EMINENT DOMAIN

First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, and docketed as

Civil Case No. R-1881.

MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL V LOZADA

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse, annul,
and set aside the Decision[1] dated February 28, 2006
and the Resolution[2] dated February 7, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) (Cebu City), Twentieth
Division, in CA-G.R. CV No. 65796.
The antecedent facts and proceedings are as follows:
Subject of this case is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 (Lot
No. 88), with an area of 1,017 square meters, more or
less, located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner
was Anastacio Deiparine when the same was subject
to expropriation proceedings, initiated by the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by
the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for
the expansion and improvement of the Lahug
Airport. The case was filed with the then Court of

As early as 1947, the lots were already occupied by

the U.S. Army. They were turned over to the Surplus
Property Commission, the Bureau of Aeronautics, the
National Airport Corporation and then to the CAA.
During the pendency of the expropriation
proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr.
acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine. Consequently,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 9045 was
issued in Lozadas name.
On December 29, 1961, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of the Republic and ordered the
latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of Lot No.
88, adjudged at P3.00 per square meter, with
consequential damages by way of legal interest
computed from November 16, 1947the time when the
lot was first occupied by the airport. Lozada received
the amount of P3,018.00 by way of payment.
The affected landowners appealed. Pending appeal,
the Air Transportation Office (ATO), formerly CAA,
proposed a compromise settlement whereby the

owners of the lots affected by the expropriation

proceedings would either not appeal or withdraw their
respective appeals in consideration of a commitment
that the expropriated lots would be resold at the price
they were expropriated in the event that the ATO
would abandon the Lahug Airport, pursuant to an
established policy involving similar cases. Because of
this promise, Lozada did not pursue his
appeal. Thereafter, Lot No. 88 was transferred and
registered in the name of the Republic under TCT No.
25057.
The projected improvement and expansion plan of the
old Lahug Airport, however, was not pursued.
Lozada, with the other landowners, contacted then
CAA Director Vicente Rivera, Jr., requesting to
repurchase the lots, as per previous agreement. The
CAA replied that there might still be a need for
the Lahug Airport to be used as an emergency DC-3
airport. It reiterated, however, the assurance that
should this Office dispose and resell the properties
which may be found to be no longer necessary as an
airport, then the policy of this Office is to give priority
to the former owners subject to the approval of the
President.

On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C.

Aquino issued a Memorandum to the Department of
Transportation, directing the transfer of general
aviation
operations
of
the Lahug Airport to
the Mactan International Airport before the end of
1990 and, upon such transfer, the closure of
the Lahug Airport.
Sometime in 1990, the Congress of the Philippines
passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6958, entitled An Act
Creating the Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority, Transferring Existing Assets of the Mactan
International Airport and the Lahug Airport to the
Authority, Vesting the Authority with Power to
Administer and Operate the Mactan International
Airport and the Lahug Airport, and For Other
Purposes.
From the date of the institution of the expropriation
proceedings up to the present, the public purpose of
the said expropriation (expansion of the airport) was
never
actually
initiated,
realized,
or
implemented. Instead, the old airport was converted
into a commercial complex. Lot No. 88 became the
site of a jail known as Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation

Complex, while a portion thereof was occupied by

squatters.[3] The old airport was converted into what is
now known as the Ayala I.T. Park, a commercial area.
Thus, on June 4, 1996, petitioners initiated a
complaint for the recovery of possession and
reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-18823 and was
raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
57, Cebu City. The complaint substantially alleged as
follows:
(a) Spouses Bernardo and Rosario Lozada
were the registered owners of Lot No.
88 covered by TCT No. 9045;
(b) In the early 1960s, the Republic sought
to acquire by expropriation Lot No.
88, among others, in connection with
its program for the improvement and
expansion of the LahugAirport;
(c) A decision was rendered by the Court
of First Instance in favor of the
Government and against the land
owners, among whom was Bernardo
Lozada, Sr. appealed therefrom;

(d) During the pendency of the appeal, the

parties entered into a compromise
settlement to the effect that the
subject property would be resold to
the original owner at the same price
when it was expropriated in the event
that the Government abandons
the Lahug Airport;
(e) Title to Lot No. 88 was subsequently
transferred to the Republic of
the Philippines (TCT No. 25057);
(f) The
projected
expansion
and
improvement
of
the Lahug Airport did not materialize;
(g) Plaintiffs sought to repurchase their
property from then CAA Director
Vicente Rivera. The latter replied by
giving as assurance that priority
would be given to the previous
owners, subject to the approval of the
President, should CAA decide to
dispose of the properties;
(h) On November 29, 1989, then President
Corazon C. Aquino, through a
Memorandum to the Department of
Transportation and Communications

