IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA,

Atlanta Division

JAMES B. STEGEMAN,
JANET D. MCDONALD, CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiffs FILE NO: 1:08-CV-1971
vs.
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
SUPERIOR COURT STONE
MOUNTAIN JUDICIAL CIRCUIT;
SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE
CYNTHIA J. BECKER;
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY; 1
BRIAN P. WATT, Esq.;
SCOTT A FARROW, Esq.,
Defendants

PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY TO GEORGIA POWER DEFENDANTS’

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT & MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR.

COMES NOW, Plaintiffs who, pursuant to N.D. Ga. L.R. 7.1C., file their

Reply to Georgia Power Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief

From Judgment & Motion to Recuse Judge William S. Duffey, Jr.

1
Georgia Power Company, Brain Watt, Scott Farrow hereinafter as “Georgia
Power Defendants”; Superior Court Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit and Superior
Court Judge Cynthia J. Becker are referred to hereinafter as “Superior Court
Defendants”.
 UNDISPUTED FACTS AND CITATIONS OF AUTHORITY

Rather than address the grounds for which Plaintiffs Moved this Court to

Reconsider it‟s Ruling, these defendants “join in and adopt in full the arguments

asserted” [Doc 43] in the Superior Court defendants‟ Responses [Doc. 42]; an act

to which they have availed themselves several times in the past.

The facts associated with both the Superior Court action and the action filed

in this Court, clearly show that Plaintiffs were denied due process of law, and their

Rights have been continually violated under color of law, by both Courts. Mr.

Stegeman has been denied his protected class status by both Courts, and the

Court‟s Rulings were obtained through fraud and fraud upon the Court by Officers

of the Court, and those who have sworn an Oath of Office to abide by the Georgia

and United States Constitutions.

The Superior Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs‟ complaint. The

counterclaim filed by Georgia Power defendants could not have stood alone, and

any Ruling made by Superior Court after dismissal with prejudice, is void on its

face; Superior Court lacked both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over

Plaintiffs‟ real property.

Nevertheless, the Georgia Power Defendants filed Motion for Summary

Judgment, and submitted Affidavits that proved that Georgia Power had actual

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knowledge that they had no easement over Plaintiffs‟ real property before they

filed Verified Answers in Superior Court. Georgia Power knowingly, willingly,

wantonly, and maliciously violated state and federal statutes for which no

indictment is necessary to prosecute.

Georgia Power succeeding in “manipulating the court systems through

calculated assertion of divergent sworn positions…” Johnson Service Co. v.

Transamerica Insurance Co., 485 F.2d 164, 174 (5th Cir. 1973); Chrysler Credit

Corp. v. Rebhan, 842 F.2d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 1988). Speaking of judicial

estoppel, the 11th Cir. went on to say “The doctrine is designed to prevent parties

from making a mockery of justice by inconsistent pleadings” American Nat’l

Bank of Jacksonville v. FDIC, 710 F.2d 1528, 1536 (11th Cir. 1983). “It is the

responsibility of the trial court to ensure that they system is not manipulated by any

party” Carson v. State, Ga. App. (SE2d) (Case No. A031403, 2003).

Superior Court defendants had conspired with Georgia Power to perform an

illegal taking of Plaintiffs‟ real property2. Defendants complained in their Motion

to Dismiss that Plaintiffs had not shown the conspiracy or agreement reached, the

facts now speak for themselves. Judge Becker gave them that which legal process

forbids.

The only party left in the Superior Court case, and the only party allowed to

2
See Plaintiffs‟ U.S. District Court complaint [Doc. 1, pgs.

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participate in the Summary Judgement was the defendant; Plaintiffs did seek to

have the dismissal set aside so that they could participate see Superior Court

Docket Report “Exhibit 1”. Further, Judge Becker‟s Grant of Summary Judgment

to Georgia Power claimed that she had “read the briefs”, would have been

impossible to do.3 See Exhibit 1 showing that there was no Brief filed by

Plaintiffs, and see “Exhibit 2” Plaintiffs‟ Brief‟s cover sheet stamped “Filed”.

Plaintiffs provided undisputed evidence that the document, provided by

Georgia Power, their only defense in both courts and the only document used to

support for the counterclaim, was fraudulent. To this day, all of the defendants and

both Courts have refused to address the document‟s legality; the issue had to be

decided before the case could continue.

GA law mandates Summary Judgments concerning land, easements must be

decided by a Jury!

