G.R. No.

160451

February 9, 2007

EDUARDO G. RICARZE, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CALTEX PHILIPPINES,
INC., PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK
(PCIBANK), Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68492, and its Resolution 2 which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was employed as a collector-messenger by City Service
Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in messengerial services. He was
assigned to the main office of Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Makati City. His primary
task was to collect checks payable to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier. He also
delivered invoices to Caltexs customers.3
On November 6, 1997, Caltex, through its Banking and Insurance Department Manager
Ramon Romano, filed a criminal complaint against petitioner before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Makati City for estafa through falsification of commercial documents.
Romano alleged that, on October 16, 1997, while his department was conducting a daily
electronic report from Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank (PCIB) Dela Rosa,
Makati Branch, one of its depositary banks, it was discovered that unknown to the
department, a company check, Check No. 74001 dated October 13, 1997 in the amount
of P5,790,570.25 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, had been cleared through PCIB on
October 15, 1997. An investigation also revealed that two other checks (Check Nos.
73999 and 74000) were also missing and that in Check No. 74001, his signature and
that of another signatory, Victor S. Goquinco, were forgeries. Another check, Check No.
72922 dated September 15, 1997 in the amount ofP1,790,757.25 likewise payable to
Dante R. Gutierrez, was also cleared through the same bank on September 24, 1997;
this check was likewise not issued by Caltex, and the signatures appearing thereon had
also been forged. Upon verification, it was uncovered that Check Nos. 74001 and 72922
were deposited at the Banco de Oros SM Makati Branch under Savings Account No.
S/A 2004-0047245-7, in the name of a regular customer of Caltex, Dante R. Gutierrez.

Gutierrez, however, disowned the savings account as well as his signatures on the
dorsal portions thereof. He also denied having withdrawn any amount from said savings
account. Further investigation revealed that said savings account had actually been
opened by petitioner; the forged checks were deposited and endorsed by him under
Gutierrezs name. A bank teller from the Banco de Oro, Winnie P. Donable Dela Cruz,
positively identified petitioner as the person who opened the savings account using
Gutierrezs name.4
In the meantime, the PCIB credited the amount of P581,229.00 to Caltex on March 29,
1998. However, the City Prosecutor of Makati City was not informed of this
development. After the requisite preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor filed two
(2) Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial documents on June 29,
1998 against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The Informations are worded as follows:
Criminal Case No. 98-1611
That on or about the 24th day of September 1997 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a private individual, with intent to defraud and intent to gain, without the
knowledge and consent of Caltex Philippines, Inc. through its duly authorized
officers/representatives, and by means of falsification of commercial document, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Caltex Phils., Inc., in the following
manner, to wit: said accused, having obtained possession of PCIBank check no. 72922
dated September 15, 1997 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, in the amount of
Php1,790,757.50 with intent to defraud or cause damage to complainant Caltex Phils.,
Inc., willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affixed or caused to be affixed signatures
purporting to be those of Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco, Caltex authorized
officers/signatories, and of payee Dante R. Gutierrez, causing it to appear that Ramon
Romano and Victor Goquingco have participated in the issuance of PCIBank check no.
72922 and that Dante R. Gutierrez had endorsed it, when in truth and in fact, as said
accused well knew, such was not the case, since said check previously stolen from
Payables Section of CALTEX, was neither duly signed by Ramon Romano and Victor
Goquingco nor endorsed by Dante R. Gutierrez, after the check, a commercial
document, was falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused purporting
himself to be the payee, Dante R. Gutierrez, deposited the check with Banco De Oro
under Account No. 2004-0047245-7, thereby appropriating the proceeds of the falsified
but cleared check, to the damage and prejudice of complainant herein represented by
Ramon Romano, in the amount of Php1,790,757.50.
Criminal Case No. 98-1612

That on or about the 15th day of October 1997 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a private individual, with intent to defraud and intent to gain, without the
knowledge and consent of Caltex Philippines, Inc. through its duly authorized
officers/representatives, and by means of falsification of commercial document, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Caltex Phils., Inc., in the following
manner, to wit: said accused, having obtained possession of PCIBank check no. 74001
dated October 13, 1997 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, in the amount of
Php5,790,570.25 with intent to defraud or cause damage to complainant Caltex Phils.,
Inc., willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affixed or caused to be affixed signatures
purporting to be those of Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco, Caltex authorized
officers/signatories, and of payee Dante R. Gutierrez, causing it to appear that Ramon
Romano and Victor Goquingco have participated in the issuance of PCIBank check no.
74001 and that Dante R. Gutierrez had endorsed it, when in truth and in fact, as said
accused well knew, such was not the case, since said check previously stolen from
Payables Section of CALTEX, was neither duly signed by Ramon Romano and Victor
Goquingco nor endorsed by Dante R. Gutierrez, after the check, a commercial
document, was falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused purporting
himself to be the payee, Dante R. Gutierrez, deposited the check with Banco De Oro
under Account No. 2004-0047245-7, thereby appropriating the proceeds of the falsified
but cleared check, to the damage and prejudice of complainant herein represented by
Ramon Romano, in the amount of Php5,790,570.25. 5
Petitioner was arraigned on August 18, 1998, and pleaded not guilty to both
charges.6 Pre-trial ensued and the cases were jointly tried. The prosecution presented
its witnesses, after which the Siguion Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law Offices
(SRMO) as private prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of Evidence. 7 Petitioner opposed the
pleading, contending that the private complainant was represented by the ACCRA Law
Offices and the Balgos and Perez Law Office during trial, and it was only after the
prosecution had rested its case that SRMO entered its appearance as private
prosecutor representing the PCIB. Since the ACCRA and Balgos and Perez Law Offices
had not withdrawn their appearance, SRMO had no personality to appear as private
prosecutor. Under the Informations, the private complainant is Caltex and not PCIB;
hence, the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by SRMO should be stricken from the records.
Petitioner further averred that unless the Informations were amended to change the
private complainant to PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced. He pointed out,
however, that the Informations can no longer be amended because he had already
been arraigned under the original Informations. 8 He insisted that the amendments of the
Informations to substitute PCIB as the offended party for Caltex would place him in
double jeopardy.

PCIB, through SRMO, opposed the motion. It contended that the PCIB had re-credited
the amount to Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been
subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as private complainant. Consequently,
the PCIB is entitled to receive any civil indemnity which the trial court would adjudge
against the accused. Moreover, the re-credited amount was brought out on crossexamination by Ramon Romano who testified for the Prosecution. PCIB pointed out that
petitioner had marked in evidence the letter of the ACCRA Law Office to PCIBank dated
October 10, 1997 and the credit memo sent by PCIB to Caltex. 9
Petitioner filed a Motion to Expunge the Opposition of SRMO. 10 In his Rejoinder, he
averred that the substitution of PCIB as private complainant cannot be made by mere
oral motion; the Information must be amended to allege that the private complainant
was PCIB and not Caltex after the preliminary investigation of the appropriate complaint
of PCIB before the Makati City Prosecutor.
In response, the PCIB, through SRMO, averred that as provided in Section 2, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the erroneous designation of the name of
the offended party is a mere formal defect which can be cured by inserting the name of
the offended party in the Information. To support its claim, PCIB cited the ruling of this
Court in Sayson v. People.11
On July 18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of the private
prosecutor for the substitution of PCIB as private complainant for Caltex. It however
denied petitioners motion to have the formal offer of evidence of SRMO expunged from
the record.12 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied on
November 14, 2001.13
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Urgent
Application for Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals (CA,) praying for
the annulment of the RTCs Orders of July 18, 2001 and November 14, 2001. The
petitioner averred that:
I
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRIEVEOUSLY (SIC) ERRED IN RENDERING ITS ORDER
ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY ALLOWING THE SUBSTITUTION OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT, AFTER THE ACUSED WAS ALREADY ARRAIGNED AND
PROSECUTION HAS ALREADY TERMINATED PRESENTING ITS EVIDENCE
THEREBY PATENTLY VIOLATING THE STRICT CONDITION IMPOSED UPON BY
RULE 110 SEC. 14 RULES ON CRIMINAL ROCEDURE.

II
AND AS A COROLLARY GROUND RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RENDERING AN
ORDER RECOGNIZING THE APPEARANCE OF A NEW PROSECUTOR WITHOUT
WRITTEN OR EVEN ORAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE COUNSEL ON RECORD.14
According to petitioner, damage or injury to the offended party is an essential element of
estafa. The amendment of the Informations substituting the PCIBank for Caltex as the
offended party would prejudice his rights since he is deprived of a defense available
before the amendment, and which would be unavailable if the Informations are
amended. Petitioner further insisted that the ruling in the Sayson case did not apply to
this case.
On November 5, 2002, the appellate court rendered judgment dismissing the petition.
The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition to annul the orders dated July 18,
2001 and November 14, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City in
Criminal Case Nos. 98-1611 and 98-1612 is hereby DENIED and consequently
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.15
The appellate court declared that when PCIB restored the amount of the checks to
Caltex, it was subrogated to the latters right against petitioner. It further declared that in
offenses against property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not
absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or
information can be properly identified. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court
in People v. Ho16 and People v. Reyes.17
On October 17, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition which is anchored on the following grounds:
I. THE PEOPLE V. YU CHAI HO 53 PHILIPPINES 874 IS INAPPLICABLE TO
THE CASE AT BAR CONSIDERING THE PACTS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY
DIFFERENT.