(DOTC), directed the transfer of

general aviation operations at
the Lahug Airport to the MactanCebu International Airport Authority;
(i) Since the public purpose for the
expropriation no longer exists, the
property must be returned to the
plaintiffs.[4]

In their Answer, petitioners asked for the immediate

dismissal of the complaint. They specifically denied
that the Government had made assurances to reconvey
Lot No. 88 to respondents in the event that the
property would no longer be needed for airport
operations. Petitioners instead asserted that the
judgment of condemnation was unconditional, and
respondents were, therefore, not entitled to recover the
expropriated property notwithstanding non-use or
abandonment thereof.
After pretrial, but before trial on the merits, the parties
stipulated on the following set of facts:
(1) The lot involved is Lot No. 88-SWO25042 of the Banilad Estate, situated

in the City of Cebu, containing an

area of One Thousand Seventeen
(1,017) square meters, more or less;
(2) The property was expropriated among
several other properties in Lahug in
favor
of
the
Republic
of
the Philippines by virtue of a
Decision dated December 29, 1961 of
the CFI of Cebu in Civil Case No. R1881;
(3) The public purpose for which the
property was expropriated was for the
purpose of the Lahug Airport;
(4) After the expansion, the property was
transferred in the name of MCIAA;
[and]
(5) On November 29, 1989, then President
Corazon C. Aquino directed the
Department of Transportation and
Communication to transfer general
aviation operations of the Lahug
Airport
to
the
Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority and to
close the Lahug Airport after such
transfer[.][5]

During trial, respondents presented Bernardo Lozada,

Sr. as their lone witness, while petitioners presented
their own witness, Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority legal assistant Michael Bacarisas.
On October 22, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the
foregoing, the Court hereby renders
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs,
Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr., and the heirs of
Rosario Mercado, namely, Vicente M.
Lozada, Marcia L. Godinez, Virginia L.
Flores, Bernardo M. Lozada, Jr., Dolores
L. Gacasan, Socorro L. Cafaro and Rosario
M. Lozada, represented by their attorneyin-fact Marcia Lozada Godinez, and
against
defendants
Cebu-Mactan
International Airport Authority (MCIAA)
and Air Transportation Office (ATO):
1. ordering MCIAA and ATO to
restore to plaintiffs the possession and
ownership of their land, Lot No. 88 Psd821 (SWO-23803), upon payment of the
expropriation price to plaintiffs; and

2. ordering the Register of Deeds to

effect the transfer of the Certificate of Title
from defendant[s] to plaintiffs on Lot No.
[88], cancelling TCT No. 20357 in the
name of defendant MCIAA and to issue a
new title on the same lot in the name of
Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. and the heirs of
Rosario Mercado, namely: Vicente M.
Lozada, Mario M. Lozada, Marcia L.
Godinez, Virginia L. Flores, Bernardo M.
Lozada, Jr., Dolores L. Gacasan, Socorro
L. Cafaro and Rosario M. Lozada.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]

Aggrieved, petitioners interposed an appeal to the

CA. After the filing of the necessary appellate briefs,
the CA rendered its assailed Decision dated February
28, 2006, denying petitioners appeal and affirming in
toto the
Decision
of
the
RTC,
Branch
57, Cebu City. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was, likewise, denied in the questioned CA Resolution
dated February 7, 2007.

Hence, this petition arguing that: (1) the respondents

utterly failed to prove that there was a repurchase
agreement or compromise settlement between them
and the Government; (2) the judgment in Civil Case
No. R-1881 was absolute and unconditional, giving
title in fee simple to the Republic; and (3) the
respondents claim of verbal assurances from
government officials violates the Statute of Frauds.
The petition should be denied.
Petitioners anchor their claim to the controverted
property on the supposition that the Decision in the
pertinent expropriation proceedings did not provide
for the condition that should the intended use of Lot
No. 88 for the expansion of the Lahug Airport be
aborted or abandoned, the property would revert to
respondents, being its former owners. Petitioners cite,
in support of this position, Fery v. Municipality of
Cabanatuan,[7] which declared that the Government
acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of
land as may be allowed by the character of its title
over the properties
If x x x land is expropriated for a particular
purpose, with the condition that when that

