Cred Trans 9.1

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty.
Jazzie Sarona-Lozare) 1
REAL MORTGAGE & CHATTEL MORTGAGE CASES
UNION BANK v. CA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133366
August 5, 1999
UNIONBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FERMINA S. DARIO and
REYNALDO S. DARIO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., CJ.:

Unionbank of the Philippines (hereafter UNIONBANK)
appeals, by way of certiorari, the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) of 26 June 1997 and its Resolution of 7 April
19982. The CA nullified the Regional Trial Court's (RTC)
Order3 of 7 August 1995 denying private respondents'
application for preliminary injunction as UNIONBANK's
consolidation of ownership divested private respondents of
their property without due process of law. It also ordered the
register of deeds to cancel UNIONBANK's title and the trial
court to hear private respondents prayer for injunctive
relief.1wphi1.nt
This case stemmed from a real estate mortgage executed on
17 December 1991 by spouses Leopoldo and Jessica Dario
(hereafter mortgagors) in favor of UNIONBANK to secure a
P3 million loan, including interest and other charges. The
mortgage covered a Quezon City property with Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 41828 in Leopoldo Dario's
name and was annotated on the title on 18 December 1991.
For non-payment of the principal obligation, UNIONBANK
extrajudicially foreclosed the property mortgaged on 12
August 1993 and sold the same at public auction, with itself
posting the highest bid.
On 4 October 1994, one week before the one-year
redemption period expired, private respondents filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City against the
mortgagors, UNIONBANK, the Register of Deeds and the
City Sheriff of Quezon City. Docketed as Civil Case No. Q94-21830, the complaint was for annulment of sale and real
estate mortgage reconveyance and prayer for restraining
notice of lis pendens was annotated on the title.
On 10 October 1994, RTC, Branch 81, through Presiding
Judge (later CA Justice) Celia Lipana-Reyes, issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the redemption
of property within the statutory period and its consolidation
under UNIONBANK's name. At a hearing four days later,
UNIONBANK's counsel orally moved for dismissal of the
complaint alleging that a certification of non-forum shopping-
is prescribed by SC-Circular 4-944 was not attached thereto.

Judge Lipana-Reyes settled the motion in favor of
UNIONBANK and dismissed5 the complaint on 17 October
1994.
Aggrieved, private respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration6 of the dismissal on 20 October 1994 and
prayed that they be permitted to amend their verified
complaint to comply with the requisites of Circular 4-94.
Upon the appointment of Judge Lipana-Reyes to the CA,
pairing Judge Agustin S. Dizon took over the case and on 15
November 1994 allowed private respondents to incorporate
the mandatory formal requirements of SC Administrative
Circular 4-94 to their complaint.
In the meantime, without notifying private respondents,
UNIONBANK consolidated its title over the foreclosed
property on 24 October 1994, TCT No. 41828 was cancelled
and TCT No. 120929 in UNIONBANK's name was issued in
its stead.
Private respondents filed an amended complaint7 on 9
December 1994, alleging that they, not the mortgagors, are
the true owners of the property mortgaged and insisting on
the invalidity of both the mortgage and its subsequent
extrajudicial foreclosure. They claimed that the original title,
TCT No. 61571, was entrusted to a certain Atty. Reynaldo
Singson preparatory to its administrative reconstitution after
a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall building. Mortgagor
Leopoldo, private respondent Fermina's son, obtained the
property from Atty. Singson, had the title reconstituted under
his name without private respondents' knowledge, executed
an ante-dated deed of sale in his favor and mortgaged the
property to UNIONBANK.
On 19 December 1994, Judge Ignacio M. Capulong to whom
this case was assigned admitted the aforementioned
amended complaint and set the application for writ of
preliminary injunction for hearing. After UNIONBANK's
motion for reconsideration of said Order was denied on 17
January 1995, it filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
questioning the admission of the amended complaint. The
CA upheld Judge Capulong's order admitting the amended
complaint on 24 April 1995, UNIONBANK thereafter elevated
its cause to this Court.
Meanwhile, on 9 February 1995 UNIONBANK filed its
answer ad cautelam asserting its status as an innocent
mortgagee for value whose right or lien upon the property
mortgaged must be respected even if, the mortgagor
obtained his title through fraud. It also averred that the action
had become "moot and academic by the consolidation of the
foreclosed property on 24 October 1994" in its name,
resulting to the issuance of TCT No. 120929 by the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City. In reaction to UNIONBANK's
revelation, private respondents moved to declare
UNIONBANK's counsel in indirect contempt attacking his
disobedience to the TRO.
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty. Jazzie Sarona-Lozare) 2

On 19 May 1995, private respondents moved to declare the
other defendants in default for their non-filing of responsive
pleadings within the mandatory period and to set the
application for preliminary injunction and indirect contempt
for pre-trial and trial.
On 14 June 1995 the second division of this Court denied
the petition for certiorari, which it considered as a petition for
review under Rule 45, "for failure to show that the CA had
committed any reversible error" in judgment.
In its 19 August 1995 Order, the RTC held the mortgagors
and the City Sheriff of Quezon City in default and sustained
UNIONBANK's contention that the act sought to be enjoined
had been enforced, negating the need of hearing the
application for preliminary injunction. Private respondents
filed a lengthy motion for reconsideration to this Order.
The annulment case was re-raffled to Branch 227 under
Presiding Judge Vicente Q. Roxas upon the creation of new
salas. Judge Roxas, on 25 March 1996, denied the motion to
reconsider the 19 August 1995 Order but suggested that
private respondents amend their application from prohibitory
to mandatory injunction.
As private respondents were unable to amend their
application, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration
and their motion for indirect contempt, "in the interest of free
speech and tolerance" on 9 July 1996. Asserting grave
abuse of discretion, private respondents brought the denial
of their motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals
on 6 September 1996.
After considering the arguments presented by the parties,
the CA ruled that despite its knowledge that the ownership of
the property was being questioned, UNIONBANK took
advantage of private respondents' procedural error by
consolidating title to the property, which "smack[ed] of bad
faith" and "evince[d] a reprobate disposition of the part of its
counsel to advance his client's cause by fair means or foul."
As a result thereof the transfer of title was vitiated by nonadherence to procedural due process.8
On 26 June 1997, CA nullified the consolidation of
ownership, ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the
certificate of title in UNIONBANK's name and to reinstate
TCT No. 41828 with the notice of lis pendens annotated at
the back. The CA also set aside the portion of the assailed
RTC Orders that declared private respondents' prayer for
writ of preliminary injunction as moot and academic.
UNIONBANK's motion for reconsideration of the abovementioned decision was likewise rejected for lack of merit on
7 April 1998.
Hence, UNIONBANK came to this Court claiming to be a
mortgagee in good faith and for value with a right to
consolidate ownership over the foreclosed property with the
redemption period having expired and there having been no
redemptioners. UNIONBANK contends that the TRO which
provisionally enjoined the tolling of the redemption period
was automatically dissolved upon dismissal of the complaint

on 17 October 1994. Conformably, consolidation of title in its
name and the issuance of TCT No. 120929 rendered further
proceedings on the application for injunction academic.
Moreover, the alleged fraudulent mortgage was facilitated
through private respondents' negligence so they must bear
the loss. It also contends that since private respondents had
filed several pleadings, due process, being an opportunity to
be heard either through pleadings or oral arguments, was
observed.
Private
respondents
maintain
that
UNIONBANK's
consolidation of the title in its name was in bad faith, vitiated
a standing court order, is against the law, thus void ab initio.
The application for preliminary injunction was not rendered
moot and academic by consolidation, which took place
during the lifetime of the TRO, and did not follow the proper
legal procedure due to the surreptitious manner it was
accomplished. By treating the application for preliminary
injunction as moot and academic and denying the motion for
indirect contempt without hearing, the RTC order ran afoul
with the requirements of due process.
Two main issues can be gleaned from the posturing and
claims of the parties, to wit, was the consolidation of title in
UNIONBANK's name proper, and was the dismissal of the
application for preliminary prohibitory injunction valid.
The issues must be answered in the affirmative.
UNIONBANK's consolidation of title over the property on 24
October 1994 was proper, though precipitate. Contrary to
private respondents' allegation UNIONBANK violated no
standing court order. The only bar to consolidation was the
temporary restraining order issued by Justice Lipana-Reyes
on 10 October 1994 which effectively halted the tolling of the
redemption period 7 days short of its expiration. When
private respondents' original complaint was dismissed on 17
October 1994 for failure to append a certification of nonforum shopping, the TRO, as an ancillary order that cannot
stand independent of the main proceeding, became functus
officio. Thus the tolling of the 12-month redemption period,
interrupted by the filing of the complaint and the TRO,
recommenced and eventually expired 7 days thereafter or on
24 October 1994, the date of the disputed consolidation.
The motion for reconsideration and to amend complaint filed
by private respondent on 20 October 1994 was of no
moment, this Court recognizing that "a dismissal,
discontinuance or non-suit of an action in which a restraining
order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as
a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary
injunction,"9 regardless of whether the period for filing a
motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case
or appeal therefrom has expired.10 The rationale therefor is
that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment
dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not
suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a
temporary injunction terminates automatically on the
dismissal of the action.11