II. LIKEWISE, THE CASE OF PEOPLE VS. REYES CA, 50 (2) OG 665,
NOVEMBER 11, 1953 HAS NO MATERIAL BEARING TO THE PRESENT
CASE.
III. THE SUBSTITUTION OF PCIBANK WILL SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICE
THE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER HENCE, IT IS PROHIBITED BY SEC. 14
OF RULE 110.
IV. THERE IS NO VALID SUBROGATION BETWEEN CALTEX AND PCIBANK.
ASSUMING THERE IS, THE CIVIL CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED TO
PROSECUTE.
V. THE TWIN INFORMATIONS UPON WHICH PETITIONER WAS INDICTED,
ARRAIGNED, PRE-TRIAL HELD AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR TERMINATED
THE PRESENTATION OF ITS EVIDENCE IN CHIEF ARE DEFECTIVE AND
VOID, HENCE THE DISMISSAL IS IN ORDER.
VI. PETITIONER TIMELY OBJECTED TO THE APPEARANCE OF PRIVATE
PROSECUTOR FOR PCIBANK.
VII. THE FINDINGS OF MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT SUPORTED BY THE
RECORD NOR EVIDENCE AND BASED ON MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS.
VIII. PETITIONERS SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DID
NOT VIOLATE THE OMNIBUS MOTION RULE UNDER SEC. 8, RULE 15 OF
THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.19
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner argues that the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complainant at this
late stage of the trial is prejudicial to his defense. He argues that the substitution is
tantamount to a substantial amendment of the Informations which is prohibited under
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 5, Rule 11020 of the Revised Rules of Rules, all criminal actions covered
by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and
control of the public prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the
accused result in damage or injury to another, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly instituted, and the offended party has
not waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately or instituted the
civil action prior to the criminal action, the prosecution of the action (including the civil)
remains under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. The prosecution of

offenses is a public function. Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by
counsel, who will act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the
interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for
the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both
parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must
be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two
actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to
isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social
order.21
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by
reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. 22 Under Article 104 of the
Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil liabilities of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. The civil liability established in Articles 100,
101, 102 and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
On the other hand, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
states:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended,
in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with
leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made
only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of
court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order
shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.

Thus, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the
complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea,
only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it does not
prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is
proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused. 23
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged
and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of
form.24 The following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new
allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in
the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense
different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which
do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused
and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not
adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely
adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new
and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is
already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for
conviction for the crime charged.25
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a
defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally
applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an
information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not
affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of
substance.26
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a
substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both
Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence
in the form of the forged checks remained the same, and all such evidence was
available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue
of the substitution.
Petitioner next argues that in no way was PCIB subrogated to the rights of Caltex,
considering that he has no knowledge of the subrogation much less gave his consent to
it. Alternatively, he posits that if subrogation was proper, then the charges against him
should be dismissed, the two Informations being "defective and void due to false
allegations."

Petitioner was charged of the crime of estafa complex with falsification document. In
estafa one of the essential elements "to prejudice of another" as mandated by article
315 of the Revise Penal Code.
The element of "to the prejudice of another" being as essential element of the felony
should be clearly indicated and charged in the information with TRUTH AND LEGAL
PRECISION.
This is not so in the case of petitioner, the twin information filed against him alleged the
felony committed " to the damage and prejudice of Caltex." This allegation is UNTRUE
and FALSE for there is no question that as early as March 24, 1998 or THREE (3)
LONG MONTHS before the twin information were filed on June 29, 1998, the prejudice
party is already PCIBank since the latter Re-Credit the value of the checks to Caltex as
early as March 24, 1998. In effect, assuming there is valid subrogation as the subject
decision concluded, the subrogation took place an occurred on March 24, 1998 THREE
(3) MONTHS before the twin information were filed.
The phrase "to the prejudice to another" as element of the felony is limited to the person
DEFRAUDED in the very act of embezzlement. It should not be expanded to other
persons which the loss may ultimately fall as a result of a contract which contract herein
petitioner is total stranger.
In this case, there is no question that the very act of commission of the offense of
September 24, 1997 and October 15, 1997 respectively, Caltex was the one defrauded
by the act of the felony.
In the light of these facts, petitioner submits that the twin information are DEFECTIVE
AND VOID due to the FALSE ALLEGATIONS that the offense was committed to the
prejudice of Caltex when it truth and in fact the one prejudiced here was PCIBank.
The twin information being DEFECTIVE AND VOID, the same should be dismissed
without prejudice to the filing of another information which should state the offense was
committed to the prejudice of PCIBank if it still legally possible without prejudicing
substantial and statutory rights of the petitioner.27
Petitioners argument on subrogation is misplaced. The Court agrees with respondent
PCIBs comment that petitioner failed to make a distinction between legal and
conventional subrogation. Subrogation is the transfer of all the rights of the creditor to a
third person, who substitutes him in all his rights. 28 It may either be legal or
conventional. Legal subrogation is that which takes place without agreement but by
operation of law because of certain acts.29 Instances of legal subrogation are those

provided in Article 130230 of the Civil Code. Conventional subrogation, on the other
hand, is that which takes place by agreement of the parties. 31 Thus, petitioners
acquiescence is not necessary for subrogation to take place because the instant case is
one of legal subrogation that occurs by operation of law, and without need of the
debtors knowledge.
Contrary to petitioners asseverations, the case of People v. Yu Chai Ho 32 relied upon by
the appellate court is in point. The Court declared
We do not however, think that the fiscal erred in alleging that the commission of the
crime resulted to the prejudice of Wm. H. Anderson & Co. It is true that originally the
International Banking Corporation was the prejudiced party, but Wm. H. Anderson & Co.
compensated it for its loss and thus became subrogated to all its rights against the
defendant (article 1839, Civil Code). Wm. H. Anderson & Co., therefore, stood exactly in
the shoes of the International Banking Corporation in relation to the defendant's acts,
and the commission of the crime resulted to the prejudice of the firm previously to the
filing of the information in the case. The loss suffered by the firm was the ultimate result
of the defendant's unlawful acts, and we see no valid reason why this fact should not be
stated in the information; it stands to reason that, in the crime of estafa, the damage
resulting therefrom need not necessarily occur simultaneously with the acts constituting
the other essential elements of the crime.
Thus, being subrogated to the right of Caltex, PCIB, through counsel, has the right to
intervene in the proceedings, and under substantive laws is entitled to restitution of its
properties or funds, reparation, or indemnification.
Petitioners gripe that the charges against him should be dismissed because the
allegations in both Informations failed to name PCIB as true offended party does not
hold water.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient
if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the
offense was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included
in the complaint or information.

On the other hand, Section 12 of the same Rule provides:

Section. 12. Name of the offended party. The complaint or information must state the
name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense
was committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is
known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a
fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the
property must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the
offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must
cause such true name to be inserted in the complaint or information and the
record.
(c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or
any name or designation by which it is known or by which it may be identified,
without need of averring that it is a juridical person or that it is organized in
accordance with law. (12a)
In Sayson v. People,33 the Court held that in case of offenses against property, the
designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long
as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified:
The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or information to state the name
and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known
and if there is no better way of Identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious
name (Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court; now Rule 110, Section 12 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] In case of offenses against property, the
designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long
as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified.
Thus, Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Section 11. Name of the offended party

(a) In cases of offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is
unknown, the property, subject matter of the offense, must be described with
such particularity as to properly Identify the particular offense charged.
(b) If in the course of the trial, the true name of the person against whom or
against whose property the offense was committed is disclosed or ascertained,
the court must cause the true name to be inserted in the complaint or information
or record.

In U.S. v. Kepner [1 Phil. 519 (1902)], this Court laid down the rule that when an offense
shall have been described in the complaint with sufficient certainty as to Identify the act,
an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial as the
same is a mere formal defect which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the
defendant. Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which had a factual backdrop
similar to the instant case, where the defendant was charged with estafa for the
misappropriation of the proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed without authority,
the erroneous allegation in the complaint to the effect that the unlawful act was to the
prejudice of the owner of the cheque, when in reality the bank which cashed it was the
one which suffered a loss, was held to be immaterial on the ground that the subject
matter of the estafa, the warrant, was described in the complaint with such particularity
as to properly Identify the particular offense charged. In the instant suit for estafa which
is a crime against property under the Revised Penal Code, since the check, which was
the subject-matter of the offense, was described with such particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of convicting the
accused, that it was established during the trial that the offended party was actually
Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the
information.
Lastly, on petitioners claim that he timely objected to the appearance of SRMO 34 as
private prosecutor for PCIB, the Court agrees with the observation of the CA that
contrary to his claim, petitioner did not question the said entry of appearance even as
the RTC acknowledged the same on October 8, 1999. 35 Thus, petitioner cannot feign
ignorance or surprise of the incident, which are "all water under the bridge for [his]
failure to make a timely objection thereto." 36
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 63, for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167571

November 25, 2008

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G.
CAWILI, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which
dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his
subsequent motion for reconsideration.2
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting
to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business
associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner
three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3)
checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for
payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for
insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal
demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and
upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.3

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and

Tongson4 for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the
Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only
Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.6 Tongson claimed that he
had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner
had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like
petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his
services, he was
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not
Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases
against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued
the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks
had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing
Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the same as the those
appearing on the checks.7 He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse
claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business
associate.8
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara
found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against
Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice
(DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In
a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it was possible for
Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered
his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation,
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to
refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was
denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP
Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the

matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her
resolution,11 ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed
pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,12 which provides that violations
penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the
four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20
January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the
Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative
proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4)
years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against
Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already
prescribed.13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief State
Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative
should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating
prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with
petitioner.15
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel
A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.16Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003,17 the DOJ, this time
through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor
and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the
complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate
informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.19 On 8 July 2003,
the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information20 charging petitioner with three
(3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting
on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense
had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3)
informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its
sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of

special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses
thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the
prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it,
and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of
offenses penalized thereunder.23 The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v.
Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings referred to
in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one before
the prosecutor's office.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari25 before the Court of Appeals
assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed
by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper
verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of
the DOJ attached to the petition is a mere photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for
the reconsideration of the appellate court's resolution, attaching to said motion
an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.27Still, the Court
of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent compliance with
the formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its
resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the petition is patently
without merit and the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.28
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed
grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that
the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too
unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also
reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which
does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4)
years in accordance with Act No. 3326.

Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of
Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari. They claim that the
offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In
addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable to petitioner and the State,
violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.30
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court
of Appeals substantially complies with the rules, the verification being
intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading
are true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of cases that a
deficiency in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect
being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an
assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correctthe court may
simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive
strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be
served,32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching
the pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner
sufficiently complied with the verification requirement.
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
petition on the ground that there was failure to attach a certified true copy or
duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain
reading of the petition before the
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution
dated 9 August 2004,33 a certified true copy of which was attached as Annex
"A."34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake.
Now, on the substantive aspects.

Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving

the violation of a municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period
is tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to petitioner,
what is applicable in this case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court
ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for preliminary
investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also
notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, petitioner notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the
Court of Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him since
the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control.38
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to
Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances
and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to
offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive
periods. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
(a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for
more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings
are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An
offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence,
under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4)
years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known

at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold

the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of
the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December
1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices
of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule at
the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.40
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is
illuminating.41 Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time
when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal
offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at
the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is
that the prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the
justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the
complaint signifies the
institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused.44 These cases
were followed by our declaration in People v. Parao and Parao45 that the first
step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature
of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the
offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the
period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition,
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed
to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the
proceedings against the offender,48 and hence, the prescriptive period should
be interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which
involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019)

and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special
laws, the Court ruled that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et
al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the
Revised Securities Act,52 another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively
interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2
of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation and punishment" in the
old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation
of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive
function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be
understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it
involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial
and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative
proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately
lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.54
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.55 A clear
example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on
24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise
timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of
the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods.
However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of
the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the
assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed.
Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already

initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to
suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its
misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not
sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to
suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their
control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the
investigating agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing
of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August
1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of
the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the
offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a
definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of
prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information
against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004
is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED
to REFILE the information against the petitioner.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 110315 January 16, 1998

RENATO CUDIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON. CARLOS D. RUSTIA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court Branch LVI, Angeles City, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner assails the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 1993 dismissing his petition and
finding that he had not been placed in double jeopardy by the filing of a second information against him,
although a first information charging the same offense had been previously dismissed, over petitioner's
vigorous opposition.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
On June 28, 1989, petitioner was arrested in Purok 6, Barangay Santa Inez, Mabalacat, 2 Pampanga,
by members of the then 174th PC Company, allegedly for possessing an unlicensed revolver. He was
brought to Camp Pepito, Sto. Domingo, Angeles City, where he was detained. A preliminary investigation
was thereafter conducted by an investigating panel of prosecutors. As a result thereof, the City Prosecutor
of Angeles City filed an information against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 11542, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his
control one (1) .38 Cal. Revolver (paltik) without any Serial Number with six (6) live
ammunitions, which he carried outside of his residence without having the necessary
authority and permit to carry the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW. 3 (Emphasis petitioner's.)

The case was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City (hereafter the Angeles
City RTC). Upon his arraignment on August 14, 1989, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charges.
During the ensuing pre-trial, the court called the attention of the parties to the fact that, contrary to
the information, petitioner had committed the offense in Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City.
Inasmuch as there was an existing arrangement among the judges of the Angeles City RTC as to
who would handle cases involving crimes committed outside of Angeles City, the judge ordered the
re-raffling of the case to a branch assigned to criminal cases involving crimes committed outside of
the city. Thereafter, the case was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.
On October 31, 1989 however, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an information
charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 11987. The case was likewise raffled to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.
This prompted the prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 11542 to file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the
Information, stating "that thru inadvertence and oversight, the Investigating Panel was misled into
hastily filing the Information in this case, it appearing that the apprehension of the accused in
connection with the illegal possession of unlicensed firearm and ammunition was made in Bgy. Sta.
Inez, Mabalacat, Pampanga, within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga" 4 and
that the Provincial Prosecutor had filed its own information against the accused, as a result of which two
separate informations for the same offense had been filed against petitioner. The latter filed his opposition
to the motion, but the trial court nonetheless, granted said motion to dismiss in its order dated April 3,
1990.
On May 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 11987 on the ground that his
continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which
he had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, and which had been dismissed despite his
opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. The trial court denied the motion to quash; hence, petitioner raised the issue to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, stating that there was no double jeopardy, dismissed the same on the
ground that the petition could not have been convicted under the first information as the same was
defective. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this appeal.
Petitioner points out the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE
CITY PROSECUTOR OF ANGELES CITY DID NOT HAVE THE
AUTHORITY TO FILE THE FIRST INFORMATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
FIRST JEOPARDY DID NOT ATTACH BECAUSE THE FIRST
INFORMATION FILED AGAINST THE ACCUSED WAS NOT VALID.
We shall discuss the assigned errors jointly as they are closely related.
Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense . . ." Pursuant to this provision, Section 7 of Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court provides in part that "(w)hen an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the

case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, . . . "
In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be
present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. 5
In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary to prove the
existence of the following:
(a) Court of competent jurisdiction
(b) Valid complaint or information
(c) Arraignment
(d) Valid plea
(e) The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused. 6
It is undisputed that petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, that he pleaded "not guilty"
therein, and that the same was dismissed without his express consent, nay, over his opposition
even. We may thus limit the discussion to determining whether the first two requisites have been
met.
As to the first requisite, it is necessary that there be a court of competent jurisdiction, for jurisdiction
to try the case is essential to place an accused in jeopardy. The Court of Appeals and the Solicitor
General agreed that Branch 60, which originally had cognizance of Criminal Case No. 11542, had no
jurisdiction over the case. In the words of the Solicitor General:
The first jeopardy did not also attach because Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court
of Angeles City was not the proper venue for hearing the case. Venue in criminal
cases is jurisdictional, being an essential element of jurisdiction (Agbayani vs. Sayo,
89 SCRA 699). In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in
the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any
one of the essential ingredients thereof took place (People vs. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77).
Although both Branches 60 and 56 are sitting in Angeles City, it is Branch 56 which
has jurisdiction to try offenses committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Petitioner was
arraigned before Branch 60, not Branch 56. 7

It must be borne in mind that the question of jurisdiction of a court over cases filed before it must be
resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction. Administrative
Order No. 7, Series of 1983 provides that:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 864 of the President of the Philippines, dated January 17,
1983, the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Region One to Twelve are hereby defined
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
PAMPANGA
xxx xxx xxx
1. Branches LVI to LXII, inclusive, with seats at Angeles City comprising ANGELES CITY and the
municipalities of Mabalacat, Magalang, and Porac as well as part of Clark Field U.S. Airbase.
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as apportioned.
Consequently, notwithstanding the internal arrangement of the judges of the Angeles City RTCs,
Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over instant case. Writ large in lawbooks in the doctrine that
jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of any trial court.
With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of
Angeles City had no authority to file the first information, the offense having been committed in the
Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation
to Section 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:
Sec. 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:
xxx xxx xxx
b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances within
their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or
complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. In the
conduct of such investigations he or his assistants shall receive the
sworn statements or take oral evidence of witnesses summoned by
subpoena for the purpose.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied
It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare
informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information,

when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. 8 It must be
exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does
not acquire jurisdiction. 9
Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor in
filing the information in question is deemed a waiver thereof. 10 As correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, petitioner's plea to an information before he filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all
objections to it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not
by express provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions, 11 questions relating to
want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a
competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the
accused (herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an
infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence, or even by express consent. 12
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former
prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in
form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the
consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the
dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to petitioner's subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy
does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily
dismissed by the prosecution. 13
Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor was the error of the
investigating panel and the same should not be used to prejudice and penalize him. It is an all too
familiar maxim that the State is not bound or estopped by the mistakes or inadvertence of its officials
and employees. 14 To rule otherwise could very well result in setting felons free, deny proper protection to
the community, and give rise to the possibility of connivance between the prosecutor and the accused.
Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and not its dismissal, should have
been the remedy sought by the prosecution. Suffice it to say that this Court, in Galvez vs. Court of
Appeals 15 has ruled that even if amendment is proper, pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also quite
plausible under the same provision that, instead of an amendment, an information may be dismissed to
give way to the filing of a new information.
In light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no breach of the constitutional prohibition against
twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense for the simple reason that
the absence of authority of the City Prosecutor to file the first information meant that petitioner could
never have been convicted on the strength thereof.
As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the instant
petition must fail for failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 24958 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 181084

June 16, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
BARTOLOME TAMPUS1 and IDA MONTESCLAROS, Defendants.
IDA MONTESCLAROS, Appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal is the decision2 of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, dated September 29, 2006 in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00215. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification, the decision 3 of the

Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, finding appellant Ida
Montesclaros (Ida) guilty as an accomplice in the commission of rape.
The present appeal stems from two criminal cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 013324-L charging
Bartolome Tampus (Tampus) and Ida as conspirators in the rape of ABC 4 on April 1, 1995 at 4:30
p.m.; and (2) Criminal Case No. 013325-L charging Tampus of raping ABC on April 4, 1995 at 1:00
a.m.
The Information5 in each case reads as follows:
CRIM. CASE NO. 013324-L6
That on the 1st day of April 1995, at about 4:30 oclock [sic] in the afternoon, in Looc, Lapulapu City,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Bartolome Tampus, taking
advantage that [ABC] was in deep slumber due to drunkenness, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic] the latter, who was at that time thirteen
(13) years old, against her will, in conspiracy with the accused Ida Montesclaros who gave
permission to Bartolome Tampus to rape [ABC].
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIM. CASE NO. 013325-L7
That on the 3rd day of April, 1995,8 at about 1:00 oclock [sic] dawn, in Looc, Lapulapu City,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
wooden club (poras), by means of threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic] [ABC], who was at that time thirteen (13) years old,
against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida, and was 13 years old at the time of the
incident. Ida worked as a waitress in Bayanihan Beer House in Mabini, Cebu City. On February 19,
1995, Ida and ABC started to rent a room in a house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. On April
1, 1995, about 4:30 p.m., ABC testified that she was in the house with Ida and Tampus 9 who were
both drinking beer at that time. They forced her to drink beer 10 and after consuming three and onehalf (3 ) glasses of beer, she became intoxicated and very sleepy.11While ABC was lying on the
floor of their room, she overheard Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be allowed to
"remedyo"12 or have sexual intercourse with her.13 Appellant Ida agreed and instructed Tampus to
leave as soon as he finished having sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida then went to work, leaving
Tampus alone with ABC. ABC fell asleep and when she woke up, she noticed that the garter of her
panties was loose and rolled down to her knees. She suffered pain in her head, thighs, buttocks,
groin and vagina, and noticed that her panties and short pants were stained with blood which was
coming from her vagina.14 When her mother arrived home from work the following morning, she kept
on crying but appellant Ida ignored her.15

