Documentary evidence

Best evidence rule

[G.R. No. 80505 : December 4, 1990.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIO TANDOY y LIM, DefendantAppellant.
Facts:
The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133 dated October 13, 1987,
convicting Mario Tandoy of the crime of violation of Art. II, Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is before us on appeal.
The prosecution only submitted a photocopy of the marked money used in the
operation.
n May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. Lt. Salido, Jr. of the Makati Police Station dispatched
Pfc. Herino de la Cruz, and Detectives Pablo R. Singayan, Nicanor Candolesas, Luisito de la
Cruz, Estanislao Dalumpines, Antonio Manalastas and Virgilio Padua to conduct a buy-bust
operation at Solchuaga St., Barangay Singkamas, Makati.
The target area was a store along the said street, and Singayan was to pose as the buyer.
He stood alone near the store waiting for any pusher to approach. The other members of
the team strategically positioned themselves. Soon, three men approached Singayan. One
of them was the accused-appellant, who said without preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang
umiskor?" Singayan said yes. The exchange was made then and there two rolls/pieces
of marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics
Unit).
The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. Manalastas and Candolesas made a body
search of the accused-appellant and took from him the marked money, as well as eight
more rolls/foils of marijuana and crushed leaves.:
The arresting officers brought Tandoy to the Office of the Anti-Narcotics Unit, Makati Police
Station, for investigation by Detective Marvin Pajilan. The accused-appellant chose to
remain silent after having been informed of his constitutional rights.
These events were narrated under oath by De la Cruz, Singayan and Pajilan. 1 Microscopic,
chemical and chromotographic examination was performed on the confiscated marijuana
by Raquel P. Angeles, forensic chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation, who later
testified that the findings were positive. The marijuana was offered as an exhibit.
As might be expected, the accused-appellant had a different story. His testimony was that
from 1:30 to 4:00 p.m. of the day in question, he was playing "cara y cruz" with 15 other
persons along Solchuaga St. when somebody suddenly said that policemen were making
arrests. The players grabbed the bet money and scampered. However, he and a certain
Danny (another "cara y cruz" player) were caught and taken to the Narcotics Command
headquarters in Makati. There they were mauled and warned that if they did not point to
their fellow pushers, they would rot in jail. The accused-appellant denied he had sold
marijuana to Singayan and insisted the bills taken from him were the bet money he had
grabbed at the "cara y cruz" game. 3
The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and
to listen to their respective testimonies, gave more credence to the statements of the
arresting officers. Applying the presumption that they had performed their duties in a
regular manner, it rejected Tandoy's uncorroborated allegation that he had been
manhandled and framed. Tandoy had not submitted sufficient evidence of his charges, let
alone his admission that he had no quarrel with the peace officers whom he had met only
on the day of his arrest.
Issue:

Issue WON the best evidence rule is applicable and the Photocopy of the marked money
bills is admissible as evidence?
Held:
No.
Ratio:
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or
exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule
does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. (Cf. Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-77; 4 Martin,
op. cit., p. 78.)
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of
establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy
thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to the
conviction of the accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana had been adequately
proved by the testimony of the police officers. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the
accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit, the failure to produce the marked money
itself would not constitute a fatal omission.
We are convinced from the evidence on record that the prosecution has overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant with proof beyond
reasonable doubt of his guilt. He must therefore suffer the penalty prescribed by law for those
who would visit the scourge of drug addiction upon our people.

