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Middle East Dilemma from the

Caliphate to Open-Source Jihad


By
Mohamed N. El-Guindy
Cybercrime Expert & TV Presenter
www.netsafe.me | www.mohamedelguindy.com
elguindy@ieee.org | elguindy@bcs.org

www.facebook.com/drelguindy
http://eg.linkedin.com/in/elguindy
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https://issa.academia.edu/drelguindy
http://www.pinterest.com/drelguindy

Originally published in VFAC Review (January-February 2014)


www.cybercrimeforum.org

Middle East Dilemma from the Caliphate to Open Source Jihad


Jihad for Allah is not limited to the specific region of the Islamic countries, since the Muslim homeland is
one and is not divided, and the banner of Jihad has already been raised in some of its parts, and it shall
continue to be raised, with the help of Allah, until every inch of the land of Islam will be liberated, the
State of Islam1 will be established2
-Mustafa Mashhur3

Introduction
Since 2008, the Internet and cyberspace tools were the most important sources of dissenting opinion4 in
Middle East and second to private media such as Aljazeera. Thence, it played crucial role in the uprisings
that took place in MENA region since Tunisian uprising in 2010. Although these uprisings helped people
organize, communicate and collaborate to topple their authoritarian governments, it didnt succeed in
solving any critical issue or changing society culture. Due to the lack of leadership in the so called Arab
Spring protests, Middle East witnessed the reign of more organized Islamist groups in Tunisia5, Egypt6
and Libya7 and they effectively hijacked the goals of those protest. In this context, Ambassador Marc
Ginsberg stated:
While radical Islam is not part of the narrative, Islamist parties are going to gain more influence because the real
economic grievances cannot be addressed by youth movements. And, there's not enough money among the non-oil
producing countries to fulfill the economic and social grievances that gave the youth the power to cause these
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revolts in the first place.

Due to many reasons, failure of establishing the so called State of Islam by Islamists resulted in
dramatic increase in types of attacks and crimes committed against nation states, civilians, or
government facilities under the cloak of Jihad to establish the so called Caliphate9. Subsequently,
this chaotic environment in the region fueled guerrilla warfare, proxy wars, politically motivated attacks,
and terrorism. But this time, the latter is based on the dangerous ideologies of the 13th century
employed with the 21st century technologies.

Although accurate meaning may differ, State of Islam and Caliphate might be used interchangeably
Translated excerpt from the Arabic book Jihad is the way by Mustafa Mashhur
3
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Mashhur was the 5 Muslim brotherhood supreme guide and one of the most important authors (1921- 2002)
4
Mapping the Arabic Blogosphere, Berkman Center for Internet and Society, 2009:
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/2009/Mapping_the_Arabic_Blogosphere
5
Al-Nahda Party established by Rashid al-Ghannushi in the early 1980s (Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia)
6
Presidency of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (from 30 June 2012 to 3 July 2013)
7
Islamist failed to control Libya but all major forces on the ground are radical movements (Muslim Brotherhoods
Justice and Construction Party and Islamic militias who are fighting each other until the moment)
8
http://apcoworldwide.com/content/viewpoints/audio/middle_east_qa.aspx
9
A term used to describe the Islamic Empire or (unity of the entire Islamic community ruled by single leader, the
Caliph)
2

Although terrorists started to use the internet as a new medium for Jihad since 9/11, they relied
heavily on cyberspace after Arab uprisings. Indeed, information and communications technology helped
both open-source revolutions and open-source conflicts, such as cyber terrorism and the so called
cyber Jihad. Nevertheless, the availability of 21st century technologies in a region that has low
technological competences10 combined with higher rates of unemployed youth, political, economic
social and religious problems will result in uncertain future and a more volatile region.
1. Understanding the roots
To begin understanding the new phenomenon of Cyber Jihad or Open-source Jihad, one must have a
working knowledge of Muslim history and early conflicts in Islam. Although this topic is very large and
beyond the scope of this research, I will deal with major historical events and people that shaped the
meaning of radical Islamic ideology behind modern terrorism. Without this understanding, security
analysts, intelligence officers, investigators and law enforcement agencies wont be able to cope with
the new decentralized and leaderless terrorism11 or Open-source Jihad.
1.1. Religious conflicts and the end of Caliphate
One of the most important conflicts that took place in Islamic history was the long-running dispute between
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Muawiyah Ibn Abi Sufyan and Ali Ibn Abi Talib that led to whats known as First Fitna or the first Islamic civil
war. Without going further into the details of this conflict, I can honestly say that it was the biggest political
conflict in Islamic history which hit the unity of Muslims forever. This dispute followed by another one called the
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2 Fitna which led to Battle of Karbala in Iraq area. This battle was a tragic one as it witnessed the killing of
Hussein Ibn Ali, the grandson of Prophet Muhammad, and marked the beginning of (Party of Ali) or Shiite sect. This
political dispute followed by several Islamic civil wars divided Muslim world into Shiites and Sunni sects which later
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divided into other sects such as Kharijites and Rafida .
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These civil wars can be traced back to the death of Prophet Muhammad which sparked the dispute over his
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succession and the beginning of Muslim Caliphate . Since Prophet Muhammad didnt put special decree on how
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his succession will be, dispute broke out on how the successor will be chosen . In this conflict, each party used his
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own interpretation of Quran to support his decision on choosing the right one to occupy the Prophets place.

