Title: Hagans vs. Wislizenus, No.

16680 (1920)
Facts This is an original petition for writ of certiorari. The facts alleged
in the petition are admitted by a demurrer. The respondent judge, in
support of his demurrer, argues that the provision of Act 190 permit
him to appoint assessors in special proceedings. The petitioner
contends that no authority in law exists for the appointment of
assessors in such proceedings.
Issue Whether or not a judge of the Court of First Instance, in special
proceedings, is authorized under the law to appoint assessors for the
purpose of fixing the amount due to an administrator or executor for
his services and expenses in the care, management, and settlement of
the estate of a deceased person.
Ruling The Court held that in the proceedings like the present the judge
of the Court of First Instance is without authority to appoint assessors.
The only provisions of law which could permit this are sections 153
161 of Act appointment of assessors in a special proceeding are
sections 153 161 of Act No. 190. Section 154 provides that either
party to an action may apply in writing to the judge for assessors to sit
in the trial. Upon the filing of such application, the judge shall direct
that assessors be provided Upon examination of Section 1 of Act
190, there is a distinction between an action and a special
proceeding. Said section 1 provides that an action means an
ordinary suit in a court of justice, while every other remedy furnished
by law is a special proceeding. 19 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Natcher vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133000 (2001)

Facts Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were
registered owners of a parcel of land. Upon the death of Graciana in
1951, Graciano, together with his six children, entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate adjudicating and dividing
among themselves the mentioned real property. In 1980, Graciano
married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,
Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia
as a result of which TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the latter's name.
On 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six
children by his first marriage, as heirs. The private respondents filed a
civil case against the petitioner before RTC Manila. They alleged that
upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of
fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by
making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in favor herein
petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the
issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly,
herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a
consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been
impaired.

Issue May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general

jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance annulment of title with
damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of
property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
Ruling The Court answered in the negative. The court ruled that an
action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a
deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for
in the Rules of Court.Matters which involve settlement and distribution
of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the
probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.Thus, under
Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement
made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may
be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding
on the person raising the questions and on the heir. In the case at
hand, RTC is acting in its general jurisdiction is devoid of authority to
render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the
real property in favor of herein petitioner. Moreover, the RTC of Manila,
Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to
validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent
Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
Title: Vda. De Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129242 (2001)
Facts Troadio Manalo died intestate and was survived by his wife, Pilar S.
Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, who are all of legal age. The
Respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio
Manalo, filed a petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila
for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo,
and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65 with the CA, alleging
that there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among
members of the same family. According to them, the petition is an
ordinary civil action involving members of the same family hence the
same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules
of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed
on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been
complied with.
Issue 1. Whether or not the case on hand is in the nature of an ordinary
civil action involving members of the same family.
2. Is Article 222 of the civil code applicable to Special proceeding cases?
Ruling With regard to the first issue, the Court declared that the nature of
the case partakes that of a Special proceeding. The court reiterated that it
is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action

or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the
complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. The said
petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of the
late Troadio, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his
said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within
the country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent
proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. It also contains an
enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the
properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the
probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition
leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein
(private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of
their deceased father, Troadio Manalo. Although, it contains certain
averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action, the Petitioners
may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The rule has always been
to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant
nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and
not by the defenses contained in the answer.
As to the second issue, the Court declared that Art. 222 of the civil code
which provides that : " No suit shall be filed or maintained between
members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in Article 2035" is applicable only to ordinary civil
actions and NOT WITH SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. This is clear from the term
'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another
or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy
which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement
of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed
in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of
a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

Mangaliman vs. Gonzales

G.R. 21033 1970

Facts:

Petitioner appellant Loreto Esguerra (Gonzales) Mangaliman, an illegitimate daughter of

Alejandro Gonzales y Tolentino, was given a legacy of one-eighth (1/8) undivided portion of the
Hacienda Evangelista located at Umingan, Pangasinan, having an area of 137 hectares. Because
she was a minor when her father died, petitioner's share was placed under the guardianship of
her half-brother, Alejandro Gonzales, Jr., a legitimate son of the testator.

