City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila

GR 14355 (1D), 31 October 1919

FACTS:
Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be
expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the
extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such expropriation was
necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for
said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had
been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and
monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public
purposes.
The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the
particular strip of land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it
(petitioner) has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that the
only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the
land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire
into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions
concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the
land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is
fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the
defendant for its value.
ISSUE:
W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the
expropriation?
HELD:
Yes. The courts have the power to restrict the exercise of eminent domain to
the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated
by the law. When the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the
authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying such
authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal
corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is, without question, within
the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or
entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed
by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire
into.

Percival Moday vs Court of Appeals

268 SCRA 586
FACTS:
Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to
initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Modays land.
Purpose of which was to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The
mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that
the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by
Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with
the expropriation nonetheless.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a
municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
HELD:
Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised
in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from
sovereignty.
It is governments right to appropriate, in the nature of a
compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose.
Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain
may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public
utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the
taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The only
ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is
beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the
same. This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that
there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even
bother to declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case
is valid.

Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty

G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998
Facts:
Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Paraaque filed on
September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation against Private
Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land of 10,000
square meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of the property but
VM didnt accept.
The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner
to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court
of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its
current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action
because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as
required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of
action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Petitioner
claimed that res judicata was not applicable.
The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioners MFR was denied. The CA
affirmed.
Issues:
1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same
force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of
a valid cause of action.
2. WON the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not
applicable when public interest is primarily involved.
Held: No to 1st Yes to 2nd. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for
the purpose of initiating an expropriation case substantially complies with the
requirements of the law because the terms ordinance and resolution are
synonymous for the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local government
unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in
court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of
government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public
entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to
the latters control and restraints, imposed through the law conferring the
power or in other legislations.

Sec 19, RA 7160

A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant
to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or
purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment
of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can
exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain
or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or
welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9,
Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there
was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized
through an ordinance.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms resolution and
ordinance are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a
resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of
the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An
ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in nature.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a
mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous
Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from
the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically
requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT

26 SCRA 620 (1969)
FACTS:
Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the
right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection
between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that the
Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of
the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter
into a contract where no agreement is had between them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government
Telephone System can be a valid object for expropriation.
HELD:
Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic
may require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of
the government service may require, subject to the payment of just
compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection
between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject
to an easement of right of way.

Barangay San Roque vs Heirs of Pastor

GR 138896 20 June 2000

be taken. This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners.

Facts:
Barangay San Roque of Talisay, Cebu filed a complaint to expropriate the
property of Pator with MTC. The MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that The principal cause of action is the
exercise of the power of eminent domain. The fact that the action also
involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is
therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
This was then filed to RTC but was dismissed, holding that an action for
eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property
to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before
the MTC or the RTC. The property value was less than 20k and should be
filed with MTC.

The primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government

or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of
private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government
entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process.
1 In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the governments exercise
of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Issue:
Whether or not eminent domain suit should be filed with MTC or RTC?
Decision:
RTC. Petitioner cites Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation It argues that the
present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that
such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
If the nature of the principal action/remedy sought is primarily for the recovery
of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation,
and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first
instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
If the nature of the principal action/remedy sought is other than the right to
recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to or a
consequence of where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, they are cognizable exclusively by CFI.
In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a
sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its
authority and right to take private property for public use.
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of
dismissal of the action.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to

REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI

GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974
FACTS:
After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the
government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced
expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just
compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the
contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The
owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government
commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential
elements of the taking of property under the power of eminent domain,
namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property
for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such
a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property, are not present.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor
has entered and occupied the property as lesse.
HELD:
No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings
commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private
property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal
authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or
injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government
entered and occupied the property under a contract of lease.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G.

ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City,
Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC.,
G.R. No. L-3491 June 24, 1983
Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total
area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of
deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City
for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon City engineer
required the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling
and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners
thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers
burial.
The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9
of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondents property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use
as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argued that the
Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local
police power, to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant
to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein.
On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the
taking or confiscation of property was obvious because the questioned
ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use
of his property.
Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
Held:
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is
not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of
Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead
within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a
proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds
and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg.
337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may provide

for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by
law or ordinance it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned
land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries.
This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The
questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners
of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and
other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The
necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said
requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities
with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when
individual lots are sold to home-owners.

US GOVERNMENT VS. CAUSBY

328 US 256, May 27, 1946
FACTS:
Government planes fly over a private property at such low altitude as to
practically touch the tops of the trees. Herein respondent, owner of the said
property filed a complaint against public respondent on grounds that there
was an intrusion into the superjacent rights of the former entitling the same to
payment of just compensation because the owner was deprive of the use of
the said property. Petitioner contends that there has been no taking because
flights are made within the navigable airspace and, there was no divestiture of
title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a taking of superjacent space which entitles for just
compensation.
HELD:
Yes. Superjacent space is not part of private property because being a public
domain, ownership of the same is vested in the State. However, if flying or
occupying over it so low and frequent as to create a direct and immediate
interference with the enjoyment and use of the land underneath it, then a
taking is considered, entitling the owner for a just compensation.

PPI vs COMELEC
GR L-119694 (En Banc) 22 May 1995
FACTS:
COMELEC issued resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide provide
free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as Comelec
Space which shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all
candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is
circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their
stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government.
Philippine Press Institute, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper
and magazine publishers asks the Court to declare said resolution
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed
by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the
taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of Comelec alleged that the
resolution does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free
print space in the newspapers. It merely established guidelines to be followed
in connection with the procurement of Comelec space. And if it is viewed as
mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police
power of the State- a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or
regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations
of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure
a fair, impartial and credible election.
ISSUE:
Whether the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain?
HELD:
No. The court held that the resolution does not constitute a valid exercise of
the power of eminent domain. To compel print media companies to donate
Comelec-space amounts to taking of private personal property for public
use or purposes without the requisite just compensation. The extent of the
taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis
temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The
monetary value of the compulsory donation, measured by the advertising
rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in nonurban areas, may be very substantial indeed.
The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use
are the necessity for the taking and the legal authority to effect the taking. The
element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent
Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to
sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed,
the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart
of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated,

that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the
Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between
that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by
Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
The taking of private property
Constitution, but not without
Section 9). And apparently
Comelec space is precisely
Commission.

for public use is, of course, authorized by the

payment of just compensation (Article III,
the necessity of paying compensation for
what is sought to be avoided by respondent

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. VS.

MUNICIPALITY (NOW CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, digested
GR # 152230 August 9, 2005

ISSUE:
Whether or not a letter to purchase is sufficient enough as a definite and valid
offer to expropriate.

FACTS:
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision of declaring respondent
municipality (now city) as having the right to expropriate petitioners property
for the construction of an access road. Petitioner argues that there was no
valid and definite offer made before a complaint for eminent domain was filed
as the law requires (Art. 35, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code). Respondent contends that a letter to purchase was
offered to the previous owners and the same was not accepted.

HELD:
No. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement of a valid
and definite offer will result in the dismissal of the complaint. The purpose of
the mandatory requirement to be first made to the owner is to encourage
settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes
in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court of action.