ABC testified that on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she was left alone in the room since her mother
was at work at the beer house.16 Tampus went inside their room and threatened to kill her if she
would report the previous sexual assault to anyone. 17 He then forcibly removed her panties. ABC
shouted but Tampus covered her mouth and again threatened to kill her if she shouted. 18 He
undressed himself, spread ABCs legs, put saliva on his right hand and he applied this to her vagina;
he then inserted his penis into ABCs vagina and made a push and pull movement. 19 After
consummating the sexual act, he left the house. When ABC told appellant Ida about the incident, the
latter again ignored her.20
On May 4, 1995, after being maltreated by her mother, ABC sought the help of her aunt, Nellie
Montesclaros (Nellie). She told Nellie about the rape and that her mother sold her.21 ABC, together
with Nellie and Norma Andales, a traffic enforcer, reported the incident of rape to the police. On May
9, 1995, Nestor A. Sator , M.D. (Dr. Sator), head of the Medico-Legal Branch of the Philippine
National Crime Laboratory Services, Regional Unit 7, conducted a physical examination of ABC and
issued a Medico-Legal Report.22 Dr. Sator testified that the result of his examination of ABC revealed
a deep healed laceration at the seven (7) oclock position and a shallow healed laceration at the one
(1) oclock position on ABCs hymen.
On September 22, 1995, ABC filed two Complaints. She accused Tampus of taking advantage of her
by having carnal knowledge of her, against her will, while she was intoxicated and sleeping on April
1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m. She declared in her Complaint that this was done in conspiracy with accused
Ida who gave permission to Tampus to rape her. And again, she stated that on April 3, 1995, she
was threatened with a wooden club by Tampus, who then succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her, against her will.
Tampus denied raping ABC on April 1, 1995. He claimed that at 4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995, he left the
house to go to the public market of Lapu-lapu City. When he arrived home at 6:00 p.m., ABC and Ida
were not there as they usually go to the beer house at 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m. 23 He denied forcing
ABC to drink beer. He also denied asking Ida to allow him to have sexual intercourse with
ABC.24 Appellant Ida also testified that she and ABC left for the beer house at 4:00 p.m. of April 1,
1995 and they came back at 6:00 a.m. the following day.25 She said that she always brought her
daughter to the beer house with her and there was never an instance when she left her daughter
alone in the house.26 She denied forcing ABC to drink beer at 4:30 p.m. of April 1, 1995, and she
denied giving permission to Tampus to have sexual intercourse with ABC. 27
Tampus also denied raping ABC on April 4, 1995. He testified that he arrived at the Barangay Tanod
Headquarters between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. of April 3, 199528 and that his actual duty time shift
was from midnight to 5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995. Guillermo Berdin (Berdin), a defense witness,
testified that on April 3, 1995, Tampus reported for duty at the police outpost at 8:00 p.m. and left at
5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995, as reflected in the attendance logbook. However, on cross-examination,
Berdin could not tell whether the signature appearing on the logbook really belonged to Tampus. It
was noted by the trial court that the handwriting used by Tampus in the logbook entry on April 2,
1995 is different from his handwriting appearing on April 3, 1995.29 It was also revealed that the
house of Tampus is just 500 meters away or just a three-minute walk from the barangay tanod
outpost and that the barangay tanod on duty could leave the outpost unnoticed or without
permission.30

Agustos B. Costas, M.D.31 (Dr. Costas), the Head of the Department of Psychiatry of the Vicente
Sotto Memorial Medical Center, issued a Medical Certification,32 which showed that appellant Ida
was treated as an outpatient at the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center Psychiatry Department
from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995 and was provisionally diagnosed with Schizophrenia,
paranoid type.
The trial court convicted Tampus of two counts of rape, as principal in Criminal Case No. 013324-L
and Criminal Case No. 013325-L. Appellant Ida was found guilty as an accomplice in Criminal Case
No. 013324-L. The trial court appreciated in Idas favor the mitigating circumstance of illness which
would diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts,
pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.33 The dispositive portion of the trial courts
decision states, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds accused Bartolome
Tampus GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of two counts of rape, as principals [sic], in
Criminal Case No. 013324-L and Criminal Case No. 013325-L and he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua in each of the aforementioned cases.
The Court also finds accused Ida Montesclaros GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as an
accomplice in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years, and eight (8) months of Reclusion
Temporal.
Both accused are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the offended party, [ABC], the
sum of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 013324-L.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 34
Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, accused Tampus died on November
16, 200035and his appeal was dismissed by the Third Division of this Court. 36 Thus, the appeal before
the Court of Appeals dealt only with that of appellant Ida. The appellate court gave credence to the
testimony of ABC and affirmed the trial courts decision with modification. It appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found that Ida failed to prove that she was
completely deprived of intelligence on April 1, 1995. On the basis of the medical report and the
testimony of the attending physician, Idas schizophrenia was determined by both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals to have diminished the exercise of her will-power though it did not deprive her
of the consciousness of her acts. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals
states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida Montesclaros is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
accomplice in the commission of rape and hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum. Further, she is ORDERED to pay moral damages in the amount of

fifty thousand pesos (Php 50,000.00) and exemplary damages in the amount of twenty-five thousand
pesos (Php 25,000.00).37
We find the findings of the lower courts to be well-taken.
The finding of guilt of Ida as an accomplice in the rape of ABC is dependent on proving the guilt of
the principal accused. Upon examination of the records of the case, we agree with the ruling of the
trial and appellate courts that the testimony of ABC is clear and straightforward, and is sufficient to
conclude that Tampus is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the rape of ABC, in Criminal
Case No. 013324-L, as well as to convict appellant Ida as an accomplice in the same criminal case.
The findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect and, generally, appellate courts will not
overturn said findings unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of
the case.38 The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained
by the Court of Appeals.39
The trial court has carefully scrutinized the testimony of complainant ABC and has given full faith and
credence to her testimony. Both the trial and appellate courts found that the rape of ABC by Tampus
on April 1, 1995 has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, it is highly inconceivable
for a young girl to impute the crime of rape, implicate her own mother in such a vile act, allow an
examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial if she has not been a victim of rape
and was impelled to seek justice for the defilement of her person. Testimonies of child-victims are
normally given full credit.40
Tampus was positively identified by ABC as the person who had carnal knowledge of her against her
will on April 1, 1995. The denial of Tampus cannot prevail over the positive and direct identification
by the victim, ABC. Although ABC was asleep and unconscious at the time the sexual debasement
was committed by Tampus, circumstantial evidence established beyond doubt that it is Tampus who
raped ABC. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.41 In cases like the one at bar, the Court takes into consideration the events that transpired
before and after the victim lost consciousness in order to establish the commission of the act of
coitus.42
The trial court correctly determined, thus:
The prosecution has clearly established by its evidence that accused Bartolome Tampus had carnal
knowledge of [ABC] on April 1, 1995 under the circumstance set forth in Article 335 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; that is, when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious.
xxxx

The Court cannot accept accused Bartolome Tampus defense of denial and alibi. His denial pales in
effect against the positive evidence given by [ABC] that he ravished her [on] two occasions.
xxxx
It is true that in the first incident on April 1, 1995, [ABC] did not see Tampus lie down with her. What
she saw was the aftermath of her deflowering upon waking up. Nevertheless, the Court has taken
note of the following circumstances: (1) The drinking session where the complainant was forced to
drink beer by both accused; (2) The conversation between the two accused when accused Tampus
requested accused Ida Montesclaros, and was granted by the latter, permission to have sexual
intercourse with the complainant; (3) Accused Tampus and the complainant were the only persons
left in the house when Ida Montesclaros went to work after acceding to the request of Tampus; (4)
The bloodstained pants, the pain and blood in complainants vagina and the pain in her head, groin
and buttocks; (5) The threat made by accused Tampus on the complainant in the dawn of April 4,
1995 that he would kill her if she would tell about the previous incident on April 1, 1995; and (6) The
second incident of rape that immediately ensued. These circumstances form a chain that points to
accused Bartolome Tampus as the person who had carnal knowledge of [ABC] when she was
asleep in an inebriated condition. 43
After establishing the guilt of Tampus as principal, the trial court then determined the guilt of Ida.
Although Ida was charged as a conspirator, the trial court found her liable as an accomplice. The trial
court ruled that her act of forcing or intimidating ABC to drink beer and then acceding to the request
of co-accused Tampus to be allowed to have sexual intercourse with ABC did not prove their
conspiracy.44 Hence, it held that, "[u]ndoubtedly, Ida Montesclaros participated in the commission of
the crime by previous acts but her participation, not being indispensable, was not that of a principal.
She is liable as an accomplice."45
In her appeal, appellant Ida argued that it is against human nature for a mother to allow her daughter
to be raped. She maintained that there was no instance when she left ABC alone in the house. The
Court of Appeals dismissed appellant Idas appeal as it also gave credence to the testimony of ABC.
In her appeal brief filed before this Court, Ida raises the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BARTOLOME TAMPUS OF
THE CRIMES OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING IDA MONTESCLAROS AS ACCOMPLICE TO
THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.46

We affirm the trial and appellate courts in ruling that Ida is liable as an accomplice in the rape of her
daughter, ABC.
Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. 47 The following requisites
must be proved in order that a person can be considered an accomplice:
(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and,
(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to
the person charged as accomplice.48
The testimony of ABC establishes that Ida cooperated in the execution of the rape by Tampus when
prior to the act of rape by Tampus, she forced ABC to drink beer and she agreed to Tampus request
for him to have sexual intercourse with ABC. Idas acts show that she had knowledge of and even
gave her permission to the plan of Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.
1avvphi1

During the cross-examination by the defense counsel, Atty. Paulito Cabrera, of witness ABC, she
testified that:
Q Before this date, April 1, 1995, did you already usually drink beer?
A No, sir.
Q So, you are telling the Honorable Court that it was only on April 1, 1995 that you first drank
beer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you say, you were forced to drink beer?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who forced you to drink beer in that afternoon of April 1, 1995?
A Bartolome Tampus and "Nanay", my mother.49
xxxx
Q By the way, your mother proposed to you to drink beer?
A Yes, sir.