10

Most MENA countries can be identified as Technology consumers. See German Institute of Global and Area
Studies (GIGA), Technological Readiness in the Middle East and North Africa, 2010
11
Leaderless Jihad is a concept articulated by Marc Sageman which sparked long debate in terrorism studies. See
Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century
12
Muawiyah I in Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muawiyah_I
13
Ali Ibn Abu Talib in Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_ibn_Abu_Talib
14
Battle of Karbala in Wikipedia
15
Khawarij in Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khawarij
16
See Rafida in Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rafida
17
For more information: Islam and Politics, By John L. Esposito, Syracuse University Press
18
Diana Steigerwald: "Ali Ibn Abi Talib", Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim world; vol.1. MacMillan
19
Madelung, W. The Succession to Muhammad, Cambridge University Press, 1997
20
Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, Tabari volume 5

Islamic history is full of many mistakes and conflicts under the banner of Jihad that are, without a doubt, rooted
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to the old conflict between Ali and Muawiyah on who will be the Caliph. Subsequent political-religious conflicts
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weakened the Caliphate , especially the Abbasid Caliphate , which declined after its Golden Age in Al-Andalus
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followed by the invasion of Mongol , Mameluks of Egypt and the Ottoman Turks.
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The fall of Abbasid Caliphate resulted in the decline of Arab-Islamic Caliphate and the rise of Ottoman Caliphate ,
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which played an important role in Middle East politics until its end in 1922 . The defeat of Ottoman Empire in
WWI and creation of secular Turkey in 1924 had officially ended the last Islamic Caliphate and the title of Caliph.
The downfall of Ottoman Caliphate was exploited by Britain and France to create the new borders of Middle East
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according to Sykes-Picot agreement and other proxy wars and treaties .
1.2. Illusion of the Caliphate in the 20th century
Although Ottoman Caliphate and the Caliph were not Arabic, it was symbolic and spiritual icon for Muslims all over
the world. Thus, its downfall was a tragic event for most Muslim spiritual leaders in Middle East. At this point, the
dispute over Islamic Caliphate arose again between those who wanted to protect the Caliphate as part of Muslim
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belief and those who see that the Caliphate is nothing related to Islam . This situation was part of new political
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and ideological trends emerged in Egypt and other Arab countries . The issue of the Caliphate was a long political,
religious, and social dispute among educated Egyptians in this period, especially after the Unilateral Declaration of
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Egyptian Independence in 1922. Egyptian Nationalists saw this idea as against Egyptian independence and
modernization. On the other side, Islamic scholars and Salafist Azhar Ulama such as Sheikh Muhammad Al33
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Zawahiri and the Salafist thinker Rashid Rida were believed of Islamic unity under Islamic State. At this time,
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Britain had declared that the restoration of Caliphate is a religious issue, in which Britain would not interfere . At
this time, there were two different ideologies on restoring the so called Caliphate, the ideology of Al-Azhar in
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Egypt and the radical Saudi-Wahhabi alliance led by Ibn Saud in Hejaz . Indeed, both ideologies were nothing but
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For more information, read Taha Hussein (1947) Al-Fitna al-Kubr (Arabic Book)
The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline and Fall, from Original Sources, Sir William Muir
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Abbasid lasts from (750 1258)
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Arabic name for modern Spain (witnessed the rise of Islamic Philosophers and thinkers like Averroes)
25
See Siege of Baghdad (1258) in Wikipedia
26
The Georgian Mameluks in Egypt by Alexander Mikaberidze:
http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/organization/c_mameluks1.html
27
THE OTTOMAN SULTNS AND CALIPHS, 1290-1924 AD: http://www.friesian.com/turkia.htm
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See Mustafa Kemal Atatrk in Wikipedia.
29
Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958, D. K. Fieldhouse: published 2008,
chapter 2, War and Partition of Ottoman Empire, 19141922
30
Al-Islam Wa Usul Al-Hukm or Islam and the Foundations of Governance: Research on the Caliphate and
Governance in Islam a Book by Ali Abdel Raziq (1888-1966)
31
For more details about this period and competing ideological trends, see Political trends in Contemporary Arab
Politics by Majid Khadoury, John Hopkins University Press 1973
32
The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism by Jamal Mohammed Ahmed, Oxford University press, London
1960
33
Al-Azhar Imam and Grandfather of Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the current Al-Qaeda leader
34
Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865- 1935), teacher of Hassan Al-Banna of Muslim Brotherhood
35
Islam Assembled by Martin Kramer, Columbia University Press 1986, pp 86
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Wahhabism traced back to Islamic radical group established by Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab in 18 century in
Najd. They claimed they have the only correct interpretation of Sunni Islam (or Salafism). For details on this radical
ideology, refer to document released by US Department of Defense The Emergence of Wahhabism and its
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political-religious dispute on who will be the representative of Islam in Muslim world. The dispute ended up by the
succession of the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance, supported by Britain, to control the Holy Land and legitimize Ibn Saud
rule over Hejaz but didnt solve the Caliphate dispute.
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The restoration of the Caliphate was one of the main reasons for Hassan Al-Banna to form Al-Ikhwan AlMuslimun or Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. As terrorism starts with an idea, Al-Banna was affected by the
ideological disputes between those who were looking to the East as the sign of Islam and those who were looking
to the West as the sign of modernization. For a religious young man such as Al-Banna, this intellectual climate
formed his ideas. He even expressed these thoughts and emphasized that:
...Leadership of the world started from the East, and then moved to the West. Now, its time for the East to rise
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again
Al-Banna later shaped his own radical and confusing ideology and believed that elder scholars lacked the complete
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vision of Islam ; therefor they failed to restore the Caliphate. Indeed, his ideology of the utopian Islamic State was
the hope to re-establish the Caliphate which is the only correct model of the state in the world. This ideology later
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adopted by all radical Islamic groups that appeared in the 20 century to date. Based on Al-Bannas radical
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ideology, his follower Sayyid Qutb , shaped the most radical meaning of Jihad to establish the Islamic State. In
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addition to Al-Banna, Qutb influenced by Abu Al-Ala Mawdudis ideology, in which Jihad includes the
overthrow of government if its separated from God. Qutb also envisioned the upcoming battle between Islam
and the West, and he wrote that the battle would be part of Jihad, which is based on the ideology of Hassan AlBanna. Al-Banna, Qutb, and Mawdudi are the intellectual gurus of all radical Islamist organizations around the
world. Ironically, their ideology of waging war or jihad to enforce the Sharia or Gods law is based on the
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philosophy of the radical Salafi scholar, Ibn Taymiya in the 13 century.
1.3. What does Jihad mean?
In Arabic language, Jihad means to strive or exert oneself. But to justify additional meanings mentioned in both
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Quran and Hadith , Islamic scholars have distinguished between the greater Jihad and lesser Jihad. They
describe greater Jihad as the spiritual struggle against ones ego; it is the personal struggle each Muslim wages to
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be a true believer and follower. This meaning might be obvious in Sufism .
Although scholars describe the lesser Jihad as the war in the cause of Islam, they urge that this does not permit
acts of war anytime, anywhere because there are strict conditions to apply this concept.