We disagree with the appellate court's observation that
consolidation deprived private respondents of their property
without due process. It is settled that the buyer in a
foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property
purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year
after the registration of the sale. 12 Consolidation took place
as a matter of right since there was no redemption of the
foreclosed property and the TRO expired upon dismissal of
the complaint. UNIONBANK need not have informed private
respondent that it was consolidaint its title over the property,
upon the expiration of the redemption period, without the
judgment debtor having made use of his right of redemption,
the ownership of the property sold becomes consolidated in
the purchaser.13 Notice to the mortgagors and with more
reason, to private respondents who are not even parties to
the mortgage contract nor to the extra judicial sale is not
necessary.
In real estate mortgage, when the principal obligation is not
paid when due, the mortgage has the right to foreclose the
mortgage and to have the property seized and sold with a
view to applying the proceeds to the payment of the principal
obligation.14 Foreclosure may be effected either judicially or
extrajudicially.
In a public bidding during extra-judicial foreclosure, the
creditor mortgagee, trustee, or other person authorized to
act for the creditor may participate and purchase the
mortgaged property as any other bidder. Thereafter the
mortgagor has one year within which to redeem the property
from and after registration of sale with the Register of
Deeds.15 In case of non-redemption, the purchaser at
foreclosure sale shall file with the Register of Deeds, either a
final deed of sale executed by the person authorized by
virtue of the power of attorney embodied in the deed or
mortgage, or his sworn statement attesting to the fact of nonredemption; whereupon, the Register of Deeds Shall issue a
new certificate of title in favor of the purchaser after the
owner's duplicate of the certificate has been previously
delivered and canceled.16 Thus, upon failure to redeem
foreclosed realty, consolidation of title becomes a matter of
right on the part of the auction buyer,17 and the issuance of a
certificate of title in favor of the purchaser becomes
ministerial upon the Register of Deeds.
There is, moreover, nothing erroneous with the denial of
private respondents' application for preliminary prohibitory
injunction. The acts complained of have already been
consummated. It is impossible to restrain the performance of
consummated acts through the issuance of prohibitory
injunction. When the act sought to be prevented had long
been consummated, the remedy of injunction could no
longer be entertained,18 hearing the application for
preliminary injunction would just be an exercise in futility.
In addition, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, movant must
show that there exists a right to be protected which is directly
threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. Furthermore,
there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is
material and substantial and that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious

damage.19 The injunctive remedy prevents a threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before
their claim can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly
adjudicated; it is resorted to only when there is a pressing
necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be
remedied under any standard compensation.20
In the case at bar, the consolidation of ownership over the
mortgaged property in favor of UNIONBANK and the
issuance of a new title in its name during the pendency of an
action for annulment and reconveyance will not cause
irreparable injury to private respondents who are plaintiffs in
the said preliminary injunction. This is because .as purchaser
at a public auction, UNIONBANK is only substituted to and
acquires the right, title, interest and claim of the judgment
debtors or mortgagors to the property at the time of levy. 21
Perforce, the judgment in the main action for reconveyance
will not be rendered ineffectual by the consolidation of
ownership and the issuance of title in the name of
UNIONBANK.
More importantly, with the main action for reconveyance
pending before the RTC, the notice of lis pendens, which
despite consolidation remains annotated on UNIONBANK's
transfer certificate of title subject to the outcome of the
litigation, sufficiently protects private respondents interest
over the property. A transferee pendente lite stands exactly in
the shoes of the transferor and is bound by any judgment or
decree which may be rendered for or against the transferor.
Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any
cancellation or issuance of the title of the land involved as
well as any subsequent transaction affecting the same,
would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation. In
other words, upon the termination of the litigation there can
be no risk of losing the property or any part thereof as a
result of any conveyance of the land or any encumbrance
that may be made thereon posterior to the filing of the notice
of lis pendens.22
Finally, as to the issue of who between private respondents
and UNIONBANK is negligent and hence must bear the loss,
the same is not the proper subject of the present petition and
can only be resolved by the trial court after the trial on the
merit of the main case.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
of 26 June 1997 nullifying the consolidation of ownership and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel TCT
No. 120929 and reinstate TCT No. 41828 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order of the trial court
dated 7 August 1999, declaring UNIONBANK's prayer for
writ of preliminary injunction moot and academic, is hereby
REINSTATED. Let this case be remanded to the Regional
Trial Court for trial on the merits.
No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

PHILBANCOR v. CA
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 129572
June 26, 2000
PHILBANCOR FINANCE, INC. AND VICENTE HIZON, JR.,

petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE DEPARTMENT
OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD
(DARAB), ALFREDO PARE, PABLO GALANG and
AMADO VIE, respondents,
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for
review of the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board sustaining the ruling of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board of San Fernando,
Pampanga allowing the legal redemption by private
respondents of two parcels of land mortgaged to and
acquired
by
petitioner
Philbancor
at
public
auction.1wphi1.nt
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Private respondents Alfredo Pare, Pablo Galang and Amado
Vie, as plaintiffs, filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (PARAB) a complaint for maintenance of
possession with redemption and tenancy right of pre-emption
against petitioners Philbancor Finance, Inc. and Vicente
Hizon, Jr. Private respondents alleged, inter alia, that
petitioner Vicente Hizon, Jr. is the owner of the disputed
agricultural lands covered by TCT Nos. 48320 and 48323
located in Balite, San Fernando, Pampanga and that they
(private respondents) are the legitimate and bonfide tenants
thereof; that on October 13, 1983, petitioner Hizon, without
their knowledge, mortgaged the disputed lots to petitioner
Philbancor Finance, Inc.; that petitioner Hizon failed to pay
his obligations to petitioner Philbancor, which eventually led
to the sale of the mortgaged lots to the latter; that they came
to know of the transaction only when they were notified by
petitioner Philbancor to vacate the lots; that they have been
tenants on the lots for more than fifty (50) years; that
petitioner Philbancor threatened to take from them the actual
or physical possession of the agricultural lots; that unless the
threatened acts of petitioner are restrained, they will suffer
substantial and irreparable injury (Complaint, Rollo, pp. 5155).
In his answer, petitioner Hizon admitted that private

respondents are his bonafide and legitimate tenants but he
averred, by way of affirmative defenses, that he is not
threatening to take possession of the disputed lots as he is
no longer the owner thereof after said lots were foreclosed
by petitioner Philbancor; that private respondents were
aware when he mortgaged the lots as they were with him
when he tried to negotiate for payment of his loan to
petitioner Philbancor (CA Rollo, p. 29).
In its answer, petitioner Philbancor alleged, among others,
that it has no tenancy or agricultural relationship with private
respondents considering that it acquired ownership over the
disputed lots by virtue of an extra-judicial foreclosure sale
pursuant to Act 3135, as amended; that it is not an
agricultural lessor as contemplated in Section 10 of Republic
Act (RA) No. 3844, as amended; that assuming private
respondents have the right to redeem the lots in question,
such right has already expired in accordance with Section 12
of R.A. 3844, which states that the right of redemption may
be exercised within two (2) years from the registration of the
sale (CA Rollo, pp. 30-31).
In a Decision dated September 17, 1993, Provincial
Adjudicator Toribio E. Ilao, Jr. rendered a decision in favor of
private respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the redemption by the plaintiffs of the land in
question at the price of P201,182.92;
2. Ordering the defendant, Philbamcor Finance, Inc., to
execute the necessary Deed of Redemption in favor of the
plaintiffs; and
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Pampanga to cause the registration of the land in question to
be conveyed to and redeemed by the plaintiffs;
The counterclaim of the defendant Philbancor Finance, Inc.
is hereby dismissed. (Ibid., pp. 81-90)
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same
was denied by the Provincial Adjudicator (CA Rollo, pp. 108109). On appeal, public respondent Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) affirmed in toto the
findings of the Provincial Adjudicator in a Decision dated
March 8, 1996 (Ibid., pp. 26-35).
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by
respondent DARAB in a Resolution (Ibid., pp. 36-38) dated
July 22, 1996, . . . . 2
On August 14, 1996, petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for review of the decision of the DARAB.3
After due proceedings, on March 17, 1997, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition.4

