Amendedpetition 24128

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
NO. ______________________________
APPLICANT 24128
PETITIONER
v.
INDIANA BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS
RESPONDENTS
AMENDED PETITION
OF DENIED APPLICANT UNDER ADM. & DISC. RULE 14, 2
(CHARACTER AND FITNESS REVIEW)
1
Applicant 24128
Amended Petition for Review
Jurisdictional statement
The Indiana Supreme Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate this matter pursuant to Adm. &
Disc. Rule 14, Section 2 as that appeal to the Court was timely.
Abbreviated Summary of the Applicants Argument (Standard of Review)

Fundamental constitutional guarantees are absolute and outside the discretion
of any court to ignore or deny.
Branan v. State, 316 N.E.2d 406, 408 (Ind.App.1974).
Overarching Issue as to errors of law

Did the Indiana Board of Law Examiners look with such an evil eye as toward a
whistleblowers ideology while working an unequal hand toward minority-viewpoint and
rights of conscience while processing Petitioners bar application against an allegedly
arbitrary standard lacking in fundamental fairness as to violate the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment as well as Rules of the Indiana Supreme
Court, and the Indiana Bill of Rights at Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, or 12?
Overarching Issue as to errors of fact

Did Applicants Original Filing with this Court (in affidavit form) and filing with the Board
of Law Examiners on May 15, 2015, and this filing, all of which counter the facts as posited
by the Examiners in their Final Report, create controversies of fact allowing this Court to
enter into a de novo review of Petitioners entire file? Petitioner especially directs the Court
to the following sections of the Examiners Final Report, in which material error can clearly
be shown: Paragraphs 6, 9, 10, 51, 61, 65, fn.19, 89, 97. Petitioner also directs the Court to
the following paragraphs communicating scandalous and unsupported allegations: 66, 71,
90, 116, 120. Petitioner also directs the Court to the following paragraphs demonstrating
retaliation as a motive: Fn. 5, 101.
Abbreviated Summary of the Applicants Argument (Statement)
After failing to recognize a prima facia case of good moral character and fitness fully
meeting the burden of Rule 12 2, the Examiners processed the application in a fashion
which was:
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Applicant 24128
(1) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law;
(2) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(3) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right;
(4) Without observance of procedure required by law; and/or
(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence.
The Examiners July 17, 2015 filing continues this mode of processing, as is revealed by
factual and legal analysis herein.
Abbreviated Statement of the Case
Application filed November 13, 2013. Applicant reviewed by character and fitness member
January 8, 2014. Applicant appeared before Board as ordered, February 13, 2014. Applicant
approved for and passed bar exam, sat February 25 & 26, 2014, notified he passed April 27,
2014. Applicant then requested to tender psychological report to Board on May 20, 2014.
Applicant refused and raised constitutional, prudential and financial objections. Board
denied admission pursuant to Rule 12 6, September 22, 2014. Applicant filed for hearing
pursuant to Rule 12 7, October 21, 2014. Board noticed matter for Rule 12 8 processing
November 26, 2014. Board attempted to re-animate denied application January 20, 2015
and invited Applicant to tender psychological report under more favorable financial terms.
Applicant refused and raised constitutional and prudential objections. Board set for Rule 12
9 hearing three weeks out. Applicant moved for continuance March 10, 2015. Board set
for April 27, 2015 hearing, which was had. Applicant filed proposed findings May 14, 2015.
Board counsel filed proposed findings June 9, 2015. Board filed Final Report denying
certification and recommending lifelong ban on re-application on July 17, 2015. Petition to
this Court filed August 13, 2015; Amended petition allowed to be filed by September 2,
2015.
Abbreviated Conclusion
Wherefore Applicant prays this Honorable Court adjudicates his application pursuant to
the proper standards and adjudicates his Application in the fashion that most advances
justice and the betterment of the State of Indiana.
The Hearing Panels Final Report of the Proceedings and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Recommendation as to Bar Applicant 24128 and the Board of Law Examiners
final decision entered July 17, 2015 is attached hereto.
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Applicant 24128
Table of Contents
STATEMENT: Supreme Court Jurisdiction ..................................................................................................9
STANDARD OF REVIEW (Constitutional Issues) ................................................................................10
STATEMENT: Constitutional Issues ..........................................................................................................10
VIOLATION OF LAW ALLEGED (Indiana Constitution) ....................................................................10
Section 1. Inherent rights .....................................................................................................................10
Section 2. Right to worship ..................................................................................................................10
Section 3. Freedom of religious opinions ............................................................................................11
Section 4. Freedom of religion .............................................................................................................11
Section 5. No religious test for office ..................................................................................................11
Section 9. Freedom of thought and speech ..........................................................................................12
Section 12. Openness of the courts, Speedy trial .................................................................................12
VIOLATION OF LAW ALLEGED (Federal Constitution) ....................................................................13
First Amendment ..................................................................................................................................13
Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection) .........................................................................................13
Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process) ................................................................................................13
STANDARD OF REVIEW (Board of Law Examiners) .........................................................................14
STANDARD OF REVIEW (Scope) ........................................................................................................14
STANDARD OF REVIEW (Findings of Fact) .......................................................................................14
STANDARD OF REVIEW (Conclusion) ...............................................................................................15
STATEMENT: Of the Case .........................................................................................................................15
January/February 2014: Off-the-record hearings result in clearance to sit for bar exam ....................15
Regarded as mentally ill and responding like a constitutionalist .........................................................16
Official stonewalling or reasonable delay? ..........................................................................................16
Of pretexts and botched investigations ................................................................................................17
A dialectical design ..............................................................................................................................17
Dramatic foreshadowing ......................................................................................................................18
ADDRESSING: My Allegations of Factual Error by the Examiners ..........................................................18
[BLE heading] Facts Relating to the Applicants Prior Applications .....................................................19
Communication rebranded as conduct .................................................................................................20
[BLE heading] Facts Relating to the Applicants Third and Most Recent Application .........................21
And now a note from our sponsor (psych eval letter) ..........................................................................23
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Applicant 24128
Miracle on South Meridian? Resurrecting a dead application (live to delay another day?) ...............26
[BLE heading] Assessment of the Applicants Efforts in Carrying His Burden to Demonstrate that He
Possesses the Requisite Character and Fitness under Rule 12 .................................................................27
A shotgun approach to leveling allegations that include how I think ..................................................28
A secularist creed that brokers no dissent ............................................................................................28
After 20 months the Board is finally able to acknowledge that I have alleged fraud on the court ......29
Denying Professor Patrick Baude his due ............................................................................................31
Demanding due process and the operation of Rule 12 without any right to it? ...............................32
Logical fallacy issue spotting exercise .................................................................................................33
Character and fitness evaluations do not count if they like me ...........................................................34
[BLE] CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ..............................................................................................................35
Out comes the shotgun to sing its song again ......................................................................................36
More shotgun: 00 Buckshot ................................................................................................................36
Selectively editing Matter of Burns .....................................................................................................37
No abuse of process and no contempt of court ....................................................................................38
Shotgunned again: Dragons breath rounds ........................................................................................39
Professor Baude and Roger Waters get the last word (on the facts) ....................................................41
ADDRESSING: Is There a Standard of Review Specific to Admission Cases? .........................................42
This Court should analyze a bar applicants petition against the case law applicable to licensed
attorneys ...................................................................................................................................................43
ADDRESSING: Allegations of the Examiners Against Petitioner..............................................................44
The Examiners err in alleging that Applicant is wrongly focused on 2009 .............................................44
The Examiners err in alleging that Applicant is wrongly concerned about religious questions ..............44
The Examiners err in positing that Applicants communications are disqualifying ................................45
Judge me under Kansas law for impolitic speech ................................................................................45
The Examiners err in positing that appearance by counsel on April 27, 2015 was disqualifying ...........46
The Examiners err in claiming Applicant abused the discovery process he was invited to utilize .........47
The Board did it first ............................................................................................................................47
I am not a perjurer and I did not engage in unauthorized practice with that woman ....................48
Board counsel actually deemed some of my discovery right on the mark ...........................................49
The Examiners err in claiming Applicant abused the litigation process he was required to utilize ........49
I had very good reason to call Michael Witte as a witness, and very good reason to release him ......50
The Examiners erred in not striking a scathing and spurious attack on Applicants character ...............52
Board counsel decided to become a fact witness three weeks ahead of the hearing ...........................52
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Applicant 24128
I was threatened with a bad result if I worked up my case (whistleblowers curse) ............................53
The Examiners err in positing that traffic infractions can justify denial and banishment .......................53
No one seemed to care until last month? .............................................................................................53
Infractions are not crimes .....................................................................................................................54
Mr. Eddingfield, were you disciplined for driving unrestrained? ........................................................55
I am trying to be funny, here, please work with me .............................................................................55
Non seat belt wearers of the world UNITE! (You have nothing to lose but your restraints) ..............56
The Examiners err in positing that Applicant does not feel like he should abide by the rules
governing all other lawyers 95 ..............................................................................................................56
I felt like I had been pretty clear on the issue, but I wrote back since the BLE asked me to. ..........57
I feel like the record is pretty clear -- and I was correct on this one ................................................57
The Examiners err in positing that Applicants conduct and his contemptuous behavior [and]
Applicants conduct and his numerous written filings with the Board granted the Board sufficient
cause to Seek additional information respecting his mental and emotional stability 122 ....................58
My bat swings at no man (or woman) ..................................................................................................58
$25 a ticket, but $4500 in psychological evals if your average exceeds one a year over four years ...58
ADDRESSING: Applicants Allegations of Fraud on This Court .............................................................59
Possible Fraud on the Court: The Government errs in refusing to hold a hearing on the Bowman
Answer .....................................................................................................................................................59
The high cost of blowing the whistle ...................................................................................................60
Possible Fraud on the Court: The Government errs by selective presentation of the Bowman report ...60
Possible Fraud on the Court: The Government errs by failing to open their records as to the Missouri
Supreme Court Report..............................................................................................................................62
Denying once again that I blew off a meeting with the Examiners 18 year ago..................................62
Enter 2007 I had no idea the BLE viewed me as a fugitive from justice ..........................................62
The Missouri Supreme Courts questions ............................................................................................63
The Board has stipulated to a violation of Rule 8 ................................................................................64
Thus the Board now shoulders an obligation as to the Missouri Supreme Court ................................64
I have no Rule 8 allegations lodged against me. (Yet who has the C&F problem?) ...........................65
Possible Fraud on the Court: The Government erred by failing to give up its crusade against Applicant
24128 when he filed his Proposed Findings on May 15, 2015 ................................................................66
ADDRESSING: Applicants Allegations of Rule 12 errors in the Final Report of the Examiners.............66
Missing the Point: The Board erred when failing to recognize prima facie case under Adm & Disc. Rule
12, Sections 2 & 3 ....................................................................................................................................66
Missing the Point: The Board errs in treating the burden of proof as a ploy to place an applicant ever on
the defensive.............................................................................................................................................67
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Applicant 24128
A riddle that needs to be solved about those facts which the BLE will NOT acknowledge ...............67
Missing the Point: The Board errs when mandating off-the-record meetings that are subsequently the
grist for allegations of fact beyond appellate review ...............................................................................68
Missing the Point: The Board errs in demanding the tender of psychological reports without a good
cause shown .............................................................................................................................................69
Missing the Point: The Board errs in its belief that none of its actions need to conform to the demands
of due process, the constitutions or the rules of this court as long as its Final decision does. 100 .......70
Missing the Point: The Board errs in punishing applicants based upon their viewpoint toward
overreaching governance .........................................................................................................................70
Complainers need not apply .................................................................................................................71
A chance to render a case of first impression? .....................................................................................71
Missing the Point: The Board errs in believing that it can deny and banish based upon an Applicants
manner of thinking. 66 ...................................................................................................................72
The Board does not like the way I think of my Professional Calling ..................................................73
The Board does not like the way I think about the Myers-Briggs test .................................................73
The Board does not like the way I think about JLAP ..........................................................................73
Imagine theres no constitution, it isnt hard to do .........................................................................74
Missing the Point: The Board errs in continuing to deny Applicant based upon a lack of insight ..........75
Insight the BLE knows it when it doesnt see it? ............................................................................75
ADDRESSING: Applicants Allegations of Evidentiary errors by the Examiners .....................................76
Missing the Particulars: The Panel erred in quashing the subpoenas of Bowman, Ross, and Sudrovech
..................................................................................................................................................................76
Missing the Particulars: The Panel erred in building upon hearsay to support its decision to punish me
for having filed civil rights litigation .......................................................................................................77
Ross unsworn letter in, my sworn affidavit out hard to make sense of that one ..............................78
Missing the Particulars: The Panel erred in building upon conclusory evidence to justify its refusal to
certify and recommended life time banishment .......................................................................................78
Show me the EVIDENCE!...................................................................................................................79
Missing the Particulars: The Panel erred in building upon immaterial and irrelevant evidence to justify
its refusal to certify and recommended life time banishment ..................................................................79
Show me the PROBATIVE EVIDENCE ............................................................................................79
Missing the Particulars: The Panel erred by committing logical fallacies throughout their Final Report
..................................................................................................................................................................80
Check out those impressive minor premises! (Not) .............................................................................80
The Undistributed Middle ....................................................................................................................80
I think, therefore I am confused ...........................................................................................................81
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Applicant 24128
Begging the Question ...........................................................................................................................82

Irrelevant Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................82
Equivocation: (Confusing (accidentally or deliberately) the meaning of a word or phrase) ...............82
Against the Man ...................................................................................................................................83
Mr. Rocchio as an Example .................................................................................................................83
Applying the Rocchio Rule? ................................................................................................................84
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................85
Praying for Justice ................................................................................................................................86
Cases
Aylett v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 54 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1995)......................................................82
Baker v. Keisker 142 N.E.2d 432, 434 (1957) .............................................................................................67
Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F.Supp.3d 1144 (S.D.Ind.2014)..................................................................................13
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). ................................................................................23
Boyle v. State, 97 Ind. 322, 332 (1884) .......................................................................................................82
Branan v. State, 316 N.E.2d 406, 408 (Ind.App.1974). ...............................................................................10
Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 962 (Ind. 2014)....................................................................................72
Brown v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 440 (7th Cir.), cert dend 133 S.Ct. 176 (2012) ..................................75
Cardinal Ritter High Sch., Inc. v. Bullock, 17 N.E.3d 281, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) ................................11
Childs v. Duckworth, 509 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (N.D. Ind. 1981) aff'd, 705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983) .......86
City Chapel Evangelical Free Inc. v. City of S. Bend ex rel. Dep't of Redevelopment, 744 N.E.2d 443,
450 (Ind. 2001) .........................................................................................................................................11
City of Fort Wayne v. Parrish, 32 N.E.3d 275, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) ...................................................55
Clark v. Clark, 578 N.E.2d 747, 74849 (Ind.App1991) .............................................................................85
Epperson v. State of Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968). ..............................................................................11
Faulkner v. Markkay of Indiana, Inc., 663 N.E.2d 798, (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) .............................................78
Finney v. Johnson, 179 N.E.2d 718 (1962) .................................................................................................68
Grand Victoria Casino & Resort, LP v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 789 N.E.2d 1041, 1048 (Ind. T.C.
2003) ........................................................................................................................................................82
Highler v. State, 854 N.E.2d 823, 829 (Ind. 2006)( ...................................................................................13
In re Arnold, 56 P.3d 259, 268 (Kan.2002) .................................................................................................46
In re Conn, 715 N.E.2d 379 (1999) ..............................................................................................................35
In re Dixon, 994 N.E.2d 1129, 1138 (Ind. 2013) .........................................................................................26
In re Fogle, 221 N.E.2d 675 (1966). ............................................................................................................47
In re Lee, 317N.E.2d 444, 445 (Ind.1974) ...................................................................................................18
In re Ogden, 10 N.E.3d 499, 501 (Ind. 2014) ..............................................................................................46
In re Raquet, 870 N.E.2d 1048 (Ind. 2007) ..................................................................................................84
In re Rocchio, 943 N.E.2d 797, 801 (Ind.2011) ...........................................................................................84
Indiana Family & Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Jones, 691 N.E.2d 1354, 1357 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998 ....................12
Johnston v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins Co., 667 N.E.2d 802, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) .............................78
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957) ..........................................................................76
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Applicant 24128
Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299 (1998)..............................................................................32

Love v. Rehfus, 946 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. 2011) ...............................................................................................72
Matter of Burns, 657 N.E.2d 738, 740 (Ind. 1995) ......................................................................................38
Matter of Garringer, 626 N.E.2d 809, 810 (Ind. 1994) ................................................................................14
Matter of Jones, 727 N.E.2d 711 (Ind.2000)................................................................................................84
Matter of Lucas, 672 N.E.2d 934 (1996) .....................................................................................................35
Matter of Staggs, 894 N.E.2d 535 (2008) ....................................................................................................35
Matthies v. First Presbyterian Church of Greensburg Indiana, Inc., 28 N.E.3d 1109, 1114 (Ind. Ct. App.
2015) ........................................................................................................................................................10
Muse v. Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Workers of Am., 2002 WL 449791 (S.D. Ind.
Jan. 29, 2002) ...........................................................................................................................................39
Nahmias Realty, Inc. v. Cohen, 484 N.E.2d 617, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)................................................79
Ogden v. Robertson, 962 N.E.2d 134 (Ind.App.2012) ................................................................................12
Ohio Valley Gas, Inc. v. Blackburn, 445 N.E.2d 1378, 1383 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) ....................................10
Oliver-Pullins v. Associated Material Handling Indus., Inc., No. 1:03CV0099-JDT-WTL, (U.D.C.,
S.D.Ind.) ...................................................................................................................................................38
Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Traina, 486 N.E.2d 1019 (Ind.1986) .......................................................14
Palin v. Indiana State Pers. Dep't, 698 N.E.2d 347, 350-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) .......................................82
Petition of Kalamara, 232 Ind. 535, 539 (1953) ..........................................................................................75
Petition of McDonald, 171 N.E.2d 691, 692-93 (1961)...............................................................................14
Petition of Webster, 171 N.E.2d 694, 695 (1961) ........................................................................................14
Pigg v. State, 929 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) ............................................................................12
Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 961 (Ind. 1993) ....................................................................................12, 73
Rosencranz v. Tidrington, 155 N.E. 705, 706 (1927), ................................................................................43
S.T. v. State, 764 N.E.2d 632, 635 (Ind.2002) .............................................................................................53
Sollers Pointe Co. v. Dep't of Local Gov't Fin., 790 N.E.2d 185, 191 (Ind. T.C. 2003) .............................79
State ex rel. Goldsmith v. Superior Court of Marion Cnty., 463 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Ind. 1984) ...................38
State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass'n v. Diaz, 838 N.E.2d 433, 438 (Ind.2005) ................................................14
State ex rel. Indiana State Bar Ass'n v. United Fin. Sys. Corp., 926 N.E.2d 8, 14 (Ind. 2010) ...................44
State ex rel. Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Comm'n v. Farmer, 978 N.E.2d 409, 412 (Ind. 2012) ..14
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 738 (2010) ...............67
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) ....................................................................................................11
Ward v. Tipton Cnty. Sheriff Dep't, 937 F. Supp. 791, 802 (S.D. Ind. 1996)( ..........................................37
Whitaker v. Becker, 960 N.E.2d 111, 115 (Ind.2012) .................................................................................49
Whitley Products, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 704 N.E.2d 1113, 1119-20 (Ind. T.C. 1998) ...........79
Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1368 (Ind. 1996) ...........................................................................72
Wright v. Steers, 179 N.E.2d 721, rehearing denied 180 N.E.2d 539 (1962)..............................................68
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) ..................................................................................................18
STATEMENT: Supreme Court Jurisdiction

Adm. & Disc. Rule 14, Section 2. Any applicant aggrieved by the final action of the State Board of Law
Examiners in refusing to recommend to the Supreme Court of Indiana the admission of the applicant to practice law
in Indiana for any reason other than the failure to pass any examination as set forth in section (1) may file a
petition [setting] forth specifically the reasons, in fact or law, assigned as error in the Board's
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Applicant 24128
determination. The Court may order further consideration of the application, [ ]. The Court shall enter such
order as in its judgment is proper, which shall thereupon become final.
Petitioner timely filed per this Rule. This Court graciously allowed the instant Amended Petition.
STANDARD OF REVIEW (Constitutional Issues)

While the function of appellate review does not encompass a calculated search of the record to
discover constitutional error; nevertheless, once constitutional error is discovered while examining
the transcript or is brought to the Court's attention, it cannot be ignored. Fundamental constitutional
guarantees are absolute and outside the discretion of any court to ignore or deny.
Branan v. State, 316 N.E.2d 406, 408 (Ind.App.1974). As the Boards Final Report notes, Applicant
cite[d] the following provisions of the Indiana Constitution: Art 1 2, 3, 5, 12 in his draft Conclusions
of Laws. Final Report, p.36, n.23. According to this Court, it would be error for this Court to ignore or
deny these constitutional claims. The following claims are advanced against the Board of Law
Examiners in this Petition.
STATEMENT: Constitutional Issues

Board of Law Examiners (BLE) Final Report of the Proceedings and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Recommendation as to Bar Applicant 24128 are herein referenced as Final Report [#].
Citations to Applicants response responding to the Final Report are herein reference as App.F.P. [#].
Citation to Applicants May 15, 2015-filed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Recommendations is
either Proposed Finding (as Examiners reference the document in their Final Report), or Exh. K.
VIOLATION OF LAW ALLEGED (Indiana Constitution)

Section 1. Inherent rights
WE DECLARE, That all people are created equal; that they are endowed by their CREATOR with certain
inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; See Kirtley v. State, 84
N.E.2d 712, 714 (1949) ([T]he personal liberty clause, Art. 1, 1 of the Constitution of Indiana [includes
the concept of] Liberty [which means] not only freedom from servitude and restraint, but embraces the
right of every one to be free in the use of their powers in the pursuit of happiness in such calling as they
may choose subject only to the restraints necessary to secure the common welfare.); See also Ohio
Valley Gas, Inc. v. Blackburn, 445 N.E.2d 1378, 1383 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)(The privilege of contracting
is both a liberty and a property right. It is protected by both the federal and state constitutions.)
CLAIM: The BLE has negatively impacted Petitioners right to pursue Petitioners profession without undue
interference by the State in the form of due process violations and unreasonable bureaucratic hurdles.
FACTS: Proposed Findings, aka Exh K, Exh H, 13, App.F.P. 70 & footnote, infra.
Section 2. Right to worship

All people shall be secured in the natural right to worship ALMIGHTY GOD, according to the dictates of
their own consciences. See Matthies v. First Presbyterian Church of Greensburg Indiana, Inc., 28 N.E.3d
1109, 1114 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)(The fundamental right to religious freedom, including the freedom to
believe and the freedom to act, is protected by the United States and Indiana Constitutions. The trial
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Applicant 24128
court's basis for granting summary judgment was that it was foreclosed by the First Amendment from
considering the issues at hand because to address such issues would have required the trial court to
interpret and apply religious doctrine or ecclesiastical law.)
CLAIM: The BLE invaded the fundamental right to religious freedom by inquiring into, weighing, and then
deeming suspect Petitioners religious beliefs and adherence to ecclesiastical law.
FACTS: Exh B, Character and Fitness evaluation of Magistrate Lori Morgan, Exh. F, Original Action affidavit, pp
37-49, Exh K, pp 6-8.
Section 3. Freedom of religious opinions

No law shall, in any case whatever, control the free exercise and enjoyment of religious opinions, or
interfere with the rights of conscience. City Chapel Evangelical Free Inc. v. City of S. Bend ex rel. Dep't
of Redevelopment, 744 N.E.2d 443, 450 (Ind. 2001) (From the literal text of Sections 2 and 3, the
discussions at the Constitutional Convention, and the surrounding circumstances, we conclude that the
framers and ratifiers of the Indiana Constitution's religious liberty clauses did not intend to afford only
narrow protection for a person's internal thoughts and private practices of religion and conscience The
inclusion of the phrase in any case whatever demonstrates the framers' and ratifiers' intent to provide
unrestrained protection for the articulated values.)
CLAIM: The BLE violated rights of conscience by refusing to allow Applicant to stand on his right to resist an
ultra vires order to pay for a psych eval as a condition precedent to bar applicant processing. CLAIM: The BLE
also violated Applicants right or conscience in 2014 by continuing to build up the Ross/Bowman/Sudrovech
inquisitions.
FACTS: Exh B, Character and Fitness evaluation of Magistrate Lori Morgan, Exh. F, Original Action affidavit, pp
37-49, Exh K, pp 6-8; Final Report: 11 & footnote, 13, 70 & footnote, 88 & footnote, 121 & footnote
Section 4. Freedom of religion

No preference shall be given, by law, to any creed, religious society, or mode of worship; and no person
shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support, any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against
his consent. Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of religious
theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of nonreligion; and
it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the
militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion,
and between religion and nonreligion. Epperson v. State of Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968). See also
Cardinal Ritter High Sch., Inc. v. Bullock, 17 N.E.3d 281, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)([C]ases [that] deal
directly with matters of faith and creed [likely implicate] rights under either the United States Constitution
or the Indiana Constitution.)
CLAIM: By mandating a secularist outlook on the law that brokers no competition from a Higher Laws confession
the BLE has violated the freedom of religion clause. Through the Morgan report and its questions in February 2014
the BLE maintained this violation of the wall of separation as to Applicant 24128.
CLAIM: By treating Applicant as suspect and in need of mental health review due to his creed the BLE violated
this clause of the Indiana Constitution.
FACTS: passim; Exb H
Section 5. No religious test for office

No religious test shall be required, as a qualification for any office of trust or profit. Torcaso v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488 (1961)(First Amendment makes it impossible for government, state or federal, to restore the
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Applicant 24128
historically and constitutionally discredited policy of probing religious beliefs by test oaths.) City Chapel
Evangelical Free Inc. v. City of S. Bend ex rel. Dep't of Redevelopment, 744 N.E.2d 443, 446 (Ind. 2001)
(We observe further that Article 1, Section 5 of the Indiana Constitution (No religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office of trust or profit) is similar but not identical to its federal
counterpart)
CLAIM: In 2009, and again in 2014, Applicant was subjected to a test oath Seeking statement that he would
confess his religion to be subordinate to the State.
FACTS: Exh.F pp 38-41, Exh.K, p 21; Exh H; Final Order: 11, 13, 70 & footnote, 121 & footnote
Section 9. Freedom of thought and speech

No law shall be passed, restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to
speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever: but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be
responsible. Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 961 (Ind. 1993) [Section] 9 has substantive content: that
popular comment on public concerns should not be restrained. Ogden v. Robertson, 962 N.E.2d 134
(Ind.App.2012), transfer denied 970 N.E.2d 665. (Indiana Constitution more jealously protects freedom
of speech guarantees than does the United States Constitution.)
CLAIM: Viewpoint and ideological discrimination in the context of government licensure, a case of first
impression under the Indiana constitution.
FACTS: Exh. H, Exh.K, 113& 88 & footnote, infra.
CLAIM: Retaliation for speech on matters of public interest communicated privately to a government body.
FACTS: 113, 88 & footnote, infra.
Section 12. Openness of the courts, Speedy trial

