Understanding Altruism Through Its Treatment in Social Sciences

A Fat Lady in a Corset: Altruism and Social Theory
Author(s): Kristen Renwick Monroe

Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Nov., 1994), pp. 861-893
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111725 .
Accessed: 22/10/2014 17:08
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Midwest Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
American Journal of Political Science.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
A Fat Lady in a Corset: Altruismand

Social Theory*
KristenRenwick Monroe, Departmentof Politics and Society,
Universityof Californiaat Irvine
Thismanuscript
reviewstheliterature
onaltruism
as ithasbeendiscussedtraditionally
ineconomicsandrational
choicetheory,
evolutionary
biology,
andpsychology.
Allofthese
fieldsassumeself-interest
is thenormforhumanbehavior;all,therefore,
experience
great
actionthatriskssacrificing
one's ownwelfarein orderto benefit
andifficulty
explaining
other.The literature
is reviewedherenotjust to understand
on altruism
and explainthe
phenomenon
itself,butalso to use ourunderstanding
ofaltruism
as an analytical
toolthat
can yieldinsighton thevalidity,
and limitations
universality,
of theintellectual
theories
abouthumanbehaviorthatorganizeso muchofourdailylivesandpublicpolicies.
Traditional
of altruism
explanations
resemblea fatladyin a corset;
theoveralleffectmaybe aesthetically
pleasing,butit does fundamental
I reviewtheliteratotheunderlying
distortion
reality.In thismanuscript,
tureon altruism
as it has been traditionally
discussedin thethreefields
in whichanalystshave paid the mostattention
to altruism:economics
and politicaleconomy,evolutionary
All three
biology,and psychology.
of thesefieldsassumethatthenormof humanbehavioris self-interest.
evenwhenthismayrisksacrificing
Behaviordesignedto benefit
another,
the actor's own welfare-whatAugusteComtefirstcalled altruismsimplydoes notfitintotheirconceptualparadigms.'It is thusimportant
thatwe consideraltruism,
notjusttounderstand
andexplainthephenomenonitselfbutalso togaininsight
on thevalidity,
andlimitauniversality,
tionsof theintellectual
theoriesabouthumanbehaviorthatorganizeso
muchofourdailylivesandpublicpolicies.Suchan analytical
explication
is thepurposeofthisarticle.
mustbeginwithsomegeneralunderstandAnydiscussionofaltruism
ingofwhattheconceptmeans.Sincemygoal hereis notto construct
a
detailedanalysisofaltruism
as an intellectual
conceptbutratherto summarizethe literature
on altruismand understand
its theoretical
imporI
move
tance,
quicklyin section1 to establisha workingdefinition
of
*I am indebtedto JackJohnston
forthecolorful
title,whichI use withapologiesto
Thepaperitselfhasbenefited
fromcomments
anyonewhomitmayoffend.
bymanypeople
overthe years,chiefamongthemBernardGrofman,
KristenMaher,JaneMansbridge,
Ross Quillian,ShawnRosenberg,
Laura Scalia,andtheanonymous
referees.
coinedthetermin the1830s.
'AugusteComtefirst
AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience, Vol. 38, No. 4, November 1994, Pp. 861-93
? 1994 by the Universityof Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin,TX 78713-7819

862
KristenRenwickMonroe
altruism
thatmostof us can readilyaccept.I nextturnto a discussion
of the literature
on altruismin economicsand rationalchoice theory
(sec. 2), evolutionary
biology(sec. 3), and psychology
(sec. 4). WhileI
findmuchof thisliterature
on altruismuseful,even excellent,I shall
arguethatit suffersfromthreeshortcomings:
(1) Too oftenscholars
leave themeaningof altruism
ambiguous.In theirempiricalwork,analystsconfusealtruismwithdifferent,
albeit closelyrelated,formsof
other-directed
behavior,suchas sharing,
helping,
giving,or cooperating.
(2) Worksin economicsand evolutionary
biology,and to a lesserextent
psychology,
relyso heavilyon theassumption
thatindividual
actorspursue self-interest
thattheyfailto detectaspectsofaltruism
thatcannotbe
explainedthrough
suchan individualistic
paradigm.
(3) In particular,
they
overlookthe cognitiveaspect of altruism,
of
especiallytheimportance
perceptionsof selfin relationto others.This view of selfdoes differ
foraltruists,who do not see themselvesas traditionally
definedselfinterested
individualsin a Hobbesianworld.I concludemydiscussion
ofpromising
(sec. 5) witha consideration
worksusingthisapproachand
suggestseveralspecificways in whichresearchon altruismcould be
improved.
What Is Altruism?Why Is It Important?
A carefulanalyticreviewofthevoluminous
andwide-ranging
literatureon altruism
revealsa remarkable
lackofagreement
overwhataltruismmeans.As a result,we findwidespreadconfusion
in ourdiscussions
in whichaltruism
of altruism,
can referto giving,sharing,
cooperating,
helping,and different
formsofother-directed
behavior.I cannotresolve
thisconceptualconfusionhere,butI can clearlystatemyown conceptualization
ofaltruism
so thatthereaderknowsexactlywhatI meanby
theterm.
I definealtruism
as behaviorintended
to benefit
another,
evenwhen
doingso mayriskor entailsome sacrificeto the welfareof the actor.
Thereare severalcriticalpointsin thisdefinition.
First,altruismmust
entail action. It cannot merelybe good intentionsor well-meaning
thoughts.
Second,thegoal of theact mustbe furthering
thewelfareof
another.If another'swelfareis treatedas an unintended
or a secondary
consequenceofbehaviordesignedprimarily
tofurther
one's ownwelfare,
theact is notaltruistic.
Third,intentions
countmorethanconsequenceS.2
2Thereis a long-standing
debateon theroleofmotivesandintentions,
withbehaviorthatwe can measureonlybehaviorand thatinferring
alistsarguing
motivefromactionis
methodologically
unsound.Mostanalystscurrently
rejectthisviewandarguethatmotive
is keyandthatgaining
on intentions
insight
justifies
thismethodological
leap.

ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL THEORY
863
If I tryto do something
niceforyou,and it endsup badlyor withlongtermnegativeconsequencesforyou,thisdoes notdiminish
thealtruism
ofmyinitialaction.Fourth,theactmustcarrysomepossibility
ofdiminutionto mywelfare.An act thatimprovesbothmyownwelfareand that
ofanotherpersonwouldnotbe altruistic
butwouldinsteadfallintothe
categoryofcollectivewelfare.
Thisconceptualization
is onlyoneofmanywaystothinkaboutaltruism.The precisedefinition
adoptedis one on whichreasonablescholars
mayhonestlydiffer.3
My intention
here is not to engagein extensive
discussionof thevariousconceptualattributes
of altruism
butratherto
arriveat a working
definition
thatbothcapturesthemostcriticalcomponentsofaltruism
and allowsus to distinguish
betweenaltruistic
behavior
and otherkindsofcloselyrelatedbehaviors.
Muchoftheconceptualconfusion
in theliterature
on altruism
emanatesfromanalystsdichotomizing
behavior,contrasting
altruismwith
selfishor self-interested
behavior.Such a dichotomization
attractsbecause ofitssimplicity,
butittooeasilyleadsto grouping
variousformsof
other-directed
behaviorintothecategoryofaltruism.
Sincemostpeople
probably
exhibitvarying
ofself-interested
subtleties
andaltruistic
behavior,itmakesmoresenseto conceptualize
typesofbehavioron a continuum.4This would allow us to detectfinegradationsin behaviorthat
rangesfromthepurelyself-interested
to thepurelyaltruistic,
withintermediateformsofbehavior(suchas giving,sharing,
andcooperating)
fallingbetweenthetwopoles. Such a continuum
wouldavoidthepitfalls
of
behaviorintononaltruistic
dichotomizing
versusaltruistic
behavior.It
wouldallow finerdistinctions
even as it retainsanalytical
juxtaposition
by keepingpureself-interest
and purealtruism
as thetwo poles of the
continuum.
Thisjuxtaposition
ofaltruism
withself-interest
is important
precisely
because so muchsocial and politicaltheoryis constructed
on thenorm
of self-interest.5
Indeed,self-interested
behavioris assumedas thenorm
3Forotherconceptualizations,
see interalia worksby Batson(1991),Kohn(1990),
Losco (1986),or Nagel(1970).
4Otheranalystsare comingto acceptthevalueof sucha continuum.
See Krebsand
Van Hesterenin Olineret al. (1992,chap.6).
5ThomasHobbes'scentralargument
thathumanity's
(Leviathan1651)suggests
naturalstateis one in whicheach ofus pursueshisor herself-interest
so unabashedly
thatwe
needa strongcentralgovernment
to restrain
our selfishnaturesor else we shalldestroy
was so powerful
thatiteffectively
setthetermsinwhichdebates
eachother.Thisargument
overhumannaturehave been arguedeversince(see Cropsey1977;Mansbridge
1990;or
Myers1983).Theoristssince then,fromAdam Smithto CharlesDarwinand Sigmund
Freud,haveacceptedthiscentraltenet,thatthereis a humannatureandthatthisnature
is self-interested.

864
fromThomasHobbes and AdamSmithto CharlesDarwin

by theorists
whether
goal hereis to determine
and SigmundFreud.6My theoretical
as
theoretical
approaches,approachesbased on self-interest
theexisting
normofhumanbehavior,have beenable to developadetheunderlying
constructs.
theoretical
within
theirexisting
ofaltruism
quateexplanations
of
If theyhave not,thenour searchto developadequateexplanations
mayalso lead us to betterunderphenomenon
altruism
as a substantive
ofthelimitations
approachesand,perhaps,
ofthesetheoretical
standing
theoriesofhumanbehavior.7
ofalternative
to theeventualdevelopment
The implications
forgeneraltheoryand forthe socialpoliciesbased on
worldcan hardlybe overstated.8
thoseparadigmsin thecontemporary
How Is AltruismTraditionallyExplained? ExplanationsfromEconomics
and Rational Choice Theory
It has reis discussedby scholarsin manydiversefields.9

Altruism
biology,
however,in economics,evolutionary
ceivedthemostattention,
of selfand psychology,
all fieldsthatrelyheavilyon the assumption
theoretical
as an important
altruism
and thatthusmustconfront
interest
godchildin
challenge.Let me beginwitheconomicsand its intellectual
politicalscience,rationalchoicetheory.10
'Freudianpsychology,
are onlythe
Darwinianbiology,and liberalpoliticalthought
mostprominent
exampleshere.See Mansbridge
(1990)fora discussionofliberalpolitical
thought,
Etzioni(1988)fora discussionof self-interest
and economictheory,Schwartz
(1986)fortherelationof self-interest
to biology,economics,and behavioralpsychology,
and Kohn(1990)fora reviewoftheliterature
on self-interest,
altruism,
andhumannature.
7Thisis pursuedin laterwork(see Monroe1994a).
8Although
I examinealtruism
as a substantive
phenomenon
andas behaviorthathas
theoretiimportant
socialvalue,mymaininterest
inthetopicremains
focusedonaltruism's
Nor
cal significance.
I do notarguethataltruism
is a widespread
empirical
phenomenon.
am I a socialactivist,
trying
to convincepeoplethatwe needmorealtruism
in theworld.
inaltruism
Rather,
myinterest
centersonthefactthatso muchimportant
socialandpolitical
theory
suggests
thataltruism
shouldnotexistatall.Thefactthatitdoespiquesmycuriosity.
as a
Although
thereare othertheorieson whichI couldfocusanalysis,mytraining
on ecoand politicaleconomist
led me to focusmytheoretical
attention
politicalscientist
nomicsand rationalchoicetheory,
theintellectual
godchildoftheeconomicmethodthat
therestof social science(see Monroe1991).The prominence
enjoyed
spreadthroughout
is attested
byrational
choicetheory
tobythePublicChoiceSociety,byNobelprizewinners
ofthe
suchas JamesBuchanan,HerbertSimon,andRonaldCoase, andbypastpresidents
AmericanPoliticalScience Associationsuch as WilliamRiker,all of whomhave been
instrumental
in encouraging
theuse of therationalactortheoryto explainbroaderkinds
ofsocialandpoliticalpuzzles.
9Batson(1991),Kohn(1990),Losco (1986),andSchwartz(1986)offer
comprehensive
reviewsofthisliterature.
lIln reviewing
theliterature
on altruism,
I foundmostoftheworksdidfallintoone
ofthesethreedisciplinary
andI therefore
categories,
organizemydiscussionoftraditional