On April 18, 1997, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals
a motion for reconsideration of the decision; however, on
May 19, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.5
QUEZON CITY MAYOR v. RCBC

SUPREME COURT
Manila
Hence, this appeal.6

The petition raises three issues; however, the last issue
raised is decisive, hence, only this issue is herein resolved,
that is, whether or not the private respondents could still
exercise their right of redemption of the parcels of land sold
at public auction due to foreclosure of the mortgages thereon
considering that they invoked their right to redeem only on
July 14, 1992, seven years after the date of registration of
the certificate of sale with the Register of Deeds.
We grant the petition.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171033
August 3, 2010
CITY MAYOR, CITY TREASURER, CITY ASSESSOR, ALL

OF QUEZON CITY, and ALVIN EMERSON S. YU,
Petitioners,
vs.
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION,
Respondent.
Republic Act No. 3844, Section 12, provides as follows:

In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the
right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and
consideration. Provided, that the entire landholding sold
must be redeemed. Provided further, that where there are
two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to
said right of redemption only to the extent of the area
actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this
section may be exercised within two (2) years from the
registration of the sale and shall have priority over any other
right of legal redemption.7
In this case, the certificate of sale of the subject property,
which was sold at public auction, was registered with the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga on July 31, 1985. 8 The twoyear redemption period thus expired on July 31, 1987. The
complaint for redemption was filed by respondents only on
July 14, 1992,9 five (5) years after expiration of the
redemption period prescribed by law.
Nonetheless, private respondents may continue in
possession and enjoyment of the land in question as
legitimate tenants 10 because the right of tenancy attaches to
the landholding by operation of law. 11 The leasehold relation
is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal
possession of the landholding. 12
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for
review on certiorari and REVERSES the decision of the
Court of Appeals. The Court orders the dismissal of the
complaint for redemption filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Region III, San
Fernando, Pampanga. This is without prejudice to the right of
the private respondents to continue as agricultural tenants in
peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land tenanted by
them. No costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision1 dated December 6, 2005, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 101,
Quezon City, in SP. Civil Action Q-04-53522 for Mandamus
with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
The procedural and factual antecedents are as follows:
The facts are undisputed. The spouses Roberto and Monette
Naval obtained a loan from respondent Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation, secured by a real estate mortgage of
properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
N-167986, N-167987, and N-167988. In 1998, the real estate
mortgage was later foreclosed and the properties were sold
at public auction with respondent as the highest bidder. The
corresponding Certificates of Sale were issued in favor of
respondent on August 4, 1998. However, the certificates of
sale were allegedly registered only on February 10, 2004.
Meanwhile, on May 30, 2003, an auction sale of tax
delinquent properties was conducted by the City Treasurer of
Quezon City. Included in the properties that were auctioned
were two (2) townhouse units covered by TCT Nos. N167986 and N-167987 and the parcel of land covered by
TCT No. N-167988. For these delinquent properties, Alvin
Emerson S. Yu was adjudged as the highest bidder. Upon
payment of the tax delinquencies, he was issued the
corresponding Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property.
On February 10, 2004, the Certificate of Sale of Delinquent
Property was registered with the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City.
On June 10, 2004, respondent tendered payment for all of
the assessed tax delinquencies, interest, and other costs of

the subject properties with the Office of the City Treasurer,
Quezon City. However, the Office of the City Treasurer
refused to accept said tender of payment.
Undeterred, on June 15, 2004, respondent filed before the
Office of the City Treasurer a Petition 2 for the acceptance of
its tender of payment and for the subsequent issuance of the
certificate of redemption in its favor. Nevertheless,
respondents subsequent tender of payment was also
denied.
The Honorable Court committed grave error when it

sustained the validity of the actions of the City Treasurer with
respect to the auction sale of the properties subject of the
petition and its unlawful refusal to accept the redemption
price of the properties subject of the auction sale contrary to
the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. 91-93, in
relation to Presidential Decree No. 464 and the Local
Government Code and DOF Assessment Regulations No. 785.
D.
Consequently, respondent filed a Petition for Mandamus with

Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction3 before the RTC. Petitioners
contended, among other things, that it had until February 10,
2005, or one (1) year from the date of registration of the
certificate of sale on February 10, 2004, within which to
redeem the subject properties, pursuant to Section 78 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464 or the Real Property Tax
Code.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings, the RTC
initially denied the petition in the Order4 dated December 6,
2004. In denying the petition, the RTC opined that
respondents reliance on Section 78 of P.D. No. 464 as basis
of the reckoning period in counting the one (1) year period
within which to redeem the subject properties was
misplaced, since P.D. No. 464 has been expressly repealed
by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, or the Local Government
Code.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration5
questioning the Order, arguing that:
A.
The Honorable Court committed grave error when it
summarily denied the petition for Mandamus filed by herein
petitioner during the hearing on the Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction without conducting a hearing or trial on
petition for mandamus. The order of the court effectively
denied petitioner its right to due process.
B.
The principal action subject of the petition for mandamus is
the annulment of the auction sale. Alternatively, petitioner
sought the right to consign the redemption price, inclusive of
interests on the basis that it was exercising the right of
redemption within the period provided by law. The Honorable
Court ruled only on the repeal of Presidential Decree No.
464 and not the issues/grounds raised in the temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction nor on the
issues raised in the petition for mandamus, contrary to law.
C.
The Honorable Court committed grave error when it denied

petitioner its right to consign the payment of the redemption
price of the properties sold in auction sale without a
determination of the factual issues of the case, contrary to
due process.
E.
The legal and factual question of the validity of the notice of
the auction sale cannot be summarily dismissed without
hearing and ruling on the allegation of lack of notice and
fraud raised by petitioner in its petition for mandamus.6
On December 6, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision 7
granting the petition, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-captioned
petition for mandamus is hereby granted.
Accordingly, the public respondents are ordered to accept
the petitioners tender of redemption payment, to issue the
corresponding certificate of redemption in the name of the
petitioner and to cancel the certificate of tax sale issued to
the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.8
In granting the petition, the RTC ratiocinated that the
counting of the one (1) year redemption period of tax
delinquent properties sold at public auction should start from
the date of registration of the certificate of sale or the final
deed of sale in favor of the purchaser, so that the delinquent
registered owner or third parties interested in the redemption
may be notified that the delinquent property had been sold,
and that they have one (1) year from said constructive notice
of the sale within which to redeem the property. The RTC
was also of the opinion that Section 261, R.A. No. 7160 did
not amend Section 78 of P.D. No. 464.
Hence, the petition raising the following arguments:
I
The regional trial court, branch 101, quezon city, decided a
question [of] law contrary to law and jurisprudence when it
decided that section 78 of p.d. 464 was not repealed by

republic act no. 7160 known as the local government code of
1991.
II
The regional trial court, branch 101, quezon city, decided a
question [of] law contrary to law and jurisprudence when it
raised the following issues which do not conform to the
petition and answer filed by the parties:
a. whether or not the respondent is entitled to the protection
of all the provisions of quezon city tax ordinance number sp91-93, otherwise known as quezon city revenue code of
1993, including section 14 thereof, promulgated pursuant to
r.a. 7160;
b. whether the period of redemption in a realty tax sale in
quezon city [h]as to be reckoned from the date of
ANNOTATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF sale pursuant to
paragraph 7, section 14 of quezon city tax ordinance no. sp91-93 or from the date of sale pursuant to section 261 of r.a.
7160.9
Petitioners argue that the RTC erred when it ruled that P.D.
No. 464 was not repealed by R.A. No. 7160 and when it
concluded that the phrase "from the date of sale" as
appearing in Section 261 of R.A. No. 7160 means that the
counting of the one (1) year redemption period of tax
delinquent properties sold at public action shall commence
from the date of registration of the certificate of sale.
Petitioners insist that, since Section 14 (a), Paragraph 7 of
the Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993 was not initially
alleged in respondents petition and was not used as basis
for its filing, the RTC erred when it took cognizance of it
when it rendered the assailed decision.
Conversely, respondent argues, among other things, that the
RTC did not rule that P.D. No. 464 was not repealed by R.A.
No. 7160, it merely made reference to Section 78 of P.D. No.
464. Respondent maintains that it has not altered its cause
of action when it cited Section 14 (a), paragraph 7 of the
Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993 for the first time in its
memorandum and that its failure to invoke the said provision
in the petition for mandamus does not preclude respondent
from invoking it in the later part of the proceedings.
Ultimately, respondent contends that the RTC correctly ruled
that it had timely exercised its right to redeem the subject
properties.
Section 78 of P.D. No. 464 provides for a one-year
redemption period for properties foreclosed due to tax
delinquency, thus:
Sec. 78. Redemption of real property after sale. Within the
term of one year from the date of the registration of the sale
of the property, the delinquent taxpayer or his representative,
or in his absence, any person holding a lien or claim over the
property, shall have the right to redeem the same by paying
the provincial or city treasurer or his deputy the total amount
of taxes and penalties due up to the date of redemption, the

