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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991


RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT,
and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound
effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution
which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of
law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the

law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out
to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in
legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated,
one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
mattersconnected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to
the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion

of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in
the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment
such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v.
Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a
liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of
the Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are
now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification
that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer
or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as
long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal
talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for
appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies
and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made
available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine
Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore,
the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice
of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the
Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be
certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous
with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is
still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities
in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal
services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of
lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members
called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys.
In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled
"associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice
of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood
to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,
140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623,
626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.
(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly
familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers
spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without

litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the
litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the
legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
(Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once
articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today,
there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries
cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such
as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work
is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both
litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases.
The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial
lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should
be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of
legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty.
And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal
task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively
rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead,
the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of
client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly
lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many
clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in
very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient
features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of
prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the
client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work.
The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging
trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in
corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the
major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the

need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and
response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting
the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little
organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the
law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and
the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a
master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the
legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services
of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and
every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado
de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed
of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is
that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house
counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal
research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining
policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or
not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a
corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running
of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in
a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country
is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys
do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice,"
May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow
the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails
to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent
lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to
the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining
modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate
counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying
theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nationstate is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously
with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public
entities but with each other often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in
some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop
alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry
that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are
examples
of
collaborative
efforts
between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises
a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of
both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial
liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for
new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users
to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles
more accessible to managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement
value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly
by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part
of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights
for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities
of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this

nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a
global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today
to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or
by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the
understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain
a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic
legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate
Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day,
he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (19631970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating
loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the

Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of
an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has
rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief
executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of
NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as
the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made
use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body,
which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia MuozPalma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a
member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal
counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central
Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far
as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p.
13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and
in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with
the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the

Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law,


1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to
discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua nonfor foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they
beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet
genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and
Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court
said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission,
171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to
revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do
so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject
to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.
( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of
a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of
its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)

acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081,
October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) SubArticle C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished
from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what
was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law."
True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the
definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are
actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that
Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for
over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first
becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of
the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I
greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President?
And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since
he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as
required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for
the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of

discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly,
the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked
Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the
man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with
anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:


I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result;
it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged
determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated
qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so
gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this
Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I
therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:


The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar,
I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole
vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from
assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally
decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in
relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did
not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that
the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been
met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,
ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."
(Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of
constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman.
Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied
with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or
any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a
nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant
who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the
same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other
than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency,
cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State
vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it
prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity
constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of
a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one
takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People
v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as
preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8
citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an
opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent,
practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290
N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C.
Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of
lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing
law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a
lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten
(10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR
AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I
am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of
law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and
the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which
do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of
law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General
in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in theactive and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the
same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting
hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on

Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts,
not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be
subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority tochoose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed
the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack
of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee
simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than
the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have
been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the
term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law,
however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could
come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to
become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is
another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such
business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated
by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is
hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the
businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer
does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can
be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as
these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If
he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed
engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules
and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance
of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells
us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent
pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that
he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is
conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has
distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The
plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal
attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he
lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a
member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities
extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I
must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in
the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not
expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law;
2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue;
and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms
of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a
specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that
he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the
law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail
to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will
we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation,
serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active

involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not
isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be
"engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is
the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the
enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the tenyear period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the
Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an
alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's
law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also
working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during
that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961
consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin
American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities
Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated
companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt
Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.


d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its
practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for
him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and
those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate
"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor
such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc.
where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of
this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at
various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market

vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as
such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also
services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any
services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or
other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be
carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d
693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes
the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or
counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or
rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such
advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct
in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank , 344 Ill. 462,176
N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked
whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he
was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to
how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his
business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times
his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties
that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall
exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a
practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties
therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't
believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in
preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered:
"I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to
do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of realestate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has
engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that
connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx


... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to
act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear
and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons
are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but
the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in
facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public
attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to
prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of
an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his
client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly
compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice,"
as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to
perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or
repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.;
as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession
of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a
required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and
issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out
to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law
office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the
oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities
which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law
was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding

Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign
corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing
business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active
and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual
transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case
ofAntam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify
for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but
the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he
may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less
than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent

Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result;
it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged
determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated
qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so
gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this
Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I
therefore vote to DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar,
I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole
vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from
assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally
decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in
relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did

not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that
the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been
met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,
ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."
(Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of
constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman.
Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied
with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or
any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a
nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant
who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the
same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other
than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency,
cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State
vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it
prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity
constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of
a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one

takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People
v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as
preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8
citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an
opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent,
practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290
N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C.
Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of
lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing
law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a
lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten
(10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR
AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I
am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of
law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and
the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which

do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of
law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General
in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in theactive and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the
same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting
hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts,
not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be
subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority tochoose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed
the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack
of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee
simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than
the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have
been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the
term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law,
however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could
come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to
become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is
another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such
business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated

by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is
hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the
businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer
does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can
be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as
these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If
he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed
engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules
and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance
of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells
us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent
pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that
he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is
conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has
distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The
plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal
attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he
lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a
member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities
extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I
must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in
the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not
expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law;
2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue;
and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms
of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a
specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that
he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the
law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail
to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will
we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation,
serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active
involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not
isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be
"engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is
the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the
enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the tenyear period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the
Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an
alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's
law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also
working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during
that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961
consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin
American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities


Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated
companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt
Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation


l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its
practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for
him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and
those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate
"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor
such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc.
where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of
this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at
various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market
vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as
such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also
services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any
services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or
other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be
carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d
693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes
the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or
counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or
rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such
advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct
in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176
N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked
whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he
was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to
how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his
business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times
his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties
that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall
exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a
practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties
therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't
believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in
preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered:
"I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to
do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of realestate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has
engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that
connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to
act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear
and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons
are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but
the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in
facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public
attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to
prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of
an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his
client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly
compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice,"
as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to
perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or
repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.;
as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession
of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a


required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and
issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out
to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law
office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the
oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities
which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law
was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding
Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign
corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing
business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active
and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual
transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case
ofAntam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify
for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but
the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he
may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less
than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
Footnotes
1 Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary.
2 14 SCRA 109

3 Commission on Appointments' Memorandum dated 25 June 1991 RE: WHAT


CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW, pp. 6-7.
4 14 SCRA 109.
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970


IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.
VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title,"
filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice
committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase,
as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust
judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the
same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this
Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is
not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this
Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never
be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned
attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and
in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the
practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus,
on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's"unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals
without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to
pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our
Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore
without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the
present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its
attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious
"lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic]
justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of
September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had
"accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that
"his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs.
Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after
due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a
copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He
served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and
place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of
the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he
did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on
August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry
return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial
court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on
August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection
to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the
following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying
that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the
Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the
motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does
not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of
paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636,

June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and,
consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is
not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme
Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs.
Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable
case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement
thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the
resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that
of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June
24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states
that in the latest case,Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the
Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to
the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the
appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962,
which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety
Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was
interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the
point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court
passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the
resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case.
Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by
minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for
reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration
and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the
second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged
from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition
to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is
interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual
members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his
petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to
make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his
certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act
on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection
with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;"
that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or

negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative
act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and
gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to
show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges
contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and
cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public
hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five
days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be
deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that
since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to
answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could
observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the
event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his
defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral
argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far
from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time
embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be
judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou
see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or
how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there
is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and
then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this is the Law
and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On
the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under
oath that the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous,
grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to
bring the entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct
unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been
asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the
highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have shown
callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...

xxx xxx xxx


To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, what
did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility.
That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain
callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding
the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of
natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said
in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY,
GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with
any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face
you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in
the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: "the story is current, though
nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not
what it is used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally
that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the
decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force
of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this
Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their
duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment
against our client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection,
carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to
speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought
to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us.
Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what
crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are
committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in
thy name."
xxx xxx xxx

We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would
correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion
must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb.
Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite
of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been
DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the
above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and
for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because
what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our selfimposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If
we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members
of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned
by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a
studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We
have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for
denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of
a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his
arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however,
most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at
all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and
large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions forcertiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we
reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the
Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S.
Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved."
Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio
Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different
reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying
petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its
reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled
to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's

business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court
disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the
Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the
Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to
take these cases. The tune that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as
already indicated different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in
concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G.
8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered
view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution
violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and
we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional
requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view
of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this
time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no
need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in alleviating its
heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein
petitions for review are often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the
Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling
reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is
axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is
not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important
reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with
law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the
exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of
the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the
dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from
straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the
procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no
need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew
or ought to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the
period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse
party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which
admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs.
Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15,
Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and
place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in
advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the
court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is
nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28,
1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of
Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious:
Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to
determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear
him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may
file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he
has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal,
which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of
his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the
posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the
liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It
would thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect
consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time
he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given
'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but,
also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public
officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial
authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer. 5 Such right is especially recognized where the
criticism concerns a concluded litigation, 6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to
public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of
Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to
comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public
servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity,
competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the
reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their
actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members
of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into
the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only

to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions
of courts and judges. 11

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the
soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected
to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair
and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has
always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar.
In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law
journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly
lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126
NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep.
641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of
opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They
have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in
constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this
subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and
livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is
a
position
too
monstrous
to
be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the
right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor
is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which
would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee.
657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant
with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege,
as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench.
(State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the
lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak
disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting
judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v.
Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the

One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such
a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not
mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no
burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior
toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the
courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due
to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain
towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take
upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and
judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and
offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law.
4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even
those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge,
and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but
discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they
are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he
is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in
rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege.
And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune.
Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he
may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that
courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer,
L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in
private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if
couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice,
may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public
criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So.
2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and

disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of


appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond
bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or
which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such.
However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of
false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and
circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of
having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on
appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement
he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it
is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further
than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch
the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year
suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a
candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of
the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said
bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members
of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even
though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of
baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State
Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte
Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for
instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney, directed
against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of
its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those
made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those
who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times
of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the
end that the public confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity
and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a
woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill
of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed
libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began:

Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected


from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort
to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to
go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible
political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme
Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for
serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances
to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the law demand that
the courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting
language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers
of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public
confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly
an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the
bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was
intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being
influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were
bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions
of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered
suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court
against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its
influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of
justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary
proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a
citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final
determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an
attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an
abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as
independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for
submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court
from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional
conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and
withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused
by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of
criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and
thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial
action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as
every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in
whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial

officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is
false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such
charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the
person
making
them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against
him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons
announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance
of their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives
are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in
the administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who
are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such
charges is guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were
foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against
a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged
criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the
motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct
upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under oath to
demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a
newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a
case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying
that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the
public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the
law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime
importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would
concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials,
whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of
free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that members of
the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts
where justice is administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or
the public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and
honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a
municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the
thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of
members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has

reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose
rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the
part of the members of the bar the law itself demands retribution not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an
attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt,
and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence,"
"criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was
considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer
was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that
greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in
those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and
his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the
defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained
this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to
his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence,
or
umpire,
watchful
and
vigilant
that
the
widow
got
no
undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of
assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness
to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the
University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or
if any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct
motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine
after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months,
delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending
to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the
very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so
directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and his associates in
their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any good
purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and
humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in
regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any
constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion,
could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his
position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any
words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge
alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous
communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable
publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the
accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in
the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto.

