Rethinking 'Moral Panic' for Multi-Mediated Social Worlds

Author(s): Angela McRobbie and Sarah L. Thornton

Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Dec., 1995), pp. 559-574
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science
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Angela McRobbieand SarahL. Thornton

Rethinking'moralpanic'for multi-mediated
socialworlds

ABSTRACT

It is now over twentyyears since the well-establishedsociologyof

deviance along with the emergent sociology of mass media produced the concept of 'moralpanic'.The variousstudies of youth
culture, drugtakersand the media reaction to these and other
phenomenaproducedsomeof the mostimportantworkin post-war
Britishsociology.This articleargues that it is now time that every
stage in the process of constructinga moral panic, as well as the
socialrelationswhichsupportit, should be revised.lt suggeststhat
more attention should be paid to the consequencesof the great
expansionof the mediaand to the manymore participantsinvolved
in publicdebate (including,for example, commercialpromotions
departmentsand pressuregroups).We argue that 'folk devils'are
less marginalizedthan they once were; they not only find themselves vociferouslyand articulatelysupported in the same mass
mediathatcastigatesthem, but their interestsare also defended by
their own niche and micro-media.Finally,the articlesuggeststhat
whatweremorestablepointsof socialcontrolhaveundergonesome
degree of shift, if not transformation.
'Moralpanic'is now a term regularlyused byjournaliststo describea
processwhich politicians,commercialpromotersand media habitually attemptto incite. It has become a standardinterviewquestionto
put to ConservativeMPs:are they not whippingup a moralpanicas a
foil to deflect attentionawayfrom more pressingeconomicissues?It
has become a routine means of making youth-orientatedcultural
productsmore alluring;acid house musicwasmarketedas 'one of the
mostcontroversialsoundsof 1988'set to outrage'thosewho decrythe
glamorizationof drug culture'.l Moreover,as moral panicsseem to
guarantee the kind of emotional involvement that keeps up the
interestof, notjust tabloid,but broadsheetnewspaperreaders,as well
as the ratings of news and true crime television, even the media
PfflJ
S Volumeno. 46 I.ssueno.4

I)ecembo 1995

1eSvSN0007-1315 )londonSchoolof2:conomcs

1995

560

AngelaMcRobbieaml SarahL. Thornton

themselvesare willingto take some of the blame.Sue Cameron,disasks, 'Is it not the
cussing 'newjuvenile crime'on BBC2'sNewsnight,
mediaitselfwhichhas helped to createthis phenomenon?'
Moralpanics,once the unintendedoutcomeofjournalisticpractice,
seem to havebecomea goal. Ratherthanperiodsto whichsocietiesare
subject'everynow and then' (Cohen 1972/80:9), moral panics have
become the wayin whichdailyeventsare broughtto the attentionof
the public.They area standardresponse,a familiar,sometimesweary,
even ridiculousrhetoricratherthan an exceptionalemergencyintervention.Used by politiciansto orchestrateconsent,by businessto promote salesin certainniche markets,and by mediato makehome and
social affairs newsworthy,moral panics are constructedon a daily
basis.
Given their high rate of turnoverand the increasingtendency to
labelall kindsof mediaeventas 'moralpanic',we thinkit is timeto take
stockof the revisions,then considerthe strengthsand weaknessesof
this key concept. Although both the originalmodel of moral panics
and the reformulationswhichintroducednotionsof ideologyand hegemonywereexemplaryinterventionsin theirtime,we arguethatit is
impossibleto relyon the old modelswiththeirstagesandcycles,univocal media, monolithicsocietalor hegemonicreactions.The proliferation and fragmentationof mass, niche and micro-mediaand the
multiplicityof voices,whichcompeteand contestthe meaningof the
issues subjectto 'moralpanic',suggest that both the originaland revised modelsare outdatedin so far as they could not possiblytakeaccount of the labyrinthineweb of determiningrelationswhich now
exist between social groups and the media, 'reality'and representation.

THE ORIGINAL I HEORYOF MORALPANICS

Althoughthe argumentthatmediacoveragecan havean activerole in

creatingdeviantbehaviourowesitsexistenceto symbolicinteractionist
theoriesof 'labelling'(cf. Becker 1963;Wilkins1964),it wasthe pioneering studies of Jock Young (1971) on the socialmeaningof drugtaking and Stanley Cohen (1972/1980) on the media-inspiredconfrontationsbetween mods and rockers,and their edited collections
(Cohen 1971; Cohen and Young 1973) which developed and effectivelylaunchedthe conceptof 'moralpanic'.Not onlydid theirstudies
explorehowagentsof socialcontrollikethe policeplayeda rolein 'amplifying'deviance,buttheydevelopeda vocabularyfor understanding
the powerfulpartplayedby the media.This meantgoing beyondthe
sociologicalaccountswhichlooked at patternsof ownershipand control as signs of complicitybetweenmediaand government.Attention

