Determinism

Determinism is the philosophical position that for every event, including human
interactions, there exist conditions that could cause no other event. "There are
many determinisms, depending on what pre-conditions are considered to be determ
inative of an event or action."[1] Deterministic theories throughout the history
of philosophy have sprung from diverse and sometimes overlapping motives and co
nsiderations. Some forms of determinism can be empirically tested with ideas fro
m physics and the philosophy of physics. The opposite of determinism is some kin
d of indeterminism (otherwise called nondeterminism). Determinism is often contr
asted with free will.[2]
Determinism often is taken to mean causal determinism, which in physics is known
as cause-and-effect. It is the concept that events within a given paradigm are
bound by causality in such a way that any state (of an object or event) is compl
etely determined by prior states. This meaning can be distinguished from other v
arieties of determinism mentioned below.
Other debates often concern the scope of determined systems, with some maintaini
ng that the entire universe is a single determinate system and others identifyin
g other more limited determinate systems (or multiverse). Numerous historical de
bates involve many philosophical positions and varieties of determinism. They in
clude debates concerning determinism and free will, technically denoted as compa
tibilistic (allowing the two to coexist) and incompatibilistic (denying their co
existence is a possibility).
Determinism should not be confused with self-determination of human actions by r
easons, motives, and desires. Determinism rarely requires that perfect predictio
n be practically possible.
Contents [hide]
1
Varieties
2
Philosophical connections
2.1
With nature/nurture controversy
2.2
With particular factors
2.3
With free will
2.4
With the soul
2.5
With ethics and morality
3
History
3.1
Eastern tradition
3.2
Western tradition
4
Modern scientific perspective
4.1
Generative processes
4.2
Mathematical models
4.3
Quantum mechanics and classical physics
4.3.1 Day-to-day physics
4.3.2 Quantum realm
4.3.3 Other matters of quantum determinism
5
See also
5.1
Types of determinism
6
References
6.1
Notes
6.2
Bibliography
7
Further reading
8
External links
Varieties[edit]
This article needs attention from an expert in Philosophy. Please add a reason o
r a talk parameter to this template to explain the issue with the article. WikiP
roject Philosophy (or its Portal) may be able to help recruit an expert. (July 2
011)

Below appear some of the more common viewpoints meant by, or confused with "dete
rminism".
Many philosophical theories of determinism frame themselves with the idea that r
eality follows a sort of predetermined path
Causal determinism is "the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent e
vents and conditions together with the laws of nature".[3] However, causal deter
minism is a broad enough term to consider that "one's deliberations, choices, an
d actions will often be necessary links in the causal chain that brings somethin
g about. In other words, even though our deliberations, choices, and actions are
themselves determined like everything else, it is still the case, according to
causal determinism, that the occurrence or existence of yet other things depends
upon our deliberating, choosing and acting in a certain way".[4] Causal determi
nism proposes that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching ba
ck to the origin of the universe. The relation between events may not be specifi
ed, nor the origin of that universe. Causal determinists believe that there is n
othing in the universe that is uncaused or self-caused. Historical determinism (
a sort of path dependence) can also be synonymous with causal determinism. Causa
l determinism has also been considered more generally as the idea that everythin
g that happens or exists is caused by antecedent conditions.[5] In the case of n
omological determinism, these conditions are considered events also, implying th
at the future is determined completely by preceding events a combination of prior
states of the universe and the laws of nature.[3] Yet they can also be considere
d metaphysical of origin (such as in the case of theological determinism).[4]
Nomological determinism is the most common form of causal determinism. It is the
notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessaril
y by rigid natural laws, that every occurrence results inevitably from prior eve
nts. Quantum mechanics and various interpretations thereof pose a serious challe
nge to this view. Nomological determinism is sometimes illustrated by the though
t experiment of Laplace's demon.[6] Nomological determinism is sometimes called
'scientific' determinism, although that is a misnomer. Physical determinism is g
enerally used synonymously with nomological determinism (its opposite being phys
ical indeterminism).
Necessitarianism is closely related to the causal determinism described above. I
t is a metaphysical principle that denies all mere possibility; there is exactly
one way for the world to be. Leucippus claimed there were no uncaused events, a
nd that everything occurs for a reason and by necessity.[7]
Predeterminism is the idea that all events are determined in advance.[8][9] The
concept of predeterminism is often argued by invoking causal determinism, implyi
ng that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching back to the o
rigin of the universe. In the case of predeterminism, this chain of events has b
een pre-established, and human actions cannot interfere with the outcomes of thi
s pre-established chain. Predeterminism can be used to mean such pre-established
causal determinism, in which case it is categorised as a specific type of deter
minism.[8][10] It can also be used interchangeably with causal determinism in the
context of its capacity to determine future events.[8][11] Despite this, predete
rminism is often considered as independent of causal determinism.[12][13] The te
rm predeterminism is also frequently used in the context of biology and heredita
ry, in which case it represents a form of biological determinism.[14]
Fatalism is normally distinguished from "determinism".[15] Fatalism is the idea
that everything is fated to happen, so that humans have no control over their fu
ture. Fate has arbitrary power, and need not follow any causal or otherwise dete
rministic laws.[5] Types of Fatalism include hard theological determinism and th
e idea of predestination, where there is a God who determines all that humans wi
ll do. This may be accomplished either by knowing their actions in advance, via
some form of omniscience[16] or by decreeing their actions in advance.[17]
Theological determinism is a form of determinism which states that all events th
at happen are pre-ordained, or predestined to happen, by a monotheistic deity, o
r that they are destined to occur given its omniscience. Two forms of theologica

l determinism exist, here referenced as strong and weak theological determinism.