All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase;
completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay. See Indiana Family & Soc. Servs. Admin. v.
Jones, 691 N.E.2d 1354, 1357 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)(Although Jones was able to testify and crossexamine the witnesses, such exercise was meaningless. The ALJ essentially ignored any evidence which
tended to show that the allegations of abuse had not occurred. Jones, in essence, was not provided with an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether her license should be revoked. A hearing upon a license
revocation is meaningless unless the respondent is permitted to challenge the underlying allegations of
abuse.); Pigg v. State, 929 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)(The Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution and the Due Course of Law Clause of the Indiana Constitution prohibit state action
which deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without the process' or course of law that is due,
that is, a fair proceeding which entitles litigants to a full and fair opportunity to litigate their claim.)
CLAIM: Requirement to tender estimated $4500 in psychological evaluation or BLE would not process application
a violation of Rule 12 1
FACTS: Final Report 37, 39, 53; Exh K, pp. 13-14
CLAIM: Burden as a means to limit candidate from holding BLE to due process violates Rule 12 2
FACTS: Final Report 91; Exh I, p. 2, 5(g&h); Exh K, pp. 28-29
CLAIM: Use of ad hoc insight a violation since found nowhere in Rule 12 2
FACTS: Final Report 12, 65, fn.17; Exh I, p. 2, 5(i)
CLAIM: Refusal to limit inquiry into jurisprudence to violent overthrow violation of Rule 12 3
FACTS: Final Report 98, pp. 39-40 (conspicuously absent); Exh K, pp. 21-23
12
Applicant 24128
CLAIM: Failure to maintain character and fitness evaluators in every county violation of Rule 12 4
FACTS: Final Report 71, 97, 100; Exh K, pp. 6, 30
CLAIM: Reversal of processing, moving from Rule 12 7 back to Rule 12 5
FACTS: Final Report 49; Exh I, p. 2, 5(e&f); Exh K, pp. 31-32
CLAIM: The use of off-the-record hearings is a violation of due process using Rule 12 5
FACTS: Final Report 3, 8, 11, 28; Exh K, pp. 28-29
CLAIM: Use of ad hoc conditional denial found nowhere in Rule 12 6
FACTS: Final Report 39; Exh K, pp. 30 - 31
CLAIM: Refusal to promptly set and hold a hearing when tendered request under Rule 12 7
FACTS: Final Report 41; Exh K, pp. 33 - 35
CLAIM: Quashing of subpoenas prior to April 27, 2015 hearing violation of Rule 12 9
FACTS: Final Report 83, 92; Exh I, p. 3, 6-10
CLAIM: Limine denial and orders prior to April 27, 2015 hearing violation of Rule 12 9
FACTS: Final Report 86, 94-95, fn.21;
CLAIM: Refusal to notify Petitioner of areas of concern per (b) violation of Rule 12 9
FACTS: Exh I, p. 2, 5(a&b); Exh K, pp. 32-33
CLAIM: Denial of relevant and material witnesses a violation of Rule 12 9
FACTS: Final Report fn.5; 83, passim as to Bowman; Exh I, p. 6
CLAIM: Disqualifying applicant as lacking honesty, trustworthiness or fitness without credible evidence
FACTS: Final Report 116, 120; Exh K, pp. 2-5, 16 20
CLAIM: Injury to property and reputation without a remedy
FACTS: Final Report 22, 34, 116, 120, passim; Exh I, p. 7, 9(a&b); Exh K, pp. 25-26
CLAIM: Ten months to Rule 12 7 hearing request and then additional ten months to 12 9(h) report inordinate
amount of processing time
FACTS: Final Report 41, and pages 2 -3, footnote to Appeal 513-14;
VIOLATION OF LAW ALLEGED (Federal Constitution)

First Amendment: See Art 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 supra
Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection) See Art 1, 12 supra; See also Highler v. State, 854 N.E.2d
823, 829 (Ind. 2006)(Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33
(1992)[Mandates that,]In our heterogeneous society policy as well as constitutional considerations
militate against the divisive assumptionas a per se rulethat justice in a court of law may turn upon the
pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or the choice of religion.)
CLAIM: The Indiana system elevates gender over religion for protection, and religion is treated as a
second class characteristic by the BLE.
FACTS: See: Final Report 11 & footnote, 70 & footnote, 99, 121 & footnote,
Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process) See Art 1, 4, 5, 12 supra; See also Baskin v. Bogan, 12
F.Supp.3d 1144 (S.D.Ind.2014), affirmed 766 F.3d 648, cert, dend. (Because they are so important, an
individual's fundamental rights, protected by due process, may not be submitted to vote.)
CLAIM: Examiners vote on bar admission for candidates, rendering the process a mere popularity
contest.
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Applicant 24128
FACTS: Final Report 96, Exh K, pp 11, 28-29.

See generally for all constitutional claims: Exh.H, Exh.F, Exh.K, Exh.I, Exh.D, This Petition, infra,
seriatim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW (Board of Law Examiners)

The general rule is well established that this court will not disturb the decision of administrative
boards unless the action of such boards is shown to be arbitrary or capricious or void because of
other illegality. [ ] Although the Board of Law Examiners is appointed by this court, we See no
reason why this court should adopt a different rule with regard to the administrative function
imposed upon it.
Petition of McDonald, 171 N.E.2d 691, 692-93 (1961) ; See also Petition of Webster, 171 N.E.2d 694,
695 (1961) (There is no evidence of an arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the board which
would authorize us to review or reverse the action of the State Board of Law Examiners.) In the final
lines of McDonald this Court set the trip line for its review lightly: There is no showing or contention made
to the court that the decision of the Board as herein presented was either arbitrary or capricious and therefore it is
the opinion of this court that the decision of the Board must be affirmed. 241 Ind. at 242 (emphasis added).
Herein Petitioner raises the contention that the decisions of the Board (both the denial and the lifetime
ban) are themselves both arbitrary and capricious. Petitioner also posits evidence of animus, and
advances a claim under the class of one Equal Protection analysis.
Petitioner furthermore, contends that many of the decisions and orders of the Board on the path to their
Final Report were arbitrary or capricious.
STANDARD OF REVIEW (Scope)

In reviewing these constitutional claims and allegations of arbitrary and capricious government processing
this Court should review the entire record: This Court's review in disciplinary cases is de novo, and we
examine all matters presented. Matter of Garringer, 626 N.E.2d 809, 810 (Ind. 1994)
STANDARD OF REVIEW (Findings of Fact)

Court examines the Commission's claims considering the evidence in light of the Commission's
burden of proof. See State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass'n v. Diaz, 838 N.E.2d 433, 438 (Ind.2005)
[The burden of proof in attorney discipline cases and judicial discipline cases is clear and
convincing evidence. See Admis. Disc. R. 23, 14(h); Admis. Disc. R. 25(VIII)(K)(6).]
State ex rel. Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Comm'n v. Farmer, 978 N.E.2d 409, 412 (Ind. 2012)
Clear and convincing evidence is defined as an intermediate standard of proof greater than a
preponderance of the evidence and less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It requires the existence of
a fact to be highly probable. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Traina, 486 N.E.2d 1019 (Ind.1986).
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Applicant 24128
STANDARD OF REVIEW (Conclusion)

Thus while undertaking de novo review on the entire record against the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard, with a special emphasis upon review of any designated violations of fundamental
constitutional guarantees, this Court should apply, in the main, its own precedent regarding attorney
discipline (and the Indiana constitution) to determine and issue such order as in its judgment is proper,
which shall thereupon become final. Rule 14, 2.
STATEMENT: Of the Case

This petition by Applicant 24128 asks the Court to review the record of his third application to join the
Indiana bar. His first was in 1996, which was abandoned when he was certified by the State of Kansas and
accepted into its bar in September of that year. His second attempt was in 2007, one year after the Missouri
Supreme Court approved him to sit for their bar exam after the National Conference of Bar Examiners
found him of sufficient character and fitness.1 Applicant 24128, after 29 months of processing by the BLE,
was denied certification and ordered to not again apply to the Indiana bar until Fall, 2013. This petition is
the result of the denial of that third (2013) application.
January/February 2014: Off-the-record hearings result in clearance to sit for bar exam
The November 2013-filed application resulted in a personal interview with a Magistrate Judge in which
inquiry was made of how Petitioner would resolve conflicts between his beliefs and law. The Magistrate
Lori K. Morgan found herself unable to recommend certifying Petitioner, instead deferring to the full Board
with recommendation that the Board inquire into [a] matter of concern that arose during the application
process in 2008, [that being Applicants] fitness to practice law in Indiana and concerns over his willingness
to obey state and federal law even when doing so violates his conscience. The Magistrates line of inquiry
was followed by a more thorough probing of Petitioners belief system in an informal hearing before the
nearly full Board in which Applicant was asked to discuss his religious views and how they impacted his
jurisprudence. In both meetings the reviewers yet focused upon the 2007-09 application, in which Applicant
had been asked whether he would choose Gods law over mans law (on the record) and denied certification,
at least in part, due to his theocentric jurisprudence, with no analysis of constitutional law, civil rights law
or Adm. & Disc. Rule 12 3.
According to the Examiners, Applicant should be banished from the Indiana courts for, inter alia, offering to
submit to an evaluation by the National Conference of Bar Examiners. 71. At the risk of doubling his banishment
to two lifetimes, Applicant re-proposes said offer in the hope that such calibration might prove salubrious.
15
Applicant 24128
In February of 2014 Applicant was asked by the Board to agree that his denial and five year
banishment from court in 2009 was done in good faith. Applicant was also asked to detail how he would
respond in situations where his Christian faith and legal duties came into conflict. It was obvious that the
2009 processing was yet the focus of the Board, and it was also obvious that the Board regarded Applicants
religious perspectives suspect.
While the Examiners did allow Applicant to set for the February 2014 exam, which he passed, they
still did not certify him for character and fitness, instead requesting that he repeat an estimated $4500 in
psychological counseling the very same path that had caused Applicant to lodge complaints alleging
violations of conscience and free exercise right during the second application processing. The Examiners,
furthermore, refused to take notice of credible allegations of a fraud on this Court incident to Applicants
2007-2009 processing, claims discovered during the prosecution of Brown v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 440
(7th Cir.), cert dend 133 S.Ct. 176 (2012), including seeming concerns of the Seventh Circuit panel set
forth in the footnotes of that decision.
Regarded as mentally ill and responding like a constitutionalist
Applicant objected to being regarded as mentally ill by the Examiners, who violated the terms of a
Department of Justice memorandum regarding the Americans with Disabilities Act that they had publicly
pledged to obey at the very time that they were processing the Applicant in a fashion violative of that very
pledge. The Examiners report demonstrates a searing focus upon the Applicants thoughts, assumptions
and level of insight.
After months of requesting that Applicant pay $4500 to tender a psychological evaluation under
the control of the Examiners, to which Applicant repeatedly replied that he could neither afford nor deem
justified on the factual record, nor deem legally justifiable under federal and state law, the Examiners, on
September 22, 2014, after a review of Petitioners arguments, denied Applicant 24128 character and fitness
certification with an appeal to Rule 12 6 and a conditional denial order violative of the same.
Official stonewalling or reasonable delay?
Applicant promptly filed for review pursuant to Rule 12 7. Then began more than eight months of actions
by the Examiners deemed to be arbitrary and capricious by the Applicant. These actions included a reversal
in the application processing, creating a discovery right for the State (but not the Applicant), repeatedly
reversing seemingly binding decisions of Board counsel, and denying Applicant critical witnesses while
filling the record at bar with numerous ultra vires, discriminatory and unconstitutional rulings/orders, as
documented in Applicants Proposed Findings, Exh. K and affidavit at Exh. I.
16
Applicant 24128
The Examiners, more than ten months after their Rule 12 6 denial, and more than sixteen months
after they had notified Applicant that he passed the February, 2014 exam, and more than 20 months after
the application was filed, finally authored a document (their first such published justification, not counting
the evaluation of Magistrate Morgan) allegedly justifying their reasons for denial, in which they also seek
an order banishing Applicant from re-applying for life.
Of pretexts and botched investigations
Applicant argues that the July 17, 2015 document is a pretext covering up a botched bar applicant
investigation (as revealed by the States discovery) and retaliation against a whistleblower seeking to reform
a system that lacks due process safeguards. (See application, cover letter, Bowman and Sudrovech reports.)
Applicant further notes that the tone and desired result of the Boards Final Report may constitute standalone evidence of animus, and especially so in light of the history of discipline and paucity of substantial
allegations therein, as well as the seeming retaliation for bringing civil rights litigation and arguing like an
attorney. (See, e.g., fn 5, & 101, Final Report.)
So far all has been written in the third person, which has the benefit of sounding lawyerly but the
drawback of plodding along. First person is much quicker, and it is my preference, as the attorney a pro
se Petitioner. While the old adage may be true, this arrangement has this one great advantage the Court
can judge whether the Examiners negative evaluation of my lawyering skill is valid. I am writing all if
this without the benefit of counsel or legal advice. It is all my work product, just as Exh K is, and, truth be
told, everything in most all of my files with the Board other than the petition for cert in Brown v. Bowman,
which Professor Charles Rice and Walter Weber (D.C. bar) had a hand in after I roughed it out.
A dialectical design
So from this point forward pro se Petitioner will prove up the facts by citation to the record, lay out the
relevant law to rebut allegations against him, demonstrate allegations of fraud on this Court, and posit that
the Board has erred. At the end of all of that he will sum all up in a conclusion that will hopefully move
this Honorable Court to docket this case for a written opinion using the Indiana Constitution to enlarge the
Hoosier States Bill of Rights to protect future bar license applicants, and, by analogy, any persons of
conscience or of a politically dissenting nature who find themselves in a bureaucratic struggle with
government agents unwilling to be held to their own obligations to obey the law. I should add that I believe
this Honorable Court is herein faced with a series of reputation-shredding errors by a government agency
that should be remedied through a remuneration in keeping with the Founders intent in Article I. Section
12.
17
Applicant 24128
I have drafted this Petition to allow a meaningful and substantive review of the entire past 20 months
with only three documents at hand: My Proposed Findings (thesis, the Board has erred); The Examiners
Final Report (antithesis, the Applicant lacks character and fitness); and this document (synthesis, analyzing
thesis in light of antithesis while responding to the allegations and contradictions throughout antithesis).2
Dramatic foreshadowing
The Examiners Final Report threw pretty much everything and the kitchen sink at the wall. Its 122
paragraphs are rife with factual inaccuracies, misstatements of the record and arguments that completely
ignore settled law. Most of the cases cited are inapposite, and the Rules are cited but not actually employed.
It is picture perfect example of obscurum per obscurius, and quite the test of my powers to discriminate
between that which could be briefed and that which must be briefed.
ADDRESSING: My Allegations of Factual Error by the Examiners

In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) the Court located (in the use of an otherwise impartial
law) a fact pattern demonstrating that the law had been applied and administered by public authority with
an evil eye and an unequal hand. This was so glaring as to result in unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar circumstances. Such being the case, the Yick Wo Court remedied a denial of
equal justice. Id.(emphasis added). Since foreign attorneys petitioning to enter the Indiana bar are
guaranteed equal treatment by In re Lee, 317N.E.2d 444, 445 (Ind.1974) (we cannot accept one standard
of integrity of the advantaged and another of the disadvantaged, anymore than we can apply varying
standards of professional competence for initial admission to the bar of this state), processing before the
Indiana Board of Law Examiners should parallel the Disciplinary Counsels processing of cases against
attorneys. (And it is certainly true that inequality should not be countenanced as between applicants.)
Strict adherence to the impartially administered rule of law is the sure and certain guardrail to ensure no
more Yick Wos. The BLE has not so operated, as the factual and legal errors set forth herein attest. See
also Exh K, Petitioners Proposed Findings presenting arguments from the Record at bar.
My report and Board counsels report were both due June 11, 2015. I rushed and filed mine on May 15, so that
the Board might be able to read it and reconsider the path they had chosen. I had hoped that by so clearly laying
out my case against their processing of my application they might grant me a license and forestall the need for this
document. They instead doubled down, recommending the maximum sentence available to them: denial and
lifetime banishment from reapplication. It is a sentence that will, if upheld, likely affect me for life, as that it is
unlikely that I will able to join any state bar (in addition to Kansas) under such a sentence given the reputational
damage which it visits upon me.
2
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Applicant 24128
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Admit
[BLE heading] Facts Relating to the Applicants Prior Applications

2.
Admit
3.
Admit. This recital fails to cite to Character and Fitness evaluator Kelly Huebner. See Exh. A
242-244
4.
Deny. I have consistently argued this finding was in error in 2009, and have subsequently
discovered evidence supporting that claim. See post-hearing motion #6, Section C; See also Missouri
Report, infra.
5.
Admit
6.
Deny. The NCBE did clear me as to character and fitness, as did Missouri, to the best of my
understanding. I was invited to sit for the Missouri bar examination, without any reservation as to
character and fitness communicated to me the year before I applied to Indiana for the second time (in
2007). This is one of the paragraphs that I have flagged as containing material error.
7.
Admit in general only. A 55-year old applicant with my life history would generate more pages in
response to the BLE-mandated application than a 25-year old fresh from law school. This recital fails to
cite to Character and Fitness evaluator the Honorable Nancy Boyer. See Exh. A 251 252 RecReform
8.
Admit in general, but please see arguments against Boards policy of citing off-the-record
meetings as evidence to justify subsequent decisions in a manner insulated from meaningful appellate
review infra. (Recommending reform BLE procedures; hereinafter RecReform.)
9.
Deny. This is one of the paragraphs that I have flagged as containing material error. Dr. Ross
report should be allowed to speak for itself, for professionals who reviewed it have told me it is quite
strange. No one else who has interviewed me, psychologist or psychiatrist, came up with the same
hypothetical as Ross3 which was utilized to send me deeper into psych processing:
Mr. Brown presents himself in a manner that indicates immediate familiarity with the others.
Furthermore, his emotional expressiveness and mood variability suggest to me the possibility of a subclinical bipolar disorder of a hypomanic type. The fervor [ ] in which he represents himself vis a vis
others and the intensity of his interpersonal style suggests a sub-clinical level of a bipolar disorder which
would warrant further consideration by a psychiatrist. I do not believe that the aforementioned
problems should preclude Mr. Brown from taking the bar exam. He has a unique style of
Such a result is quite common in the science of ad hoc psych evals: John Ioannidis, professor of health
research and policy at Stanford University, said the study was impressive and that its results had been eagerly
awaited by the scientific community. Sadly, the picture it paints - a 64% failure rate even among papers published
in the best journals in the field - is not very nice about the current status of psychological science in general, and for
fields like social psychology it is just devastating, he said.
3
http://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/aug/27/study-delivers-bleak-verdict-on-validity-of-psychology-experiment-results
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Applicant 24128
interpersonal interaction which does not necessarily rise to the level of not allowing him to take the bar.
He appears to have moral integrity but an idiosyncratic style which may be indicative of a subclinical
bipolar illness. Further inquiry is warranted.
10.
Deny. This is one of the paragraphs that I have flagged as containing material error. Dr. Rosss
only bold statement in his 2008 report was that I be cleared to sit for the exam; he found me to have good
moral character and sufficient fitness. Drs. Alexy, Sass, Flueckiger and Bowman all interviewed me after
Ross, and all rejected his possibility of a sub-clinical bipolar disorder of a hypomanic type theory, based
entirely upon my communications to him, as devoid of merit. As Bowman pointed out, people do not just
come down with bipolar at the tender age of 48. A fine question for Dr. Ross is whether he was directed
to so find, to come up with some reason to remand to a psychiatrist. That is one of the questions I have
oft asked -- the answer may reveal fraud on this Court.
11.
Deny. Nowhere does the previous record contain the words vehemently resisted, raising the
question of who is attempting to edit the Boards 2009 report to testify via the Boards 2015 Final Report.
Given that a majority of the current Board members (including two of three of the signatories to the
Panels instant report) were not even on the Board in Spring, 2008, and Board counsel was not active in
the file at that time (to the best of my knowledge), the vehemently resisted is hearsay at best, and
possibly evidence of animus. I was present, and will merely direct the Court to the correspondence file,
where no evidence of vehement resistance is found. The choice of those words likely reveals what the
author/s thinks of those who dare question the State.
Communication rebranded as conduct
12.
Deny. The Board witnessed no behavior. I was before the Board once in 2007 and again in
2009. Nothing in the record fairly supports the charge that my communication then was antagonistic and
threatening.4 That is the 2015 author taking great literary license with the 2009 report rather than being
content to merely quote the language of the 2009 Board. No objective evidence supports the allegation
that I ignored and abused the 2009 hearing process. I did indeed write my character and fitness
evaluator a letter asking her, politely, if she might need to recuse for cause. That May 1, 2009 letter is
found in the record at B7-2B. It was far from demonizing as the Board alleges,5 but it was questioning
I recommend a review of the June 1, 2009 transcript, from which quotes are pulled and distorted in the 2009
Order, as well as in the Final Report. The most constitutionally significant (abusive) exchange during that
hearing began when I was asked by an Examiner, during my Rule 12 9 hearing, if I firmly believe that I am
obligated as a Christian to put obedience to Gods law above human law? C138. I answered in the affirmative
and was disqualified as unfit for so doing. I have refused to recant, and am yet deemed unfit..
5
This unsupported charge of demonizing as a pseudonym for self-defense is an example of a label-making
government commission that neither plays nice nor fights fair.
20
Applicant 24128
her objectivity, which seemingly violates the Boards belief that bar applicants enjoy no rights under the
state or federal constitutions while being processed. See burden argument, infra.
13.
Admit that the 2009 Board was biased against those who question the government, as is the 2015
Board. Note communication which the Board dislikes (i.e. whistleblowing as to constitutional and due
process violations) is deemed to constitute conduct. Note reliance on insight as a disqualifier for bar
admission. See analysis, infra. RecReform
14.
Admit that the Board denied me a law license based upon, in the main, my religiously-informed
political science (jurisprudence) and ordered me to not apply again for five years in an unsigned final
report that contained no analysis against constitutional provisions, not one citation to case law, no citation
to a statute, and not even a citation to any of the criteria of Rule 12, 2. As the Board states, see 11,
lack of insight into conduct (i.e. challenging the Board as to constitutional and/or due process issues)
is independently sufficient to [find applicant] lacks the requisite good moral character for admission to
this bar. (Emphasis added.) The 2015 Board remains as committed to enforcing this non-Rule 12, 2
term against core political speech as did the 2009 Board. See analysis, infra.
15.
Admit in general only, noting that I did not then fully understand the fraud perpetrated upon the
Court; See analysis infra.