soctalworlds
Rethinking
'moral
panic'for multi-medzated

561

wasnow being paid to the ideologicalrole of the mediaand the active

constructionof certainkindsof meaning.
In addition, this work explored how deviant behaviourwas interactive rather than absolutist. It was more often the outcome of
complexchainsof socialinteractionthanthe productof young people
witha predisposition,individuallyor environmentally,towardscrime
or rule-breakingbehaviour.Finallythis approachchallenged moral
guardians by suggesting that their overreaction was counterproductive.The mediacoverageof devianceactedas a kind of handbook
of possibilities to be picked over by new recruits. Worse still,
segregatingyoung people awayfrom the communitycreateda greater
riskof long-termsocialdisordersince'a societycan controleffectively
only those who perceive themselves to be members of it' (Young
1971:39). Overreaction,therefore, contributedto further polarization,though this might havebeen the desiredeffect, as StuartHallet
al. ( 1979)laterargued.
Cohen'sFolk Devils and Moral Panics is rightfullya classicof media
sociology,embracinga greaterdegree of complexitythan the many
summariesof the workindicate.He acknowledgesthatsocialcontrolis
uneven and much less mechanistic than the model of deviancy
amplificationsuggests. Indeed one group of respondents (drawn
from the non-mod, non-rocker public) criticizes the media for
over-reportingthe clashes,whileothersdescribehowtheycamedown
to the beachto havea lookat the 'fun'.Cohen hasa sophisticatedgrasp
of how these events fed into popularfolklore ('Whereare the mods
and rockers today?'was a question he was repeatedly asked while
carryingout his fieldwork)and when the panic had finally run its
course and de-amplificationhad set in, the charactersin this drama
settled into history as recognizable social types belonging to a
particularperiod, sometimesreferredto, even by the agentsof social
control,witha hint of nostalgia.
HOOLIGANS, HISTORY, AND HEGEMONY

Engagingdirectlywith the law and other rhetoricof Thatcherismin

the late 1970sand into the 1980s, Geoff Pearson'sHooligans:A Hzstory
of Respectable
Fears( 1983)focuseson the waymoralpanicsoften entail
looking backto a 'golden age' where socialstabilityand strong moral
disciplineactedas a deterrentto delinquencyand disorder.However,
twentyyearspreviously,the same processcould be seen in operation:
the 'kids' were seen as unruly and undisciplined, unlike their
counterpartsof the previousdecade. The same anxietiesappearwith
startlingregularity;these involvethe immoralityof young people, the
absence of parental control, the problem of too much free time
leading to crime, and the threat which deviant behaviour ,oosesto

AngelaMcRobbte
andSarahL. Thornton
identityand labourdiscipline.
Pearsonshowshow,during
1940s, there were scares
the 1930s, there were a about 'coshboys'and Blitzkidsand how,the
in
string of moral panics
leisure time and the
decline of the Britishwayabout the misuse of
of
popularityof Hollywood
cinema.Pursuingthischainlife through the
backthrough the
of investigation
nineteenthcentury,Pearson
of the complaints
argues
that the nature
and the
normativeand consensual social response to them provides a
lenceof socialchange and language for understandingthe turbudiscontinuity.The value
studyis to casta critical
shadowoveranyclaimsabout of this historical
inviolent crimes
the dramatic
carriedout by young
people. Instead,it shows rise
moralpanics in society act
how
as
draws
on a complexlanguage a form of ideologicalcohesion which
of
nostalgia.
The studies of Cohen,
Young
and Pearsonshow
acting
on behalf of the
dominantsocialorder. Theymoral panics as
orchestrating
are a means of
consent by actively
opinion
and socialconsciousnessinterveningin the space of public
through the use of highly
andrhetorical language
emotive
which
'something
be done about it'. Thehas the effect of requiring that
argumentabout deviancy
fication
is preciselythat where
amplisocial
and legislativeaction, such strategiesare indeed followedby
they
also
reassurethe publicthatthere
strong
governmentand
is
Itis only withtheoriesstrongleadership.
of ideologythatthe idea
panics
of the
as defining and
distortingsocial issues gives media'smoral
integrated
way to a more
and connective
understanding of the construction
meaning
across the whole range
of
of media forms and
Policing
t)zeCnsis ( 1979)by
institutions.
StuartHall
for
ContemporaryCulturalStudies and hiscolleaguesat the Centre
(CCCS),Universityof
ham
marksa turning point in
Birmingthis respect.They
Marxist
and a more theoretical
introduceda more
vocabularyto the terrain,which
more
palatableto British
was
sociologists
and
semiologicalanalysisof the massthan much of the structuralist
media which followed it,
because
it drew on the
empirical
model
of the moral panic first,
second,
becauseof its concern for
and,
result,
Policing the Crzsiscan be historyand politicalculture.As a
sociology
and culturalstudies. seen as bridging the gap between
Policing
theCrisuintroduced
analyse
the way in which the Gramscianconceptof hegemonyto
moral panics around
alleged
mugging and
criminalityof young
Afro-Caribbeanmalescreatedthe the
conditions
of consentwhichwere
social
society
more focused towardslawnecessaryfor the constructionof a
and
order and less inclinedto
liberalism
and 'permissiveness'of
the
the 1960s.This
ofmoral
the panic
particularanalysis
shows it not to be an
connective
strategy,partof the practice isolatedphenomenonbut a
of hegemonywhich
the
sphere
of influence which
enlarges
Gramsci
moral
labelled 'civil society'.The
panic then becomes an
envoy for dominant
ideology. In the
562
national

