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5.

Revocation
Every instrument purporting to create a power of attorney of which a true copy or an
office copy has been deposited in the office of the Registrar or a senior Assistant
Registrar in accordance with this Act or any law repealed by this Act whether before
or after the commencement of this Act, shall, so far as the said instrument is valid and
so far as may be compatible with the terms of the instrument, continue in force until
notice in writing of the revocation thereof by the donor, or of the renunciation thereof
by the donee, has been deposited in every office in which the office copy or true copy
thereof has been so deposited, or either the donor or the donee has died or the donee
has become of unsound mind, or the donor has been adjudged to be of unsound mind
or a receiving order has been made against him in bankruptcy.

Revocation.
A power of attorney is a powerful document, its validity will continue in force indefinitely
unless either (i) revoked or renounced (revocation will take place by way of a notice in
writing of the donor's revocation or of the donee's renunciation and these have been deposited
in every office in which the appointment was required to be deposited); or (ii) extinguished
by the death of the donor or the donee, the bankruptcy of the donor, or the donee has become
inflicted with unsoundness of mind or the donor has been adjudged to be of unsound mind:
see Wan Salimah bte Wan Jaffar v Mahmood bin Omar (Anim bte Abdul Aziz,
Intervener) [1998] 5 MLJ 162. This section shows that the clear intention of Parliament was
for a Power of Attorney, once registered with the High Court, to remain valid and continue to
be in force until revoked by the donor: see Masteron Sdn Bhd v Abdul Aziz bin Abdul
Halim [2000] 5 MLJ 57. This section shows that the clear intention of Parliament was for a
Power of Attorney, once registered with the High Court, to remain valid and continue to be in
force until revoked by the donor: see Masteron Sdn Bhd v Abdul Aziz bin Abdul
Halim (supra).
In Seah Siang Mong v Ong Ban Chai and another case [1998] 1 CLJ SUPP 295, the High
Court held that there is no need to revoke a power of attorney which was not given for
valuable consideration.
Also note the provision for revocation of the power of attorney under s 30 of the Trustee Act
1949 (Act 208) (Revised 1978) (3 Trusts and Settlements). In favour of any person dealing
with the donee, any act done or instrument executed by the donee shall, notwithstanding that
the power has never come into operation or has become revoked by the act of the donor or by
his death or otherwise, be as valid and effectual as if the donor were alive and of full capacity,
and had himself done that act or executed the instrument, unless the person had actual notice
that the power had never come into operation or of the revocation of the power before such
act was done or instrument executed: see s 30(6) of the Trustee Act 1949.
In Muthusamy v Subramaniam [1965] 2 MLJ 273, the plaintiff entered into an agreement
with the defendant whereby he sold (with an option to re-purchase) the business of a mess of
which he was chief tenant, to the defendant. The plaintiff also empowered the defendant by a
power of attorney to deal with subtenants and to transfer the tenancy to his name or that of
any other person. The defendant later transferred the tenancy of the premises to his own
name, despite the fact that the power of attorney had been revoked. The agreement only