costs of sale and the interest at the rate of twenty per
centum on the purchase price, and such payment shall
invalidate the sale certificate issued to the purchaser and
shall entitle the person making the same to a certificate from
the provincial or city treasurer or his deputy, stating that he
had redeemed the property.10
From the foregoing, the owner or any person holding a lien
or claim over a tax delinquent property sold at public auction
has one (1) year from the date of registration of sale to
redeem the property. However, since the passing of R.A. No.
7160, such is no longer controlling. The issue of whether or
not R.A No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, repealed
P.D. No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code has long been
laid to rest by this Court. Jurisdiction thrives to the effect that
R.A. No. 7160 repealed P.D. No. 464.11 From January 1,
1992 onwards, the proper basis for the computation of the
real property tax payable, including penalties or interests, if
applicable, must be R. A. No. 7160. Its repealing clause,
Section 534, reads:
SECTION 534. Repealing Clause.
xxxx
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No.
1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of
Republic Act No. 5447 regarding the Special Education
Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by
Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree
No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential
Decrees Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136
are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.
Inasmuch as the crafter of the Local Government Code
clearly worded the above-cited Section to repeal P.D. No.
464, it is a clear showing of their legislative intent that R.A.
No. 7160 was to supersede P.D. No. 464. As such, it is
apparent that in case of sale of tax delinquent properties,
R.A. No. 7160 is the general law applicable. Consequently,
as regards redemption of tax delinquent properties sold at
public auction, the pertinent provision is Section 261 of R.A.
No. 7160, which provides:
Section 261. Redemption of Property Sold. Within one (1)
year from the date of sale, the owner of the delinquent real
property or person having legal interest therein, or his
representative, shall have the right to redeem the property
upon payment to the local treasurer of the amount of
delinquent tax, including the interest due thereon, and the
expenses of sale from the date of delinquency to the date of
sale, plus interest of not more than two percent (2%) per
month on the purchase price from the date of sale to the
date of redemption. Such payment shall invalidate the
certificate of sale issued to the purchaser and the owner of
the delinquent real property or person having legal interest
therein shall be entitled to a certificate of redemption which
shall be issued by the local treasurer or his deputy.

From the date of sale until the expiration of the period of
redemption, the delinquent real property shall remain in the
possession of the owner or person having legal interest
therein who shall remain in the possession of the owner or
person having legal interest therein who shall be entitled to
the income and other fruits thereof.
The local treasurer or his deputy, upon receipt from the
purchaser of the certificate of sale, shall forthwith return to
the latter the entire amount paid by him plus interest of not
more than two percent (2%) per month. Thereafter, the
property shall be free from all lien of such delinquent tax,
interest due thereon and expenses of sale.12
From the foregoing, the owner of the delinquent real property
or person having legal interest therein, or his representative,
has the right to redeem the property within one (1) year from
the date of sale upon payment of the delinquent tax and
other fees. Verily, the period of redemption of tax delinquent
properties should be counted not from the date of
registration of the certificate of sale, as previously provided
by Section 78 of P.D. No. 464, but rather on the date of sale
of the tax delinquent property, as explicitly provided by
Section 261 of R.A. No. 7160.
Nonetheless, the government of Quezon City, pursuant to
the taxing power vested on local government units by
Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution 13 and R.A. No.
7160, enacted City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93, otherwise
known as the Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993,
providing, among other things, the procedure in the
collection of delinquent taxes on real properties within the
territorial jurisdiction of Quezon City. Section 14 (a),
Paragraph 7, the Code provides:
7) Within one (1) year from the date of the annotation of the
sale of the property at the proper registry, the owner of the
delinquent real property or person having legal interest
therein, or his representative, shall have the right to redeem
the property by paying to the City Treasurer the amount of
the delinquent tax, including interest due thereon, and the
expenses of sale plus interest of two percent (2) per month
on the purchase price from the date of sale to the date of
redemption. Such payment shall invalidate the certificate of
sale issued to the purchaser and the owner of the delinquent
real property or person having legal interest therein shall be
entitled to a certificate of redemption which shall be issued
by the City Treasurer.
xxxx
Verily, the ordinance is explicit that the one-year redemption
period should be counted from the date of the annotation of
the sale of the property at the proper registry. At first glance,
this provision runs counter to that of Section 261 of R.A. No.
7160 which provides that the one year redemption period
shall be counted from the date of sale of the tax delinquent
property. There is, therefore, a need to reconcile these
seemingly conflicting provisions of a general law and a
special law.
A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects

or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally
belonging to such class. A special statute, as the term is
generally understood, is one which relates to particular
persons or things of a class or to a particular portion or
section of the state only.14 In the present case, R.A. No. 7160
is to be construed as a general law, while City Ordinance No.
SP-91, S-93 is a special law, having emanated only from
R.A. No. 7160 and with limited territorial application in
Quezon City only.
A general law and a special law on the same subject should
be accordingly read together and harmonized, if possible,
with a view to giving effect to both. Where there are two acts,
one of which is special and particular and the other general
which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and
thus conflict with the special act, the special must prevail,
since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of
the general statute and must be taken as intended to
constitute an exception to the rule. 15 More so, when the
validity of the law is not in question.
In giving effect to these laws, it is also worthy to note that in
cases involving redemption, the law protects the original
owner. It is the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat
the owners right. Therefore, redemption should be looked
upon with favor and where no injury will follow, a liberal
construction will be given to our redemption laws, specifically
on the exercise of the right to redeem.16
To harmonize the provisions of the two laws and to maintain
the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat the owners
right to redeem his property, Section 14 (a), Paragraph 7 of
City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93 should be construed as to
define the phrase "one (1) year from the date of sale" as
appearing in Section 261 of R.A. No. 7160, to mean "one (1)
year from the date of the annotation of the sale of the
property at the proper registry."
Consequently, the counting of the one (1) year redemption
period of property sold at public auction for its tax
delinquency should be counted from the date of annotation
of the certificate of sale in the proper Register of Deeds.
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, from the date of
registration of the Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property
on February 10, 2004, respondent had until February 10,
2005 to redeem the subject properties. Hence, its tender of
payment of the subject properties tax delinquencies and
other fees on June 10, 2004, was well within the redemption
period, and it was manifest error on the part of petitioners to
have refused such tender of payment.1avvphi1
Finally, respondents failure to cite Section 14 (a), Paragraph
7, City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93 in its petition for
mandamus does not preclude it from invoking the said
provision in the later part of the judicial proceeding.
The issues in every case are limited to those presented in
the pleadings. The object of the pleadings is to draw the lines
of battle between the litigants and to indicate fairly the nature

of the claims or defenses of both parties.17 Points of law,
theories, issues and arguments should be brought to the
attention of the trial court to give the opposing party an
opportunity to present further evidence material to these
matters during judicial proceedings before the lower court.
Otherwise, it would be too late to raise these issues during
appeal. A party cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the
nature of the issue in the case. When a party deliberately
adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that
theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change
the same on appeal, because to permit him to do so would
be unfair to the adverse party.18
As early as in its Memorandum to Serve as Draft
Resolution,19 respondent had brought Section 14 (a),
Paragraph 7 of City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93, or the
Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993, to the attention of
petitioners. Respondent also reiterated the applicability of
the provision to his claim of redemption in its motion for
reconsideration of the Order initially denying the petition for
mandamus. Petitioners were given every opportunity to
counter respondents allegations, which it in fact did by filing
an Opposition20 to the motion for reconsideration. Since the
inception of the petition in the lower court, respondent has
not changed its preposition that the one (1) year redemption
period shall be counted from the date of registration of the
certificate of sale and not from the date of sale of the subject
properties. Citing the appropriate provision of the Quezon
City Revenue Code of 1993 did not alter this, but on the
contrary, even buttressed its claim.
Furthermore, petitioners cannot feign ignorance of a law that
it has promulgated in the exercise of its local autonomy. Nor
can it be allowed to deny the applicability of Section 14 (a),
Paragraph 7 of the Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993,
while at the same time invoking that it has strictly adhered to
the Quezon City Revenue Code when it conducted the public
auction of the tax delinquent properties.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
Subject to the above disquisitions, the Decision of the RTC in
SP. Civil Action Q-04-53522, dated December 6, 2005, is
AFFIRMED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 169190
February 11, 2010
CUA LAI CHU, CLARO G. CASTRO, and JUANITA

