Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Atilano
G. R. No. L-22487
May 21, 1969
Facts:
Eulogio Atilano I bought Lot No. 535 from Gerardo Villanueva. Eulogio obtained a transfer
certificate of title in his name. In 1920, he subdivided the land into 5 parts. He executed a deed
of sale in favor of his brother Eulogio Atilano II, covering lot 535-E. Lots 535-B, C and D were sold
to other persons. Lot 535-A was retained by Eulogio Atilano I. Upon his death, it was transferred
to Ladislao Atilano.
When the land was resurveyed, it was found out that the lot Eugelio Atilano II was
occupying was actually Lot 535-A and not 535-E, as what was referred to in the deed of sale.
The lot that Ladislao was occupying was 535-E, and not 535-A.
subsequently, the heirs of Eugelio Atilano II filed an action against Ladislao, claiming that
they offered to surrender the possession of Lot 535-A and demanded the possession of Lot 535E, which offer was denied. Lot 535-E has an area of 2612 square meters, while 535-A only has
1808.
In their answer, Ladislao and the other possessors of Lot 535-E alleged that the reference
to Lot 535-E in the deed of sale was a mere error because Eulogio Atilano I even bought Lot 536
to increase the area of the land in his possession.
Issue:
Whether or not Ladislao may be compelled to surrender Lot 535-E because of the
reference to this lot in the contract.
Held:
No. It can be inferred that the specific portion where the vendee was then already residing,
where he reconstructed his house at the end of the war, and where his heirs, the plaintiffs herein,
continued to reside thereafter: namely, lot No. 535-A; and that its designation as lot No. 535-E in
the deed of sale was simple mistake in the drafting of the document. The mistake did not vitiate
the consent of the parties, or affect the validity and binding effect of the contract between them.
The new Civil Code provides a remedy for such a situation by means of reformation of the
instrument. This remedy is available when, there having been a meeting of the funds of the
parties to a contract, their true intention is not expressed in the instrument purporting to embody
the agreement by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct on accident.
Dihiansan vs. CA
G. R. No. L-49539
September 14, 1987
Facts:
Jose Serrano is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Ateneo Avenue in Naga City.
Sometime in 1966, the Archbishop of Caceres, a corporation sole, signified the intention of
donating to the City of Naga, portions of land which it owned on both sides of Ateneo Avenue to
widen the road. However, such donation did not materialize so the Archbishop offered the land
for sale to adjoining owners, one of which was Serrano.
Upon knowing Serranos preferential right over the property, Benjamin Dihiansan
requested Serrano to allow him to purchase the land. Serrano agreed. By virtue of this
agreement, Dihiansan executed a contract in favor of Serrano, obligating himself to re-sell the
property. In the same contract, Dihiansan bound himself not to sub-lease the property until
Serrano has repurchased the same. In another document, he also bound himself to pay a
monthly honorarium to Serrano until the latter has purchased the property. However, Dihiansan
failed to resell the property despite repeated demands.
Serrano took the matter to court and found out that Dihiansan already sold the property to
Ramon King. Dihiansan alleged that the agreement regarding the honorarium was void because
it was without consideration and that he offered to sell the land to Serrano but the latter refused.
Issue:
Whether or not the agreement regarding the honorarium was void ab initio due to lack of
consideration.
Held:
No. The consideration is Serranos preferential right to buy the property in question from
the owner. The contract clearly stipulates that pDihiansan shall re-sell the disputed property to
Serrano. The contract is the law between the parties. When the words of a contract are plain and
readily understandable, there is no room for construction. As the parties' agreement is reduced in
writing, the rule applies that their agreement is to be "considered as containing all such terms and
there can be between the parties and their successors-in-interest no evidence of the terms of the
agreement other than the contents of the writing.
Santi vs. CA
G. R. No. 93625
November 8, 1993
Facts:
Esperanza Jose was in her lifetime, the registered owner and in absolute possession of a
parcel of land in Cavite. In 1957, she leased a portion of the property to Spouses Eugenio Vitan
and Beatriz Francisco for a period of 20 years at P180 per month, automatically extended for
another 20 years but with a rental of P220 per month. The spouses built a cinema house on said
property.
Sometime in 1962, the lessees sold all their rights over the lessors property to Augusto
Reyes Jr. A new contract of lease was entered between the latter and Jose for a period of 20
years, extendable for another period of 20 years upon expiration. Later on, Jose sold her rights
and participation over the land to Vicente Santi.
In 1982, when the lease expired, Santi wrote Alexander Reyes, representative of Augusto
Reyes, informing him of the termination of the lease and demanding a peaceful turnover of the
land. Reyes refused, alleging that the lease was automatically extended for another 20 years.