Documentary evidence
Best evidence rule
G.R. No. 83377
February 9, 1993
BASILIO DE VERA, LUIS DE VERA, FELIPE DE VERA, HEIRS OF EUSTAQUIA DE VERA-PAPA
represented by GLICERIA PAPA-FRANCISCO, et al., petitioners, vs. SPOUSES MARIANO AGUILAR
and LEONA V. AGUILAR, respondents.
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated
November 27, 1987 in CA-GR CV No. 07448 entitled, "Basilio de Vera, Luis de Vera, Felipe
de Vera, Heirs of Eustaquia de Vera-Papa, represented by Gliceria Papa-Francisco, and
Heirs of Maria de Vera-Torres, represented by Luis V. Torres, plaintiffs-appellees versus
Spouses Mariano Aguilar and Leona V. Aguilar, defendants-appellants", which reversed the
decision ** of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Third Judicial Region, Branch 14, for
failure of petitioners to prove the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale and of all
its duplicate original copies.
Petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and Maria, all surnamed de Vera and respondent
Leona, married to respondent Mariano Aguilar, are the children and heirs of the late
Marcosa Bernabe who died on May 10, 1960. In her lifetime, Marcosa Bernabe owned the
disputed parcel of land situated in Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan, with an area of 4,195
square meters, designated as Cadastral Lot No. 3621, Cad. 337, Case No. 4, Meycauayan
Cadastre.
The disputed property was mortgaged by petitioners Basilio and Felipe de Vera to a certain
Atty. Leonardo Bordador. When the mortgage had matured, the respondents redeemed the
property from Atty. Leonardo Bordador and in turn Marcosa Bernabe sold the same to them
as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale dated February 11, 1956.
On February 13, 1956, the respondents registered the deed with the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan resulting in the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Marcosa
Bernabe and the issuance of another in the name of the Aguilars. Since then and up to the
present, the Aguilars have been paying taxes on the land.
On July 20, 1977, respondent Mariano Aguilar was issued a free patent to the land on the
basis of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-1356(M) was issued in his name.
On September 1, 1980, the petitioners wrote to the respondents claiming that as children
of Marcosa Bernabe, they were co-owners of the property and demanded partition thereof
on threats that the respondents would be charged with perjury and/or falsification. The
petitioners also claimed that the respondents had resold the property to Marcosa Bernabe
on April 28, 1959.
On September 27, 1980, the respondents wrote in reply to the petitioners that they were
the sole owners of the disputed parcel of land and denied that the land was resold to
Marcosa Bernabe.
True to petitioners' threat, they filed a falsification case against the respondents. However,
on March 31, 1981, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Arsenio N. Mercado of Bulacan
recommended dismissal of the charge of falsification of public document against the
respondents for lack of a prima facie case.

On March 26, 1981, petitioners filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1356(M).
In ruling in favor of the petitioners, the trial court admitted, over the objection of the
respondents, Exhibit A purporting to be a xeroxed copy of an alleged deed of sale
executed on April 28, 1959 by the respondents selling, transferring and conveying unto
Marcosa Bernabe the disputed parcel of land for and in consideration of P1,500.00.
Not contented with the decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals contending
that they never sold back to Marcosa Bernabe the disputed parcel of land. Furthermore,
respondents contended that since the petitioners have failed to produce the original of the
alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959, the same was not the best evidence of the
alleged sale hence it should have been excluded and should not have been accorded any
evidentiary value. On the other hand, the petitioners claimed that the existence of the
document of sale dated April 28, 1959 had been duly established by the testimony of the
notary public before whom it was acknowledged and by Luis de Vera who was present
during its execution and that the loss of the original document had been proven by the
testimony of the representatives of the offices of the National Archives and the Provincial
Assessor of Bulacan.
On November 29, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the trial
court's decision. It found that the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale has not
been duly proven by the petitioners. Hence, secondary evidence, i.e., presentation of the
xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of sale is inadmissible.

Issue:
WON the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the original deed of sale so as to
allow the presentation of the xeroxed copy of the same?
Held:
No.
Ratio:
Section 4 of Rule 130 (now Section 5, Rule 130) of the Rules of Court on Secondary
Evidence states:
Sec. 4.
Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. When the original writing
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss
or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses.
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed.
But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the
former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution;
loss; contents although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The
sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the
judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case.
Indeed, upon the appellees' own evidence the original of the deed of sale in question, a
purported xerox copy and certified true copy of which are marked as Exhibits A and B, has not
been lost or destroyed. It was submitted to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Malolos for
registration. The appellees, therefore, should have asked the office to produce it in court and if it
could not be produced for one reason or another should have called the Register of Deeds or his
representative to explain why. That they failed to do. The loss or destruction of the original of the
document in question has not, therefore, been established. Hence, secondary evidence of it is
inadmissible . . . .