Respondent-appellee Manuel I. Gonzales is a legitimate son of the testator, and was for some
time the administrator of the estate. For the payment of the services of said respondent as
administrator, it was agreed on November 5, 1943 among the testator's widow and legitimate
children that he would be paid the sum of P11,000.00. This agreement was approved by the
probate court. Alleging that he had not been paid his fee of P11,000.00, respondent filed before
the probate court a motion for execution, which motion was granted in an order issued by the
court . Eventually, the Hacienda Evangelista, which had previously been levied on execution, was
sold by the sheriff to respondent for the sum of P2,307.46. The one-year redemption period
having elapsed without petitioner's guardian having taken any step to redeem her undivided share
of the hacienda, the sheriff executed a final deed of sale in favor of respondent.
After coming of age, petitioner sought to recover her legacy by filing a motion in the probate court
to set aside the sale of the Hacienda Evangelista. Having found, however, that her guardian was
duly notified of such sale, the court a quo denied her motion on October 15, 1954. Petitioner did
not appeal from this order, instead she filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against her former guardian for damages for the loss of her share in the hacienda (Civil Case No.
25986).
Petitioner learned later that before the sale to respondent of the Hacienda Evangelista, including
her one-eighth undivided share thereof, said respondent had actually been paid for his services
as administrator an amount more than the P11,000.00, claimed by him. Contending that
respondent, through fraud and misrepresentations had obtained the order of payment for his
services and the subsequent writs of execution which ultimately led to his acquisition of the
property, petitioner, filed a petition before the same probate court for the reconveyance to her of
her one-eighth undivided share in the Hacienda Evangelista by the respondent.
"After considering the petition for reconveyance of Loreto Esguerra (Gonzales) Mangaliman, and
the opposition thereto, of Manuel Gonzales, the Court is of the opinion that inasmuch as the
question of title or ownership is involved, said Manuel Gonzales may not be divested of his title
within these probate proceedings but in an independent suit filed with a competent court."

ISSUE:
The only question to be resolved in this appeal is, whether or not the Court of First Instance of
Manila, as a probate court, has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's petition for reconveyance.
HELD:

The probate court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for reconveyance, in
question. The remedy sought by petitioner for the reconveyance to her of her share in the
Hacienda Evangelista upon the ground that the same was acquired by respondent through fraud
or misrepresentation cannot be obtained by a mere petition in the probate proceedings. The court
of first instance, acting as a probate court, has limited jurisdiction and can take cognizance only of
"matters of probate, both testate and intestate estates, . . . and all such special cases and
proceedings as are not otherwise provided for. The jurisdiction of a probate court is limited and
special, and this should be understood to comprehend only cases related to those powers
specified in the law, and can not extend to the adjudication of collateral matters.
The petition filed by petitioner before the probate court which seemingly seeks merely the
reconveyance to her of her undivided share in a parcel of land which originally formed part of the
estate of her father in fact calls for the nullification, of the order of execution issued by the probate
court which is already final, and of the subsequent sale of a property to respondent, upon the
alleged ground of fraud. The defense interposed by respondent is that petitioner's action to
recover the property is already barred by prescription, laches, and res judicata. The petition for
reconveyance has given rise to a controversy involving rights over a real property which would
require the presentation of evidence and the determination of legal questions that should be
ventilated in a court of general jurisdiction.

Governinglaw
Beam vs Yatco
FACTS:
On her death in the State of California on October 8, 1934, Lydia McKee Beam left a last will and
testament which, after due and regular proceedings, was admitted to probate in the superior court
of the State of California for the County of Almeda.
Lydia McKee Beam was the wife of A. W. Beam from their marriage in 1913 until her death, and
the other two plaintiffs are the legitimate children of said marriage. Plaintiffs are, and since birth,
have been, and Lydia McKee Beam was, throughout of her life, citizens of the United States of
America. A. W. Beam was for many years, beginning from year 1902, a resident domiciled in the
Philippines.
On April 18, 1934, A. W. Beam, with his wife Lydia and daughter Eugenia, left the Philippines for
California and arrived at San Francisco on May 9, 1934, and since such arrival neither said Lydia
nor any of the plaintiffs have been in the Philippines, except A. W. Beam who was in the
Philippines from December 20, 1936, to January 15, 1937.

