Grace White

HIST253
Student No. 4265981
.

What were some of the consequences to society and culture of Japans rapid
industrialization in the 1950s and 1960s?
After losing the Second World War Japan faced the challenge of rebuilding their country:
in respects to not only their society and changing the toxic atmosphere that had been
created in the lead up and during WWII but also rebuilding the countries infrastructure
and economy. To do this Japan would rapidly industrialise reaching the same level of
industry in the West in the space of only two decades. Whilst this massive task was
achieved and had the positive effect of eventually increasing the quality of life for most
Japanese people, the period in which the growth took place was not without negative
repercussions. This essay shall focus on two major aspects that were negative; the high
incidence of organised crime within the mining industry and its violent effects on the
workers and community, also the environmental effects of rapid industrialization using
the Minamata disease as an example of this.
To most people outside of Japan the rapid increase and change of the Japanese economy
was referred to as an economic miracle.1 After WWII much of Japans infrastructure was
destroyed, and the need to rebuild quickly and create a stronger Japan put a huge amount
of stress on industry to be able to provide the output required to lift Japan into the realms
of success that would make them equal with the West. One of these industries that faced a
massive amount of pressure was the mining industry; this pressure to produce quickly
and cheaply was passed onto the workers in a violent and systematic manner.
The area where the prevalence of organized crime was most frequent was in Chihoku. In
this area violence was institutionalised and an expected part of working in the mining
1 Tipton, EK, 'The 'economic miracle'...and its underside', in Modern Japan: A Social and Political
History, 2nd edn, (London: Routledge, 2008), pp187-202.

industry. In his journal article A Culture of Violence Allen looks at the different types of
violence performed, the frequency of these acts and how eventually the victims managed
to be accepting of the violent community they were a part of. The level of violence was
often dependent on how large the mining company was, the smaller the company, the
more likely it was that the working conditions were less humane and the overseers were
more prone to violence. The larger companies, which had more money to spend, had
better working conditions and did not punish workers as much. Allen discusses three
main types of mines that the coalminers would work in; the first was known as daikigyo
(large companies), the next was chukokigyo (small to medium sized mines) and last was
called tanuki bori, which literally translates to badger-holes, named after the size.2
The large companies were known to be the best as they had large-scale operations that
needed to be maintained well to ensure the output was high. By keeping the mines fully
operational they were also safer. Along with this they had better housing and services for
their employees. The next level down, being the chukokigyo, employed between 60
people at the minimum, and up to 500 people. Some of the mines were considered
reasonable places to work, whilst others ones, called asseiyama (pressure mines) were
violent. To keep these mines within the production rate required they employed people
with criminal backgrounds, yakuza, who would ensure employees were kept in order.
These overseers were known in the business as komu kakari. The tanuki bori were old
mines no longer owned by larger companies that were often leased by husband and wife
partnerships. These mines were usually in disrepair and the rate of accidents resulting in
injury and death was quite high.3
The management by the komu kabori was a systematised form of violence that used a
form of hierarchy to subjugate their workers into conditions that would not have occurred
unless the violence itself was eventually accepted by the workers as something they could
not escape. The men who carried out the violence were a part of a greater string of
2 Allen, M 2009, 'A culture of violence', in Undermining the Japanese Miracle: Work and Conflict in a
Coalmining Community, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.108
3 Allen, M 2009, 'A culture of violence', in Undermining the Japanese Miracle: Work and Conflict in a
Coalmining Community, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.108