The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the
rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public
policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty
here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the
obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded
and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can
recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to
courts and judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of
courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their official acts."Bradley v.
Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards
the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge,
induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words
addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes
misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The
distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was
recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully
sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it
held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a
commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of
any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if
only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the
judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to
the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking
the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under
such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes
professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been
directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to
the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is
guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div.
136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes
(City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a
sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to
his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been robbed of
80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under the state, the
matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to discipline
the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings
leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with
robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public may
feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge
will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same
as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit
judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court,
and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the
accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly
disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial
officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle,
and in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex
parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149;Commonwealth

v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep.
351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to
make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable
warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18
months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the
sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack
against the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the
attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming
that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a
case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of
cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of
propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession
into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case,
prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member
of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign
from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers,
critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which
transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend
to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly
administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with
disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the
exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and
ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted
outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of
comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for
contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end,
nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion
for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this
Court, although conceding that

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will
be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the
propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that
respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said
institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its
dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter
disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with
having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's
client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law,
reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law,
refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i
local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or
narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so
many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only
remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court,"
which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry
from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the
Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he would
introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good
faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the
respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which
was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He
not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the
next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and
reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court
which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and
narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus
embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the
honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this
Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so
many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in
whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would
tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of
the members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of
justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last
bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or
protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their

confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they
cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands,
and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer
of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such
attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on
a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his
conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from
the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et
al., supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of
blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct
was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one
pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on
its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge
that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making
any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the
industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in
determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and continuously
repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to
hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted
statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court
are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and respect
due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members and some former
members of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of
sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases
of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.

18

which, in the interest

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the
doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against
scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not
after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a
contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to
account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its
vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a
modification thereof, however, came when, inPeople vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice

Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel,
which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was
later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the
Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the
1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of
the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of
the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may
still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran
in Alarcon:

A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in


administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is
'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to
destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into
disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What
is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper
comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a
pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to
vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to
destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action
pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper
publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is
sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public
confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements
and actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's
appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had
been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt
for such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our
Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in
so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his
fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent
in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its
ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In
this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no
consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal
profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself
unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of
an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the
solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent
in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law
those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental
power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial
functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys
towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any
respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys

to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the
exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that
he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust
and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of
the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within
its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the
admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar
and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege
conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere
inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of
Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an
assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in
question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty.
Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way.
Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language,
he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The
integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his
contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial
victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this
Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually
makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration
of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as
"calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his
client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his
actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect
toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no
apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative
attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its
members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose
disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation
speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far
transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any
purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and,
more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public
confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this
character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense
of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross
misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of
Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our
disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above
criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high
function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no
means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real
qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court
must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused
by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises,
that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants,
prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter
misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but
also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by
the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade
against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual
members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity
separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the
intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but.
only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their
office. 30So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be
the Court itself, not the individual members thereof as well as the people themselves whose
rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the
administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the
solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of
the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members
collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify
them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court,
exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In
the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant,
prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited
upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may

range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under
the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal
animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and
independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court
be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be
overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may
not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will
realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every
effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that
suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his
misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way
of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to
decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the
comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a
person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in
degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit
of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for
himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension
becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of
law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is
hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and
the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo
and Villamor JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Docketed as Civil Case 8909 on September 17, 1965 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
2 See e.g. "Mounting Discontent against the Supreme Court's Minute Resolution," 32
Lawyers J. p. 325; "Lack of Merit Resolutions are Obnoxious," 31 Lawyers J. p. 329.
3 In the years 1966, 1967 and 1968, this Court rejected by minute resolutions 803, 682 and
848 petitions, respectively, and resolved by extended decisions or resolutions 584, 611 and
760 cases, respectively. For the period covering the first six months of the year 1969, this
Court rejected by minute resolutions 445 petitions, and resolved by extended decision or
resolutions 279 cases.

4 U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918); In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61
Phil. 736 (Malcolm, J., dissenting); Austria vs. Masaquel, G.R. L-22536, Aug. 31,
1967; Cabansag vs. Fernandez, et al., G.R. L-8974, Oct. 18, 1957.
5 In re Gomez, supra.
6 In re Gomez, supra; In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 (1930) ; In re Abistado 57
Phil. 668 (1932); People vs. Alarcon; In re Contempt Proceedings, Mangahas, 69 Phil. 265
(1939). SeePennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 90 L. ed. 1295; In re Bozorth, 118
A. 2d 432; In re Jameson, 340 Pac. 2d 432 (1959) ; In re Pryor, 26 Am. Rep. 474; Hill vs.
Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286;Caig v. Hecht, 68 L. ed. 293 (Concurring opinion of Justice Taft).
7 Strebel v. Figueras, 96 Phil. 321 (1954).
8 State v. Bee Pub. Co., 83 N.W. 204, Sullivan, J. See also State ex rel Atty. Gen. v. Circuit
Ct., 72 N. W. 193.
9 In re Jameson, 340 Pac. 2d 432 (1959).
10 U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918) ; In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376; Cabansag v. Fernandez,
L-18974, Oct. 18, 1957; Austria vs. Masaquel, L-22536, Aug. 31, 1967; Re Troy (1920), 111
Atl. 723; State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Circuit Ct. (1897), 65 Am. St. Rep. 90; Goons v. State, 134
N.E. 194; State vs. Sweetland, 54 N.W. 415; Hill vs. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286; Case of
Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657.
11 State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (NS) 585; Re Pryor, 26 Am. Rep.
747; Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 637; Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657; Brannon v.
State, 29 So. 2d 918;Medgar Evers v. State, 131 So. 2d 653; Re Ades, 6 F 2d 467.
12 "A judge as a public official," said Justice Thornal in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, "is
neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office."
13 In re Bozorth, 118 Atl. 432: "The harsh and sometimes unfounded criticism of the
members of any of the three branches of our Government may be unfortunate lot of public
officials ..., but it has always been deemed a basic principle that such comment may be
made by the public ... . Nor should the judicial branch ... enjoy any more enviable condition
than the other two branches."
In Bridges v. California, 86 L. ed. 192, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, said: "...
an enforced silence, however, limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the
bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it
would enhance respect." Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the minority opinion, said:
"Judges as persons, or courts as institutions, are entitled to no greater immunity from
criticism than other persons or institutions. Just because the holders of judicial office are
identified with the interest of justice they may forget their common human frailties and
fallibilities. There have sometimes been martinets upon the bench as there have sometimes
been wielders of authority who have used the paraphernalia of power in support of what they
called their dignity. Therefore judges must be kept mindful of their limitations and of their
ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous stream of criticism expressed with candor
however blunt "A man cannot be summarily laid by the heels because his words may make
public feeling more unfavorable in case the judge should be asked to act at some later date,

any more than he can for exciting public feeling against a judge for what he already has
done." ... Courts and judges mast take their share of the gains and pains of discussion which
is unfettered except by laws of libel, by self- restraint, and by good taste. Winds of doctrine
should freely blow for the promotion of good and the correction of evil. Nor should restrictions
be permitted that cramp the feeling of freedom in the use of tongue or pen regardless of the
temper of the truth of what may be uttered."
14 Sec. 3, Rule 138.
15 Sec. 20(b), Rule 138.
16 See e.g. Re Chopac, 66 F. Supp., where an attorney was suspended for three years for
writing a judge a letter in which he said that the judge in signing an order took "advantage of
your office to rule with passion and vehemence." Also People v. Green, 3 P. 65, where an
attorney was disbarred for stopping a judge upon the street and addressed abusive, insulting
language to him. See alsoJohnson v. State, 44 So. 671; In re McCowan, 170 P. 1101; State
v. Calhoon, 102, 2d 604; Re Huppe, 11 Pac. 2d 793; State v. Rhodes, 131 NW 2d 118; Re
Rogers, 212 Pac. 1034; In re Griffin, 1 NYS 7; In re Wilkes, 3 NYS 753; Re Manheim, 99
NYS 87; Re Greenfield, 262 NYS 2d 349; In re Klein, 262 NYS 2d 416; In re Smith, 36 A 130.
17 In re Humphrey, 163 P. 60; In re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39; In Snyder's Case, 76 ALR 666; Re
Troy, 111 A. 723; State v. Sprigs, 155 P. 2d 285.
18 Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Rosario Olba,
Contempt proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil. 312, 315; People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil.
579; People vs. Venturanza, et al., 85 Phil. 211, 214; De Joya, et al. vs. CFI of Rizal, 99 Phil.
907, 914; Sison vs. Sandejas, L-9270, April 29, 1959; Paragas vs. Cruz, L-24438, July 30,
1965; Cornejo vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 772, 775.
19 In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376; In re Lozano, 54 Phil. 801; In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; People
vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 1965; Cornejo vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 772, 775. State vs. Dist. Court, 151 Pac.
2d 1002; In re Shannon, 27 Pac. 352; State ex rel. Grice vs. Dist. Court, 97 Pac.
1032; Weston vs. Commonwealth, 77 S.E. 2d 405; State vs. Kaiser, 13 P. 964; State vs. Bee
Pub. Co. 83 N.W. 204;Patterson vs. Colorado. 51 L. ed. 879; Re Hart, 116 N.W. 212.
20 69 Phil. 265.
21 42 O.G. 59.
22 Article VIII, Section 12, Constitution.
23 Re Simpson, 83 N.W. 541.
24 Re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39, 84.
25 Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
26 See Norman Dorsen, Frontiers of Civil Liberties, pp. 60-61; Griswold, "Of Time and
Attitudes," 74Harvard Law Review, 81, 94; Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court of the United
States, (1961) pp. 176-177; see also Freund, On Law and Justice (1968) ch. 4.