Historical Roots, link on Federation of American Scientist: http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/iraqi/wahhabi.pdf and


Delong-Bas, Natana J., Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, Oxford University Press.
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The Holy Land of Mecca and Medina in current Saudi Arabia
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Sheikh Hasan Ahmed Abdel Rahman Muhammed al-Banna (14 October 1906 12 February 1949)
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Translated excerpt from The Three Messages by Hassan Al-Banna
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Muzakerat Al-Dawa Wa Al-Daya by Hassan Al-Banna
41
See THE THOUGHT OF SAYYID QUTB, Luke Loboda, Ashbrook
42
Abu al-A'la Mawdudi (1903-79): the Indian and later Pakistani thinker. He was the first Islamist writer to
approach jihad systematically. See
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Ibn Taymiya (1268-1328), see Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern
Politics, enlarged ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 101
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Report of the deeds and sayings of Prophet Muhammad


See Sufism by Dr. Alan Godlas, University of Georgia: http://islam.uga.edu/Sufism.html

Nevertheless, modern-day Islamists have mocked the interpretation of greater jihad and employed the lesser
Jihad as the only meaning for Jihad to wage war against the indel until it accepts Islam or prepares to pay a
tribute. This interpretation of radical Islamist will drive us back to the ideology of Ibn Taymiya. But the
disagreement among Muslims over the interpretation of jihad is deeply rooted in the diversity of Islamic thought
which made the term confusing even among Muslims.
The doctrine of armed Jihad against non-Muslim enemies or even Muslims with different ideologies would
take us back to the three radical Islamists mentioned earlier, Al-Banna, Mawdudi and Qutb. This trio brought the
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ideologies of Communism , Fascism and Nazism in Europe to the meaning of Jihad in the Middle East. Their
ideologies even evolved into a death cult, where the highest level of Islamic worship is to die and leave this satanic
world. This blend of Jihad and death cult formed the manic idea of the so called martyrdom, which adopted
by so many brainwashed young Muslims.
1.4. Jihad as Holy war in Modern Times

For centuries, Muslims have fought each other and called this Jihad or Holy War. Each party
interpreted the Jihad according to his thoughts that can be rooted back to the early Islamic civil war
between Muawiyah and Ali Ibn Abi Talib. One obvious example which still resonates to date is the conflict
between Sunni and Shiites sects in Iraq and all over the Middle East. Each party is calling the other Kafir or
Infidel; therefore Jihad must be waged against him to establish the correct Islamic State. Paradoxically, this
exploitation of Jihad for mobilizing people or masses to wage wars didnt succeed in solving conflicts but created
more chaos. The reasons are: not all Muslims are accepting the conception of Jihad as Holy War; and applying
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ideologies from the 13 century in modern times will not work. Nevertheless, Western Powers have learned to
exploit this conception for political gain as they believe that religion is a Trojan horse for Middle East, in which
anything could be hidden. One of the first attempts to exploit Jihad as holy war was the German-Turkish Jihad in
the twentieth century. During the WWI, Germans exploited the Islamic ideologies of Muslims in Ottoman Empire
in order to destroy the British Empire by attacking its colonies. Wilhelm II, the German Emperor was the engineer
of the Turkish-German Jihad against British in East colonies to control resources. Sean McMeekin, the author of
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The Berlin-Baghdad Express, called him the mythical Muslim Emperor of Germany or Hajji Wilhelm . In 1914,
Ottoman Empire declared an Islamic Holy War to fight beside central powers and Germany against the Allies.
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Indeed, this Holy War or Jihad was originally introduced in Germany by the Intelligence Bureau for the East ,
headed by Max von Oppenheim who did create plans to revolutionize the Islamic territories of British Empire.

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In his book Ma'alim fi al-Tariq or Milestones, Qutb adopted a Leninist-style revolutionary vanguard advocating
worldwide Islamic revolution.
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Muslim Brotherhood adopted most of Nazi party ideologies even translated Hitlers MEIN KAMPF to Arabic
with the title My Jihad and later worked with the Waffen-SS during WWII, see: Hitlers Shadow Nazi War
Criminals, U.S. Intelligence, and the Cold War. Published by the National Archives, Chapter two:
http://www.archives.gov/iwg/reports/hitlers-shadow.pdf
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More details on Muslims Brotherhood see Mitchell, Richard P., The Society of the Muslim Brothers, Oxford
University Press, 1993
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Sean McMeekin, The BerlinBaghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germanys Bid for World Power,
especially chapter II, German Holywar fever, p.85
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Hajji or the pilgrim who performs the Hajj or pilgrimage in Islam (one of the five pillars of Islam)
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In German Nachrichtenstelle fr den Orient, see Richard J. Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence:
British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire 1904-1924, published by Routledge 1995, pp. 175186