purpose is ended or abandoned the

property shall return to its former owner,
then, of course, when the purpose is
terminated or abandoned the former owner
reacquires the property so expropriated. If
x x x land is expropriated for a public
street and the expropriation is granted
upon condition that the city can only use it
for a public street, then, of course, when
the city abandons its use as a public street,
it returns to the former owner, unless there
is some statutory provision to the
contrary. x x x. If, upon the contrary,
however, the decree of expropriation gives
to the entity a fee simple title, then, of
course, the land becomes the absolute
property of the expropriator, whether it be
the State, a province, or municipality, and
in that case the non-user does not have the
effect of defeating the title acquired by the
expropriation proceedings. x x x.
When land has been acquired for
public use in fee simple, unconditionally,
either by the exercise of eminent domain
or by purchase, the former owner retains
no right in the land, and the public use may
be abandoned, or the land may be devoted
to a different use, without any impairment

of the estate or title acquired, or any

reversion to the former owner. x x x.[8]

Contrary to the stance of petitioners, this Court

had ruled otherwise in Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and
Maria Rotea v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority,[9] thus
Moreover, respondent MCIAA has brought
to our attention a significant and telling
portion in the Decision in Civil Case No.
R-1881 validating our discernment that the
expropriation by the predecessors of
respondent was ordered under the running
impression
that Lahug Airport would
continue in operation
As for the public purpose of
the expropriation proceeding,
it
cannot
now
be
doubted. Although Mactan A
irport is being constructed, it
does not take away the actual
usefulness and importance of
the Lahug Airport:
it
is
handling the air traffic both
civilian and military. From it
aircrafts fly to Mindanao and

Visayas and pass thru it on

their flights to the North
and Manila. Then,
no
evidence was adduced to
show
how
soon
is
the Mactan Airport to
be
placed in operation and
whether
the LahugAirport will
be
closed
immediately
thereafter. It is up to the other
departments
of
the
Government to determine
said
matters. The
Court
cannot substitute its judgment
for those of the said
departments or agencies. In
the absence of such showing,
the Court will presume that
the Lahug Airport will
continue to be in operation
(emphasis supplied).
While in the trial in Civil Case No. R-1881
[we] could have simply acknowledged the
presence of public purpose for the exercise
of eminent domain regardless of the
survival ofLahug Airport, the trial court in
its Decision chose not to do so but instead
prefixed its finding of public purpose upon

its understanding that Lahug Airport will

continue to be in operation. Verily, these
meaningful statements in the body of
the Decision warrant the conclusion that
the expropriated properties would remain
to be so until it was confirmed
that Lahug Airport was
no
longer in
operation. This inference further implies
two
(2)
things:
(a)
after
the Lahug Airport ceased its undertaking
as such and the expropriated lots were not
being used for any airport expansion
project, the rights vis--vis the expropriated
Lots Nos. 916 and 920 as between the
State and their former owners, petitioners
herein, must be equitably adjusted; and (b)
the foregoing unmistakable declarations in
the body of the Decision should merge
with and become an intrinsic part of
the fallo thereof which under the premises
is clearly inadequate since the dispositive
portion is not in accord with the findings
as contained in the body thereof.[10]

Indeed, the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 should

be read in its entirety, wherein it is apparent that the
acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated lots
was
subject
to
the
condition
that

the Lahug Airport would continue its operation. The

condition not having materialized because the airport
had been abandoned, the former owner should then be
allowed to reacquire the expropriated property.[11]
On this note, we take this opportunity to revisit our
ruling in Fery, which involved an expropriation suit
commenced upon parcels of land to be used as a site
for a public market. Instead of putting up a public
market,
respondent Cabanatuan constructed
residential houses for lease on the area. Claiming that
the municipality lost its right to the property taken
since it did not pursue its public purpose, petitioner
Juan Fery, the former owner of the lots expropriated,
sought to recover his properties. However, as he had
admitted
that,
in
1915,
respondent Cabanatuan acquired a fee simple title to
the lands in question, judgment was rendered in favor
of
the
municipality,
following
American
jurisprudence, particularly City of Fort Wayne v. Lake
Shore & M.S. RY. Co.,[12] McConihay v. Theodore
Wright,[13] andReichling v. Covington Lumber Co.,
[14]
all uniformly holding that the transfer to a third
party of the expropriated real property, which
necessarily resulted in the abandonment of the
particular public purpose for which the property was