27 In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577; De Durant, 10 Ann. Cas. 1913, 1220.
28 State vs. Peck, 91 Atl. 274; 286; Fairfield County Bar vs. Taylor, 22 Atl. 441.
29 Ex Parte Tyler, 40 Pac. 33, 34; Treadwell's case, 7 Pac. 724; Deles vs. Aragona, March
28, 1969, 27 SCRA 634, 644, and the cases therein cited.
30 Sarcos vs. Castillo, et al., L-29755, January 21, 1969.
31 Cf. Radiowealth, Inc. vs. Agregado, 47 O.G., No. 12 (Supp) pp. 87, 89, citing Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 2, P. 870; Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil. 552, 553; Ex parte
Alabama State Bar Ass'n., 8 So. 768.
32 Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
33 Melville vs. Wettengel, 57 Pa. 2d 699; People vs. Winogard, 287 Pac. 864; People vs.
Kelly, 285 Pac. 767; People vs. Harris, 112 N.E. 978; People vs. Anderson, 112 N.E. 273; In
re Gullickson, 181 Atl. 716; Haitmanek vs. Turano, 158 A. 878; Grimsell vs. Wilcox, 98 A.
799; States vs. Kern, 233 N.W. 629; In re Borchardt, 192 N.E. 383; State vs. Trapley, 259
Pac. 783; State vs. Jennings, 159 S.E. 627; In re Jacobson, 126 S.E. 2d 346; Mulvey vs.
O'Niell, 44 Atl. 2d 880; State ex rel Oklahoma Bar Ass'n vs. Hatcher, 209 Pac. 2d 873;
Cleveland Bar Ass'n vs. Wilkerson, 156 N.E. 2d 136 N.E. 2d 136; In re Eddy, 292 N.Y.S. 619.

G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970


SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt Proceedings
Against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and
Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads.
RESOLUTION

SANCHEZ, J.:
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International
Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of record purportedly
made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto,
members of the Bar, with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. On
November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-cause order.
The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth in the memoranda
personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:
a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made these false, ridiculous
and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur

International. Such efforts could be accurately called "scattershot desperation"


(Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three lines from the
bottom of page 13 and first line page 14).
b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant attitude
of the petitioners. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's
Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom of the page).
c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their claims and stories not only from
case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. (Respondents' Supplemental
Memorandum,Ibid., p.17, sixth, seventh and eighth lines from bottom of the page).
MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his
behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B.
Sotto, the Solicitor General points out, contain the following statements:
d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the
misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third
Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the
"right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse
losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the
light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the
Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a
most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated
Sept. 10, 1968).
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 after judgment herein was rendered
and signed by Vicente L. Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and
Graciano Regala and Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr.
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering, judging and resolving the
case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges
"[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the
favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated
January 31, 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled
case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of
an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered
in this case." The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a
number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the
July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought
about respondent MacArthur's belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that
there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of "petitioners, their appointing authority and a
favored party directly benefited by the said decision." The "incidents" cited are as follows:
(a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law has not been declared unconstitutional.
(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-entitled case.

(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to adduce evidence
as is the procedure in all previous cases of this nature.
(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the appeal from a
denial of a motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a
wholesome development of the law but only served to delay respondent for the benefit of
the favored party.
(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but destroyed it,
and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a reason, not for no reason at
all.
(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which the Honorable
Supreme Court has refused to correct.
(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous decisions,
and the main issue "right to reject any or all bids" is being treated on a double standard basis
by the Honorable Supreme Court.
(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows better and
has greater understanding than the said decision manifests.
(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars by said decision
without an effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the facts through
presentation through the trial court, which is elementary.
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy
and Graciano Regala and Associates, in writing pointed out to this Court that the statements
specified by the Solicitor General were either quoted out of context, could be defended, or
were comments legitimate and justifiable. Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of
the interests of his clients. It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not plead such
thoughts, his client would be deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to
change the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7, paragraph 2 of the
motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion, which
in full reads:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they
are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter
what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity.
Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering that any emanation from their
mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism
for a party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to
judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court seemingly totally oblivious or
uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved and also of Judge Geraldez
who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an accused who is also his
correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright
dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that
many of our government officials are just amoral?
And, in addition, he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7
thereof.

It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his compliance with this
Court's resolution of November 21, 1968. He there stated that the motion to inhibit and third
motion for reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that he alone should be held
responsible therefor. He further elaborated on his explanations made on November 21, 1968.
On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already deleted
paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft but that it was still
included through inadvertence.
On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for MacArthur, registered an
amended motion to inhibit. While it repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion and
Mr. Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it left but three paragraphs of the original motion to
inhibit, taking out the dissertation on judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the
decision of this Court of July 31, 1968.
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as early as October 7, 1968, he
insisted in withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. His
ground was that he did not agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two justices.
According to him, "[t]he present steps (sic) now being taken is against counsel's upbringing
and judicial conscience."
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took pains to say that the
questioned statements he made were also taken out of context and were necessary for the
defense of his client MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that those statements lifted
out of context would indeed be sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20(f), Rule 138, had
been violated.
On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there
averred that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the charge against him
because it is one of civil contempt against a party and the charge is originally cognizable by
the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also
stressed that said charge was not signed by an "offended party or witness", as required by
law; and that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not stand in the stead of an
"offended Party or witness."
We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of December 2, 1968, as
further clarified by a supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he manifested that the use
of or reference to his law firm in this case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or
any of his associates; that on July 14, 1967, one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's behalf,
offered to retain his services, which was accepted; that Meads inquired from him whether he
could appear in this case; that he advised Meads that this case was outside his professional
competence and referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise turned down the
offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and he agreed to terminate their previous retainer
agreement; that he had not participated in any manner in the preparation or authorship of
any pleading or any other document in connection with this case.
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his side of the case. In brief, he denied
participation in any of the court papers subject of our November 21, 1968 order; claimed that
he was on six months' leave of absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as one of
the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his permission to have his name included as
counsel in all of MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072), even while he was on leave of
absence.

Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3, 1969.


A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969, respondent MacArthur,
through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a special appearance for the
purpose, lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said
motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the
time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case which condition is prohibited by the
New Rules of Court Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part.
... . only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take
part in its consideration and adjudication ..." This requirement is especially significant in the
present instance because the member who penned the decision was the very member who
was absent for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the
Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for
justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft
and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required by
the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court
on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and /or to the United States
Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation
of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without either
compensation or due process of law and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring
the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price
premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or
compensation is made.
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M.
Caling "to show cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be
dealt with for contempt of court."
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return. He there alleged that the said fourth
motion for reconsideration was already finalized when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his
office and requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that he turned
down said request twice on the ground that he did not know anything about the case, much
less the truth of the allegations stated in the motion; that "the allegations in said motion were
subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with the background of the case
involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F. Meads"; that upon assurance that
there was nothing wrong with the motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same;
that he was misled in so signing and the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to
him especially the oral argument allegedly made in the case.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling, this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved
"to require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the
said return [of Atty. Caling] and at the same time to show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago and Morton Meads, should not be dealt with for contempt of court, on or before
August 16, 1969; and ... to direct that the three, Atty. Juanita M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally appear Before this Court on Thursday, August 27,

1969, at 9:30 a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings against all of them will be heard
by this Court."
On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation. He disavowed the truth
of Atty. Caling's statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the motion. The truth,
according to Santiago, is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he
knew of a lawyer nearby who could help him file another motion for reconsideration, and he
(Santiago) mentioned Atty. Caling; he there upon accompanied Meads to Caling, told Caling
of Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling. Santiago insists that he never prepared the
motion and that he never even read it.
On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is as follows: On July 14,
1969, he went to Atty. Santiago's office with the fourth motion for reconsideration which he
himself prepared. Santiago started to read the motion and in fact began to make some
changes in Pencil in the first or second paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur
wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked Santiago if he could
recommend one. They then went to Caling whose office was on the same floor. Santiago
introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing the fourth motion to Caling. While
Caling was reading the document, Santiago left. After reading the motion, Caling gave his
go-signal. He signed the same after his name was typed therein. The motion was then filed.
According to Meads, from the time he entered the office of Santiago to the time the motion
was filed, the period that elapsed was approximately one hour and a half. Santiago was with
Caling for about three minutes and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes.
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that the quotation from the
Rules of Court set forth in the fourth motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of
context because said quotation is precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a
complete quotation and that it is a common practice in court pleadings to submit partial
quotations. Meads further contends that the announced plan to bring the case to the World
Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also included a notice of appeal to the World Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito Caling and
Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to the second contempt incident. We shall now
discuss the first and second contempt incidents seriatim.
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration,
we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures
petitioners as "vulturous executives". He speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic
tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as "false,
erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner. He there charges that the ex
parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case
even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this
Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro,
because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of
the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of
the newly-created Board of Investments, "a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was
rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would seem that the principles thus
established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the
Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself." He puts forth the claim that lesser and

further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that there
is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a
particular cause or party." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro
are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in
the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the
appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their
judgment. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife,
warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to
happen in our country, "although the process has already begun."
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as
disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact that it has been made. He explained that, he
deleted this paragraph in his rough draft, which paragraph was included in the motion filed in
this Court only because of mere inadvertence. This explanation does not make much of a
distinguishing difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but also
because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. And
this paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our judicial authorities" who "believe that
they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no
matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto
eternity." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation from
their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or
favoritism for a party or an issue." After citing acts of two judges of first instance, he paused
to ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of
intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our
government officials are just amoral?"
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against
respondent MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners, their appointing
authority and a favored party directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a lecture on
judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court about loss of confidence, and
paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that "any other justices who have received favors
or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any boardpetitioner, or their agents or principals, including the President", should also inhibit
themselves.
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law.
The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts
aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices
who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any
members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including the president." The
absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are
appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each received a
favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case
involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The
consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be
wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country. Counsel is
presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed
effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such
disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of

faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are
thus called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967),
20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become
common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance
thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one
such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of
the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to
support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The attorney's oath
solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity ... to the courts.' Worth
remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by
rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to
uphold.' "
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice."1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to
which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." 2 Faith in the courts
a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the
continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." 3 Thus has it been
said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and
not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the
proper administration of justice."4
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the
defense of his client. A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty
and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are
administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as
many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly
subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics."5 As rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a judge from the
very nature of his position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is the attorney, and no other,
who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial
position.6 From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for
attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may happen
that counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who
presides over the court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may
grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even
under
adverse
conditions
are
necessary
for
the
orderly
administration
of
justice."7

The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And
yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades
the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against
improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice 8 is thus transgressed. Atty.
Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the statements pointed out
to us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made
"false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against
MacArthur." He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition
of petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the

petitioners." He charges petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories
not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such language is
not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends
the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to say that these statements were taken out
of context. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements. They do not in any
manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a]
lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession."9 It is
Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of
the
cause
with
which
he
is
charged." 10
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the
accused convicted of murder made use of the following raw language in his brief : "The accused
since birth was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has never
owned a thousand pesos in his own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold fifty
thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. A simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work
and that would transform him into a new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a palatial
mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth, protection and stability was
given to do the forbidden deed." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an
affront to the court."