Rethinking
'moral
panic'for multi-medzated
soczalworlcls

563

languageof commonsense, it operatesas an advancewarningsystem,

and as such it progresses from local issues to matters of national
importance,from the site of tensionand pettyanxietiesto full-blown
socialand politicalcrisis.The authorsare alert to the complexityof
historical and social breakdown which, they claim, can then be
managedonlythroughthe escalationof the controland coercion.This
begs manyquestionsin relationto the scaleof socialcontrol,but what
is particularlyimportantis the recognitionthat ideologyis a suffusive
socialprocess,and that it is not a simplequestionof the distortionof
truth, but rather that ideology is a force which works continuously
throughthe mobilizationof'common sense'.
Despitethe pivotalpositionPolicingtheCrisisoccupiesin the history
of the concept of moral panic, the panoramicsweep of its Gramsciinfluencedargumentacrossthe entire landscapeof post-warBritain
makes it more a work of classic neo-Marxistscholarship than a
sociologyof deviance.Criticalresponsehasthus been dividedbetween
those sociologistswho take issue with the study's empiricalclaims,
suggestingas Waddingtondoes that
the evidence cited in support of the view that the situationwith
regard to crime in general and 'muggings'in particularwas not
gettingdramaticallyworse,and in some respectsshowsan improvement, does not in fact support this contention. (Waddington
1986:257)
and writerslike PaulGilroywho drawfrom the studya vocabularyfor
developing further an analysis of race and ethnicity, relocating
PolicingtheCrisiswithina more distinctlyCulturalStudiesperspective.
(Gilroy 1987) More recently Schlesingerand Tumber (1994) have
returned to the sociologyof crime reportingand both responded to
Hallet al. (1981)and re-visitedmoralpanictheoryas a whole.
As its title suggests,SimonWatney'sPolicingDesire(1987) looksnot
at crimebut at so-calleddeviantsexual practice,takingthe debatesof
Policing the Crisis further by providing a foundation for a better
understandingof how controversialsocialand sexual issues become
inscribedwithcertainkindsof meaningacrossa wide varietyof media
forms.Watneyrightlypointsout that the gradualand stagedcreation
of a 'folkdevil'as describedby moralpanictheoristsappliesto neither
gay men and lesbiansnor people who are HIV positive.Insteadthere
is a whole world of 'monstrous'representations.Since sexualityis
subjectedto regulation and control through a multiplicityof institutionseach withtheirown distinctivediscursivepracticesand textual
strategies,moral panics are not, as some have suggested, the key to
understandingfearsand anxietiesaboutAIDS. As Watneyputs it
the theoryof moralpanicsis unableto conceptualisethe massmedia
as an industryintrinsicallyinvolvedwith excess, with the voracious
appetite and capacityfor substitutions,displacements,repetitions

564

AngelaMcRobbie
andSarahL. Thornton

and signifyingabsences.Moralpanictheoryis alwaysobligedin the

final instance to refer and contrast 'representation'to the arbitration of 'the real',and is hence unable to develop a full theory
concerning the operationsof ideology within all representational
systems.Moralpanicsseem to appearand disappear,as if representation were not the site of permanent struggle of the meaning of
signs. (Watney1987:4 1)
Classicmoral panic theoristswould ignore the daily endorsement
(not to say enjoyment)of heterosexualityas an ideologicalnorm and
the consequencesthis has for those who are excluded. Policiesand
practiceswhichare concernedwith'policingdesire'do not, according
to Watney,emanate from one or two centralizedagenciesof social
control.They areendemicin mediaand society,andin thiscontextthe
moral panic is best seen as a local intensificationor 'the site of the
current front line' rather than a sudden, unpleasantand unanticipated development (Watney 1987:42). Watney suggests that our
understanding of moral panics might be fruitfully informed by
psychologicalmodels which seek to understand the ambivalence,
excessiveinterestand even fascinationdisplayedby moralguardians
for the objectsof theirdistaste.
Through consideringthe meaningswhichhave developedaround
AIDS and homosexuality,Watney replaces the vocabularyof the
moralpanicwith thatof representation,discourseand the 'other'.In
so doing, he is ableto bring to his workconceptsdrawnfrom fieldsof
psychoanalysis,film studiesand culturalstudiesto producea deeper
accountof processesof exclusionand regulationthanthatavailablein
the traditionalsociologyof socialcontrol.
CONTESTING 'SOCIETY' AND 'HEGEMONY'