Thompson, et., al,. v. McDougal, 248 Ga. App. 270, 546 S.E.2d
44 (2001) Judgment reversed; the Court held: “But use alone is
insufficient to acquire prescriptive…establishes at most, a
revocable license.” “Factual question…regarding whether a
prescriptive easement has been established must be resolved by
a jury. See Hasty v. Wilson, 233 Ga. 739, 743(2)(a)(158 SE2d
915) (1967).

Furthermore, Court records proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that the

Summary Judgment Ruling was made prior to the Summary Judgment hearing,

3
Plaintiffs were denied the right to participate in the Summary Judgment

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that Judge Becker claimed had taken place. The ruling was signed and filed at

9:12 AM on the date that the hearing was to have begun at 9:30 A.M., see

“Exhibit 3” Judge Becker‟s Order claimed that Plaintiffs had not appeared for the

hearing. How would she have known that? The ruling was signed before Court

had begun.4 There was no Summary Judgment hearing, only a Ruling in favor of

Georgia Power, and Judge Becker‟s violations of state laws concerning

requirements for Recordation.

The Courts‟ blatant disregard of the Georgia Land Registration Act‟s

mandatory laws, as well as the blatant disregard for Plaintiffs‟ Rights, is not only

conscionable, and a manifest injustice, but has been elevated to the level of

criminal. The defendants have blemished the U.S. District Courts, and put the

reputations of the Courts to be in a position to be questioned by normal citizens.

The Federal government and Federal Courts are “to protect the citizens from

unjust state action”; they are to intervene when state entities refuse a citizen due

process of law. “The Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual against state

action” Williams I, 341 U.S. at 92 (Opinion of Douglas J). See also United States

v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) @ 383 U.S. 806:

“…state action in direct violation of the mandate of the

4
Just as Plaintiffs‟ complaint [Doc 1] claimed, and in fact had shown, Superior
Court had a pattern and/or practice of claiming to have a hearing or having a
hearing scheduled when there was not, the Court had no Summary Judgment
hearing.

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 Fourteenth Amendment – that no State shall deprive any person
of life or liberty without due process of law. This is a direct
traditional concern of the Federal Government. It is an area in
which the federal interest has existed for at least a century, and in
which federal participation has intensified.”

Judge Duffey, Jr. attempted to claim that Plaintiffs would “have the

opportunity to raise the Civil and Constitutional Rights violations” in the Superior

Court; the only way he could make such a claim would have been through ex parte

communication with Judge Becker, and she had told him that.

Further, in Judge Duffey‟s Dismissal, he claimed that there were important

“state issues” involved. In Georgia Power v. Irvin, et., al., 267 Ga. 760, 482

S.E.2d 362 (1997), a case involving Georgia Dept. of Transportation, Georgia

Dept. Natural Resources, Georgia Power,5 a private land owner and an easement6 it

was held that “subject only to Georgia Power‟s limited use for power generation”

for the Tallulah Hydroelectric plant, the Ga. Supreme Court affirmed declaratory

judgment for the private landowner and against Georgia Power and the DNR.7

Without question and contrary to Judge Duffey‟s ruling concerning Georgia

5
Although the names Georgia Dept. of Transportation, Georgia Dept. Natural
Resources, and Georgia Power Company all have “Georgia” listed in the name, the
Dept. of Transportation and Dept. of Natural Resources are the only two that are
part of the state of Georgia. Georgia Power is not, it is a division of Southern
Company, not the State of Georgia.
6
A case in which there had actually been an easement granted to Georgia Power.
7
Georgia Power‟s claim of title in the case, emanated from 1910 warranty deed
conveying 11.7 tract “fee simple forever”, had a tunnel and overhead power lines.

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law, a private property easement between Georgia Power and a private landowner

does not constitute “important state issues”, nor does the transmission of power.

Judge Duffey, Jr. has a pattern and practice of refusing to follow guidelines

set out by the 11th Circuit and U.S. Supreme Courts when a member of a protected

class is one of the parties in a suit; has a pattern and practice of ruling on

credibility of Plaintiffs‟ evidence when rebuttal evidence has not been supplied; a

pattern and practice of making false claims about Plaintiff(s) in his rulings; has a

pattern and practice of verbally abusing and ridiculing the Plaintiff(s), going so far

as to accuse them of being criminals. Judge Duffey was required to disqualify

himself.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a Judge‟s bias does not have “to stem

from an extra-judicial source”; when “such pervasive bias and prejudice is shown

by otherwise judicial conduct as would constitute bias against a party” Davis v. Bd.

Of School Comm’rs of Mobil County, 517 F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th Cir. 1975) cert

denied, 425 U.S. 944, 96 S. Ct. 1685, 48 L. Ed.2d 188 (1976). There is no

question that Judge Duffey‟s treatment of the Plaintiffs would cause “a reasonable

person, apprised of all the facts and circumstances, would question the judge‟s

impartiality” Hunt v. Am. Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011,

1015 (11th Cir. 1986); Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1110-

11 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820, 101 S.Ct. 78, 66L. 2d 22 (1980).