It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be
considered offended parties in this case. This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of
this nature. There should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for
contempt under the circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any
manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto." 11
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties; and that
he too has committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade
the administration of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of contempt.

3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It was improper for Atty.
Santiago to have included the name of the firm of Atty. Regala without the latter's knowledge
and consent. Correctly did Regala insist and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of
respondents that he had not participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled
case. Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. He is
exonerated.
4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito
R. Uy. Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the
preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation. He should be held
exempt from contempt.
5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The fourth motion for
reconsideration is, indeed, an act of contumacy.
First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been made why this has
been done.

Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said Section 1 was
quoted as follows: "Justices; who may take part. ... only those members present when any
matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..."
However, the provision in its entire thought should be read thus
SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. All matters submitted to the court for its
consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and
adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division of the court at
the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether such
Justices were or were not present at the date of submission; however, only those members
present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication, if the parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect in writing filed with
the
clerk
at
the
date
of
submission. 12
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to explain this point.

Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about
the portion left out was anyway marked by "XS" which is a common practice among
lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his
conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the
lawyer knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not
take a lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this Court. There was
a qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification was intentionally omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the
United States government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time
was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so,
unnecessary statements were injected. More specifically, the motion announced that
MacArthur "will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine government
officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court" and would invoke "the
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars
annually ... ."
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its
favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads' return. There
is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An
appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to
reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being
dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no
aboveboard explanation.
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted
from the contempt charge against him. He knows that he is an officer of this Court. He
admits that he has read the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While he
has been dragged in only at the last minute, still it was plainly his duty to have taken care
that his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character.
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for
reconsideration. He cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him even though he is
not a lawyer. He is guilty of contempt.

8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he had nothing to do with the
fourth motion for reconsideration and that he had not even read the same is too transparent
to survive fair appraisal. It goes against the grain of circumstances. Caling represents before
us that it was Santiago who convinced him to sign the motion, who with Meads explained to
him the allegations thereof and the background of the case. Caling says that if not for his
friendship with Santiago, he would not have signed the motion. On the other hand, Meads
states that Santiago began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration and even started to
make changes thereon in pencil. We must not forget, too, that according to Meads himself,
he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with Santiago before they proceeded to Caling.
It is highly improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth motion for reconsideration during
all that time.
Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He has
not resigned from his position as such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings. Whatever
steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of
the Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best
efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself
ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers,
jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should
terminate their relation."
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of
ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given
cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To
preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio
of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a
cause before a court of justice.
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only for one reason, this Court
had really no alternative but to decide the main case against respondent MacArthur. As we
held in our decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms and
conditions of the invitation to bid. For, this invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not
accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. And We repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid of the
Company [MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite bond." 13 It would not require
the adroit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond., contrary to the
instructions to bidders, is not entitled to any consideration.
It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein was by a unanimous Court,
even if the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the decision
on the merits of this case, the result would have been the same: MacArthur's cause would
just the same have failed.
For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:
1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty
of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100;
and holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of
contempt of court; and
2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty.
Juanita M. Caling guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an
additional P1,000, Morton F. Meads, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. Caling, P200.

Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for
whatever action he may deem proper to take in the premises against Morton F. Meads who
is an alien.
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Solicitor General, for
such action as he may deem proper in relation to the disbarment or suspension of Attys.
Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to the personal
records of Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling. So
ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion C.J., Castro, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes
* Editor's Note: See main decision in 24 SCRA 491-495.
1 People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855.
2 In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602.
3 Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160.
4 People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572, 580.
5 5 Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1966 ed., p. 69, citing In re Kelly, 243 F. 696,
706.
6 Malcolm, op. cit., p. 161.
7 Ibid., pp. 161-162; emphasis supplied.
8 Section 3(d), Rule 71, provides:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing.After charge in writing
has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a
person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
xxx xxx xxx

9 5 Martin, op. cit., p. 97.


10 Section 20(f), Rule 138, Rules of Court.
11 Section 5(d), Rule 135, Rules of Court.
12 Emphasis supplied.
13 Decision of July 31, 1968, p. 3, Rollo, p. 387.
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971


THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU
INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR
LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners,
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M.
OLBES and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Lacsina, Lontok and Perez and Luis F. Aquino for petitioners.
Francisco de los Reyes for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for other respondents.

CASTRO, J.:
Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial
Relations dated August 17, 1965 and October 20, 1965, respectively, in Case 1698-ULP.
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group
Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees AssociationNATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free
Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the
Companies).
Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was
formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU
unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting
president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members
of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade
Unions (NATU), to no avail.

Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of
the Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956
as assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department, and he was
soon receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he was receiving from the FFW. Enaje was
hired on or about February 19, 1957 as personnel manager of the Companies, and was
likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective
bargaining with the Unions.
In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the
Companies for a modified renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts which
were then due to expire on September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed and to make
whatever benefits could be agreed upon retroactively effective October 1, 1957.
Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were conducted on
the Union's proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as
a result of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for "deadlock on
collective bargaining." Several conciliation conferences were held under the auspices of the
Department of Labor wherein the conciliators urged the Companies to make reply to the
Unions' proposals en toto so that the said Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping
their demand for union security in exchange for other benefits. However, the Companies did
not make any counter-proposals but, instead, insisted that the Unions first drop their demand
for union security, promising money benefits if this was done. Thereupon, and prior to April
15, 1958, the petitioner Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU dropped this
particular demand, and requested the Companies to answer its demands, point by point, en
toto. But the respondent Insular Life Assurance Co. still refused to make any counterproposals. In a letter addressed to the two other Unions by the joint management of the
Companies, the former were also asked to drop their union security demand, otherwise the
Companies "would no longer consider themselves bound by the commitment to make money
benefits retroactive to October 1, 1957." By a letter dated April 17, 1958, the remaining two
petitioner unions likewise dropped their demand for union shop. April 25, 1958 then was set
by the parties to meet and discuss the remaining demands.
From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no
satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. On May 13, 1958 the
Unions demanded from the Companies final counter-proposals on their economic demands,
particularly on salary increases. Instead of giving counter-proposals, the Companies on May
15, 1958 presented facts and figures and requested the Unions to submit a workable formula
which would justify their own proposals, taking into account the financial position of the
former. Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they considered
the Companies' unfair labor practices.
Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in
salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after
the notice to strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the
Unions.
On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life
Building at Plaza Moraga.
On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, the
respondent Jose M. Olbes (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Olbes), sent to each of
the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows:

We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.


However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:
1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so.
2. Take your meals within the office.
3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office
where comfortable cots have been prepared.
4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.
5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.
6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.
The decision to make is yours whether you still believe in the motives of the strike or in
the fairness of the Management.
The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were
convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter of May 21, 1958.
From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, 1958,
some management men tried to break thru the Unions' picket lines. Thus, on May 21, 1958
Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records
section, respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the picket lines in front of the
Insular Life Building. Garcia, upon approaching the picket line, tossed aside the placard of a
picketer, one Paulino Bugay; a fight ensued between them, in which both suffered injuries.
The Companies organized three bus-loads of employees, including a photographer, who with
the said respondent Olbes, succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular
Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the
resistance offered by some picketers.
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence,
the Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal's Office of
Manila. During the pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office, the Companies likewise
filed a petition for injunction with damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila which,
on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking members of the
Unions, issued on May 31, 1958 an order restraining the strikers, until further orders of the
said court, from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the
Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to
and from, out and in, of the Companies' building.
On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent individually to
the strikers a letter (exhibit B), quoted hereunder in its entirety:
The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.
Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of our
decision.

We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions open for
long. We have continued to operate and will continue to do so with or without you.
If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are
no criminal charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for
work at the home office. If by this date you have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain
your replacement.
Before, the decisions was yours to make.
So it is now.
Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the
Unions, except three (3), were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts. These three
cases involved "slight physical injuries" against one striker and "light coercion" against two
others.
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well
as the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or
else be replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to
work on June 2, 1958.
However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure
clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management
committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening committee
initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with
pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted
immediately by the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal's
office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's
office, the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34
officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that
they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without however stating the
specific acts allegedly committed. Among those who were refused readmission are Emiliano
Tabasondra, vice president of the Insular Life Building Employees' Association-NATU;
Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees AssociationNATU; and Isagani Du Timbol, acting president of the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.
Employees Association-NATU. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified
months later that they were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given
separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to
now have not been readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal notices given to
them.
On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the
Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with
(1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted
action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and
return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid
overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work on or before
June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of the
Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union
membership and degree of participation in the strike.