Britishsocietyand media,youth cultureand 'deviance'havechanged

considerablysince the 1960s, and these historicaltransformations
bring to light some of the theoreticaland methodologicallimits of
these various studies. In original moral panic theory, 'society'and
'societal reactions' were monolithic and, as others have already
argued, ultimatelyfunctionalist.Similarly,Hall et al., Pearson and
Watney perhaps over-state hegemony and overlook the counterdiscoursesfrom whichthey drawand to whichtheycontribute.In the
1990s,when socialdifferentiationand audiencesegmentationare the
orderof the day,we need takeaccountof a pluralityof reactions,each
with their different constituencies,effectivitiesand modes of discourse.
Given the kinds of moral panic to which they attend, it is
problematicthat Cohen's'society',Pearson'sdescriptionof collective
memoryand Hallet al. 's 'hegemony'excludeyouth.Ethnographiesof

Rethinking
'moral
panic'formulti-medzated
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565

contemporaryyouth culture (cf. Thornton 1995) find that youth are

inclinednotto lamenta safe and stablepastbutto have overwhelming
nostalgiafor the dayswhen youthculturewasgenuinelytransgressive.
The 1990s youth culture is steeped in the legacy of previous'moral
panics'; fighting mods and rockers, drug-taking hippies, foulmouthedpunksand gender-bendingNew Romanticsare partof their
celebratedfolklore.Whetheryollth culturesespouse overt politicsor
not, they are often set on being culturally'radical'.Moralpanic can
therefore be seen as a culminationand fulfillmentof youth cultural
agendas in so far as negative news coverage baptizestransgression.
Whatbetterway to turn difference into defiance, lifestyleinto social
upheaval,leisureinto revolt?
Disapprovingmass media coverage legitimizesand authenticates
youth culturesto the degree that it is hard to imaginea Britishyouth
'movement'without itt For, in turning youth into news, mass media
both frame subsultures as major events and disseminate them; a
tabloidfront page zsfrequentlya self-fulfillingprophecy.Sociologists
might rightlysee this in terms of 'deviancyamplification',but youth
have their own discourseswhich see the process as one in which a
'scene'is transformedinto a 'movement'.Here youth havea point,for
what gets amplified is not only a 'deviant'activity,but the records,
haircutsand dance styleswhichweresaidto accompanythe activities.
Knowledgeof this youth-cultureethos is such that its exploitation
has become a routine marketing strategy of the publishing and
recording industries. For example, the 'moral panic' about 'Acid
House'in 1988, 1989 and 1990 beganwitha predictionon the backof
the albumthat launchedthe musicgenre. The sleeve notes described
the new sound as 'drug induced', 'sky high' and 'ecstatic'and
concluded with a prediction of moral panic: 'The sound of acid
tracking will undoubtedly become one of the most controversial
sounds of 1988, provokinga split between those who adhere to its
undergroundcreed and those who decry the glamorizationof drug
culture.'In retrospect,this seems prescient,but the statementis best
understood as hopeful. Moralpanics are one of the few marketing
strategiesopen to relativelyanonymousinstrumentaldancemusic.To
quote one music monthly,they amount to a 'pricelessPR campaign'
(Q,January1989)2.
Following London Records' sleeve notes, the youth-orientated
music and style press repeatedlypredictedthat a moral panic about
Acid Hollse was 'inevitable'.3Innuendo, then full-blown exposes
about Ecstacyuse in Britishclubs, appeared in the music press for
monthsbefore the storywas pickedup by the tabloids.By the end of
August, many magazines were wondering why the tabloids were
ignoring the issue, while others, confident of eventual moral panic,
imagined possible headlines like 'London Gripped by Ecstacy!'or
'Drug Crazed New Hippies in Street Riot' (TimeOut 17-24 August