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 Georgia Power defendants‟ Brief for Motion to Dismiss, judicially confessed

to “fraud upon the Court, maliciously and negligently abused process within the

Court, made false statements to and within the Court”, but attempted to excuse the

behavior as “merely because Georgia Power and its attorneys sought to have the

case against it dismissed” [Doc 3-2 pg.10]. “What a party admits to be true in his

pleadings, he is not permitted to subsequently deny.” State Hwy. Dept. v.

Lumpkin 222 Ga. 727 (152 SE2d 557) (1966), rev‟d on other grounds, Dept. of

Transp. V. Hardin, 231 Ga. 359, 361 (201 SE2d 441)(1973).

Judge Becker has disregarded The Court of Appeals of Georgia and

Supreme Court of Georgia past rulings by granting Georgia Power what the

appellate Courts have consistently held they cannot be granted, prescriptive

easement.

Supreme Court of Georgia and Georgia Court of Appeals have consistently

Ruled against Georgia Power when attempting to obtain prescriptive easements,

see Lanier et., al., v. Burnette, et., al., 245 Ga. App. 566, 538 S.E.2d 476 (2000)

which held:

“Since utility companies have the power of eminent domain, then

the utility can acquire all necessary easements through and
acquire all necessary easements through the exercise of such
power. O.C.G.A. §22-2-100(5); Harwell v. Georgia Power
Co.,246 Ga. 203 (269 SE2d 464) (1980).

Further, Superior Court can, only in very limited circumstances, grant

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easement rights. By failing to adhere to past appellate Court rulings, and by

granting that which the Superior Court is not allowed to grant; then by having a

Court Order Recorded into the County Deed Books referencing Plaintiffs‟ Security

and Warranty Deeds “Exhibit 4”, Judge Becker has violated the law, and proved

Plaintiffs‟ claim of conspiracy between herself and Georgia Power.

To dismiss under Younger abstention, Judge Duffey turned the Plaintiffs

into defendants in Superior Court. The facts clearly show that the Plaintiffs were

not then, and never have been the defendants in either the Superior Court case, or

the case before this Court. Although the U. S. Appellate Courts review “a district

court‟s decision to abstain from exercising it‟s jurisdiction for an abuse of

discretion” 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Circ. 2003), “an

error in law constitutes an abuse of discretion” Major League Baseball v. Crist,

331 F.3d 1177, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003), citing United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215,

1219 (11th Cir. 1999).

8
Dismissal under Younger is manifest error as shown in Ankenedrandt v.

Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992) Certiorari to The United States Court of Appeals

for the 5th Cir. No. 91-367 (1992) in holding:

“The District Court erred in abstaining from exercising

8
Under both Federal and State Civil Practice Rules, dismissal with prejudice is a
decision on the merits and concludes the case. When Appellant‟s Superior Court
case was dismissed with prejudice, that was the Final Order the case was over,
period.
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 jurisdiction under Younger doctrine. Although this Court has
extended Younger…it has never applied the notions of comity so
critical to Younger where, as here, no proceeding was pending in
state tribunals.” “„[a]bstention from … federal jurisdiction
is the exception, not the rule.‟ Colorado River Water
Conversation Dist. V. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976).
Abstention rarely should be invoked,…federal courts have a
„virtually unflagging obligation…to exercise the jurisdiction
given them.‟ Id., at 817.”

District Court‟s Dismissal cited Wexler which was reversed and remanded:

“…abstention may be appropriate…where the plaintiff in the federal case chose

not to assert a constitutional defense as defendant in state court.” Plaintiffs‟

Motions for Reconsideration filed in this court, and the 11th Circuit court, pointed

out that in both Courts cases, they were Plaintiffs. Because Plaintiffs had correctly

pointed out why Judge Duffey‟s Ruling was incorrect, in the Ruling Denying

Reconsideration, he changed Plaintiffs‟ party status to defendants attempting to

remedy the matter.

Nevertheless, Wexler still didn‟t work. Plaintiffs‟ case, dismissed with

prejudice, was decided on the merits. Georgia Power‟s Counterclaim also had to

be dismissed, it could not stand on its own, the Ruling would have had to specify

circumstances why counterclaim could not be Ruled on at the same time.