commands, so they were only following the orders given to them. What is interesting to
note is that the violence was carried out with enthusiasm. Allens interview with a former
employee describes the sort of day-to-day violence that was required to run the mines, If
a miner was sick they would investigate itthey would come around to the houses where
we lived and wait outside and call out that the miner was slacking. Another employee
describes and even worse situation if we did something the kacho [section chief] didnt
approve of, we were hit by one of the strong-arm men for instance, if we had said that
we werent going to work because the water was too high, the romu would have just
come around to the tanju to make us go. 4
Apart from the ongoing violence that was extremely prevalent in these mining
communities, the consequences of the quick industrialization caused corruption in the
area of law enforcement. Any level of law or government inquiry never looked into the
violence as they saw the management or the employees as the complete responsibility of
the mining companies. As long as there was continual evidence that the mining
production was at a level that would support the rapid industrialization they continued to
dismiss or turn a blind eye to what was a system of organized crime. The only threat to
the authority of the mining companies was the possible emergence of unions that would
fight back. To deal with this threat mining companies, particularly smaller ones would be
particularly ruthless in stopping any forms of democratic unions.5
From this example of the mines in the Chihoku area, it becomes clear that the effects of
the rapid industrialization in Japan had a negative effect on the work culture of Japan,
encouraging a culture of crime and violence that is accepted if it provides overall
economic benefit to Japan.
The next example of the negative social and cultural effects that rapid industrialization
had on Japan is the Minamata disease. The manufacturing of acetaldehydebytheChisso
factory,usedinmakingplasticsspiltintothebayandcombinedwithorganicmolecules
madetheheavymetalcompoundmethylmercurychloride.The cause of the disease was
mercury poisoning that could make its way into the food chain as an organic compound,
4 Allen, M 2009, 'A culture of violence', in Undermining the Japanese Miracle: Work and Conflict in a
Coalmining Community, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 109-110
5 Allen, M 2009, 'A culture of violence', in Undermining the Japanese Miracle: Work and Conflict in a
Coalmining Community, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.112

affecting the fish and shellfish that the people in Minamata relied on as a main source of
food caused this disease.6
The lack of care for the environment and the health consequences that followed was
similar to the organized crime in the mining communities in that it was more important to
authorities to focus on the economic benefits reaped from the industrialization, than to
make inquiries about any negative consequences. In the journal article Minamata
Disease and Environmental Governance by Harutoshi Funabashi, the issue of bad policy
relating to Environmental law in Japan is discussed in detail. An area that is important is
where Funabashi outlines main failures by the Japanese authorities on the case of the
Minamata disease.
The first of these failures is in regards to the failure to initial stage. To understand their
failure in the initial stage the sequence of events that occurred will be discussed. The
background behind the events beginning in 1956 was that the Chisso factory, operational
since 1908 had been polluting the waters in the area since its opening. In May 1956 the
first victims of the disease were discovered, the symptoms that showed were, numbness
in their hands and feet. Then they became unable to grasp things or fasten buttons. If they
try to walk, they stumble. They cannot run, and they speak in a childish tone. They often
complain of difficulties seeing, hearing, or swallowing food ... Those symptoms
gradually develop Death appears to come to patients between two and six weeks after
the onset of the disease ... 11 out of 30 patients have died, i.e., the mortality rate is
36.7%.7
The disease was first suspected to be a contagious bacterial disease, this was soon
dismissed as research took place and the Kumamoto University research group found that
a toxic substance caused the disease.8 At the time, some people already suspected that the
cause of the disease was from the Chisso factory, since they had been the polluting the
area already for half a century. In January 1957 the Minamata Fishery Cooperative

6 Harutoshi Funabashi, Minamata Disease and Environmental Governance, in InternationalJournalof

JapaneseSociology,(Tokyo:TheHoseiUniversity,2006)
7 Harada,Masazumi,MinamataDisease,(KumamotoNichinichiShinbunCultureandInformation
Center,2004),p.23 24
8 Harada,Masazumi,MinamataDisease,(KumamotoNichinichiShinbunCultureandInformation
Center,2004),p.27