865
No matterhowrareempirically,
themereexistenceofaltruism
prean
for
economic
sents important
theoretical
Economists
challenge
theory.
a phenomenon
are awareof this,and we findAdam Smithconsidering
thatresemblesaltruismlong beforeAugusteComtecoinedthe actual
In general,early-nineteenth-century
termin the 1830s.1"
politicaleconomistshad difficulty
decidinghow altruismcould existin an egoistical
worldoriented
towardefficiency.
Forthemostpart,earlypoliticaleconomistsbelievedhumanspossesseda dualnature:one egoisticaland interested onlyin theirpersonalwelfareand the othermorepublic-spirited
withtheirown.12
andable to putthewelfareofotherson an equalfooting
As economicsas a discipline
becamemorerigorous,
however,andparticinthelatenineteenth
revolution
theoularlyafterthemarginalist
century,
and economic
riesproposing
a singleutility
function
beganto dominate,
fields.Anyorganizational
ofaltruism
aroundthesethreedisciplinary
categoriexplanations
willbe somewhat
anda particular
scholar'sworkmaybe classed
artificial,
zation,however,
or overlapwithanother.
in one fieldbutintersect
book,his 1759treatiseon
Considerjust one example:AdamSmith'slesser-known
articulates
In TheTheory
Smith'sdiscussionofsympathy
of MoralSentiments,
sympathy.
thatapproachesthecontemporary
conceptofpsychicgratification,
a conceptofempathy
as pleasureemanating
fromthepleasureof another(Frank1988).
defined
by economists
Thisinterpretation
wouldmakeSmithequallyat homeinboththeeconomicsor thesocial
I construct
Smith'sdiscussion
ofempathy
here.Butifwe interpret
psychological
categories
withanother,thenSmithwouldfitmoreappropriately
as one thatstressesidentification
category.
intowhatI shalllatercall thesocialcognition
The readercan immediately
identify
thedilemmahere:a certainprecisionmustbe
I developthedistinctions
utilizedheretocommusacrificed
inorderto achieveparsimony.
fashion.Sucha characina compactandcoherent
nicateinformation
abouta vastliterature
seems
ofcomplexconcepts;itnonetheless
terization
regrettably
entailssomepigeonholing
justified
foranalytical
purposes.
1'See Wispe(1978,304)or Lopreato(1984,296).
12"The tension
economicsbeginswithAdamSmith,whoexpressedsomewhat
within
viewsofmanin histwopublished
works.Each ofthetwobookshe [Smith]
contradictory
the
aboutsocietypresents
onlyone ofthesetwomodelsofmanwhileforgetting
published
other.In The Wealthof Nations(1902)he affirms
thatit is 'vain' formanto expectthe
from'theirbenevolence
sentenceofhisfirst
only.'However,thefirst
'helpofhisbrethren'
runs:'How selfishsoevermanmaybe
of MoralSentiments,
bookon society,TheTheory
himinthefortune
someprinciples
inhisnature,
whichinterest
supposed,thereareevidently
ofothers,andrendertheirhappinessnecessaryto him,though
he derivesnothing
fromit,
'moralsentiments'
exceptthepleasureofseeingit.' Whythendoes manwiththealtruistic
of theTheorydisplaytheegoisticbehaviorof theWealthof Nations?Thiscontradiction
betweenthetwo workswas even givena label by Germanscholars:'Das AdamSmith
Problem"'(Kolm 1983,22).
ofman'sdualnaturebut
Kolm(1983,21,22) findsParetothemostclassicexpression
also citesEdgeworth,
andJ.S. Millamongtheutilitarians
andLeon Walrasand
Bentham,
Smith(in TheTheory
as referring
to humanity's
dualnature.
of MoralSentiments)

866
humanity
was heldto have a "fairlyconstantpreference
ordering
which
synthesizes
all thedesires,aspirations,
andinclinations
oftheindividual"
(Kolm 1983,20).
Smith'stwentieth-century
intellectual
heirsin economicsthusapproachedaltruism
theoretically
inone oftwoways:(1) as interdependent
utility
functions,
withaltruism
definedin technicaltermsas including
in
one's own utilityfunction
the quantitiesconsumedby othersor (2) as
dual utilities,originating
in a dual natureof man,one egoisticand the
otherpublic-orother-spirited.
Analystswhotreataltruism
as interdependentutility
functions
seldomdiscusswhythehappinessofothersbrings
13 Those whoadopta dual-utility
pleasureto thealtruist.
function
viewof
humanity
usuallyassumesimplythathumanbeingsare bornwithboth
selfishand altruistic
partsto theirnature.14
The originofthisnatureand,
moreimportant,
therole of culturein its shaping,is consideredexogenousto thetheory.Bothtacksthusfailto explaintwoofthemostinterestingquestionsrelatingto altruism:Whydo people exhibitdiffering
propensities
foraltruism?And whydoes the same individualat times
behavemorealtruistically
thanat others?
Much of theimportant
recenteconomicworkon altruism
arose in
responseto Titmuss's(1971) workon whypeople donateblood. This
publication
attractedwidespreadattention
and stimulated
some economiststo recognizetheimportance
ofaltruism
as a substantive
phenomenonthatdidnotfiteasilyintothe"belovedmodelofutility
maximization
subjectto constraints"
(Phelps1975,2). These economistsdid nottreat
altruism
as a kindofdeviantcase to be used as a beaconturnedon basic
economictheory,
however,butratheras a substantive
phenomenon
that
economictoolsmightelucidate.15
13Thereasons,usuallyleftunexplained,
are occasionallyanalyzedas correlatesor
predictors
of altruism
(such as genderor ethnicity),
bestassignedto theprovinceof the
socialpsychologist.
14Harsanyi's(1976)worktypifies
thegeneraldiscussionof dual utilities.Harsanyi
distinguishes
betweena person's"ethical" preferences
(whichexpresswhatthe actor
wouldprefer
onthebasisofonlyimpersonal
socialconsiderations)
and"subjective"preferences(whattheactoractuallyprefers
on thebasisofpersonalinterests
oranyotherbasis).
Thisdistinction
allowsus to differentiate
betweenwhatsomeone"thinksis goodfromthe
socialpointof viewand whathe regardsas goodfromhis ownpersonalpointof view"
(Sen 1977,336).Subjectivepreferences
makeup theindividual's
utility
function.
In practice,thedistinction
betweendual utilities
and interdependent
utilities
often
breaksdown,as is demonstrated
by Frohlich's(1974)rationalchoiceanalysisofaltruism
builton workon utility
theory
byValavanis(1958).
15This fittednicelyinto the movement
closelyassociatedwithGary Becker,of
applying
theeconomicapproachto subjectstraditionally
outsidethepurview
ofeconomics,
suchas marriage,
suicide,or discrimination.

867
Contemporary
economists
followtheirpredecessors
and,whenthey
treataltruism
as a substantive
phenomenon,
generally
view altruism
as
a subtlevariantofself-interest.
Theirexplanations
oftenstresstheimportanceofpsychicgratification,
inwhichthealtruist
helpsanother
primarily
becauseit makesthealtruist
feelgood abouthimself
or herself(Becker
1976a,1976b)orbecausethealtruist
expectseventually
togetbacksomethingin return
forhisgood deed,eitherin theformofmaterial
goodsor
similarbenevolentbehavioror cooperation(Axelrod1984).16 We thus
findaltruism
as a mechanism
to obtaindeferred
self-interest,
as a psychic
good, as an investment,
a "quid for[a] moreimplicitand conjectured
quo" (Phelps1975,2), as an unrequited
transfer
wherethegivingprovidesitsowngratification
(e.g., Becker'sparticipation
altruism),
oroccasionallyas a moralisticconstrainton utilitymaximization
(Calabresi
1975).
On thewhole,economistsapproachaltruism's
theoretical
challenge
to theirdiscipline
indirectly
andwithgreatreluctance.
Theyoccasionally
wonderhowaltruism
affects
ordistorts
themarket
mechanism
(Buchanan
1975).Once in a greatwhilesomeonediscusseswhatfunction
altruism
mightplay in the currenteconomicsystem.(Is altruismproductive
or
counterproductive?
Whatare its costs? Does selectiveand controlled
altruismmake everyonebetteroff?)But it is the rareeconomistwho
asks whethera thorough
examination
ofaltruism
mightsuggestthatthe
economictheoryofrationalactionitselfwouldneedto be refined.17
Becker's Altruism
The economicapproachto altruism

is perhapsbestcapturedin two
recentworks by Nobel Prize winnerGary Becker."8Becker's two
"6Economists
also stressthesize ofthesocialunitin whichaltruism
occurs,arguing
thatexistingclustersof self-reinforcing
altruists
willencouragefurther
altruistic
activity
(AxelrodandHamilton1981).Hereagain,we can discerntheintermingling
ofhypotheses,
withclustersofaltruists
filling
thefunction
ofsocialor situational
factors.In an analogous
fashion,the self-reinforcing
altruists
act as mechanisms
through
whichlearning
occurs,
sinceitis frequently
assumedthatthereis a modeling
effect
at work;this,inturn,is linked
thatpeoplebehavealtruistically
totheassumption
to avoidgroupopprobrium,
towingroup
praise,or to gainthereciprocity
discussedabove. Economists
also stresstheresourcesan
altruist
possesses;forexample,Margolis(1982,1987)explainsaltruism
intermsofa dualutility
modelinwhichan actorweighstheallocation
ofresources
betweenhisgroupinterest
andhis self-interest,
to a senseofthefairshareeach deserves.
according
17For an interdisciplinary
discussionof this,withchaptersby bothrationalactor
theorists
andtheircritics,see Monroe(1991b).
181 citeBecker'stwo worksas 1976aand 1976bto distinguish
betweenchapter12,
"A Theoryof Social Interactions"
in
(originally
publishedin 1974and laterreproduced
Becker's1976collection),and "Altruism,
Egoism,and GeneticFitness:Economicsand

868
chapters-oneon socialinteractions
andtheotheron altruism
andsociobiology-stimulated
economists'interest
in altruism
and wereimportant
in directing
researchers
towardthebiologicalparadigmand theimportanceofgroups.
Becker'sfirst
articleresurrects
thenineteenth-century
idea ofsocial
income,definedas thesumofa person'sownincomeplusthemonetary
valueto himor heroftherelevantcharacteristics
ofothers.Beckeruses
thisconceptto highlight
theextentto whichthewelfareof othersmay
enteran individual's
utility
function.
He triesto incorporate
socialinteractionsintothe moderntheoryof consumerdemandby assumingthat
variouscharacteristics
of different
individuals
(e.g., family
membership)
affectthisutility
function.
Beckerthenexploresthebehavioralimplicationsof thisby examining
(1) familyrelations,(2) charity,
and (3) envy
and hatred.
Beckerclaimsthatthe greaterthe contribution
of an individual's
socialenvironment
to his or hersocialincome,"the morehiswelfareis
determined
by the attitudesand behaviorof othersratherthanby his
ownincome"(Becker1976a,260). Beckerdevelopshistheoryintowhat
he calls the "rottenkid" theoremto arguethatthe theoryis powerfulenoughto explainwhyall membersofa family
willbehavein a similarlylovingway,once one memberdemonstrates
concernforothersin
theunit:
. . . whenone membercares sufficiently
aboutothermembers
to be thehead,all
members
havethesamemotivation
as theheadto maximize
family
opportunities
and
to internalize
fullyall within-family
"externalities,"
regardless
of how selfish(or,
indeed,howenvious)thesemembers
are.Evena selfish
childreceiving
transfers
from
hisparentswouldautomaticallyconsidertheeffects
ofhisactionson othersiblings
as wellas onhisparents.Putstilldifferently,
sufficient
lovebyonemember
guarantees
thatall membersact as iftheylovedothermembers
as muchas themselves.
As it
were,theamountof"love" byone member
leadsall othermembers
by"an invisible
hand"to act as iftheytoo lovedeveryone. (Becker1976b,270)
In otherwords,selfishkidswillnotdestroythefamilyin whichothers
care forfamilymembers.Beckerextendsthelogicofa familygroupto
othergroups,calleda "synthetic
'family'consisting
ofa charitable
person i and all recipients
ofhis charity"(Becker1976a,273). For Becker,
suchcharitable
behaviorcan be motivated
bythedesireto improveothers' materialwell-being,
to avoid scorn,or to receivesocial acclaim.
Beckeragainarguesthatall members
willtry"to maximize'family'opSociobiology,"publishedin 1976as bothan articleand as chapter13 in Becker's1976
collection.Page numbersreferto the 1976volume,entitledTheEconomicApproachto
Human Behavior.