Sps Beam have acquired multiple properties and rights in the Philippines
In 1923, they became citizens of California
In 1934, Lydia McKee Beam died.
On or before April 26, 1937, the CIR declared and assessed items of property of Sps. A.
W. Beam and Lydia McKee Beam at the time of the death of the latter on October 18,
1934 at P8, 100,544.91. One-half thereof, appraised at P4, 050,272.46, was the estate to
the deceased Lydia McKee Beam located in the Philippines and transmitted to plaintiffs
by virtue of inheritance, devise, or bequest, gifts mortis causa or advance in anticipation
of inheritance and the collector assessed and demanded inheritance taxes aggregating
P343, 698.72 which the plaintiffs paid under protest that was overruled by the collector.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint praying that the amount paid by them be refunded, but the
lower court dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE: WON lower court erred on judging that California law was the governing law
RULING: NO.
As correctly stated by appellee, even granting appellant's contention that the deceased
became a resident of California only in 1934, she was a citizen of that state at the time of
her death and her national law applicable to the case, in accordance with article 10 of the
Civil Code, is the law of California which, in the absence of contrary evidence, is to be
presumed to be the same as the Philippine law.
The finding of the lower court that they are citizens of California is fully supported by the
testimonies of A. W. Beam and John W. Haussermann, wherein the first stated that in 1923 he
bought a house in Oakland, California, and used it as a residence until December, 1930, when he
built another in Piedmont, California, which he has used and occupied as a residence since then,
and his children were in school in California and Mrs. Beam wanted to be with them and made a
home for them, and it was his intention to live in California and from 1923 on, his family spent
most of their time in California, where he himself used to take long vacations, and that he never
really intended to live permanently in the Philippines, while Haussermann testified that A. W.
Beam left the Philippines somewhere along 1923 and 1924 when he established a home for his
wife and children on Kenmore Avenue, Oakland, and he went there frequently.
Also, because the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs to establish their right to recover, in view of
the fact that they had failed to establish that right based on their alleged Utah citizenship to
invoke the laws of the state which, it is alleged, to the effect that properties acquired by the
spouses during marriage belong to them separately, the dismissal of the complaint is fully
justified, and the defendant is entitled to take advantage of the plaintiff's failure to present
sufficient proof and of the evidence adduced by themselves. Where plaintiffs themselves show a
state of facts upon which they should not recover, whether defendant pleaded such fact as a
defense or not, their claim should be dismissed. Evidence introduced without objection becomes
property of the case and all the parties are amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects
resulting from the evidence .
As correctly stated by Yatco, even granting appellant's contention that the deceased became a
resident of California only in 1934, she was a citizen of that state at the time of her death and her
national law applicable to the case, in accordance with article 10 of the Civil Code, is the law of
California which, in the absence of contrary evidence, is to be presumed to be the same as the
Philippine law.

Transferincontemplationofdeath
Dizon vs Posadas

Facts:
1. Plaintiff Luis Dison filed a suit against CIR to recover inheritance tax paid under protest
amounting to P2,808.73. Felix Dison, plaintiff's father executed a deed of gift which
transferred 22 tracts of land, reserving to himself during his lifetime the usufruct of 3 tracts.
The donation was formally accepted by plaintiff.
2. The plaintiff (herein petitioner) alleged in his complaint that the tax is illegal since he
received the property by a deed of gift inter vivos duly accepted and registered before the
death of his father. He also contended that Act 2601 being an inheritance tax statute, does not
tax gifts. The defendant answered in general denial with a countermand. The court dismissed
the countermand. Both sides appealed, but the CIR appeal was dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not the gifts inter vivos are taxable (inheritance tax)
YES.
Inheritance tax is imposed upon the gift inter vivos that plaintiff received from his father as
this was really an advancement upon the inheritance to which he would be entitled upon the
death of the latter. Sec. 1540 of the Administrative Code did not tax gifts per se but only
those which are made to those who shall prove to be heirs, devisees, legatees and
donees mortis causa of the donor. The term 'heirs' include those given the status of heirs
irrespective of the quantity of property they may receive as such.
- See more at: http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/11/dison-v-posadasdigest.html#sthash.UniSr9x4.dpuf