Q Before you concede to her proposition, did you not complain that you had not been used
to drinking beer and then, why suddenly, she would let you drink beer at that time?
A No, sir.
Q Did you not tell her that, "I am not used to drinking beer, so, I would not drink beer"?
A Because the beer was mixed with Coke.
Q So, you mean that you also agreed to drink beer at that time?
A I just agreed to the proposal of my mother.
Q But you never voiced any complaint or any refusal to her at that time?
A No, sir because I was afraid that she might maltreat me.
Q At that time when she proposed to you to drink beer, was she already threatening to
maltreat you if you would not drink that beer?
A Not yet.
Q And how were you able to conclude that she might maltreat you if you would not drink that
beer that she proposed for you to drink?
A Because "Nanay" stared at me sharply and she had a wooden stick prepared.
Q Are you sure that she was doing that while she was offering the glass of beer to you?
A Yes, sir.50
xxxx
Q While you were drinking beer, your mother and Bartolome went out of the house and you
overheard Bartolome asking or proposing to your mother that he would have sexual
intercourse with you which you term in the Visayan dialect "remedyo", Bartolome would want
to have a "remedyo" with you. When [sic], particular moment did you allegedly hear this
statement, while you were drinking beer or after you had finished drinking beer?
A When I was already lying on the floor of the room we were renting.51
xxxx
Q And, of course, as you have stated now, it was you, you were quite sure that it was you
who was being referred by Bartolome Tampus when he said to your mother in the Visayan
dialect that "gusto siya moremedyo nimo", he wants to have sexual intercourse with you?

A Yes, sir, but I dont know the meaning of "remedyo".

Q At that time, you did not know the meaning of "remedyo"?
A Not yet, sir.52
xxxx
Q Was that the very first time that you ever heard of the word "remedyo"?
A Yes, sir53
xxxx
Q And when your mother came back from work at about 7:00 oclock [sic] in the morning of
April 2, 1995, did you not also bother to tell her of what you suspected that something
serious or bad had happened to you in the previous day?
A Because she already knew, sir.
Q How did you know that she already knew?
A Because I heard her telling Omeng,54 "After you have sexual intercourse with her, leave her
immediately!"55
xxxx
Q Considering that you never knew what is the meaning of the word, "remedyo", when your
mother arrived in the morning of April 2, 1995, did you not confront your mother, did you not
tell her that, "Is this what you mean by "remedyo", as what you had agreed with Bartolome
Tampus that he would do something to my genitals?
A No sir, because when she arrived, she kept on laughing.56
All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in the rape of ABC.
The testimony of ABC shows that there was community of design between Ida and Tampus to
commit the rape of ABC. Ida had knowledge of and assented to Tampus intention to have sexual
intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to drink beer, and when ABC was already drunk, she
left ABC alone with Tampus, with the knowledge and even with her express consent to Tampus plan
to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.
It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should not be
indispensable to the commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by
indispensable cooperation. The evidence shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida are not
indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First, because it was both Ida and Tampus who

forced ABC to drink beer, and second because Tampus already had the intention to have sexual
intercourse with ABC and he could have consummated the act even without Idas consent.
The acts of Ida are closely related to the eventual commission of rape by Tampus. They both forced
ABC to drink beer; when ABC was already drunk, Tampus asked Ida if he could have sexual
intercourse with ABC and Ida gave her consent; and lastly, Ida left ABC alone with Tampus so that
he proceed with his plan to rape ABC.
Circumstances affecting the liability of the Appellant as an Accomplice
We agree with both the trial and appellate courts in their appreciation of the mitigating circumstance
of illness as would diminish the exercise of willpower of Ida without depriving her of the
consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.
Dr. Costas testified that Ida was provisionally treated for schizophrenia a few months before the
incident, from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995. Based on his expert opinion, Ida was not
totally deprived of intelligence at the time of the incident; but, she may have poor judgment. On
Direct Examination of Dr. Costas by City Prosecutor Celso V. Espinosa, he testified as follows:
Q Doctor, taking into consideration your diagnosis, as you said, is provisional, would you say
that the patient [sic] totally deprived of intelligence or reason?
A Not totally.
Q She will be conscious of her acts?
A She may be, that is possible, for certain cause.
Q And there will be loss of intelligence?
A There could be.
Q Now, Doctor, she is charged her [sic] as one of the principals in the commission of the
crime of rape for having given her daughter to be sexually abused by her co-accused,
allegedly convinced by her co-accused on the first day of April, 1995. Now, if she was then
under treatment, Doctor, from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995, would you say,
Doctor, that having taken this diagnosis for [sic] schizophrenic patient, at the time, after
January 12, 1995, she must have acted with discernment?
A It is possible because you are this kind of mental illness even with the treatment, and even
without any medication, it may be what we called spontaneous, really it will get back.
Q At that time it will loss the intelligence? [sic]
A I think because it might be back, the treatment should be yearly.

Q Doctor, in your opinion, since our office is very much concern [sic] on this, if a person is
totally deprived of intelligence, he has still discernment, she is unconscious of her act, she or
he may be exempted from any criminal liability, please tell, Doctor, in your personal opinion
for the purpose of this proceedings she may be acting with discernment and with certain
degree of intelligence?
A It is possible but I think of a mother feeding her own daughter to somebody, I think there is
a motive, she wants to gain financial or material things from the daughter if no material gain,
then perhaps it was borne out of her illness. This is my opinion. 57
xxxx
Q Doctor, is this schizophrenic person can distinguish the right or wrong? [sic]
A If they are in the [sic] state of illness, judgment is impaired to discern between right or
wrong.
Q In the case of this particular accused, what would you say at the state of her ailment?
A When she was brought to the hospital, Your Honor, I think, although the mother alleged
that the sickness could be more than one year duration, it is in acute stage because she was
allegedly destroying everything in the house according to the mother, so she was in acute
stage.58
On cross-examination by Atty. Paulito Cabrera, Dr. Costas testified thus:
Q Would you say, Doctor, that that particular ailment of Ida Montesclaros affected her sense
of judgment?
A I think, so.
Q And that being scizophronic [sic] somehow, it has, while in that stage, the patient lost
contact with reality?
A Yes, that is possible.
Q In your opinion, Doctor, granting, for the sake of argument, the alleged accusation against
her is true, being an expert on scizophrania, could you tell the Honorable Court as a mother,
who would allegedly do such an offense to her daughter, is it still in her sound mind or proper
mental sane [sic]?
A I think, as I said, one thing to be considered is the motivation if she want [sic] to gain some
material things, if not, it is because of her judgment.
Q If she would not gain anything from allowing her daughter allegedly to be rubbished by
another person, then there must be something wrong?

A There must be something wrong and it came up from scizpphrania.

A It is the judgment, in the case of the schizophrenic.59
We have previously held that Schizophrenia may be considered mitigating under Art. 13(9) if it
diminishes the exercise of the willpower of the accused.60 In this case, the testimony of Dr. Costas
shows that even though Ida was diagnosed with schizophrenia, she was not totally deprived of
intelligence but her judgment was affected. Thus, on the basis of the Medical Certification that Ida
suffered from and was treated for schizophrenia a few months prior to the incident, and on the
testimony of Dr. Costas, Idas schizophrenia could be considered to have diminished the exercise of
her willpower although it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts.
We note that in the case at bar, the undisputed fact that Ida is the mother of ABCwho was 13
years old at the time of the incidentcould have been considered as a special qualifying
circumstance which would have increased the imposable penalty to death, under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, viz.:
ARTICLE 266-B. Penalties.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim;
xxxx
Both the circumstances of the minority and the relationship of the offender to the victim, either as the
victims parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, must be alleged in the
information and proved during the trial in order for them to serve as qualifying circumstances under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.61
In the case at bar, although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship with
the accused as the latter's daughter was not properly alleged in the Information, and even though
this was proven during trial and not refuted by the accused, it cannot be considered as a special
qualifying circumstance that would serve to increase the penalty of the offender. Under the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should be given retroactive effect following the rule that statutes
governing court proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage,62 every Information must state the qualifying and the aggravating
circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of
the penalty.63 Since in the case at bar, the Information in Criminal Case No. 013324-L did not state
that Ida is the mother of ABC, this circumstance could not be appreciated as a special qualifying

circumstance. Ida may only be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua. In any event, Republic Act No. 9346, entitled an "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law on June
24, 2006 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.
Civil indemnity imposed against the appellant
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision ordered Tampus and Ida "jointly and severally, to
indemnify the offended party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 013324-L." 64 The
Court of Appeals, however, did not award any civil indemnity to ABC, and only awarded moral and
exemplary damages. We deem it necessary and proper to award ABC civil indemnity of P50,000.00.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape. This is distinct from moral
damages awarded upon such finding without need of further proof, because it is assumed that a
rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award. 65
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the victim in simple rape cases is entitled to an award of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto and another P50,000.00 as moral damages. 66 However,
Tampus civil indemnity ex delicto has been extinguished by reason of his death before the final
judgment, in accordance with Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.67 Thus, the amount of civil
indemnity which remains for accomplice Ida to pay is put at issue.
It becomes relevant to determine the particular amount for which each accused is liable when they
have different degrees of responsibility in the commission of the crime and, consequently, differing
degrees of liability. When a crime is committed by many, each one has a distinct part in the
commission of the crime and though all the persons who took part in the commission of the crime
are liable, the liability is not equally shared among them. Hence, an accused may be liable either as
principal, accomplice or accessory.
The particular liability that each accused is responsible for depends on the nature and degree of his
participation in the commission of the crime. The penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for
a particular crime is imposed upon the principal in a consummated felony.68 The accomplice is only
given the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by the law for the crime committed 69 and
an accessory is given the penalty lower by two degrees.70 However, a felon is not only criminally
liable, he is likewise civilly liable. 71 Apart from the penalty of imprisonment imposed on him, he is
also ordered to indemnify the victim and to make whole the damage caused by his act or omission
through the payment of civil indemnity and damages.
Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the accused. Although, unlike criminal liabilityin
which the Revised Penal Code specifically states the corresponding penalty imposed on the
principal, accomplice and accessorythe share of each accused in the civil liability is not specified
in the Revised Penal Code. The courts have the discretion to determine the apportionment of the
civil indemnity which the principal, accomplice and accessory are respectively liable for, without
guidelines with respect to the basis of the allotment.
Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[i]f there are two or more persons civilly liable
for a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond." Notwithstanding