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Thereafter he made himself German Abu Jihad or the father of Islamic Holy War . Ironically, this Jihad ideology
ended up with the worst backfire on Ottomans and Germans. The Jihad campaign opened the door for Britain to
partition the Ottoman Empire and redrew the new boundaries of modern Middle East.
Other examples followed in modern times for exploiting Jihad as warfare by both Arab leaders and Western
Powers. For decades the US had secretly helped Jihadists and radical Muslim groups all over Middle East to quash
pro-communist groups. By the end of 1979, US started Operation Cyclone to support radical Islamists to wage
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Holy war against Infidel Russian troops in Afghanistan . Those radicals called Mujahedeen People who
practice Jihad. In 1980, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Adviser, appeared in a photo with Osama
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Bin Laden and declared:
We know of their deep belief in God, and we are confident that their struggle will succeed. That land over there is
yours. You will go back to it one day, because your fight will prevail and you'll have your homes and your mosques
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back again, because your cause is right and God is on your side.
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The secret operation also supported those fanatics by sponsoring the Madrassa and its textbooks, in which Jihad
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as warfare was delivered in addition to Sayyid Qutbs ideologies . In this context, Osama bin Laden studied Islam
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in Saudi Arabia under two Muslim Brotherhood members . Mohamed Qutb, brother of Sayyid Qutb and Abdullah
Azzam, major figure in the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Terrorism experts urge that the later was
the intellectual architect behind Jihad in Afghanistan.
Despite this holy war success in ending communist government and defeat of Russian troops, it brought Al-Qaeda,
Taliban, terrorism and chaos. Simply, it brought the genie that cannot be put back into the bottle.
During Iran-Iraq war in 1980s, the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran declared Jihad on Iraq and considered the war as a
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holy war and called for teenagers and children to volunteers for martyrdom missions . On the other side,
Saddam Hussein declared holy war against Iran and called Sunni countries to help him. The war fought for eight
years left countless numbers of dead and Jihad didnt solve the issue but made it worse. Later in 1990, when
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Saddam invaded Kuwait, Saudi highest cleric announced Jihad decree to all Muslims against Saddam Hussein.
In 2003, Saddam Hussein called on the Iraqi people to commit themselves to a holy war or Jihad against U.S. and
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British forces seeking his ouster . President Omar Al-Bashir backed with Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan is also
obvious example of exploiting Jihad as warfare which ended entirely in chaos and bloody conflicts which resulted

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For detailed story on Max von Oppenheim and his role in Pan-Islamism and Jihad, see Dschihad fr den
deutschen Kaiser or Jihad for the German Emperor, Spiegel Online:
http://einestages.spiegel.de/static/topicalbumbackground/6327/dschihad_fuer_den_deutschen_kaiser.html
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See America's Afghanistan War: The Success that Failed by Jagmohan Meher and also Holy War Inc. by Peter
Bergen, Free Press
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http://www.veteranstoday.com/2012/01/26/tidbits-what-is-being-held-back-from-you/brzezinski-binladen/
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http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/29/cp.00.html
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Islamic schools teaches subjects leading to graduation of clerics
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http://partners.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/20000625mag-taliban.html
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http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/01/afghanistan.terrorism3
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Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, Federation of American Scientists:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33038.pdf
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See Rawshandil, Jalil; Sharon Chadha, Jihad and international security. Macmillan.
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http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/20/world/war-in-the-gulf-muslims-saudis-decree-holy-war-on-hussein.html
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http://www.foxnews.com/story/2003/04/01/saddam-speech-read-on-iraqi-tv-by-information-minister/

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in partitioning of Sudan . Even during Muslim Brotherhoods rule in Egypt, Mohamed Morsi attended a
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conference to support Syria, in which most clerics announced Jihad to support Syrian jihadists and rebels . After
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Egyptian army ousted Morsi last July, al-Qaida and supporters of Muslim Brotherhood declared Jihad on antiMorsi Egyptians and the killings started. This situation will drive us back to Qutbs ideology from his own book,
Milestones; he wrote:
Any place where Islamic sharia is not enforced and where Islam is not dominant becomes the Home of Hostility
A Muslim will remain prepared to fight against it, whether it be his birth place or a place where his relatives reside
or where his property or any other material interests are located.
Conflicts based on Jihad as warfare are growing in Middle East countries, especially after the so called Arab
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Spring, which will result in more chaos, divisions, and bloodsheds as long as the illusion of Caliphate still
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resonate .
2.

Jihad as asymmetric warfare

In military, intelligence and political science, defining Jihad as asymmetrical conflict is a dilemma. As I mentioned
earlier, the problem with Jihad is its broader definitions that include warfare, terrorism, motivation, religious and
political ideologies. In contrast, there is no one definition to asymmetric warfare in addition to the lack of global
definition to terrorism at International level. Needless to say, what we consider as a terrorist may be considered
a freedom fighter by others. What a nation state considers terrorism might also be an asset for other countries.
That is great challenge when dealing with the so called Jihad as warfare. Since Jihadists believe they are at war
and they treat that war seriously, we should deal with their type of Jihad as asymmetrical warfare.
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Hinez Dinter defined asymmetric warfare as Asymmetric warfare is a set of operational practices aimed at
negating advantages and exploiting vulnerabilities rather than engaging in traditional force-on-force
engagements.
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Dr. Rod Thornton definition might be clearer asymmetric warfare is violent action undertaken by the have-nots
against the haves whereby they have-nots, be they state or sub-state actors, seek to generate profound effects -at
all levels of warfare (however defined), from tactical to strategic by employing their own specific relative
advantages against the vulnerabilities of a much stronger opponents.
The concept of asymmetry in warfare is not new and maybe the old work of Sun Tzu, The Art of War was the first
to use this tactic. More than 1500 years ago, he stated "All warfare is based on deception. When confronted with
an enemy one should offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates,
prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him." The tactic is simply based on finding asymmetry or weakness
in nation state which not always military, and then exploits it.

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http://sudanreeves.org/2008/09/13/chaos-by-design-khartoums-patterns-of-violence-in-darfur-2008/
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/74082.aspx
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http://www.meforum.org/3548/al-qaeda-jihad-morsi-egypt
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http://www.christianpost.com/news/violence-erupts-in-egypt-in-pro-morsi-march-calls-for-jihad-99462/
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http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/pakistani-taliban-praise-bin-laden-by-waging-jihad-for-thecaliphate/
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http://www.examiner.com/article/ayman-al-zawahiri-urges-jihadist-forces-syria-to-create-caliphate
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http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA395646
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Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and Response in the 21st Century by Rod Thornton
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Indeed, there are many other definitions to asymmetric warfare introduced by scholars such as guerilla warfare,
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unconventional wars and the theory of 4 Generation Warfare , which is not completely new and has profound
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and incurable flaws .
Despite utilizing the term Jihad to justify their cause in establishing the so called Islamic State, modern
Jihadists are influenced by this secular thinking in western military thoughts and strategies. In 2002, One of Al74
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Qaeda prominent thinkers, Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi , introduced an article on 4 generation warfare in Jihadist
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online magazine Al-Ansar . Al- Qurashi wrote also several articles and essays on guerilla warfare and quoted
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well-known leaders such as Mao, General Giap, Che Guevara, and Fidel Castro as well as American scholars . In
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2004, another Jihadist thinker who influenced by this secular strategy was Abu Bakr Naji . Naji wrote an important
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book called The management of savagery in which he emphasized on recruit and train guerrilla fighters and
urge all Jihadists to read and understand Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi articles on war and strategies. In addition, he
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emphasized on targeting facilities that will affect economy in infidel countries in addition to sensitive facilities
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such as oil, tourism etc. Furthermore, Naji stressed that targeting large group of police or military who has weak
management could be an advantage for Jihadists to attack and get their weaponry. According to his guidelines,
Jihadists should go to places where geography is an advantage, where Salafism has taken place, and where there is
a failed state. All strategies and tactics mentioned in Naji book are currently practiced by all Jihadists in Middle
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East .
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Jihadists have learned that secular thinking and western military strategies are a must to defeat the infidel
governments in their countries. But I argue that cyberspace as a new battlefield will change the theories of
warfare, enhance Jihadists strategies and tactic; therefore open-source Jihad will increase. Consequently, the next
generation Jihadists will be far more dangerous as far as they are fractionated.
3.