869
portunitiesand 'family' consumption,instead of their own income or
consumption
alone" (Becker1976a,274).Withhistheory,
Beckerargues
thatwe can explainhowandwhythealtruist's
givingwillincreaseas his
or herpercentageof incomein thecharitablefamilyincreasesand will
decreaseas the increasein the incomeof recipients
increases.Becker
criticizesconventional
theoriesof consumerchoiceforignoring
social
interactions
and considering
charitablegivingsimplyas a "good" that
entersthe giver'sutilityfunctionalong withhis othergoods (Becker
1976a, 274-75).
Becker'smovefromviewingaltruism
as a simpleproblemin interpersonalutilitieswas a majoradvance.I applaudhis use of the social
incomeconceptto focusattention
on the extentto whichthe welfare
of othersmayenteran individual'sutilityfunction.'9
Becker'sworkis
also important
because it confronts
altruismdirectly
and, in doingso,
stumbleson theparadoxat theheartofeconomics:theprimacyof selfinterest
as a motiveforcein humanbehaviorand thepersistence
ofbenevolence.Beyondthis,Becker'stheoryofsocialinteraction
madegiant
stridesin movingaway fromthe individualactorand intoa situation
whereindividuals
havemorethanone identity
(e.g., an individual
can be
a rottenkidand stillrecognizehe is also a memberof a familygroup).
ButBecker'sessentialexplanation
ofwhytherotten
kidwillbe thenorm
consistsofonlyvaguereferences
to humannature.In particular,
Becker
suggeststhata betterunderstanding
ofhumannaturecan comeifeconomistsconsidersociobiology,
a fielddevotedto thescientific
deciphering
ofhumannatureand one as challengedas economicsby theendurance
ofaltruism,
giventhehighsurvivalvalueofself-interested
behavior.Because so muchoftheeconomicdiscussionofaltruism
afterBeckerdoes
borrowconceptsfromevolutionary
biology,letmenowturnto a discussionofthisgeneralapproach.20
I thencan presenta jointcritiqueofboth
'9Beckerarguesthatbeforethetheoryof consumerdemandwas formalized
(in the
1880s)economistsoftendiscussedthe basic determinants
of wants.Withgreaterrigor,
however,mainstream
economists
gave decreasing
attention
to wantslike "distinction,
a
goodnameorbenevolence"(Becker1976a,254).Utility
cameto dependmoreon material
goodsandservices,withless attention
paidtotheutility
placedontheinteractions
between
individuals.
to Becker,Pigou,Fisher,and Panteloni"includedattriAlthough,
according
butesofothersin utility
functions
withthem"(Becker1976a,255).For
[they]didnothing
the mostpart,discussionof social interactions
was givenover to sociologistssuch as
Simmel,Durkheim,
Freud,and Weberor laterto sociologicaldiscussionsof "social exchange"(Blau 1964)or to Parson's(1969)theoryofaction.
20Although
Beckeruses the term"sociobiology,"I deliberately
employthe more
neutral
term"evolutionary
biology,"sinceforsomesocialscientists
sociobiology
hascome
to be associatedwitha subtleformofracism.

870
thebiologicalapproachand thoseeconomicworksthatborrowheavily
fromevolutionary
biology.
Evolutionary
Biology
Altruism
also constitutes
a majortheoretical
concernforbiologists,
since behaviorin whichan organismacts to promotethe survivalof
anotherorganism,
ratherthanhis or herown survival,violatestheindividualselectionprinciple
on whichthefoundation
ofevolutionary
biology
was constructed.2"
In general,evolutionary
biologists
(e.g., Wilson1975;
Trivers1971)explaindeviations
fromtheindividual
selectionist
principle
on whichtheirdisciplineis foundedin one of two ways: kinor group
selection.
Thegroupselectionhypothesis
was an earlyattempt
toexplainaltruismwithinthebiologist'sparadigmof individualselection.Essentially,
thegroupselectionhypothesis
thatDarwiniannaturalselection
suggested
worksnot on individualsdirectlybutrathervia groups.22
Groupselectionistsarguethataltruistsdo not fareas well as egoistsin a normal
Darwinianworld,butat a grouplevel,groupsthatpossessaltruists
may
do betterin competition
thando groupswithoutany altruists.The asis thatgroupsdevelopsomemechanism
sumption,
therefore,
to protect
theirown altruistsin orderforthegroupas a wholeto competemore
in thebiologicalprocessofnaturalselection.
effectively
In contrast,
thekinselectionhypothesis
explainsaltruism
byarguing
thattheprocessofnaturalselectionworksthrough
thegene,ratherthan
through
thegroupor theindividual
organism.
For example,iftwosisters
sharegene Y, thatgene mightbest be passed on to futuregenerations
through
one sister'sdedicating
herlifeto protecting
hersister'schildren
(childrenwho also carrygene Y) ratherthanby producing
childrenof
herown,childrenwho mightfurther
drainscarceresourcesandjeopardize thesurvivalofall children
whocarrygene Y. Kin selectionists
thus
thatthegene,ratherthantheindividual
hypothesize
organism
or group,
is therelevantunitfornaturalselection(Dawkins1976).A selfishgene
therefore
mayrationally
reproducethrough
one organism
sacrificing
to
protectoffspring
ofa relatedorganism
thatcarriesthesamegene.
One is immediately
struckbytheextenttowhichevolutionary
biologistsoffer
explanations
thatcloselyresembletheexplanations
ofaltruism
foundin economicsand rationalchoicetheory.Each approachfocuses
heavilyon the conceptof reciprocity
(I help you so you willhelp me
21Foran excellent
andsuccinctoverviewofworkon altruism
inevolutionary
biology,
see Krebs'sintroduction
to section3 in Olineret al. (1992).
22SeeWilson(1975)fora presentation
ofthetheory,
andSchwartz
(1986)fora critique.

87I
later),the clustering
phenomenon(groupsof altruistsencourageeach
to kinor criticalgroupmembers
other),andtheextensionofself-interest
theextent
(helpingyouprotectsmygenes,too).23Thisprobablyreflects
towhichbotheconomicsandbiologyhavestrong
intellectual
rootsinthe
of self-interest
are particularly
and therefore
assumption
challengedat
theirtheoretical
It is
foundations
by behaviorthatis notself-interested.
therefore
notsurprising
thatthesedisciplines
havereactedto altruism
by
similarconceptualexplanations.
developing
Since evolutionary
in human
biologiststendto be less interested
thanare economistsand rationalchoicetheorists,
altruism
theseparallel
theoretical
trackscan be illustrated
best empirically
by considering
the
twomostimportant
recenteconomicanalysesofaltruism,
bothofwhich
drawheavilyon biologicalconcepts.ThesearebyBecker(1976a,1976b)
and by Margolis(1982,1987).24
Biology, Social Interactions,and Interdependfent
UtilityFunctions
Becker'scritiqueattempts
to forgea unionbetweeneconomicsand
It casts thebiologicalargubiology,based on theirmutualstrengths.25
mentsin economists'terms,arguingthatbiologistshave stoppedshort
ofdeveloping
modelswithrationalactorswhomaximizeutility
functions
subjecttolimited
resources.TheyrelyonwhatBeckercallsthe"rationality"of geneticselection(i.e., theenvironment
encouragesbetter-suited
behaviorand discouragesbehaviorless well suitedforsurvival).In conand have
trast,economists"have reliedsolelyon individual
rationality,
the effectsof geneticselection"into theirmodels
not incorporated
(Becker1976b,284). Beckerwantsto forgea morepowerful
analysisby
oftheeconomistto thegrouprationaljoining"theindividual
rationality
ityof the sociobiologist"(1976b,284). To do this,whilestillretaining
actorswhopursueindividual
Beckerfollowstheearliertraself-interest,
ditionoftreating
altruism
as a problemininterdependent
utility
functions,
thatin certaincircumstances
"altruismpays."
arguing
Beckerexplainsthisin threeways. First,he equatesconsumption
withfitnessin biologicalterms.Second,he arguesthataltruism
initially
23I deliberately
use theword"help," ratherthan"altruism,"sinceI do notbelieve
towardtheself-interest
pole of a
suchacts are trulyaltruistic
butratherfallsomewhere
continuum
running
fromself-interest
to altruism.
24 There
economicanalysesofaltruism;
because
have,ofcourse,beenotherinteresting
of space constraints,
I can discussonlytheworksthathave had themostfar-reaching
impact.Othersare citedin notesor in thereferences.
notjust by his NobelPrizebut
of Becker'sworkis demonstrated
25The importance
also by the otherworkit inspiredand the commentsit evokedfromseveralauthors
1981).
(Hirshleifer
1977,1981;Tullock1975;Wintrobe

872
impliesreducingone's ownconsumption
to increasetheconsumption
of
another.Butthird,thealtruist'sselfishbeneficiaries
(theegoists)willnot
wantto hurtthealtruist.
Whynot?Because hurting
thealtruist
willlimit
thealtruist's
future
abilitytocontribute
to theegoist'sownconsumption.
If thedamagestheegoistswouldotherwise
have inflicted
on thealtruist
exceedthecost ofthealtruist'scontributions
to them,thenthealtruism
actually"pays" becausethealtruist
is betteroffand thusmorelikelyto
survivethanis a comparableself-centered
individual.
Beckerclaimsthissocial interaction
is superiorto the
framework
sociobiologist'sgeneticfitnessframework.
Why?Because the Becker
framework
allows foregoismand explainshow altruismcan survive
withina worldof egoists.This means,forBecker,that"[models]of
groupselectionare [thus]unnecessarysincealtruistic
behaviorcan be
selectedas a consequenceofindividual
rationality"
(Becker1976b,284).
Becker'slogichereis masterful
inexplaining
altruism
whilenotmovingfromthebase ofself-interested
individuals
as thecornerstone
ofeconomicthought.And it did maketwo important
contributions.
First,it
thattherewerecircumstances
inwhichself-interested
demonstrated
individualsmight
be inducedto maximize
jointincome,thuspermitting
both
partiestoreachhigher
levelsofindividual
thanwouldotherconsumption
wise be possible.This openedthedoorforimportant
laterworkon the
evolutionof cooperationin a worldof egoists(cf. Axelrod1984 or
Axelrodand Hamilton1981).Andsecond,Beckerintroduced
to economics and rationalchoicetheorythedistinction
betweentruealtruism
and
a categoryof behaviorthatevolutionary
biologists(Trivers1971)call
reciprocalaltruism
and thatsociologists(Blau 1964;Homans1961)call
socialexchange.
Becker'sanalysisalso makesseveralcriticalerrors.
Unfortunately,
First,Becker'sconceptofaltruism
is extraordinarily
restrictive.
Becker's
scenariowherealtruism
pays is logicallypossiblebutonlyunderrather
limitedconditions.Even someoneas sympathetic
to Becker'sapproach
as GordonTullockcommented:"It seemsverydubiousthatany realworld situationwould fitthe model" (Tullock 1975, 503). Second,
Becker'sanalysisrequiresthealtruist
to correctly
thepreferanticipate
enceorderings
ofhisrecipients;
thisis notoriously
difficult
to do.26Third,
Beckerignorestheextentto whichthebiologicalprocessofgroupselection is a nonconscious,outcome-oriented
process and not conscious
choice.Fourth,Becker'suse of thepsychicutility
and revealedpreferenceconceptsis tautological.
It arguesthatsomepeople(altruists)
simply
getpleasurefromothers'happiness.How do we knowthisis so? They
on Becker.
26Wintrobe
(1981)notedthisin a comment