taken, is not a ground for the recovery of the same by

its previous owner, the title of the expropriating
agency being one of fee simple.
Obviously, Fery was not decided pursuant to our now
sacredly held constitutional right that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.[15] It is well settled that the taking of
private property by the Governments power of
eminent domain is subject to two mandatory
requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public
purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the
property owner. These requirements partake of the
nature of implied conditions that should be complied
with to enable the condemnor to keep the property
expropriated.[16]
More particularly, with respect to the element of
public use, the expropriator should commit to use the
property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition
for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file
another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then
incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter desires to
reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of
expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack

one indispensable element for the proper exercise of

the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular
public purpose for which the property will be
devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner
would be denied due process of law, and the judgment
would violate the property owners right to justice,
fairness, and equity.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that
the taking of private property, consequent to the
Governments exercise of its power of eminent
domain, is always subject to the condition that the
property be devoted to the specific public purpose for
which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular
purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued,
and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former
owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of
the property, subject to the return of the amount of just
compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of
the power of eminent domain has become improper
for lack of the required factual justification.[17]
Even without the foregoing declaration, in the instant
case, on the question of whether respondents were
able to establish the existence of an oral compromise
agreement that entitled them to repurchase Lot No. 88

should the operations of the Lahug Airport be

abandoned, we rule in the affirmative.
It bears stressing that both the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu
and the CA have passed upon this factual issue and
have declared, in no uncertain terms, that a
compromise agreement was, in fact, entered into
between the Government and respondents, with the
former undertaking to resell Lot No. 88 to the latter if
the improvement and expansion of the Lahug Airport
would not be pursued. In affirming the factual finding
of the RTC to this effect, the CA declared
Lozadas
testimony
is
cogent. An
octogenarian widower-retiree and a
resident of Moon Park, California since
1974, he testified that government
representatives verbally promised him and
his late wife while the expropriation
proceedings were on-going that the
government shall return the property if the
purpose for the expropriation no longer
exists. This promise was made at the
premises of the airport. As far as he could
remember, there were no expropriation
proceedings against his property in 1952
because the first notice of expropriation he
received was in 1962. Based on the

promise, he did not hire a lawyer. Lozada

was firm that he was promised that the lot
would be reverted to him once the public
use of the lot ceases. He made it clear that
the verbal promise was made in Lahug
with other lot owners before the 1961
decision was handed down, though he
could not name the government
representatives who made the promise. It
was just a verbal promise; nevertheless, it
is binding. The fact that he could not
supply the necessary details for the
establishment of his assertions during
cross-examination, but that When it will
not be used as intended, it will be returned
back, we just believed in the government,
does not dismantle the credibility and
truthfulness of his allegation. This Court
notes that he was 89 years old when he
testified in November 1997 for an incident
which happened decades ago. Still, he is a
competent witness capable of perceiving
and making his perception known. The
minor lapses are immaterial. The decision
of the competency of a witness rests
primarily with the trial judge and must not
be disturbed on appeal unless it is clear
that it was erroneous. The objection to his
competency must be made before he has
given any testimony or as soon as the

incompetency becomes apparent. Though

Lozada is not part of the compromise
agreement,[18] he nevertheless adduced
sufficient evidence to support his claim. [19]

As correctly found by the CA, unlike in Mactan Cebu

International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals,
[20]
cited by petitioners, where respondent therein
offered testimonies which were hearsay in nature, the
testimony of Lozada was based on personal
knowledge as the assurance from the government was
personally made to him. His testimony on crossexamination destroyed neither his credibility as a
witness nor the truthfulness of his words.
Verily, factual findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding and
conclusive on this Court and may not be reviewed. A
petition forcertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court contemplates only questions of law and not of
fact.[21] Not one of the exceptions to this rule is present
in this case to warrant a reversal of such findings.
As regards the position of petitioners that respondents
testimonial evidence violates the Statute of Frauds,

suffice it to state that the Statute of Frauds operates

only with respect to executory contracts, and does not
apply to contracts which have been completely or
partially performed, the rationale thereof being as
follows:
In executory contracts there is a wide field
for fraud because unless they be in writing
there is no palpable evidence of the
intention of the contracting parties. The
statute has precisely been enacted to
prevent fraud. However, if a contract has
been totally or partially performed, the
exclusion of parol evidence would
promote fraud or bad faith, for it would
enable the defendant to keep the benefits
already delivered by him from the
transaction in litigation, and, at the same
time, evade the obligations, responsibilities
or liabilities assumed or contracted by him
thereby.[22]