16.
Admit
17.
Admit. Note the Examiners use of the term processing of his application, which they later in the
Final Report cite as evidence of my abusive language. (I.e., it is not abusive when they do it.)
18.
Admit. Note that the Court had no idea, nor did I, as to the fraud that would be admitted in the
Bowman report filed with the federal court in February, 2010. Admit case dismissed on jurisdictional
question, not on the merits. Could have refiled in state court, elected not to. The Ross letter is, without a
doubt, hearsay. See analysis infra
19.
Admit attempt to facilitate briefing intended to bring fraud to the Courts attention.
20.
Admit
21.
Admit
[BLE heading] Facts Relating to the Applicants Third and Most Recent Application
22.
Admit
23.
Admit, note size concerns already discussed, supra. See A001. Note duty of candor owed to
process, thus causing applicants to rightly err on disclosure, not restraint. Note that more than some of the
21
Applicant 24128
pages in my file were put there by opposing counsel, including parts of the record that I thought
unnecessary. 6
24a. Admit, as directed to do, repeatedly, by the Boards Executive Director. The Board took no issue
with anything I wrote in my February 14, 2014 letter, including my recounting of what I was asked at the
off-the-record meeting. I also asked to be judged under Indiana case law dealing with admissions, which
I cited to the Examiners to render that more likely to happen. (None of those directly on-point cases
(some as to merits, all as to discipline) are in the Final Report.)
24b. For reasons unknown, the Examiners have failed to include any reference to the Rule 12, Section 4
process in their factual account.7 RecReform
24c. The Board likewise fails to mention Magistrate Lori Morgans character and fitness report. It is
found at Exh B. I recommend the Court review it, both due to its agreement with the character and fitness
reports of Boyer (2007) and Huebner (1996) and its reliance upon ideology to non recommend.
25.
Admit. See analysis of due process concerns as to the Boards use of off-the-record hearings, infra
26.
Admit. Note no written justification for this failure to recognize a prima facia case of character
and fitness. None would be written for more than a year, until the Final Report eighteen months later.
RecReform
27.
Deny. Please see repeated assurances from Board that I have been given the total file in this
matter. Note even accusations of wrongdoing on my part for asking again after being told I have my
entire file. That file, which is the record in this matter, contains no minutes or attendance tallies or any
record at all from this off-the-record meeting, or any other such meetings, and thus I must flag this note as
to attendance as either hearsay (the Board testifying once again) or evidence that the Board has not yet
tendered to me the total and entire file as it repeatedly claims.
28.
Admit in general only. When the Board President informed me, on February 13, that I was cleared
to sit for the bar examination twelve days ahead, but not certified as to character and fitness, I informed
In similar fashion it was the BLE that helped supersize my 2007-09 application by including my Indiana 1996,
Kansas 1996 and Missouri 2005 submissions all quite duplicative, none requested by me, none included this time
around. After mandating their inclusion in 2009, the Board then argued that my file was massive and led this Court
to reject for that reason alone. See November 16, 2009 order.
7
On January 8, 2014 I met with Allen County Magistrate Lori K. Morgan. Her report of that meeting is a crucial
piece of evidence, and, in fact, the only writing of the Board addressing my character and fitness prior to the July
17, 2015 final report. The Morgan report can be read at Exh.B. My letter to Magistrate Morgan recounting our
meeting, which she did not discount, is at C211. My recounting of the curious way in which I came to be
interviewed by an Allen County Magistrate (when Section 4 calls for the county of my choice) is recounted here:
Exh.K, pp. 6 8.
22
Applicant 24128
her that I would have to consider this option before committing and would let her know. I wrote the
February 14 letter to communicate to the Board my choice to go forward and to address some of the
questions put to me in the off-the-record meeting of February 13. The Board did not deny that my
recounting of the February 13 meeting was accurate, including the question of whether I could agree that
the 2009 Board operated in good faith. Also note the flagging of my use of the term agents. The Board
prefers representatives. Failure to abide by the Boards preferences on such matters is counted as
evidence of a lack of insight, as are allegations of due process violations. The colored outside the lines
quote flagged by the Board is actually on C030. I stand behind my analysis of Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). It is directly on-point with the Boards dedication to pledges of allegiance
and demonstrations of loyalty to insight.
29.
Admit, note email is revealing as to my motivation.
30
Admit that I updated the Board, as directed to do, repeatedly, by the Boards Executive Director.
31.
Admit that I used that update to further the work begun on February 14 of putting the questions
that I was asked during the off-the-record hearing into the record.
32.
Admit
33.
Admit
And now a note from our sponsor (psych eval letter)

34.
Deny. Sent to my counsel three weeks after I was informed that I had passed the exam, Executive
Director Bradley Skolniks letter read:

[O]n May 20, 2014 the Board met to consider Mr. Browns pending application for admission to
the bar upon examination. After careful and deliberate consideration, the Board voted to request
that Mr. Brown obtain updated psychological testing from one of the following licensed clinical
psychologists at [a firm owned and operated by one of the three, a psychologist who has served on
the State Board of Psychology with Dr. Stephen Ross the past decade.] The psychological testing
should consist of a battery of measures comparable to prior assessments Mr. Brown has
undergone, testing the applicants personality and current functioning. Mr. Brown will be
required to sign a release allowing the Board access to the raw testing data and the testing
psychologist to have access to the applicants filings with the Board.
Emphasis added. I note that I hold my entire and total record and no document records the Boards
alleged careful and deliberate consideration culminating in a vote and then a request that was, in fact,
a demand. See request analysis at Exh F., p 65; See voting analysis at Exh K.
35.
Admit
36.
Deny, it was no request. My response included:

Please realize that if this request communicates a legally binding condition precedent then it
constitutes a bar to my admission to the practice of law in Indiana. I simply do not have the
23
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financial resources project cost in excess of $4000 appeal to [BLE] to held find an
affordable path to certification . I humbly submit that my pending application amply documents
my good moral character and fitness, precluding the need for further psychological testing [you
have] no grounds on which to [order] supplemental testingI respectfully submit that a battery of
additional psychological testing of such an intrusive and subjectivist manner is not warranted in the
context of the bar admission of a licensed practitioner lacking any felony arrests (ever) or any
misdemeanor convictions (nor even arrests) in the past 22 years. As for the question of my
current functioning, please See [bar application] .I stand prepared to take the Oath of attorneys
(without exception or caveat) I have never been disciplined in my nearly 18 years of practice .
[dedication to] full candor [pledged and explained] I remain hopeful that I can add an Indiana
license to my recent Masters degree and thus escape the reputational fall-out and economic
hardships currently impacting my family and career at law. [Emphasis added]
37.
Admit
38.
Admit, recommend the letter to the Court as the best explanation of where this application stood
one year ago. Note that Timothy J. Sudrovech, MA, LCSW, LCAC, is a social worker who works for the
Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program (JLAP), a government agency, making him a government
agent. This Courts agent who really did pre- and post- brief the government-mandated psychologist and
government-mandated psychiatrist. Exh E Appeal 293, 35, Appeal 298 55, Appeal 308 101,
Appeal 309 -316, Appeal 325 165.
39.
Admit that my third application to join this Courts bar was denied eleven months ago, on
September 22, 2014, in a letter that could have issued in response to my letter of June 23, 2014. Further
admit that the Board did not follow Rule 12, 6 and instead issued what can only be called an ultra vires
conditional denial. See analysis at Exh. K.
40.
Admit; See Exh. F.
41.
Admit. I had to file that request for hearing without the benefit of any statement of the Board on
my character and fitness, as is per Board policy, and without the benefit of a review of the Morgan report,
which the Board refused to tender until 13 months after the fact. See Exh. K. RecReform
42.
Admit
43.
Admit. The Board eventually responded to my request for information as to its seemingly
nonstandard processing: It is not the role of the Board to educate any applicant on the policies and
procedures of the Board of Law Examiners. Exh. E Appeal 371 RecReform
44a.Admit in general only. I never admitted that the evidence was not in dispute, for I realized that the
Board had focused very narrowly on its request and had ignored all else in my file, including the
Bowman answer and my allegation of fraud on this Court. I was concerned that the Board planned to
send the Section 8 up with a narrow question of its ability to so request and an even narrower record.
Those concerns were detailed in my October filing with this Court, where I predicted that the Board may
24
Applicant 24128
so attempt to stall my application with procedural questions rather than substantive review which the
Board was refusing to do without a report from a psychologist of its own choosing, pre-briefing, postbriefing, while my family paid the estimated $4500 cost as it did five years earlier.
44b. Note that the BLE never questioned my $4500 estimate. Neither did the BLE offer to help my
family pay that amount in 2014. When the BLE finally did offer to pay that in 2015, incident to an ultra
vires act of reversing the processing of my application, it refused to answer logically compelling questions
to why the offer of a grant was not forthcoming in 2014, or 2008, when I clearly requested such
assistance and was ignored. These questions of funding are in my January 22 and February 12, 2015
letters, which the Board focuses upon not to answer the reasonable questions asked therein, but to
accuse me of seditious conduct for asking such questions. See infra.
45.
Admit that I delivered said letter when the Board failed to work with me to build a stipulated
record pursuant to Rule 12, Section 8, and that it included the allegation that the Board was refusing to
investigate my application. I did not know (at that time) that the Board was suffering under the erroneous
belief that I had committed perjury in the June 1, 2009 hearing and was also liable for the unauthorized
practice of law. When the Board finally, in March, sixteen months after I filed my application and six
months after denial, finally deemed it best to have me formally respond to such spurious allegations I did
so, dispositively. See Exh. E, Appeal 064 and Exh E, Appeal 233. (I posit these constitute evidence of a
botched investigation.)
46.
Deny in part. I had actually reported on a significant lack of financial resources in April, 2014 (C
058), reporting before the Board ordered me into an estimated $4500 psych eval that my family was in an
economic crisis due to my lack of work and graduate school expenses. I notified the Board six months
earlier, Please realize that if this request communicates a legally binding condition precedent then it
constitutes a bar to my admission to the practice of law in Indiana. The Board ignored that reality for 90
days and denied me for failing to comply with its $4500, I-say-ultra vires, unconstitutional, and privacy
invasive request. (And thus unlawful, and thus one that created no duty to obey.)
47.
Admit that I brought no friendly witnesses to the April 27, 2015 hearing8 because the Board
quashed witnesses Ross, Bowman, Sudrovech and Harrell and refused to aid me in the search for witness
Susan Shayne, a former employee of this Court (i.e the Board) who had information relevant to the Rule
The Board states that only one witness appeared at the hearing. Such is not quite the case, as that Exh K uses the
testimony from Board counsel (as to my 2009 mental health tests, which were not in evidence), as well as
admission from all three Examiners present to demonstrate the arbitrary and capricious nature of the Panels
processing. See Exh. K, passim.
25
Applicant 24128
12, Section 4 due process violation which I allege. Having been denied key witnesses needed to clear my
good name, I abandoned the plan to put on any witnesses at all. See Exh K, See Exh.I.
48.
Admit. The Examiners seemingly labor under the belief that merely entertaining the thought that
government employees could be less than completely unbiased and without even the slightest whiff of
partisanship is akin to sedition. I do not believe that fiction, and five minutes researching political
donations, advocacy associations and public statements of past Examiners (if not current) should disabuse
the Board of that fiction as well.9
Miracle on South Meridian? Resurrecting a dead application (live to delay another day?)
49.
Admit in general. The Board attempted to resurrect my September 22, 2014-denied application,
sua sponte, after it had been four months in the metaphorical grave. The Boards act was arbitrary,
capricious and possible evidence of animus. The Board was just not going to take no for an answer as to
me seeing their designated shrink they either thought I needed him desperately (for reasons not recorded
in any document of record) or that they needed him desperately to aid them in writing a report on me.
RecReform
50.
Admit. The letter asks cogent questions in light of the Boards ultra vires attempt to reverse the
flow of the statutorily (and thus due process) defined processing. I was admittedly stressed and strident in
that letter. Such can be said of all of my correspondence after the Boards attempt to stave off review
before this Court through re-animating my denied application by putting the Rule 12 processing in
reverse, as my fate then led me 650 miles west to find work in Kansas, where I now live separated (not
legally) from my wife and five kids so that I can best support them as an attorney. My letters from
January 2015 onward should be read within that social context.
51.
Deny. This is one of the paragraphs that I have flagged as containing material error. The Board
errs in stating that I held my entire file on February 12, 2015. I had no minutes, nor evidence of any
investigation of my application by the Board (whatsoever), nor drafts of the Rule 12, Section 8 filing that
was allegedly planned for January 16, nor the character and fitness report of Magistrate Lori K.
Morgan. Given what the Board testifies in Final Report, I still do not have the entire file of even a
full copy of the documents incident to my 2007-09 or 2013-15 processing. RecReform
The Examiners position appears to be that merely inquiring into recusal procedures is evidence of a lack of
character and fitness. If so, could not this Court be shown lacking in that area for having codified such in the Rules
governing judges? Attorneys have to deal with this sensitive topic, and do sometimes raise the ire of judges by so
doing. See In re Dixon, 994 N.E.2d 1129, 1138 (Ind. 2013)(Dixon was found to have violated no duties to the court
in so doing. The Examiners seemingly reject such a conclusion, even in the abstract.)
26
Applicant 24128
52
Admit in part. The February 9, 2015 filing speaks for itself. As to footnote 13, See http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Court+of+the+Star+Chamber
53.
Admit in part. See analysis of this allegation infra.
54.
Admit
55.
Admit that the Board failed to appreciate (let alone answer) my questions based upon a 2000 year
old Latin maxim. (Cui bono? See http://mentalfloss.com/article/57898/20-latin-phrases-you-should-be-using) I

had first asked those questions in immediate reaction to the Boards January 20, 2015 attempted reanimation of my denied application. The more sarcastic tone came in the quoted February letter, after the
Board ignored the same questions (that went to the allegedly always relevant question of bias) asked in
the January 22 letter.
56.
Admit
57.
Admit that I was given less than 20 days notice of a Rule 12 9 hearing.
58.
Admit that I pulled an all-nighter to get ready for the hearing by getting my subpoena requests to
the Board the next day.

59.
Admit that I asked for a three week continuance (the Board made it six). I had little choice after
the Board took ten days to issue me blank subpoenas, delivering them less than ten days ahead of the
hearing. See Exh. K
60.
Deny. This application entered into a litigation mode at the insistence of Board counsel Brenda
Rodeheffer. After which she accused me litigating too thoroughly. See litigation analysis, infra.
61.
Deny. This is one of the paragraphs that I have flagged as containing material error. This
application entered into a discovery mode at the insistence of Board counsel Brenda Rodeheffer. After
which she accused me of engaging too thoroughly. All of my discovery was relevant to issues used
against me in the Boards Final Report. See discovery analysis, infra.
62.
Deny. The Panel erred when it did not slate this matter under Rule 12, 8. See Exh K and Exh I
(affidavit not in evidence for reasons unknown a brief overview of manifold errors of BLE.)
63.
Deny. See appearance analysis, infra.
[BLE heading] Assessment of the Applicants Efforts in Carrying His Burden to Demonstrate that
He Possesses the Requisite Character and Fitness under Rule 12
64.
Deny
27
Applicant 24128
65.
Deny in part. Please note that the Examiners are not quoting from the 2009 record, they are
paraphrasing in a most prejudicial manner, revealing contemporary animus. (See especially arguing and
accusing in light of the actual 2009 transcript.)
A shotgun approach to leveling allegations that include how I think
66.
Deny. It is easy to level such accusations, much more difficult to prove them. Note the absence of
citations to the record. Note that in the paragraphs to follow the Board fails to prove these quite
accusatory accusations.
67
Admit, noting that the flag For instance communicates that the Board is marshaling evidence
responsive to 66. Of course, were I not discontented by that order I would not have sought review from
the SCOTUS, as that those content with judicial orders seldom appeal. My arguments on brief, in early
2010, are thus cited as evidence of obstreperous and abusive behavior justifying my lifelong
banishment from Court in 2015, after having just served an effective eight years of banishment.10 I do
commend that brief to this Court -- it is relevance still.
68
Admit, noting that this paragraphs footnote may reveal more about this Board and its reliance
upon expensive mental health practitioners than it does about me. See analysis, infra.
69.
Admit, noting that the Board cites as yet another example of my obstreperous and abusive
behavior justifying a lifelong banishment from Court my hope and prayer voiced in note #12 on page
A 003, as well the revolutionary (to the Board anyway) implications arising out of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the preamble to the professional code governing attorneys. This likely reveals more
about the Board than me. See conscience and viewpoint analysis, infra.
A secularist creed that brokers no dissent
70.
Deny in part. See correspondence at C007, A 002, C015. I actually attempted to take religion off
the table with my creedal statement, which included provisions of the Indiana Bill of Rights. A009. In
reality, it is the Examiners who are found enforcing a creed: I merely set mine out in the hopes of
escaping from this law of the case that has seemingly done me in once again:
10
The Examiners failed to comment on the footnote accompanying the above allegedly disqualifying thought, in
which I confessed to advancing the argument, on brief, that I should have enjoyed a presumption of good moral
character and fitness given my eleven years of successful lawyering under a Kansas license. I renew that argument,
noting that I have now held my Kansas license for seventeen years without discipline. A002 On February 13,
2014 I had held that Kansas license for 17 years without discipline. I should have been certified as having good
moral character and fitness to practice on that day, rather than just green lighted for the bar examination. (Failing
to have approved me for the bar exam on that day would have resulted in me having an immediate claim incident to
Rule 12 7 and allowed this process to be expedited by more than a year.)
28
Applicant 24128
The Hearing Panel believes that a member of the Indiana bar must obey Indiana law and
federal law, even when doing so violates an attorneys conscience, and that an avowed
willingness not to do so is disqualifying. [Exh. H, 42-43].11
71.
Admit that Board reserves the right to punish me for my unfounded assumptions and any
thoughts or words that disparage the Board, the Court, [or] the Indiana Bar. See analysis, infra.
72.
Admit that Board reserves the right to punish me for complain[ing] often about such trivial
matters as allegedly hostile, sectarian, view-point-biased, religiously and politically influenced application
processing showing itself in manifold rule violations, include the reversing of processing, backing up
from Rule 12, Section 9 to Section 5 in January. See Exh. K; See analysis infra.
After 20 months the Board is finally able to acknowledge that I have alleged fraud on the court
73.
Deny as to fn. 19; This is one of the paragraphs that I have flagged as containing material error.
Admit to the statements reporting fraud on this Court to the Board more than one and a half years ago.
Admit that the Board reserves the right to once again (as in 2009) punish me for daring to disparage the
honest[ ] and professional[ ] ... [government appointed] psychological and psychiatric evaluators who
aided in the evaluation of Applicants second application. As for the rather than focus comment, see
burden analysis, infra.
74.
Admit in part. Note of the attacks is shorthand for the evidence presented on brief to rebut the
allegations made in paragraph 66. The Board rests as to evidence supporting the allegations in 66, except
to recommend a reading of my letters. It should be noted that the Board failed to certify me on February
13, 2014. My only letter in the record at that time was the cover letter to my application, A002. The
Board ordered me to tender, at my cost, a psychologists evaluation, from only one firm in the state, of
their choosing, with all information contained therein open to all on the Board, on May 27, 2014. C 063.
My only additional letters of record at that time were dated February 14, C023, and April 1, 2014, C037.
The Board refused to certify me for moral character and fitness on September 22, 2014. The only
additional letters from me at that time are dated June 23, C066, and August 15, 2014, C076. I do stipulate
that these letters communicate concepts which the Board deems disqualifying in support of the allegations
of paragraph 66, and that no other evidence relevant to the allegations of paragraph 66 is at bar.
75 81.
Admit in part. Board accurately cites to record. See analysis, infractions and bar denials,
infra.
11
. See likely reference to Exh H in Morgan report, Exh B. See questions from Examiners in April 1, 2014 letter,
jurisprudence, C045, religious thought, C048, C 057. See also Exh. F, pp. 30 end of affidavit; See also Exh K,
Proposed Findings, pp 1-2, 7-9.
29
Applicant 24128
82.
Admit, noting the duplicity in the Boards argument given the operation of Adm & Disc Rule 19 -
the very Rule which the Board cited to keep the Morgan report from me for months.
83.
Admit the Board is concerned about my mindset. As for the Boards seeming scoffing at my
belief that I was denied a license for failing to demonstrate the sought-after empathy for progressive
causes -- social worker Sudrovech, in his January 22, 2009-dated report (that the Examiners leveraged to
justify denying my application), wrote of his concern that I failed to show sufficient empathy about
issues associated with [my] beliefs. A061. Also admit to Boards stipulation of Bowman and Sudrovech
as fact witnesses. See analysis of Bowman, Sudrovech, Ross, Shayne as fact witnesses, infra.
84.
Admit in part, noting the duplicity in the Boards argument given the operation of Rule 19. I
believe my filing with the Commission raised serious and substantial questions, and received a note from
Commissioner Myra Selby stating as much.
85.
Admit that I perceive a patriotic duty to uphold the principles enshrined in the preamble of the
Kansas and Indiana codes of professional conduct. The Board correctly cites 98 of the filing at issue.
In response to the rhetorical question at footnote 20, the Court need only take note of 100 in the same
filing, in which I correctly guessed that the Board would deny this whistleblower the right to call relevant
witnesses in a Rule 12, 9 hearing.
86.
Admit, asking the Court to consider the Boards allegation and its negation: Applicants legal
arguments at times show either a misunderstanding of the principles set forth in cases or a deliberate
misstatement. Rendered clear and certain, the allegation is, at bottom, that I sometimes misunderstand
cases. I stipulate. Denial would constitute a claim of incapability of error. That, it would seem, is the
Boards self-claimed charism. The Board cites only to my attachment of the Holleman decision to a one
page motion within a month of its release as support for the explosive charge that Applicant is either
unable or unwilling to review and accurately represent case law to the Board.12 (Is it fair to use this same
standard to evaluate the Boards citations to case law in its Final Report and then disqualify the Board in
perpetuity if it is found unable or unwilling to review and accurately represent case law to this Court?)
87.
Admit in part, noting that the Board has, in essence, admitted to ethical violations. See analysis of
Rule 8.1 in the argument section, infra.
I pause to note the irony or hypocrisy. The Board banished me from court for five years in 2009 without one
citation to case law. Now it seeks to banish me for life because I dared cite a recently decided case in a context it
deemed inapposite. So the Board has evolved from having no use for case law to being the potentate rendering
absolute constructions on case law that are vouchsafed beyond any debate. I am not certain which position I find
more disquieting.
12
30
Applicant 24128
Denying Professor Patrick Baude his due

88.
Admit that the Board marshals, as further evidence of my allegedly troubled mindset and penchant
for misstatement, my perspective on Baude, Patrick L. (1993) "An Essay on the Regulation of the Legal
Profession and the Future of Lawyer's Characters," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 68: Iss. 3, Article 3.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol68/iss3/3 (hereinafter Baude, [page ])
The Board denies Indiana University Maurer School of Law Professor Baude (former President of
the Board of Law Examiners?) whistleblower status while excoriating me for presenting a complete
mischaracterization of the piece which, according to the Board, really has nothing at all to do with the
Indiana Board of Law Examiners, but is instead merely a critique [ ] of the history and future of
character and fitness inquiries authored in 1993. Of course, this is the future from that pieces
perspective, and, of course, Professor Baudes historical experience with the Examiners was most likely
heavily Hoosier, and, going further, I will risk it all (including everlasting banishment from court) and
insist on the controversial interpretation that Law Examiner Baude was blowing the whistle on the very
system that he was part of at that time. My evidence for that claim is his own disclaimer in the article,
confessing something akin to cognitive dissonance when he footnoted: The author is a member of the
Indiana Board of Law Examiners. Of course, the views expressed here are not the views of that Board. In
fact, it is doubtful that the views expressed here are those of the author in his capacity as a member of the
Board. Baude, 647
Why would the ideas expressed not be done in Examiner Baudes official capacity? Likely
because the ideas would not be generally acceptable to the Board he served, as he admits. Professor
Baude was blowing the whistle. It needs to be blown again. Unfortunately that task has fallen on me, and
I lack the good professors credentials, professional perch or powerful friends in high places. A rarely
experienced rite of passage, even a hazing, that Examiner Baude described in 1993 yet exists, twenty-two
years later. It does not now, just as it did not then, serve any straightforward purpose. Baude, 649.13
89.
Deny the Boards accusation that I am either stupid or lawless. (I am somewhat relieved that
crazy has been taken off the table as a choice.) See Exh. K, the likely reason for the Boards ire three
weeks after those Proposed Findings were filed. This is one of the paragraphs that I have flagged as
containing material error. See analysis on appearance, infra.
13
Banished from the realm (after 20 months of bar application processing, including passing the grand inquisition
of the bar exam but failing the lesser inquisition as to religious loyalties) for disagreeing with the Board on the
proper interpretation of a law review article? Could this be an admission that the Baude article is consequential?
The lady doth protest too much, methinks. Hamlet Act 3, scene 2, 222230.
31
Applicant 24128
90.
Admit that I thought the attorney for the Board had the ability to bind the Board in keeping with
Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299 (1998) and admit that I thought the same case law stood
for the proposition that the government was bound by its attorneys stipulations. The questioning of my
intelligence contained in this paragraph is a direct result of Applicant 24128s Objection to
Representational Issue, E 469 472, which posited that the same law that has governed corporate boards
and general counsel or defendant and trial counsel for the last century should govern the Board and its
counsel. The Board rejected that concept, a position that I believe to be incorrect as a matter of wellsettled law. Evidently holding onto that the same opinion (after the Panel has ruled) disqualifies me to be
a licensed attorney in the State of Indiana. (Appellate counsel need not apply?)
91.
Admit that I have documented a system that has proven itself, repeatedly and over a matter of
years, both arbitrary and capricious. The Board made doing so quite easy, actually. The Boards Final
Report adds animus to the ledger. As to the balance of this paragraph, see burden analysis, infra.
Demanding due process and the operation of Rule 12 without any right to it?
92.
Admit that I sought orders from the Panel, which Boards counsel directed me to do. That the
author/s of this report are construing the straightforward seeking of orders from the Panel to constitute
demand[ing] that others perform services he requests and provide the information he seeks probably
reveals more about the author/s than me. As does the determination that a bar applicant has no right to
seek to subpoena witnesses the State objects to, have the record assembled before the hearing, propound
discovery (when invited to do just that by government counsel) or file motions in limine.14
93.
Admit quotes are correct. But Counselor Rodeheffer was wrong as a matter of law as to the
discovery option she initiated. See discovery analysis, infra.

94.
Deny filing any discovery or motions that were entirely improper and outside the scope of any
legitimate practice of law. Deny the motion offering to recall Witte as a witness was in any fashion
improper given that he was relevant only to bring C 001-006 into evidence, and those documents would
be unnecessary if the government abandoned the unauthorized law allegations in light of my discovery
14
The author again engages in a selective presentation of the material at A 161-63. In this discovery process (that
Boards counsel initiated) I also sought information incident to: My allegation that Bowman and Sudrovech
committed a fraud upon the BLE and this Court. My allegation that the BLE had violated [my] civil and
constitutional rights, including right under the [ADA] through the almost [then] one year delay in certification. My
allegations filed with the Race and Gender Fairness Commission as to violations of fairness, due process and equal
protection violations.
32
Applicant 24128
responses. (The government did drop those allegations, it seems that counsel just did not want me to
know?) See analysis of discovery and litigation, infra.
95.
Deny filing improper discovery or motions. Posit that government counsel filed a manifestly
improper motion for a protective order. See analysis, infra.