Neither did the testimony of notary public Ibasco, Jr. to the effect that he did not have a copy of
the deed of sale in question because his files were burned when his office at Ronquillo Street,
Manila was gutted by fire in 1971 and 1972 (p. 4, tsn., November 10, 1981, Steno, Crisostomo)
establish the loss or destruction of the original document in question. What was lost or destroyed
in the custody of Atty. Ibasco, Jr. was but one of the duplicate original copies on file with him. Nor
did the testimony of Hipolito Timoteo, representative of the Assessor's Office of Bulacan, to the
effect that he failed to see the deed of absolute sale annotated on the simple copy of tax
declaration No. 15412 (p. 7, tsn., Aug. 12, 1982, Steno, Vallarta) and of David Montenegro, Jr. of
the National Archives to the effect that his office had no copy of the document in question
because the notary public might not have submitted a copy thereof; or that it was lost or
destroyed during the transmittal; and that most of the record before 1960 were destroyed by
termites (pp. 8-12, tsn., Oct. 5, 1982, Steno, Tecson), prove loss or destruction of the original and
of all the duplicate original copies of the document in question.

Parol Evidence Rule

G.R. No. L-1256
October 23, 1903
VICENTE W. PASTOR, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANUEL GASPAR, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Facts:
From the facts admitted by the pleadings and those found by the court, it appears that in
November, 1900, there existed in Manila a partnership composed of Macario Nicasio and
the defendant Gaspar under the name "Nicasio and Gaspar." It owned the steam launch
Luisa, and its only business was the relating to this launch.
Desiring to increase this business, on the 24th day of November, 1900, a contract was
made between the firm of Nicasio and Gaspar on the one side, and on the other side the
plaintiff, the defendants Eguia, Iboleon, and Monserrat, and one Hermoso. This contract
recites that Nicasio and Gaspar, by writing of the same date, have enlarged the business
of their partnership; have bought six lorchas, which are named, and that, needing money
with which to pay for the lorchas and the necessary repairs thereon, the parties of the
second part have furnished them 28,000 pesos as loan, the amount furnished by each
being named. The firm of Nicasio and Gaspar then acknowledges the receipt of these
amounts. The fifth clause of the contract is as follows:
Fifth. The partnership of Nicasio and Gaspar undertakes to return to the said Eguia,
Monserrat, Iboleon, Pastor, and Hermoso the said total sum of 28,000 pesos within the
period of ten years from the date of the instrument, and to guarantee the fulfillment of
said payment they pledge to said parties the said lorchas Pepay, Lola, Consuelo, India,
Niceta, and Castellana, in the sums respectively which said parties have furnished for the
purchase and repair of said vessels, as before stated, ceding and assigning to said parties,
in like proportions the profits and gains which may be realized from the exploitation of
said vessels; the said vessels to be the property of said Eguia, Monserrat, Iboleon, Pastor,
and Hermoso, and of the parties of the first part, proportionate with the sums which the
said parties have invested in said vessels; the management of said vessels during the
time in which said debt remains unpaid to remain with the partnership of Nicasio and
Gaspar, with the understanding that whatever may be the result of the business of said

vessels, neither the said partnership nor the parties of the first part shall become
responsible for the payment of said debt, except in so far as the said vessels shall respond
therefor, and in no event shall they respond therefor with any other property; injuries to
and all losses of said lorchas to be shared by all the parties hereto, as well as crews'
expenses and other outlays necessary for the preservation of said vessels, in the
proportion which corresponds to each party hereto according to his investment; the
parties of the first part binding themselves not to encumber or pledge said vessels while
said debt remains unsatisfied to the parties of the second part.
It was provided in the seventh clause that the launch Luisa was not included in this
contract.
It is alleged in the complaint, and not denied by the answer, that the contract thus entered
into on November 24, 1900, was in July, 1901, dissolved and terminated, and the lorchas
sold by mutual consent.
The cause of action set forth in the complaint is that there was actually a partnership
between the parties to the contract of November 24, and that the consent of the agent of
the plaintiff to its dissolution and the sale of the lorchas was obtained by fraud of the
defendants. The prayer of the complaint is that the dissolution of the partnership and the
sale of the lorchas be declared null, and that the plaintiff be restored to his rights therein,
and if this can not be done that he recover of the defendants damages in the sum of
42,500 pesos.