566

andSarahL. Thornton
McRobbie
Angela

In September1988,duringthe 'sillyseason',the tabloidsfinally

1988).
tookthe bait and subjected the culture to the full front-page
The government,Labouroppositionandthe police were
treatment.
only
keento ignore the topic for as long as they possiblycould,
legislation.
makingstatements,arrestsand recommending
belatedly
panic was incited by a couple of culture industries(e.g.
moral
This
and magazinepublishing)wellversedin the 'hip'ideologies
recording
ofyouth subsultures.
In additionto the difficultywe havein excludingratherlargesocial
groupsand industrialactivitiesfrom accountsof 'society'or 'consenthe
sus',so we can'tignore the manyvoiceswhich now contributeto
pressure
groups,
interest
debateduring moral panics. In the 1990s,
lobbiesand campaigningexpertsare mobilizedto intervenein
groups,
moralpanics.Forexample,the spokeswomanof the NationalCouncil
on an
forOne ParentFamilies,Sue Slipman,playeda leading role,
in
months,
six
or
three
of
almostweekly basis over a period
mothers
single
young
of
Tories
the
diminishingthe demonizationby
forhavingchildrenwithoutbeing married.
in
One of the main aims of pressuregroups is timelyintervention
media
the
to
instantly
respond
to
able
relevantmoral panics- to be
demonizationof the group they represent, and to provide inforThe
mationand analysisdesigned to counter this representation.
working
at
skills
their
particular
in
and
effectivenessof these groups
or
withthe mediaand providinghighlyprofessional'soundbites'more
machinery
media
to
resource
invaluable
an
lesson cue make them
They
workingto tight schedulesand withincreasinglysmallbudgets.
'balance'
providing
by
duty
their
doing
be
to
allowthe mediato be seen
can
in their reporting.At the same time, they show how 'folkdevils'
anddo 'fightback'.
This phenomenonof becomingan expert, havingbeen a deviant,
hasa long historyin the fieldof seriouscrime,drugabuseandjuvenile
up to
delinquency.However,the proliferationof groupsrecentlyset they
which
campaignon behalf or with folk devils and the skillwith
engage withmediais an extremelyimportantdevelopmentin political
on law
culture. When Labourand Conservativestake the same line for
the
need
the
and order, arguing for 'effectivepunishment'and
to
voice
give
to
tnoralregenerationof society,manymediaare inclined
immediate
an
of
other, sometimesdissenting,groups. In the absence
and articulate response from Labour, such groups occasionally
A new
function as a virtualform of oppositionto the government.media,
the
of
prominence
the
politicalsociology,takinginto account
the
might fruitfully explore the precise sphere of influence and
effectivenessof these organizations.
This marksa seriesof developmentswhichhaveoccurredperhaps
the
in response to the impact of moral panic theory itself,4 i.e.must
sociologistas expert.At leastsome of the agentsof socialcontrol

soczalworlds
multi-mediated
'moralpanic'for
Rethinking

567

have been listeningwhen figureslikeJock Young and Geoff Pearson

were invited to add their voices to these debates, because in recent
incidentswhere there have been fears that disorderor olltbreaksof
riotingmightspreadto otherareasor to othercities,the playingdown
of the scaleof such incidentshas been a recurrentfeatureand a point
of recommendationby the policein relationto the media.
Althoughmoral panicsare anti-intellectual,often characterizedby
a certain religious fervour, and historicallymost effectivelyused by
the right, only a predominantlyright-wingnational press arguably
stops them from being amenable to the current left. Of course,
governmentis alwaysadvantaged,due to higher numberof authoritativenews sourcesand to institutionalizedagenda-setting.But, there
is alwaysthe possibilityof backfire.Forexample,whenJohn Majorattemptedto buildupon the moralpanicaround'singlemothers'(if not
initiated,then certainlyfueled by governmentspokespeoplebecause
it helped legitimizewelfare cutbacks)with his 'Backto Basics'campaign, the media, followed by Labour,deflected the empty rhetoric
backonto the Tory party,turningthe campaignintoan ad-hocinvestigationinto the personalmoralityand sexualpracticesof Tory MPs.
The delicatebalanceof relationswhichthe moralpanicsociologists
saw existing between media, agents of socialcontrol, folk devils and
moral guardians, has given way to a much more complicatedand
fragmented set of connections.Each of the categoriesdescribedby
moral panics theorists has undergone a process of fissure in the
intervening years. New liaisons have been developed and new
initiativespursued. In particular,two groups seem to be makingever
more vocaland 'effective'intervention:pressuregroupshave,among
other things, stronglycontestedthe vocalityof the traditionalmoral
guardians; and commercialinterests have planted the seeds, and
courted discourses,of moral panic in seeking to gain the favourable
attentionof youthfulconsumers.
This leads us to query the usefulnessof the term 'moralpanic'- a
metaphor which depicts a complex society as a single person who
experiences sudden fear about its virtue. The term's anthropomorphismand totalizationarguablymystifymorethantheyreveal.Its
conception of moralsoverlooksthe youthful ethics of abandonand
the moral imperativesof pressuregroups and vocal experts. In the
l990s, we need to acknowledgethe perspectivesand articulationsof
different sectorsof society.New sociologiesof socialregulationneed
to shift attentionawayfrom the conventionalpoints in the circuitof
amplificationand controland look insteadto these other spaces.
MORAL PANICS FOR EVERY MEDIUM