Jihad in the information age


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According to Human Security Report Project (HSRP) , the state-based armed conflicts decreased in mid 2000s and
its related deaths also have declined. Nevertheless, this trend is not positive as it is counterbalanced with worst
conflicts which are terrorism, non-state armed conflicts and Jihad. While these types of conflicts may be less lethal

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Understanding Fourth Generation War by William S. Lind: http://www.antiwar.com/lind/?articleid=1702


http://www.asymmetricconflict.org/blog/is-fourth-generation-warfare-really-new/
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4 Generation warfare has long debate, read Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths by Dr. Antulio J.
Echevarria II., US Army War College: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=632
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A pseudonym for a bin Laden adviser
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Al-Ansar magazine archive: http://www.tawhed.ws/c?i=325 check issue No.2 4 generation Warfare
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For more details, see Decoding Al-Qaeda's Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America by Ryan, Michael W. S.
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Unidentified person, may be a pseudonym
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Arabic version: http://www.e-prism.org/images/Idarat_al-Tawahhush_-_Abu_Bakr_Naji.pdf check English
translation here: http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of-savagery-themost-critical-stage-through-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf
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They call any country as Infidel as long as there is no Islamic governance on Salafi ideology.
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Ibid. 78, pp.19-20
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Attacking Egyptian army personnel who have weak management, far in Sinai desert, not professionally trained
on this type of guerilla warfare: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/12/ansar_jerusalem_the_1.php
82
Strategic notes by Abdullah Bin Muhammad published 2011: http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/abdallah-bin-mue1b8a5ammad-strategic-notes.pdf see also: http://www.tawhed.ws/c?i=321
83
Strategic study, Libya After Gadhafi by Al-Yaqeen Media Center: https://archive.org/details/Libya_After
84
http://hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/2012/text.aspx
72

than major wars in human history, its directed mainly against civilians in addition to violent confrontation against
nation states or a group of states. What makes these conflicts, especially Jihad, have much greater effect on
st
national security is the availability of ICTs and mass communications in the 21 century. Imagine a series of
terrorist attacks occurred in different sites around the country captured on TV and posted on the Internet. The
destabilization effect of such attacks, even with fewer casualties, can endanger the security of human and affect
state politics. For example, the attacks of 11 September 2001 had more destabilization effect than Vietnam War or
other state-based conflicts. Not surprisingly, its effects on politics still resonate to date.
When Al-Qaeda started in Afghanistan, there was no Internet. There were only Jihadist leaders and Madrassa in
addition to deep financial support. No idea, good or evil, will spread without leadership and financial support in
st
addition to the suitable environment. In the past, ideas took time and efforts to spread. But in the 21 century, the
Internet changed this equation of spreading ideas. Jihadist learned that propaganda is a must to success even if
they dont win the war. Its a proven and true method of psychological warfare.
85

In a letter to Mullah Mohamed Omar, Osama Bin laden said:


It is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of
the total preparation for the battles
Jihadists have applied the lesson to harness mass media by sophisticated and adaptive uses of new media
technologies and moved from physical space to cyberspace. After the collapse of Taliban in November 2001, AlQaeda didnt vanish but lost its haven in Afghanistan and became decentralized. Hamid Mir, Osama Bin Ladens
biographer, watched every second al Qaeda member carrying a laptop computer along with a Kalashnikov as
they prepared to scatter into hiding and exile. On the screens were photographs of Sept. 11 hijacker Mohamed
86
Atta.
They wanted the ideology to remain and a new version of leaderless Al-Qaeda with no hierarchical order will
emerge using new technologies.
87

The move from Afghanistan camps to cyberspace required an engineer . The man behind this ideology was Abu
88
89
Musab al-Suri who wrote his vision in a book entitled The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance . Although AlSuri was a member of Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and influenced by the ideology of Sayyid Qutb, he didnt
believe in waging Jihad from top by replacing the rulers of Middle East countries. In contrast, he designed his own
vision based on leaderless Jihad or individualized jihad. He described his ideology and future vision for Future
90
Salafi Jihadists to establish the Islamic State in over 1600 pages published on the Internet in 2004 . Al-Suri clearly
described in his book that Jihadists need to understand the importance of Information Technology,
85