On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the material allegations of
the complaint, stating special defenses therein, and asking for the dismissal of the complaint.
After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding Judge Arsenio
Martinez, rendered on August 17, 1965 a decision dismissing the Unions' complaint for lack
of merit. On August 31, 1965 the Unions seasonably filed their motion for reconsideration of
the said decision, and their supporting memorandum on September 10, 1965. This was
denied by the Court of Industrial Relations en banc in a resolution promulgated on October
20, 1965.
Hence, this petition for review, the Unions contending that the lower court erred:
1. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in sending out individually to the
strikers the letters marked Exhibits A and B;
2. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
striking members of the Unions in the matter of readmission of employees after the strike;
3. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing officials and
members of the Unions without giving them the benefit of investigation and the opportunity to
present their side in regard to activities undertaken by them in the legitimate exercise of their
right to strike; and
4. In not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of the Unions, with full back
wages, from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual employment.
I. The respondents contend that the sending of the letters, exhibits A and B, constituted a
legitimate exercise of their freedom of speech. We do not agree. The said letters were
directed to the striking employees individually by registered special delivery mail at that
without being coursed through the Unions which were representing the employees in the
collective bargaining.
The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following
unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day
and that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an
unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the right of collective bargaining through
dealing with the employees individually instead of through their collective bargaining
representatives. (31 Am. Jur. 563, citing NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co. [CA 9th] 133 F2d
676, 146 ALR 1045)
Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining
agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually in
connection with changes in the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding
individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, the employer is
still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees' bargaining representative
(Melo Photo Supply Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332).
Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as constituting unwarranted acts of
interference. Thus, the act of a company president in writing letters to the strikers, urging
their return to work on terms inconsistent with their union membership, was adjudged as
constituting interference with the exercise of his employees' right to collective bargaining

(Lighter Publishing, CCA 7th, 133 F2d 621). It is likewise an act of interference for the
employer to send a letter to all employees notifying them to return to work at a time specified
therein, otherwise new employees would be engaged to perform their jobs. Individual
solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his representative
urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor
practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to
undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free
from the employer's molestation. 1
Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees in order
to entice them to return to work, it is not protected by the free speech provisions of the
Constitution (NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70). The same is true with exhibit
B since it contained threats to obtain replacements for the striking employees in the event
they did not report for work on June 2, 1958. The free speech protection under the
Constitution is inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent
contains a promise of benefit, or threats, or reprisal (31 Am. Jur. 544; NLRB vs. Clearfield
Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70; NLRB vs. Goigy Co., 211 F2d 533, 35 ALR 2d 422).
Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the strikers
with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional movies," "overtime" pay for "work
performed in excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families, so they would
abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or unionbusting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a
strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they are
represented by a union, since the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to
determine what the consequences of returning to work would be.
Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join labor organizations are the following
acts: the offer of a Christmas bonus to all "loyal" employees of a company shortly after the
making of a request by the union to bargain; wage increases given for the purpose of
mollifying employees after the employer has refused to bargain with the union, or for the
purpose of inducing striking employees to return to work; the employer's promises of benefits
in return for the strikers' abandonment of their strike in support of their union; and the
employer's statement, made about 6 weeks after the strike started, to a group of strikers in a
restaurant to the effect that if the strikers returned to work, they would receive new benefits
in the form of hospitalization, accident insurance, profit-sharing, and a new building to work
in.2
Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting prosecutor of the lower court which
states that "the officers and members of the complainant unions decided to call off the strike
and return to work on June 2, 1958 by reason of the injunction issued by the Manila Court of
First Instance," the respondents contend that this was the main cause why the strikers
returned to work and not the letters, exhibits A and B. This assertion is without merit. The
circumstance that the strikers later decided to return to work ostensibly on account of the
injunctive writ issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic quality
of the letters, which were calculated, or which tended, to interfere with the employees' right to
engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of a strike. Interference constituting unfair
labor practice will not cease to be such simply because it was susceptible of being thwarted
or resisted, or that it did not proximately cause the result intended. For success of purpose is
not, and should not, be the criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited act constitutes
unfair labor practice.

The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within the
meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may
reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights under
section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee
was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a
reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on
self-organization and collective bargaining. (Francisco, Labor Laws 1956, Vol. II, p.
323, citing NLRB v. Ford, C.A., 1948, 170 F2d 735).
Besides, the letters, exhibits A and B, should not be considered by themselves alone but
should be read in the light of the preceding and subsequent circumstances surrounding
them. The letters should be interpreted according to the "totality of conduct doctrine,"
... whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated not only on the
basis of their implicit implications, but were to be appraised against the background of and in
conjunction with collateral circumstances. Under this "doctrine" expressions of opinion by an
employer which, though innocent in themselves, frequently were held to be culpable because
of the circumstances under which they were uttered, the history of the particular employer's
labor relations or anti-union bias or because of their connection with an established collateral
plan of coercion or interference. (Rothenberg on Relations, p. 374, and cases cited therein.)
It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended
renewal of their respective collective bargaining agreements to the respondents, the latter
hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel
manager and assistant corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive compensations. After
the notice to strike was served on the Companies and negotiations were in progress in the
Department of Labor, the respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without
increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from
their unions. And during the negotiations in the Department of Labor, despite the fact that the
petitioners granted the respondents' demand that the former drop their demand for union
shop and in spite of urgings by the conciliators of the Department of Labor, the respondents
adamantly refused to answer the Unions' demands en toto. Incidentally, Enage was the
chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining between the
former and the Unions. After the petitioners went to strike, the strikers were individually sent
copies of exhibit A, enticing them to abandon their strike by inducing them to return to work
upon promise of special privileges. Two days later, the respondents, thru their president and
manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others,
escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings
occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the
process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life
Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers. Then
the respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not
dismissed, and these three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal
actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of first instance
restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of
the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and
vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' buildings. On the same day that the
injunction was issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was sent again individually and by registered
special delivery mail to the strikers, threatening them with dismissal if they did not report
for work on or before June 2, 1958. But when most of the petitioners reported for work, the
respondents thru a screening committee of which Ramon Garcia was a member
refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on the ground of "pending criminal charges."
lwph1.t

However, when almost all were cleared of criminal charges by the fiscal's office, the
respondents adamantly refused admission to 34 officials and union members. It is not,
however, disputed that all-non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the
breakthrough incident of May 23, 1958 were readmitted immediately by the respondents.
Among the non-strikers with pending criminal charges who were readmitted were Generoso
Abella, Enrique Guidote, Emilio Carreon, Antonio Castillo, Federico Barretto, Manuel
Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano. And despite the fact that the fiscal's office found no probable
cause against the petitioning strikers, the Companies adamantly refused admission to them
on the pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without
stating specifically the inimical acts allegedly committed. They were soon to admit, however,
that these alleged inimical acts were the same criminal charges which were dismissed by the
fiscal and by the courts..
Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters,
exhibit A and B, yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents
scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism within them.
To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the strikers and secure replacements for them in
order to protect and continue their business, the CIR held the petitioners' strike to be an
economic strike on the basis of exhibit 4 (Notice of Strike) which states that there was a
"deadlock in collective bargaining" and on the strength of the supposed testimonies of some
union men who did not actually know the very reason for the strike. It should be noted that
exhibit 4, which was filed on January 27, 1958, states, inter alia:
TO:
DEPARTMENT
MANILA

BUREAU

OF

LABOR

RELATIONS
LABOR

OF

Thirty (30) days from receipt of this notice by the Office, this [sic] unions intends to go on
strike against
THE
INSULAR
Plaza Moraga, Manila
THE
Plaza Moraga, Manila
INSULAR
Plaza Moraga, Manila .

LIFE

FGU

LIFE

ASSURANCE

INSURANCE

BUILDING

CO.,

LTD.

GROUP

ADMINISTRATION

for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING...


However, the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day period, reckoned from
January 27, 1958. This simply proves that the reason for the strike was not the deadlock on
collective bargaining nor any lack of economic concessions. By letter dated April 15, 1958,
the respondents categorically stated what they thought was the cause of the "Notice of
Strike," which so far as material, reads:
3. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the union shop, you filed a notice
of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations on 27 January 1958, citing `deadlock in

collective bargaining' which could have been for no other issue than the union shop." (exhibit
8, letter dated April 15, 1958.)
The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said notice of strike was filed. And
the actual and main reason for the strike was, "When it became crystal clear the
management double crossed or will not negotiate in good faith, it is tantamount to refusal
collectively and considering the unfair labor practice in the meantime being committed by the
management such as the sudden resignation of some unionists and [who] became
supervisors without increase in salary or change in responsibility, such as the coercion of
employees, decided to declare the strike." (tsn., Oct. 14, 1958, p. 14.) The truth of this
assertion is amply proved by the following circumstances: (1) it took the respondents six (6)
months to consider the petitioners' proposals, their only excuse being that they could not go
on with the negotiations if the petitioners did not drop the demand for union shop (exh. 7,
respondents' letter dated April 7, 1958); (2) when the petitioners dropped the demand for
union shop, the respondents did not have a counter-offer to the petitioners' demands. Sec.
14 of Rep. Act 875 required the respondents to make a reply to the petitioners' demands
within ten days from receipt thereof, but instead they asked the petitioners to give a "well
reasoned, workable formula which takes into account the financial position of the group
companies." (tsn., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 62; tsn., Feb. 26, 1969, p. 49.)
II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of the strikers, namely: (1) the
employee must be interested in continuing his work with the group companies; (2) there must
be no criminal charges against him; and (3) he must report for work on June 2, 1958,
otherwise he would be replaced. Since the evidence shows that all the employees reported
back to work at the respondents' head office on June 2, 1953, they must be considered as
having complied with the first and third conditions.
Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at whether they also complied with the
second condition. It is not denied that when the strikers reported for work on June 2, 1958,
63 members of the Unions were refused readmission because they had pending criminal
charges. However, despite the fact that they were able to secure their respective clearances
34 officials and union members were still refused readmission on the alleged ground that
they committed acts inimical to the Companies. It is beyond dispute, however, that nonstrikers who also had criminal charges pending against them in the fiscal's office, arising
from the same incidents whence the criminal charges against the strikers evolved, were
readily readmitted and were not required to secure clearances. This is a clear act of
discrimination practiced by the Companies in the process of rehiring and is therefore a
violation of sec. 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act.
The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They
separated the active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it,
on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused readmission even
after they were able to secure clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the
criminal charges filed against them. It is significant to note in this connection that except for
one union official who deserted his union on the second day of the strike and who later
participated in crashing through the picket lines, not a single union officer was taken back to
work. Discrimination undoubtedly exists where the record shows that the union activity of the
rehired strikers has been less prominent than that of the strikers who were denied
reinstatement.
So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although authorized by the Court of
Industrial Relations to dismiss the employees who participated in an illegal strike, dismissed

only the leaders of the strikers, such dismissal being evidence of discrimination against those
dismissed and constituting a waiver of the employer's right to dismiss the striking employees
and a condonation of the fault committed by them." (Carlos and Fernando, Labor and Social
Legislation, p. 62, citing Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Phil. Air Lines Emloyees Association, L-8197,
Oct. 31, 1958.)
It is noteworthy that perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from
charges of discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work the respondents
delegated the power to readmit to a committee. But the respondent Olbes had chosen
Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, and Ramon Garcia, assistant
corporate secretary, to screen the unionists reporting back to work. It is not difficult to
imagine that these two employees having been involved in unpleasant incidents with the
picketers during the strike were hostile to the strikers. Needless to say, the mere act of
placing in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers the power of reinstatement, is a form
of discrimination in rehiring.
Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is having the machinery of
reinstatement in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers, and reinstating a union
official who formerly worked in a unionized plant, to a job in another mill, which was
imperfectly organized. (Morabe, The Law on Strikes, p. 473, citing Sunshine Mining Co., 7
NLRB 1252; Cleveland Worsted Mills, 43 NLRB 545; emphasis supplied.)
Equally significant is the fact that while the management and the members of the screening
committee admitted the discrimination committed against the strikers, they tossed back and
around to each other the responsibility for the discrimination. Thus, Garcia admitted that in
exercising for the management the authority to screen the returning employees, the
committee admitted the non-strikers but refused readmission to the strikers (tsn., Feb. 6,
1962, pp. 15-19, 23-29). Vicente Abella, chairman of the management's screening
committee, while admitting the discrimination, placed the blame therefor squarely on the
management (tsn., Sept. 20, 1960, pp. 7-8, 14-18). But the management, speaking through
the respondent Olbes, head of the Companies, disclaimed responsibility for the
discrimination. He testified that "The decision whether to accept or not an employee was left
in the hands of that committee that had been empowered to look into all cases of the
strikers." (tsn., Sept. 6, 1962, p. 19.)
Of course, the respondents through Ramon Garcia tried to explain the basis for such
discrimination by testifying that strikers whose participation in any alleged misconduct during
the picketing was not serious in nature were readmissible, while those whose participation
was serious were not. (tsn., Aug. 4, 1961, pp. 48-49, 56). But even this distinction between
acts of slight misconduct and acts of serious misconduct which the respondents contend was
the basis for either reinstatement or discharge, is completely shattered upon a cursory
examination of the evidence on record. For with the exception of Pascual Esquillo whose
dismissal sent to the other strikers cited the alleged commission by them of simple "acts of
misconduct."
III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed striker
was given the opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges against him. As
earlier mentioned, when the striking employees reported back for work on June 2, 1958, the
respondents refused to readmit them unless they first secured the necessary clearances; but
when all, except three, were able to secure and subsequently present the required
clearances, the respondents still refused to take them back. Instead, several of them later
received letters from the respondents in the following stereotyped tenor:

This will confirm the termination of your employment with the Insular Life-FGU Insurance
Group as of 2 June 1958.
The termination of your employment was due to the fact that you committed acts of
misconduct while picketing during the last strike. Because this may not constitute sufficient
cause under the law to terminate your employment without pay, we are giving you the
amount of P1,930.32 corresponding to one-half month pay for every year of your service in
the Group Company.
Kindly acknowledge receipt of the check we are sending herewith.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
President,
Acting President, FGU.

JOSE

M.
Insurance

OLBES
Life

The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged "acts of misconduct" attributed to the
dismissed strikers were the same acts with which the said strikers were charged before the
fiscal's office and the courts. But all these charges except three were dropped or dismissed.
Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not
indicate sufficient basis for dismissal.
Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers &
Employees Association-NATU, was refused reinstatement allegedly because he did not
report for duty on June 2, 1958 and, hence, had abandoned his office. But the overwhelming
evidence adduced at the trial and which the respondents failed to rebut, negates the
respondents' charge that he had abandoned his job. In his testimony, corroborated by many
others, Tabasondra particularly identified the management men to whom he and his group
presented themselves on June 2, 1958. He mentioned the respondent Olbes' secretary, De
Asis, as the one who received them and later directed them when Olbes refused them an
audience to Felipe Enage, the Companies' personnel manager. He likewise categorically
stated that he and his group went to see Enage as directed by Olbes' secretary. If
Tabasondra were not telling the truth, it would have been an easy matter for the respondents
to produce De Asis and Enage who testified anyway as witnesses for the respondents on
several occasions to rebut his testimony. The respondents did nothing of the kind.
Moreover, Tabasondra called on June 21, 1958 the respondents' attention to his nonadmission and asked them to inform him of the reasons therefor, but instead of doing so, the
respondents dismissed him by their letter dated July 10, 1958. Elementary fairness required
that before being dismissed for cause, Tabasondra be given "his day in court."
At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return, does
not constitute abandonment nor bar reinstatement. In one case, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the taking back of six of eleven men constituted discrimination although the five
strikers who were not reinstated, all of whom were prominent in the union and in the strike,
reported for work at various times during the next three days, but were told that there were
no openings. Said the Court:
... The Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported, that, in taking back six
union men, the respondent's officials discriminated against the latter on account of their
union activities and that the excuse given that they did not apply until after the quota was full

was an afterthought and not the true reason for the discrimination against them. (NLRB v.
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 1381) (Mathews,
Labor Relations and the Law, p. 725, 728)
The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should have returned after being refused
readmission on June 2, 1958, is not persuasive. When the employer puts off reinstatement
when an employee reports for work at the time agreed, we consider the employee relieved
from the duty of returning further.
Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he revealed that despite the fact that the
Companies spent more than P80,000 for the vacation trips of officials, they refused to grant
union demands; hence, he betrayed his trust as an auditor of the Companies. We do not find
this allegation convincing. First, this accusation was emphatically denied by Tongos on the
witness stand. Gonzales, president of one of the respondent Companies and one of the
officials referred to, took a trip abroad in 1958. Exchange controls were then in force, and an
outgoing traveller on a combined business and vacation trip was allowed by the Central
Bank, per its Circular 52 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks) dated May 9, 1952, an
allocation of $1,000 or only P2,000, at the official rate of two pesos to the dollar, as pocket
money; hence, this was the only amount that would appear on the books of the Companies.
It was only on January 21, 1962, per its Circular 133 (Notification to Authorized Agent
Banks), that the Central Bank lifted the exchange controls. Tongos could not therefore have
revealed an amount bigger than the above sum. And his competence in figures could not be
doubted considering that he had passed the board examinations for certified public
accountants. But assuming arguendo that Tongos indeed revealed the true expenses of
Gonzales'
trip

which
the
respondents
never
denied
or
tried
to
disprove his statements clearly fall within the sphere of a unionist's right to discuss and
advertise the facts involved in a labor dispute, in accordance with section 9(a)(5) of Republic
Act 875 which guarantees the untramelled exercise by striking employees of the right to give
"publicity to the existence of, or the fact involved in any labor dispute, whether by advertising,
speaking, patrolling or by any method not involving fraud or violence." Indeed, it is not only
the right, it is as well the duty, of every unionist to advertise the facts of a dispute for the
purpose of informing all those affected thereby. In labor disputes, the combatants are
expected to expose the truth before the public to justify their respective demands. Being a
union man and one of the strikers, Tongos was expected to reveal the whole truth on
whether or not the respondent Companies were justified in refusing to accede to union
demands. After all, not being one of the supervisors, he was not a part of management. And
his statement, if indeed made, is but an expression of free speech protected by the
Constitution.
Free speech on both sides and for every faction on any side of the labor relation is to me a
constitutional and useful right. Labor is free ... to turn its publicity on any labor oppression,
substandard wages, employer unfairness, or objectionable working conditions. The
employer, too, should be free to answer and to turn publicity on the records of the leaders of
the unions which seek the confidence of his men ... (Concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 547, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430.) (Mathews, Labor
Relations and the Law, p. 591.)
The respondents also allege that in revealing certain confidential information, Tongos
committed not only a betrayal of trust but also a violation of the moral principles and ethics of
accountancy. But nowhere in the Code of Ethics for Certified Public Accountants under the
Revised Rules and Regulations of the Board of Accountancy formulated in 1954, is this
stated. Moreover, the relationship of the Companies with Tongos was that of an employer

and not a client. And with regard to the testimonies of Juan Raymundo and Antolin Carillo,
both vice-presidents of the Trust Insurance Agencies, Inc. about the alleged utterances made
by Tongos, the lower court should not have given them much weight. The firm of these
witnesses was newly established at that time and was still a "general agency" of the
Companies. It is not therefore amiss to conclude that they were more inclined to favor the
respondents rather than Tongos.
Pacifico Ner, Paulino Bugay, Jose Garcia, Narciso Dao, Vicente Alsol and Hermenigildo
Ramirez, opined the lower court, were constructively dismissed by non-readmission allegedly
because they not only prevented Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente
Abella, chief of the personnel records section of the Companies, from entering the
Companies' premises on May 21, 1958, but they also caused bruises and abrasions on
Garcia's chest and forehead acts considered inimical to the interest of the respondents.
The Unions, upon the other hand, insist that there is complete lack of evidence that Ner took
part in pushing Garcia; that it was Garcia who elbowed his way through the picket lines and
therefore Ner shouted "Close up," which the picketers did; and that Garcia tossed Paulino
Bugay's placard and a fight ensued between them in which both suffered injuries. But despite
these conflicting versions of what actually happened on May 21, 1958, there are grounds to
believe that the picketers are not responsible for what happened. The picketing on May 21,
1958, as reported in the police blotter, was peaceful (see Police blotter report, exh. 3 in CAG.R. No. 25991-R of the Court of Appeals, where Ner was acquitted). Moreover, although the
Companies during the strike were holding offices at the Botica Boie building at Escolta,
Manila; Tuason Building at San Vicente Street, Manila; and Ayala, Inc. offices at Makati,
Rizal, Garcia, the assistant corporate secretary, and Abella, the chief of the personnel
records section, reported for work at the Insular Life Building. There is therefore a
reasonable suggestion that they were sent to work at the latter building to create such an
incident and have a basis for filing criminal charges against the petitioners in the fiscal's
office and applying for injunction from the court of first instance. Besides, under the
circumstances the picketers were not legally bound to yield their grounds and withdraw from
the picket lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate exercise of their
rights, they had every reason to defend themselves and their rights from any assault or
unlawful transgression. Yet the police blotter, about adverted to, attests that they did not
resort to violence.
lwph1.t

The heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the picket line do not affect or
diminish the right to strike. Persuasive on this point is the following commentary: .
We think it must be conceded that some disorder is unfortunately quite usual in any
extensive or long drawn out strike. A strike is essentially a battle waged with economic
weapons. Engaged in it are human beings whose feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising
passions call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket line. The transformation
from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the contest is difficult to prevent even
when cool heads direct the fight. Violence of this nature, however much it is to be regretted,
must have been in the contemplation of the Congress when it provided in Sec. 13 of Act 29
USCA Sec. 163, that nothing therein should be construed so as to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike. If this were not so, the rights afforded to employees by
the Act would indeed be illusory. We accordingly recently held that it was not intended by the
Act that minor disorders of this nature would deprive a striker of the possibility of
reinstatement. (Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107 F2d 472, cited in Mathews, Labor
Relations and the Law, p. 378)

Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, et al. and Ramon Garcia was but a necessary
incident of the strike and should not be considered as a bar to reinstatement. Thus it has
been held that:
Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of a strike is no bar to
reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, p.
855 citing Stackpole Carbon, Co. 6 NLRB 171, enforced 105 F2d 167.)
Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were transgressions of law,
they amount only to mere ordinary misdemeanors and are not a bar to reinstatement.
In cases involving misdemeanors the board has generally held that unlawful acts are not bar
to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Id., p. 854, citing Ford
Motor Company, 23 NLRB No. 28.)
Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of criminal charges against non-striking
employees before the fiscal's office, they were readily admitted, but those strikers who had
pending charges in the same office were refused readmission. The reinstatement of the
strikers is thus in order.
[W]here the misconduct, whether in reinstating persons equally guilty with those whose
reinstatement is opposed, or in other ways, gives rise to the inference that union activities
rather than misconduct is the basis of his [employer] objection, the Board has usually
required reinstatement." (Teller, supra, p. 853, citing the Third Annual Report of NLRB [1938],
p. 211.)
Lastly, the lower Court justified the constructive dismissal of Florencio Ibarra allegedly
because he committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents when, as president of
the FGU Workers and Employees Association-NATU, he advised the strikers that they could
use force and violence to have a successful picket and that picketing was precisely intended
to prevent the non-strikers and company clients and customers from entering the
Companies' buildings. Even if this were true, the record discloses that the picket line had
been generally peaceful, and that incidents happened only when management men made
incursions into and tried to break the picket line. At any rate, with or without the advice of
Ibarra, picketing is inherently explosive. For, as pointed out by one author, "The picket line is
an explosive front, charged with the emotions and fierce loyalties of the union-management
dispute. It may be marked by colorful name-calling, intimidating threats or sporadic fights
between the pickets and those who pass the line." (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law,
p. 752). The picket line being the natural result of the respondents' unfair labor practice,
Ibarra's misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not a bar to reinstatement. Besides,
the only evidence presented by the Companies regarding Ibarra's participation in the strike
was the testimony of one Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former member of the board of directors of
the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers and Employees Union-NATU, who became a
"turncoat" and who likewise testified as to the union activities of Atty. Lacsina, Ricardo
Villaruel and others (annex C, Decision, p. 27) another matter which emphasizes the
respondents' unfair labor practice. For under the circumstances, there is good ground to
believe that Encarnacion was made to spy on the actvities of the union members. This act of
the respondents is considered unjustifiable interference in the union activities of the
petitioners and is unfair labor practice.
It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an employer of union
activities, or surveillance thereof, are such instances of interference, restraint or coercion of

employees in connection with their right to organize, form and join unions as to constitute
unfair labor practice.
... "Nothing is more calculated to interfere with, restrain and coerce employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization than such activity even where no discharges result.
The information obtained by means of espionage is in valuable to the employer and can be
used in a variety of cases to break a union." The unfair labor practice is committed whether
the espionage is carried on by a professional labor spy or detective, by officials or
supervisory employees of the employer, or by fellow employees acting at the request or
direction of the employer, or an ex-employee..." (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective
Bargaining, Vol. II, pp. 765-766, and cases cited.) .
IV. The lower court should have ordered the reinstatement of the officials and members of
the Unions, with full back wages from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement
to their usual employment. Because all too clear from the factual and environmental milieu of
this case, coupled with settled decisional law, is that the Unions went on strike because of
the unfair labor practices committed by the respondents, and that when the strikers reported
back for work upon the invitation of the respondents they were discriminatorily
dismissed. The members and officials of the Unions therefore are entitled to reinstatement
with back pay.
[W]here the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct on the part of an
employer amounting to an 'unfair labor practice,' the strikers are entitled to reinstatement
with back pay. (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p. 418.)
[A]n employee who has been dismissed in violation of the provisions of the Act is entitled to
reinstatement with back pay upon an adjudication that the discharge was illegal."
(Id., citing Waterman S. S. Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 119 F2d 760; N. L. R. B. v. Richter's Bakery,
140 F2d 870; N. L. R. B. v. Southern Wood Preserving Co., 135 F. 2d 606; C. G. Conn, Ltd.
v. N. L. R. B., 108 F2d 390; N. L. R. B. v. American Mfg. Co., 106 F2d 61; N. L. R. B. v.
Kentucky Fire Brick Co., 99 F2d 99.)
And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege that the positions of
these union members have already been filled by replacements.
[W]here the employers' "unfair labor practice" caused or contributed to the strike or where
the 'lock-out' by the employer constitutes an "unfair labor practice," the employer cannot
successfully urge as a defense that the striking or lock-out employees position has been
filled by replacement. Under such circumstances, if no job sufficiently and satisfactorily
comparable to that previously held by the aggrieved employee can be found, the employer
must discharge the replacement employee, if necessary, to restore the striking or locked-out
worker to his old or comparable position ... If the employer's improper conduct was an initial
cause of the strike, all the strikers are entitled to reinstatement and the dismissal of
replacement employees wherever necessary; ... . (Id., p. 422 and cases cited.)
A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves is, from what date should the backpay
payable to the unionists be computed? It is now a settled doctrine that strikers who are
entitled to reinstatement are not entitled to back pay during the period of the strike, even
though it is caused by an unfair labor practice. However, if they offer to return to work under
the same conditions just before the strike, the refusal to re-employ or the imposition of
conditions amounting to unfair labor practice is a violation of section 4(a) (4) of the Industrial
Peace Act and the employer is liable for backpay from the date of the offer (Cromwell

Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-19778,
Decision, Sept. 30, 1964, 12 SCRA 124; Id., Resolution on motion for reconsideration, 13
SCRA 258; see also Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 730 and the cited cases). We
have likewise ruled that discriminatorily dismissed employees must receive backpay from the
date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the date of their discharge (Cromwell
Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra).
The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to report back for work on June 2, 1958,
which the latter did. A great number of them, however, were refused readmission because
they had criminal charges against them pending before the fiscal's office, although nonstrikers who were also facing criminal indictments were readily readmitted. These strikers
who were refused readmission on June 2, 1958 can thus be categorized as discriminatorily
dismissed employees and are entitled to backpay from said date. This is true even with
respect to the petitioners Jose Pilapil, Paulino Bugay, Jr. and Jose Garcia, Jr. who were
found guilty only of misdemeanors which are not considered sufficient to bar reinstatement
(Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, p. 854), especially so because their
unlawful acts arose during incidents which were provoked by the respondents' men.
However, since the employees who were denied readmission have been out of the service of
the Companies (for more than ten years) during which they may have found other
employment or other means of livelihood, it is only just and equitable that whatever they may
have earned during that period should be deducted from their back wages to mitigate
somewhat the liability of the company, pursuant to the equitable principle that no one is
allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another (Macleod & Co. of the Philippines v.
Progressive Federation of Labor, 97 Phil. 205 [1955]).
The lower court gave inordinate significance to the payment to and acceptance by the
dismissed employees of separation pay. This Court has ruled that while employers may be
authorized under Republic Act 1052 to terminate employment of employees by serving the
required notice, or, in the absence thereof, by paying the required compensation, the said Act
may not be invoked to justify a dismissal prohibited by law, e.g., dismissal for union activities.
... While Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes a commercial establishment to terminate the
employment of its employee by serving notice on him one month in advance, or, in the
absence thereof, by paying him one month compensation from the date of the termination of
his employment, such Act does not give to the employer a blanket authority to terminate the
employment regardless of the cause or purpose behind such termination. Certainly, it cannot
be made use of as a cloak to circumvent a final order of the court or a scheme to trample
upon the right of an employee who has been the victim of an unfair labor practice. (Yu Ki
Lam, et al. v. Nena Micaller, et al., 99 Phil. 904 [1956].)
Finally, we do not share the respondents' view that the findings of fact of the Court of
Industrial Relations are supported by substantial and credible proof. This Court is not
therefore precluded from digging deeper into the factual milieu of the case (Union of
Philippine Education Employees v. Philippine Education Company, 91 Phil. 93; Lu Do & Lu
Ym Corporation v. Philippine-Land-Air-Sea Labor Union, 11 SCRA 134 [1964]).
V. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent Presiding
Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations and the counsels for the private
respondents, on the ground that the former wrote the following in his decision subject of the
instant petition for certiorari, while the latter quoted the same on pages 90-91 of the
respondents' brief: .

... Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions:


In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a determination as to whether or not the
acts of the employees concerned justified the adoption of the employer of disciplinary
measures against them, the mere fact that the employees may be able to put up a valid
defense in a criminal prosecution for the same acts, does not erase or neutralize the
employer's right to impose discipline on said employees. For it is settled that not even the
acquittal of an employee of the criminal charge against him is a bar to the employer's right to
impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charged was
based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest... The act of the
employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just
cause for dismissal. (Lopez, Sr., et al. vs. Chronicle Publication Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R.
No. L-20179-81, December 28, 1964.) (emphasis supplied)
The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which contained the underscored
portions of the above citation read however as follows:
Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito Vicente, we are inclined
to uphold the action taken by the employer as proper disciplinary measure. A reading of the
article which allegedly caused their dismissal reveals that it really contains an insinuation
albeit subtly of the supposed exertion of political pressure by the Manila Chronicle
management upon the City Fiscal's Office, resulting in the non-filing of the case against the
employer. In rejecting the employer's theory that the dismissal of Vicente and Aquino was
justified, the lower court considered the article as "a report of some acts and omissions of an
Assistant Fiscal in the exercise of his official functions" and, therefore, does away with the
presumption of malice. This being a proceeding for unfair labor practice, the matter should
not have been viewed or gauged in the light of the doctrine on a publisher's culpability under
the Penal Code. We are not here to determine whether the employees' act could stand
criminal prosecution, but only to find out whether the aforesaid act justifies the adoption by
the employer of disciplinary measure against them. This is not sustaining the ruling that the
publication in question is qualified privileged, but even on the assumption that this is so, the
exempting character thereof under the Penal Code does not necessarily erase or neutralize
its effect on the employer's interest which may warrant employment of disciplinary
measure. For it must be remembered that not even the acquittal of an employee, of the
criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its
employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges was based constitute
nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest.
In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish his "suspicion," which
actually amounts to a public accusation, that his employer is exerting political pressure on a
public official to thwart some legitimate activities on the employees, which charge, in the
least, would sully the employer's reputation, can be nothing but an act inimical to the said
employer's interest. And the fact that the same was made in the union newspaper does not
alter its deleterious character nor shield or protect a reprehensible act on the ground that it is
a union activity, because such end can be achieved without resort to improper conduct or
behavior. The act of the employees now under consideration may be considered as a
misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal.** (Emphasis ours)
It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted by the
respondent Judge do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this Court's decision in L20179-81. Moreover, the first underscored sentence in the quoted paragraph starts with "For
it is settled ..." whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered ...," in this Court's decision.