Logical fallacy issue spotting exercise
96.
Admit that the Board locates in my Proposed Findings all the evidence necessary to demonstrate
my alleged inability to comport [myself] in a way that can be perceived by others to be civil and
respectful (especially those whom the Applicant seeks to persuade to his cause) A quote from
Professor Baude fits well here: What is touted as consumer protection-the admission process, restrictions
on unauthorized practice, and judicial oversight-is just a cleverly disguised guild arrangement. Baude
648 The Board, in essence, has voted me off its Island an Island that is not a constitutional republic,
else I would have rights against whims of the majoritarian (or is it just elitist?) voting block.
97.
Admit that my Proposed Findings contain what the Board has determined to be direct evidence of
my inability or unwillingness to follow [ad hoc] rules. This is one of the paragraphs that I have flagged
as containing material error. Note where the rule that the Board cites in the second sentence comes from
by example of the Board, in a 2009 document that arguably violated Rule 11 on its face, and denied me
admission, sentenced me to five years of banishment, all without citation to even one case or any analysis
under Rule 12 2. In defense, I did state that I would follow Exb H only as to style and format. On
page 15 of Exh.K I wrote I will not seek to emulate the Boards 2009 Order in this document, I will
instead marshal relevant law to apply to the above facts and then cited the Indiana law that should
have moved the Board to consider doing the same. Evidently psych evals are preferred to the Rule of
Law be the BLE. See analysis of the third bullet of this paragraph infra.
98.
Admit that I allege the Board has acted unconstitutionally, unlawfully, erroneously and
discriminatorily during my processing. See Exh K15

99.
Deny. According to the Board I hold the entire and total record. It contains no document, not
one, evincing why the Board failed to approve me for character and fitness in February, 2014. Neither
15
The Board may determine the requested admission is justified if it studied the psychiatric practices of the former
Soviet Union. See U.S. National Library of Medicines National Institutes of Health:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2800147/ Time and again, human rights and mental health
organizations receive reports on cases of abuse of psychiatry for political purposes. The fact that these reports come
from a wide range of countries shows that there is an ongoing tension between politics and psychiatry and that the
opportunity to use psychiatry as a means to stifle opponents or solve conflicts is an appealing one, not only to
dictatorial regimes but also to well-established democratic societies.
33
Applicant 24128
does it hold any clue, outside Skolniks brief and bureaucratic letters, as to why I was requested (i.e.
demanded) to put myself on the couch of the Boards chosen psychologist at fiscally-ruinous cost in May,
2014. Nor does it hold any explanation, outside of Skolniks letters, as to why my application was denied
in September 2014. Now, a year and a half after that initial no confidence vote in February, 2014,
fifteen months after the demand that I see their psych on my familys credit card, the entire Board finally
deigns to testify as to just what they were group thinking and not group thinking, with absolutely no
citation to any documentation or record of any kind. See due process and hearsay analysis, infra.
Character and fitness evaluations do not count if they like me
100.
Admit. Magistrate Lori Morgans crucial character and fitness evaluation speaks for itself. I
certainly do get it that the Board is not bound by the face to face interview. I was so interviewed by
Magistrate Morgan, it was overall quite positive, it was ignored so much so, in fact, that it was skipped
over in the recitation of relevant facts in the Boards Final Report. I was so interviewed by Judge Nancy
Boyer in 2007. A 255 Judge Boyer recommended that I be certified (once the Kansas inquiry which
were subsequently dismissed on the merits was cleared up). Her report was ignored as well and
likewise skipped over in the Boards instant reciting of the fact. I was interviewed by the late and
Honorable (sometime after the interview) Kelly Huebner in 1996. A 244 She wrote a glowing report on
me. A 243 It was likewise skipped over as the Board recounted case history. See Rule 4 analysis, Exh K
pp 6-7. That which exonerates, that which commends, that which impeaches the Panels determination to
see me banished for life all such character and fitness reports are not counted as evidence by the BLE.
101.
Admit that the selection is accurately (albeit only partially) quoted: The Examiners selectively edit
out the heading above the quoted paragraph: Conclusion of Arbitrary and Capricious Analysis. All of
the terms cited are from Indiana case law. Queue Professor Baude: The starting point has to be Deborah
Rhode's comprehensive study published in 1985, [which in] concluding [ ] that "[a]s currently
implemented, the moral fitness requirement both subverts and trivializes the professional ideals it purports
to sustain," has yet to be seriously attacked, yet alone refuted. Her evidence [shows] that the requirement
is in part a form of professional hypocrisy. Baude 650. Could there be a greater showing of hypocrisy
than seeking my banishment from this Court for quoting the case law of this Court? Is the Board
position that I argue too much like an attorney to be an Indiana attorney? This is much like the Boards
mantra that insisting you are sane is sure and certain evidence of your insanity. See my August 15 letter,
C076. (What sane applicant would not retreat to sarcasm as a coping strategy? Better they just go away
that seems to be the metanarrative, as Board counsel came right out and stated in her report.)
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[BLE] CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

103.
Admit
104.
Admit the privilege concept, but this Court might do well, in light of what I have documented, to
acknowledge that the practice of law is not merely participation in a trade guild in which elitist
journeymen (and women) can shut out undesirables like me. Or is it? The whistleblowing examiner
asked if systems like the BLE were not, in reality, cleverly disguised guild arrangement. Baude 648.
(Reformers and malcontents (but I repeat myself) need not apply.)
105.
Admit, but note that the Examiners do not seem to believe that due inquiry is limited by the state
and federal constitutions, federal statutes, or the Rules of this Court. And the Examiners certainly stress
that the process due includes their weighting of an applicants insight, assumptions, empathy quotient and
opinions about overreaching governance.
106.
Admit. See burden analysis, infra.
107.
Admit
108.
Admit
109.
Admit
110.
Admit that such is the law, but is this unbounded by law or constitutional concerns? This question
is one of the overarching keys to the instant controversy. Is the Board limited by law, or merely its
Collective Conscience?
111.
Admit that such is the law, but is this unbounded by law or constitutional concerns? This question
is one of the overarching keys to the instant controversy. Is the Board limited by law, or only its Statist
Will?
112.
Deny. Given relevant Indiana case law (which the Board neither acknowledges nor cites to this
Honorable Court16) no precedential justification existed for the former five year ban in 2009, nor for the
presently prayed for denial, nor for a lifetime ban in 2015.
113.
Deny. Other than the safety belt infractions, the evidence all consists of core political speech and
my refusal to abandon the allegation of fraud on this Court in the Bowman answer and the 2005 Missouri
Supreme Court record. Careful empirical studies, especially Deborah Rhode's work, which probably
Despite my having set forth the law in letters to the Board. -- to no avail. See C 027 C 030, 034 (SCOTUS
cases on bar admission and the great import of keeping with precedent so that substantive due process and other
demands of justice are met), C 031 033 (three cases of bar applicants: Matter of Lucas, 672 N.E.2d 934 (1996);
Matter of Staggs, 894 N.E.2d 535 (2008), In re Conn, 715 N.E.2d 379 (1999)).
16
35
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defines this genre, have shown that the current effect of regulation has not been to protect the public so
much as to ensure the spoils of victory to those who control the politics of the bar. Baude, 648.
Out comes the shotgun to sing its song again
114.
Deny. The Board is wrong to fear me in the bar. I have filed three applications, undergone three
inquiries, and still the Board has not one valid complaint against me in the file from a lawyer or judge
but many glowing comments from lawyers and judges, including even Federal Judge William C. Lee
(whom, unlike Tim Sudrovech, I have actually met, had discussions with, and even stood before,
repeatedly). See Exh K, prima facia case analysis. Finally the Board goes on the record as to why I was
ordered into a psych eval. This is discussed, infra.
115.
Admit, but the problem at bar is not well captured by the Wisner quote. It is rather better
diagnosed by former bar examiner Baude: The character and fitness standard for admission is
administered in an unpredictable way and rests on unsubstantiated and implausible factual assumptions
Baude, 650.
More shotgun: 00 Buckshot
116.
I deny in the strongest terms the charge that I am dishonest. I deny in the strongest terms the
charge that I am untrustworthy. I deny in the strongest terms the charge that I lack respect for the rights
of others. I deny in the strongest terms the charge that I lack concern for basic fairness. 17 It is none of the
Boards concern if I make false assumptions, for when the government sets out to affect the way people
think, well, things can get a bit tyrannical. (Lifetime banishments and that sort of thing.) I deny that I
have made any egregious false claims ... against a wide variety of government representatives and third
parties. The Board brings forth no evidence supporting such a claim in their Final Report.
117.
Admit. Abusive litigation is usually a call for the court hearing the case to make, not opposing
counsel. None of my litigation referenced by the Examiners was deemed abusive. In fact, there was not
even a motion for costs at the conclusion, let alone one under Rule 11 or one for vexation and
unreasonable litigation practices. In fact, the only grist for such charges at bar, by my read of the record,
are two: (1) the law-free and unsigned September 25, 2009 order of the Board, and: (2) the mostly
relevant law-free and quite personal July 17, 2015 order of the Board. While the latter is at least signed,
and not a violation of Rule 11 on its face, its author or authors do deign to issue broadsides against my
17
I believe that these charges are unsupportable on the record and thus scandalous, uncivil and unprofessional. See
also much the same in Board counsels Rule 26 motion and closing at the April 27, 2015 hearing.
36
Applicant 24128
litigation practices without ever showing, by anything closely approximating clear and convincing
evidence, what it is about that litigation that they reference. Examples:
The Applicants legal arguments at time show either a misunderstanding of the principles set forth in
cases or a deliberate misstatement.86
Applicant is apparently either unable to appreciate the difference between testimony at a hearing
and affidavit testimony or believes the rules do not apply to him. 89
Applicant demonstrates an inability to grasp the differences [of matters sounding under agency,
representational and corporate law]. 90
Applicant filed numerous motions and other pleadings that were entirely improper and outside the
scope of any legitimate practice of law. 94
Applicants inability or unwillingness to follow the rules is evident in his Proposed Findings [which
failed to model] the Boards 2009 Findings as to style and format.18 97
Applicants Proposed Findings are nonsensical and improper, beg the question, and further
justify the grave concerns19 the Board has expressed as the Applicants character and fitness to practice
law in the State of Indiana. 102
Applicant [has in] numerous instances misinterpreted or misrepresented case law, statutes, or
other matters. 120
If the Board cannot support each of the above allegations with clear and convincing evidence then we
have located abusive litigation in the Boards Final Report. Such abuse is not common, but it can be
found in the record of even seasoned attorneys. See, e.g., Ward v. Tipton Cnty. Sheriff Dep't, 937 F. Supp.
791, 802 (S.D. Ind. 1996)(According to the Department, Ward's counsel acted unreasonably and
vexatiously by maintaining the individual capacity Title VII claims against Sheriff James Schroeder,
Matthew Thompson, and Chester Netherton, the First Amendment claim and the state claims, beyond the
time when she knew or should have known they were without a reasonable basis in law or fact.) While
the motion for fees against opposing counsel was denied as insufficiently evidenced, it is clear that such
allegations are easier to level than to prove up.
Selectively editing Matter of Burns
118.
Admit. I must say it is difficult to understand why attorney Burns case has been cited, for there
are not abusive, insulting or threatening behaviors even alleged at bar that come within its orbit. It is
This charge is true. My document was signed and contains copious citations to case law the Boards was
unsigned and contained not one citation to case law.
19
Grave concerns that I am, as I have claimed to be all along, a whistleblower documenting unconstitutional
actions.
18
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interesting to note that while building scaffolding for me with the Burns case the Examiners found it
advantageous to delete the mitigating sentences underlined below:
Effective, professional representation does not include abusive, insulting, and threatening
behavior. We are not unmindful that in the heat of conflict emotional outbursts are
possible. However, the aggressive nature of the comments and acts made by Respondent in
this case clearly goes beyond acceptable standards of professionalism. It was contrary to
the Oath of Attorneys which requires abstention from offensive personality; it undermines
public confidence in and respect for the legal system; and it is prejudicial to the
administration of justice. Respondent's professional misconduct warrants a period of
suspension.
Matter of Burns, 657 N.E.2d 738, 740 (Ind. 1995) (It is interesting to note that he Examiners accuse me of
doing what they seemingly have done with Burns and many other cases.)
If the Examiners wish to marshal cases more relevant to the facts at bar, cases of litigation abuse
without the presence of threats of violence, such cases are certainly found in Indiana law, and sometimes
involve attorneys much better placed, more professional and well respected than the coarse and volatile
Mr. Burns. See, e.g.,Oliver-Pullins v. Associated Material Handling Indus., Inc., No. 1:03CV0099-JDTWTL, (U.D.C., S.D.Ind.) 2003 WL 21696207, at *3-4 (S.D. Ind. May 20, 2003)(court faulting plaintiff
for a litany of legal misunderstandings and factual misstatements).
No abuse of process and no contempt of court
119.
Deny. Having set forth two cases that use the word abusive, the Examiners next allege that I
abused the process throughout the pendency of [this] third application. I also showed [my] contempt
for these proceedings over the same time period. The Examiners marshal two proofs for this. One, my
baseless original action located in the record, and two, my attempt to substitute an affidavit in lieu of
personally appearing for his own hearing. As for the latter, my choice to be represented by counsel on
April 27 constitutes neither contempt nor an abuse of process. See appearance analysis, infra. As for the
former, did I demonstrate contempt for the Court by petitioning the Court, and then quietly getting about
my business after the Court denied my petition? The Examiners count disagreeing with the government
as evidence of a lack of that ethereal concept known as insight, which, in their thinking, constitutes a
fatal lack of character and fitness. So from their perspective, yes, I did do wrong my mere thoughts
make that case. But did I objectively abuse the system by filing an original action? This would prove a
difficult argument to win given State, ex rel. Pebblecreek, Inc. v. Clark Circuit Court, 438 N.E.2d 984,
985 (Ind. 1982)(Relators denied a permanent writ one year after their previous request for a temporary
writ was denied. Neither sanctions nor any rebuke accompanied the second denial.) See also State ex rel.
Goldsmith v. Superior Court of Marion Cnty., 463 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Ind. 1984) ([I]t is clear that the
38
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Relator has attempted to circumvent the appeals process.) Yet no charge of frivolity, abuse or contempt
followed. I am safe from that eventuality as well. The Board fails to grasp that mere dismissal, even if on
the merits, and even if accompanied by trenchant commentary from a court20 (which is not evident in my
case), is not usually counted as abusive litigation. The allegations leveled in paragraph 119 may evince
abuse of process and contempt for the rule of law on the part of the Examiners as could be said of most
of the arguments set forth in the Final Report as a whole. See analysis, infra.
Shotgunned again: Dragons breath rounds
120.
Deny. Evidently the Examiners did not believe that 116 adequately conveyed their disgust for
me, as that in this paragraph I am denounced once more. I again deny in the strongest terms the charge
that I am dishonest. Evidently the Examiners did not believe that 85 & 90 adequately conveyed their
broadsides against my intelligence quotient. I deny in the strongest terms the charge that I am unable to
read and interpret the law or other source materials. I may not be smart enough to be an Indiana
superlawyer or Examiner one day, but my nearly nineteen years of licensure should be evidence that I am
at least smart enough to be a Kansas attorney. Not to mention that I did pass the Indiana bar exam at the
tender age of 55 with all of a dozen days to study (since I did not expect the Examiners to allow me to sit),
and did graduate summa cum laude from an accredited law school, and have helped put more than a few
published appellate cases in American law libraries the world over. This paragraph likely evinces animus
on the part of the Board.
121.
Deny. It is rather bar applicants that need to be protected from the BLE carrying on as I have
now documented in 2007-09 and 2013-15. The [Minnesota State Bar] could find no studies which have
statistically validated attorney character and fitness screening. At least one extensive study and scholarly
article by a [visiting] Harvard Law School professor concludes that such screening as currently done
cannot be validated and should be scrapped . Bar Application Comm., Minn. State Bar Ass'n, Bar
Application Committee Report and Recommendation 5, May 1991 (revised Nov. 1991) Baude, 651.
The late professor continued:
[Plaintiffs] contention is unsupported by any evidenceBecause Wells' affidavit is conclusory, irrelevant, and
not based on personal knowledge, it should be stricken. Because Taylor's affidavit is irrelevant and conclusory, it
should be stricken. [Plaintiffs] affidavit offers no support for his claim Plaintiff has presented nothing to
make out a prima facie case of racial animus .Plaintiff [ignores] this claim in his Response Plaintiff's own
conclusory and unsupported belief is insufficient to raise a genuine issue. he has no admissible evidence to
support this claim. His own conclusory and unsupported belief fails to raise a genuine issue for trial. Muse v.
Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Workers of Am., 2002 WL 449791 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 29, 2002) It is
interesting to note, given Muse, that the Examiners accuse me of not being able to make proper use of affidavits or
to marshal evidence in a way that advances my clients goals. (A complaint that I have never had from a client.)
20
39
Applicant 24128
Substantial and respectable voices within states, often among the officials charged with
enforcement responsibility, question the value of any character screening. The reply of the traditionalists
is not, "Oh no, you're off base," but rather, "Well, maybe, but we're carrying on." In this context, one
would expect to find some states abandoning the inquiry, others appointing committees to modify it, some
states introducing new and stricter in-your-face rules, and so on. It is the absence of any strong reaction
that is at least curious and, I believe, telling Baude, 652.21
122.
Deny. This final paragraph is revealing. The Board was prompted to Seek additional information
respecting [my] mental and emotional stability on May 27, 2014. At that time the only conduct, other
than that reported in my application, was my off-the-record January 8 appearance before Magistrate
Morgan and February 13, 2014 off-the-record appearance before the Board. I feared that these off-therecord appearances could be misused, given the deference they are granted -- as is documented in my
2009 file. For that reason I wrote Magistrate Morgan a letter memorializing the discussion at our
meeting. I did not send that letter to the Board. The Board somehow obtained that letter and placed it in
the file hereto (without a stamp from the BLE) but then did not reference that letter at all. C211-12. In
fact, the Boards Final Report does not reference Morgans character report at all. Why not? Please see
Exh. B.
As for my appearance before the Board I likewise transcribed my notes from those meetings and
sent them back to the Examiners, in my mandatory update letters of February 14 and April 1, 2014.
Morgan took no exception to my letter; the Board took no exception to my letters of February 14 and
21
The Board claims it is recommending denial and banishment because it is on the altruistic mission of protecting
other litigants, courts, tribunals or third parties from me. But consider that they claimed the same high moral
ground in 2009. Since that time what track record have I amassed? Additional federal litigation, no disciplinary
complaints. Litigation against Hoosier attorneys, none of whom filed statement of concern. Statements from some
rather well credentialed attorneys, most of them Hoosiers, including Magistrate Morgan. A graduate degree, adjunct
professoring, still the father of five and husband of one. Still willing to call the government out when it colors
outside the rule of law. (And that is the rub.) Is the Board protecting the court system from me, or is it someone else
being protected? Consider the Bowman report (that the Board fondly quotes against me once again, even after the
Seventh Circuit Seemingly raised an eyebrow). In that screed against me, this alarm is sounded for all who have
ears to hear: I believe [Brown] would likely use admission to the bar of any state to continue to work for
religious rights He realizes that legal rather than [sit ins] will best advance his [prolife] objectives If
admitted to the Indiana bar he likely would continue his anti-abortion activities He is vulnerable to [ ]
lack of insight when dealing with anti-abortion activities. Ex 47B (2009 record) p.9 And there is that
insight theme in the reports of a JLAP psychiatrist imagine that. [Bar admission] regulation has not been to
protect the public so much as to ensure the spoils of victory to those who control the politics of the bar. Baude,
648 Could it be that I threaten to upset this balance of power, since I have demonstrated a willingness to challenge
the status quo ante, and thus the animus and ire on display in the Boards Final Report? Note the culture war theme
of the Bowman report as the Seventh Circuit did. Could it be that I truly do bring legitimate claims of fraud on
the Court to the docket?
40
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April 1. Had I misconstrued the discussion during that meeting in either my February 14 or April 1 letters,
then an affidavit from any one of those present, or even a copy of the minutes of that meeting (which I do
not have, despite having the total and entire file) could have caused the Board to deny my application
on the day either of those letters hit Skolniks desk. I subsequently included my recounting of the
February 13 meeting in my sworn affidavit of October, 2014: Exh F, pp 26 end. No allegation has ever
been raised that I was anything but honest and accurate when reporting the content of that off-the-record
meeting.
As the record reveals, I stood on conscience and rights afforded me under the Indiana and federal
constitutions and resisted a bare naked order that I get my head checked to allow the Board to once
again take an inventory of my religious, jurisprudential and political opinions. The Board admits as much
when alleging that, Due to the Applicants complete refusal to provide the Board with the requested
[$4500 psych eval], the Board was left to consider only the Applicants conduct [?] and his contemptuous
behavior [?] throughout his dealings with the Board [when we denied him certification on September 22,
2014. Note the linkage between having my worldview weighed in Bowman-like scales once again and bar
admission: [Y]ou are unable to proceed with the updated psychological testing needed by the Board to
render a determination as to character and fitness. [Thus] you have failed to sustain the burden of proof
that you possess the requisite character and fitness.
Professor Baude and Roger Waters get the last word (on the facts)
Wise Professor Baude asked the right question more than two decades ago:
[W]hat if the regulation of lawyers [looked only at fitness], eliminating the inquiry into "character"?
There would be no plausible claim that lawyers should control the system of discipline (at least, any more
than they control all systems of discipline through the needs of staffing enforcement agencies and judicial
review). Regulation of lawyers would resemble the licensing of plumbers. It would be accomplished by
guidelines enacted by the legislature and enforced through an ordinary agency process, instead of through
judicial guidelines often beyond the constitutional reach of either the executive or legislative branch.
No doubt the regulatory agencies could be partly captured, but it would be hard to achieve the permanent
and irrevocable custody which exists under the current system. Baude, 657
Board Recommendation: Deny. I re-applied for the February, 2014 bar exam (which I took and passed)
after serving a rare five year not to re-apply order of this Court,22 which came after twenty-nine months
of processing through the IBLE (including a year in JLAPs keep). Now, after more than seven-years, I
am told, after nearly twenty months of processing and after success on the Indiana bar exam, that I am
denied once again and banned from court for life -- in part because the Examiners do not like the way I
22
Such an arguably draconian order (on facts sanctionable under the professional code and not the mere lack of
insight) split the Florida Supreme Court. See Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners ex rel. R.L.W., 793 So. 2d 918, 928
(Fla. 2001).
41
Applicant 24128
interpret a recently decided case and a 1993 law review essay. In both instances of denial, 2009 and 2015,
there is no need to file any charges against my Kansas license, for I am neither accused nor found liable of
violations of the professional code governing our profession. I stand guilty, once again, of attempting
to stand on due process and rights of conscience. I have engaged in discovery when invited by the Board,
and filed litigation when required to by the Board. I have shared with the Board, in letters sometime
impassioned, that my deepest fear is the loss of the Rule of Law. I made that case much better in 2013-15
than I did in 2007-09, for adversity and reflection has made me a better whistleblower -- and a better
appellate attorney -- yet I am now viewed as worse, even much worse, than I was in 2009 by the
Examiners. Once again found with a fatal lack of insight, most likely for being a whistleblower, I now
bear the full wrath of the Examiners- who pray that I be banished from court for the rest of my life.
(Arguably, I am sure they would claim, all in good faith once again, as it was in 2009.)
I am given to artistic license, and so defer the last word on the nature of the Examiners case against me to
a poet and fellow dissident-cynic whose life work I much respect.23
ADDRESSING: Is There a Standard of Review Specific to Admission Cases?

This Court has rarely addressed the concept of the character and fitness needed to gain admission to its bar.
Years before this Court spoke the Board of Law Examiners into being, Rosencranz v. Tidrington, 155 N.E.
705, 706 (1927), revealed what this Court considered a fair process of admission. It searched the admitting
courts record for charge[s] of any irregularity, misconduct, abuse of discretion, accident, surprise, fraud, or
error of law that could impeach the admission decision. Finding none, and locating no allegation in
appellant's petition that the order of the court was not sustained by sufficient evidence or was contrary to
law, the Court allowed the challenged admission decision to stand.
In this petition I allege, with references to the record, charges of irregularity, misconduct, abuse of
discretion, surprise, fraud, and error of law, while also alleging that the Examiners decision is not sustained
by sufficient evidence. I also charge the Board with a violation of federal statutory law. (I.e., the ADA).24
The evidence before the court is incontrovertible, there's no need for the jury to retire. In all my years of judging
I have never heard before of someone more deserving of the full penalty of law.Since, my friend, you have
revealed your deepest fear, I sentence you to be [in stones] before your peers. Tear down [his] wall! Roger
Waters, Bob Ezrin 1979.
24
It is interesting to note that this charge, including a charge against Board counsel for arguing that I was mentally
ill (based upon the very reports she and the Board had deemed totally irrelevant a week before the hearing) resulted
in Adrienne Meiring being substituted for Brenda Rodeheffer in the processing of my ADA complaint, as that
Rodeheffer, I was informed, was conflicted out by my ADA complaint against her closing argument before the
Board. Ironically Meiring wrote me on June 9, the very day that Rodeheffer filed her draft findings and conclusion,
which contain much of the passion found in the Boards Final Report. Meiring did not copy Rodeheffer on her
letter, in which she claimed to be taking over all related to my ADA claim, which was raised as part and parcel of
23
42
Applicant 24128
This Court should analyze a bar applicants petition against the case law applicable to licensed
attorneys
I do not advocate that this Court look only to a nearly 90 year old case when
reviewing the record at bar. The decision to admit and the decision to discipline are closely
related, as is revealed on the face of this Courts rules (in which they share some similarities
as to procedure). Furthermore, this Court has noted that the two share a common raison
dtre under the law: We view our primary responsibility in admission and discipline matters as
that of guarding the public against incompetent and unscrupulous professionals. Our primary
concern is the probability of undue risk to the public, and in determining whether or not the public
should be further exposed to a lawyer once found guilty of misconduct, we cannot accept one
standard of integrity of the advantaged and another of the disadvantaged, any more than we can apply
varying standards of professional competence for initial admission to the bar of this state.
In re Lee, 317 N.E.2d 444, 445 (1974)(emp.add.) Bar applicants come in many shapes and sizes, ethically
and economically speaking. Some can afford high priced counsel, many are improvised and have to stand
alone before this Court. Even so, due process demands that this Court cannot accept one standard of integrity
of the advantaged and another of the disadvantaged. Rich or poor, well represented or pro se, character and
fitness review should be the same. In a similar fashion, due process mandates that this Court not apply
varying standards of professional competence for initial admission to the bar of this state. In other words,
the dearth of cases addressing character and fitness under Rule 12 can be adequately compensated for by an
appeal to character and fitness cases under Rule 23.
As this Court stated in State ex rel. Indiana State Bar Ass'n v. United Fin. Sys. Corp., 926 N.E.2d
8, 14 (Ind. 2010):: This Court's authority to set standards for [i.e. admission requirements] and supervise
[i.e. post admission discipline] the practice of law arises from the need to protect the public from those
who are not properly licensed or qualified to act as attorneys.
I thus recommended that applicant petitions under Rule 14 be judged under the law applied to licensed
attorneys.25
the instant matter, as the Board admits at fn. 25, Final Report. It would appear that being conflicted out for ADA
purposes did cause the Board to conclude that Rodeheffer might be too personally invested to have a hand the
major hand -- in drafting its Final Report? Counsel Rodeheffer recently wrote to assure me that she remains the
counsel of record; Meiring seems to have exited stage left.
25
A search of Admis.Disc.R. 12 and Applicant within West Key 45I(A) Admission to Practice reveals a
few cases dealing with academic denial (Admis.Disc.R. 14(a), no cases (other than one foreign licensure bid)
involving Admis.Disc.R. 14(b). This petition may present a case of first impression.
43
Applicant 24128
ADDRESSING: Allegations of the Examiners Against Petitioner

Find below my reasoned response to those factual allegations of the Examiners which appeared to be
presented as disqualifying me from admission to the Indiana bar and justifying a longtime banishment from
re-application.
The Examiners err in alleging that Applicant is wrongly focused on 2009

The very application process itself mandated that I report on happenings well before 2009, but certainly
including my previous processing. See Q 23, instructions for Form B-1s and B-2s all questions authored
and mandated by the Examiners. Magistrate Morgan failed to recommend certification based upon her
determination that [a] matter of concern arose during the application process in 2008 Exh.B Yet I
am the one wrongly focused on 2009? Examiner Larimore asked me if I could stipulate that my processing
in 2007-09 was all done in good faith, another strange question to ask if I was to ignore 2009. C023 The
Examiners demanded psychological reports from me to update the 2008 reports. C063. Judge Brugnaux
stated that since I was a re-applicant, I would have to meet with the Board no matter what Morgan
recommended. That is just a subset of the pronouncements and policies of the State that made 2009 very
much a looming obstacle in 2013.26
The Examiners err in alleging that Applicant is wrongly concerned about religious questions
It was not me who injected religion into the equation, it was Dr. Ross first, and then Dr. Bowman, and then
the Panel of June 1, 2009, and then the report of September 25, 2009. (See my petition to the SCOTUS from
2010 for details.) I was so concerned with keeping religion out, in fact, that I first attempted to inform the
Court that my religion was merely run of the mill Catholicism, see 19 (an unsuccessful attempt to open a
dialogue regarding my concerns about fraud visited on this Court). I later sought out lawyerly advice on how
to keep religion out of the mix, as detailed at C008. Advice of counsel (counsel closely aligned with JLAP),
I attempted to take religion off the table by just filing a creedal statement, as explained at A 003.
When (I say objective) fears that I was going to be treated to special processing emerged right off
the bat, I again wrote in an attempt to build a firewall against another religiously-nuanced inquisition: C 015.
Magistrate Lori Morgan brought it up, none the less, C211, and so did the Examiners on February 13, 2014,
C048. Since I could not seem to move the Examiners off the religion topic, I determined that I was duty
26
What the Board likely means is that the Applicant was focused upon the idea that a fraud had been visited upon
this Court, and maybe more than one, incident to his 2009 application, and his desire to report that to this
Honorable Court, as I finally get to do herein.
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Applicant 24128
bound to share my weltanschauung with them, as dictated by the foundational teaching of my chosen creed.
See letters of April 1, August 15, 2014.
The Examiners err in positing that Applicants communications are disqualifying