873
mustgetpleasurefromothers'happiness,or else theywouldnotbehave

as theydo. In otherwords,altruistsrevealtheirpreference
to make
othershappybybehavingaltruistically.
Thisis circular
logic.Distinguishingbetweengoods altruism(Becker'soriginaluse of thepsychicutility
forone's takingpleasurein another'sgoodfortune)
andparexplanation
ticipation
altruism
(takingpleasureat beingan agentincausinganother's
does noterase thecircularity
goodfortune)
oftheunderlying
argument.
Fifth,psychicincomedoes nothave to be altruism;
Margolis(1982,54)
quiteproperly
notesthatpotlatchand conspicuousconsumption
are examplesofpsychicincomebutare hardlyaltruism.
Finally,whatBecker
describesas altruism
is moreaccuratelycharacterized
as strategic
altruismor enlightened
self-interest.
Here, Beckermisappliesthebiologists'
In Becker'sreciprocalaltruism,
an actor
conceptofreciprocalaltruism.
helpsothersin the "expectationor hopethathe willthenbe helpedby
themin the future"(Becker 1976b,821). This is altruismonlyin the
return
immediate
sense;a donationis madebutno immediate
is expected
in thelongrun,however,forthereis the
or received.It is notaltruism
thisfuture
expectationoffuturereturn.And-more important-where
reciprocity
is notexpected,Beckerarguesthattheinitial"altruistic"act
shouldnot occur. Whyit does occur undertheseconditionsremains
withinBecker'smodelofaltruism.
unexplained
In general,then,Becker's discussionof altruismis unconvincing
In
because he has definedaltruismtoo narrowly
and idiosyncratically.
Becker'saltruism
does notallowforsacrifice
particular,
by thealtruist;
indeed,forBecker,altruismresultsin eventualindividualgain.This is
certainly
notthestandardusageofthetermnoris ittheusageemployed
by evolutionary
biologists,mostof whomdefinealtruism
as increasing
the fitnessof anotherat the expenseof one's own fitness(cf. Wilson
1975,117). On this,Beckerappearsto have misreadthe biologistshe
claimsto follow.27
Beyondthis,Beckerfailsto pursuethe biologists'
in the worldof
emphasison groupsand insteadremainsentrenched
thatWilsonis citedby Beckeras defining

altruism
as "occurring
27It is interesting
[w]hena person. . . increasesthefitnessof anotherat theexpenseof his own fitness"
(Wilson1975,117,citedin Becker1976a,290).Yet immediately
afterBeckercitesWilson,
Beckerthenproceedsto arguethataltruismcan actually"increasepersonalfitness"
(Becker1976a,291). How can thisbe reconciledwithWilson'sdefinition?
At theleast,
someconceptualclaritywouldbe usefulhere.So despiteBecker'sclaimto be applying
fromtheusefulstarthe madein
sociobiological
concepts,his 1976workactuallyretreats
it failsto
the biologicalapproach.And mostunfortunately,
1974towardincorporating
pursuethe biologist'semphasison groupsthat Becker appearedto be pursuingin
1974.

874
theindividual
actorwho pursuesself-interest
albeitin a cleverstrategic
fashion.
Economics and Group Selection
Becker'sis nottheonlyexampleofan economist

drawing
on biological concepts,in particular
thebiologicalconceptofgroupselection.Anotherapproachis illustrated
by Margolis,who addressesgroupinterest
mostsuccessfully
to explainwhypeoplecontribute
to thepublicinterest
whenthereturntheyexpectappearsinconsequential
and theeffecton
societyminuscule.Like Becker,Margolisdrawson biologicalconcepts
to explainhumanmotivation.28
The standardargument
in evolutionary
biology(cf. Wilson 1975) suggeststhatnaturalselectionfavorsselfinterestbecause self-interested
creatureswill leave moredescendants
theirgenesthanwillgroup-interested
natural
carrying
beings.Therefore,
selectionfavorsself-interest.
Groupselectionists,
however,suggestthat
in competition
amongdifferent
breedinggroups,groupsthathave some
willhave an advantageover
memberswho act to further
groupinterest
groupswithonlyself-interested
individuals.Within
a group,then,selfinterest
can be favored,butamonggroups,groupinterest
is a moresuccessfulstrategy.
to suggestthatindividuals
have
Margolisuses a Darwinianargument
dual sourcesof motivation:
individual
within
him
a
has
both
selfevery
interested
person(S-Smith)and a group-interested
person(G-Smith).
Thisargument
parallelsthatof earlypoliticaleconomists,
whoassumed
a dualityofhumannature:"manas private,self-seeking
man
individual;
as citizenand social being"(Margolis1982,x). Margolisnotesthatthis
theproblemso thatwe now
"dual-utility"
approachsimplyreformulates
mustmove beyondthe earliersimpleformulation
of the problemthat
addressedhowa self-interested
individual
can use resourcesrationally
to
further
willuse
groupinterest.
Instead,we mustask whentheindividual
resourcesto maximizehis self-interested
and whenwillhe
preferences
maximizehisgroup-interested
preferences.
The challengeforMargolisthusbecomesto decidehowgroupselectionoccurs(i.e., how is group-interested
behaviortempered
so thatthe
selectiveadvantageof self-interested
behavioris controlled?).
Margolis
needssome mechanism
thatlets nonhelpers
(economistscall thesefree
and punishedby helpers,butthismechanism
must
riders)be identified
28Margolis
takesa cue fromMosca andarguesthat"ifindividuals
areobservedto be
actingin a mannerthatseemsrationalfroma socialbutnotan individual
pointof view,
thenwithout
prejudiceyetto theconventional
modelofchoice-we can saythattheyare
actingas iftheyhadtwodifferent
functions"
utility
(1982,2).

875
also be sufficiently
subtleto preventnonhelpers
frommimicking
helpers
enoughto avoiddetection.Margolissuggeststhatthedistinction
between
altruism
"based on internal
psychicbenefits
fromthesheerfactofparticipation[and]theotherbased on externally
observablebenefits"willprovidethismechanism
(Margolis1982,27).
Margolisalso exploresthebiologicalarguments
concerning
genetic
inertia,whichsuggest(1) thatgroupsfindsome mechanism
to punish
self-interested
and(2) thataltruism
individuals,
is a hangover
fromearlier
smallersocieties in which everyonecan observe and judge others
(Margolis1982,32). This argument
addressesthe question:Whydon't
peoplealwaysact selfishly
whenno one is looking?In biology,thegeneculturetheory(Lumsdenand Wilson1983)offers
onlythevagueanswer
balancesthe natural
thatthe culturalneed forgroupinterest/altruism
an equallyvagueexplapropensity
to selectself-interest.
Margolisoffers
thenationbutone directedto theindividual
levelbased on equilibrium
ofinditowarda balanceand integration
ory,whichpositsthetendency
vidualdual utilities:"The largertheshareofmyresourcesI have spent
in allocating
the moreweightI give to myselfishinterests
unselfishly,
I can centeron
marginal
resources.On theotherhand,thelargerbenefit
thegroupcomparedwiththebenefit
fromspendingmarginal
resources
on myself,themoreI willtendto act unselfishly"
(Margolis1982,36).
This stillleaves us withthe exogenouslyintroduced
conceptof a split
value systemwithinindividuals(the self-interested
individualand the
group-interested
individual),withoutspecifying
how these two selves
originated.
Althoughwe can inferthatthesetwo individualsoccur in
varying
mixeswithindifferent
cultures,theprecisemechanism
bywhich
NeitherMargolisnor the
theydevelop stillremainsto be articulated.
evolutionary
biologistswho developed the gene-culture
theorythat
Margolisadaptsto humanbehaviorsolvethisproblem.29
In general,then,boththe explanations
fromevolutionary
biology
in economicsleave unansweredthe questionof
and theircounterparts
betweenaltruism
and self-interest
dehow,when,and whythemixture
onlya small
velopeddifferently
acrosscultures.Evolutionary
biologists,
29Theclosestanyrationalactortheorist
comesto addressing
thequestionofculture
is Hirshleifer's
comment
on Becker's"rottenkid" discussionofaltruism.
Hirshleifer
suggeststhatif the rottenkid has the last word-as the daughters
did in KingLear once
Lear had relinquished
his fortune-there
is no reasonwhyaltruismshouldcontinue.
does mentionthe possibility
thatthe parentmay,whilestillin fullcontrol,
Hirshleifer
constrain
his childby "posthypnotic
. . .culturalindoctrination
suggestion
or even by
physicalmeans" (Hirshleifer
1977,501). This is the closestany of the rationalchoice
theorists
cometodiscussing
theroleofcultural
constraints
on egoism,andHirshleifer
does
notdevelopthediscussionbeyondthisbriefmention.

876
anyway,leave considerations
percentage
ofwhomstudyhumanaltruism
to anthropologists.
Economistsdeemsuchfactors
of culturalinfluences
to culturalworks
exogenousto theirmodels,and we findlittlereference
in theiranalyses.
on altruism
Cultureand Altruism
is Whiting's
studieson altruism
The best of thefewcross-cultural
in sixcultures,
workthatdid
researchon children
(1983)anthropological
inhuman
ofkinshiptieson altruism
addressthecomparative
importance
examinespatternsof childrearing.
beingsand across cultures.Whiting
whowereraisednotjustinthetraditional
Western
She considerschildren
nuclearfamilybut also in moreextendedfamilieswheregrandparents,
closely.She also examinessocieties
aunts,uncles,andcousinsinteracted
areraisedincommon,
livinginwhatarecalledwomen's
inwhichchildren
houses untila certainage, at whichpointboys undergoan initiation
andjoin themen.In constructing
heranalysisin thisfashion,
ceremony
triesto isolateboththeroleofcultureandthekindsofbiological
Whiting
concludesthatyoung
emphasizes.Whiting
tiesthekinselectionargument
become
forotheryoungsters
childrenwho are giventhe responsibility
moresociallyresponsibleand caringadultsthanchildrenwho are not
argues,holdstruereThis finding,
Whiting
givensuch responsibilities.
are relatedto theirchargesthrough
theseyoungsters
gardlessofwhether
kinshipbondsor bloodrelations.
Whiting's(1983) workprovidesvaluableevidenceabout altruism,
for biologistsconcernedwith human acts of altruism.
particularly
is
Whiting's one of the rareworksin thisarea, however,and has-to
myknowledge-neverbeen citedby eithereconomistsor biologists.In
culture'srole in settinga mix between
general,questionsconcerning
andeconleft
unanswered
bothbybiologists
and
are
altruism self-interest
and
these
successfully
omistswho have borrowed
biologicalconcepts
appliedthemto humanaltruism.
to delineateculture'sinfluWhileonlyWhiting
(1983)has attempted
ence through
suchan explicitbiologicalanalysis,therehave beenother
treatment
of
generalanalysesof cultureand altruism.The traditional
Baron's
culturehas focusedon itseffect
on specificvaluesofindividuals.
theDutchrescueof JewsduringWorldWar II
(1992)work,explaining
ofJews
theDutchtradition
ofreligious
toleranceandassimilation
through
theDutch
thisapproach.Baroncontrasts
intoDutchculture,illustrates
culturalvalueswiththoseofPolishnunswhosavedJews,andhe argues
in
thatthe nunshad to breakwiththe Polishcultureof anti-Semitism
to theirRomanCatholicculturalemphasison helpingand
preference
ofothers.
suffering
alleviating

877
A moreinnovativerecentapproachto cultureis demonstrated

by
Blum's (1992) worksuggesting
theseJewishrescueactivitiesinvolved
bothfeelingclose to all humanbeingsand a desireto affirm
theJewish
cultureitself.In thisanalysis,universalism
causes an altruistto save
anyperson;culture'sinfluence
worksthrough
causinga rescuerto save
someonefroma particular
culturethatis valued.A similarly
innovative
approachis foundin Seidler's(1992)workthatsuggestscultureaffects
altruismthroughthe WesternEnlightenment
conceptof the self.This
Westernviewmakesboththeselfandfeelings
manifestations
ofegoism,
inordertohavefreedom
causingactorstoengageinself-denial
andequality.Seidlerarguesthatthereis anothertradition
in whichemotionsand
individuality
are treatedas partofthesocialcontextofthehumancondition,one integral
to moralbehaviorandnotinconflict
withit.In Seidler's
explanation
ofaltruism,
culturethusworksthrough
an explanaidentity,
tionI also foundusefulin my own empiricalanalysis(Monroe1990,
1994b).Thisapproachto cultureis quiterecent,however,anditspotentialunprovenand itsinfluence
limitedin thefield.
Critiqueof Biological-EconomicApproach
ofaltruism
Overall,then,bothbiologicalandeconomicexplanations
thatbuildon biologicalconceptsfallshortintwoareas:(1) theyconceptualize altruismtoo narrowly,
and (2) theyanalyzealtruismin termsof
and costs to theindividualactor.Such a conceptualparadigm
benefits
worksreasonablywell in explaininglimitedaltruistic-like
activitiesby
rationalactors(suchas philanthropists)
whohelpotherswhileincurring
onlylittledecreasein theirown welfare.(Philanthropists,
afterall, seldomgiveawayenoughoftheirincometo becomeeconomically
uncomfortable
themselves.)But thisconceptualapparatuscannotsuccessfully
Andclearly,
explainaltruistic
acts thatinvolvegreatcostto thealtruist.
such acts exist.They are fullydocumented
in biologicalstudiesof baboons and rabbits(Cronin1991)who warnothersin theirgroupsof a
predator,therebydrawingattention
to themselves,
attention
thatcosts
themtheirlives.Atthehumanlevel,we findcountlessincidents
inwhich
in myownwork(Monroe1990,
peoplegivetheirlivesto helpstrangers;
1991a)I have interviewed
recipientsof the CarnegieHero awardand
peoplewho rescuedJewsin Nazi Europe.30
All ofthesepeopledidrisk
theirlives forstrangers
and withno thought
of reward.Furthermore,
manyCarnegieheroesdied in theirattempts
to save others,receiving
on peoplewhorescuedJewsinNazi Europe.Forthebest
30There
is a vastliterature
recentwork,see Olinerand Oliner(1988)or Monroe(1994b).