the determination of the respective liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories within their
respective class, they shall also be subsidiarily liable for the amount of civil liability adjudged in the
other classes. Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[t]he principals, accomplices,
and accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among
themselves for their quotas, and subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable." 72
As courts are given a free hand in determining the apportionment of civil liability, previous decisions
dealing with this matter have been grossly inconsistent.
In People v. Galapin,73 People v. Continente,74 United States v. Lasada,75 People v. Mobe,76 People v.
Irinea,77People v. Rillorta,78 People v. Cagalingan,79 People v. Villanueva,80 People v. Magno,81 People
v. del Rosario,82People v. Yrat,83 People v. Saul,84 and People v. Tamayo,85 the principal and
accomplice were ordered to pay jointly and severally the entire amount of the civil indemnity
awarded to the victim. In People v. Sotto,86 the accomplice was ordered to pay half of the amount of
civil indemnity imposed by the trial court, while the principal was liable for the other half. In People v.
Toring,87 the principal, accomplice and the accessory were made jointly and severally liable for the
entire amount of the civil indemnity.
In the cases mentioned above, the principal and accomplice were made to pay equal shares of the
civil indemnity. This makes the accomplice who had less participation in the commission of the crime
equally liable with the principal for the civil indemnity. The degree of their participation in the crime
was not taken into account in the apportionment of the amount of the civil indemnity. This is contrary
to the principle behind the treble division of persons criminally responsible for felonies, i.e., that the
liability must be commensurate with the degree of participation of the accused in the crime
committed. In such a situation, the accomplice who just cooperated in the execution of the offense
but whose participation is not indispensable to the commission of the crime is made to pay the same
amount of civil indemnity as the principal by direct participation who took a direct part in the
execution of the criminal act. It is an injustice when the penalty and liability imposed are not
commensurate to the actual responsibility of the offender; for criminal responsibility is individual and
not collective, and each of the participants should be liable only for the acts actually committed by
him.88 The proportion of this individual liability must be graduated not only according to the nature of
the crime committed and the circumstances attending it, but also the degree and nature of
participation of the individual offender.
In Garces v. People,89 People v. Flores,90 People v. Barbosa,91 People v. Ragundiaz,92 People v.
Bato,93 and People v. Garalde,94 the accomplice was held to be solidarily liable with the principal for
only one-half (1/2) of the amount adjudged as civil indemnity. In Garces, the accomplice was held
solidarily liable for half of the civil indemnity ex delicto but was made to pay the moral damages of
P50,000.00 separately from the principal. In Flores, Ragundiaz, Bato, and Garalde, the accomplice
was held solidarily liable for half of the combined amounts of the civil indemnity ex delicto and moral
damages. In Ragundiaz, the accomplice was also made solidarily liable with the principal for half of
the actual damages, and in Garalde the accomplice was also held solidarily liable with the principal
for half of the exemplary damages, aside from the civil and moral damages.
In these cases, the accomplice was made jointly and severally liable with the principal for only half of
the amount of the civil indemnity and moral damages, only for purposes of the enforcement of the

payment of civil indemnity to the offended party. When the liability in solidum has been enforced, as
when payment has been made, the person by whom payment has been made shall have a right of
action against the other persons liable for the amount of their respective shares. 95 As against each
other, whoever made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share that corresponds to
each, with interest for the payment already made.96 In these cases, therefore, payment is made by
either the principal or the accomplice, the one who made the payment to the victim could demand
payment of the part of the debt corresponding to his co-debtor. If for example the principal paid the
victim the entire amount of the civil indemnity, he could go against the accomplice for one-fourth
(1/4) of the total amount of civil indemnity and damages. The principal was primarily liable for only
one-half (1/2) of the total amount of civil indemnity and he was solidarily liable with the accomplice
for the other half. Since the principal paid for the half which the accomplice is solidarily liable with, he
could claim one-half (1/2) of that amount from the accomplice. Thus, the principal would have
become ultimately liable for three-fourths (3/4) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and
damages, while the accomplice would have become liable for one-fourth (1/4) of such amount.
In People v. Cortes,97 People v. Budol,98 People v. Nulla,99 and People v. Madali,100 the principal was
ordered to pay twice the share of the accomplice in the civil indemnity. In Nulla, the Court
determined the respective amounts for which the principal, accomplice and accessory were liable
for. The principal was ordered to pay P20,000.00, the accomplice was ordered to pay P10,000.00,
and the accessory was ordered to pay P2,000.00. Unlike the cases cited above where the principal
and accomplice were held solidarily liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity or half of it, in
Nulla, the court particularly determined the amount for which each shall respond. This is consistent
with Article 109 and Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code, which require that the courts should
determine the amount for which the principals, accomplices and accessories must respond to and
upon specifying this amount, the principals are solidarily liable within their class for their quota, the
accomplices are solidarily liable among themselves for their quota and the accessories are solidarily
liable for their quota. If any one of the classes is unable to pay for its respective quota, it becomes
subsidiarily liable for the quota of the other classes, which shall be enforced first against the property
of the principals; next, against that of the accomplices; and lastly, against that of the accessories. 101
There are also cases where the principal was ordered to pay more than double the amount that the
accomplice is liable for. In Lumiguis v. People,102 the civil liability of P6,000.00 was apportioned as
follows: the sole principal was primarily liable for P3,000.00, the four accomplices were primarily
liable in solidum among themselves for the other half of the indemnity, or P3,000.00. Thus, each
accomplice was answerable for one-fourth (1/4) of P3,000.00 or one-eighth (1/8) of the entire
amount of civil indemnity, which is P750.00.
Similarly in People v. Bantagan,103 the principal was required to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
in the amount of P500.00. In case of his insolvency, his three accomplices should be jointly and
severally liable. The three accomplices were jointly and severally liable for the other P500 and in
case of their insolvency the principal was secondarily liable for such amount.
In People v. Castillo,104 the accomplice was ordered to pay one-fourth (1/4) of the amount of the civil
indemnity, while the principal was liable for the remaining three-fourths (3/4).

In People v. Cariaga,105 the total amount of indemnity and damages due to the heirs of the victim
amounted to P601,000.00. The sole accomplice was ordered to pay P101,000.00 which is roughly
one-sixth (1/6) of the entire civil indemnity, while the two principals were ordered to pay the rest of
the indemnity and damages amounting to P500,000.00.
The cases cited above demonstrate the ad hoc method by which the ratio of shares of the civil
indemnity and damages among the principal, accomplice and accessory is determined. Though the
responsibility to decide the respective shares of persons liable for a felony is left to the courts, this
does not mean that this amount can be decided arbitrarily or upon conjecture. The power of the
courts to grant indemnity and damages demands factual, legal and equitable justification, and
cannot be left to speculation and caprice.
The entire amount of the civil indemnity, together with the moral and actual damages, should be
apportioned among the persons who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the
degree of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation in the criminal act.
Salvador Viada, an authority in criminal law, is of the opinion that there are no fixed rules which are
applicable in all cases in order to determine the apportionment of civil liability among two or more
persons civilly liable for a felony, either because there are different degrees of culpability of
offenders, or because of the inequality of their financial capabilities.106 On this note, he states in his
commentaries on the 1870 Penal Code of Spain that the law should leave the determination of the
amount of respective liabilities to the discretion of the courts.107 The courts have the competence to
determine the exact participation of the principal, accomplice, and accessory in the commission of
the crime relative to the other classes because they are able to directly consider the evidence
presented and the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses.
We must stress, however, that the courts discretion should not be untrammelled and must be guided
by the principle behind differing liabilities for persons with varying roles in the commission of the
crime. The person with greater participation in the commission of the crime should have a greater
share in the civil liability than those who played a minor role in the crime or those who had no
participation in the crime but merely profited from its effects. Each principal should shoulder a
greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages than every accomplice, and each
accomplice should also be liable for a greater amount as against every accessory. Care should also
be taken in considering the number of principals versus that of accomplices and accessories. If for
instance, there are four principals and only one accomplice and the total of the civil indemnity and
damages is P6,000.00, the court cannot assign two-thirds (2/3) of the indemnity and damages to the
principals and one-third (1/3) to the accomplice. Even though the principals, as a class, have a
greater share in the liability as against the accomplice-- since one-third (1/3) of P6,000.00 is
P2,000.00, while two-thirds (2/3) of P6,000.00 is P4,000.00-- when the civil liability of every person is
computed, the share of the accomplice ends up to be greater than that of each principal. This is so
because the two-thirds (2/3) share of the principalsor P4,000.00is still divided among all the four
principals, and thus every principal is liable for only P1,000.00.
In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice is solidarily liable with the principal for the
entire amount of the civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an erroneous apportionment of the civil
indemnity. First, because it does not take into account the difference in the nature and degree of
participation between the principal, Tampus, versus the accomplice, Ida. Idas previous acts of

cooperation include her acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting Tampus to have sexual
intercourse with her daughter. But even without these acts, Tampus could have still raped ABC. It
was Tampus, the principal by direct participation, who should have the greater liability, not only in
terms of criminal liability, but also with respect to civil liability. Second, Article 110 of the Revised
Penal Code states that the apportionment should provide for a quota amount for every class for
which members of such class are solidarily liable within their respective class, and they are only
subsidiarily liable for the share of the other classes. The Revised Penal Code does not provide for
solidary liability among the different classes, as was held by the trial court in the case at bar.
lavvphi1

Thus, taking into consideration the difference in participation of the principal and accomplice, the
principal, Tampus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and
moral damages and appellant Ida should be ordered to pay one-third (1/3) of the amount. Civil
indemnity for simple rape was correctly set at P50,000.00 and moral damages at P50,000.00. The
total amount of damages to be divided between Tampus and Ida is P100,000.00, where Tampus is
liable for P66,666.67 (which is two-thirds [2/3] of P100,000.00) and Ida is liable for P33,333.33
(which is one-third [1/3] of P100,000.00). This is broken down into civil indemnity of P16,666.67 and
moral damages of P16,666.67. However, since the principal, Tampus, died while the case was
pending in the Court of Appeals, his liability for civil indemnity ex delicto is extinguished by reason of
his death before the final judgment.108 His share in the civil indemnity and damages cannot be
passed over to the accomplice, Ida, because Tampus share of the civil liability has been
extinguished. And even if Tampus were alive upon the promulgation of this decision, Ida would only
have been subsidiarily liable for his share of the civil indemnity of P66,666.67. However, since
Tampus civil liability ex delicto is extinguished, Idas subsidiary liability with respect to this amount is
also eliminated, following the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Tampus obligation to
pay P66,666.67 his quota of the civil indemnity is the principal obligation, for which Ida is only
subsidiarily liable. Upon the extinguishment of the principal obligation, there is no longer any
accessory obligation which could attach to it; thus, the subsidiary liability of Ida is also extinguished.
On the matter of exemplary damages, we find that exemplary damages were incorrectly awarded by
the Court of Appeals.
In criminal cases, exemplary damages are imposed on the offender as part of the civil liability when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.109 Also known as "punitive" or
"vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to
serious wrongdoings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of
an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.110 Exemplary damages may be
awarded only when one or more aggravating circumstances are alleged in the information and
proved during the trial.111
In the case at bar, no qualifying or aggravating circumstance was appreciated against Ida. Although,
the minority of the victim coupled with the fact that the offender is the parent of the victim could have
served to qualify the crime of rape, the presence of these concurring circumstances cannot justify
the award of exemplary damages since the relationship of the offender, Ida, to the victim, ABC, was
not alleged in the Information.112 The minority of the rape victim and her relationship with the offender
must both be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in order to be appreciated as an
aggravating/qualifying circumstance.113 While the information in the instant case alleged that ABC

was a minor during the incident, there was no allegation that Ida was her parent. Since the
relationship between ABC and appellant was not duly established, the award of exemplary damages
is not warranted.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, dated September 29,
2006, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00215, finding appellant Ida Montesclaros guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as accomplice in the crime of rape and sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida Montesclaros is
ORDERED to pay civil indemnity in the amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and
sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67), and moral damages in the amount of sixteen thousand, six
hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67). The award of exemplary damages
is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184800