.
Examiners allege that my February 9, 2015 filing with the Commission broke the boundaries of free
speech, as they seem to allege against all my letters from that month. The litany of complaints which the
Board sets forth are all well after it had attempted to move my application backwards, see Exh. K , and all
were written more than five months after my application had been denied but still six months before the
Board would file its Final Report on that denial. Clearly an applicants time means nothing to the Board
yet that passage of time in the wake of a rash of procedural irregularities visited much frustration upon this
applicant. My writings attempting to address those irregularities are now mined for the most strident quotes
(even if the sentences must be wrenched out of context) to press the Boards point. See, e.g. 45 46, 47,
50, 53, 55 56, 72 (all from 2015, the year after I sat for the bar exam), 73 (first four from February 2014,
last two from February, 2015). Yet even if my legal briefings and correspondence contained repeated and
virulent accusations that [judicial actors or agents] committed malfeasance in the administration of [my
application] (and they do not), the Board would still need to prove my accusations false to get traction
against me under Indiana law. In re Ogden, 10 N.E.3d 499, 501 (Ind. 2014) None of them are impossible
and the Board shows none of them false.
Judge me under Kansas law for impolitic speech
I note that the Examiners have not filed any complaints with the Kansas Disciplinary Authority for
any of my alleged bad conduct (i.e. communications) complained of in their Final Report (nor for my
disqualifying spate of non-restraint, i.e. seat belt infractions). Had they filed on my letters, my case would
have been analyzed under this standard: We conclude that, to the extent the application of KRPC 4.4 and
8.4(d) in this case placed restrictions on Respondent's speech, they were not overbroad and did not violate
either the First Amendment [or] 11 of the Kansas Bill of Rights. A lawyer's right to free speech is tempered
by his or her obligation to both the courts and the bar, an obligation ordinary citizens do not undertake.
In re Arnold, 56 P.3d 259, 268 (Kan.2002). The Final Report broadly alleges as much about my
communication. Attorney Arnold appeared in federal court to litigate a case even though he had been on an
inactive license for ten years. That misrepresentation, and an intemperate letter to the trial judge earned
him a public censure. Here are the more terse selections from that offensive letter to the federal judge (which
was copied to opposing counsel):
Please seriously consider retiring from the bench. You simply don't have what is required to decide
the kind of issues that you were presented with in this case. Your threat to dismiss the entire case,
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your ridiculous allowance (originally) of only 15 days to secure alternate counsel, and your refusal
to clarify your order prohibiting me from communicating with Olathe officials, was the last straw.
Your absurdly fastidious insistence on decorum and demeanor mask an underlying incompetence.
You act like a robot. Do yourself and Johnson County litigants a great favor and get off the bench
now. Either you recuse yourself from further participation in this case, or I will fill (sic) a motion
seeking reassignment to a competent judge. Also, be prepared for an ethical complaint concerning
your refusal to clarify your muddled order this morning.
It is possible, but not clear (due to the unauthorized law count) that I could face, had I sent a letter like the
above to the Board, disciplinary charges in Kansas. I sent nothing close to that letter to the Board and the
BLE has filed nothing against my Kansas license. In fact, a review of the record will reveal no concerns
transmitted to me as to my communication with the Board other than opposing counsels Rule 26(c) motion
and memorandum, (E 119, E 196), which I do recommend that this Court review -- especially in light of the
Final Reports reliance upon its 2009 report, the 2008 report of Dr. Bowman, and the testimony of Dr. Ross
all the focus of my discovery (that the Board found calumnious).
The Examiners err in positing that appearance by counsel on April 27, 2015 was disqualifying
The Examiners repeatedly lodge the seemingly fatal allegation that I violated some unknown rule or unnamed
ethical obligation by appearing through counsel and tendering an affidavit at the April 27, 2015 hearing.
63, 89.
I did nothing wrong. (See, e.g., Exh. I for an explanation.) Nevertheless, the Board assures this Court
that by attempting to substitute an affidavit in lieu of personally appearing for his own hearing this
Applicant showed contempt for these proceedings and abused the process. 119. The Board is seemingly
arguing that I put forth, in that affidavit, testimony that I intended to give on April 27, 2015. Such is not the
case. The affidavit speaks to one topic and one topic alone why I determined it best to not appear at the
discretionary (as to me) hearing on April 27. The operative pages of the affidavit (only eight) merely address
how I came to the conclusion that appearing only through counsel was best. I recommend it to the Court for
it further sets forth procedural and due process irregularities of the Board.
The Board also alleges that I showed contempt for these proceedings and abused the process by
appearing only through counsel on April 27. It should be noted that I appeared in February, 2014, in response
to Executive Director Skolnik certified letter mandating my appearance pursuant to Rule 12, 5. See Boards
Final Report, 25. Skolnik sent me no such order as to the April 27, 2015 hearing. The Board cites no rule,
statute or order of the Board causing me to appear. Note that Rule 12, 9 sets forth a contempt citation
procedure for non-showing witnesses: The Board has not filed against me. Need anymore be written?
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A few days before the hearing, after I had lost most all my witnesses and motions incident to the
hearing, including answers to admissions that even Board counsel thought I should have, I moved to render
the Section 9 hearing a Section 8 stipulated record submission. Even though the Boards counsel had earlier
agreed that we could go that way whenever I made the call, Board counsel opposed. Yet in her opposition
she stated that she had no objection to me not testifying and instead resting on the record. Appeal 492, 6.
Furthermore, the very Rules governing the process grant me the right to appear by counsel. Rule 12
9(f), An applicant or conditional admittee may be represented by counsel at such person's expense.
Finally and dispositively, my hearing strategy, (formed after I lost nearly every pre-trial motion and
after most all of my most relevant witnesses were released via the quashing of subpoenas), was informed by
In re Fogle, 221 N.E.2d 675 (1966). The Board took no umbrage at Mr. Fogles hearing strategy mine is
the mirror image. Fogle appearance only by counsel raised no concern, mine is cited as justification for a
lifetime banishment from court. This may constitute evidence of animus, or, in the alternative, merely
ignorance of the case law that allegedly cabins the Boards discretion.
The Examiners err in claiming Applicant abused the discovery process he was invited to utilize
In 93 the Board faults me for noting that I would not have realized that I enjoyed discovery rights under
Rule 12 but for Board counsels use of the same. My ignorance is pardonable. Board counsels email
informed me that I enjoyed such a right since the BLE was an administrative agency under, she said, pursuant
to the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act. See Exh K pp 38-39. I had just studied for and passed the
Indiana bar exam, and one thing that I noted was that, to my great disadvantage in 2007-09, the BLE was not
under the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act, which defines Agency as any officer, board,
commission, department division, bureau, or committee of state government that is responsible for any stage
of a proceeding under this article. Except as provided in IC 4-21.5-7, the term does not include the judicial
department of state government, the legislative department of state government, or a political subdivision.).
Ind. Code 4-21.5-1-3 (empadd). In accusing me of ignorance on this issue, the Board proves that it still
just does not get it: The Board is not under the APOA, and so does not come outfitted with optional discovery
functions, at least for applicants. Board counsel erred, on the record, clearly and without defense other than
ignorance of the Rules governing the process.
The Board did it first
Since Board counsel went first, and since Board counsel insisted -- who was I to disagree? As I saw it, if the
Board wanted me to answer its discovery, and was inviting me to reciprocate, well then I should oblige the
Board on both fronts. The Board served eighteen five-years-deep, accusatory, il-informed Requests for
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Admission on me, most of which could have been answered by merely reading my April 1 and August 15,
2014 letters.
I had inventoried many questions that were not answered by any correspondence from the Board
the rest is the controversial history of my application after the Board declared discovery opened on March
16, 2015, less than one week after the Board ordered me to assume the position of a litigator.
The Board-tendered admissions constituted the first actual known investigation of my application,
occurring some six months after application denial. I was asked questions reaching clear back to my
processing before the Board in February, 2009, more than five years prior. See K 16-20. (Yet the Board
charges me with being too focused upon 2009.)
In those admissions I was accused of engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in a fashion that
would have, were it true, justified disciplinary filings against my Kansas license and revocation of my federal
court privileges. It was those allegations that caused me to notice up Michael Witte for the hearing, as that
he and I had personally discussed that very issue years earlier. C001-004.
I am not a perjurer and I did not engage in unauthorized practice with that woman
Even more troubling, I was also accused of having committed perjury during my 2009 testimony before the
Board, an allegation that should have, if true, resulted in an immediate disciplinary filing against my Kansas
license, a notice recommending revocation of my federal court and SCOTUS privileges, and a filing of Class
D felony charges against me under Ind.Code 3544.121 (2012).
Understanding that I also had a right to discovery, I studied Rule 12 for limitations, I studied the rules
of original actions for limitations, and I researched Indiana law for limitations. I found no rules limiting
discovery before the Board. I must admit that I yet found no warrant for discovery under Rule 12, but trusted
Board counsel when she assured me that I did have a right to discovery and seemingly invited me to take part
in it, just as she had.
Mindful that [t]he purpose of the discovery rules is to allow for minimal trial court involvement and
to promote liberal discovery, Whitaker v. Becker, 960 N.E.2d 111, 115 (Ind.2012), I propounded toward
the goal that the Board and I had shared since November, 2014, when the Board proposed the plan of arriving
at a stipulated record. I determined that discovery was the most proper tool available to pull together the
record needed to prove my 2013 application a prima facia case of good moral character and fitness and that
the Board erred when denying the same and keeping me from being licensed in May, 2014. (This theory also
took in the fraud on the court that I allege from 2009, yet another reason my discovery was vibrantly resisted
and passionately denounced. See Rule 26 motion by Board counsel.)
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Board counsel actually deemed some of my discovery right on the mark

My discovery is all a matter of record, as well as my thorough justification for every subpart of it and my
good faith working of Rule 26 after that came into play. E 207 232. I violated no rules and opened myself
to no sanction other than lifetime banishment from court, that is. It is instructive to note the Board counsel
actually agreed that a subset of my discovery was valid, and agreed to respond. E 255 The Panel overruled
counsels stipulation and quashed all of my discovery within days of me filing full and complete answers (E
233), without objection, to the Boards discovery that had initiated the process. E 370 (Yet the Board accuses
me of having a lack of concern for basic fairness, 116, among other over-the-top epithets.)
The charge that I abused discovery is spurious at best, and likely evidence of animus on the part of
the Board. See Motion in limine re: Inquisition, E 430, for a two page overview of some of my discovery
concerns. That motion seeking to have such inquiries from 2008 deemed off limits in the April 27 hearing
was denied, E 500. That denial was one of the reasons that I appeared only via counsel on April 25. See Exh.
I.
The Examiners err in claiming Applicant abused the litigation process he was required to utilize
As is set forth in my answer to 60, I was told that I had to engage in litigation to advance my application
on March 10, 2015. In fact, I was ordered to file answers to motions to quash on April 14, 2015. E 204
Paragraph 92 contains an amazing allegation, since the Boards counsel likewise sought orders from the
Panel, and, in fact, was the first to do so. E 004. The Final Report construing the straightforward Seeking of
orders from the court to be demand[ing] that others perform services he requests and provide the information
he Seeks This is either evidence of animus or evidence that the author of this particular paragraph has
no litigation experience and little understanding of how motions to a court actually read.
The motions, counter motions, objections and orders filed in this matter, all of which began with the
Boards counsel informing me that I could not communicate to the Board except through standard litigation
filings, are cataloged in the first pages of Exhibit E. I cannot verify the Examiners count, as that the indexing
was not updated in the final days of this matter, but I do note that the Examiners show no actual litigation
abuses through my litigation.
I would merely ask the Court to review my motion for a videotaped hearing, E 375, and then the
fallback, my motion for an audiotaped hearing (at my cost), E488, and determine if the Boards recounting
of those motions to this Court (95) bear any likeness to objective reality. I sought the recordings to protect
myself, not to catch myself being offensive. As my affidavit tendered at that hearing reveals, my
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determination that I was insufficiently protected given the injustice in the eve of hearing Order at E 497-500
was one of the reasons I elected to not appear but through counsel. See Exh. I. See also Exh. K pp 38-39.
I would similarly ask the Court to review my motion in limine as to Rule 12, 9(b), E380, and note
that it was denied, with the Board stating that there was no need to abide by 9(b) since the hearing was not
before a jury. Sound reasoning? Can a 9(b) hearing ever be before a jury? No. My motion in limine at E
420 is cited as cause to consider me unfit to practice or lacking the character to be an attorney in 86. I
disagree.
I had very good reason to call Michael Witte as a witness, and very good reason to release him
I would similarly ask the Court to review the motion in limine that the Board deems entirely improper and
outside the scope of any legitimate practice of law E382, against the backdrop that I noticed Michael Witte
as a witness only because the Board had alleged unauthorized law against me.27 Not one sentence or
paragraph of any filing is set forth as evidence supporting the Boards litany of conclusory pejoratives,
including that my positions and legal arguments are often tortured (66), nonsensical (102), my filings
are improper, id., uncivil or abusive, (114), dishonest, disrespectful, unfair (116), and contain
egregious false claims based upon false assumptions, id, which constitute abusive litigation (117),
and an abuse of the process showing contempt for the proceedings (119) proving that I am dishonest
(reflecting character) or unable to properly read and interpret the law (reflecting fitness) based upon
numerous instances where I allegedly misinterpreted or misrepresented case law, statutes and other
matters. (120). I believe that much of the Boards ire can be explained by a review of the documents at E
484 487, 491 498. (Evidence of a botched investigation and ensuing cover-up.)
The above litany is, this Court is assured, part and parcel of Applicants conduct and his numerous
filings with the Board that justifies a lifetime banishment from Court. Yet nowhere does the Board cite a
violation of Rule 11 (for reason of being frivolous, abusive or even unsigned (not that the Examiners have a
problem with that one)) or any Rule in the model code (followed by both Kansas and Indiana). Nor did the
Examiners file against my Kansas license, or notify the federal court for the Northern District of Indiana, or
inform the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals of their allegedly poor decision to grant me the honors of
membership in 2011. Or recommend that a complaint be filed with the United States Supreme Court, in
which I have been duly admitted and qualified as an Attorney and Counselor since September 15, 2000
27
The Board had, in essence, accused me of the unauthorized practice via requests for admission and then quietly
dropped that line of thought after finding that I had, a year earlier (in my April 1, 2014 letter, C043-044) shared the
information which rendered that allegation spurious. See C 001-004, correspondence with Witte.
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and to which I petitioned, twice, in the four years antecedent to my third application to this Court each one
about the actions of committees of this Court.28
It should prove dispositive to this groundless allegation that the very Final Report at issue opens with
a frank acknowledgement that my motion in limine as to Rule 12, 7 caused the Board to rethink the entire
raison detre for a Rule 12 9 hearing. See E 433; See especially E 440, Public Policy Argument for
analysis on how the Boards interpretation of Rule 12 is harming bar applicants and threatening due process.
I prevailed on this motion, as the Board admits, causing a change in Board nomenclature and even its view
of the Section 9 hearing process. Even more personally gratifying, the Board President admitted, on the
record, in response to this motion and perhaps others, the following: We've fallen into an informal but bad
practice. Hearing transcript, pp. 4-5. I believe that could be said of the entire bar application process in
Indiana, based upon my experiences since 2007 and as thoroughly documented in the record at bar. In fact,
[The BLE has] fallen into an informal but bad practice could be a justifiable epitaph for my scuttled career
at law, 2007 present.
The charge that I abused the litigation process is spurious at best, and likely evidence of animus on
the part of the Board. See esp fn. 24, K 47 (An economic explanation for the reason for some of the present
acrimony).
28
Nor cite to a pattern of such conduct in any of the many cases reported as my work product in Westlaw at
Litigation History Report, Bryan J. Brown. Accessing such a report, or merely running my name through Westlaw,
seems to be beyond the technical ken of the Examiners, who alleged, via discovery, that I had perjured myself on
June 1, 2009 by claiming to have appeared before numerous federal courts of appeal. Of course, even without
Westlaw access they could have merely looked up my Linked In profile, where I have those cases set out as
professional accomplishments. Or even easier, merely read my April 1, 2014 letter, one of the letters that allegedly
caused the Examiners to think I need my head re-checked, which, on pages 5 and 6, C041-043, I listed all of my
federal cases, in response to Examiner Laramores February 13, 2014 question about my federal court litigation.
This letter, which is cited to justify sending off for a psych eval, was evidently not sufficiently interesting to moot
the allegations of unauthorized law and perjury eleven months later. This is evidence supporting the botched
investigation theory or was it no investigation at all, just slander thrown toward me with the belief that facts
sufficient to doom my application would be brought to the Board by their hand-picked psychologist?. Of interest, it
was Board counsel who released the press statement, while searching to find the present Executive Director, that
pledged the following to the public, including to me: The Executive Director assists Board members with the
responsibility of conducting an extensive investigation into each applicant and for making the recommendation to
the Indiana Supreme Court whether a person meets the criteria to be admitted to the bar.
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/media-press-releases-2011.pdf (empadd) This extensive investigation
determined that I had engaged in the unauthorized practice and lied on the stand about my litigation history
absolutely wrong on both counts. And absolutely destructive as to my life, my economy and my family since May,
2014. Were the Board not Graced with monarchial immunity such negligence would surely matter.
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The Examiners erred in not striking a scathing and spurious attack on Applicants character
Soon after my discovery was propounded, Board counsel utilized the new litigation posture she had kicked
off to file a fourteen page motion and memorandum for a protective order pursuant to Trial Rule 26(c), E
121.
My discovery hit a nerve for some reason. My arguments justifying the need to review my entire
and total file were deemed irrational. (I had, only a few weeks earlier, finally received the Morgan report,
more than thirteen months after it was penned, see issue presented at K pp 29-31.)
My inquiry into any civil rights investigations that ensued in response to accusations of constitutional
and statutory (including ADA complaints) drew this response from the Courts ADA coordinator: There is
no civil rights investigator for the Indiana Supreme Court. It is again nonsensical for the Applicant to believe
that the Board was conducting investigations of itself and its agents based upon Applicants allegations. K
38, C 161. (Indeed, this Applicant had filed ADA complaints on February 9 (with the Fairness Commission,
Exh. D) and March 2, 2015 (with both Rodeheffer and Skolnik). Both were ignored.
Board counsel decided to become a fact witness three weeks ahead of the hearing
In her memorandum supporting the Rule 26(c) motion counsel launched a blistering ad hominem attack on
the ultimate issue at bar, arguing
[t]hat Applicant has made the particular discovery requests is relevant to character and fitness because the
discovery is evidence of incivility, inability to understand the meaning of rules and laws, inability to make
clear and cogent communications, and other issues of character and fitness. E 124, n1.
Counsel also accused me of propounding the discovery requests out of a desire to visit annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression and undue burden on the government, E 127, and accused me of giving
justification for the discovery that is nonsensical and calumnious. Id. (In part because I did not realize
that the Supreme Courts day ended at 4:30 rather than 5:00.) Boards counsel had filed her Rule 26(c)
motion and attack upon my character and fitness (including the allegation that I refused to follow the rules)
without first engaging in the allegedly-mandatory Rule 26(f) process.
(F) Informal Resolution of Discovery Disputes. Before any party files any [ ] motion for protection from
discovery pursuant to Rule 26(C), that party shall:
(1) Make a reasonable effort to reach agreement with the opposing party concerning the matter which is the
subject of the motion or request; and
(2) Include in the motion or request a statement showing that the attorney making the motion or request has
made a reasonable effort to reach agreement Ind. R. Trial P. 26
Even though government counsel had ignored (or seemingly did not know of) this Rule, the protective
order did issue in full even more than what she sought, in fact -- and it also exonerated Board counsel from
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a facial violation of Rule 26(f).29 The Hearing Officer ordered Board counsel to not respond to any of my
discovery despite Board counsels agreement to tender a subset of the propounded discovery as that it may
aid Applicant in preparing for the hearing. See E 255, E 370. That it would have done, as well as preparation
of this document. See Exh I.
I was threatened with a bad result if I worked up my case (whistleblowers curse)
One need not be a cynic to locate multiple threats in the record affecting my due process rights at E 121-22
and K pp 37-38. My pleas all went unanswered; all of my discovery was denied; most all of my subpoenas
were quashed; the Board never seriously considered my allegations of fraud on this Court; my most relevant
witnesses were denied me (but then used against me by the Board, both at the April 27, 2015 hearing and in
their Final Report); and I have been deemed so lacking as to character and fitness as to warrant a lifetime
banishment from court, after an effective seven year banishment. Could a worn down cynic come to the
conclusion that the end was pre-determined, and that the only difficult part has been banging out the means?
The Examiners err in positing that traffic infractions can justify denial and banishment
It does not help my cynicism that it is only at the Final Report stage that I learn, for the first time, that my
self-reported (via the 2013 application) seat belt nonuse is relevant yea and amen, even dispositive.
I confess: I really did tally up five Class D infractions (some diversions, others nolo pleas) over a
four year period. Three of them were more than three years aged when I filed the 2013 application, but two
(both diversions I think) had occurring in the 30 months prior to filing. This series of allegedly lawless, even
revolutionary acts raises much concern with the Examiners (but only of late), and particularly because I seem
to have been tardy in developing good safety belt habits while reserving the right unto myself to openly
question police officers about the wisdom, general application and even specific policing of this law.
No one seemed to care until last month?
For some strange reason Magistrate Morgan did not inquire into my seat belt practices in January, 2014; the
Board did not ask if I had driven down to Indianapolis on February 13, 2014 while belted in in fact the
gathered Examiners did not bring up seat belts at all. I was cleared to sit for February 25, 2014 exam
without a condition that I arrive buckled up. Nor did the Executive Director ever inquire into my use or
nonuse of personal restraint devices incident to my duty to update my application. Sixteen months after I
self-reported this allegedly troubling trend of scoffing at the law, the Board served discovery upon me,
29
Yet I am bound by that Rule, as is this Court, as is a panel of this Court, according to S.T. v. State, 764 N.E.2d
632, 635 (Ind.2002)(As a general proposition, ... all litigants, as well as the court, are bound by the rules.) As
documented herein, the Examiners are not as dedicated to that concept as might be expected. See, e.g., footnote 5,
Final Report; hearsay analysis, Exh. K (Petitioners Proposed Findings).
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eighteen admissions, hitting such serious topics as unauthorized practice, allegations of perjury, and my civil
rights litigation that seems to so trouble the Board. (See, e.g., E233; reference of cost to Dr. Ross) This search
of my backstory failed to even ask about seat belt use or any additional infractions, traffic law problems or
other safety breaches (such as not keeping the smoke alarm batteries charged, jaywalking or hindering the
forward progress of racing pigeons; see Infractions, infra.). I did not include the issue in my April 27, 2015
affidavit or brief the safety restraint issue in my Proposed Findings since I did not even know, in May 2015,
that the topic concerned the Board.30
Infractions are not crimes
Class D is the least serious infraction on the Indiana books. Other Class D infractions include unauthorized
U turns, wearing any color other than hunter orange while stalking game, and allowing your dog to stray
beyond your premises unaccompanied, IC 15-20-1-4. The real serious infractions begin at Class C, which,
thankfully, I have not committed. They include such deviant and unlawyerly conduct as restraining a 12 foot
board with only two straps, IC 9-20-18-14, nailing a garage sale sign to a tree, IC 8-23-20-6, crossing an
intersection diagonally, IC 9-21-17-10, or knowingly detaining a racing pigeon, IC 15-19-4-1.
I must confess, based upon Indiana case law (which is curiously lacking from the Final Report as to
this subject) that the Examiners stipulation that a multiplicity of safety belt violations may not be a
significant concern [in the context of character and fitness] seems to pretty well nail this issue this issue
that still animates a large portion of the Examiners analysis and that is the only actual conduct (or is it
lack of conduct?) alleged against me. 81.
The Legislature does not render a Class D infraction a serious hit: A judgment of up to twenty-five
dollars ($25) may be entered for a violation constituting Class D infraction. Ind. Code 34-28-5-4(d). [I]f a
judgment is entered for violation constituting a Class D infraction, defendant is not liable for court costs.
Ind. Code 34-28-5-1 Neither does the Hoosier court system: City of Fort Wayne v. Parrish, 32 N.E.3d
275, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)(Non-use is not negligence.)31 Neither do state bar examiners: Traffic
infractions in the Westlaw Indiana Key 45 database (bar admission) resulted in no cases. Seat or safety /2
belt in Key 45 allfeds and allstates returned only two cases, neither of which was relevant. (The Court can
set national precedent by upholding the Examiners. Such is not my prayer.)
30
I am proud to now say that I have gone nearly 28 months without an Indiana Class D infraction, and have only
had two in the past 45 months. I credit my success to self-restraint. (My jurisprudence and world view remain the
same.)
31
Note also a motion in limine as the force behind an interlocutory appeal in this instance. Yet the Examiners
label my use of such per se improper and outside the scope of any legitimate practice of law in their attempt to
paint me as unfit to litigate before this Honorable Court.
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Mr. Eddingfield, were you disciplined for driving unrestrained?