878
to applythe kindof
It is difficult
theCarnegiemedalposthumously.31
where
modelthatMargolis(1982,1987)developsto situations
equilibrium
thendies; dyingstopsthe
who pursueshis groupinterest
an individual
actors.
ifwe thinkin termsof individual
rathereffectively,
equilibrium
I wouldargue,
forms
ofaltruism,
Thisfailuretoexplainsuchextreme
as actionthateitherbenefits
existsbecause economistsdefinealtruism
otherswithno gain to the actoror thatbenefitsothersmorethanit
definition
excludesor igthe actor.This somewhatrelativistic
benefits
It directsdiscussioninto"mineand
ofself-sacrifice.
noresthepossibility
It casts the argumenttoo strictlyin termsof postthine" terms.32
individuals
who,likeHobbes's maninthestateofnature,
Enlightenment
distinct
fromsociety.Thisin turnblinds
are antecedent
to and therefore
a strongpartof
identities
and grouptiesthatconstitute
us to theshifting
humannature(see Elster1986).Whilesuchcloserelianceon an individualisticconceptualparadigmmayworkwell to explainthe behaviorof
the manyindividualswho are willingto
some individuals,
particularly
incuronlysmallcosts in theirown welfareto helpothers,it is vastly
whosealtruism-toadopttheeconomist's
less successfulforindividuals
perhapseventheir
welfare,
vocabulary-coststhemtheirownindividual
of boththe biologicaland the
lives. This remainsa seriouslimitation
economicparadigms.
PsychologicalExplanations
and psychologists
resembleeconomistsand evoluPsychoanalysts
as a normofhuman
biologistsin theiracceptanceofself-interest
tionary
31Therewere,ofcourse,numerous
ofbothrescuersofJewsandtheir
Nazi executions
members.
family
is found
actortrapthatensnaresmosteconomists
32Further
evidenceoftheindividual
(1975).Frolichnotesthat
in theexchangebetweenFrohlich(1974,1975)and Fitzgerald
butthat
rewardsfrombearinga burdenforanother,
maygetvicariousutility
"an altruist
Underthosecircumstances
therewardmaybe lowerthanthecost of thehelprendered.
wouldchoosenotto assumeanyoftheother'sburden"(Frohlich1975,
altruist
therational
one he
phenomenon,"
480).Frohlichthennotesthatthisis "an all too commonempirical
"It is one inwhichthereis a genuine
directly.
arguesthereaderhas no doubtexperienced
to engagein a charitable
but. . . in whichthe
act, and so forth,
desireto helpa friend,
costs of doing so are viewed as prohibitive....
In such situations,the altruismis abortive
betweentheactors"(Frohlich1975,
of thearea of contention
and thereis no reduction
choiceanalytheweaknessinrational
demonstrates
analysisbeautifully
480-81).Frohlich's
andcosts.
intermsofindividual
benefits
ses ofaltruism:
theseanalysesassumeactorsthink
willnotoccurwhenthecostsare too high,as
theypredictthataltruism
Consequently,
does exist.People do helpotherseven whenthecoststo
Frohlichargues.But altruism
thantherewardstheyreceivefromtheiraction.Theydo sacrifice
themselves
are higher
It is simply
thattheirbehavior
cannotbe explained
forothers.Theydo behavealtruistically.
rationalactorparadigmthatassumesall actorsare isolatedselfthe traditional
through
individuals.
interested

879
behavior.33
Indeed,we discernsomeofthesamepatterns
inpsychological
treatments
ofaltruism
thatwe findamongeconomists
andbiologists
(e.g.,
a tendencyto ask whetheraltruismmightnot simplybe just a way to
feelgoodaboutoneself,to alleviateguiltforearlierwrongs,or to obtain
praiseforbeinga good person).But thispatternappearsless pervasive
ofaltruism
thanamongeconomicor
amongpsychological
interpretations
biological explanations.34
workson altruism
tendtofallintotwocategoOverall,psychological
ries:developmental
and social. Worksin bothcategoriesoffercreative
illustrations
ofhowtomoveawayfromthetheoretical
orientation
flowing
the
fromFreud'spremisethatbehavioris ultimately
rootedin satisfying
self,a premisethatmakesaltruismas greata theoretical
challengefor
as foreconomistsand evolutionary
psychologists
biologists.
DevelopmentalPsychological Explanations
ratherthan
In general,developmental
stresslearning,
psychologists
of
the biologists'genetically
transmitted
predispositions,
as predictors
altruism.
As thechildgrowsandidentifies
witha criticalother,thesuper
ego develops.This superego suppressesthe basic selfishdesires,and
altruistic
behavioremerges,eitheras a resultof guilt(imposedby this
or as a resultof theinternalization
superego formoraltransgressions)
ofvaluesandstandards
learnedin earlychildhood.Muchofthedevelopfocuses
mentalworkon childpsychology
thataddressesaltruism
directly
bothon thestagesat whichchildren
startto giveto othersandon tracing
theprocessbywhichthisnaturalproclivity
to sharegrowsanddevelops
intoa morefull-fledged
ethicalsystem.It is generally
heldthatchildren
learnby reinforcement
and modelingof behavior.35
This developmental
33 use theterm"psychologist"
to referto workbypsychoanaor "psychological"
are
I do so, sincemoreofthestudieson altruism
and psychologists.
lysts,psychiatrists,
ratherthanpsychiatrists.
donebypsychologists
as a helping
is widelypracticed
34Twofactorsmayaccountforthis.First,psychology
willingandgreater
mayprovidemorereceptivity
socialactivism
Psychology's
profession.
to believethatbehaviorthatis otherdirectedactually
ness on thepartof psychologists
thusmaymake
motive.The socialactivismofpsychology
anyulterior
does existwithout
and mayresultin a moreopen
of self-interest
weddedto a paradigm
it less ideologically
hasa generalconcernwith
Second,psychology
workon altruism.
approachinitsempirical
tolead
mayworkwithitssocialactivism
inidentity
generalinterest
Psychologists'
identity.
thatdiffer
so habituandpersonalities
patterns
identity
to consideraltruistic
psychologists
an
actorsthattheyactuallycan be said to constitute
allyfromthoseof self-interested
of
Whateverthe causes, some of the richestrecentexplanations
altruistic
personality.
altruism
are foundin psychology.
exampleofworkinthisarea.
1983editedvolumeprovidesan excellent
35Bridgeman's
therecentstateof thearton
represents
of children
Staub's(1992)workon socialization
andprovidesextensivecitations.
socialization

88o
alongwithotherforms
approachoftentendsto suggestthataltruism,
of moralaction,occurs only at the higheststages of ethicalgrowth
needs have been satisfied
(Kohlberg1984)or afterotherpsychological
withsimilar
(Maslow 1962).36In doingso, worksin thisfieldintersect
and economics.
discussionsofethicsin philosophy
howthelogicofthisapproachplaysoutinempirical
To demonstrate
let us considerjust one example.A religiousperson
workon altruism,
homefromchurchand sees
and an excellentswimmer,
Alexis returning
a youngchilddrowningin a lake near Alex's home. He immediately
wouldexpsychologist
jumpsin and saves thechild.A developmental
plain thisactionthroughreferenceto the values Alex learnedfroma
thensuppressedhis ownselfcriticalrolemodel,valuesthateffectively
I shall
theorists
andcognitive
interested
desires.Unlikethephilosophers
does notmakespecific
thedevelopmental
psychologist
discussshortly,
andemotions)
values,cognition,
internal
states(suchas Alex's particular
the focusof the analysis;such factorsare insteadconsideredprimarWhatthedeof socialization
patterns.
ilyas theresultsofreinforcement
formof
velopmental
approachemphasizesis thefactthata particular
led to or enprocessthatoriginally
learningoccurred,notthecognitive
couragedsuchlearningto takeplace. Andunlikeeconomicanalysesof
are
theapparentexternalrewardsthatencouragesuchlearning
altruism,
of this
one of the criticisms
not discussed.This omissionconstitutes
approach;in theabsenceof theserewards,it is notalwaysclearwhere
occurs.37
and howreinforcement
Social Psychological Explanations
assumptions
Whiletheyadoptmanyof the same basic underlying
who analyze
foundin thedevelopmental
approach,socialpsychologists
movebeyondtheindividual
actorto focusmoreon theinteracaltruism
tionbetweenthe individualactorand theexternalsocial or situational
thusconsidera somewhatwidervarietyof
factors.Social psychologists
factorsthando developmental
Theymayjoin thedeveloppsychologists.
36BothPiaget(1948)and Kohlberg(1984)base theirworkon the assumption
that
individuals
progressthroughstagesof moralreasoningas a resultof a kindof mental
maturational
processinteracting
withexperience.WhilePiagetrepresents
a moregeneral
of moral
cognitive
developmental
approach,Kohlbergfocusesmoreon thedevelopment
reasoning.
In essence,Kohlbergarguesthatindividuals
pass through
sixstagesofprogressivemoralreasoning,
each one moreadvancedthantheearlieronesbyvirtueofincreased
tojustice.Although
abilityto resolveissuesrelating
Kohlbergdoes notfocusspecifically
on altruism,
itis onlypartlyexplainedbythe
he does discusshelpingbehavior,suggesting
can do it veryearlyin theirlives.
levelofmoralreasoning,
sincesomechildren
37SeetheOliners'discussionofthis(1988,8-12).

88i
as theresultof sociallearning
in analyzingaltruism
mentalpsychologist
buttheyalso includefacmodels,
and
role
critical
or self-reinforcement
helpedor thesurwith
person
the
familiarity
the
altruist's
as
torssuch
act takesplace.38Theirapproachtends
in whichthealtruistic
roundings
processin which
as an outcomeofa decision-making
to explainaltruism
of theactorsjoin withtheexternalenvironcharacteristics
theinternal
Analystsin thiscategorywould
mentin a patternof mutualinfluence.
factorsabouttheactor,suchas individual
thustendto considerinternal
whether
thealwell-being,
psychological
values,occupationalinterests,
howopenthe
a leaderor a follower,
or an introvert,
is an extrovert
truist
traits.39
personality
actoris to new experiences,and otherself-reported
Situationaltraitsthatmightbe consideredwouldincludethe physical
act occurs(e.g., a darkand lonely
in whichthe altruistic
environment
of the
characteristics
alleyor a crowdofpeople)40and/ortheparticular
individualin need of help (e.g., a cryingchildor a largeand possibly
man).41
muscle-bound
threatening
Let me returnto the earlierexample,theyoungmancalled Alex,
In thisexample,Alex
personandan excellentswimmer.
whois a religious
in
is on thewayhomefromchurchwhenhe sees a youngchilddrowning
jumpsintothelake to save the
a lake nearhis homeand immediately
analystwouldstressAlex's learnedvalues,
child.Whilea developmental
an analystfollowingthe social psychologicalapproachmightexplain
of his strongsense of religious
Alex's actionsthrougha combination
to othersor thefactthatAlex is someonewhofeelshe has
commitment
states),plus his
to takechargeof a situation(bothofwhichare internal
(a lakenearhishome)inwhichto
situation
risk-free
beingin a relatively
aphelp a deservingperson(a youngchild).The social psychological
of Alex's
a combination
proachthusexplainsAlex's altruismthrough
volumeontherescueoftheDanishJews,includ(1987)interesting
38SeeGoldberger's
terrain.
offamiliar
geographic
ingessayson theimportance
and rescuersof Jewswhether
39TheOliners,forexample,asked bothnonrescuers
involved
theyfeltthemselves
andwhether
peopleintheircommunity
theyfeltlikemarginal
between
difference
In thisinstance,theyfoundlittleor no significant
in thecommunity.
thetwogroups(Olinerand Oliner1988,chap.7).
World
40Scholarsseekingto explaintheactionsof peoplewhorescuedJewsduring
pointto themassrescueoftheDanishJews,in whichan
WarII, forexample,frequently
by the
estimated85% of the Jewsin Denmarkwere saved, as beinggreatlyfacilitated
factorthatwas notavailableforPolish
ofneutralSweden,a situational
physicalproximity
1987).
rescuers,forexample(see Goldberger
findings
41See Piliavan
(1989),or Staub(1980)forworkssummarizing
(1981),Hoffman
to helpthoseperceivedas similarto oneself,worksthatcouldalso be
on thetendency
worldview,andempathy.
of self-perceptions,
in thecategories
classified