May 5, 2010

WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO PERECHE,

SR., Petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P.
GIMENEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail the
issuances of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent) Order 1 of
April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to quash the Amended Information indicting them for libel,
and Joint Resolution2 of August 12, 2008 denying reconsideration of the first issuance.
Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez3 (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on behalf of the
Yuchengco Family ("in particular," former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee (Helen)
and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan), 4 a criminal complaint,5 before the Makati City
Prosecutors Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos,
who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez,

Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente
Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are
trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively, the accused), and a certain
John Doe, the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com.
PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans,
Inc. (PPI) - a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by
the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) - who had previously purchased traditional pre-need
educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder after PPI,
due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments
before the Makati RTC.
Decrying PPIs refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI
sought to provide a forum by which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under
their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under the address of www.pepcoalition.com.
Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a
blogspot6 under the website address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo egroup7 at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily accessible to the public or by
anyone logged on to the internet.
Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various dates
from August 25 to October 2, 2005, he "was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13],
maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the accused] containing highly derogatory
statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and
particularly, Malayan."8 He cited an article which was posted/published on www.pepcoalition.com on
August 25, 2005 which stated:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong
pagbagsak ng negotiation because it was done prematurely since we had not file any criminal
aspect of our case. What is worse is that Yuchengcos benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is
the fact na talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.
LETS MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP AND AMLC
AND WHEREVER. Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues to
air our grievances and call for boycott ng YGC. Let us start within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga
investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and again convince friends to do
the same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga ngayon specially those who
joined only after knowing that there was a negotiation for amicable settlements.
FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT
BECAUSE THEY HAD SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO KILL
US NA. x x x 9(emphasis in the original)
By Resolution of May 5, 2006,10 the Makati City Prosecutors Office, finding probable cause to indict
the accused, filed thirteen (13) separate Informations11 charging them with libel. The accusatory

portion of one Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-876, which was raffled off to public
respondent reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of
Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the
website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another together with John Does, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking
the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance
Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for
further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article
imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in
the said website www.pepcoalition.comand injurious and defamatory article as follows:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong
pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had
successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x x
A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com is
attached as Annex "F" of the complaint.
That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above defamatory article
are known to the accused as trustees holding legal title to the above-cited website and that the
accused are the ones responsible for the posting and publication of the defamatory articles that the
article in question was posted and published with the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the
complainant before the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutors Resolution by a petition for review to
the Secretary of Justice who, by Resolution of June 20, 2007,13 reversed the finding of probable
cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Informations for libel filed in court. The Justice
Secretary opined that the crime of "internet libel" was non-existent, hence, the accused could not be
charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.14
Petitioners, as co-accused,15 thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public respondent, a Motion
to Quash16the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest
jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are not punishable by law
since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally defective
for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense of libel.

Citing Macasaet v. People,17 petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular
place within the trial courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or
that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed
and first published.
By Order of October 3, 2006,18 the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause existed,
quashed the Information, citing Agustin v. Pamintuan.19 It found that the Information lacked any
allegations that the offended parties were actually residing in Makati at the time of the commission of
the offense as in fact they listed their address in the complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in
Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and first published in Makati.
The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information,20 insisting that the Information
sufficiently conferred jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v. Panganiban 21 which
held that the Information need not allege verbatim that the libelous publication was "printed and first
published" in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out that Malayan has an office in Makati of which
Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution alleged that even assuming that the Information was
deficient, it merely needed a formal amendment.
Petitioners opposed the prosecutions motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia, that since
venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction
is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by amendment. 22
By Order of March 8, 2007,23 the public respondent granted the prosecutions motion for
reconsideration and accordingly ordered the public prosecutor to "amend the Information to cure the
defect of want of venue."
The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20, 2007, 24 the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of
Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the
website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public
conspiring, confederating together with John Does, whose true names, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the
honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co.
Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further
purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice
or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said
website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an injurious and defamatory
article, which was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City, as follows:
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)

Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information25 which, they alleged, still failed to vest
jurisdiction upon the public respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were
"printed and first published" by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution erroneously laid the
venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article.
By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found the
Amended Information to be sufficient in form.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration26 having been denied by the public respondent by Joint
Resolution of August 12, 2008, they filed the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition faulting
the public respondent for:
1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT
PUNISHABLE BY LAW;
2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS
CONTINUES TO BE DEFICIENT; and
3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF
CURING JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.27
With the filing of Gimenezs Comment28 to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether petitioners violated
the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible; and (2) whether grave abuse of
discretion attended the public respondents admission of the Amended Information.
The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts, 29 as a rule, requires that
recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher
court.30 A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter should be filed
in the Court of Appeals.31 The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions.
Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate courts
do not involve factual but purely legal questions. 32
In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority,
by way of exception, in order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a pure question of
law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of the RPC whether the
Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in light of the
requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the
same extent as if he were the author thereof.

The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in
this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however,
That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the
time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in
case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended
parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or
city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
matter is printed and first published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. 33 This
principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically
provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
In Macasaet,34 the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo 35 which laid out
the rules on venue in libel cases, viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate
our earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the
complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was
committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where he was actually
residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and
first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the
circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue
of the action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited
to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first
published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the
second. Thus, it stated that the offending article "was first published and accessed by the private
complainant in Makati City." In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite
allegation of printing and first publication.
The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati
becomes pronounced upon an examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA
No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals36 explained the nature of these changes:

Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal libel,
following the amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code:
"Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written
defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the
place where the same was written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the
public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any
jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written
or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the
injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel
case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free Press, Pio
Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace
court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to
the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from
inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote
municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional
Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303,
311).
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate or
arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish
nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation
becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses
influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended
party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with
particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported
by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers,
magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any
inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material
appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its
printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first access to the
defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with "printing and first publication" would spawn

the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It
hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the
websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel
anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending
website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of
Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to
the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or
capable of being accessed.
1avvphi1

Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as amended, are
unduly oppressive, the Courts pronouncements in Chavez37 are instructive:
For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule providing
that a private person must file the complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first
publication, or at the complainants place of residence. We would also have to abandon the
subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet.
There is no convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations imposed on libel
actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file
the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is no
need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was printed and
first published.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to
quash the Amended Information.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint
Resolution of August 12, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br.
149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and
DISMISS the case.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 178323

March 16, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARMANDO CHINGH y PARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Armando Chingh y Parcia (Armando) seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01119 convicting him of Statutory Rape and Rape Through Sexual
Assault.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
On March 19, 2005, an Information for Rape was filed against Armando for inserting his fingers and
afterwards his penis into the private part of his minor victim, VVV,2 the accusatory portion of which
reads:
That on or before March 11, 2004 in the City of Manila, Philippines, [Armando], with lewd design and
by means of force, violence and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
commit sexual abuse and lascivious conduct upon a ten (10) year old minor child, [VVV], by then
and there pulling her in a dark place then mashing her breast and inserting his fingers in her vagina
and afterwards his penis, against her will and consent, thereby causing serious danger to the normal
growth and development of the child [VVV], to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.3
Upon his arraignment, Armando pleaded not guilty to the charge. Consequently, trial on the merits
ensued.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the victim, VVV; the victims father; PO3
Ma. Teresa Solidarios; and Dr. Irene Baluyot. The defense, on the other hand, presented the lone
testimony Armando as evidence.
Evidence for the Prosecution

Born on 16 September 1993, VVV was only 10 years old at the time of the incident. On 11 March
2004 at around 8:00 p.m., along with five other playmates, VVV proceeded to a store to buy food.
While she was beckoning the storekeeper, who was not then at her station, Armando approached
and pulled her hand and threatened not to shout for help or talk. Armando brought her to a vacant lot
at Tindalo Street, about 400 meters from the store. While in a standing position beside an
unoccupied passenger jeepney, Armando mashed her breast and inserted his right hand index finger
into her private part. Despite VVVs pleas for him to stop, Armando unzipped his pants, lifted VVV
and rammed his phallus inside her vagina, causing her to feel excruciating pain.
Threatened with death if she would tell anyone what had happened, VVV kept mum about her
traumatic experience when she arrived home. Noticing her odd and uneasy demeanor as well as her
blood-stained underwear, however, her father pressed her for an explanation. VVV confessed to her
father about her unfortunate experience. Immediately, they reported the matter to the police
authorities. After his arrest, Armando was positively identified by VVV in a police line-up.
The genital examination of VVV conducted by Dr. Irene Baluyot (Dr. Baluyot) of the Philippine
General Hospitals Child Protection Unit, in the morning of 12 March 2004, showed a "fresh
laceration with bleeding at 6 oclock position" in the childs hymen and "minimal bleeding from [said]
hymen laceration." Her impression was that there was a "clear evidence" of "penetrating trauma"
which happened within 24 hours prior to the examination. The photograph of the lacerated genitalia
of VVV strongly illustrated and buttressed Dr. Baluyots medical report.4
Evidence for the Defense
Armando denied that he raped VVV. Under his version, in (sic) the night of 11 March 2004, he and
his granddaughter were on their way to his cousins house at Payumo St., Tondo, Manila. As it was
already late, he told his granddaughter to just go home ahead of him while he decided to go to
Blumentritt market to buy food. While passing by a small alley on his way thereto, he saw VVV along
with some companions, peeling "dalanghita." VVV approached him and asked if she could go with
him to the market because she will buy "dalanghita" or sunkist. He refused her request and told VVV
instead to go home. He then proceeded towards Blumentritt, but before he could reach the market,
he experienced rheumatic pains that prompted him to return home. Upon arriving home, at about
8:30 oclock in the evening, he watched television with his wife and children. Shortly thereafter, three
(3) barangay officials arrived, arrested him, and brought him to a police precinct where he was
informed of VVVs accusation against him.5
On April 29, 2005, the RTC, after finding the evidence of the prosecution overwhelming against the
accuseds defense of denial and alibi, rendered a Decision6 convicting Armando of Statutory Rape.
The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused ARMANDO CHINGH GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Statutory Rape defined and penalized under Article
266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 8353 and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify private complainant [VVV]
the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) as moral damages and to pay the costs.