Not only need the attitudesand activitiesof different social groups

and organizationsbe taken into accountand not subsumedunder a

568

anzlSarahL. Thornton
McRobbie
Angela

'society',but also the disparateperspectivesof different

consensual
a
mass,niche and micro-medianeed to be explored. Britain saw
during
titles
73 per cent increasein consumermagazine
remarkable
resultof moredetailedmarketresearch,tightertarget
the
the1980s
and new technologieslike computermailingand desk-top
marketing
(Marketing13 August 1993).Crucially,the successof many
publishing
ofthese magazineshas been in the discoveryand effectiverepresenof nichesof opinionand identity.
tation
above, moral panic is a favouritetopic of the youth press.
seen
As
the
Whenthe mass media of tabloids and TV become active inwere
press
subsultural
moralpanicabout'AcidHouse',the
'inevitable'
ready.They trackedthe tabloidseverymove, re-printedwhole front
of Acid
pages,analysedtheir copy and decried the mzsrepresentation
youth.
for
up
speak
House.Some 30 magazinesnow targetand
Another area of developmentis the gay and lesbianpresswho are
representedby several national and regional, weekly and monthly
papers,magazines and free sheets, some of which have become
a
sub-dividedby age, like the long-establishedGayNews which takes
course,
Of
Boyz.
political
less
differenteditorialline from the younger,
of
thesedevelopmentsare verymuchdependenton the development
and
presence
the
of
recognition
a'pinkeconomy'and the commercial
persistenceof high levelsof gay discretionaryincome.
Despitetheir proliferationand diversification,however,the media
areobviouslynot a positivereflectionof the diversityof Britain'ssocial
in
interests.This is partlybecause there are large groups of people
editorially
therefore,
and,
which the media are not economically,
interested- crucially,the D and E 'socialgrades'whicharecategorized
by the National ReadershipSurveyas the unskilledworkingclass and
'thoseat the lowestlevelsof subsistence',in otherwords,the long-term
of
employedand poorlypensioned.Buteven here,thereareglimmers
the
of
voice
newspaper
the
as
perceived
hope. The Big Issue is now
of
homeless.Othergroupsand agenciesproducea never-endingflow
a
in
newsletters and press releases many of which are written
and
house-stylecustomizedto the needs of thejournalistson nationalas a
local media. So-calledfolk devils now produce their own media
counterto whatthey perceiveas the biasedmediaof the mainstream.
Moreover,these niche and micro-mediacan even attemptto incite
theirown moralpanics.Take, for example,two rivalpoliticalgroups,
the SocialistWorkersParty (SWP)and the British National Party
to
(BNP)- both of whichhave their own tabloidpapers,whichspeakthe
of
wake
the
In
their membersand attemptto reach out beyond.
electionof a BNP councillorin Tower Hamletsin autumn 1993, the
of
fascistBNP paperwrotehystericallyaboutthe lostneighbourhoods
League
Anti-Nazi
the
of
members
the whiteworkingclassand vilified
the
(ANL,a branchof the SWP)as 'ANAL'scum.The SWPpaper,onand
country
the
sweeping
was
fascism
how
other hand, recounted

Rethinking
'moralpanic'formulti-mediated
socialworlds

569

full-outNazismwasjust aroundthe corner,due to the actionsof their

chief 'folkdevil',not the BNP hooligan,but the police- those'traitors'
to the workingclasswho gavethe BNP the protectionof the state.Both
attemptedto fuel violent politicalaction with their respectivemoral
panic discourses- arguably with a measure of success. This case
suggeststhatmoralpanics,of thislocalizedvariety,are not necessarily
hegemonic.
But one needn'tturn to specialistmagazinesand newspapersto find
the pluralityand divergencesof opinionthatcharacterizetoday's(and
probablyyesterday's)'moral panics'.Even the nationaldailies have
dependablydifferent stances.The paper whose tone and agenda is
closest to 1960/1970s-stylemoral panic is probablythe DailyMail.
Duringthe Thatcheryears,the DailyMailpractisedand perfectedthe
characteristicsof hegemony,in a waywhichwasin uncannyharmony
withThatcherism.It wasa dailyprocessof reachingout to winconsent
through endlessly defining and redefining social questions and
representing itself as the moral voice of the newly self-identified
middleclassas wellas the old lower-middleclass.The factthattheMail
is the only nationaldailywithmore femalethan malereaders- if only
51 per cent female- undoubtedlyinformsits respectablegirl'sbrand
of moralindignity.Hence, hysteriaaboutsingleand teenage mothers
is perfectmaterialfor a DailyMailmoralpanic.
Tabloids like the Sun prefer to espouse an altogether different
brandof moraloutrage.Witha toplesssixteenyearold on page 3 and
a hedonistic pro-sex editorial line, their moralism need be finely
tuned. But that doesn't stop them from being the most preachyand
prescriptiveof Britain'sdailypapers,with page after page of the 'Sun
says . . .' However, the Sun'sfavouritemoral panics are of the 'sex,
drugs and rock'n'roll'variety- storiesabout other people havingfar
toomuchfun, if only becausethe paper is set on maintaininga young
(andnot graying)readership.Moreover,these kindsof storyhavethe
advantageof allowingtheir readersto have their cake and eat it too;
they can vicariouslyenjoy and/or secretlyadmire the transgression
one moment, then be shocked and offended the next. When consideringthe waymoralpanicsworkwithindifferent publications,one
need keep in mind that Sun readerstake their paper a good deal less
seriously than Mail readers take theirs. As Mark Pursehouse discovered in interviewingSun readers, one of the key pleasures in
readingthe Sunis the processof estimatingwhatpartof a storyis true,
whatpartsexaggeratedor totallyinvented.(cf. Pursehouse1991)
In the last few years, the broadsheetshave not only made use of
more visual and colour material, they also seen to have adopted
tabloid-styleheadlines to accompanytheir tabloidsupplements.For
example, the covers of the GuardianG2 section frequently sport
exaggerated,sensationalheadlines. 'BLOODON THE STREETS':
They're PackingPistolsin Manchester'announcesa story about the