CASTRO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. HILARIO L. LAQUI, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 218, Quezon City and PHILIPPINE BANK
OF COMMUNICATION, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the 29 April 2005 and 4
August 2005 Resolutions2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 88963. In its 29 April 2005 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari3 of petitioner
spouses Claro G. Castro and Juanita Castro and petitioner
Cua Lai Chu (petitioners). In its 4 August 2005 Resolution,
the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
In November 1994, petitioners obtained a loan in the amount
of P3,200,000 from private respondent Philippine Bank of
Communication. To secure the loan, petitioners executed in
favor of private respondent a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage 4
over the property of petitioner spouses covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 22990. In August 1997, petitioners
executed an Amendment to the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage5 increasing the amount of the loan by P1,800,000,
bringing the total loan amount to P5,000,000.
SO ORDERED.
For failure of petitioners to pay the full amount of the
outstanding loan upon demand,6 private respondent applied
for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage.7
Upon receipt of a notice8 of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale,
petitioners filed a petition to annul the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale with a prayer for temporary restraining order
(TRO). The petition for annulment was filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City and docketed as Q-02-46184.9
CU LAI CHU v. LAQUI
The extrajudicial foreclosure sale did not push through as

originally scheduled because the trial court granted
petitioners prayer for TRO. The trial court subsequently lifted
the TRO and reset the extrajudicial foreclosure sale on 29
May 2002. At the foreclosure sale, private respondent
emerged as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale10 was

executed on 4 June 2002 in favor of private respondent. On
7 June 2002, the certificate of sale was annotated as Entry
No. 185511 on TCT No. 22990 covering the foreclosed
property.
After the lapse of the one-year redemption period, private
respondent filed in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City an
affidavit of consolidation to consolidate its ownership and title
to the foreclosed property. Forthwith, on 8 July 2003, the
Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. 22990 and issued in its
stead TCT No. 25183512 in the name of private respondent.
On 18 August 2004, private respondent applied for the
issuance of a writ of possession of the foreclosed property.13
Petitioners filed an opposition.14 The trial court granted
private respondents motion for a declaration of general
default and allowed private respondent to present evidence
ex parte. The trial court denied petitioners notice of appeal.
Undeterred, petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari. The appellate court dismissed the petition. It
also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Orders of the Trial Court
The 8 October 2004 Order15 granted private respondents
motion for a declaration of general default and allowed
private respondent to present evidence ex parte. The 6
January 2005 Order16 denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the prior order. The 24 February 2005
Order17 denied petitioners notice of appeal.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals dismissed on both procedural and
substantive grounds the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioners. The appellate court noted that the counsel for
petitioners failed to indicate in the petition the updated PTR
Number, a ground for outright dismissal of the petition under
Bar Matter No. 1132. Ruling on the merits, the appellate
court held that a proceeding for the issuance of a writ of
possession is ex parte in nature. As such, petitioners right to
due process was not violated even if they were not given a
chance to file their opposition. The appellate court also ruled
that there was no violation of the rule against forum shopping
since the application for the issuance of a writ of possession
is not affected by a pending case questioning the validity of
the extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
The Issue
Petitioners raise the question of whether the writ of
possession was properly issued despite the pendency of a
case questioning the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure
sale and despite the fact that petitioners were declared in
default in the proceeding for the issuance of a writ of
possession.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.

Petitioners contend they were denied due process of law
when they were declared in default despite the fact that they
had filed their opposition to private respondents application
for the issuance of a writ of possession. Further, petitioners
point out that the issuance of a writ of possession will
deprive them not only of the use and possession of their
property, but also of its ownership. Petitioners cite Bustos v.
Court of Appeals18 and Vda. De Legaspi v. Avendao19 in
asserting that physical possession of the property should not
be disturbed pending the final determination of the more
substantial issue of ownership. Petitioners also allege forum
shopping on the ground that the application for the issuance
of a writ of possession was filed during the pendency of a
case questioning the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure
sale.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the
application for the issuance of a writ of possession in a
foreclosure proceeding is ex parte in nature. Hence,
petitioners right to due process was not violated even if they
were not given a chance to file their opposition. Private
respondent argues that the issuance of a writ of possession
may not be stayed by a pending case questioning the validity
of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. It contends that the
former has no bearing on the latter; hence, there is no
violation of the rule against forum shopping. Private
respondent asserts that there is no judicial determination
involved in the issuance of a writ of possession; thus, the
same cannot be the subject of an appeal.
At the outset, we must point out that the authorities relied
upon by petitioners are not in point and have no application
here. In Bustos v. Court of Appeals, 20 the Court simply ruled
that the issue of possession was intertwined with the issue of
ownership in the consolidated cases of unlawful detainer and
accion reinvindicatoria. In Vda. De Legaspi v. Avendao,21
the Court merely stated that in a case of unlawful detainer,
physical possession should not be disturbed pending the
resolution of the issue of ownership. Neither case involved
the right to possession of a purchaser at an extrajudicial
foreclosure of a mortgage.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Pardo 22
squarely ruled on the right to possession of a purchaser at
an extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage. This case
involved a real estate mortgage as security for a loan
obtained from a bank. Upon the mortgagors default, the
bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. At the auction
sale, the bank was the highest bidder. A certificate of sale
was duly issued and registered. The bank then applied for
the issuance of a writ of possession, which the lower court
dismissed. The Court reversed the lower court and held that
the purchaser at the auction sale was entitled to a writ of
possession pending the lapse of the redemption period upon
a simple motion and upon the posting of a bond.1avvphi1
In Navarra v. Court of Appeals,23 the purchaser at an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale applied for a writ of possession

after the lapse of the one-year redemption period. The Court
ruled that the purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale
has a right to the possession of the property even during the
one-year redemption period provided the purchaser files an
indemnity bond. After the lapse of the said period with no
redemption having been made, that right becomes absolute
and may be demanded by the purchaser even without the
posting of a bond. Possession may then be obtained under a
writ which may be applied for ex parte pursuant to Section 7
of Act No. 3135,24 as amended by Act No. 4118,25 thus:
SEC. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act,
the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the
province or place where the property or any part thereof is
situated, to give him possession thereof during the
redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent
to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to
indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was
made without violating the mortgage or without complying
with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made
under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion x x x and
the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of
possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in
which the property is situated, who shall execute said order
immediately. (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, the certificate of sale of the foreclosed
property was annotated on TCT No. 22990 on 7 June 2002.
The redemption period thus lapsed on 7 June 2003, one
year from the registration of the sale.26 When private
respondent applied for the issuance of a writ of possession
on 18 August 2004, the redemption period had long lapsed.
Since the foreclosed property was not redeemed within one
year from the registration of the extrajudicial foreclosure
sale, private respondent had acquired an absolute right, as
purchaser, to the writ of possession. It had become the
ministerial duty of the lower court to issue the writ of
possession upon mere motion pursuant to Section 7 of Act
No. 3135, as amended.
Moreover, once ownership has been consolidated, the
issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial
duty of the court, upon proper application and proof of title.27
In the present case, when private respondent applied for the
issuance of a writ of possession, it presented a new transfer
certificate of title issued in its name dated 8 July 2003. The
right of private respondent to the possession of the property
was thus founded on its right of ownership. As the purchaser
of the property at the foreclosure sale, in whose name title
over the property was already issued, the right of private
respondent over the property had become absolute, vesting
in it the corollary right of possession.
Petitioners are wrong in insisting that they were denied due
process of law when they were declared in default despite
the fact that they had filed their opposition to the issuance of
a writ of possession. The application for the issuance of a
writ of possession is in the form of an ex parte motion. It
issues as a matter of course once the requirements are
fulfilled. No discretion is left to the court.28
Petitioners cannot oppose or appeal the courts order