Santi claimed that a subsequent agreement must be entered into in order that the lease be
extended.
Issue:
Whether or not the terms of the contract of lease must be interpreted to grant an
automatic extension.
Held:
No. The phrase "automatically extended" did not appear and was not used in the lease
contract subsequently entered into by Esperanza Jose and Augusto Reyes, Jr. for the simple
reason that the lessor does not want to be bound by the stipulation of automatic extension as
provided in the previous lease contract.
The stipulation "said period of lease being extendable for another period of twenty (20) years . . ."
is clear that the lessor's intention is not to automatically extend the lease contract but to give her
time to ponder and think whether to extend the lease. If she decides to do so, then a new contract
shall be entered into between the lessor and lessee for a term of another twenty years and at a
monthly rental of P220.00. This must be so, for twenty (20) years is rather a long period of time
and the lessor may have other plans for the property. If the intention of the parties were to
provide for an automatic extension of the lease contract, then they could have easily provided for
a straight forty years contract instead of twenty.
Tanguilig vs. CA
Facts:
Herce contracted Tanguilig to construct a windmill system for him for which he shall pay a
consideration of 60,000. Pursuant to the contract, Herce paid a downpayment of 30,000.00, an
installment of 15,000. leaving a 15,000. balance.
Herce refused to pay the balance because he had already paid this amount to San Pedro
General Merchandising Inc., which constructed a deep well to which the windmill system was to
be connected. According to Herce, since the deep well formed part of the system, the payment
he tendered to SPGMI should be credit to his account.
On the other hand, according to Tanguilig, the 60,000 was solely for the construction of
the windmill and the construction of the deep well was not part of it.
The trial court held that the construction of the deep well was not part of the windmill
project as evidenced clearly by the letter proposals. It noted, "if the intention of the parties is to
include the construction of the deep well in the project, the same should be stated in the
proposals. In the absence of such an agreement, it could be safely concluded that the
construction of the deep well is not a part of the project undertaken by the plaintiff. However, the
CA ruled to the contrary.
Issue:
Whether or not the deep well project should be considered as part of the agreement of
the parties.
Held:
No. Nowhere in either proposal is the installation of a deep well mentioned, even
remotely. Neither is there an itemization or description of the materials to be used in constructing
the deep well. There is absolutely no mention in the two (2) documents that a deep well pump is a
component of the proposed windmill system. The contract prices fixed in both proposals cover
only the features specifically described therein and no other. While the words "deep well" and
"deep well pump" are mentioned in both, these do not indicate that a deep well is part of the
windmill system. They merely describe the type of deep well pump for which the proposed
windmill would be suitable. Since the terms of the instruments are clear and leave no doubt as to
their meaning they should not be disturbed.
Facts:
Patricio Contreras and Jerusalem Gingco brought a suit against China Bank and spouses
Juan Molina and Teodora Arenas to annul a mortgage executed by the spouses in favor of the
bank. The CFI of Manila ruled that the deed of mortgage dated November 8, 1930 is null and void
as to the one-half of the mortgaged property belonging to Jerusalem Gingco and rescinded as to
the remaining one-half belonging to the spouses Molina.
The sheriff at first undertook to collect from the China Banking Corporation one-half of the
judgment, upon the indication, it is claimed, of the plaintiffs' attorney, but objection by the bank
having been filed with the court, the Honorable Alfonso Felix, judge, ordered that the portion of
the judgment due from this defendant was only one-third. The latter amount was later paid by the
bank and turned over to, and receipted for by, the plaintiffs' counsel. It was contended that the
banks liability must be solidary.
Issue:
Whether or not the banks liability must be solidary.
Held:
No. There is no dispute, and it can be said with confidence, that the China Banking
Corporation's liability under the terms of the judgment of this court is merely joint, joint in the
sense in which the word is understood in the civil law. "It is already a well-established doctrine in
this jurisdiction that, when it is not provided in a judgment that the defendants are liable to pay
jointly and severally a certain sum of money, none of them may be compelled to satisfy in full said
judgments."
Issue:
Whether or not Tanedo is entitled to the fruits of the land.
Held:
Tanedo also
No. Although the plaintiff and the defendant employed the word rescind, it has not, in the
contract executed by them, either the scope or the meaning of the words rescission to which
article 1295 refers and which takes place only in the cases mentioned in the preceding articles,
1291 and 1292. Article 1295 (of the Old Civil Code) refers to contracts that are rescissible in
accordance with law in the cases expressly fixed thereby, but it does not refer to contracts that
are rescinded by mutual consent and for the mutual convenience of the contracting parties. The
rescission in question was not originated by any of the causes specified in articles 1291 and 1292
nor is it any relief for the purposes sought by these articles. It is simply another contract for the
dissolution of a previous one, and its effects, in relation to the contract so dissolved, should be
determined by the agreement made by the parties, or by application of the other legal provisions,
but not by article 1295, which is not applicable.