Issue:
WON a contract of partnership was made between plaintiff and defendants by virtue of the
contract executed on November 24, 1900?
Held:
None.
Ratio:
The question on this branch of the case is whether the contract on its face creates a
partnership or not. The court finds that the plaintiff believed that he could not be a partner
because he was a Spanish subject. There can therefore be no doubt as to his intention in signing
this contract. He did not believe that on its face it made him a partner. If he had so believed, he
would not have signed it. If he was willing to sign a contract which on its face made him a
partner, he and his associates would have joined with Nicasio and Gaspar in the amended
articles of partnership which they signed on this very day, and this second document would have
been entirely unnecessary. The inference from these facts is so strong that it can not be
overcome by the fact that in subsequent dealings the parties called themselves partners. The
plaintiff undoubtedly wished to secure, as far as he could, the rights of a partner without making
himself one.
The contract, in the opinion of the writer, was that Nicasio and Gaspar should take the money of
the other parties to the contract, manage the business as they saw fit, pay the investors their
share of the profits as long as the business continued, and not to sell the lorchas until they had
been so repaid. Anything more than this would have made the investors partners according to
the instrument itself, the one thing which they were seeking to avoid. It may be added that, in a
similar contract which the plaintiff made with Nicasio in April, 1900, he in 1902 considered
himself a creditor and made a demand on Nicasio for the payment of the debt.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that even if the transaction was a loan, it could not be terminated
without his consent until the expiration of the period of ten years. Article 1127 of the Civil Code
does not say that the period allowed for the performance of an obligation is for the benefit of the
creditor as well as the debtor. It says that it shall be so presumed unless the contrary appears. In
this case the contrary does appear in two clauses hereinbefore cited under (5) and (6). Upon
paying the loan at the end of ten years, they would have had the undoubted right to mortgage or

sell the lorchas, and then by the mere act of payment would have ceased to be consignees
thereof. No declaration of that kind in the contract was at all necessary. These rights would result
as a matter of law. The insertion of these clauses can only be explained on the theory that the
period was for the benefit of the debtors alone, and that they would be at liberty at any time,
even before the expiration of ten years, to sell the property, provided they repaid the loan.

Parol Evidence Rule

G.R. No. L-18077
September 29, 1962
RODRIGO ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. SOCORRO A. RAMOS, defendant-appellee.
When the terms of an agreement has been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
containing all that has been agreed upon, and no evidence other than the terms there can be
admitted between the parties. However, this holds true only if there is no allegation that the
agreement does not express the true intent of the parties.
Facts:
Plaintiffs entered into a contract of conditional sale with Pedro del Rosario over a land in
QC for P600K, to be paid within 2 years. Upon a performance bond, Del Rosario was given
possession of the land for development as a subdivision. He also undertook to pay for the
subdivision survey, the construction of roads, the installation of light and water and the
payment of whatever income tax may be required. Unable to pay, and to avoid court
litigation, a contract of rescission was entered into. To release the performance bond, Del
Rosarios partner, Socorro Ramos, was allowed to buy 20 of the lots on condition that she
assume the payment of P50K as her share in the construction of roads and other
improvements required in the subdivision. A new deed of sale was executed in

consideration of P235,056.00, of which an initial payment of P35,056 was made, the

balance secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the 20 lots and a interest on a parcel of
land in Bulacan. Ramos failed to pay the balance.