882
internal
stateplustheparticular
characteristics
ofthepersonhelpedand
thesituational
contextin whichthealtruistic
act occurred.42
The bestsingleillustration
ofworkfollowing
thissocialpsychological approachis theanalysisby Olinerand Oliner(1988)of peoplewho
rescuedJewsin Nazi Europe. Althoughself-categorized
as social psychological,theOliners'workactuallyseemssomewhatbroader,sinceit
considersand findssupportfor the importance
of a wide varietyof
predictors;
rolemodels,empathy,
familyties and bonds,acceptanceof
responsibility,
and patternsof disciplining
childrenare buta fewof the
factorstheOlinersfindsignificant
influences
on altruistic
behavior.43
In
thisregard,theirworkcan be takenas illustrative
ofworksinpsychology
ingeneral.Theirmostcentralexplanation,
however,does remaina social
psychological
one, stressing
whattheOlinerscall extensivity.
As developedanddefined
bytheOliners,extensivity
consistsofpatterns
ofethical
values of care and inclusiveness.These patternsso permeatethe way
certainindividualscharacteristically
relateto and shape theirsense of
commitment
to othersthattheycan be said to constitute
an altruistic
personality.44
In developing
theirargument,
theOliners(1988)confront
whatis one
ofthegeneralcriticisms
ofworksinthisarea: theunderlying
assumption
thatpersonalities
are stable. Yet we have muchevidencethatpeople
growand changeas a resultoflaterlifeexperiences.Furthermore,
it is
entirely
possiblethatassumingstablepersonalities
mayunderestimate
theextentto whichparticipation
in one altruistic
act maychangea person's laterbehavior,perhapsthrough
theperson'sidentity
influencing
perception,
whichthenencouragesmore-or evenless-altruism.
Thislastargument,
ofcourse,correlates
withMargolis's(1982,1987)
economicanalysisof altruism,
in whichMargolispositsa trade-off
betweenself-interested
acts and other-directed
acts. But Margolis'slogic
suggeststhat,at leastforsomeindividuals,
theperformance
ofan altruisticact mightactuallyserveto lessentheprobability
of suchfuture
acts.
The kindof analysisMargolisadvanceswouldthusseem to contradict
42Recent
workon interactionist
modelsbestexemplifies
thisapproach(see interalia
Staub1980,1992and Olineret al. 1992).
43Both
theOliners(1988,174-85)andHoffman
(1975,1977)findthatharshdiscipline
inhibits
thedevelopment
ofaltruism
whilereasoning
withchildren
encourages
lateraltruistic
activity.
Theysuggestthisphenomenon
mayserveto providea scriptor pattern
forcaring
forothers.
44Other
worksinthiscategory
havesuggested
thataltruism
actually
maybe an attempt
on thepartof the altruistto increaseself-esteem
(Krebs 1978,1982),to live up to the
expectations
of others(Fogelman1994),or to alleviategeneralguiltforpast misdeeds
(Lerner1970).

883
thekindofongoingaltruistic
personality
theOlinersposit.Andcertainly
thekindoftraumatic
experiencethattheOlinersconsiderintheirempirical work(whichfocusesexclusively
on peoplewhorescuedJewsduring
WorldWar II) is probablyone of thebestcandidatesforan experience
thatdramatically
changesan individual'slaterbehavior.45
The Oliners
appearto recognizetheselimitations,
and theirlatertheoretical
work
(1992)edgesintomoreof an interactionist
approachin whichthesocial
processesthatencourageextensivity
are stressed.46
A Cognitive-Perceptual
Analysisof Altruism
If I am correctin arguingthateconomics,biology,and psychology

canprovideonlylimited
foraltruism
explanations
becauseoftheirattachmentto theassumption
ofindividual
self-interest
as thebasiccomponent
humanbehavior,thenwe needto findan approachthatis not
underlying
so conceptually
limited.I am notarguingthatwe shoulddiscardearlier
approaches;I suggestonlythatourknowledge
ofaltruism
wouldbenefit
fromthepursuitofotherapproachesthatdo notsharetheseconceptual
limitations.
thereare othervaluableapproachesto altruism.47
Certainly,
Butthe
area thatI believeoffersthe best promiseformovingdiscussionsof
altruismbeyondthe limitations
of the assumptionof individualselfinterestis whatI wouldcall thecognitive-perceptual.
Whatdo I mean
by this?Withoriginsin philosophyand social cognition,
a cognitiveperceptualapproachexplainsaltruismby focusingon factorssuch as
identity,
self-perception,
worldview,andempathy.
Thereare,ofcourse,
worksin psychologyand economicsthatalso considersome of these
factors;Smithconsidersempathy,and the Olinersconsideridentity.
But in general,a cognitive-perceptual
analysishas its own intellectual
origin.Let me briefly
discussthisorigin,suggesthowsuchan approach
differs
fromthemoretraditional
approachesto altruism
and then-once
one ofthecriticisms
ofanalyzing
rescuersnow,at timet,andaskingthem
45Indeed,
aboutattitudes
duringthewar,whichoccurredsome50 yearsago,has beentheextentto
whichretrospective
memory
has beenshapedbytheveryactstheresearcher
is interested
in explaining.
I am grateful
to Jonathan
Pool forpointing
thisoutto me.
46TheOlinerssuggesteightprocessesin particular.
The firstfourrelateto forming
attachments
to knownothers:empathy,
bonding,
learning
caringnorms,andparticipating
in caringbehaviors.The last fourdeal withdeveloping
a senseof obligation
towardthe
broadersocietyand includediversifying,
networking,
reasoning,
and forming
globalconnections.
to isolatethecultural
factorsthat
47Anthropological
research,forexample,attempts
Theseexplanations
ofaltruism
stressfamily
birthorder,
altruism.
influence
might
position,
factorsthatcan existregardless
oftheparticular
cultural
context.
andstablesurroundings,

884
I haveestablishedthisbackground-define
morepreciselywhatthisapproachdoes and whatquestionsit mightanswer.In doingso, I should
notethatalthough
thisis theapproachI havepursuedinmyownempirical work,I omitdiscussionofmyownworkandfocusmoreon thefield
at thegenerallevel.48
Originsof Cognitive-PerceptualApproach
This approachoriginatedin the same puzzle thatbaffledSmith,

Freud,and Darwin:If theworldis such a nastyplace in whichpeople
mustlookoutforthemselves,
whydo self-interested
individuals
nonetheless care forothers,even whendoingso worksagainsttheirown selfinterest?49
Earlyphilosophical
explanations
ofaltruism
(alongwithother
formsof moralaction)focusedon an actor'sabilityto empathizeor to
shiftthe actor's centralperceptionfromhimselfor herselfto thatof
anotherpersonor to membersof a particular
group.Empathy,defined
as putting
oneselfin another'splace and actuallyexperiencing
generally
how thatpersonmustfeel,is thensaid to providea connecting
bond
thatsupposedlyencouragesmorehumaneand compassionate
treatment
towardtheother.Particularly
relevantearlyworksof thistypeinclude
Hume's ([1750] 1939)workon empathyand ethicaldevelopment
and
Smith's([1759]1853)workon sympathy.50
Laterscholarswho consideredtheimportance
ofcognition
forgeneral formsof social behaviorusuallytreatedcognitionin one of three
ways: (1) as schema,script,or mentalframework;
(2) as motivational
factors;or (3) as moralfactors.Underlying
all ofthesetreatments,
however,seemsto be a generalconceptofcognition
as referring
to theprocess of knowing,
including
bothawarenessandjudgmentaboutreality.
Tonnies's (1957) workon the behavioralconsequencesof world
viewsservesas an excellentexampleofearlyworkin thisarea. Tonnies
in worldviews:Gemeinschaft
positeda twofolddistinction
referred
to a
worldviewin whichbehavioremanatesfromcommunity
tiesor intrinsic
moralvalues(wesenwille)
andwas opposedto theGesellschaft
orassociationalworldview, wherebehaviorreflectsa goal-oriented
rationality
(kurwille).
Closelyrelatedto Tonnies'soriginalworkis a vastliterature
innormative
politicaltheorythatdiscussesthebehavioralimportance
of
communitarian
worldviews as opposed to moreliberalor libertarian
48Myconcernhereis onlyto avoidunseemly

emphasison myownresearch.
49SeeMansbridge's
(1990)excellentcollectionon recentdiscussionsof self-interest.
50Theterm"empathy"did notexistwhenSmithwrotebutSmithappearsto mean
muchthesamethingmostofus do whenwe use theterm"empathy"today.

885
worldviews.51
Later,moretechnicalworkson cognition
also assess how
themindprocessesand framesitsunderstanding
of reality(Kahneman,
Slovic,and Tversky1982;Bruner1988,1990).These worksdo notdeal
explicitlywithaltruism,however,and the moregeneralphilosophical
worksthatdeal explicitly
withaltruism
in termsof differences
in world
viewsare few.(Kolm's 1983analysisis one ofthefewexamples.)
Muchof thebest recentworkon cognition
is foundin psychology,
whereitgrewoutoftwoseparateintellectual
trajectories.
The first
is the
developmental,
whereit originated
in theearlyworksin developmental
psychology
by Baldwin(1983),Piaget(1948),and Vygotskii
(1978)and
in Kohlberg'slaterworkon thedevelopment
of moralreasoning.52
The
nondevelopmental
origincomesfromboththeoretical
work,suchas that
ofWilliamJames(cf. 1893)andexperimental
workon consciousnessand
such as F. C. Bartlett'sworkin the 1920s.53
cognition,
Worksin this
secondtrajectory
tendto assumethereis a givenprocessby whichhumansprocessinformation
It
regardlessof cultureor social structures.
focuseson explainingthisprocess,ratherthanon tracingits development,and can be seen in contemporary
workin psychology
by Simon
(1982)and by Kahneman,Tversky,and Slovic(1982).
Cognitionand Altruism:Recent Works
on the
Whenwe turnto recentworksthatfocusmorespecifically
and empathyforaltruism
and othercloselyreof cognition
importance
richnessand
latedformsofprosocialbehavior,we findbothintellectual
thatconfusethelay reader.Even the
technicaland semanticintricacies
conceptof cognition,
generallydefinedto referto thehighlyorganized
mentalaspectsdevelopingin a brain,is used in widelydifferent
concepin theliterature
is to thinkof
tualterms.The mostwidespreadtendency
of an externalrealityand as a mechas botha representation
cognition
But differnew organizations.
anismthathas a potentialforgenerating
ent schools of psychology-notto mentionmoreneurophysicological
viewis wellrepresented
by
5There are manyworksin thisarea. The communitarian
Taylor(1989),Sandel(1982),or Maclntyre
(1984).The liberalviewis wellillustrated
by
Rawls(1973),Dworkin(1978),or Nagel(1987).
52See JamesMarchBaldwin'sworkin The Psychology Review at the end of the
nineteenth
century,
JeanPiaget'sworkon thestructures
ofthought
at different
stagesof
development(e.g., The Moral Developmentof theChildand Biologyand Knowledge, 1971),
in a structured
or L. S. Vygotskii'sanalysisof the interplay
of cognizingindividuals
environment.
53Bartlett
(1932)gavepeoplestoriesandwouldleaveoutstepsinthestoriesthatthe
thatwe all have scriptswe carryin our
to Bartlett
peoplethenwouldfillin, suggesting
minds.The earlyschemaworkgrewoutofthiskindofanalysis.