Furthermore, the Court in Wexler held:

“…The comity Justice Black wrote… between state courts and
federal courts…does not offend the respectful relationship
between state and federal courts…there is no doctrine that the
availability or even the pendency of state judicial proceedings

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 excludes the federal courts.” NOPSI, 109 S.Ct. at 2521”
“… parallel proceedings…do not present…”undue interference”
in state court proceedings necessary to apply Younger. NOPSI,
109 S.Ct. at 2513. Nor would a federal injunction of the kind
sought in this case, usurp the state courts‟ ability to “perform
their judicial functions.” Id. at 2518. See also Pennzoil Co., 107
S.Ct. at 1526. We, therefore, vacate… dismissal and remand…”

The District Court‟s Ruling goes against stare decisis, the 11th Circuit‟s, and

the U.S. Supreme Court‟s past decision “recalling the Supreme Court‟s reasoning

that a litigant be forced to bring their federal claims in the State Court even if the

claim is supported by the same facts”:

“First, we find no federal authority supporting…that federal

claims…supported by the same alleged facts must be raised by
state plaintiffs…under state law in state courts. Instead, we recall
the Supreme Court‟s reasoning from 1964: „[t]here are
fundamental objections to any conclusion that a litigant who has
properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to
consider federal constitutional claims can be compelled … to
accept instead a state court‟s determination of those claims.‟
England v. La. State Bd. Of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 84
S.Ct. 461, 464, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1964). We recently wrote that
“generally, as between state and federal courts, the rule is that
the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to
proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court
having jurisdiction.” Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Morales,
368 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir.2004) (quoting Colorado River).”
“Younger doctrine does not require abstention merely because a
federal plaintiff, alleging a constitutional violation in federal
court, filed a claim under state law, in state court, on the same
underlying facts. See Rogers v. Desiderio, 58 F.3d 299, 301 (7th
Cir.1995); Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 882 (3rd Cir.1994);
Crawley v. Hamilton County Comm’rs, 744 F.2d 28, 30 (6th
Cir.1984). …would not prevent the state court from exercising
its jurisdiction just as a state court‟s ruling against the parties

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 who are federal plaintiffs would not offend the federal courts.”

The District Court case was brought due to fraud, fraud upon the Court,

fraudulent concealment of legal and controlling 1937 Railway/Power pole

placement map showing Fields, not Wells as owner of Plaintiffs‟ property; use of

falsified land documents (felony in GA), conspiracy, due process violations under

color of law in order to allow the taking of private property void of mandated

statutory process. The Supreme Court and other Circuits have held:

United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43,
53-54, 114 S. Ct. 492, 501 (1993) (concluding that the right to
maintain control over one‟s home is “a private interest of historic
and continuing importance”); United States v. All Assets of
Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1992)
(noting, under the Mathews test, that the interest in one‟s home
“merits special constitutional protection”); United States v. 141st
Street Corp. by Hersh, 911 F.2d 870, 875 (2d Cir. 1990)
(observing that the home occupies a privileged place in the eyes
of the law). One‟s home…the most cherished property interests
that due process protects, and the uninterrupted enjoyment of its
comforts and security is undoubtedly a significant private
interest.”

Further, Superior Court‟s Rulings continually violated The Georgia and

United States Constitutions, Georgia law, Federal law, and stare decisis. There are

specific statutory procedural requirements concerning land, proceedings required

to be in rem, requiring specific statutory procedures be followed.9 The Civil

Practice Act would be applicable

9
Superior Court and Judge Becker were named defendants in District Court for the
very actions that the Judge and Court continued with until its Final Judgment.

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 “except to the extent that specific rules of practice and procedure
in conflict [t]herewith are expressly prescribed”; “the trial…,
shall submit to a special master…”; “a special master must first
be appointed”; “Without the appointment of a special
master…the trial court was not authorized to enter…against
them. See Bonner v. Bonner, 272 Ga. 545 (2) (533 SE2d 72)
(2000)” Woodruff v. Morgan County, 670 S.E.2d 415, 284 Ga..
651 (Ga. 11/17/2008) Reversed and Remanded.

Plaintiffs were denied the right to Appeal this Court‟s rulings, they were

continually blocked by an Appeals clerk for reasons beyond Plaintiffs‟ knowledge.

Of course, Plaintiffs realized when Judge Duffey granted the Motion to Appeal in

Forma Pauperis, that something was amiss.

December 24, 2008 Judge Duffey, Jr. Granted Motion to Proceed on Appeal

in Forma Pauperis. January 7, 2009 Plaintiff filed Motion for Appointment of

Counsel, January 16, 2009 Judge Hull Denied the Motion; Motion for

Reconsideration was filed January 30, 2009 and Denied February 11, 2009.