Ramos claimed that the contract failed to mention certain important conditions agreed
upon, such as the plaintiffs promise to construct roads in the lands to be subdivided for
sale. Such condition was allegedly a superfluity, there being an ordinance in QC requiring
the construction of roads in a subdivision before lots therein could be sold, and said
ordinance was deemed part of the contract. Ramos also claims that the true purchase
price of the sale was P185,000.00, not P235,056.00, the difference being the voluntary
contribution of Ramos to the cost of the construction of the roads which plaintiffs allegedly
assumed to do.

Issue:
Was there an oral agreement or understanding between the parties as claimed by Ramos,
and should parole evidence regarding such agreement be allowed?
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
The construction of the roads was a condition precedent to the enforcement of the terms
of the deed of sale for the reason that the subdivision regulations of QC requires, as a matter of
law, that the sellers of land therein to be converted into subdivision lots construct the roads in
said subdivision before the lots could be sold. The construction of roads in the prospective
subdivision must have been uppermost in the mind of Ramos for her purpose in purchasing the
property was to develop it into a subdivision. Such is proven by the execution by the plaintiffs of
a so-called Explanation along with the deed of sale, stating that P50K was advanced as Ramos
contribution to the construction of the roads. The document specifically states that the P50K
would be deducted from the purchase price appearing in the deed of sale.
The Rules provide that, when the terms of an agreement had been reduced to writing, it is to be
considered as containing all that has been agreed upon and that no evidence other than the
terms there can be admitted between the parties. This holds true only if there is no allegation
that the agreement does not express the true intent of the parties. If there is and this claim is in
issue in the pleadings, the same may be the subject parole evidence. Ramos has specifically
pleaded in her answer that the contract of sale in question does not express the true intent of
the parties with regard to the construction of the roads.
Parol Evidence Rule
G.R. No. L-17820
April 24, 1963
LAND SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GARCIA
PLANTATION CO., INC., and/or SALUD GARCIA and VICENTE B. GARCIA, defendants-appellees.
When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an event, which,
for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be established by parole evidence.
Facts:
Land Settlement and Development Corp. (LASEDECO) sold 2 tractors to Garcia Plantation.
The payment of the purchase price was secured by two promissory notes signed by Salud
de Gracia. Upon the Plantations failure to pay such purchase price, LASEDECO filed an
action for the collection of P5,955.30.

By way of defense, the Sps. Garcia claimed that the two promissory notes had been
novated by a subsequent agreement between them and Filomeno Kintanar, the manager
of the Board of Liquidators of LASEDECO, whereby the deadline of payment was extended
to May 31, 1957. To prove this, they presented a letter written by Kintanar, dated
November 20, 1956 and addressed to Mrs. De Gracia, providing for an extension of
deadline of payment on the condition that she will make a substantial downpayment
immediately, or else the extension shall be deemed not granted. As de Gracia had failed to
pay such substantial downpayment, LASEDECO claims the obligation had become due and
demandable.

Issue:
May parole evidence be admitted to show the true intention of the parties as to the letter
executed subsequent to the deed of sale?
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
The subject of agreement alluded to in the letter of Kintanar was the condition to be
complied with or the consideration given for the extension of time within which the Sps. Garcia
may pay their account. The lower court should have admitted the parole evidence sought to be
introduced to prove the failure of the document in question to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties. When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon the
occurrence of an event, which, for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be established
by parole evidence. This is not varying the terms of the written contract by extrinsic agreement,
for the simple reason that there is no contract in existence; there is nothing to which to apply the
excluding rule.
The rule excluding parole evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not extend so far as to
preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence, to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parole
agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received , regardless of whether or
not the written agreement contains reference to such collateral agremeent. Here, reference is
made of a previous agreement in the second paragraph of the latter, and although a document is
usually to be interpreted in the precise terms in which it is couched, Courts, in the exercise of
sound discretion, may admit evidence of surrounding circumstances, in order to arrive at the true
intention of the parties.
Had LASEDECO been allowed to prove the condition precedent to the extension of the payment,
LASEDECO would have been able to show that because of the failure to pay a substantial down
payment, the agreement was breached and the contract never became effective, and the
extension should be considered as not having been given at all.