This Court previously passed on an opportunity to stress the importance of seat belts when disciplining an
attorney who drove drunk, tried to outrun the police, crashed and got ejected (no seat belt) and was found
with drug paraphernalia in his wrecked car. Matter of Eddingfield, 572 N.E.2d 1293, 1296 (Ind. 1991). This
Court failed to note Eddingfields nonuse of safety restraints while handing down the appropriate thirty
(30) days suspension (with automatic restatement).
If this Court had noted his lack of self-restraint (as to buckling in) Eddingfields fate might have been
much worse that is, if this Court were to think like the BLE well, at least as the BLE thinks when I am
on the docket.
When the Examiners seek to forge a link between my lack of seat belt use and alleged dearth of
character and fitness to become a licensed Indiana attorney they face a real problem given this official
comment to Ind.Prof. Code Rule 8.4:
[A]lthough a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally
answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. There must
be a nexus between the criminal act and one of the three personal qualities set forth in Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b),
to-wit: honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as an attorney.
Need more be written about seat belt infractions? Some have wondered, Whatever happened to moral
turpitude? It was replaced by the above, chasing off fixations as to deviant sex, use of recreational drugs,
seedy associations and past crimes of passion from the character and fitness calculus evidently so that
the BLE can import seat belt compliance. (No word yet on letting dogs run free while hammering signs on
trees to advertise caged racing pigeons.)
I am trying to be funny, here, please work with me
I jest. But I ask the Court to understand that read in context, my series of libertarianesque seat belt confessions
was intended to emulate Dave Barryesque humor (it was certainly lost in translation) as it ended with my
admission that Nonrestraint is stupidity. That quote from my application is curiously absent from the BLEs
presentation to this Court. I believe that my lame attempt at humor added to my dearth of Indiana infractions
since May, 2013 should have kept my lack of vehicular self-restraint from becoming a concern such seemed
to be the situation, in fact, until I filed my Proposed Findings in May, 2015 -- blowing the whistle on the
Board.
Since that filing my lack of habitual buckling has become quite the issue. (I never have been asked if I
ride a motorcycle without a helmet, swim right after eating or run with scissors so it must not be a sincere
concern for my personal safety.) The Boards position is that this bar applicants obvious contempt for all
that is orderly and civilized, as demonstrated by his five infractions over 48 months, is a death knell for his
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chances to become an Indiana attorney. Forget the mere $25 a pop, five over four years even though only
two in the past three years just cost me a career and the $30,000 I sunk into a Masters Degree at Grace
College while pending my five year time out. (I would have rather paid court costs.)
Non seat belt wearers of the world UNITE! (You have nothing to lose but your restraints)
Some would be tempted to dub this your lack of seat belting proves you a revolutionary test one that should
bring Adm & Disc Rule 12 3 into the discussion:
No person who advocates the overthrow of the
government of the United States or this state by force, violence or other unconstitutional or illegal means,
shall be certified to the Supreme Court of Indiana for admission to the bar of the court and a license to the
practice of law. Like such a firebrand, the BLE reasons, I cast off restraint and so I am rightly denied
certification in perpetuity as an agent of chaos and anarchy.32
Can one be denied admission for five Class D infractions over four years? Or even five Class C
infractions? Or any infractions? The Examiners law-free argument makes no sense to me. In my opinion
it is the Boards insistence on not supporting its thundering proclamations with precedent that is improper.
See Exh. H, see instant Final Report. It is the Boards refusal to consider the implications of Section 3 when
they weigh politics and jurisprudence just like the BLE did as to my Higher Laws jurisprudence in 2009
that is a threat to our legal order, rather than me with an Indiana law license. As for begging the question
(something the Board accuses me of), this question begs to be asked and answered: What is the reason that
the Board, after twenty months of completely ignoring my seat belt infractions, trots them out in the Final
Report as justification for denial and a lifetime banishment from Court? How can my infraction be such a
threat to the social order in 2015 to justify a lifetime ban, when they were of such little concern in 2014 that
I was cleared to sit for the bar exam? The cynic in me has to wonder if this new found concern for my
physical safety (but not my ability to feed my children) just might constitute a pre-text attempting to coverup a botched investigation? I opened this section with a frank and candid confession I would like to invite
the Board to be just as frank and candid with this Court.
The Examiners err in positing that Applicant does not feel like he should abide by the rules
governing all other lawyers 95
As further evidence of my alleged feel[ing] of an inability or unwillingness [i.e. lack of fitness or lack
of character] to follow the rules the Examiners cite my allegation that the BLE denied [my] application
based on the Applicants economic impediment. 97. (So, for those keeping score, feelings must mean
thoughts.)
A far cry from 2009, when I was banned for a mere five years for ascribing to the Founders Higher Laws
jurisprudence. See Exh H.
32
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Applicant 24128
Consider: On June 23, 2014, I communicated my response to [the Boards] demand (which I
considered unwarranted and ultra vires at best) in a brief, two page letter, stating, in part:
Please realize that if this request communicates a legally binding condition precedent then it constitutes a
bar to my admission to the practice of law in Indiana. I simply do not have the financial resources to pay
for additional psychological testing. I am nearly indigent due to my inability to obtain gainful employment
over the past years. Using the [past testing demanded by the Board six years earlier] I project cost in
excess of $4,000. C 067
About a month after my June letter the Board responded:

[Y]ou request that you not be required to obtain psychological testing. Following consideration of this
matter, the Boards position remains unchanged. The Board, therefore, renews its request that you proceed
with the updated psychological testing [from the Board-designated firm at the applicants estimated cost of
$4000].
C075, July 22, 2014.33
I felt like I had been pretty clear on the issue, but I wrote back since the BLE asked me to.
So I then wrote:
I am unable to proceed [due] to profound limitations inherent in my present economic situation ... the sheer
size of the request, monetarily speaking, is an absolute bar given my fiscal disabilities. If the ability to
pay out thousands of dollars for a psych eval is a conditio sine qua non for me becoming an Indiana attorney,
then my impoverished economic situation renders me unable to become an Indiana attorney. [Thus] the
Board can simply deny me based upon my economic impediment. C076-77, August 15, 201434
Five weeks later the Board took me up on the August 15, 2014 offer and, as I interpret the record, simply
den[ied] me based upon my economic impediment. I arrived at the feeling (which the Board now finds so
ludicrous) by reading this letter in my mail box:
[T]he Board previously deferred a determination as to your character and fitness and requested that you
obtain updated psychological testing from Psychological Service Associates. [Y]ou are unable to
proceed with the updated psychological testing needed by the Board to render a determination as to
character and fitness. [Thus] you have failed to sustain the burden of proof that you possess the requisite
character and fitness As a result, the Board has denied your application to practice law in the state of
Indiana. C132, September 22, 2014
I feel like the record is pretty clear -- and I was correct on this one
I do not feel the Boards error could be more blatant. And I do feel that I should abide by the same laws
and rules as any other Kansas licensed or federally admitted attorney. Most controversially, I feel that
government attorneys should be held to a higher standard, and especially as to due process and dispassionate
presentation. Going further, I feel like I have documented a pretty much ironclad case of an arm of this
Court throwing off collective self-restraint, ignoring the Rule of Law, and racking up a disturbing record of
The Boards correspondence throughout 2014 constitutes a prima facia violation of its own March, 2014 pledge
to abide by the terms of the Department of Justices Louisiana report. See Exh K, Section 5
34
I also included the Boards own report to the Missouri Supreme Court from 2005 raising no known impediment
against me and making no charge of improper action in 1996-97 in the hope of causing some to question whether I
had faced unreasonable headwinds in 2009 (Compare 2009 BLE Order at paras 12 - 15).
33
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violations of its own rules of conduct rendering five Class D infractions pale by comparison. If the
recommendation in my case is justifiably permanent banishment, then the recommendation, should I make
my case against the Board, would be an end to character and fitness assessment by the Board. (The NCBE
is non-partisan and professional.)
The Examiners err in positing that Applicants conduct and his contemptuous behavior [and]
Applicants conduct and his numerous written filings with the Board granted the Board
sufficient cause to Seek additional information respecting his mental and emotional stability 122
The Board claims to have decided that I needed a psych eval based on my actions which are other than my
correspondence and communications. The Board also claims that I became abusive in my reaction to its
request that I obtain a psych eval. 114, 122
My bat swings at no man (or woman)
In the next paragraph the Board cites a case in which an attorney threatened to kill opposing counsel with a
baseball bat! Given such a context, and given that in the final section of its report the Board brazenly attempts
to blur the line between actions and dialogue, between conduct and correspondence, between
contemptuous behavior and filings with the Board, I perceive the need to cite this well-worn authority:
Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me.
The Board brings forth no allegation, not one, that I uttered anything close to a true threat during
the entire 20 months that I have been the Boards captive. There is no bad conduct, no bad behavior and no
abuse of the government in the record. (At least not by me, that is.) The Board does this Court and all
future bar applicants a grave disservice when attempting to charge, by innuendo, that my communications
crossed the line. They are not even close. Not even my wild speculation and nefarious assumptions
letters. (The Board is likely referencing the letters of January 22 and February 12, 2015, letters written to
confront a Board that was violating due process by reversing the processing of my complaint, taking back
months of foot dragging forward progress that was destroying my family economics, as the Board well knew
due to my required updates.)35
$25 a ticket, but $4500 in psychological evals if your average exceeds one a year over four years
By process of elimination, it must have been my safety belt violations that caused the Board to recommend
I shell out $4500 for psychological testing? That is the only actual conduct the Board cites to in my file
prior to its May, 2014 request that I tender the eval. Need I ask if this could be a pre-text? Could it be that
Of course I am only guessing what the Board is alleging with the terms wild speculation and nefarious
assumptions, since the Board provides precious few actual citations to the record to back its own wild
accusations and nefarious speculations. (My legitimate questions as to the origin of the $4500 and the politics
of selective funding set forth in my January 22, 2015 letter remain cogent -- and unanswered. C204-210)
35
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the Board thought they had me lying under oath, and so needed no further witnesses nor proof of my lack of
character and fitness -- until they actually asked me about that charge a full six months after denying my
application? See K p 16, error one (failure to investigate). Or could it be that the Board thought they had an
ironclad case of unauthorized practice that would certainly doom my application, and so let time run, until
the admissions came back in April, 2015, and they then realized that I had more than sufficient safe harbor?
See C-001 -004. Or could it be that the Board had missed the changes in the ADA as to regarded as in
2009 and thus did not appreciate that treating me to the same processing in 2015 as they did in 2009 could
result in liability? See K p 40, error five. Or could it be that the Board just did not understand, until my May
14, 2015 filing, just how badly they had botched the processing (if I may use that word without raising a
presumption of unfitness) of my application, and now must find cover, even if the cover is as ridiculous as
claiming a series of Infraction Ds add up to a lifetime banishment from court for sedition.
At the end of the day this Board does not just have a problem with me, this Board has a problem with
free speech, rights of conscience, due process, equal justice, government accountability, constitutional
governance and the rule of law. Yet I am the one deemed unfit and lacking character, so much so that I need
to be banned from the Indiana state court system in perpetuity; while the Examiners intend to carry on, per
diem business as usual, just as Professor Baude feared they would.36
ADDRESSING: Applicants Allegations of Fraud on This Court

Possible Fraud on the Court: The Government errs in refusing to hold a hearing on the Bowman
Answer
In footnote 19 the Board misstates and misconstrues my allegations as to the Bowman answer. The Board
also fails to appreciate this from the Bowman report, which impeaches their explanation of why the Bowman
answer does not matter: Review of Mr. Browns psychological testing report of November 7, 2008 by
William Alexy That was Dr. Bowman writing in her report that she had reviewed Alexys written report.
See also my federally-filed affidavit stating that Alexy denied agreeing with Bowman on any of the conflicts
between his report and her mischaracterization of his report. (Reproduced in the Bowman answer.) Also, if
the Board is going to place so much reliance on Bowmans testimony via the amended answer, then what of
Bowmans allegations that Sudrovech committed fraud on the BLE, and thus this Court, and thus the Court
above this Court? See Exh. F, pp. 51 61, Exh A, pp. 058 072, Exh. K, n.4 on p.7. The Board is presenting
Substantial and respectable voices within states, often among the officials charged with enforcement
responsibility, question the value of any character screening. The reply of the traditionalists is not, Oh no, you're
off base, but rather, Well, maybe, but we're carrying on. Baude 652
36
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Applicant 24128
a very selective defense as to the Bowman answer, and doing so without the benefit of testimony from either
Bowman or Sudrovech. (My subpoenas were quashed.)
The high cost of blowing the whistle
These are serious allegations if true, then the cost to me has been very high. Too high to contemplate? So
high that Art 1 12 has no remedy, or is the remedy just too politically incorrect to even consider?
What is most notable about 30 31 is that the Examiners do not take note of the attachment
delivered to them with the February 14, 2014 letter (and via excerpts and explanation in my 2013 application
at 071-073.) Until the Final Report they had ignored it completely.
This oversite is not by accident; the
reason is found on the following pages/paragraphs of the record, which is my sworn testimony (via verified
federal complaint) and Dr. Bowmans amended answer: Exh. E 317, 139 (religion), E 318, 142 143
(constitutional rights) E 320, 148- 149 (religion), E 321, 152- 153 (religion), E 324, 162 (Seventh Circuit
noted this paragraph), E 325, 164 - 165 (Sudrovech fraud on this Court given content of his January 22,
2009 report), E 327-28, 173 177 (Bowman fraud on this Court as to report of Dr. Alexy admitted), E 329,
178 179 (I reported fraud on this Court, Board took no action), E 331-32, 185 187 (Bowman biases),
E 315, 128 (Bowman informed of me prior to my contacting her through JLAP referral). See also my reports
with my application as to this potential fraud on the Court: A 058 073. See also my Original Filing
affidavit, Exh. F.37
I humbly request this Court to give this matter the well-deserved attention that the Examiners never
have. The Boards labeling of my allegations as false, even egregiously false without a hearing and after
quashing Sudrovech and Bowman as witnesses smacks of a government cover-up. There may be evidence
of wrongdoing and cover-up that affects more than just this politically incorrect bar applicant.
Possible Fraud on the Court: The Government errs by selective presentation of the Bowman report
Not only have the Examiners ignored my claim, now for at least 20 months (not counting my attempts to
get them before the Board prior to my 2013 filing), the Bowman quotes deployed against me are all
wrenched out of context and trimmed to the bone to hide their culture war pedigree. Put back in context
they reveal a seemingly desire to mislead this Court through a selective and stilted presentation (underlined
portion is what Board presented):
a. [He] consistently exhibited a grandiose sense of importance.[by] reporting [that he] engaged in
[successful] legal maneuvers [i.e., constitutional defenses sounding in the necessity defense] to
37
Here is found the reason I am alleged to be making egregious false claims and false assumptions against a wide
variety of government representatives and third parties. Those third parties would be Dr. Elizabeth Bowman and
social worker Tim Sudrovech. This paragraph constitutes my original whistleblower effort, now in its fifth year, to
get this material before this Court.
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avoid the legal consequences of his [protest] arrests [some 17 years previous] showing off
his knowledge of case law and by presenting himself as a chivalrous defender of the helpless
[unborn][and his comments] devalued abortion providers. p.7
b. He displayed a sense of entitlement [by making] remarks about psychological tests about which
he obviously knew nothing and [voicing] incorrect opinions, such as believing the MMPI
was a product of government [coercion].
c. He showed a lack of empathy for women whose pregnancies may be the result of rape or incest,
[and] for abortionist [plaintiffs] p.738
Paragraph 10 demonstrates the degree to which the Board is willing to go to place heavily edited materials
(designed to cast me in the worst possible light) before this Honorable Court. Does selective presentation of
such crucial information constitute a stand-alone fraud on this Court? This question is especially crucial as
that all discovery arising out of the Bowman report, the Bowman report itself, and even the witness Elizabeth
Bowman, were all repeatedly decreed irrelevant by the Panel, in rulings requested by Board counsel. April
20, 2015 Order: The panel agrees with the State [i.e. Board counsel] that the interrogatories are irrelevant
to the issue(s) to be heard at the April 27 hearing April 21, 2015 Order Any testimony to be offered by
Dr. Bowman would be stale and irrelevant to the issue pending before the hearing panel. Yet lo and behold,
the Bowman report is now quite relevant, or at least a few choice phrases are -- when wrenched completely
out of context, that is.
I was shocked to find such culture wars analysis in the report of a government approved and
appointed psychiatrist, but even more shocked later, when I was asked, on the record, the very same thing
that Bowman had asked of me in closed door, off-the-record sessions (the kind that the Examiners prefer).
That it became a matter of record and still did not matter to any judicial officer I found astounding.39 Here
is diagnosed a good bit of my cynicism: As the above quotes demonstrate, I was well-probed in a robust
inquisition by Bowman, and she was not shy to report just that; nor were the Examiners embarrassed. In fact,
they build upon that grand inquisition still. This weighing of my weltanschauung explains my letters
addressing the religious belief questions asked of me in my first two off-the-record meetings with the Hoosier
legal elite (in 2014) incident to the instant application. See, e.g., C 211-214.
Compare to Sudrovechs January 22-dated report faulting me for showing an insufficient empathy about issues
associated with [my] beliefs. A061. Evidently the Catholic position on the pro-life issue, if not recanted on
demand, is a bar to bar admission in Indiana, both in 2009, when the above was first used against me, and in 2015,
when this argument is renews, since I remain dedicated to the position my Church affirms.
39
My question is direct, is that [Bowman report quote] correct do you firmly believe that youre obligated as a
Christian to put obedience to Gods law above human law? Thats my question to you? Is that assessment
correct? The question is is that assessment correct? C138
38
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Possible Fraud on the Court: The Government errs by failing to open their records as to the Missouri
Supreme Court Report
At paragraph 87 the Board attempts to rebut my argument, first filed as a post hearing motion in June 10,
2009, Ex.B7-2-G, pp.3-5, presented to the Board again one year ago, C095, C107, and last argued in the
record at K p13 n.9, that a 2005 document signed on the Boards behalf impeaches the Boards 2009
accusations, now repeated against me in 2015, that I blew off an off-the-record Rule 12, 5 appearance
more than eighteen years ago.
This is important because that allegation, that I had disrespected the Board via a no-show, was the
main justification for the Boards harsh treatment of me on January 25, 2008, when I was, in effect, shipped
off and into JLAP until remanded back on January 22, 2009. (The Ross report, the Bowman report and two
Sudrovech reports were the result of that year with JLAP. The second Sudrovech report is worthy of notice
due to its weighing/evaluating of the Bowman report, after which clinician Sudrovech faults me for failing
to demonstrate, while in JLAPs keep, sufficient empathy about issues associated with his beliefs. A061.
This is quite an allegation for a social worker to level after repeatedly refusing to even meet the subject he is
psychoanalyzing (not to mention while lacking any psycho-analytical credentials). See Exh A, A058-061.
Denying once again that I blew off a meeting with the Examiners 18 year ago
I have consistently resisted the allegation that I stood up the Examiners in 1997, in part because it just makes
no sense. Any objective person should ask: Well dont the Examiners have a paper trail? Great question
it seems they do not.
While finishing up law school twenty years ago I did not know where I wanted to live and work. I
applied for admission to the Montana, Kansas and Indiana bars. Montana immediately accepted me, no
questions asked. (I never spoke with them again no family, no job offers.) Kansas and Indiana took a bit
more time, but Kansas did not lag too far behind Montana. When Kansas approved me, my wife (a Kansan)
and I planned to live with her parents in Topeka until I passed the bar and then find work somewhere. I soon
found that work in Mississippi, even before taking the bar exam. I lost all interest in a return to my home
state of Indiana for a decade. As 1997 dawned I was living in Tupelo, Mississippi doing work I enjoyed with
a great team. I had just passed my Kansas bar the September before and was active in cases. I had no plan
or reason to return to Indiana and no desire to take the Indiana bar exam Indiana had missed out on me in
1996, when Kansas and Montana were willing to take me in. I closed that door.
Enter 2007 I had no idea the BLE viewed me as a fugitive from justice
Ten years later I reapplied for the Indiana bar. I had just lost a political job in Kansas and the time was right
to come home to Fort Wayne. I then met the Examiners, who were kind enough to introduce me to JLAP
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for a mental health evaluation for reasons understated and uncertain. As stated, the Board first leveled the
charge that I blew them off in 1997 twelve years after the fact, in 2009, out of the blue at the June 1, 2009
hearing.40 While I have always objected and attempted to set the record straight, the Examiners were
unmoved by my testimony and evidenced, instead preferring their mere unsourced allegation.
Note that the Examiners argue that I hold my entire and total file from both 2007-09 and 201315. Nowhere in that file is found minutes from a February 1997 meeting. No allegation appears anywhere
as to me missing such a meeting prior to the 2009 record, over twelve years later.
After the 2009 processing had ended, I located, deep in the middle of the Missouri bar application
that the Examiners had included with my 2009 docket (adding to its heft), a document that the Missouri
Supreme Court sent to the BLE in October 2005.
The Missouri Supreme Courts questions
In that official investigatory document the Missouri Supreme Court instructs the Indiana State Board of Law
Examiners to please answer the following questions and to provide all relevant information. The Boards
representative failed to share with the Missouri Supreme Court those details that would so animate the Indiana
Supreme Court against me in 2009 and again in 2013-15, to wit, the controverted allegation that I blew off
the Board in February 1997.
In their October, 2005 response to that very relevant question (which would loom over my application
filed two years later), the Board merely wrote that my application was dismissed 2/1997. Not only did the
Board not allege that I had stood them up, the Board failed to answer direct questions about that very issue.
The Board is yet of the opinion, even after reviewing their own applicant-exonerating response on
that official 2005 investigatory document, that I am yet to be faulted for my alleged 1997 no show the one
that the Board lacks any documentation to prove. Even worse, the Board must have, in its own files, the very
Missouri Supreme Court record that I found disproving the allegation that I blew off a scheduled
appearance. Who has known of that document, and the lack of any documentation from 1997, and still agreed
to look away as I was accused of not attending a mandatory meeting more than 18 years ago? Does the
current Board know? The current hearing officer? The current Board counsel? If yes, then serious questions
are at bar.
Rather than admitting that the Missouri report exonerates me from the foundationless charge now
eighteen years past, the Board argues that its agent (who, I would guess, has filed no affidavit on this question)
40
The allegation was raised without warning, despite the operation of Rule 12, 9(b). (Compare 2009 Ex.59c with
Ex 61, with June 1, 2009 transcript for pattern.) In the present case my similar request pursuant to Rule 12, 9(b)
was deemed unnecessary, and I was, in effect, told to be ready for anything at the hearing.
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simply chose to answer none of the yes/no questions respecting whether the Applicant was required to
appear or whether the application was withdrawn after a question arose about character and fitness [as they
allege did happen]. They dismiss my theory that such questions were not answered because the file
contained no evidence of any wrongdoing on my part in 1997 (i.e., an all-clear), and instead tacitly argue that
their agent was either negligent or willfully covering up for me in 2005. (The Examiners do not pause to
clarify which it was.)
The Board has stipulated to a violation of Rule 8
Either way, whether pure negligence or a conspiracy to aid and abet this presumptive revolutionary, the Board
has admitted to a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, either through a deliberate act of its agent
or due to Mary Godseys failure to adequately supervise her operation when another State requests an
investigatory report.
In their zeal to bury the 2005 Missouri report, the Examiners are prepared to admit that the former,
well-respected Executive Director violated this provision of the Indiana Code:
[A] lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall
not: (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in
the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or
disciplinary authority
Rule 8.1. Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters
And if not via negligent supervision, then it appears, if the present Examiners are correct, that
someone violated this provision of the Indiana Code:
(a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.
Rule 8.3. Reporting Professional Misconduct
These provisions leave little room to maneuver. Faced with the choice of admitting to a violation of
the above rules or admitting that it has no records supporting the allegation that I dissed the Board in 1997
a foundational stone in its case against me since 2007 -- the Examiners plead to their agent having violated
one or both of the above.
Thus the Board now shoulders an obligation as to the Missouri Supreme Court
According to the Comments to Rule 8.1,
Paragraph (b) of this Rule also requires correction of any prior misstatement in the matter that the
applicant or lawyer may have made and affirmative clarification of any misunderstanding on the
part of the admissions or disciplinary authority of which the person involved becomes aware.
Having so argued, the Board is now under a duty to inform both Missouri and the NCBE of its
grievous error in 2005. I request an order from the Court that the Board do just that. I furthermore request
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that I be copied on that official notice, and the evidence marshaled to support the impeachment of the 2005
report constitute documents actually created in 1997. The June 1, 2009 hearing contained no such evidence
impeaching the 2005 report, for the Missouri report was still hidden in the Boards files at that time. Even
before I had the 2005 report, I had filed evidence in complete agreement with the 2005 report in the form of
a post hearing motion with signed statements from myself and my mother as to the events (and mailings) of
December 1996/January 1997. Can the Board overcome this sworn evidence? (B72G, p.3-5). I think not.
If the Board lacks the evidence to rebut the Missouri report and my sworn statements backing the
Missouri report then the Board should admit that fact and recall the allegation against me that it even still
advances (See 4, infra). This fraud on the Court, if that is what it turns out to be, has plagued me since 2007,
and, in essence scuttled my career at law. If the truth is the Missouri report, and if that truth is indeed residing
in the Boards files, then career-impacting animus has been documented.
I have no Rule 8 allegations lodged against me. (Yet who has the C&F problem?)
It is interesting to note that the Board advanced no argument in 2009 that I had violated professional codes,
nor does it so argue in 2015.
I have no doubt that had I alleged the Board violated Rules 8.1 and 8.3 that allegation would be cited,
front and center, as evidence of lack of character on my part, yet another example of my inability to be civil
and respectful of the very tribunal Applicant Seeks to persuade. 72 (Thus the Board has rendered its
processing a popularity contest on the level of a reality television show - constitutional concerns about the
protection of dissidents need not apply.)
Candor (that positive virtue from Section 2 that the Board has never learned to love) bids me onward.
I believe that evidence residing in the Boards own files since 2005 (i.e., the Missouri document at issue),
evidence that faces no contrary documentary evidence due to the Boards lack of any evidence countering it,
proves that the Board did me wrong in 2007 with a spurious allegation for which it has no proof on the
contrary, had proof disproving the allegation -- and yet repeats it still, in 2015, to my great harm. This
constitutes evidence of fraud on this Court and fraud on the Court above, since my 2009 denial was taken up,
at much cost to me personally.
I humbly request this Court to give this matter the well-deserved attention that the Examiners never
have. There may be evidence of wrongdoing that affects more than just this politically incorrect bar applicant,
as well as an eight year cover-up of judicial misconduct.
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Possible Fraud on the Court: The Government erred by failing to give up its crusade against
Applicant 24128 when he filed his Proposed Findings on May 15, 2015
My May 14, 2015 fifty plus page brief was filed nearly a month ahead of deadline to allow Board counsel
and the Board opportunity to understand the allegations of malfeasance therein. I had hoped that once they
understood that there was no reasonable path other than approving me they would do just that. The Board
instead recommended denial and an order banishing me from the application process for the remaining
balance of my life, a seeming response to my application and the lifeline presented therein at E 005.
I believe the Boards response to my well-reasoned May 14, 2015 filing to be so unreasonable as to
constitute yet another fraud upon this Court.41
ADDRESSING: Applicants Allegations of Rule 12 errors in the Final Report of the

Examiners
The usual due process constraint is that courts cannot abandon settled principles. [citations omitted] Stop
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 738 (2010) Kennedy, J.
concurring, joined by Sotomayer, J.
Missing the Point: The Board erred when failing to recognize prima facie case under Adm & Disc.
Rule 12, Sections 2 & 3
The practice of law is a privilege rather than a natural or vested right. In re Harrison, 109 N.E.2d 722, 723
(1953). The privilege is contingent upon the faithful performance of the duties imposed upon the attorney
by the society which grants him the privilege. The first and continuing requirement of an attorney is that he
be of good moral character. Rule 3-12. Being of good moral character necessarily implies that he will
conform to the moral standards of his profession as provided (1) by law, (2) by his oath of office and (3)
the code of ethics of the legal profession.
Baker v. Keisker 142 N.E.2d 432, 434 (1957)