petitioned Chisso to stop the discharge of polluted effluents in January 1957.9

In the spring 1957, feeding cats fish from the area tested the theory that the fish in the
area were causing the disease due to the pollution. They showed the same symptoms as
the victims of the disease and died. DespitethisevidencenobanonChissopollutingthe
areahappenedastheprefecturalandcentralgovernmentsfailedtomakeanyeffective
measures.InmeetingstheDirectorofthePublicHealthBureau,MinistryofHealthand
Welfarestatedthatthediseasemightbecausedbyheavychemicalpollutioncausedbya
factoryinMinamata.ThoughnotdirectlystatingthatChissowasthecauseofthedisease,
itwasclearthiswaswhatwasimplied.Furtherreportsoverthenextthreeyearssaidthe
samething.Thegovernmentcabinetdiscussedthese,butanyattempttocreate
environmentalpolicywasstoppedbytheMinisterofMinistryofInternationalTradeand
Industry(MITI).10TheChissofactoryitselfstronglyarguedthattheywerethecauseof
theoutbreak.Eventuallythough,theyorganizedacontractforvictimsofthediseaseto
givethemasmallamountofcompensation,butstilldidnotclaimtheywereresponsible
forthedisease.
Anotherareaoffailurewasthelackofmeasuresmadetodecreasethespreadingofthe
diseaseandthedamagetotheenvironment.Funabashistatesthatittookuntil1968for
thediseasessourcetobeofficiallyrecognizedasthefaultoftheChissoCompanyfor
theirpollutioncauseheavymetalstogointothewatersource.Thismeantthatany
effectivemeasureswerenotabletotakeplace.Onethingthatcouldhavebeendealtwith
though,isthatafteritwasclearthecatshaddiedfromeatingthelocalfish,acomplete
fishingbancouldhaveeasilybeenmade.Anothermeasurethatcouldhavebeentaken
wasthatafterthediscoverythatitwasheavymetalscausingthedisease,thestoppingof
Chissofactorypollutingcouldhaveoccurredontheinstructionoftheauthorities.As
eventhoughithadnotbeendirectlystatedasbeingtheChissofactorysfault,asa
manufacturerofheavymetalsthatwouldbethemostreasonablethingtodotoensureno
9 Harutoshi Funabashi, Minamata Disease and Environmental Governance, in InternationalJournalof
JapaneseSociology,(Tokyo:TheHoseiUniversity,2006),p.10
10 Harutoshi Funabashi, Minamata Disease and Environmental Governance, in InternationalJournalof
JapaneseSociology,(Tokyo:TheHoseiUniversity,2006),p.11

moreheavymetalscouldeffecttheaquaticlifeintheareaandthenasaconsequence,the
community.
TheneedforincreasingtheeconomicpowerinJapanwasrational,astheyhadfaceda
significantsetbacktotheirprogressinWWII,butthemethodsusedtoachievethisrapid
industrializationwerequestionable.Theresultsofthesemethodsclearlyshowthelackof
careinregardstothesafetyofthosewhoworkedintheindustriesandthosewholivedin
theareasaroundtheindustries.WhilstJapansstandardoflivingdramaticallyincreased
inthespaceofafewdecadestherepercussionsofthelowethicalstandardsrequiredto
ensurequickprogresshavebeenevident.TheChikutofactoryworkersandtheviolence
theyfacedwasanissuethatshouldnothavebeenoccurring,letalonebeingcondonedby
thelocalauthorities.SimilarlythedeathanddiseaseinMinamatashouldnothave
occurred,andwhenitdidoccur,shouldhavebeentakenmoreseriously.Thelessons
learnedfromthisperiodoftimehasshownaneedformoreconcernabouttheimpactsof
industrializationonsociety,andnotjustitsimpactoneconomicgrowth.
Bibliography:
Allen, M 2009, 'A culture of violence', in Undermining the Japanese Miracle: Work and
Conflict in a Coalmining Community, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009),
Harutoshi Funabashi, Minamata Disease and Environmental Governance, in
InternationalJournalofJapaneseSociology,(Tokyo:TheHoseiUniversity,2006)
Harada,Masazumi,MinamataDisease,(KumamotoNichinichiShinbunCultureand
InformationCenter,2004),
Tipton, EK, 'The 'economic miracle'...and its underside', in Modern Japan: A Social and
Political History, 2nd edn, (London: Routledge, 2008),