February 18, 2009 Motion to Recuse was filed; the Appeal was dismissed March

30, 2009 without prior notification to Plaintiff that had fourteen days to attempt to

remedy the default in violation of US Court of Appeals Rules.

Plaintiff talked with the clerk at the 11th Circuit and learned that he had very

few days left in which to attempt to have the Appeal re-instated. April 13, 2009

Appellant‟s Brief and Record Excerpts were delivered via Courier; the clerk did

not file them until April 16, 2009. Letter dated April 16, 2009 to Plaintiff stated

that the Brief and Record excerpts had been received but there was no Motion to
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Reinstate the Appeal; fourteen days was provided to get the Motion to the Court.

April 22, 2009 Plaintiff had the Motion to Reinstate hand delivered to the

Appellate Court. May 8, 2009 Plaintiff received a letter from the clerk claiming

that the Order Appealed from and Certificate of Service for Record Excerpts were

not with the Brief and excerpts and that Plaintiff had fourteen days to remedy the

defect. May 14, 2009 Plaintiff mailed via Overnight Delivery Reply to Georgia

Power defendants‟ Response to Motion to Reinstate, along with the Certificate of

Service for Record Excerpts and Order Appealed from. May 24, 2009 another

letter was delivered to Plaintiff claiming that he still had not submitted the missing

items and had fourteen days to comply. Plaintiff then had the documents hand

delivered via courier who had signed a document acknowledging what he was

delivering to the Court for proof of what had been delivered.

The 11th Circuit denied Motion to Reinstate the Appeal. The Clerks at the

appellate court do not repeatedly give a party a chance to correct deficiencies. The

attempt by that clerk to have Plaintiff believe what she was doing borders on the

line of ridiculous. It was obvious by all the false claims of omitted items, etc. that

the Appeal would not be allowed to continue onward.

CONCLUSION

After Judge Becker, in a retaliatory move, dismissed Plaintiffs‟ Superior

Court case with prejudice, neither the Plaintiffs nor their property were part of the

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Superior Court action. It is actual knowledge to most parties, as well as to the

Courts that Dismissal with Prejudice is a Ruling on the Merits of the case, once a

ruling on the Merits of the case is made, the case is ended.

Federal Courts are to protect the citizens against unjust state action. The

case before this Court was clearly such a case and clearly showed unjust state

action. There was no excuse for Judge Becker‟s actions; no excuse why the

Georgia Attorney General sat back and allowed a Judge to break the laws

concerning real property; no excuse for the treatment of the Plaintiffs by this

Court, or the Court of Appeals clerk. Certainly none of the acts bestowed upon

Plaintiffs can be considered Justice.

Plaintiffs Moves this Honorable Court for an Order Granting

Reconsideration, and Granting their Motion to Recuse Judge Duffey, Jr. so that

they may have a fair and impartial tribunal, and seek redress as guaranteed by the

Constitutions.

Respectfully submitted, this 21st day of April, 2010,

By: ______________________________
JAMES B. STEGEMAN, Pro Se

By: ______________________________
JANET D. MCDONALD, Pro Se
821 Sheppard Rd,
Stone Mtn, GA 30083
(404) 300-9782

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 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

In compliance with LR 7.1D, N.D. Ga., I certify that the foregoing Motion

has been prepared in conformity with LR 5.1, N.D. GA. This Motion was prepared

with Times New Roman (14 point) type, with a top margin of one and one-half

(1.5”) inches and a left margin of one (1”) inch, is proportionately spaced.

This 21st day of April, 2010

___________________________
JAMES B. STEGEMAN, Pro Se
821 Sheppard Rd
Stone Mountain, GA 30083
(770) 879-8737

___________________________
JANET D. MCDONALD, Pro Se
821 Sheppard Rd
Stone Mountain, GA 30083
(770) 879-8737

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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA,
Atlanta Division

JAMES B. STEGEMAN,
JANET D. MCDONALD, CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiffs FILE NO: 1:08-CV-1971
vs.
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
SUPERIOR COURT STONE
MOUNTAIN JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
et., al;
Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I Certify that I have this 21st day of April, 2010, served a true and correct

copy of the foregoing Reply to Georgia Power Defendants’ Response to

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief From Judgment & Motion to Recuse Judge William

S. Duffey, Jr. upon Defendants, through their attorney on file by causing to be

deposited with U.S.P.S., First Class Mail, proper postage affixed thereto, addressed

as follows:

Daniel S. Reinhardt Devon Orland

Troutman Sanders, LLP State of Georgia Dept. of Law
Bank of America Plaza – Suite 5200 40 Capitol Square, S.W.
600 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, GA 30334-1300
Atlanta, GA 30308-2216

_____________________________
JAMES B. STEGEMAN

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