I believe that I presented a prima facia case as to Rule 12 2 on February 13, 2014, when the Board
determined to allow me to sit for the bar exam yet placed no reason in writing for its decision delaying
actually denying my character and fitness evaluation. Why was I was not certifiable on that date? Can the
Board simply decide not to decide? While I might be lacking in such non Section 2 realms as insight, or
be a hypothetical revolutionary raising up an army of nonbucklers (in a fashion not violative of Section 3), I
was at that time right with (1) the law, I confessed to being ready (2) to take the oath once again and I had
(3) never been disciplined for an ethical misstep as an attorney. See Exh. K, Proposed Findings, pp. 19. So
An example of Boards counsel visiting fraud on the Board is documented at 56 of counsels June 9, 2015 filing.
Merely compare the argument she places before the Board with this sentence from her email at issue to appreciate
the fraudulent nature of her presentation: If you still want the panel to answer this question, please do it in the
form of a formal Motion, not an email, That line, coupled with the position of the Panel and Board counsel that
both the Panel and the Board could recall or overrule anything Board counsel committed to, is key to understanding
the attempted fraud at 56 of Board counsels brief.
41
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why not the certification? Failure to do so was an exercise in discretion that was too much discretion as in
arbitrary and capricious governance.
Missing the Point: The Board errs in treating the burden of proof as a ploy to place an applicant
ever on the defensive
Final Report 91, 97, 98 & 102 reveals the reason, clearly stated, as to why I lack sufficient character and
fitness to be an Indiana attorney, and it has nothing to do with my seat belting non-habit. Despite multiple
rulings and reminders that he bore the burden of proof and that the only issue was his fitness and character
to practice law, particularly in light of his refusal to comply with the request for an updated psychological
demand. Not only was the request not a request, see analysis at Exh. F p.65, failing to accede to the
request was evidence that I needed to accede to the request. In other words, only a crazy person would resist
paying out $4500 to be analyzed by a psychologist of the States choosing, to be pre-briefed and post-briefed
by the State, with all Examiners granted access (and logically all BLE support staff and all support staff of
the individual Examiners) to the raw testing results. On a related front, the U.S. National Library of
Medicine reports that [t]he political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union originated from the concept
that persons who opposed the Soviet regime were mentally ill because there was no other logical explanation
why
one
would
oppose
the
best
sociopolitical
system
in
the
world.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2800147/
It is interesting that the Examiners dub my May 14, 2015 - filed document Proposed Findings and
then turn right around and argue the, document does not [ ] set out finding, legal conclusions, or any possible
recommendation that this Board could ever make. What purports to be factual findings are approximately
fourteen pages of the Applicants oft-repeated complaints and allegations about the Board and his
processing. 97. These allegations, meticulously tied to the record, are, the Examiners conclude, far
from actual findings and conclusions as to the issue before the Hearing Panel and Board, [but rather]
nonsensical and improper Exh. K not only beg[s] the question (which question the Board does not
say), but also serves to further justify the grave concerns the Board has expressed as to the Applicants
character and fitness to practice law in the State of Indiana. 102. And there it is . I urge the Court to
read Exh. K to realize just how very unfit I am to be an attorney in the State of Indiana questioning the
government and actually using the law to do it no less! (How unlawyerly of me well, evidently un-Indiana
lawyerly of me anyway.)
A riddle that needs to be solved about those facts which the BLE will NOT acknowledge
A rhetorical question can thus be posed: When are proposed findings of fact not really facts? When they are
findings accusing the Board of error. This is because the Board is only programed to receive (information as
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to the applicants burden), one can check out anytime they want, but they can never leave (behind the concept
that The applicant shall have the burden of proving that he or she possesses the requisite good moral
character and fitness to practice law.) At all time now past perpetuity for me. (Eternally banned, rock
uphill not included).
Thus does the Board use the applicants burden to keep the applicant ever on the offensive, and
never, ever taking inventory of whether the Board is actually keeping up with due process and the rule of law
itself. But See Wright v. Steers, 179 N.E.2d 721, rehearing denied 180 N.E.2d 539 (1962) (The constitution
is made to be observed by public officials and judges.); Finney v. Johnson, 179 N.E.2d 718 (1962)(The
constitution was framed to be strictly observed by all public officers and particularly the courts as guardians
of the citizens' rights stated therein.); Sovich v. State, 167 N.E. 145 (App.1929), transfer denied 174 N.E.
812 (Citizens' constitutional rights should always be zealously guarded by courts.)
Missing the Point: The Board errs when mandating off-the-record meetings that are subsequently the
grist for allegations of fact beyond appellate review
[T]he Hearing Officer's findings and conclusions are given special emphasis as they are the products of
direct observation of witnesses. Matter of Garringer, 626 N.E.2d 809, 810 (Ind. 1994)
In keeping with the Boards general principle that all applicants who have previously been denied
are specifically considered by the Board, I was summoned to the February 13, 2014 meeting of the Board,
a mere twelve days prior to the 2014 bar exam. I was hoping to take that exam, but had no assurance that I
would be cleared to sit.
I requested that this crucial off-the-record meeting revisiting the serious and significant questions
of 2007-09 be held on the record. C020. I asked, in part, because the 2009 BLE Order had, in my mind,
improperly made use of my also non-record appearance before the Board on January 25, 2008. See 2009
BLE Order, paras 29-30, 35, 47 (note context and lack of citations to any record). My request for a record
was denied with a citation to Board policy.42
While the Board never endeavored to make any record of the February 13 meeting (at least none that
was copied to me, which due process might recommend), I did copy back to the Board the content of that
meeting my letters of February 14 and April 1, 2014.
Against the above standard of review, all the Board has to do is posit an applicant was curt, or
showed attitude, or looked crazy, or demonstrated a fatal lack of insight the Board will receive deference
There is no record made when an applicant meets with the Board. In the event an applicant disagrees with any
determination by the Board, he or she may request a hearing under Admission & Discipline Rule 12, Section 9 which
is on the record. Bradley Skolnik, email, 1/27/14
42
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from the Court as to those observations and the applicant has no record whatsoever to counter that deference.
I made this difficult for the Board to do but the Board still attempts it see final paragraphs of Final Report
alleging conduct and vaguely mentioning before the Board. Note that I only stood before the Board in
February, 2014, never since, and there is nothing in the record before then alleging any strangeness or
conduct -- on my part at that meeting. Recall that I have the entire and total file. Enter the Boards Final
Report, where the Board needs such allegations to justify their psych eval order: So easy to allege when there
is no record. In sum, as to the off-the-record hearing policy (or tradition) of Rule 12, 5, to quote the current
Board President (on a similar matter),We've fallen into an informal but bad practice. Hearing transcript,
pp. 4-5 (admission as to Rule 12, 9) The Boards informalities are especially difficult on unwanted
applicants like myself as I have now documented via three times at bat.
Missing the Point: The Board errs in demanding the tender of psychological reports without a good
cause shown
One of the paragraphs authored by Board counsel did not make the final cut, but it does raise a serious and
substantial question at the very heart of this controversy, and its deletion as the draft became the Final Report
may direct toward a question which the Examiners do not want asked and refuse to answer. Counsel wrote:
Given both Applicants history, including the prior psychological evaluations, and his conduct with the 2013
application and since, the Board had sound reasons to require updated psychological testing and evaluation;
yet, Applicant has refused to obtain the requested testing and evaluation. Draft June 9, 2015, 8, p.20. The
question begs to be asked and begs to be answered: What sound reasons did the Board have to require
updated psychological testing and evaluation in May, 2014? I had asked repeatedly (C067-68, C094-94),
all to no avail. In fact, merely asking reveals a fatal lack of insight, which rhymes with insolence, which
is what an applicant who questions the Examiners or who attempts to peer behind their curtain demonstrates.
That said, the Examiners did finally answer the crucial sound reasons question, at long last, at 114:
It was due to:
a. My history: (No actual reference to what in my history, but my litigation against JLAP and its assigns
was noted more than a few times in the Final Report, as was my alleged no show in 1997.)
b. The materials presented with my application: (No actual reference to which materials, but my
allegations against Bowman and Sudrovech, as well as my affinity for the psych-replacing $40 MyersBriggs assessment certainly raised the Examiners ire. See 68.)
c. My February 13, 2014 appearance before the Board: (Note, not a hearing, but rather an appearance.
No record is made and appellate review defers to whatever the Board says happened there, so this is the
unassailable trump. The Boards scribes always have the last word on what happened in an off-the-record
hearing. In my case they need not even allege, just vaguely point and accuse.)
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I submit that the question remains unanswered, and I submit that the answer to this question may very well
reveal the presence of animus.43 I also submit that standing on principle and conscience and refusing to go
see a psychologist unless the Board issues an order with good cause shown is not an error on my part, even
if it has cost me more than fifteen months of my life to date. It is rather my constitutional right, under both
the First Amendment, and even more so, under Article 1, Sections 2 and 3 and 12 of the Indiana Constitution.
Missing the Point: The Board errs in its belief that none of its actions need to conform to the demands
of due process, the constitutions or the rules of this court as long as its Final decision does. 100
At 100 the Board makes the long-discredited only the final decision maker can violate constitutional
rights argument in an attempt to exonerate themselves from the content of the Morgan report. (The good
Magistrate located a matter of concern in my file that she described as my fitness to practice law in
Indiana given concerns over my willingness to obey state and federal law even when doing so violates his
conscience.44 Exh.B 003.
The Board seems to think its agents can discriminate and violate the Indiana Constitution at will as
long as the absolutely immune Board and not the front end tortfeasor renders the coup de grce . (See, e.g.,
my processing in 2008-09.) But I was interviewed by Morgan in January, 2014, and the alleged final decision
to deny me was made nearly nine months later. And yet, here I am, one year after that denial, nineteen months
after meeting with Magistrate Morgan, finally filing my Rule 14 appeal with the Indiana Supreme Court.
Time matters much to a bar applicant at least to this one, now thrice. Time matters little to the BLE. Neither
do rights of conscience.
Missing the Point: The Board errs in punishing applicants based upon their viewpoint toward
overreaching governance
The Examiners repeatedly use the word nonsense for my communication, 77&102, correspondence and
briefing (which they also describe as tortured, 66, and allege that such can arise only out of a mind that is
unfit to recite the law (i.e. stupidity) or patently dishonest, 120.) I am excoriated for my perspective on the
Race and Gender Fairness Committee, 84, mocked for my claim to patriotic obligation, 85, alleged to be
either stupid or dishonest for disagreeing with the Board on the application of a recently-decided appellate
43
According to the US National Library of Medicines National Institutes of Health, [P]olitical abuse of
psychiatry refers to the misuse of psychiatric diagnosis, treatment and detention for the purposes of obstructing the
fundamental human rights of certain individuals and groups in a given society. In [totalitarian] regimes abuses of
the human rights of those politically opposed to the state are often hidden under the guise of psychiatric treatment.
In democratic societies whistle blowers on covertly illegal practices by major corporations have been subjected to
the political misuse of psychiatry. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2800147/
44
Some would think that Adm. & Disc. Rule 12, 3 was written for such a time as this. Evidently not. The Magistrate
reports plying me with the Oath and being satisfied I was no revolutionary still no certification. Evidently Indiana
lacks organic law protecting rights of conscience? It appears that the BLE thinks so.
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case, 86, accused of repeated misstatement of fact for arguing that the Boards 2005 character and fitness
report to the Missouri Supreme Court was accurate and truthful, C095, C017, and accused of filing a
complete mischaracterization of Professor Baudes essay. 88
Complainers need not apply
I am further faulted for complaining about the government to the government (or as it was called in the
Eighteenth Century, petitioning the government for a redress of grievances).
Court, [or] the Indiana Bar.
I disparage the Board, the
The Examiners likewise fault me for disparaging the honesty and
professionalism of the psychological and psychiatric evaluators who were appointed [by the government].
The quotes that follow merely demonstrate that I have a legitimate claim to whistleblower status. The third
quote in 73 clearly alleges fraud on this Honorable Court (or as the Board puts it, demonstrates a fatal lack
of insight).
What result if I had instead lauded the Board, the Court, and the Indiana Bar? Could it be that my
viewpoint is the issue? Consider: The Applicant makes it very clear what his opinion of the Board is:
101 the block quote that follows is all from Indiana case law, but one would not know that given how the
quote was torn out of context. The Board clearly finds my viewpoint, my attitude, my perspective, my
ideology the problem even when all I am doing is quoting this Court!
The Examiners seem to have missed Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 962 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied
(July 31, 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 970, 190 L. Ed. 2d 834 (2015). Evidently Brewington is not sufficient
medicine to treat the Boards ills. A keycite of 45I(A) Admission to Practice with Examiners reveals only
nine Indiana cases, all between 1960-67; none but In re Fogle helpful to issues at bar. It could be argued that
a case from this court directly addressing the bar application process is overdue. One addressing ideology
and bar admission may be just the medicine most needed to cure the Boards seeming fever. Perhaps what
is really needed in this hour is precedent directly addressing viewpoint discrimination under the Indiana
Constitution? Precedent in the context of one interfacing with the government in the realm of professional
licensure -- while the government is demanding the supplicant take action violative of conscience.
A chance to render a case of first impression?
A search of the West Key system for viewpoint or idea discrimination brings back no Indiana cases. A
similar search for content-based discrimination brings back only six, with only Love v. Rehfus, 946 N.E.2d
1, 5 (Ind. 2011) being of recent vintage. (Love is of narrow application and did not address the Indiana Bill
of Rights.)
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A case on the topic of viewpoint discrimination/political correctness/insight building off of the Indiana
Constitution45 could do much to address the hole in that safety net due to Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d
1363, 1368 (Ind. 1996) (The right to speak clause articulates a liberty interest, not an equality interest. It
protects against restriction of expressive activity, not discrimination because of content or viewpoint.) A
viewpoint discrimination decision addressing the Indiana Constitution could build off (and even transcend)
the following platform:
Our Bill of Rights does not expressly refer to political speech, and it has been argued that 9
merely sets out the freedom and responsibility equation, leaving all substantive protection of
expression to the limitations imposed on the police power by other provisions of our Bill of Rights.
We reject this view, however, for while we agree that various provisions of our Bill of Rights help
limit the permissible scope of abuse, See, e.g., Ind. Const. art. I, 3 (state may not control
exercise of religious opinions), we also believe 9 has substantive content: that popular
comment on public concerns should not be restrained.
Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 961 (Ind. 1993)
Since Whittington came after Price, confusion is not uncommon. Perhaps this lack of guidance as to
viewpoint/idea discrimination is the cause of the Boards belief that it is acceptable to deny bar admission
(and ban me for life) due to my view on such debatable matters as the Baude essay, when psych evals grow
stale, the value of being patriotic, the exclusion of religion from race and gender promotion, the content of
complaints tendered to the government and whether it is OK to ask your local policeman how he deals with
undocumented workers without car insurance or driving privileges. Freedoms just another word for no
more freedoms left to lose?
Missing the Point: The Board errs in believing that it can deny and banish based upon an Applicants
manner of thinking. 66
It is difficult to miss the upshot of the Final Ruling: The Board just does not like the way I think! Consider
how the Board scuffs me for unwelcome thoughts: derision for JLAP, 28, lack of insight, 11, 65,
discontent [with a ruling] 67, hope, implied 69, unfounded assumptions, 71, questioning
authority 78, complaining about the policy behind the law, 79 & 80, attitude, 81, mindset, 83,
Applicant believes, 86, and false assumptions against a wide variety of government representatives,
116. In 68 my views on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator are found quite troubling. In 95 I am alleged
to have the wrong feelings about the rule of law.
45
As would undoubtedly be encouraged by former Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard, Second Wind for the Indiana
Bill of Rights, 22 Ind.L.Rev. 575 (1989). Cited in Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 957 (Ind. 1993).
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The Board does not like the way I think of my Professional Calling
It is evident from 69 that the Board wishes to banish from this applicant even the very concern about
injustice, inequality, biases and parochialism in the administration of justice. I ask that my paragraph
(A003) be read in context so that the implication for which the Board reports me can be best interpreted.
The Examiners selective editing removed the first half of the sentence: My Kansas law license saddles me
with the welcome task Please note that I am borrowing my material from the Pre-amble to the
Professional Code.
The Board does not like the way I think about the Myers-Briggs test
The Examiners claim that I use this test to posit that I am sane and of good moral character. 46 I cannot
locate any such claims as to this test in my materials, but they are correct that I was referencing it to assert
the following claim, which the Examiners emphasized in their Final Report as yet another example of my
detestably erroneous opinions: I think the fact that I am an ENTP well trained in constitutional law who
takes as his mission in life confronting government overreaching explains everything in my file. 68 As I
stated in that paragraph (the Examiners omitted this opening clause), Socrates recommended that we all get
to know ourselves. I used the Myers-Briggs assessment, in part, to do just that, reporting it at A074. The
Examiners use my grave affront to their understanding of the mysteries as evidence supporting an order of
denial and lifetime banishment. An end ironically similar to Socrates fate. (Ill be taking Kansas over
hemlock, thank you very much.)
The Board does not like the way I think about JLAP
According to 31, the Examiners are concerned that I fear JLAP could be used as a tool for the
advancement of ideological uniformity and political conformity. Such fears, according to the BLE, show
put me beyond the pale as to fitness to practice law. Id., fn.7 Such thinking, it would seem, is just not
acceptable to the guardians of Indianas legal gate.
Given that their denial and lifelong banishment order at bar is due, in large part, to what I think one
could find it ironic that the Examiners find it difficult to imagine a scenario in which some in the Hoosier
hierarchy conceived of just such a use for JLAP.
46
Actually that was the conclusion of Drs. Ross, Alexy, Sass and Flueckiger, and, if read closely, even Dr.
Bowman. See my August 15, 2014 letter, presenting all. C076. The Examiners response was denial, both
substantive and procedural. C132 (Please note the double entendre.)
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Could official court machinery be utilized to aid those elitists who want to minimize the influence of
attorneys and judges who just do not get it on important issues affecting our evolving moral and legal
foundations here in Indiana?
Consider this editors policy report from the states most influential legal newspaper:
Why shouldnt lawyers undergo evaluations by mental-health professionals and doctors to make sure you
are still up to task for the job? [ ] What about a requirement that if you want to be a judge, you have to
have your character and fitness examined before running or applying for that post? [S]urely there is
information that isnt divulged to the judicial nominating commission. A confidential interview with a
health professional could provide the nominating commission with a simple yes or no as to whether this
person should be a judge.
See, e.g., http://www.theindianalawyer.com/first-impressions/09/12/10/more-frequent-fitness-exams/PARAMS/post/22496 (Dec
10, 2009)
Add to this line of public advocacy the fact that the Board deigns to reach back more than sixty years
to include the following in their instant report, and my alleged paranoia may be found reasonable to some:
One who is mentally qualified to practice law [today] might not be qualified to do so eighteen years later,
and one whose character and fitness could not be challenged [eighteen years ago] might be vulnerable in that
regard [today]. Petition of Kalamara, 232 Ind. 535, 539 (1953). As the Examiners present in their Final
Report, character and fitness can change over time at 112, and lack of insight, 11, 65, a defective
manner of thinking, 66, incorrect opinions on mental health tests, 68, unfounded assumptions, 69,
and false assumptions against a wide variety of government representatives, 116 all constitute legitimate
grounds for BLE concern, and, if found of the wrong mind on these subjects, a life time banishment.
In my defense, my sense of history and overreaching governance concerns (the former borne through
study, the latter borne mostly through Hoosier experience) causing me to fear the misuse of JLAP are not
unique to me. (But as Lois Lerner has well-demonstrated, some Americans are simply unworthy of
constitutional protections.)
Imagine theres no constitution, it isnt hard to do
The Board scoffs at my concerns that JLAP could one day become ideologically and politically useful to
powerful interests opposed to traditional Hoosier values. Could such a thing already be fait accompli?
Dr. Bowman's report specifically stated that Brown firmly believes he is obligated as a Christian to put
obedience to God's laws above human laws. Dr. Bowman further noted that Brown expressed devaluing
attitudes towards pharmacological or psycho-therapeutic mental health treatment and that he made
sarcastic remarks devaluing authority of all types, especially mental health authority and the abortion
industry.
Brown v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 440 (7th Cir.), cert dend 133 S.Ct. 176 (2012)
The above trifecta (Gods law, psy-ops and abortionists as authorities) render it easy for me to
envision some government bureaucrats drafting a thought crimes code to ensure that all attorneys exude
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the desired [progressivist] manner of thinking, 66, that is, think as the government (or at least some
government agent) desires. The above quote, and my recent denial and banishment order, are both evidence
that just such a system is at work in Indiana. This petition will answer the question of whether it is acceptable
to this Honorable Court.
Missing the Point: The Board errs in continuing to deny Applicant based upon a lack of insight
As is revealed at paragraphs 70 -72, 96 and footnote 17, the Board stands prepared to deny me a law license
and banish me in perpetuity, as it did for a mere five years in 2009 (11,65) because I am found, after a
time-out that should have proven re-educational, to yet lack this thing they call insight.
Insight as code for character suffers from potential vagueness:
The term good moral character . . . is unusually ambiguous. It can be defined
in an almost unlimited number of ways for any definition will necessarily reflect the attitudes, experiences,
and prejudices of the definer. [] Such a vague qualification, which is easily adapted to fit personal views
and predilections, can be a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the right to
practice law
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957). I have been denied the right to practice law based
upon analysis that, in effect, reads: Were there no other grounds on which to deny the Applicants
application, this lack of [undefined term] would be independently sufficient to show that he lacks the requisite
good moral character for admission to this bar. If moral character were the missing word, there would be
some help in case law. But when this thing they call insight becomes the missing word, insight not even
being found in Rule 12, 2, well then ambiguity is brought to bar, and with it, nearly unlimited discretion
on the part of the Board. (Just as they like it, as that it goes quite well with off-the-record hearings and other
informalities.)
Insight the BLE knows it when it doesnt see it?
What is this insight? It is a term closely associated with civility in the writings of the Board. At 72, 96,
114 & 115 I am alleged to lack civility, in the way in which I communicated my allegations that due process
and constitutional violations on the part of the Board were visiting harm (months of admission delay) upon
me and my family. The Board is especially focused on my 2015 correspondence (C057 - forward) in JanuaryFebruary 2015, when the Board began reversing the processing of my already delayed application both
delay and progress, forwards or backwards, are seemingly rights the Board reserves unto itself.47 I have to
wonder, could anyone question the Board of Law Examiners processing and not be found uncivil in so
doing? I think the evidence at bar suggests that the mere audacity to question this secretive, powerful
To be fair to the Board, the Courts Rules do not state that applicants have to be processed linearly, or that
processing cannot take more than two years from Section 5 to Section 9.
47
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chamber of the Indiana judiciary is, ipsi dixit, uncivil, that is, lacking in insight, no matter how gentle the
nudgings. (See, e.g. my completely ineffectual as in all content ignored -- two page letter of June 23, 2014,
C067.)
The Board is given to code. Uncivil and disrespectful are code for not knowing better than to
question the authorities.
Lack of self-restraint and lack of insight are code for rejecting civil and
respectful and becoming a whistleblower.
As the Board states, my Proposed Findings speak for
themselves, demonstrating in full my lack of professionalism, incivility, my absence of an honest dedication

to the rule of law and my utterly offensive personality, all things that the Examiners charge against me via
innuendo through the use of Wisner, and directly elsewhere. All are allegedly on full display at Exh. K. I
pray this Court reads that document to determine if I am correct as to my concerns about the true nature and
mission of the Indiana Board of Law Examiners. (Not to mention it is possible that Professor Baudes essay
might have some relevance?)
What is this thing they call insight? I believe it is nothing less than thinking and communicating as
the Examiners demand, being the kind of compliant attorney the Examiners want to mint. Insight (and its
twin, civility) is political correctness on steroids in the hands of the BLE, and it has swallowed up eight
years of my life. I can testify firsthand that it is a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory
denial of the right to practice law once removed. (As an aside, I do not believe any of the Marxist applicants
of the 1950s were run through the compassionless gauntlet that my family has experienced.)
ADDRESSING: Applicants Allegations of Evidentiary errors by the Examiners

Missing the Particulars: The Panel erred in quashing the subpoenas of Bowman, Ross, and
Sudrovech
As the Examiners stress in 83, questions of fact exist as to why reports were dated and filed when they
were. The Board ridicules me for raising such questions of fact, without stopping to ponder that recognizing
them as fact questions render Tim Sudrovech and Elizabeth Bowman relevant fact witnesses. Bias is always
relevant in Indiana courts just not before the chamber that mints Indiana attorneys, where bias is never
relevant if it be bias alleged against a government witness. After having denied me these witnesses, the
Board now uses them against me once again, as in 2009. This is simply astounding. The Board rules that
Ross and Bowman were both irrelevant to any and all questions as to my application; then Board counsel
uses them both in her closing argument to accuse me of madness; then the Board uses them both in the Final
Report to support a banishment for life order. This is due process? I guess I am not due all that much from
the Boards perspective.
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The Board labels these potential witnesses reports stale, with no citation to legal authority or expert
opinion. Evidently the Boards naked decree is sufficient to make it so. Enter my argument from Holleman.
I find warrant therein to argue that six years is not ipsi dixit too stale. That argument is one of the headliners
for my banishment, as the Board finds such argument reason to declare me unfit to be an Indiana attorney.
See many argument at Exh. I, p 6 it is likely where the Board took most offense. There is no legal reason
to count the reports at bar stale, and my dissection of them, showing that each supported my cause for
licensure one year ago, C076, should have resulted in certification instead of the September 22, 2014 denial.
C132. (Note the Board was not shy to use them against me just shy to allow me to use them in support of
my application.)
Note the chastisement in 83 for my daring to seek an order allowing me to subpoena witnesses
[who the Boards attorney already told me] have no relevant evidence. 48 The cited pages reveal those
witnesses to include Dr. Elizabeth Bowman, Tim Sudrovech and Sue Shayne, all witnesses relevant to the
very (contested) matters that the Board argued in its Final Brief. Relevant for the Board, not relevant for the
applicant. My discovery contains analysis of why each is relevant, on many fronts. See E 217-232. See also
K pp 4-5, C076 (my August 15, 2014 letter detailing all relevant psych witnesses); See also E390, E400,
E445 (objections to quashing); K p 4, n.7. Professor Baudes hypocrisy quote may be applicable.
Missing the Particulars: The Panel erred in building upon hearsay to support its decision to punish
me for having filed civil rights litigation
The Board accepts as true the testimony of Dr. Stephen Ross, footnote 5, after having ruled, when denying
me Ross as a witness, that [a]ny testimony to be offered by Dr. Ross would be stale and irrelevant to the
issue pending before the hearing panel. April 20, 2015 Order.
Not only does the Board violate its own ruling, the Board violates Ind. Evidence Rule 603. See
Johnston v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins Co., 667 N.E.2d 802, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)(The unsworn letter
report of the other expert would obviously be inadmissible hearsay and cannot be considered in these
summary judgment proceedings); See also Faulkner v. Markkay of Indiana, Inc., 663 N.E.2d 798, (Ind. Ct.
App. 1996)(Doctor not allowed to present another experts report due to inability to cross-exam).
48
Disagreeing with Board counsel as to the relevance of the witnesses was a costly decision on my part. See 70
(1) of Board counsels June 9 filing, Even after Board counsel objected to Applicants subpoena requests because
he sought to subpoena witnesses who would have no relevant evidence, Applicant insisted [on service]. Who
needs due process when all that is needed is the Boards counsel to dictate those witnesses acceptable to the
government?
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Ross unsworn letter in, my sworn affidavit out hard to make sense of that one
It is ironic that Ross unsworn and nonauthenticated testimony (just as his and Bowmans and Sudrovechs
reports were in 2009) is deployed against me by a committee of this Court that claims to respect and uphold
Indiana law, while, in the very same document, the Board argues that I should face the most severe sanction
it can hand down for (at least in part) daring to submit a sworn affidavit in lieu of appearance. Ross letter
is used as testimony, even though the rules of evidence and case law stand against it; my affidavit has been
denied admission, despite Board counsels pledge that It is the Boards practice to allow all documentation
into evidence without objection that the applicant wishes to admit.
And also despite the fact that the Board can bring forth no legal argument to bar its admission.
The Board accuses me of begging the question. This question begs to be asked and answered: What
is the reason that the Board violates its very own order and such beyond-cavil law to vouchsafe the argument
that this whistleblower should be punished for having filed civil rights litigation against JLAP and its
agents?49
Missing the Particulars: The Panel erred in building upon conclusory evidence to justify its refusal
to certify and recommended life time banishment
It is instructive to note that the Board refused to accept psychiatrist Dr. Bryan Flueckigers report in 2009,
labeling it conclusory without defining that term or citing one case defining that term.50 Six years later it
is the Board that is fronting conclusory evidence, which is defined under Indiana law. Whitley Products, Inc.
v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 704 N.E.2d 1113, 1119-20 (Ind. T.C. 1998); See also See Shoot v. Anderson
Twp. Assessor, 868 N.E.2d 79, 82 (Ind. T.C. 2007)
Board counsel, in her rough draft of the Boards Final Report, came right out and said it: Applicant showed a
lack of respect for the rights of others and lack of concern for basic fairness in bringing a [federal 42 USC 1983]
lawsuit against private practitioners Dr. Bowman, Dr. Ross and others after exhausting the appropriate legal
remedies BC Findings, 12, p.21 Applicant abused the legal process in his lawsuit against Dr. Bowman and
others. Id., 14, p.21. Note Board counsel setting herself up as the arbiter of all that is appropriate, which does
not include appeals under federal civil rights laws.
50
Consider the Seventh Circuit on the Flueckiger report: Brown later sent another letter to defendants Sudrovech
and Terry Harrell, Executive Director of JLAP. This letter also raised concerns about the evaluation process and
requested an independent review of his case by "state officers trained in constitutional and civil rights law." Order
5. The following day, Brown requested permission to be evaluated by a psychiatrist of his own choosing.
Sudrovech denied this request stating that evaluations were to be provided by a psychiatrist from the JLAP
providers list. Despite this denial, Brown went ahead and met with his choice, Dr. Bryan Flueckiger, who issued a
report on May 1, 2009 stating that Brown satisfied the requirements of Rule 12 and recommended that he be
permitted to sit for the Indiana bar examination. Brown, 668 F.3d at 440, n.1. A review of the many psychiatrist
and psychologist reports in the record will reveal that only Dr. Flueckiger was given this Courts Rule 12 standards
to guide his evaluation. If Dr. Elizabeth Bowman reports is rightly set aside due to the admitted material
inaccuracies within then the Flueckiger report, finding me mentally fit as the proverbial fiddle, becomes the only
psychiatrist report in my file. See August 15, 2014 letter for detailed analysis tied tightly to the record: C076.
49
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Show me the EVIDENCE!