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/AFGP2002-600321-Trans.pdf


86
Steven Coll and Susan B. Glassner, Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of Operations. August 2005
87
So many engineers, technicians and medicine doctors are among Jihadists:
http://orientemiedo.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/diego-gambetta-steffen-hertog-why-are-there-so-manyengineers-among-islamic-radicals.pdf
88
His real name is Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, born in Syria. For more details see The Master Plan by Lawrence
Wright, The New Yorker 2006
89
In Arabic Dawat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-alamiyyah if you know Arabic, just search the name and see
the number of URLs that share this book.
90
Check this Arabic version on Archive.org: https://ia700304.us.archive.org/1/items/The-call-for-a-global-Islamicresistance/The-call-for-a-global-Islamic-resistance.pdf

communications and electronics especially related to explosives. He wrote also that Information and
communications technology, mass media, and the Internet are promising and should be used as a new medium to
spread the ideology, gather information, and wage Jihad. Furthermore, he noted that targeting critical facilities
91
of ICT in infidel countries is vital in Jihad as it will shut down the entire country . That was the first Jihadist
92
to talk about Cyber Jihad . In his book, he stated that this guide is for the third generation mujahedeen, as he
called them. The Jihadists who will form the new Al-Qaeda as an ideology and will utilize the Internet for selflearning, and then they will use this knowledge to wage Jihad in their home countries.
Those third generation Mujahedeen, as Al-Suri predicted, will replace Al-Qaeda. Consequently, their Jihad will be
leaderless and waged by small groups rather than an organization. He believed that Al-Qaeda is not an
93
organization...it is a call, a reference, a methodology . With the spread of such vision on the Internet, the ideology
of Jihad as warfare or asymmetric terrorism became open-source and inspired other terrorist groups in Middle
East. Those small radical groups are challenging the security and existence of many Arab states and become even
94
transnational .
3.1. Online Mujahedeen: from theory to practice
The first dedicated online Jihad website was created by Babar Ahmed, a Pakistani-British Engineer studied at the
95
University of London and worked at Imperial College London . The website was Azzam.com which created in
honor of Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian who was Bin Ladens mentor and considered the father of Afghani
96
97
Jihad . Although other online activities such sending mails and coded messages were exploited by Al-Qaeda ,
98
the theories of Online Jihad didnt appear until the fall of Taliban and the rise of Bin Laden of the Internet ,
Anwar Al-Awlaki. He is also the father of English Jihadi propaganda, US-born Al-Qaeda member, Internet savvy,
and influent in many languages. In 2009, Al-Awlaki inspired the new generation of Jihadists with his long essay, 44
99
Ways to Support Jihad . Al-Awlaki expressed his thoughts to spread the Jihad ideology online and to wage Jihad
using the Internet. He coined the terms Internet Mujahedeen and WWW Jihad that include several ways:
-

Establishing discussion forums that offer a free, uncensored medium for posting information relating to
Jihad.
Establishing email lists to share information with interested brothers and sisters.
Posting or emailing Jihad literature and news.
Setting up websites to cover specific areas of Jihad, such as: Mujahedeen news, Muslim POWs, and Jihad
literature.
100

In 2010, Al-Awlaki with Samir Khan introduced another piece of radical open-source jihad publication, the
101
102
Inspire Magazine . This e-zine was published by AQAP in English language which was the de facto core of
91

Ibid. p.1389
Ibid.
93
Ibid. 77
94
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-rise-of-al-qaeda-in-syria
95
http://www.freebabarahmad.com/the-story/who-is-babar-ahmad
96
He was member of Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine: http://www.pwhce.org/azzam.html
97
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/aug/15/world/fg-cyberterror15/2
98
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-08-25-1A_Awlaki25_CV_N.htm
99
http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2009/02/16/10561.shtml
100
Both Samir Khan and Awlaki killed by drone attack in Yemen in 2011
101
https://archive.org/stream/InspireMagazine2/InspireMagazineIssue2#page/n0/mode/2up
102
Al-Qaeda in Arabia Peninsula
92

global open-source jihad. It helped other Jihadists to establish their own e-publications in several topics related
to Jihad from simple ideological articles to complex tactics and technical knowledge.
3.2. Open Source Jihad needs Open Source Tools
With the extensive use of the Internet, Jihadists started to realize the importance of exploiting Open-source
tools to wage Jihad. Cyberspace offers free information, much of it of interest to terrorist movements. Terrorists,
for instance, can learn from the Internet a wide variety of details about targets such as transportation facilities,
public buildings, airports, and law enforcement capabilities. According to media reports, a terrorist group linked to
103
Al-Qaeda published a guide to use Google for information gathering and data mining. The gathered data can be
104
used to deliver manuals or instructions for Mujahedeen in the battlefield. According to Gabriel Weimann ,
Jihadists are using open-source information as well as security analysts are doing. In a training manual captured in
105
Afghanistan this statement proved clearly that Jihadists have at least the basics of open-source intelligence :
"Using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80 percent of all
information required about the enemy."
In Middle East there is also extensive use of free available tools by Jihadists to plan their attacks. One obvious
106
107
example is using Google Earth to gather information and maps on their targets . Based on the ideology of
Open-source Jihad, Abu Qasura Al-Tunsi, a Jihadist traveled to Syria to fight with Al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat Al108
Nursa, noted: "He joined Jihad with no help but Allah and Google Earth." In 2007, British Army officials
discovered numerous Google Earth print-outs which showed in great detail buildings inside the British base in
109
Basra, Iraq .
Terrorists had used other web 2.0 technologies such as forums and blogs to share information, spread propaganda,
and communicate with fellow jihadists. In mid 2000s, online Al-Qaeda linked discussion forums started to spread
110
111
with the rise of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Irahbi007 and Abu Reuter . Online Jihadi forums, such as Shumukh al112
Islam , still provide a secure and protected environment for Jihadists and considered the main source of jihadists
materials and statements. But things started to change when social media fueled the Arab uprisings in 2010.
3.3. Social Mujahedeen
Extensive use of social media platforms in Middle East during the Arab Awakening increased number of users on
113
theses platforms, especially Facebook and Twitter. According to Arab social media report , total number of
Facebook users in the Arab world as of end of May 2013 is 54,552,875 up from 45,194,452 in June 2012. Egypt has
the highest number of Facebook users in the region with user penetration increased from 3.7% in 2010 to 16.2% in

103

The Jawa Report: Terrorists Launch Google Guide, 2006


http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/networks/terror-goes-online
105
80% of intelligence information came from public sources: http://www.fas.org/irp/fbis/studem.html
106
http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/osc071906.pdf
107
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3463966,00.html
108
http://www.memri.org/report/en/print7334.htm
109
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1539401/Terrorists-use-Google-maps-to-hit-UK-troops.html
110
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/25/AR2006032500020.html
111
http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/publications/journal/82/rogan.pdf
112
http://shamikh1.info/vb/
113
http://www.arabsocialmediareport.com
104