886
countries
utilizewidely
thatdiscusscognition-anddifferent
disciplines
to referto thismentalapparatus.54
different
terminology
is usuallyinterpreted
as referring
to
In general,however,cognition
theprocessby whichindividuals
come to knowabouttheworld;it inaboutthenaturaloccurcludesboththeideaofawarenessandajudgment
referto thatparticular
partof
renceof events.55
Cognitiveframeworks
an individual's
beliefsabouthowtheworldworksthatis usedtoorganize
time.In
and makesense of realityforthatindividualat thatparticular
scholarsincreasingly
arguethat
termsof whatis includedin cognition,
of emotions,
information
processingalso mustinvolvea consideration
andaffect.56
tendency
amongpsychologists
thus
motivations,
The current
boththeorganizsystemas including
appearstobe toregardthecognitive
processing.
ingofinformation
and affector affective
The standardtreatment
psychologists
(cf.Mandler
amongcognitive
1984;Rumelhart
1986)concernedwiththe schemaand theselffocuses
on notjust theperson'swordsabouthimself
or herselfbutalso on the
and thestoriestheperson
waythepersoninteracts
withtheinterviewer
in anand so on.57Researchers
relationships,
tellsaboutdailyactivities,
are makingincreasing
use of
thropology,
linguistics,
and psychotherapy
to distheseordinary
discoursematerials
(suchas naturalconversations)
cover the self-schema
in naturalistic
thatis, situationsthat
situations,
occuroutsidethe controlled,
Some of these
experimental
laboratory.58
54Terms
rangefromconsciousness,
socialrepresentation,
cognitive
systems,
and social regulatory
mechanisms.
55Wemaynotethatitis snowing
(awareness)andthatsuchsnowis unusual(judgment)
inJulyinmostofNorthAmerica.Children
providecolorful
examplesofthetwo-part
aspect
of cognition.
A friend'stwo-year-old
was bothamazedand delighted
on Halloweento
discoverthatperfect
strangers
openedtheirdoorsto himandfilledhishandswithcandy.
Evenmoresurprising,
hismother
lethimtakeandeatthecandyfromstrangers.
Bothfacts
wereunusual(awareness)and delightful
(judgment)
givenhiscognitive
framework.
56See,forexample,FiskeandLinville(1980),whoarguethatpsychologists
havebeen
in schemaresearchandneedto buildin emotion.
too cognitive
57Ihave used thegeneralconceptof an organizing
cognitive
framework
ratherthan
themoretechnically
developedconceptofa schemaprecisely
becauseI treattheconcept
as a heuristic
and wishto avoidbecomingsidetracked
intoan epistemological
discussion
ofschemaas a concept.
The classic definition
of schema utilizedby cognitivepsychologists,
such as
Mandler(1984)orRumelhart
inKantandusuallyentailsfiveproperties:
(1986),hasitsorigin
(1) schemasare notimages;(2) schemasare generative;
(3) theyare organizedstructures;
(4) theyare notconscious;and (5) schemasare constructive.
58See Lakoff(1987)on language,
Casson(1983)on anthropology
andcultural
patterns,
D'Andrade(1994),andQuinnandHolland(1987)onthemethodological
issuesintheidentification
ofculturally
basedschemas,andTannen(1990)on genderandlanguageandworld
view.

887
Exintricate
diagrammatic
mapsofself-schemas.
scholarsaredeveloping
data (similarto thekindsof storiesanthropolotensiveuse of narrative
gistsandliterary
analystshavereliedon) can providebothinitialimpressionisticstudiesand theraw materialformoretechnicalmodelsof the
cognitive
process.
analysisof altruPresenting
a fullydevelopedcognitive-perceptual
But I can suggesthow such
ismlies beyondthe scope of thisarticle.59
frommoretraditional
discussions,at least in
an analysiswould differ
framework
shouldallow
threeimportant
ways. First,sucha theoretical
in
and
identity
formation,
fordifferences actors'self-perception
explicitly
in relationto
especiallytheway actorsview theworldand themselves
fromotherapproaches,then,by
otherpeople.Thisapproachwoulddiffer
inparticular
an individual's
theconceptofselfand identity,
emphasizing
of
in
Such
an
wouldmakeit
self
relation
to
others.
emphasis
perception
have a distinct
altruists
wayofviewingthe
possibleto considerwhether
world,a different
wayofseeingthingsthando therestofus. Thiswould
firststep in movingempiricalanalysisaway fromthe
be an important
to theworldin whichactorsare implicitly
analyst'sa prioriattachment
in theirorientation.60
It
and self-interested
assumedto be individualistic
at manydifferent
levels,from
also wouldallow forculturalinfluences
in viewsofothers.
viewsoftheselfto variation
differing
Second, in earlierresearchon altruism,altruistshave oftenbeen
to someothergroup,suchas
or injuxtaposition
analyzedby themselves
with
or egoists.It is certainly
to contrastaltruists
important
bystanders
others,if onlyto ascertainthatthebehavioraltraitor attitudedemonstratedby thealtruist
fromthetraitsof otherswho are not
trulydiffers
But thebifurcated
altruists.61
approachfoundin otheranalysesfailsto
makesufficient
allowanceforthenuancesin humanbehavior.Giventhe
inhumanbehavior,itseemsmoresensibleto envision
rangeand subtlety
a conceptualcontinuum,
withpurelyself-interested
behaviorat one pole
and purealtruismat the other.Utilizingsuch a continuum
in research
wouldlet individuals
self-select
theirmedianbehavioralposition;it also
at
wouldallow individualsto moveto varyingspotson thecontinuum
andexterdifferent
on changesinbothinternal
pointsintime,depending
nalfactorsthatmayinfluence
theiraltruistic
behavior.62
59SeeMonroe(1994a,1994b).
someofwhichhas beentrans(1982,1987)workon identity,
'Janusz Reykowski's
exampleofthis.
latedintoEnglish,providesan important
ifhe or she had a rolemodeland thento
61Forexample,simplyto ask thealtruist
whetherwe all have role modelsand
withoutdetermining
concludethisis significant
wouldbe to drawconclusions
similar,
themessagestheyconveyto us areroughly
whether
thathavenotbeenfullytestedempirically.
discuss.
factorstheinteractionists
62Thiswoulddetectthekindofpsychological

888
Finally,withinthisgeneralcontext,use of quantitative
and freeflowinginterviewsshouldbe encouraged.I have alreadyarguedthat
scholarsanalyzingaltruismshouldtryto understand
the individual's
worldview,particularly
howtheindividual
sees him-orherself
inrelation
to others.Such a concernmayhelpus understand
notjust thealtruisticlikeactionsof theself-interested
rationalactorbelovedby economists,
biologists,and psychologists
but also the kindof altruistic
personality
theOlinersfound,peoplewhomaynotfitso easilyintotheindividualistic
patternon whicheconomics,psychology,
and evolutionary
biologyare
based. If used withcare,theuse offree-flowing
interviews,
stories,and
narratives-asopposed to predesigned
surveys-and the self-selection
emphasisofthecontinuum
shouldfacilitate
detection
ofthisworldview
and minimizethe likelihoodof imposingthe analysts'own cognitive
worldviewon a subject.63
Conclusion
In thisarticle,I have arguedthataltruism

is morethanjust an intertobe explainedthrough
estingempirical
phenomenon
thedominant
theoriesineconomics,evolutionary
biology,andpsychology.
Altruism
should
be used as an analyticaltool by whichwe can examineand refinethe
and notethelimitations
oftheseexisting
strengths
theoriesthat
theories,
assumeself-interest
is thenormforhumanbehavior.Suchtheoriesform
the core of economics,evolutionary
biology,and psychology;
through
rationalchoicetheorytheyhavemadea significant
intellectual
impactin
politicalscience.An analysisof altruism
therefore
has criticalimplicationsforseveralsocial and humansciences.
To examinealtruism
substantively
andthentotreatitas an analytical
toolused to explicateexisting
theoriesbased on self-interest,
I reviewed
theliterature
on altruism
foundin economics,evolutionary
biology,and
Whilemuchofthisworkis excellent,it suffers
psychology.
fromseveral
limitations
thatariseat leastin partbecauseoffourfactors.
limitations,
and self-interest
First,analyststreataltruism
as dichotomous
ratherthan
continuous
variables.Thisresultsin lumping
related-butanatogether
and empirically
lytically
distinct-forms
ofaltruistic-like
behavior(such
as helping,giving,and sharing)intoone categoryand callingit all altruism. This conceptualvaguenessthenresultsin empiricalfindings
that
appearcontradictory.
is definedso narrowly
Second,altruism
thatitexcludesfruitful
discussionofformsof altruism
thatincludeself-sacrifice,
behaviorthatclearlyexistsamongless cognitively
developedanimalsas
runstheriskofhaving
technique
notesthatsuchan interview
63GregBrunkcorrectly
theoppositeeffect.

889
ofaltruism
critiques
wellas amonghumanbeings.Third,thepredominant
the
individual
as
the
basic
actor,a
an
commitment
to
ideological
contain
to
the
identithat
blinds
of
shifting
often
importance
analysts
commitment
ties, especiallygroupand social identities.And fourth,all but a few
inofcognitive-perceptual
ignoretheimportance
discussionsofaltruism
inrelahowactorsperceivethemselves
particularly
fluences
on altruism,
from
significantly
differ
theseperceptions
tionto others.For altruists,
assumedby economists,
actorstraditionally
thoseof the self-interested
It is because these
Darwinianbiologists,and Freudianpsychologists.
setand delineatetherangeofchoiceoptionswe find
identity
perceptions
based so exclusively
ofothersthatdisciplines
availablein ourtreatment
ofaltruism.
explanations
can offeronlylimited
on individual
self-interest
approachthatmayprovemost
I believeit is the cognitive-perceptual
altruism.This approachshouldbe exploredmore
usefulin explicating
socialtheoriesthatallow
workas we attempt
to construct
fullyinfuture
ethicalpoliticalbehaviorrepresented
morefullyforthekindofimportant
by altruism.64
Manuscriptsubmitted17 November 1993
Final manuscriptreceived28 February 1994
REFERENCES
New York:Basic Books.
Axelrod,Robert.1984.TheEvolutionofCooperation.
Axelrod,Robert,and W. D. Hamilton.1981."The Evolutionof Cooperation."Science
25:306-18.
New York:AMS Press.
Baldwin,JamesMark.1983.HandbookofPsychology.
of
Baron,Lawrence.1992."The DutchnessofDutchRecovers:The NationalDimension
Altruism." In Embracing the Other: Philosophical, Psychological, and Historical
ed. PearlM. Olineret al. NewYork:NewYorkUniversity

inAltruism,
Perspectives
Press.
Bartlett,F. C. 1932. Remembering:A Studyin Experimentaland Social Psychology.New
York:Macmillan.
Batson, C. Daniel. 1991. The AltruismQuestion: Toward a Social Psychological Answer.
Hillsdale,NJ:Erlbaum.
Chap. 12,in TheEconomicApBecker,Gary.1976a."A Theoryof Social Interaction."
proach to Human Behavior. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press.
Egoism,and GeneticFitness:Economicsand Sociobiology."

. 1976b."Altruism,
Chap. 13, in The Economic Approach to Human Behavior. Chicago: Universityof
ChicagoPress.
Blau, Peter Michael. 1964. Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: Wiley.
Bridgeman,Diane L. 1983. The Nature of Prosocial Development. New York: Academic
Press.
64I presentsucha theory

in Monroe(1994a,1994b).

890
PersecuResisting
andtheMoralValueofReasoning:
Blum,LawrenceA. 1992."Altruism
tion,Racism, and Genocide." In Embracingthe Other:Philosophical,Psychological,
and Historical Perspectives in Altruism,ed. Pearl M. Oliner et al. New York: New
Press.
YorkUniversity
Bruner,Jerome.1988.ActualMinds,Possible Worlds.Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
Press.
Press.
HarvardUniversity
. 1990.ActsofMeaning.Cambridge:
Buchanan,James. 1975. "The Samaritan'sDilemma." In Altruism,Morality,and Economic
ed. EdmundS. Phelps.New York:RussellSage Foundation.

Theory,
Calabresi, Guido. 1975. "Comment." In Altruism,Morality,and Economic Theory,ed.
EdmundS. Phelps.New York:RussellSage Foundation.