empowered the defendant to effect a transfer of the tenancy into his own name or that of any
other person on the failure of the plaintiff to exercise his option by 31 December 1951.
Therefore, in effecting the transfer of the tenancy on 11 May 1951, he was acting outside the
scope of his authority and in clear defiance of the agreement. The defendant contended that
the power was irrevocable and that, therefore, he was entitled to act under the authority of
that power. The court was referred to a proposition at page 177 of 'Powers of Attorney' by F
Bower Alcock which reads, 'A power had been described as being coupled with an interest
where an agreement is entered into on a sufficient consideration whereby an authority is
given for the purpose of securing some benefit to the donee of the authority'; such powers
cannot be expressly revoked or countermanded, so long as the consideration subsists. The
defendant argued that the power in the present case was coupled with an interest and that,
therefore, it could not be revoked. While the court accepted the proposition cited from
Alcock, the court was not satisfied that the power in the present case was coupled with an
interest. There was nothing in the power which referred to any consideration for which it was
given and nowhere did it state that the power was to be irrevocable. The power must
therefore, be regarded as a naked power which can be expressly revoked as was done in this
case (see Frith v Frith [1906] AC 254).
A power of attorney continues in force until notice in writing of the revocation is given by the
donor or the donee renunciates the power of attorney, 'so far as may be compatible with the
terms of such instrument'. In Pg Md Yaakub Pg Hashim & Ors v Ak Mahrup Pg
Hashim [1997] 5 CLJ 456, the power of attorney was given for the lifetime of the donee.
There was no provision in the power of attorney itself for an earlier termination of it.
Therefore, however dissatisfied the plaintiffs were with the performance of the defendant,
there was no way in which the power of attorney could be revoked, short of an agreement by
both parties that the power of attorney should no longer apply.
In Malaysia Building Society Bhd v Johore Mining and Stevedoring Company Sdn Bhd &
Anor [2004] 5 CLJ 82, it was contended that the power of attorney was coupled with an
interest and that, therefore, it could not be revoked. However, it was not satisfied, that the
power in the present case was coupled with an interest. There was nothing in the power which
referred to any consideration for which it was given or even to the agreement for the sale of
the business and nowhere did it state that the power is to be irrevocable. The power was
therefore regarded as a naked power which can be expressly revoked as was done in this
case.
Continue in force until.
A land 'vested' in the donee under a power of attorney which is expressed to be irrevocable
will continue to so vest until notice of renunciation in writing by the donee is deposited in
every office in which the office copy of the power of attorney or the true copy thereof has
been so deposited or either the donor or donee has died or the donee has become of unsound
mind. In such event, the vesting of the property in the donee does not signify that the donor
has divested himself of the title to his property and transferred the same to the donee. He can
still exercise his rights with the consent of the donee to convey such property to other person
and as a corollary upon the death or the unsoundness of mind of the donee, the property will
revert to the donor. In Wee Tiang Peck v Teoh Poh Tin [1995] 1 MLJ 446, the applicant had
executed an irrevocable power of attorney in favour of the respondent in respect of a Malay
reserve land. The applicant later applied for an order that the power of attorney was null and

void ab initio for contravening the provisions of s 7(i) of the Malay Reservations Enactment
1930. The court had to decide whether the power of attorney given without the prior approval
of the Ruler-in-Council contravened s 7(i) of that Enactment which places certain restrictions
on dealings in rights and interests in reservation land acquired by any person not being a
Malay. Thus the issue was whether there was a vesting of the rights and interests of the said
land in the donee of the power. It was argued that the creation of the power of attorney by the
applicant, having regard to the general nature of the power, was tantamount to vesting in the
respondent the rights and interests of the said land and consequently, in the absence of
approval of the Ruler-in-Council, the power of attorney was void ab initio. Idris Yusoff J in
the High Court held that the creation of the power of attorney by the applicant in favour of
the respondent did not in any way infringe upon the provisions of s 7(i) of that Enactment and
the power of attorney was therefore valid. This is because the effect of s 5 is that the vesting
of the property in the respondent pursuant to the irrevocable power of attorney did not signify
that the applicant had divested himself of the title to his property and transferred the same to
the respondent. As such, this case fell outside the ambit of s 7(i) of that Enactment.
Receiving order.
On the making of a receiving order, the Official Assignee is constituted receiver of the
property of the debtor and thereafter, except as directed by the Bankruptcy Act 1967 (Act
360) (Revised 1988) (1 Bankruptcy), no creditor to whom the debtor is indebted in respect
of any debt in bankruptcy shall have any remedy against the property or person of the debtor
in respect of the debt or shall proceed with or commence any action or other legal
proceedings in respect of such debt unless with the leave of court and on such terms as the
court may impose: see s 8 Bankruptcy Act 1967. See generally 6(2) Halsbury's Laws of
Malaysia [170] Bankruptcy (2006 Reissue) (Revised Title Scheme).
Definitions. For 'office copy', see s 10 post and for 'Senior Assistant Registrar', see s 2 ante.

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