treaty-making. Substantive concerns regarding
particular issue areas and the effects of different designs provide important
information, but do not speak to the overarching role of treaty-making in
the global system as does this project. From this perspective, treaties are
more prevalent, and their exponential growth through the 1960s and 1970s
suggests a far more important role for cooperative interaction in the evolu-
tion of international relations than other perspectives can offer.
Specifically, the results of this study provoke us to consider the connec-
tions between the practice of multilateral treaty-making and the broader
norms of multilateralism. Ruggie (1993b: 7) argues that the generic multilat-
eral form entails more than arrangements of three or more states and
includes the generalized principles of indivisibility (participants see them-
selves as a unit), and diffuse reciprocity (participants expect roughly equiva-
lent benefits over time). Multilateralism is thus more than a quantitative
description; it has to do with the quality of an institutional arrangement
(ibid., pp. 7–12). Individual treaties can be signed for a number of reasons. It
would be folly to suggest that all treaties are consistent with the principles
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
FIGURE 7
Non-State Treaty Signators. Number of International Organization Signators of Multilateral Treaties in Each Year
Notes
from jamming), yet its emergence as best practice closed off avenues of history that
might have led to the development of more ergonomic letter placement more
rational for the computer age. See Arthur, 1994.
7. In line with Couch and Farrell’s (2004) analysis of changes in paths, alterna-
tives to multilateral treaty-making do not necessarily disappear even when multi-
lateral treaty-making grows in prominence. Public Unions survive into the twentieth
century and large multilateral conferences saw resurgence in the late twentieth cen-
tury. This retention of latent institutional forms is entirely consistent with the path-
dependence argument and is, according to Couch and Farrell, a means for change in
paths.
8. It has not escaped our notice that treaties of war and peace depart from this pat-
tern. The politics of war and peace may be more crisis-driven than the bulk of inter-
national interaction.We take up the implications of this departure in forthcoming work.
9. Ikenberry (2001) considers these costs to be so high that nothing short of a
major war provides the opportunity to restructure the system.
10. Initial social network analyses of treaty signings indicate the emergence of
distinct, non-Western regional treaty systems (Hoffmann et al., 2007).
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Appendix I
either the graduate or undergraduate coders who were involved.A set of six
broader categorizations was created into which all sub-categories were
placed. Appropriate placement of about two-thirds of the sub-categories
into their broader categorizations was apparent, although the graduate stu-
dent in charge of the dataset, and both faculty members involved, reviewed
these choices. Those categories that were more difficult to fit were broken
down by treaty title, and all three of us discussed proper placement. All
decisions were based on review and consensus, and as a result there are no
concerns with inter-coder reliability.
In this article, we use version 1.2 of the dataset. It is not perfect. The
largest source is self-consciously biased toward treaties that were published
in either English or French (Wiktor, 1998: xxi). This is justified by Wiktor in
part given the requirements of the League of Nations and the UN to sub-
mit all treaties in one of those languages to its depository. Our second
largest sources (Mostecky, 1965) is less constrained by language, but ends in
1963. Version 1.3 of this dataset is in process, and will include treaties from
updates of the Mostecky dataset, as well as material from treaty calendars
of the USSR and China. It will also include materials from specialty sources
in areas like the environment and human rights. While the dataset is not
perfect, we believe it is sufficiently representative of multilateral treaty-
making to serve as the foundation of the large-n study presented here. We
look forward to future modifications and we welcome input.