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AngelaMcRobbiearuSSarahL Thornton

increasinguse of firearmsby youngdrugdealerson mountainbikesin

Manchester'sMoss Side (Guardzan9 August 1993). Given the more
measuredcopy which follows, the Guurdzanwould seem to be using
this'shockhorror'languageto lightenup the story- the capitalletters
signifying an ironic borrowing of tabloid style. But, as the Sun's
languageis understoodby manyof its readersas tongue-in-cheek,the
Guardzan'sirony gives it an alibi,but not absolution.Moreover,these
mixtures of outrage and amusement point to the 'entertainment
value' of moral panics- something mentioned but not really integrated into previous models. (cf. Curran and Sparks 1991 for a
critiqueof the sastigmaticperspective'of accountsof politicsand the
presswhichoverlookentertainment.)
In consideringtheDailyMail, the Sun and the Guardzan,we'vefound
that each paper has its own styleof in-housemoralism.As the British
pressbecomesmorecompetitive,one strategyfor maintaininghealthy
circulationfiguresis for a newspaperto castitself in the role of moral
guardian,ever alert to new possibilitiesfor concernand indignation.
It would seem that professionaljournalisticstyle,carefullyattunedto
the popularityof 'humaninterest'stories,drawson a moralisticvoice
which, for the purposes of variety, it is willing to undercut with
occasionalirony,jokes, etc.
Althoughthe multiplicityof contemporarymoralpanicsis perhaps
best demonstratedin relationto printmedia,the sametendenciescan
be found in radio and television. Even with only four terrestrial
channels,newdefinitionsof youthprogramminghaveopeneda space
for counter-discourses.Television producer Janet Street-Porter,
drawing on the cut-up graphic style of punk and indicatinga new
commitment on the part of broadcastersto take youth seriously,
pioneered'YouthTV' in the mid-eightiesthroughher Def II serieson
BBC2.In keepingwiththiscommitmentseveralof theseprogrammes
were explicitlyaimed at countering youthful folk devils and moral
panics,particularlyaround drugs. Thus an informativeand rational
BBC2Reportageprogrammeon the use of Ecstasyin raveculturecan
be set againstthe much more traditionalsensationaland fearfulCook
Report(ITV) on the samesubject( 1992).
MEDIATEDSOCIAL WORLDS

In additionto unpacking'society',on the one hand, and the 'media',

on the other, the third considerationin updating models of 'moral
panic'need be that the media is no longer somethingseparablefrom
society. Social reality is experienced through language, communication and imagery. Social meanings and social differences are
inextricablytied up with representation.Thus when sociologistscall
for an accountwhichtellshow life actuallyis, and whichdealswiththe

Rethinking
'moralpanic'for
multi-mediated
socialworlds

571

realissuesratherthanthe spectacularand exaggeratedones, the point

is that these accountsof realityare alreadyrepresentationsand setsof
meanings about what they perceive the 'real' issues to be. These
versionsof 'reality'wouldalsobe impregnatedwiththe markof media
imageryratherthan somehowpure and untouchedby the all-pervasive tracesof contemporarycommunications.
The media have long been seen to be embedded in the fabricof
society.Whatmay be constitutivelynew is the degree to whichmedia
have become something with which the social is continuouslybeing
defined. For example, characterizationslike 'Mirrorreader'or 'Times
reader' often give us as good an indication of social class as the
mentionof a particularoccupation.Socialage and generation(rather
thanbiologicalage) are playedout in the relationbetweenRadiosOne
and Two or Capital 1tMand Capital Gold. Subtle differences of
gender identityare negotiatedwhen, say,a working-classwomansays
she dislikesall soapoperas,preferringinsteadnews,sportand nature
programmes.Similarly,at the riskof being cliche,for a man to admit
his devotion to the films of Joan Crawfordand Judy Garlandis, in
some contexts,tantamountto 'comingout'.
At another level, the hard and fast divide between media professionalsand media 'punters'seems to have broken down to some
extent. The ownership of home video-cameras,the new space for
broadcastinghome video materialon nationaltelevision(in serieslike
VideoDiartes),the existence of 'right to reply' programmes, the
possession of degrees in media studies all point in this direction.
Audiencescan be creditedwith possessinga greaterdegree of 'media
literacy' than they did in the past. Also important here is the
introductionof a distinctivelyamateurish(ratherthan professional)
style of presentation,developed by Channel Four'sTheTubein the
early 1980s and best reflected in the 'fluffed' mannerismof its two
presenters,Jools Holland and Paula Yates. Finally, the increasing
relianceon the audienceas a resourcefor successfultelevision,either
as visualizedparticipantsor audibleinternalaudiences,seemsto givea
positiveplace to the audience in the processof programmeproduction.
The strengthof the old modelsof moralpanicwasthattheymarked
the connection between 'the media'and 'socialcontrol'.But, nowadays, most political strategiesare media strategies.The contest to
determine news agendas is the first and last battle of the political
campaign.Moreover,the kinds of social issues and politicaldebates
whichwere once includedon the agendasof moralpanictheoristsas
sitesof socialanxiety,and even crisis,could now be redefinedas part
of an endlessdebateaboutwho 'we'are and what'our'nationalculture
is. These are profoundly'homeaffairs'.The dailyintensityand drama
of theirappearanceand the manyvoicesnowheardin the background
but in the foreground,punctuatingand producingreality,pointmore