Miailhe vs CA
Facts:
William Miailhe and his family owned properties in Manila, which had been owned by
them and were in their possession for over 100 years until August 1, 1976. On said date, the
armed forces forcibly and unlawfully took possession of the properties. Such possession
continued until August 19, 1977 without any payment of rentals.
The Office of the President directed DBP to acquire the property for the government.
Thus, they Miailhes were forced to sell the properties due to threats and intimidation employed.
DBP sold the properties to the Republic. When Marcos left the country in February 24 1986, the
Miailhes demanded the return of the properties but to no avail.
In March 23, 1990, William Miailhe instituted an action for the annulment of the sale. It
was ruled that the action had already prescribed.
Issue:
Whether or not the action has already prescribed.
Held:
Yes. Actions for the annulment of contracts prescribe in four years. If the ground for
annulment is vitiation of consent by intimidation, the four-year period starts from the time such
defect ceases. The running of this prescriptive period cannot be interrupted by an extrajudicial
demand made by the party whose consent was vitiated. If the facts demonstrating the lapse of
the prescriptive period are apparent from the records, the complaint should be dismissed.
Dalay vs Aquiaitin
FACTS:
Ciriaco Villarin, being the owner of 6 parcels of land executed a document in favor of
Eugenio Gomez, acknowledging a debt. The document states that when he fails to pay his debt
when the date agreed upon comes, the lands secured shall be used as payment. Villarin failed to
pay his debt and Eugenio, believing him to be entitled to the lands, executed a document in favor
of Juan Dalay, transferring to the latter the lands by virtue of a sale. Therefore, Juan Dalay, took
possession of such lands. In an affidavit made by Villarin, he acknowledged the title and transfer
of the lands to Eugenio.
However, 15 days after, Villarin contracted a debt in favor of Bernardino Aquiatin and
used the same properties as security for payment. A civil case was then filed. The CFI decided in
favor of Aquiatin and the lands were levied.
Dalay then instituted an action against Aquiatin and Maximo, the deputy sheriff, to have
himself declared as the owner of said lands. The answer of Aquiatin alleges that the sale upon
which Dalay relies is simulated and fraudulent, and that said plaintiff had not had exclusive
possession of, nor title to, said lands.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale was void.
Held:
No. The transfer is not void per se inasmuch as Villarin consented to the said property
passing to Gomez in payment of the debt after the expiration of the period for payment, if the debt
was not paid. There is no question as to the occurrence of the other elements of this contract
made in favor of Dalay, the defect consisting in Villarin not having previously executed the deed of
assignment he had promised. This defect, which would have been a ground for annulling this
transfer made by Gomez in favor of Dalay, had Villarin brought the proper action, was cured by
the act of said Villarin in executing the document wherein he acknowledged that the title to, and
possession of, said lands were transferred to Gomez as in a real and absolute sale.
Held:
Yes. It appears that, at the time the authority was given, the manifest purpose of Dy
Buncio was to have Bastida offer the property for sale to Ysmael. The intention was not to sell it
exclusively to Bastida, as now claimed by Dy Buncio, so much so that he previously gave Bastida
an authority to sell the property for P300,000 to any interested person. There is therefore no
impediment on the part of Bastida to transfer his right under the option, and this he may do either
under the contract or under the law. Thus, "All rights acquired by virtue of an obligation are
transmissible in accordance with law if the contrary is not stipulated"
motivated and because such an agreement carries with it the patent badges of absolute
simulation.
Menil vs. CA
Facts:
Agueda Garan obtained a homestead patent over the land in question. A title was issued
in her name. She sold the land to Patenciano Menil within the 5-year prohibitive period as
evidenced by a deed of sale. However, the parties did not register the sale so the land remained
in Garans name.
Subsequently, another deed of sale was executed in favor of the same vendee and this
time it was registered. Menil mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the Philippines to
secure an agricultural loan.
Menil and his wife were in possession of the land when Garan forcibly took possession
thereof. The latter filed an action for quieting of title against the former, but such complaint was
dismissed.
However, Garan still refused to vacate the premises. The lower court ruled that Menil is
entitled to the land but the CA declared the sale as null and void and ordered the cancellation of
the certificate of title.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale was null and void.