AnnualReviewofAnAnthropology."
Casson,RonaldW. 1983."Schematain Cognitive
thropology12:429-62.
Comte, Auguste. [1830-42] 1975. Course of Positive Philosophy.Paris: Hermann.
Cronin, Helena. 1991. The Ant and the Peacock: Altruismand Sexual Selection from
ofCambridge.
Darwinto Today.New York:PressSyndicateoftheUniversity
Cropsey,Joseph. 1977. Political Philosophyand theIssues ofPolitics. Chicago: University
ofChicagoPress.
Data." In Personal
ofSchemasin Naturalistic
D'Andrade,Roy. 1994."The Identification
Schemas and Maladaptive InterpersonalBehavior Patterns,ed. JonMardi Horowitz.
ofChicagoPress.
Chicago:University
Press.
Dawkins,Richard.1976.TheSelfishGene.New York:OxfordUniversity
Dworkin,Ronald. 1978. "Liberalism." In Public and Private Morality,ed. Stuart
Press.
University
Cambridge
Cambridge:
Hampshire.
Eisenberg, Nancy. 1986. AltruisticEmotion, Cognition, and Behavior. Hillside, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Press.
University
Cambridge
Elster,Jon,ed. 1986.TheMultipleSelf.Cambridge:
Etzioni, Amitai. 1988. The Moral Dimension: TowardA New Economics. New York: Free
Press.
. 1993. The Spiritof Community:Rights,Responsibilities,and the Communitarian
Agenda.New York:Crown.
Fiske,Susan T., and PatriciaW. Linville.1980."WhatDoes theSchemaConceptBuy
Us?" Personalityand Social PsychologyBulletin6:543-57.
andExtensions."JourCorrections
or Altruism:
BruceD. 1975."Self-Interest
Fitzgerald,
nal of ConflictResolution 19:462-78.
Fogelman,Eva. 1994.Conscienceand Courage.New York:AnchorBooks.

Reason. New York:Norton.
Frank,RobertH. 1988.Passionswithin
ofConflict
Journal
WhatDifference?"
orAltruism:
Norman.1974."Self-Interest
Frohlich,
Resolution 18:55-73.
. 1975. "Comments in Reply." Journalof ConflictResolution 19:480-83.
Leo. 1987.TheRescueoftheDanishJews.New York:New YorkUniversity

Goldberger,
Press.
Harsanyi, John C. 1976. Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and ScientificExplanation.
Boston:D. Reidel.
Netherlands;
Dordrecht,
ofHaving
The Importance
Jack.1977."Shakespearevs. Beckeron Altruism:
Hirshleifer,
the Last Word." Journalof Economic Literature15:500-02.
. 1981. Scarcity, Self-Interest,Spontaneous Order. Los Angeles: Departmentof
at Los Angeles.
ofCalifornia
Economics,University
Journal
Relationship."
BehaviorandtheParent-Child
MartinL. 1975."Altruistic
Hoffman,
of Personalityand Social Psychology31:937-43.

89I
Bulletin
. 1977."Sex Differences
inEmpathy
andRelatedBehaviors."Psychological
84:712-22.
. 1989."Empathy,Social Cognition,
and MoralAction."In MoralBehaviorand
Development: Advances in Theory,Research, and Applications, ed. William M.
Kurtines
andJacobL. Gewirtz.Hillsdale,NJ:Erlbaum.
Homans, George C. 1961. Social Behavior: Its ElementaryForms. New York: Harcourt,
BraceandWorld.
Hume, David. [1750] 1939.A TreatiseofHuman Nature. London: OxfordUniversityPress.
New York:Holt.
James,William.1893.Psychology.
underUncertainty:
Kahneman,
Daniel,Paul Slovic,and AmosTversky.1982.Judgment
University
Press.
Heuristics
and Biases. New York:Cambridge
Kelly, George Alexander. 1955. The Psychology of Personal Constructs. New York:
Norton.
Lawrence.1984.Essayson MoralDevelopment.
Vol. 2. New York:Harperand
Kohlberg,
Row.
Kohn, Alfie. 1990. The BrighterSide of Human Nature: Altruismand Empathyin Everyday
Life.New York:Basic Books.

1983."Altruism
and Efficiency."
Ethics94:18-65.
Kolm,Serge-Christophe.
of the Conceptand a Reviewof the
Krebs,Dennis. 1970."Altruism:An Examination
Literature." Psychological Bulletin73:258-302.
toAltruism."
InAltruism,
Sympathy,
Developmental
Approach
. 1978."A Cognitive
and Helping,ed. LaurenWispe.New York:AcademicPress.
An Evaluation."Ethics92:447. 1982."PsychologicalApproachesto Altruism:
58.
ofAltruistic
PersonalKrebs,DennisL., andFrankvanHesteren.1992."The Development
ity." In Embracing the Other:Philosophical, Psychological, and HistoricalPerspec-
Press.
ed. PearlM. Olineret al. New York:New YorkUniversity
tivesinAltruism,
Lakoff,George. 1987. Women,Fire, and Dangerous Things. Chicago: Universityof Chi-
cago Press.
Lopreato, Joseph. 1984. Human Nature and Biocultural Evolution. London: Allen and
Unwin.
Altruism:
A Comparison
ofVariousModels."PolitiLosco,Joseph.1986."Understanding
cal Psychology7:323-48.
Lumsden, Charles J., and Edward 0. Wilson. 1983. PrometheanFire: Reflectionson the
HarvardUniversity
Press.
OriginsofMind.Cambridge:
Maclntyre, Alisdair. 1984. AfterVirtue:A Study in Moral Theory.2d ed. Notre Dame:
ofNotreDame.
University
of ChicagoPress.
Chicago:University
Mansbridge,
Jane,ed. 1990.BeyondSelf-Interest.
Margolis, Howard. 1982. Selfishness,Altruism,and Rationality.Cambridge: Cambridge
Press.
University
. 1987. Patterns, Thinking,and Cognition:A Theoryof Judgment.Chicago: Univer-
sityofChicagoPress.
NJ:Van Nostrand.
ofBeing.Princeton,
Maslow,AbrahamH. 1962.Towarda Psychology
Maudler, Jean Matler. 1984. Stories, Scripts, and Scenes: Aspects of Schema Theory.
Hillsdale,NJ:Erlbaum.
and theTheoryofRationalAction:Rescuers
Monroe,KristenRenwick.1990."Altruism
ofJewsin Nazi-Europe."Ethics101:103-22.
ofCalifornia
. 1991a."A Different
University
WayofSeeingThings."Manuscript,
at Irvine.
, ed. 1991b. The Economic Approach to Politics. New York: HarperCollins.

892
anda Cognitive-Perceptual
. 1994a."But WhatElse CouldI Do?: Choice,Identity,
15:201-26.
TheoryofEthicalPoliticalBehavior."PoliticalPsychology
and Social Theory.Princeton:
. 1994b.JohnDonne's People: Altruism,Self-Interest,
Press.
University
Princeton
and the
1990."Altruism
Monroe,KristenR., MichaelC. Barton,and Ute Klingemann.
TheoryofRationalAction:AnAnalysisofRescuersofJewsinNazi Europe."Ethics
101:103-22.
of ChicagoPress.
Myers,Milton.1983.TheSoul ofEconomicMan. Chicago:University
Press.
Oxford:Clarendon
ofAltruism.
Nagel,Thomas.1970.ThePossibility
Oliner,PearlM., SamuelP. Oliner,LawrenceBaron,LawrenceA. Blum,DennisL. Krebs,
theOther.NewYork:NewYork
eds. 1992.Embracing
andM. ZuzannaSmolenska,
Press.
University
New York:FreePress.
Personality.
Oliner,Samuel,andPearlOliner.1988.TheAltruistic
Parsons, Talcott. 1969. Politics and Social Structure.New York: Free Press.
Phelps, Edmund S., ed. 1975. Altruism,Morality, and Economic Theory. New York:
RussellSage Foundation.
Piaget, Jean. 1948. The Moral Developmentof the Child. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
New York:AcademicPress.
Intervention.
Piliavan,JaneAllyn.1981.Emergency
Quinn, Naomi, and Dorothy Holland. 1987. Cultural Models in Language and Thought.
Press.
University
New York:Cambridge
Press.
ofJustice.London:OxfordUniversity
Rawls,John.1973.A Theory
andHelpofPro-socialBehavior."In Cooperation
Janusz.1982."Motivation
Reykowski,
ing Behavior: Theories and Research, ed. Valerian J. Derlaga and Janusz Grzelak.
Manuscript,
The Role of Extensivity."
of HelpingMotivation:
. 1987."Activation
PolishAcademyofScience.
Rumelhart,David E. 1986. Parallel DistributedProcessing: Explorationsin theMicrostructureof Cognition.Cambridge:MIT Press.

Sandel, Michael J. 1982. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge
Press.
University
Schwartz,Barry. 1986. The Battlefor Human Nature. New York: Norton.
theOther:
andMorality."In Embracing
Seidler,VictorJ. 1992."Rescue,Righteousness,
Philosophical, Psychological, and Historical Perspectives in Altruism,ed. Pearl M.
Press.
Olineret al. New York:New YorkUniversity
of EcoSen, Amartya.1977."RationalFools: A Critiqueof theBehavioralFoundations
nomic Theory." Philosophyand Public Affairs6:317-44.
MIT Press.
Vols. 1-2. Cambridge:
A. 1982.ModelsofBoundedRationality.
Simon,Herbert
Smith,Adam.[1776]1902.TheWealthofNations.New York:Collier.
. 1853. The Theoryof Moral Sentiments.London: HenryG. Bohn.
Influences
Staub,Ervin.1980."Social and ProsocialBehavior:Personaland Situational
and Their Interactions." In Personality:Basic Aspects and CurrentResearch, ed.
NJ:Prentice-Hall.
ErvinStaub.EnglewoodCliffs,
ParentalSocialization,
. 1992."The OriginsofCaring,Helping,andNonaggression:
theOther:PhiloInEmbracing
Influence."
theFamilySystem,Schools,andCultural
sophical, Psychological, and Historical Perspectivesin Altruism,ed. Pearl M. Oliner
Press.
et al. New York:New YorkUniversity
Tannen, Deborah. 1990. You JustDon't Understand: Women and Men in Conversation.
New York:Morrow.
Taylor, Charles. 1989. Sources of the Self: The Making of theModern Identity.Cambridge:
Press.
HarvardUniversity

893
Titmuss,RichardMorris. 1971. The GiftRelationship:From Human Blood to Social Policy.
New York:PantheonBooks.
Tonnies, Ferdinand. 1957. Communityand Association [Gemeinschaftund Gesellschaft],
trans.CharlesP. Loomis.East Lansing:MichiganStateUniversity

Press.
Robert.1971."The EvolutionofReciprocalAltruism."
Trivers,
ReviewofBiolQuarterly
ogy 46:35-57.
Tullock, Gordon. 1975. In Altruism,Morality, and Economic Theory,ed. Edmund S.
Phelps.New York:RussellSage Foundation.

Valavanis,Stefan.1958."The Resolution
ofConflict
WhenUtilities
Interact."Journalof
ConflictResolution 212:156-69.
Vygotskii,Lev Semenovich. 1978.Mind in Society: TheDevelopmentofHigherPsychologi-
cal Processes.Cambridge:
HarvardUniversity
Press.
Beatrice.1983."Childrenin Six Cultures."In TheNatureofProsocialDevelopWhiting,
ment,ed. Diane L. Bridgeman.
Wilson,Edward0. 1975.Sociobiology.
Cambridge:
HarvardUniversity
Press.
R. 1981."It Pays to Do Good,butNot MoreGood ThanIt Pays." Journalof
Wintrobe,
Economic Behavior and Organization2:201-13.
Wispe, Lauren G. 1978. Altruism,Sympathy,and Helping: Psychological and Sociological
Principles.


Understanding Altruism Through Its Treatment in Social Sciences

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Understanding Altruism Through Its Treatment in Social Sciences

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

A Fat Lady in a Corset: Altruism and Social Theory

Author(s): Kristen Renwick Monroe

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

A Fat Lady in a Corset: Altruismand

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL THEORY

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

fromThomasHobbes and AdamSmithto CharlesDarwin

It has reis discussedby scholarsin manydiversefields.9

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL THEORY

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL THEORY

The economicapproachto altruism

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL THEORY

portunitiesand 'family' consumption,instead of their own income or

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL THEORY

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL THEORY

mustgetpleasurefromothers'happiness,or else theywouldnotbehave

thatWilsonis citedby Beckeras defining

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

Becker'sis nottheonlyexampleofan economist

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL THEORY

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL THEORY

A moreinnovativerecentapproachto cultureis demonstrated

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

costs of doing so are viewed as prohibitive....

In such situations,the altruismis abortive

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL THEORY

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL THEORY

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL THEORY

If I am correctin arguingthateconomics,biology,and psychology

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

This approachoriginatedin the same puzzle thatbaffledSmith,

48Myconcernhereis onlyto avoidunseemly

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL THEORY

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL THEORY

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

In thisarticle,I have arguedthataltruism

This content downloaded from 147.91.1.45 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:08:50 PM

ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL THEORY

ed. PearlM. Olineret al. NewYork:NewYorkUniversity

Bartlett,F. C. 1932. Remembering:A Studyin Experimentaland Social Psychology.New

Batson, C. Daniel. 1991. The AltruismQuestion: Toward a Social Psychological Answer.