granting the writ of possession in an ex parte proceeding.
The remedy of petitioners is to have the sale set aside and
the writ of possession cancelled in accordance with Section
8 of Act No. 3135, as amended, to wit:
SEC. 8. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which
possession was requested, but not later than thirty days after
the purchaser was given possession, petition that the sale be
set aside and the writ of possession cancelled, specifying the
damages suffered by him, because the mortgage was not
violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the
provisions hereof. x x x
Any question regarding the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale and the resulting cancellation of the writ
may be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined
in Section 8 of Act No. 3135, as amended. Such question
should not be raised as a justification for opposing the
issuance of a writ of possession since under Act No. 3135,
as amended, the proceeding for this is ex parte.
Further, the right to possession of a purchaser at an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale is not affected by a pending
case questioning the validity of the foreclosure proceeding.
The latter is not a bar to the former. Even pending such latter
proceeding, the purchaser at a foreclosure sale is entitled to
the possession of the foreclosed property.29
Lastly, we rule that petitioners claim of forum shopping has
no basis. Under Act No. 3135, as amended, a writ of
possession is issued ex parte as a matter of course upon
compliance with the requirements. It is not a judgment on the
merits that can amount to res judicata, one of the essential
elements in forum shopping.30
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioners for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review. We
AFFIRM the 29 April 2005 and 4 August 2005 Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88963.
SO ORDERED.
MALLARI v. GSIS

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 157659,
January 25, 2010
ELIGIO P. MALLARI, Petitioner.

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and THE
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PAMPANGA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
By petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner appeals the
decision promulgated on March 17, 2003, whereby the Court
of Appeals (CA) dismissed his petition for certiorari.
Antecedents
In 1968, the petitioner obtained two loans totaling
P34,000.00 from respondent Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS). To secure the performance of his
obligations, he mortgaged two parcels of land registered
under his and his wife Marcelina Mallaris names. However,
he paid GSIS about ten years after contracting the
obligations only P10,000.00 on May 22, 1978 and
P20,000.00 on August 11, 1978.1
On August 22, 1986, the petitioner sued GSIS and the

Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 44, in San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed
as Civil Case No. 7802, 2 ostensibly to enjoin them from
proceeding against him for injunction (with an application for
preliminary injunction). The RTC ultimately decided Civil
Case No. 7802 in his favor, nullifying the extrajudicial
foreclosure and auction sale; cancelling Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 284272-R and TCT No. 284273-R already
issued in the name of GSIS; and reinstating TCT No. 61171R and TCT No. 54835-R in his and his wifes names.3
GSIS appealed the adverse decision to the CA, which
reversed the RTC on March 27, 1996.4
The petitioner elevated the CA decision to this Court via
petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 124468).5
On September 16, 1996, this Court denied his petition for
review.6 On January 15, 1997, this Court turned down his
motion for reconsideration.7
As a result, the CA decision dated March 27, 1996 became
final and executory, rendering unassailable both the
extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale held on September
22, 1986, and the issuance of TCT No. 284272-R and TCT
No. 284273-R in the name of GSIS.
GSIS thus filed an ex parte motion for execution and for a
writ of possession on September 2, 1999. 8 Granting the ex
parte motion on October 8, 1999, 9 the RTC issued a writ of
execution cum writ of possession on October 21, 1999, 10
ordering the sheriff to place GSIS in possession of the
properties.
What followed thereafter was the series of inordinate moves

of the petitioner to delay the efforts of GSIS to recover on the
debt, and to have the unhampered possession of the
foreclosed property.
The sheriff failed to serve the writ, however, partly because

of the petitioners request for an extension of time within
which to vacate the properties. It is noted that GSIS acceded
to the request.111avvphi1
After reminding the petitioner of his unpaid obligation on May

2, 1979, GSIS sent on November 2, 1981 a telegraphic
demand to him to update his account. On November 10,
1981, he requested a final accounting, but did not do
anything more. Nearly three years later, on March 21, 1984,
GSIS applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage by reason of his failure to settle his account. On
November 22, 1984, he requested an updated computation
of his outstanding account. On November 29, 1984, he
persuaded the sheriff to hold the publication of the
foreclosure notice in abeyance, to await action on his
pending request for final accounting (that is, taking his
payments of P30,000.00 made in 1978 into account). On
December 13, 1984, GSIS responded to his request and
rendered a detailed explanation of the account. On May 30,
1985, it sent another updated statement of account. On July
21, 1986, it finally commenced extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings against him because he had meanwhile made
no further payments.
Yet, the petitioner did not voluntarily vacate the properties,

but instead filed a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash
the writ of execution on March 27, 2000.12 Also, the petitioner
commenced a second case against GSIS and the provincial
sheriff in the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga (Civil Case
No. 12053), ostensibly for consignation (coupled with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order). However, the RTC dismissed Civil Case
No. 12053 on November 10, 2000 on the ground of res
judicata, impelling him to appeal the dismissal to the CA
(C.A.-G.R. CV No. 70300).13
In the meanwhile, the petitioner filed a motion dated April 5,
2000 in Civil Case No. 7802 to hold GSIS, et al. 14 in
contempt of court for painting the fence of the properties
during the pendency of his motion for reconsideration and/or
to quash the writ of execution.15 He filed another motion in
the same case, dated April 17, 2000, to hold GSIS and its
local manager Arnulfo B. Cardenas in contempt of court for
ordering the electric company to cut off the electric services

to the properties during the pendency of his motion for
reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of execution.16>
To prevent the Presiding Judge of Branch 44 of the RTC
from resolving the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 7802,
GSIS moved to inhibit him for alleged partiality towards the
petitioner as borne out by his failure to act on the motion for
reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution, motions
for contempt of court, and motion for issuance of break open
order for more than a year from their filing, praying that the
case be re-raffled to another branch of the RTC. 17
Consequently, Civil Case No. 7802 was re-assigned to
Branch 48, whose Presiding Judge then denied the motions
for contempt of court on July 30, 2001, and directed the
Branch Clerk of Court to cause the re-implementation of the
writ of execution cum writ of possession dated October 21,
1999.18
The petitioner sought reconsideration,19 but the Presiding
Judge of Branch 48 denied his motion for reconsideration on
February 11, 2002.20
Ruling of the CA
By petition for certiorari dated March 15, 2002 filed in the
CA, the petitioner assailed the orders of February 11, 2002,
July 30, 2001, October 21, 1999, and October 8, 1999.21
On March 17, 2003, however, the CA dismissed the petition
for certiorari for lack of merit,22 stating:
We find the instant petition patently devoid of merit. This
Court is not unaware of the legal tactics and maneuvers
employed by the petitioner in delaying the disposition of the
subject case (Civil Case No. 7802) which has already
become final and executory upon the final resolution by the
Supreme Court affirming the judgment rendered by the Court
of Appeals. We construe the actuation of the petitioner in
resorting to all kinds of avenues accorded by the Rules of
Court, through the filing of several pleadings and/or motions
in litigating this case, as running counter to the intendment of
the Rules to be utilized in promoting the objective of securing
a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.
The issues raised in the present controversy have already
been settled in our existing jurisprudence on the subject. In
the case of De Jesus vs. Obnamia, Jr., the Supreme Court
ruled that "generally, no notice or even prior hearing of a
motion for execution is required before a writ of execution is
issued when a decision has already become final."
The recent accretion to the corpus of our jurisprudence has
established the principle of law, as enunciated in Buaya vs.
Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. that "once a judgment
becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it
executed as a matter of right, and the issuance of a Writ of
Execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court."
The rule is also firmly entrenched in the aforecited Buaya

case that "the effective and efficient administration of justice
requires that once a judgment has become final, the
prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits of the
verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed by the
same parties. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to
controversies. Any attempt to prolong, resurrect or juggle
them should be firmly struck down. The system of judicial
review should not be misused and abused to evade the
operation of final and executory judgments."
As succinctly put in Tag Fibers, Inc. vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, the Supreme Court is emphatic in
saying that "the finality of a decision is a jurisdictional event
that cannot be made to depend on the convenience of a
party."
We find no cogent reason to discompose the findings of the
court below. Thus, we sustain the assailed Orders of the
court a quo since no abuse of discretion has been found to
have been committed by the latter in their issuance.
Moreover, this Court finds this petition to be part of the
dilatory tactics of the petitioner to stall the execution of a final
and executory decision in Civil Case No. 7802 which has
already been resolved with finality by no less than the
highest tribunal of the land.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.23
Issues
Hence, this appeal.
The petitioner insists herein that the CA gravely erred in
refusing "to accept the nullity of the following orders" of the
RTC, to wit:
1. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED OCTOBER
8, 1999, GRANTING THE EX-PARTE MOTION FOR
EXECUTION AND/OR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF
EXECUTION OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF THE
RESPONDENT GSIS;
2. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED OCTOBER
21,
1999
GRANTING
THE
ISSUANCE
AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION CUM
WRIT OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT
GSIS;
3. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED JULY 30,
2001 DIRECTING TO CAUSE THE RE-IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION CUM WRIT OF
POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT GSIS;
and

4. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED FEBRUARY
11,
2002,
DENYING
THE
MOTION
FOR
RECONSIDERATION
OF
THE
ORDER
DATED
SEPTEMBER 14, 2001, IN RELATION TO THE COURT
ORDER DATED JULY 30, 2001.24
Ruling of the Court
The petition for review on certiorari absolutely lacks merit.
I
Petition for Certiorari in CA
Was Filed Beyond Reglementary Period
The petition assailed before the CA on certiorari the following
orders of the RTC, to wit:
1. The order dated October 8, 1999 (granting the ex parte
motion for execution and/or issuance of the writ of execution
cum writ of possession of GSIS);25
2. The order dated October 21, 1999 (directing the issuance
of the writ of execution cum writ of possession in favor of
GSIS);26
3. The order dated July 30, 2001 (requiring the Branch Clerk
of Court to cause the re-implementation of the writ of
execution cum writ of possession, and dismissing the
motions to hold GSIS, et al. in contempt);27 and
4. The order dated February 11, 2002 (denying the motion
for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001 seeking the
reconsideration of the order dated July 30, 2001).28
The July 30, 2001 order denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution, and
motion to hold GSIS, Tony Dimatulac, et al. and Arnulfo
Cardenas in contempt; and declared GSISs motion for
issuance of break open order and for designation of special
sheriff from GSIS Legal Services Group as premature. In
turn, the motion for reconsideration and/or to quash writ of
execution denied by the order of July 30, 2001 had merely
challenged the orders of October 8, 1999 and October 21,
1999 (granting the writ of execution cum writ of possession
as a matter of course).
Considering that the motion for reconsideration dated August
17, 2001 denied by the order dated February 11, 2002 was in
reality and effect a prohibited second motion for
reconsideration vis--vis the orders dated October 21, 1999
and October 8, 1999, the assailed orders dated July 30,
2001, October 21, 1999, and October 8, 1999 could no
longer be subject to attack by certiorari. Thus, the petition for
certiorari filed only in March 2002 was already improper and
tardy for being made beyond the 60-day limitation defined in
Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended,29 which requires a petition for certiorari to be filed
"not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution," or, in case a motion for reconsideration

or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or
not, "the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of
the denial of the said motion."
It is worth emphasizing that the 60-day limitation is
considered inextendible, because the limitation has been
prescribed to avoid any unreasonable delay that violates the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their
cases.30
II
Nature of the Writ of Possession
and its Ministerial Issuance
The petitioner claims that he had not been notified of the
motion seeking the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ
of possession; hence, the writ was invalid.
As earlier shown, the CA disagreed with him.
We sustain the CA, and confirm that the petitioner, as
defaulting mortgagor, was not entitled under Act 3135, as
amended, and its pertinent jurisprudence to any prior notice
of the application for the issuance of the writ of possession.
A writ of possession, which commands the sheriff to place a
person in possession of real property, may be issued in: (1)
land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No.
496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in
possession of the mortgaged property, and no third person,
not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (3)
extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, pending
redemption under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by
Act No. 4118; and (4) execution sales, pursuant to the last
paragraph of Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.31
Anent the redemption of property sold in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale made pursuant to the special power referred
to in Section 132 of Act No. 3135,33 as amended, the debtor,
his successor-in-interest, or any judicial creditor or judgment
creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the
property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under
which the property is sold has the right to redeem the
property at anytime within the term of one year from and
after the date of the sale, such redemption to be governed by
the provisions of Section 464 to Section 466 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, to the extent that said provisions were not
inconsistent with the provisions of Act 3135.34
In this regard, we clarify that the redemption period
envisioned under Act 3135 is reckoned from the date of the
registration of the sale, not from and after the date of the
sale, as the text of Act 3135 shows. Although the original
Rules of Court (effective on July 1, 1940) incorporated
Section 464 to Section 466 of the Code of Civil Procedure as
its Section 25 (Section 464); Section 26 (Section 465); and
Section 27 (Section 466) of Rule 39, with Section 27 still
expressly reckoning the redemption period to be "at any time

within twelve months after the sale;" and although the
Revised Rules of Court (effective on January 1, 1964)
continued to provide in Section 30 of Rule 39 that the
redemption be made from the purchaser "at any time within
twelve (12) months after the sale," 35 the 12-month period of
redemption came to be held as beginning "to run not from
the date of the sale but from the time of registration of the
sale in the Office of the Register of Deeds."36 This
construction was due to the fact that the sheriffs sale of
registered (and unregistered) lands did not take effect as a
conveyance, or did not bind the land, until the sale was
registered in the Register of Deeds.37
Desiring to avoid any confusion arising from the conflict
between the texts of the Rules of Court (1940 and 1964) and
Act No. 3135, on one hand, and the jurisprudence clarifying
the reckoning of the redemption period in judicial sales of
real property, on the other hand, the Court has incorporated
in Section 28 of Rule 39 of the current Rules of Court
(effective on July 1, 1997) the foregoing judicial construction
of reckoning the redemption period from the date of the
registration of the certificate of sale, to wit:
Sec. 28. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on,
successive redemptions; notice to be given and filed. The
judgment obligor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property
from the purchaser, at any time within one (1) year from the
date of the registration of the certificate of sale, by paying the
purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centum
per month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of
redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or
taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after
purchase, and interest on such last named amount at the
same rate; and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a
prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment
under which such purchase was made, the amount of such
other lien, with interest.
Property so redeemed may again be redeemed within sixty
(60) days after the last redemption upon payment of the sum
paid on the last redemption, with two per centum thereon in
addition, and the amount of any assessments or taxes which
the last redemptioner may have paid thereon after
redemption by him, with interest on such last-named amount,
and in addition, the amount of any liens held by said last
redemptioner prior to his own, with interest. The property
may be again, and as often as a redemptioner is so
disposed, redeemed from any previous redemptioner within
sixty (60) days after the last redemption, on paying the sum
paid on the last previous redemption, with two per centum
thereon in addition, and the amounts of any assessments or
taxes which the last previous redemptioner paid after the
redemption thereon, with interest thereon, and the amount of
any liens held by the last redemptioner prior to his own, with
interest.
Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer
who made the sale and a duplicate filed with the registry of
deeds of the place, and if any assessments or taxes are paid
by the redemptioner or if he has or acquires any lien other

than that upon which the redemption was made, notice
thereof must in like manner be given to the officer and filed
with the registry of deeds; if such notice be not filed, the
property may be redeemed without paying such
assessments, taxes, or liens. (30a) (Emphasis supplied).
Accordingly, the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest must
redeem the foreclosed property within one year from the
registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds in order to
avoid the title from consolidating in the purchaser. By failing
to redeem thuswise, the mortgagor loses all interest over the
foreclosed property.38 The purchaser, who has a right to
possession that extends beyond the expiration of the
redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the
property when no redemption is made,39 that it is no longer
necessary for the purchaser to file the bond required under
Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, considering that the
possession of the land becomes his absolute right as the
lands confirmed owner.40 The consolidation of ownership in
the purchasers name and the issuance to him of a new TCT
then entitles him to demand possession of the property at
any time, and the issuance of a writ of possession to him
becomes a matter of right upon the consolidation of title in
his name.
The court can neither halt nor hesitate to issue the writ of
possession. It cannot exercise any discretion to determine
whether or not to issue the writ, for the issuance of the writ to
the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes a
ministerial function.41 Verily, a marked distinction exists
between a discretionary act and a ministerial one. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a
public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when
the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary, not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge
requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor the
exercise of judgment.42
The proceeding upon an application for a writ of possession
is ex parte and summary in nature, brought for the benefit of
one party only and without notice being sent by the court to
any person adverse in interest. The relief is granted even
without giving an opportunity to be heard to the person
against whom the relief is sought.43 Its nature as an ex parte
petition under Act No. 3135, as amended, renders the
application for the issuance of a writ of possession a nonlitigious proceeding.44
It is clear from the foregoing that a non-redeeming mortgagor
like the petitioner had no more right to challenge the
issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession
upon the ex parte application of GSIS. He could not also
impugn anymore the extrajudicial foreclosure, and could not
undo the consolidation in GSIS of the ownership of the
properties covered by TCT No. 284272-R and TCT No.