114

2013. This increase in social media users attracts also Jihadists and created new revolutionary haven for new
generation of Jihadists. After the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011, Al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups on the
Internet urged their followers and supporters to use all online communications tools to support and wage Jihad.
115

One of the well-known Jihad media outlets, Al-Fajr Media Center issued a declaration related to the death of
Osama Bin Laden and at the end of the statement they emphasized on Internet Jihad using new media. They stated
116
that Internet is a battlefield for Jihad and for Dawah . Furthermore, media jihadists should learn new skills on
how to exploit new media to defeat media wars of the infidels. In this context, Shumukh al-Islam published an
article on why to use twitter in Jihadi media instead of Facebook and other platforms. They stated that twitter is
much easier in spreading messages to million followers than Facebook. Its also more open, secure and doesnt
117
require private data. Later on, another statement issued by Al-Thabbat forum listed the most important Jihadi
accounts on Twitter. There has been a considerable increase in social media activities among the jihadi followers
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119
and sponsors . As evidenced by Jihadica.com , a clear majority of jihadi Twitter accounts were created in 2012,
simultaneous to the shift in nature of the Syrian crisis from peaceful protests to violent conflict.
Using Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and other social media tools, global jihadists can share their contribution of
jihadi media, literature, videos, and graphic arts. These free and open tools allowed even non-jihadists to
participate, engage and share their thoughts within global jihadi environment. The emergence of open-source
jihad created what so called online Jihadosphere, similar to Arabic blogosphere for activists.
The new generations of Jihadists are harnessing social media in propaganda, fundraising, recruitment and
communications as well as information gathering. They use social media to collect physical addresses, phone
numbers, and private information related to the target, such as family members and their connections. This
technique is widely used in Egypt by members of Muslim Brotherhood who are extensively using open-source tools
to gather information on police officers. Due to lack of security awareness in Middle East, many law enforcement
personnel and even army are using social media without covering their real identity and even sharing their private
120
photos and family connections that make them easy targets. A photo published on Facebook pages linked to
Muslim Brotherhood groups asking follower to send home address of one of the judges who prosecuted their
friends and associates jailed for protesting after the ouster of the president, Muhammad Morsi, on July 3, 2013.
Simple image search using Google will display many results for the same photo shared by Facebook and twitter
users.
Even If police officer is not sharing anything private on his public profile, Jihadists can still able to trick him using
social engineering techniques. They easily create fake profiles for pretty women, police officers with real data
previously collected or anything of interest to the target, then request a friendship. If that wont work, they can
try hacking techniques to gain access to his email address then to his account.

114

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18532839
http://tawhed.ws/dl?i=14051103
116
Arabic word means missionary work for Islam
117
http://althabaat.com/showthread.php?t=242
118
Tweeting for the Caliphate: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/tweeting-for-the-caliphate-twitter-as-the-newfrontier-for-jihadist-propaganda
119
Graph for 66 important Jihadi accounts on twitter: http://wandrenpd.com/Graphs/66jihadi/Graph.html see
also: http://zoom.it/1Rda#full
120
http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/363244
115

One of the recent assassinations of police officers in Egypt was carried out by the terrorist group, Ansar Bayt AlMaqdis. In their statement of responsibility published on Jihadist forums, they urged anyone who has data on
121
other officers to communicate with them using all available communication methods . One month later, Muslim
122
123
Brotherhood group on Facebook revealed list of police officers with their real names, phones and addresses
124
as a call for vendetta . These evidences prove that Jihadists capabilities in using open-source tools are much
powerful than law enforcement in Middle East.
3.4. Open Source Training
The Internet has become a virtual university for Jihadists. They use it to learn everything from military strategies
to bombing, explosives, hacking and propaganda. The training materials can be found in many of the major
languages used in Middle East, ranging from Arabic to Persian and Urdu. Terrorist are no longer need to travel to
join training camps, at their homes armed with computers and internet access, they can develop, deliver and
125
receive high quality training. In 2006, the Technical Mujahed online Magazine was the first technical
publication to instruct jihadists on data security, GPS, encryption, Hacking and hiding data using steganography.
Additional training publications and e-magazines that deliver specialized training are widely available on the
126
Internet such as the Mujahedeen Poisons Handbook that contains various recipes for homemade poisons
127
and poisonous gases. The most well-known and important Jihadi book online is the Encyclopedia of Jihad that
includes chapters such as how to kill, explosive devices, manufacturing detonators, assassination with
mines, and security and intelligence. There are additional publications that can work as guides for virtual jihadi
128
camps such as Al-Battar Training Camp which includes everything on how to deal with weapons and other
military training. Jihadists are also offerings specialized training in media and propaganda such as the publications
129
of Al-Yaqeen centers course on The Methodology in Gaining Media Experience. Extremists are also exploiting
130
131
the anonymity of virtual communities and online gaming to plan terrorist attacks or train other Jihadists .
Online Gaming and Virtual Environments (OGVEs) are very important tools for todays terrorists since September
132
11 where Microsoft Flight Simulator used to train terrorists to fly planes . OGVEs are good place to start when
real training is expensive, risky and dangerous; thus virtual training will be a wiser idea. Jihadists understand that
militaries around the world are using virtual simulators with great success and one of the groups that learned this
133
lesson in Middle East is Hezbollah fighters. Indeed, leaked NSA documents revealed that Hezbollah has even
hooked up a PlayStation controller to a laptop in order to guide some of its real missiles. They also designed and
134
developed their own 3D game called Special Force 2 which is used for training and recruitment to prepare young
youth to fight their enemy. The game also has a mission to be a martyr with other features such as multiplayer,
121