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AngelaMcRobbte
aruS
SarahL. Thornton

to the reality of dealing with social difference than to the unity of

currentaffairs(cf. Hall,Connelland Curtis1981).
CONCLUSIONS

Whathasbeen arguedhere is thatthe modelof moralpanicis urgently

in need of updatingpreciselybecauseof its success.Whilethe theory
beganits life in radicalsociology,the strengthof the argumentquickly
found its way into those very areas with which it was originally
concerned,influencingsocialpolicyand attitudesto deviancegenerally.As a result,the police,as agentsof socialcontrolnow showsome
awarenessof the dangersof overreaction,while sectorsof the media
regularlyremind viewersof the dangersof moralpanicand thus of
alienatingsections of the communityby falsely attributingto them
some of the characteristics
of the so-calledfolk devils.
Crucially,the theory has, over the years, drawn attention to the
importanceof empoweringfolkdevilsso thattheyor theirrepresentativescan challengethe cycleof sanctionsand socialcontrol.Pressure
groups, lobbies,self-helpand interestgroups have sprungup across
the country and effectively positioned themselvesas authoritative
sourcesof commentand criticism.They now contributeto the shape
of publicdebate,playinga majorrole in contestingwhatthey perceive
as dangerousstereotypesand popularmisconceptions.
The theoryhas also influencedbusinesspractice,albeitthroughan
undoubtedlymorecircuitousroute.Cultureindustrypromotionsand
marketing people now understand how, for certain products like
records, magazines,movies and computer games, nothing could be
betterfor salesthana bit of controversy- the threatof censorship,the
suggestionof sexual scandalor subversiveactivity.The promotional
logic is twofold: first, the culturalgood will receive a lot of free, if
negative,publicitybecauseitsassociationswithmoralpanichavemade
it newsworthy;second, rather than alienatingeveryone, it will be
attractive to a contingent of consumers who see themselves as
alternative,avant-garde,radical,rebelliousor simplyyoung. In the
old models of moral panic, the audience played a minor role and
remainedrelativelyuntheorized.Withfew exceptions,they were the
spaceof consensus,the spaceof mediamanipulation,the spaceof an
easily convinced public. A new model need embrace the complex
realmof reception- readers,viewers,listenersand the varioussocial
groups categorizedunder the heading of public opinion cannot be
readoff the representationof socialissues.
The moralpanicswe havebeen discussinghere are less monolithic
than those the classicmodel implied.Recentmoralpanicsdo remain
overwhelminglyconcerned with moral values, societal regularities
and drawingof lines betweenthe permissibleand the less acceptable.
However, hard and fast boundariesbetween 'normal'and 'deviant'

Rethinking
'moralpanic'formulti-mediated
socialworkls

573

wouldseem to be less common- if only becausemoralpanicsare now

continuallycontested. Few sociologistswould dispute the expansion
over the last decade of what used to be called,quite simply,the mass
media. The diversificationof forms of media and the sophisticated
restructuringof variouscategoriesof audience requirethat, while a
consensual social morality might still be a political objective, the
chances of it being delivered directly through the channels of the
mediaare much less certain.
(Dateaccepted:October1994)

AngelaMcRobbie,
Departmentof SocialScience
LoughboroughUniversity
of Technology
and
SarahL. Thornton
Departmentof MediaStuxlies
Universityof Sussex

NOTES

1. Sleeve notes of The Ho?vseSound of

ChicagoVolumeIII: AcidTracksreleasedin
January1988by LondonRecords(a label
of PolygramInternational).
2. This may not, in fact, be new.
Perhaps the first publicity campaign
intentionallyto court moraloutragewas
conducted by Andrew Loog Oldman
who, back in the 1960s, promoted the
Rolling Stones as dirty, irascible,rebelliousand threatening.(cf. Norman1993)
3. Cf. 'New Acid Daze', New Musical
Express(6 February1988); 'Acid Daze',
RecordMirror(20 February1988);'Acid
Daze',MelodyMaker(27 February1988);
Darren Reynolds 'Acid House', Soul
Underground(April 1988).The repetition
of the phrase 'Acid Daze' suggests the
storieswerePRled.
4. Cohen'sFolkDevilsand MoralPanics
and Young'sTheDrugtakershavebeen on
the syllabi of many A-level sociology
courses anct unlverslty courses In sociology, social policy, social work, and
morerecentlymediastudies.
.

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