[18] The first one, strong theological determinism, is based on the concept of a
creator deity dictating all events in history: "everything that happens has bee
n predestined to happen by an omniscient, omnipotent divinity".[19] The second f
orm, weak theological determinism, is based on the concept of divine foreknowled
ge "because God's omniscience is perfect, what God knows about the future will ine
vitably happen, which means, consequently, that the future is already fixed".[20
] There exist slight variations on the above categorisation. Some claim that the
ological determinism requires predestination of all events and outcomes by the d
ivinity (i.e. they do not classify the weaker version as 'theological determinis
m' unless libertarian free will is assumed to be denied as a consequence), or th
at the weaker version does not constitute 'theological determinism' at all.[21]
With respect to free will, "theological determinism is the thesis that God exist
s and has infallible knowledge of all true propositions including propositions a
bout our future actions", more minimal criteria designed to encapsulate all form
s of theological determinism.[22] Theological determinism can also be seen as a
form of causal determinism, in which the antecedent conditions are the nature an
d will of God.[4]
Logical determinism or Determinateness is the notion that all propositions, whet
her about the past, present, or future, are either true or false. Note that one
can support Causal Determinism without necessarily supporting Logical Determinis
m and vice versa (depending on one's views on the nature of time, but also rando
mness). The problem of free will is especially salient now with Logical Determin
ism: how can choices be free, given that propositions about the future already h
ave a truth value in the present (i.e. it is already determined as either true o
r false)? This is referred to as the problem of future contingents.
Adequate determinism focuses on the fact that, even without a full understanding
of microscopic physics, we can predict the distribution of 1000 coin tosses
Often synonymous with Logical Determinism are the ideas behind Spatio-temporal D
eterminism or Eternalism: the view of special relativity. J. J. C. Smart, a prop
onent of this view, uses the term "tenselessness" to describe the simultaneous e
xistence of past, present, and future. In physics, the "block universe" of Herma
nn Minkowski and Albert Einstein assumes that time is a fourth dimension (like t
he three spatial dimensions). In other words, all the other parts of time are re
al, like the city blocks up and down a street, although the order in which they
appear depends on the driver (see Rietdijk Putnam argument).
Adequate determinism is the idea that quantum indeterminacy can be ignored for m
ost macroscopic events. This is because of quantum decoherence. Random quantum e
vents "average out" in the limit of large numbers of particles (where the laws o
f quantum mechanics asymptotically approach the laws of classical mechanics).[23
] Stephen Hawking explains a similar idea: he says that the microscopic world of
quantum mechanics is one of determined probabilities. That is, quantum effects
rarely alter the predictions of classical mechanics, which are quite accurate (a
lbeit still not perfectly certain) at larger scales.[24] Something as large as a
n animal cell, then, would be "adequately determined" (even in light of quantum
indeterminacy).
Philosophical connections[edit]
With nature/nurture controversy[edit]
Nature and nurture interact in humans. A scientist looking at a sculpture after
some time does not ask whether we are seeing the effects of the starting materia
ls or of environmental influences.
Although some of the above forms of determinism concern human behaviors and cogn
ition, others frame themselves as an answer to the debate on nature and nurture.
They will suggest that one factor will entirely determine behavior. As scientif
ic understanding has grown, however, the strongest versions of these theories ha
ve been widely rejected as a single-cause fallacy.[25]
In other words, the modern deterministic theories attempt to explain how the int