Conclusory paragraph 66 is evidence of both animus and hypocrisy given that the Board yet rejects the
Flueckiger report as conclusory. The Board shoulders the obligation to bring forth clear and convincing
evidence supporting each and every one of these conclusory allegations in 66 in order to support the
prayed for denial and banishment predicated upon them: Yet the Board failed to do so.
Missing the Particulars: The Panel erred in building upon immaterial and irrelevant evidence to
justify its refusal to certify and recommended life time banishment
[C]onclusory statements are not probative evidence. Sollers Pointe Co. v. Dep't of Local Gov't Fin., 790
N.E.2d 185, 191 (Ind. T.C. 2003) Probative is defined as follows: Having the effect of proof; tending to
prove, or actually proving. Testimony carrying quality of proof and having fitness to induce conviction of
truth, consisting of fact and reason co-operating as co-ordinant factors. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Daviess,
243 Ky. 356, 47 S.W.2d 990, 992. Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Edition, p. 1367, cited in Nahmias
Realty, Inc. v. Cohen, 484 N.E.2d 617, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)
Show me the PROBATIVE EVIDENCE
It is crucial to note that the Board denied my character and fitness on September 22, 2014. At that time the
so-called post-application, post-appearance barrage of correspondence and communications with the Board
was limited to a few email and letters of February 14, April 1, June 24 and August 15, 2014. I beg this Court
to review that evidence firsthand. Does it present clear and convincing evidence that I should be denied
character and fitness and banished from court for life, or does it rather present a prima facia case of moral
character and sufficient fitness?
I also note that evidence that I question authority, think like a tea partier,51 allege the Board has
violated its own rules and the applicable constitutions, inquiry into the 2005 report to the Missouri Supreme
Court, and argue that Tim Sudrovech used Dr. Bowman to visit a fraud upon this Court are not reasons to
deny me a law license and banish me from court for life. Most, if not all, of that is irrelevant, immaterial
evidence in the case at bar. The Boards conclusion that I should be banned is based upon conclusory
evidence the Boards conclusions, that is pretty much all. The Boards conclusions are less about the actual
evidence and, more likely constitute evidence of animus. Most of the Boards conclusions are based solely
upon nonprobative, immaterial allegations of things that are not wrongdoing. I am not accused of emulating
my brother in the unlit curtilage of a public place in which known persons of interest congregate -- but some
of the Boards evidence is closely akin to that law school example.
51
See letter to Rodeheffer and Skolnik dated March 2, 2015 for this argument, as well as an ignored official ADA
claim.
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Missing the Particulars: The Panel erred by committing logical fallacies throughout their Final
Report
Legal argument generally has three sources of major premises: a text (constitution, statute,
regulation, ordinance, or contract), precedent (case law, etc.), [or] policy (i.e., consequences
of the decision). Often the major premise is self-evident and acknowledged by both sides.
The minor premise, meanwhile, is derived from the facts of the case. There is much to be
said for the proposition that legal reasoning revolves mainly around the establishment of
the minor premise.
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges 42 (2008) (quoting
O.C. Jensen, The Nature of Legal Argument 20 (1957))(Emphasis added). The Examiners use this familiar
format, at least to a degree. In law school it is taught as IRAC, issue, rule, analysis, conclusion. In that case
you have minor premise (I), major premise (R), the resolution of them together (A), and then the
determination of the result (C).
The Examiners backload their report with the major premises, mostly the rules, and then some
inapposite cases dealing with out of control and objectively abusive attorneys. Rule 12 2 is cited, but not
3. As for policy, there are the recurring concepts of insight, civility, professionalism, and respect,
all of which are employed, without much legal warrant, as major premises. Of interest, none of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, either from Indiana or Kansas, are marshaled as major premises. Evidently one can
run far afoul of insight, civility, professionalism, and respect and never violate a Rule of Professional
Conduct. (Is this a problem? Vagueness? Overbreadth? Both?)
Check out those impressive minor premises! (Not)
As minor premises, the Examiners marshal a series of Class D traffic infractions, correspondence questioning
their processing of the application, accusations of discovery abuse (as to the current application only),
accusations of litigation abuse (as to the current application) and accusations of contemptuous filings
(including the civil rights case against JLAP, the filing with the Race and Gender Fairness Commission and
the Original Action filing at this Court last October).
As the above authors note, There is much to be said for the proposition that legal reasoning revolves
mainly around the establishment of the minor premise. Each of the above minor premises is analyzed,
supra. None of them pass the clear and convincing standard as to the question of proving wrongdoing
other than making government-favored attorneys feel bad. (Apparently all an applicant need do to find
himself banished from Indiana courts for life much like monarchs of days gone by and modern day despots.)
The Undistributed Middle
According to the Board, the conclusion derived when the major premises and the minor premises mesh is
that I must be denied admission and banished from court for the rest of my earthly days. A major problem
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with that conclusion is that none of the sources in cited the major premises actually discuss the factual
allegations of the minor premises. That is to say, what I actually did (or rather actually said), in the
particulars, does not run afoul of the actual terms of the cases and rules cited. Put another way, I could file
a nolo or demur to all alleged, and should still be licensed to practice law in Indiana.
That is called the fallacy of the undistributed middle. Here how the Hon. Thomas Graham Fisher
used this tool:
In the alternative, the Department argues that (1) riverboats are watercraft, (2) motorboats are
watercraft, therefore, (3) riverboats are motorboats and, thus, the registration requirements apply.
However, the Department's argument falls prey to the fallacy of the undistributed middle. The nature
of this fallacy becomes more obvious in the following example: Cats are mammals. Dogs are
mammals. Therefore, cats are dogs.
State v. Star Enterprise, 691 So.2d 1221, 1229 n. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir.1996) (citing Ruggero J. Aldisert, Logic
for Lawyers 105 (1992)), aff'd. The Department's arguments are without merit.
Grand Victoria Casino & Resort, LP v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 789 N.E.2d 1041, 1048 (Ind. T.C.
2003)
Liberty University School of Law Professor Stephen Rice offers an example from the Honorable
Ruggero Aldisert:
This fallacy is also illustrated [in Aylett v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 54 F.3d 1560 (10th
Cir. 1995) where] the court reduced the argument to this syllogism:
Some persons who have a personal stake in litigation are not credible.
Mr. Memmott is a person who has a personal stake in this litigation.
Therefore, Mr. Memmott is not credible.
Stephen M. Rice, Indispensable Logic: Using the Logical Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle As A Litigation
Tool, 43 Akron L. Rev. 79, 104 (2010)
I think, therefore I am confused
Here is how that would look at bar:
Some persons who are accused of engaging in abusive litigation and discovery practices get disbarred
Applicant is accused of engaging in abusive litigation and discovery practices by this Board
Therefore Applicant must be denied certification and banned for life
Some persons who are accused of motor vehicle crimes get disbarred
Applicant is accused of engaging in infractions while operating a motor vehicle.
Some persons who disrespect judges and hearing officers get disciplined
The Board feels like the Applicant has disrespected them
Other, more easily recognized logical fallacies animate the Boards Final Report, such as:
81
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Begging the Question (Petitio principii Seeking of the first-beginning):

That the argument clearly involves a petitio principii, must be apparent upon the most casual
examination. The very point in controversy is at once assumed ... Boyle v. State, 97 Ind. 322, 332 (1884)
The point in controversy in this instance is whether I actually did anything worthy of discipline, let alone a
lifelong banishment from the court system in the land of my birth. When the Board casts about accusations
(without citation to any actual facts supporting the legal allegations) and then assumes that the facts alleged
violate the legal standards cited -- that is when the Board commits this logical fallacy. See 53, 66, 116,
120.
Irrelevant Conclusion (Ignoratio elenchi: ignorance of the cross-examination; ignorance of the point in
dispute):
This fallacy was pointed out by the Indiana Court of Appeals in Palin v. Indiana State Pers. Dep't, 698 N.E.2d
347, 350-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), when the court noted that Appellants' counsel misrepresents in her brief
that Finding No. 16 consists only of the first sentence, because that is the only portion included in counsel's
quotation of the finding. As noted, supra, the Board often, rather than merely quoting a report, paraphrases
it. See pulls from 2009 report, paraphrasing of Applicant, many other examples as set forth in my answers
to the Boards Final Report. See, e.g. 45 46, 47, 50, 53, 55 56, 72 (all from 2015, the year after I sat
for the bar exam), 73 (first four from February 2014, last two from February, 2015). If not paraphrasing,
rephrasing or redirecting, those who (often habitually) engage in this type of fallacy dissect quotes, picking
and choosing sentences, leaving out those that detract from the point. (See, e.g. Burns case, Bowman report,
and paragraph 101, Applicant actually quoting case law, but presenting in a fashion intended to make the
Applicant seem to be the source of the arguably insight-free language.) More examples of this fallacy
found in the Final Report at 10, 11, 58, 73, 73n.19, 92, 95, 97 (esp as to Skolnik), 118. The selective
quoting found throughout the Board Final Report closely tracks the concerns voiced by the Palin court.
Equivocation: (Confusing (accidentally or deliberately) the meaning of a word or phrase)
The Board tries its level best to conflate the meaning of communication and conduct, of argument and abuse,
of critique and contempt. It is a dangerous word game that threatens centuries of freedom of speech as well
as rights of conscience. See 66, 73, 74, 92, 93, 96, 97, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122. Such is also
evident in the Oliver case, supra.
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Against the Man52

The Board makes many appeals to civility, professionalism, humility and having insight throughout it brief,
but especially at the end, where it reminds the Applicant that an Indiana attorney must abstain from offensive
personality and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness ... See, e.g., the
Muse and Ward cases, supra, as examples of alleging discrimination when none can be demonstrated, even
via numerous ineffectual (yet stigmatizing) affidavits and particularized (yet groundless) pleadings.
Guilt by association is attempted throughout the Final Report, but especially at the end when the
Examiners cite not to Dixon, not to Ogden, not to Brewington, but rather to Burns, to Wisner, to Zavodnik.
Had a table of authorities been generated this ruse would be even stronger. Truth is Dixon and Odgen and
Brewington are close to being on point, but it takes a flight of fantasy (or prevarication) to make the facts at
bar come within shouting distance of Burns, Wisner, or Zavodnik. (Could it be the Examiners merely hope
the Court will just look at the cases cited and trust them that the minor premises fit? Would such an argument
constitute a fraud on the Court?)
Also to the backside of guilt by association, note that the Examiners include not one case in their brief
involving an actual bar applicant. Why might that be? Because the guilt by association does not work there.
Those who drink and drive and get caught multiple times, even racking up felonies for it, get light
punishments as compared to me: Matter of Jones, 727 N.E.2d 711 (Ind.2000)(Six month suspension, stayed
in full for treatment plan). Drunk and police fleeing Attorney Eddingfield was ejected from his car when he
wrecked it he was tragically unrestrained. Even so, he was handed a mere thirty day suspension, with no
mention of his unbeltedness. Even those who download kiddie porn generally get light punishments as
compared to me. In re Raquet, 870 N.E.2d 1048 (Ind. 2007)(thirty day suspension). What have I done that
is so very much worse than kiddie porn or serial drunk driving? I have questioned authority, refused to
compromise my conscience and stood on my constitutional rights. A trifecta bringing on career death before
the Indiana Board of Law Examiners twice now for me.
Mr. Rocchio as an Example
Consider: What did the BLE hold back to use on me had I really cut loose -- as another out-of-state
attorney recently did when frustration got the best of him:
[A]nyone who has not suffered a full frontal cranial lobotomy knows
52
Argumentum ad hominem (argument to the human): an attack (abusive or circumstantial) against ones
opponent rather than an attack against the issue which ones opponent is presenting; the abusive type of this
argument is sometimes called guilt by association or the genetic fallacy, while the circumstantial type is
sometimes called poisoning the well.
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This rather bizarre and foolish disciplinary process is about behavior and protocol; what to say
and how to behave in the presence of the supreme monarchy, or in this situation, the representatives
of the Indiana Supreme Court who alone decide what is and what is not attorney misconduct subject
to discipline. My experience with the Indiana attorney disciplinary system is a hideous aberration
of justice: a Disciplinary Commission and staff attorney with a self-image of pompous arrogance; a
hearing officer who permits herself to be used as a rubber stamp....
In re Rocchio, 943 N.E.2d 797, 801 (Ind.2011). The colorful and seemingly highly agitated Mr. Rocchio
was also quoted as having shared the following less-than-civil thoughts in a less-than-subtle manner:
The hearing officer noted Respondent's invectives against the Commission's former executive
secretary (a first-class ass), the Commission (soft and lazy), the disciplinary process (a modern
day version of the Star Chamber, a Salem witch hunt, or a Spanish Inquisition), and this Court's
disciplinary rules (frivolous and antiquated, rules of behavior conceived over a cigar and brandy
... during the late Victorian Era by a group of self-impressed lawyers), as well as his repeated use
of caustic terminology (e.g., despicable, deceptive and ridiculous, naked stupidity, cutesy and
evasive). The Respondent also engages in personal attacks on the hearing officer, calling her
sadistic and displaying a disappointing level of ignorance, arrogance, and stupidity.
Rocchio, 802.
Applying the Rocchio Rule?
The Examiners string cited Rocchio, but failed to make much of the Rocchio facts. Why might that be? One,
because the Examiners bring very little evidence to bar that closely approximates Mr. Rocchios attacks.
My most strident quips merely nip at the heels of Rocchios least caustic. Two, because for all of his
invective, Rocchio earned only a six month suspension. Three, because Justice Rucker, in his dissent, sent
the message that even in cases of such palpable disrespect and this was just that, and sanctionable by my
lights the rule of law must be front and center. [T]he length of suspension [is] disproportionate to the
misconduct alleged, and inconsistent with sanctions imposed for similar misconduct. Judge Rucker thought
a thirty (30) day suspension without automatic reinstatement would be the more judicious result.
The Board has evidently poured over my writings over 20 months, and even in 2007-09, seeking
excerpts to support the allegation that I launched unfounded personal attacks. I submit that mine pale in
comparison to those the Examiners launch against me (poisoning the well) in the Final Report, to wit: 86
(1st sntc.), 86 (last sntc.), 89, 90, 96, 97, 116, 120, not to mention in Board counsels ill-timed and, to use her
terminology, calumniating Rule 26(c) motion and allegations of madness in the April 27, 2015 hearing.
Indiana courts are not tolerant of ad hominem attacks as substitutes for legal reasoning:
Such statements are as foolish as they are mischievous. Counsel has need of learning the ethics of
[her] profession anew, if [she] believes that vituperation and scurrilous insinuation are useful to [her]
or [her] client in presenting [her] case. The mind, conscious of its own integrity, does not respond
readily to the goad of insolent, offensive, and impertinent language. It must be made plain that the
purpose of a brief is to present to the court in concise form the points and questions in controversy,
and by fair argument on the facts and law of the case to assist the court in arriving at a just and proper
conclusion. A brief in no case can be used as a vehicle for the conveyance of hatred, contempt, insult,
disrespect, or professional discourtesy of any nature for the court of review, trial judge, or opposing
84
Applicant 24128
counsel. Invectives are not argument, and have no place in legal discussion, but tend only to produce
prejudice and discord.
Clark v. Clark, 578 N.E.2d 747, 74849 (Ind.App1991) (quoting Pittsburg, etc. R. Co. v. Muncie & P.
Traction Co., 77 N.E. 941, 942, 166 Ind. 466 (1906)). (Bracketed female pronouns in the Clark opinion.)
Professor Rice has less impassioned view from his ivory tower.
Of course, in the law, it is not enough to simply make conclusory statements. Instead,
lawyers are required to prove their conclusions. Herein lies the power of the fallacy as a tool
for challenging legal conclusions.
Rice 43 Akron L. Rev. at 105. Applying all of this to the Final Report at bar, it can be observed that certain
paragraphs in the Final Report simply do not track the facts before the Board. The most glaring of these are
the broadsides contained in 66, 96, 116 and 120, all of which are long on invective and short on any
citations to the record. The cases the Examiners cite would be on-point if the allegations that the Examiners
lodge were objectively true. They are not, and thus the problem of the undistributed middle. The Examiners
claim to have found the major premises they needed to send my career to the gallows for good this time
they needed none but insight to get me banned for five years in 2009. They just do not have the necessary
minor premises to make that case law, the actual Rules, work -- and so they attempt to fill the gaps with other
logical fallacies, substituted major premises and much invective (the shotgun). I am, to use a historic quote,
to be censored because I am considered to be a bad man., and thus the rule of law need not be applied. See.
Childs v. Duckworth, 509 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (N.D. Ind. 1981) aff'd, 705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983)
It is ironic, given the above, that the Board accuses this Applicant of demonstrating, in his filings,
faulty reasoning and nonsensical arguments that beg the question. Applicant would welcome an
analysis such as he files herein, prepared by the Board in response to this document, or Proposed Findings,
or Original Action, Exh F, or Race and Gender Commission submission, Exh D.
CONCLUSION
The Examiners ire against me seems to break down into three camps: Communication (what I have said or
written), conscience (what I think) and conduct (what I have done or what I have failed to do). While the
Examiners attempt to stress the latter, examination of the record will reveal that I have only stood in their
presence once, in an off-the-record meeting (actually a hearing) that was off-the-record at their insistence.
There is no allegation of bad conduct on my part in that hearing (the record well supports the finding that I
was sufficiently well-behaved) but the Examiners do seemingly attempt to make much of my conduct,
meaning, in the main, what I wrote to them during the twenty months of processing. (To use a word that
inflames the Board, See infra.)
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Truth be told, the Examiners really have this and only this as my conduct in the record: I was cited
with five Indiana traffic infractions for not wearing a seat belt between 2009 and 2013 (three of those in
2010). All else alleged against me is directed to my communication with the government or my manner of
thinking. Examiners seek to deny me a law license for the second time, and this time banish me from court
for life, mostly due to my communication to them communication questioning them as to the due process
(procedural and substantive) -- or rather lack of due process -- which I was documenting while they processed
my 2013 application.
Conscience is the third realm of concern. The Boards Final Report contains more than some evidence
that it is my way of thinking (and refusal to allow their own chosen and pre-briefed psych evaluator to probe
my jurisprudence and deepest thoughts in an off-the-record hearing that would ripen into an experts report
that none can successfully impeach) that has driven them to utter apoplexy.
Why am I marked with a scarlet letter of rejection, over and over again, by the Examiners? Professor
Baude wondered aloud if the character evaluation was not, at its very core, merely a way to send messages
to those whom the legal elite did not want to license:
[It could be that] the real point of the character and fitness requirement is that it deters some definable
subset of people from even beginning the study of law. Taken this way, the paucity of applicants
actually screened out by the admitting authorities is proof that the requirement is efficaciousscoundrels, radicals, and the like do not waste their time in law school because they realize that the
investment would be wasted and instead they use the capital to fund a political campaign or a
graduate degree in business.
Baude, 653. One does not have to read between the lines of Board counsels June 9-filing to find this
deterrence argument: Applicant has shown a lack of responsibility in his own admission [in] that he has
impoverished his family to pursue admission to the Indiana Bar, even though he is licensed to practice law
in Kansas and knew that he could not apply again in Indiana for five years. Conclusion, 9 [Brown fails
to admit that his poverty which he partly blames on the Board is due to] the fact that he has remained a
member of the Kansas Bar and has voluntarily chosen to remain in Indiana (Facts, 75).
Praying for Justice
It is my prayer that a review of this document and the Boards Final Report will move this Honorable Court
to order further consideration of the application [and thereafter] enter such order as [is] proper. As I have
stated, the Exhibits make accessing the full record unnecessary, and especially the aggregating (and
evidently aggravating) Exh.A (application), Exh.F (original action affidavit), Exh.I (April 27 affidavit) and
Exh.K(Applicants Proposed Findings).
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My final prayer is that this proper judgment will be a written opinion in the form of precedent of
first impression arising out of that treasured patrimony of our Indiana Constitution which brings about
improvement of the law, greater access to the legal system, [a bias-free] administration of justice and a
[general upgrade] in the quality of service rendered by the legal profession while sending the message, an
important message in our hour, that [a]n independent legal profession is an important force in preserving
government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose
members are not dependent on government for the right to practice. Preamble, Indiana Rules of Professional
Conduct.
Respectfully, this, the 2nd Day of September, 2015
_________________
Bryan John Brown
KS Bar No. 17634
This Petition is being served on the Board via e-service to Executive Director Bradley Skolnik in keeping
with the service of process directives applicable to litigation, even though it is an open question, given
that the BLE is this Courts creation and is thus not distinct from this Court. Because there is no
provision under Rule 14, Admission and Discipline, for the Board to respond, it is doubtful that such
service is mandatory.
87
Applicant 24128

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

INDIANA BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS

Amended Petition for Review

Abbreviated Summary of the Applicants Argument (Standard of Review)

Overarching Issue as to errors of law

Overarching Issue as to errors of fact

Amended Petition for Review

(1) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

Amended Petition for Review

Amended Petition for Review

Amended Petition for Review

Amended Petition for Review

Amended Petition for Review

Begging the Question ...........................................................................................................................82

Amended Petition for Review

Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299 (1998)..............................................................................32

STATEMENT: Supreme Court Jurisdiction

Amended Petition for Review

STANDARD OF REVIEW (Constitutional Issues)

STATEMENT: Constitutional Issues

VIOLATION OF LAW ALLEGED (Indiana Constitution)

Section 2. Right to worship

Amended Petition for Review

Section 3. Freedom of religious opinions

Section 4. Freedom of religion

Section 5. No religious test for office

Amended Petition for Review

Section 9. Freedom of thought and speech

Section 12. Openness of the courts, Speedy trial

Amended Petition for Review

VIOLATION OF LAW ALLEGED (Federal Constitution)

Amended Petition for Review

FACTS: Final Report 96, Exh K, pp 11, 28-29.

STANDARD OF REVIEW (Board of Law Examiners)

STANDARD OF REVIEW (Scope)

STANDARD OF REVIEW (Findings of Fact)

Amended Petition for Review

STANDARD OF REVIEW (Conclusion)

STATEMENT: Of the Case

Amended Petition for Review

Amended Petition for Review

Amended Petition for Review

ADDRESSING: My Allegations of Factual Error by the Examiners

Amended Petition for Review

[BLE heading] Facts Relating to the Applicants Prior Applications

Amended Petition for Review

Amended Petition for Review

Court; See analysis infra.

Amended Petition for Review

Amended Petition for Review

Admit, note email is revealing as to my motivation.

And now a note from our sponsor (psych eval letter)

Director Bradley Skolniks letter read:

Deny, it was no request. My response included:

Amended Petition for Review

Admit; See Exh. F.

Amended Petition for Review

Amended Petition for Review

Amended Petition for Review

Admit in part. See analysis of this allegation infra.

old Latin maxim. (Cui bono? See http://mentalfloss.com/article/57898/20-latin-phrases-you-should-be-using) I

the Board the next day.

Deny. See appearance analysis, infra.