284273-R, which consolidation was already irreversible.
Hence, his moves against the writ of execution cum writ of
possession were tainted by bad faith, for he was only too
aware, being his own lawyer, of the dire consequences of his
non-redemption within the period provided by law for that
purpose.
III
Dismissal of Petitioners Motion for Indirect Contempt
Was Proper and In Accord with the Rules of Court
The petitioner insists that the RTC gravely erred in

dismissing his charges for indirect contempt against GSIS, et
al.; and that the CA should have consequently granted his
petition for certiorari.
The petitioners insistence is plainly unwarranted.
First of all, Section 4, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, provides as follows:
Section 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for
indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court
against which the contempt was committed by an order or
any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be
commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars
and certified true copies of documents or papers involved
therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are
related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition
for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in
its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge
and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (n)
(Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, a person may be charged with indirect contempt only
by either of two alternative ways, namely: (1) by a verified
petition, if initiated by a party; or (2) by an order or any other
formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why
he should not be punished for contempt, if made by a court
against which the contempt is committed. In short, a charge
of indirect contempt must be initiated through a verified
petition, unless the charge is directly made by the court
against which the contemptuous act is committed.
Justice Regalado has explained why the requirement of the
filing of a verified petition for contempt is mandatory:45
1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the
proper procedure for commencing contempt proceedings.
While such proceeding has been classified as a special civil

action under the former Rules, the heterogeneous practice,
tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to file a mere
motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefor and
without complying with the requirements for initiatory
pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of
this amended section. Worse, and as a consequence of
unregulated motions for contempt, said incidents sometimes
remain pending for resolution although the main case has
already been decided. There are other undesirable aspects
but, at any rate, the same may now be eliminated by this
amendatory procedure.
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings
initiated motu proprio by order of or a formal charge by the
offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified
petition with full compliance with the requirements therefor
and shall be disposed of in accordance with the second
paragraph of this section. (Emphasis supplied).
Clearly, the petitioners charging GSIS, et al. with indirect
contempt by mere motions was not permitted by the Rules of
Court.
And, secondly, even assuming that charges for contempt
could be initiated by motion, the petitioner should have
tendered filing fees. The need to tender filing fees derived
from the fact that the procedure for indirect contempt under
Rule 71, Rules of Court was an independent special civil
action. Yet, the petitioner did not tender and pay filing fees,
resulting in the trial court not acquiring jurisdiction over the
action. Truly, the omission to tender filing fees would have
also warranted the dismissal of the charges.
It seems to be indubitable from the foregoing that the
petitioner initiated the charges for indirect contempt without
regard to the requisites of the Rules of Court simply to vex
the adverse party. He thereby disrespected the orderly
administration of justice and committed, yet again, an abuse
of procedures.
IV
Petitioner Was Guilty of
Misconduct As A Lawyer
The CA deemed it unavoidable to observe that the petition
for certiorari brought by the petitioner to the CA was "part of
the dilatory tactics of the petitioner to stall the execution of a
final and executory decision in Civil Case No. 7802 which
has already been resolved with finality by no less than the
highest tribunal of the land."46
The observation of the CA deserves our concurrence.
Verily, the petitioner wittingly adopted his aforedescribed
worthless and vexatious legal maneuvers for no other
purpose except to delay the full enforcement of the writ of
possession, despite knowing, being himself a lawyer, that as
a non-redeeming mortgagor he could no longer impugn both

the extrajudicial foreclosure and the ex parte issuance of the
writ of execution cum writ of possession; and that the
enforcement of the duly-issued writ of possession could not
be delayed. He thus deliberately abused court procedures
and processes, in order to enable himself to obstruct and
stifle the fair and quick administration of justice in favor of
mortgagee and purchaser GSIS.
His conduct contravened Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, by which he was enjoined as
a lawyer to "observe the rules of procedure and xxx not [to]
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice." By his dilatory
moves, he further breached and dishonored his Lawyers
Oath, particularly:47
xxx I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients xxx
We stress that the petitioners being the party litigant himself
did not give him the license to resort to dilatory moves. His
zeal to defend whatever rights he then believed he had and
to promote his perceived remaining interests in the property
already lawfully transferred to GSIS should not exceed the
bounds of the law, for he remained at all times an officer of

the Court burdened to conduct himself "with all good fidelity
as well to the courts as to [his] clients." 48 His true obligation
as a lawyer should not be warped by any misplaced sense of
his rights and interests as a litigant, because he was, above
all, bound not to unduly delay a case, not to impede the
execution of a judgment, and not to misuse Court
processes.49 Consequently, he must be made to account for
his misconduct as a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari
for lack of merit, and affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on March 17, 2003, with the costs of
suit to be paid by the petitioner.
The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is directed to investigate the petitioner for what
appear to be (a) his deliberate disregard of the Rules of
Court and jurisprudence pertinent to the issuance and
implementation of the writ of possession under Act No. 3135,
as amended; and (b) his witting violations of the Lawyers
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
SO ORDERED.

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CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty.

UNIONBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

DAVIDE, JR., CJ.:

is prescribed by SC-Circular 4-944 was not attached thereto.

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty. Jazzie Sarona-Lozare) 2

was automatically dissolved upon dismissal of the complaint

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty. Jazzie Sarona-Lozare) 3

paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty. Jazzie Sarona-Lozare) 4

June 26, 2000

PHILBANCOR FINANCE, INC. AND VICENTE HIZON, JR.,

In his answer, petitioner Hizon admitted that private

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty. Jazzie Sarona-Lozare) 5

QUEZON CITY MAYOR v. RCBC

Hence, this appeal.6

CITY MAYOR, CITY TREASURER, CITY ASSESSOR, ALL

Republic Act No. 3844, Section 12, provides as follows:

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty. Jazzie Sarona-Lozare) 6

The Honorable Court committed grave error when it

Consequently, respondent filed a Petition for Mandamus with

The Honorable Court committed grave error when it denied

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty. Jazzie Sarona-Lozare) 7

of taxes and penalties due up to the date of redemption, the

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty. Jazzie Sarona-Lozare) 8

A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty. Jazzie Sarona-Lozare) 9

Republic of the Philippines

February 11, 2010

CUA LAI CHU, CLARO G. CASTRO, and JUANITA

CU LAI CHU v. LAQUI

The extrajudicial foreclosure sale did not push through as

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty. Jazzie Sarona-Lozare) 10

The petition has no merit.

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty. Jazzie Sarona-Lozare) 11

Petitioners cannot oppose or appeal the courts order

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty. Jazzie Sarona-Lozare) 12

January 25, 2010

ELIGIO P. MALLARI, Petitioner.

On August 22, 1986, the petitioner sued GSIS and the

What followed thereafter was the series of inordinate moves

The sheriff failed to serve the writ, however, partly because

After reminding the petitioner of his unpaid obligation on May

Yet, the petitioner did not voluntarily vacate the properties,

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty. Jazzie Sarona-Lozare) 13

The rule is also firmly entrenched in the aforecited Buaya

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty. Jazzie Sarona-Lozare) 14

order or resolution," or, in case a motion for reconsideration

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty. Jazzie Sarona-Lozare) 15

by the redemptioner or if he has or acquires any lien other

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty. Jazzie Sarona-Lozare) 16

The petitioner insists that the RTC gravely erred in

While such proceeding has been classified as a special civil

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (Atty. Jazzie Sarona-Lozare) 17

bounds of the law, for he remained at all times an officer of

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