Held:
Yes. The law prohibiting any transfer or alienation of homestead land within five years
from the issuance of the patent does not distinguish between executory and consummated sales;
and it would hardly be in keeping with the primordial aim of this prohibition to preserve and keep
in the family of the homesteader the piece of land that the state had gratuitously given to them, to
hold valid a homestead sale actually perfected during the period of prohibition but with the
execution of the formal deed of conveyance and that the delivery of possession of the land sold to
the buyer deferred until after the expiration of the prohibitory period, purposely to circumvent the
very law that prohibits and declares invalid such transaction to protect the homesteader and his
family.
Carantes vs. CA
Facts:
A proceeding for expropriation was commenced by the government for the construction of
the Loakan Airport and a portion of Lot 44, which was originally owned by Mateo Carantes, was
needed for the landing field. The lot was subdivided into Lots Nos. 44-a (the portion which the
government sought to expropriate), 44-b, 44-c, 44-d and 44-e. Negotiations were also under way
for the purchase by the government of lots 44-b and 44-c.
When Mateo Carantes died, his son Maximino Carantes was appointed administrator of
the estate and filed a project of partition of the remaining portion of Lot 44 wherein he listed as
the heirs of Mateo Carantes who were entitled to inherit the estate, himself and his brothers and
sisters. An Assignment of Right to Inheritance was executed by the children of Mateo and the
heirs of Apung Carantes in favor of Maximino Carantes for a consideration of P1. Maximino sold
to the government lots nos. 44-b and 44-c and divided the proceeds of the sale among himself
and the other heirs of Mateo.
A complaint was instituted by the three children of Mateo and the heirs of Apung
Carantes against Maximino praying that the deed of assignment be declared null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the Assignment of Right to Inheritance is null and void.
Held:
No. Article 1409 (2) of the new Civil Code relied upon by the respondent court provides
that contracts "which are absolutely simulated or fictitious" are inexistent and void from the
beginning. The basic characteristic of simulation is the fact that the apparent contract is not really
desired or intended to produce legal effects or in any way alter the juridical situation of the
parties.
The respondents' action may not be considered as one to declare the inexistence of a
contract for lack of consideration. It is total absence of cause or consideration that renders a
contract absolutely void and inexistent. 5 In the case at bar consideration was not absent. The
sum of P1.00 appears in the document as one of the considerations for the assignment of
inheritance. In addition, the document recites that the decedent Mateo Carantes had, during his
lifetime, expressed to the signatories to the contract that the property subject-matter thereof
rightly and exclusively belonged to the petitioner Maximino Carantes. This acknowledgment by
the signatories definitely constitutes valuable consideration for the contract.
Held:
No. Unfortunately for herein appellant, in contracts invalidated by illegal subject matter or
illegal causa, Articles 1305 and 1306 of the Civil Code then in force apply rigorously the rule in
pari delicto non oritur action, denying all recovery to the guilty parties inter se. And appellant is
clearly as guilty as her husband in the attempt to evade the legal prohibition against donation
between spouses.
Facts:
Matilde Cantiveros is the owner of various parcels of realty in Leyte. She and her husband
Jose Vasquez, signed a marital contract of separation. Basilia Hanopol, a cousin, who was
married to Gustavus Bough, lived with Cantiveros.
Bough told Cantiveros that her husband Vasquez was in town and might contest the contract
for the separation of the conjugal property. Cantiveros was then induced to sign a fictitious
contract of sale of all her property which consist of 63 parcels of land to Basilia Bough.
In order to reassure Cantiveros that they would not take advantage of the fictitious sale,
spouses Bough prepared and signed a deed of donation by them to Cantiveros of all the property
to be effective in case of their death and their children before the death of Cantiveros. She
remained in possession of the property.
The spouses Bough filed a complaint for recovery of possession of the property covered by
the deed of sale. Cantiveros asked that judgment be rendered declaring the contract of sale
theretofore made between herself and Basilia Bough null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale must be declared null and void.
Held:
Yes. The rule is expressed in the maxims:"Ex dolo malo non oritur actio," and "In pari
delicto potior est conditio defendentis." The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement; it
leaves the parties where it finds them. Where, however, the parties to an illegal contract are not
equally guilty, and where public policy is considered as advanced by allowing the more excusable
of the two to sue for relief against the transaction, relief is given to him. Cases of this character
are, where they conveyance was wrongfully induced by the grantee through imposition or
overreaching, or by false representations, especially by one in a confidential relation.
In this instance, the grantor, reposing faith in the integrity of the grantee, and relying on a
suggested occurrence, which did not in fact take place, was made the dupe of the grantee, and
led into an agreement against public policy. The party asking to be relieved from the agreement
which she was induced to enter into by means of fraud, was thus in delicto, but not in pari
delicto with the other party. The deed was procured by misrepresentation and fraud sufficient to
vitiate the transaction.