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A Comment on the Role of Metaphor in

Knowledge Generation
ARTICLE in THE ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW APRIL 2003
Impact Factor: 6.17 DOI: 10.2307/30040704

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Loizos Heracleous
The University of Warwick
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A Academy of Management

Review

2003,Vol. 28, No. 2, 190-197.

DIALOGUE
A Comment on the Role of Metaphor in
Knowledge Generation

a creative process of relating A to B that can lead

to generative insights precisely because of its
potential to create cognitive associations or correspondences that did not exist before. This is
the essence of Black's "strong creativity thesis"
(1979: 37-39), which holds that metaphorical
statements are not simply creative by revealing
aspects of the target domain that were already
there but by cognitively constituting such aspects by virtue of the two domains they bring
into interaction. These metaphors are what
Schbn refers to as generative metaphors, capable of generating new perceptions, explanations, and inventions (1979: 259), and what Black
refers to as strong metaphors, possessing a high
degree of "implicative elaboration" (1979: 27).
Thus, it is problematic for the authors to argue
that all metaphors are nongenerative, based on
examples of the use of single, nongenerative
metaphors, such as viewing atoms as solar systems (Oswick et al., 2002: 298). The multiplicity of
metaphors in organization science, as exemplified by Morgan's (1986) seminal work, illustrates
the opposite situation. Far from constraining
knowledge generation (Oswick et al., 2002: 294),
Morgan's work was instrumental in loosening
the hold of the positivist systems orthodoxy in
organization science and in legitimating the
employment of alternative viewpoints, to an
extent far beyond the original metaphors he
proposed. The generative potential of metaphor should not be judged metonymically, as
Oswick and colleagues do, based on examples
of weak metaphors, but, rather, on the totality
of generative
advancement
of organization
science based on metaphors as a class of tropes.
It is therefore inaccurate to argue that metaphor "functions as an aid to knowledge dissemination rather than knowledge generation"
(2002: 298).
Further, the similarity/dissimilarity
distinction on which the authors build their argument
is precisely the kind of "false binary opposition"
(2002: 296) they take to task. Aristotle's view of
metaphors implies that similarity and dissimilarity are not discreet entities but, rather, form a
continuum along which types of tropes could be
mapped. Irony and anomaly, thus, are not dis-

Professors Oswick, Keenoy, and Grant (2002)

present a compelling argument on the role of
metaphor in knowledge generation. The authors
build their argument on the suggestion that
tropes such as metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche, on the one hand, operate within the "cognitive comfort zone" (2002: 294) of similarity and,
thus, are unlikely to foster generative insights,
whereas tropes such as anomaly, irony, and paradox are based on dissimilarity and can, on the
other hand, offer genuine insights. The authors
argue that metaphor emphasizes "middle-range
similarity [that] is intuitively conservative and,
thus, cognitively prescriptive rather than liberating" (2002: 298). Metaphor, in this perspective,
[and]... funcpromotes "analytical closure...
tions as an aid to knowledge dissemination
rather than knowledge generation" (2002: 298).
They conclude that it would be more fruitful,
from a knowledge generation perspective, to
"resort to conceptual ironies rather than organizational metaphors in the analysis of organizational phenomena" (2002: 301).
Even though this is an appealing viewpoint, it
is theoretically problematic. First, metaphors
are not, in fact, based on high levels of similarity, as the authors argue. Second, metaphors are
not simply useful for disseminating
existing
knowledge: they have delivered generative insights in organization science by virtue of not
only revealing previously unseen associations
but also creating new ones between target and
source domains. Third, the similarity/dissimilarity distinction on which the authors base their
argument is itself the kind of "false binary opposition" (2002: 296) they criticize.
Aristotle originally suggested
that "metaphors should be transferred from things that are
related but not obviously so" (Rhetoric, 3:11: 5),
in order to maximize their generative potential.
This is very different from the notion of "optimum overlap" (2002: 297) proposed by the authors, which suggests high levels of static similarity between pre-existing entities or domains.
Constructing metaphors from domains that are
not obviously related, as Aristotle suggested, is
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2003