eraction of both nature and nurture is entirely predictable. The concept of heri
tability has been helpful in making this distinction.
Biological determinism, sometimes called genetic determinism, is the idea that e
ach of human behaviors, beliefs, and desires are fixed by human genetic nature.
Behaviorism involves the idea that all behavior can be traced to specific causes e
ither environmental or reflexive. John B. Watson and B. F. Skinner developed thi
s nurture-focused determinism.
Cultural determinism or social determinism is the nurture-focused theory that th
e culture in which we are raised determines who we are.
Environmental determinism, also known as climatic or geographical determinism, p
roposes that the physical environment, rather than social conditions, determines
culture. Supporters of environmental determinism often[quantify] also support B
ehavioral determinism. Key proponents of this notion have included Ellen Churchi
ll Semple, Ellsworth Huntington, Thomas Griffith Taylor and possibly Jared Diamo
nd, although his status as an environmental determinist is debated.[26]
With particular factors[edit]
A technological determinist might suggest that technology like the mobile phone
is the greatest factor shaping human civilization.
Other 'deterministic' theories actually seek only to highlight the importance of
a particular factor in predicting the future. These theories often use the fact
or as a sort of guide or constraint on the future. They need not suppose that co
mplete knowledge of that one factor would allow us to make perfect predictions.
Psychological determinism can mean that humans must act according to reason, but
it can also be synonymous with some sort of Psychological egoism. The latter is
the view that humans will always act according to their perceived best interest
.
Linguistic determinism claims that our language determines (at least limits) the
things we can think and say and thus know. The Sapir Whorf hypothesis argues that
individuals experience the world based on the grammatical structures they habit
ually use.
Economic determinism is the theory which attributes primacy to the economic stru
cture over politics in the development of human history. It is associated with t
he dialectical materialism of Karl Marx.
Technological determinism is a reductionist theory that presumes that a society'
s technology drives the development of its social structure and cultural values.
With free will[edit]
Main article: Free will
A table showing the different positions related to free will and determinism
Philosophers have debated both the truth of determinism, and the truth of free w
ill. This creates the four possible positions in the figure. Compatibilism refer
s to the view that free will is, in some sense, compatible with determinism. The
three incompatibilist positions, on the other hand, deny this possibility. The
hard incompatibilists hold that both determinism and free will do not exist, the
libertarianists that determinism does not hold, and free will might exist, and
the hard determinists that determinism does hold and free will does not exist.
The standard argument against free will, according to philosopher J. J. C. Smart
focuses on the implications of determinism for 'free will'.[27] However, he sug

gests free will is denied whether determinism is true or not. On one hand, if de
terminism is true, all our actions are predicted and we are assumed not to be fr
ee; on the other hand, if determinism is false, our actions are presumed to be r
andom and as such we do not seem free because we had no part in controlling what
happened.
In his book, The Moral Landscape, author and neuroscientist Sam Harris also argu
es against free will. He offers one thought experiment where a mad scientist rep
resents determinism. In Harris' example, the mad scientist uses a machine to con
trol all the desires, and thus all the behavior, of a particular human. Harris b
elieves that it is no longer as tempting, in this case, to say the victim has "f
ree will". Harris says nothing changes if the machine controls desires at random
- the victim still seems to lack free will. Harris then argues that we are also
the victims of such unpredictable desires (but due to the unconscious machinati
ons of our brain, rather than those of a mad scientist). Based on this introspec
tion, he writes "This discloses the real mystery of free will: if our experience
is compatible with its utter absence, how can we say that we see any evidence f
or it in the first place?"[28] adding that "Whether they are predictable or not,
we do not cause our causes."[29] That is, he believes there is compelling evide
nce of absence of free will.
Some research (founded by the John Templeton Foundation) suggested that reducing
a person's belief in free will is dangerous, making them less helpful and more
aggressive.[30] This could occur because the individual's sense of self-efficacy
suffers.
With the soul[edit]
Some determinists argue that materialism does not present a complete understandi
ng of the universe, because while it can describe determinate interactions among
material things, it ignores the minds or souls of conscious beings.
A number of positions can be delineated:
Immaterial souls are all that exist (Idealism).
Immaterial souls exist and exert a non-deterministic causal influence on bodies.
(Traditional free-will, interactionist dualism).[31][32]
Immaterial souls exist, but are part of deterministic framework.
Immaterial souls exist, but exert no causal influence, free or determined (epiph
enomenalism, occasionalism)
Immaterial souls do not exist
there is no mind-body dichotomy, and there is a Ma
terialistic explanation for intuitions to the contrary.
With ethics and morality[edit]
Another topic of debate is the implication that Determinism has on morality. Har
d determinism (a belief in determinism, and not free will) is particularly criti
cized for seeming to make traditional moral judgments impossible. Some philosoph
ers, however, find this an acceptable conclusion.
Philosopher and incompatibilist Peter van Inwagen introduces this thesis as such
:
Argument that Free Will is Required for Moral Judgments
The moral judgment that you shouldn't have done X implies that you should have d
one something else instead
That you should have done something else instead implies that there was somethin
g else for you to do
That there was something else for you to do implies that you could have done som
ething else
That you could have done something else implies that you have free will
If you don't have free will to have done other than X we cannot make the moral j

udgment that you shouldn't have done X.[33]

However, a compatibilist might have an issue with Inwagen's process because one
can not change the past like his arguments center around. A compatibilist who ce
nters around plans for the future might posit:
The moral judgment that you should not have done X implies that you can do somet
hing else instead
That you can do something else instead implies that there is something else for
you to do
That there is something else for you to do implies that you can do something els
e
That you can do something else implies that you have free will for planning futu
re recourse
If you have free will to do other than X we can make the moral judgment that you
should do other than X, and punishing you as a responsible party for having don
e X that you know you should not have done can help you remember to not do X in
the future.