https://twitter.com/DrElguindy/status/405585854589988864/photo/1 (Arabic)
https://www.facebook.com/Rabaa.Prevails
123
http://pastebin.com/dXcQCe0v
124
http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/382568 (Arabic)
125
Archive: http://www.tawhed.ws/c?i=391
126
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2005/08/05/GR2005080501187.html
127
https://archive.org/stream/m-w-s/ma#page/n0/mode/2up
128
https://ia700709.us.archive.org/35/items/battar-lessons/Battar.htm
129
https://ia600607.us.archive.org/20/items/the-best-method-of-collecting-mediaexperience/manhaje3lamy_1.pdf
130
http://techcrunch.com/2007/07/30/are-terrorists-using-second-life-to-plan-attacks/
131
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/social/second-life-a-terrorist-training-camp/267
132
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-357006/The-flight-software-trains-terrorists.html
133
http://www.examiner.com/article/leaked-documents-reveals-nsa-s-view-of-online-role-playing-games
134
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FTmeWTyFxhg
122

online text and voice chat. This radicalization games will continue to have wider effect on people who are engaged
in such hidden environments and many of them will become potential Jihadists.
3.5. Jihadists and virtual currencies
Top ten of Anwar Al-Awlakis guide 44 ways to support Jihad stressed on supporting Jihad with money. That is
good reason why Jihadists will meet cybercriminals online. Cybercrime has increased dramatically in Middle East
135
countries since I published my research in 2008 . I predicted also that terrorist will also use cybercrime for
fundraising. Several recent terrorist events appear to have been funded partially through online credit card fraud.
136
137
Fundamentalists have reportedly used identity theft and money laundering to support terrorist activities .
Jihadists my also communicate with underground markets to fund terrorist attacks and even hire organized crime
rings. Extremist groups in Middle East are easily collaborating with cybercriminals online using gambling and
brokering websites in addition to virtual communities such as Second Life. Virtual worlds on the Internet are also
associated with virtual currencies; therefor terrorist will join to benefit from the absence of face-to-face
interaction. Consequently, they will exploit the unregulated virtual currencies looming on the internet to fund
Jihad. The use of virtual currencies to launder illicitly obtained money has been associated closely with
138
transnational crime groups and terrorists .
3.6. Jihadists from Cyber-attacks to drones
Terrorists might appear that they have limited cyber-attack capabilities such as website defacement and DDoS
attacks. But their use of the Internet as a training source with more skilled jihadists join the global jihad cause, they
may be able to carry out sophisticated and dangerous cyber-attacks. Hackers who believe in hacking as a Jihad
have access to the same toolset as other members of the hacker underground community. In addition, Jihadists
have managed to develop their own encryption system and spread it on the internet through their underground
media organization, Global Islamic Media Front. For example, Ansar Al-Dardashah is an encrypted Instant
139
Messaging program and Mobile Encryption tools which are developed by Jihadists . Radical groups that are likely
to exploit the new era of cyber-warfare might be located in Iran or Hezbollah in Lebanon. Other radical groups
across Middle East dont have the same capabilities in cyber-attacks. Although there no evidences those Jihadists
will have the capability to exploit cyber weapons such as Stuxnet, there is still little chance that more capable
countries such as Iran will reverse engineer those types of weapons and might end up in hands of other radical
groups. But the fear is not only related to cyber-attacks as other warfare technologies can still be exploited by
Jihadists, such as drones and war robots. With the cheap mass production and replication available from China and
140
141
other places such as Iran , drones might be available to radical groups in Middle East. Even if they couldnt get
142
143
these highly advanced warfare weapons, they still be able to train on how to avoid , hack , and destroy such

135

Cybercrime in the Middle East, ISSA journal, June 2008 by Mohamed N. El-Guindy
http://themoscownews.com/russia/20131125/192070127/Russian-police-uncover-Islamist-terrorist-financegang.html
137
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/09/terrorist-financing-cybercrime-and-undergroundeconomy.html
138
http://www.jpost.com/Features/Front-Lines/Business-Virtual-terror-finance-310318
139
http://gimfmedia.com/tech/en/asrar-al-dardashah/
140
Hezbollah drones made in Iran http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19914441
141
http://ideas.time.com/2013/01/31/criminals-and-terrorists-can-fly-drones-too/
142
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/al-qaida-tipsheet-avoiding-drones-found-mali
143
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB126102247889095011
136

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weapons. In this context, the Washington Post published a leaked document stated that Al-Qaeda leadership is
hoping to exploit the technological vulnerabilities of drones and formed special cell to recruit engineers and
specialists to deal with this drone threat.
Future of Jihadists: Chasing a Mirage
st

Radical groups and extremists are still thinking of restoration of the Caliphate in the 21 century but this looks like
an illusion. May be they are good in fighting asymmetric conflicts but they will fail in politics. Based on the old
ideology of Jihad and the different interpretation of the Islamic State by each group, they will fail in establishing
any governance in this high-tech world. One obvious example is the Jihadists fighters who struggle to capture
145
territories from Syrian regime. Once they capture a city, they start fighting each other on who will establish the
146
Islamic State. The defeated Jihadists will return back to their home countries backed with radical ideology and
advanced fighting skills which will challenge state security. Those Jihadists will be of less dangerous to western
countries. Once those terrorist are connected, they will be traceable and detected even if they are using advanced
technologies. But in Middle East region, this is completely different as the capabilities of terrorist groups surpass
state capabilities. Failed states emerged due to the failure of Arab awakening will make the situation worse. Thus,
Governments in the region need to address their internal challenges from economic to political and social issues in
addition to improving their capacity building. If terrorist gain more experience in this chaotic techno-wars of the
147
future with no improvements in Middle East, our region will be the backyard for drone attacks and new borders
148
will be redrawn . Governments may found the solution in Sun Tzu text
"If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself
but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor
yourself, you will succumb in every battle."

144

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-documents-detail-al-qaedas-efforts-to-fight-backagainst-drones/2013/09/03/b83e7654-11c0-11e3-b630-36617ca6640f_story.html
145
Rebel vs. Rebel: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/18/rebel_vs_rebel_syria_jihadists_groups
146
Suspected militant returning from war in Syria arrested in Spain:
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/05/world/europe/spain-terror-arrest/
147
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/26/iraq-requests-us-drones-missiles-deal-al-qaeda-att/
148
How 5 countries could be 14: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/opinion/sunday/imagining-a-remappedmiddle-east.html

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