Dialogue

tinct from metaphors, as the authors imply, but

simply farther along the continuum toward dissimilarity. Far from being a distinct class of
tropes, therefore, irony and anomaly are useful
in knowledge generation in the same way metaphors are: as a way of either revealing previously unseen connections, associations, or correspondences or constituting new ones (that will
still need to be pragmatically and empirically
valid). Thus, the authors' example of Galileo's
comparison of the world to a sphere (2002: 295)
was generative not because it was anomalous
but precisely because it highlighted empirically
valid and previously unseen correspondences
between the world and spheres.
REFERENCES
Aristotle. 1991. On rhetoric. (Translated by G. A. Kennedy).
New York:Oxford University Press.
Black, M. 1979. More about metaphor. In A. Ortony (Ed.),
Metaphor and thought: 19-43. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Morgan, G. 1986.Images of organization. Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage.
Oswick, C., Keenoy, T., & Grant, D. 2002.Metaphorand analogical reasoning in organization theory: Beyond orthodoxy. Academy of Management Review, 27: 294-303.
Schan D. A. 1979. Generative metaphor. A perspective on
problem-setting in social policy. In A. Ortony (Ed.),Metaphor and thought: 254-283. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

Loizos Heracleous
National University of Singapore

The Edge of Metaphor

Professor Heracleous's trenchant but essentially misdirected critique permits us to briefly
address some important and much neglected
issues that were beyond
conceptual-theoretic
the scope of our initial note (Oswick, Keenoy, &
Grant, 2002). We have two points of clarification
and one of substance.
First, Heracleous claims that "metaphors are
not, in fact, based on high levels of similarity."
This view appears to fly in the face of conventional usage. Heracleous's anomalous position
seems to be based on the long-standing ambiguous status of "metaphor" as an analytic category in organizational science; the problem is

191

that, in the literature, the concept of metaphor is

employed both as a generic term to cover all
tropes and also as a specific trope in its own
right. Heracleous's expressed preference for
dealing in "metaphors as a class of tropes"
clearly favors the generic meaning. Used generically, "metaphor" does indeed embrace a range
of allegedly "lesser" tropes, which-for
their
effect-involve
differing degrees of similarity
and dissimilarity
between the source and
target domains.
We would be the last to claim that concepts
have fixed meanings, but our analytic concern
was to explore the analogical potential of a variety of tropes. In conventional usage, among
these, metaphor (and the subtropes of metonymy
and synecdoche) and simile rely primarily on
similarity. According to the most comprehensive
dictionary we could find, metaphor is a "figure
of speech in which a name or descriptive term is
transferred to some object different from, but
analogous to, that to which it is properly applicable" (Compact Oxford English Dictionary,
1994), whereas simile involves "a comparison of
one thing with another" (Compact Oxford English Dictionary, 1994). Indeed, Morgan himself
argues that "metaphor proceeds through implicit or explicit assertions that A is (or is like) B"
(1986: 13)-a definition that appears to conflate
simile within metaphor (and clearly privileges
"similarity"). Hence, we opted for the conventional understandings
of the differences between specific tropes (and our analytic prejudice was well sourced; see Oswick et al., 2002:
297). Inexplicably, Heracelous has simply chosen to ignore this and operate with the alternative conception of metaphor.
Second, Heracleous triumphantly accuses us
of basing our argument on the construction of a
"false binary opposition"-a practice we specifwe differentiate
ically disparaged-because
tropes in terms of the extent to which they rely
upon similarity or dissimilarity. This is a curious
charge, for the mutually implicated nature of
similarity and dissimilarity was central to our
analysis of how some tropes "work." As a criticism, it is perhaps best regarded through the
metaphor of the "cheap shot."
Finally, to our point of substance: Heracleous
insists that "metaphors are not simply useful for
disseminating existing knowledge" but "have
delivered generative insights..,. as exemplified
by Morgan's (1986) seminal work." However, he