It appearing that accused is detained, the period of his detention shall be credited in the service of
his sentence.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Armando appealed the Decision before the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 01119.
On December 29, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision7 finding Armando not only guilty of Statutory
Rape, but also of Rape Through Sexual Assault. The decretal portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: accused-appellant is hereby found GUILTY of two counts of rape and is,
accordingly, sentenced to suffer, for the crime of statutory rape, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and, for the offense of rape through sexual assault, the indeterminate penalty of 3 years, 3 months
and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 11 months and 1 day of prision mayor,
as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay the victim, a total of P80,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P80,000.00 as moral damages; and P40,000.00 as exemplary damages, or a grand total
ofP200,000.00 for the two counts of rape.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.8
In fine, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, and considering that the appeal opened the entire
case for judicial review, the CA also found Armando guilty of the crime of Rape Through Sexual
Assault. The CA opined that since the Information charged Armando with two counts of rape: (1) by
inserting his finger in the victims vagina, which is classified as Rape Through Sexual Assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; and (2) for inserting his penis in
the private part of his victim, which is Statutory Rape, and considering that Armando failed to object
thereto through a motion to quash before entering his plea, Armando could be convicted of as many
offenses as are charged and proved.
The CA ratiocinated that coupled with the credible, direct, and candid testimony of the victim, the
elements of Statutory Rape and Rape Through Sexual Assault were indubitably established by the
prosecution.
Armando now comes before this Court for relief.
In a Resolution9 dated September 26, 2007, the Court required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs. In their respective Manifestations,10 the parties waived the filing of their
supplemental briefs, and instead adopted their respective briefs filed before the CA.
Hence, Armando raises the following errors:
I

The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of rape under article
266-a, paragraph 1 (d) of the revised penal code in spite the unnatural and unrealistic
testimony of the private complainant.
II
The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Simply stated, Armando is assailing the factual basis of his conviction, which in effect, mainly
questions the credibility of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, particularly his victim,
VVV.
Armando maintains that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that will overcome the
presumption of innocence. Likewise, Armando insists that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him
based on the unrealistic and unnatural testimony of the victim. Armando claims that VVVs testimony
was so inconsistent with common experience that it deserves careful and critical evaluation. First, it
was so unnatural for VVV to remain quiet and not ask for help when the accused allegedly pulled her
in the presence of several companions and bystanders; second, VVV did not resist or cry for help
while they were on their way to the place where she was allegedly abused, which was 300 to 400
meters away from where he allegedly pulled her; third, VVV could have run away while Armando
was allegedly molesting her, but she did not; fourth, Armando could not have inserted his penis in
the victims organ while both of them were standing, unless the victim did not offer any resistance.
Generally, the Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, as it
was in the better position to observe their candor and behavior on the witness stand. Evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court; it had
the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude,
especially under cross-examination. Its assessment is entitled to respect unless certain facts of
substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 11
From the testimony of the victim, VVV, she positively identified Armando as the one who ravaged her
on that fateful night of March 11, 2004. VVV clearly narrated her harrowing experience in the hands
of the accused. Notwithstanding her innocence and despite the thorough cross-examination by
Armandos counsel, VVV never faltered and gave a very candid and truthful testimony of the
traumatic events. VVVs testimony was corroborated and bolstered by the findings of Dr. Irene
Baluyot that the victims genital area showed a fresh laceration with bleeding at 6 oclock position in
her hymen.12 Dr. Baluyot concluded that an acute injury occurred within 24 hours prior to the
examination and that the occurrence of rape within that period was very possible. 13 Also, the age of
VVV at the time the incident occurred, which was 10 years old, was duly established by her birth
certificate,14 her testimony,15 and that of her fathers.16
Time and again, this Court has held that when the offended parties are young and immature girls, as
in this case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not
only their relative vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be
exposed if the matter about which they testified were not true. 17 A young girl would not usually
concoct a tale of defloration; publicly admit having been ravished and her honor tainted; allow the

examination of her private parts; and undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the
trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she not in fact been raped and been truly moved to protect
and preserve her honor, and motivated by the desire to obtain justice for the wicked acts committed
against her.18 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly held that the lone testimony of the victim in a rape
case, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction.19
On the other hand, Armando admitted that he saw VVV on the date of the incident, but denied the
accusations against him and merely relied on his defense that he was watching TV with his family
when barangay officials arrested him.
Armandos defenses were also unavailing. His contention that it was unnatural and unrealistic for
VVV to remain quiet when he pulled her from her companions and why she did not cry for help or
run away when he was allegedly ravaging her deserves scant consideration. Clearly, the reason why
VVV did not shout for help was because Armando told her not to shout or talk. 20 Likewise, the reason
why VVV did not run when Armando was molesting her was because his finger was still inside her
private part.21 Moreover, Armandos argument that he could not have inserted his penis in the victims
organ while both of them were standing is preposterous. It is settled that sexual intercourse in a
standing position, while perhaps uncomfortable, is not improbable.22
Armando tendered nothing but his bare denial and contention that he was elsewhere when the crime
was committed. Aside from this, he presented no more evidence to substantiate his claims.
Jurisprudence dictates that denial and alibi are the common defenses in rape cases. Sexual abuse
is denied on the allegation that the accused was somewhere else and could not have physically
committed the crime. This Court has always held that these two defenses are inherently weak and
must be supported by clear and convincing evidence in order to be believed. As negative defenses,
they cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the complainant. 23Consequently, Armandos bare
denial and alibi must fail against the testimony of VVV and her positive identification that he was the
perpetrator of the horrid deed. Unmistakably, it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that
Armando had carnal knowledge of VVV.
1awphil

Anent Armandos conviction for the crime of Rape Through Sexual Assault.
The CA correctly found Armando guilty of the crime of Rape Through Sexual Assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. (R.A.)
8353, or The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.24From the Information, it is clear that Armando was being
charged with two offenses, Rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
and rape as an act of sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A. Armando was charged with
having carnal knowledge of VVV, who was under twelve years of age at the time, under paragraph 1
(d) of Article 266-A, and he was also charged with committing an act of sexual assault by inserting
his finger into the genital of VVV under the second paragraph of Article 266-A. Indeed, two instances
of rape were proven at the trial. First, it was established that Armando inserted his penis into the
private part of his victim, VVV. Second, through the testimony of VVV, it was proven that Armando
also inserted his finger in VVVs private part.
The Information has sufficiently informed accused-appellant that he is being charged with two counts
of rape. Although two offenses were charged, which is a violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that "[a] complaint or information must charge
only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses."
Nonetheless, Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure also states that
"[w]hen two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails
to object to it before trial, the court may convict the appellant of as many as are charged and proved,
and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in
each offense." Consequently, since Armando failed to file a motion to quash the Information, he can
be convicted with two counts of rape.
As to the proper penalty, We affirm the CAs imposition of Reclusion Perpetua for rape under
paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A. However, We modify the penalty for Rape Through Sexual Assault.
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, VVV was ten (10) years old.
This calls for the application of R.A. No. 7610, or "The Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," which defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes
the penalty therefor in Section 5 (b), Article III, to wit:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as
the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporalin its medium period.25
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in
prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation
where a child is abused for profit, but also where one through coercion, intimidation or influence
engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child. 26
Corollarilly, Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulations27 of R.A. No. 7610 defines "Lascivious conduct"
as:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or

arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of a person.28
In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time of the commission of the offense.
Pursuant to the above-quoted provision of law, Armando was aptly prosecuted under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, 29 for Rape Through Sexual
Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty prescribed therein, which is prision mayor,
considering that VVV was below 12 years of age, and considering further that Armandos act of
inserting his finger in VVVs private part undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the appropriate
imposable penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is
reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts of lasciviousness under
Article 366, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more severe penalty of
reclusion temporal in its medium period than the one who commits Rape Through Sexual Assault,
which is merely punishable by prision mayor. This is undeniably unfair to the child victim. To be sure,
it was not the intention of the framers of R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed the applicability of R.A.
No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children. Despite the passage of R.A. No. 8353, R.A. No.
7610 is still good law, which must be applied when the victims are children or those "persons below
eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect
themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition."30
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be
that which could be properly imposed under the law, which is fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and
twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal. On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is reclusion temporal in its minimum period, or
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
Hence, Armando should be meted the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months
and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months
and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As to Armandos civil liabilities, the CA correctly awarded the following damages: civil indemnity
of P50,000.00 and another P50,000.00 as moral damages for Rape under paragraph 1(d), Article
266-A; and civil indemnity ofP30,000.00 and moral damages also of P30,000.00 for Rape under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A. In line, however, with prevailing jurisprudence, we increase the award of
exemplary damages from P25,000.00 and P15,000.00, for Rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266A and Rape under paragraph 2, Article 266-A, respectively, toP30,000.00 for each count of rape.31
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated December 29, 2006 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01119 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. For Rape under paragraph 1 (d),
Article 266-A, Armando Chingh y Parcia is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua;
and for Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A, he is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion

temporal, as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay VVV the total of P80,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P80,000.00 as moral damages, and P60,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.