Finally, the second and last underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the respondent
Judge's decision, appears not in the same paragraph of this Court's decision where the other
sentence is, but in the immediately succeeding paragraph.
This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against
the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels. We are inclined to believe that the
misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the
respondent Judge to mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many pending cases are the
courts of the land, and it is not difficult to imagine that because of the pressure of their varied
and multifarious work, clerical errors may escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the
respondents' counsels have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in the
respondent Judge's decision, to copy it verbatim, and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway,
the import of the underscored sentences of the quotation in the respondent Judge's decision
is substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in this Court's
decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against
him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act
upon which the criminal charges were based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to
the employer's interest."
Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions and
rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same
word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and
salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's decisions and rulings do all
other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This is because the
decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines," are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort. We said in no uncertain
terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al. (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this
Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever present
is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court
may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the
public who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and members of the bar meticulously
discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from
this Court's decisions but from other sources and make certain that they are verbatim
reproductions down to the last word and punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded
from acting on misinformation, as well as be saved precious time in finding out whether the
citations are correct.
Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels, there was no substantial
change in the thrust of this Court's particular ruling which they cited. It is our view,
nonetheless, that for their mistake, they should be, as they are hereby, admonished to be
more careful when citing jurisprudence in the future. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the
Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 is reversed and set aside, and another is
entered, ordering the respondents to reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning
Unions to their former or comparatively similar positions, with backwages from June 2, 1958
up to the dates of their actual reinstatements. Costs against the respondents.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor
and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25503

December 17, 1966

LEON DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,


vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO CHINGCUANGCO, Associate Judge of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of NUEVA ECIJA and TOMAS IMPERIO, respondents.
Manuel A. Cordero for petitioner.
Angel C. Imperio for respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction principally assailing an order of the
Court of Agrarian Relations denying a motion to stay execution of its judgment dispossessing
the tenant until he is indemnified for alleged expenses and improvements.
As leasehold tenant, petitioner, Leon del Rosario, occupied a parcel of land owned by
respondent Tomas Imperio, situated in Cabocbocan Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Said land became
the subject matter of litigation between said parties before the Court of Agrarian Relations,
Fourth regional district, in CAR Cases Nos. 2652-NE '61 and 2902-NE '62. And on July 12,
1963, a decision was rendered therein, the dispositive portion running as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) ordering the ejectment of Leon del Rosario
from the landholding in question subject to Section 43 and Section 50, paragraph (a), R.A.
No. 1199, as amended by R.A. No. 2263; and(2) ordering Tomas Imperio to pay Leon del
Rosario the value of the excess rentals received by him for the agricultural years 1961-62
and 1962-63.
Said judgment was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals on March 26, 1965.
Subsequently, on October 26, 1965, Imperio filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations a
motion for execution of the aforestated judgment. Del Rosario however opposed it, on the
ground that he has a right of retention over the land until he is indemnified for expenses and
improvements, alleging that in the present case he is entitled thereto. Acting thereon, the
Court of Agrarian Relations, on November 18, 1965, issued an order for the issuance of a
writ of execution, stating that the judgment had become final and executory, and that Del
Rosario's claim for indemnity, if any, should be filed with said court for determination, but
cannot stop execution of said judgment. Del Rosario filed a motion for reconsideration but
this was denied by the same court on December 14, 1965. And on December 16, 1965, the
corresponding writ of execution was issued.
Petitioner Del Rosario then filed, on December 27, 1965, the present special civil action
herein.
Respondents, on January 4, 1966, were required by Us to answer the petition; and on
January 8, 1966, We issued a writ of preliminary injunction addressed:

To:
Hon.
Judge,
Cabanatuan City

Bienvenido
Court

The
Provincial
(reg.-spl.-del.)
Cabanatuan City

of

Sheriff

Chingcuangco
Agrarian

of

(reg.-Spl.-del.)
Relations

Nueva

Ecija

stating:
NOW, THEREFORE, until further orders from this Court, You, your agents, your
representatives and/or any person or persons acting in your behalf are hereby restrained
from implementing the Writ of Execution dated December 16, 1965, in CAR Cases Nos.
2652-NE-61 and 2902-NE-62 of the Court of Agrarian Relations of Cabanatuan City entitled
"Leon del Rosario, plaintiff, versus Tomas Imperio, defendant."
On January 20, 1966, respondents filed their answer. Further developments came by way of
two petitions for contempt: First, a petition filed by respondent Imperio dated February 5,
1966, to declare petitioner's counsel in direct contempt, on the alleged ground that in his
petition herein said lawyer cited a fictitious authority. Second, a petition filed by Del Rosario,
dated June 20, 1966, to cite for contempt respondent Imperio, and three non-parties, the
Chief of Police of the Municipality of Rizal, Nueva Ecija (Eduardo Dumlao), and policemen
Remigio Baldonado and Romeo Miguel, for having allegedly sought to eject Del Rosario from
the land in question notwithstanding, this Court's preliminary injunction. To this a
supplementary petition for contempt was filed, dated July 25, 1966, alleging further that with
the full backing of said policemen, Imperio caused the plowing and harrowing of the
landholding and prevented Del Rosario from reaping the crops therein.
After the respective parties had filed their comments to the petitions for contempt, We
deferred their resolution until consideration of this case upon the merits.
At issue on the merits of this petition for certiorari is the proper interpretation or application of
Section 43 of Republic Act 1199 (Agricultural Tenancy Act) which provides:
SEC. 43. Rights and Obligations of Tenant-Lessee.With the creation of the tenancy
relationship arising out of the contract between the landholder-lessor and tenant-lessee, the
latter shall have the right to enter the premises of the land, and to the adequate and peaceful
enjoyment thereof. He shall have the right to work the land according to his best judgment,
provided the manner and method of cultivation and harvest are in accordance with proven
farm practices. Upon termination of the relationship, he shall be entitled to one-half of the
value of the improvements made by him, provided they are reasonable and adequate to the
purposes of the lease. (Emphasis supplied)
in relation to Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations, stating:
Rule 15.Writ of Execution.
Section 1. Requisites for Issuance of Writ of Execution in Case of Final Judgment Ejecting
Tenant.In cases where the dispossession is authorized by final judgment no writ of
execution shall issue unless upon certification of the corresponding Judge that the tenant

has been fully indemnified of his claim under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 1199 in case of
share tenancy or under Section 43 thereof in case of leasehold tenancy.
It is the position of respondents that Section 43 of Republic Act 1199 merely grants the
tenant the right to recover one-half of the value of improvements he made on the land,
without giving him any right of retention over the land until he is so reimbursed. As to Section
1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations, they contend that the same had
been superseded with the advent of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (R.A. 3844), effective
August 8, 1963, which replaced the Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations with the Rules
of Court (Sec. 115, R.A. 3844). And, they emphasize that there can be no vested right on
procedure, arguing that petitioner's right under the former Rules of the Court of Agrarian
Relations cannot be anything more than procedural.
There is no merit to the view that Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of Agrarian
Relations is not applicable in this case for having been abrogated with the enactment of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code. Said Code, it is true, provides that the Court of Agrarian
Relations shall be governed by the Rules of Court. (Sec. 155, R.A. 3844). And neither the
Rules of Court then obtaining nor the present Rules of Court contain a similar provision
requiring payment to the tenant of one-half of the value of his improvements before there can
be execution of a judgment dispossessing him. Nonetheless, since the Rules of Court were
applied to the Court of Agrarian Relations only on August 8, 1963, pursuant to Republic Act
3844 as aforestated, its effectiveness to pending cases as of that time, such as the instant
case, should follow the norm set forth in Rule 133 therein; "These rules . . . shall govern all
cases brought after they take effect, and also all further proceedings in cases then pending,
except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application would not be feasible or
would work injustice, in which event the former procedure shall apply."
Should it turn out that indeed petitioner tenant had made improvements on the landholding,
a point not for Us now to decide then Section 43 of Republic Act 1199 clearly gives him
the right to one-half of their value, thereby imposing upon the landholder dispossessing him
the correlative duty of paying the same. The rule prevailing during the pendency of this case
in the Court of Agrarian Relations required that this account be settled before any judgment
of ejectment can be executed. It is therefore not difficult to see that to apply the Rules of
Court, which do not contain a similar provision, would be unjust to the tenant. In this event,
the former procedure is to be followed, namely, Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the
Court of Agrarian Relations.
Respondent Imperio's argument that petitioner failed to show that improvements were in fact
made, should be addressed to the Court of Agrarian Relations. The point is that the tenant's
claim for reimbursement under Section 43 of Republic Act 1199 should first be threshed out,
determined and resolved before the tenant can be dispossessed by writ of execution. This
recourse is but in accordance with the policy of the law to protect the rights of tenants upon
the principle of social justice (Sec. 2, Republic Act 1199).
The petition for contempt filed by respondent Imperio charges petitioner's counsel of having
cited a fictitious case and a non-existing ruling. The record bears out that petitioner's counsel
alleged in page 5 of the petition forcertiorari herein, thus:
Section 1, Rule 15, Rules of the Courts of Agrarian Relations, predicated on Section 43 of
Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, supra, has been upheld to be valid by this Honorable
Tribunal so that now no writ of execution can be issued unless it is complied with first (Paz
Ongsiako, Inc. vs. Celestino Abad, et al., G.R. No. L-121447). This ruling, in effect, created

and established or confirmed the prior substantial right of a tenant to indemnification before
he is finally ejected from his holding.
Petitioner's counsel obviously had in mind this Court's decision in Paz Ongsiako, Inc. vs.
Celestino Abad, L-12147, July 30, 1957. Although he cites as docket number L-121447
instead of L-12147, the same is plainly but a slight typographical mistake not sufficient to
place him in contempt, especially because the names of the parties were given correctly. As
to said counsel's interpretation of this Court's decision in said case, or of what the ruling
therein "in effect" created, established or confirmed, the same are mere arguments fully
within the bounds of earnest debate, rather than a deception urged upon this Court. The first
petition for contempt is therefore without merit.
The second petition for contempt is against respondent Imperio and three others, not parties
herein: the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, Eduardo Dumlao;
policeman Remigio Baldonado; and, policeman Romeo Miguel. Said petition as well as the
supplemental petition thereto, allege that respondent Imperio, with the aid of the three law
enforcement officers, disturbed petitioner in the possession and cultivation of the land, on
June 13, 1966; caused its plowing and harrowing on June 27, 1966; and prevented the
petitioner from reaping the second rice crop on July 16, 1966. The foregoing acts, if true,
would be a ground for contempt only if at the time this Court's writ of preliminary injunction
was issued, respondent court's writ of execution had not yet been carried out. From the
sheriff's return,1 however, it would appear that respondent Imperio was placed in possession
of the land by virtue of the writ of execution as of December 18, 1965. This Court's
preliminary injunction, restraining implementation of the writ of execution, was issued only on
January 8, 1966. Respondents, therefore, may not be held in contempt. Nonetheless, the
premature implementation of the writ of execution being illegal, petitioner should be restored
to peaceful and undisturbed possession of the landholding, until his claim for payment of
improvements (one-half of their value) is settled by respondent court.
WHEREFORE, respondent court's orders of November 18, 1965 and December 14, 1965,
denying petitioner's motion to stay execution pending settlement of his claim for one-half of
the value of alleged improvements, as well as the writ of execution already issued, are
hereby set aside; respondents are ordered to restore petitioner to the landholding, and to
proceed according to Section 1 of Rule 15 of the former Rules of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, by first determining petitioner's claim for improvements under Section 43 of
Republic Act 1199, before issuing a writ of execution for the said tenant's dispossession. The
petitions for contempt are denied for lack of merit. No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.

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