In this case, the Statute of Frauds, invoked by

petitioners to bar the claim of respondents for the
reacquisition of Lot No. 88, cannot apply, the oral
compromise settlement having been partially
performed. By reason of such assurance made in their

favor, respondents relied on the same by not pursuing

their appeal before the CA. Moreover, contrary to the
claim of petitioners, the fact of Lozadas eventual
conformity to the appraisal of Lot No. 88 and his
seeking the correction of a clerical error in the
judgment as to the true area of Lot No. 88 do not
conclusively establish that respondents absolutely
parted with their property. To our mind, these acts
were simply meant to cooperate with the government,
particularly because of the oral promise made to them.
The right of respondents to repurchase Lot No. 88
may be enforced based on a constructive trust
constituted on the property held by the government in
favor of the former. On this note, our ruling in Heirs
of Timoteo Moreno is instructive, viz.:
Mactan-Cebu
International
Airport
Authority is correct in stating that one
would not find an express statement in the
Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 to the
effect that the [condemned] lot would
return to [the landowner] or that [the
landowner] had a right to repurchase the
same if the purpose for which it was
expropriated is ended or abandoned or if
the property was to be used other than as

the
Lahug
Airport. This
omission
notwithstanding, and while the inclusion of
this pronouncement in the judgment of
condemnation would have been ideal, such
precision is not absolutely necessary nor is
it fatal to the cause of petitioners
herein. No doubt, the return or repurchase
of the condemned properties of petitioners
could be readily justified as the manifest
legal effect or consequence of the trial
courts underlying presumption that Lahug
Airport will continue to be in
operation when it granted the complaint
for eminent domain and the airport
discontinued its activities.
The predicament of petitioners involves a
constructive trust, one that is akin to the
implied trust referred to in Art. 1454 of
the Civil Code, If an absolute conveyance
of property is made in order to secure the
performance of an obligation of the
grantor toward the grantee, a trust by
virtue of law is established. If the
fulfillment of the obligation is offered by
the grantor when it becomes due, he may
demand the reconveyance of the property
to him. In the case at bar, petitioners
conveyed Lots No. 916 and 920 to the
government with the latter obliging itself

to use the realties for the expansion of

Lahug Airport; failing to keep its bargain,
the government can be compelled by
petitioners to reconvey the parcels of land
to them, otherwise, petitioners would be
denied the use of their properties upon a
state of affairs that was not conceived nor
contemplated when the expropriation was
authorized.
Although the symmetry between the
instant case and the situation contemplated
by Art. 1454 is not perfect, the provision is
undoubtedly applicable. For, as explained
by an expert on the law of trusts: The only
problem of great importance in the field of
constructive trust is to decide whether in
the numerous and varying fact situations
presented to the courts there is a wrongful
holding of property and hence a
threatened unjust enrichment of the
defendant. Constructive trusts are fictions
of equity which are bound by no
unyielding formula when they are used by
courts as devices to remedy any situation
in which the holder of legal title may not
in good conscience retain the beneficial
interest.

In constructive trusts, the arrangement is

temporary and passive in which the
trustees sole duty is to transfer the title and
possession over the property to the
plaintiff-beneficiary.Of
course,
the wronged party seeking the aid of a
court of equity in establishing a
constructive trust must himself do
equity. Accordingly, the court will exercise
its discretion in deciding what acts are
required of the plaintiff-beneficiary as
conditions precedent to obtaining such
decree and has the obligation to reimburse
the trustee the consideration received from
the latter just as the plaintiff-beneficiary
would if he proceeded on the theory of
rescission. In the good judgment of the
court, the trustee may also be paid the
necessary expenses he may have incurred
in sustaining the property, his fixed costs
for improvements thereon, and the
monetary value of his services in
managing the property to the extent that
plaintiff-beneficiary will secure a benefit
from his acts.
The rights and obligations between the
constructive trustee and the beneficiary, in
this case, respondent MCIAA and
petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920, are

echoed in Art. 1190 of the Civil Code,

When the conditions have for their
purpose the extinguishment of an
obligation to give, the parties, upon the
fulfillment of said conditions, shall return
to each other what they have received x x x
In case of the loss, deterioration or
improvement of the thing, the provisions
which, with respect to the debtor, are laid
down in the preceding article shall be
applied to the party who is bound to return
x x x.[23]

On the matter of the repurchase price, while

petitioners are obliged to reconvey Lot No. 88 to
respondents, the latter must return to the former what
they received as just compensation for the
expropriation of the property, plus legal interest to be
computed from default, which in this case runs from
the time petitioners comply with their obligation to
respondents.
Respondents must likewise pay petitioners the
necessary expenses they may have incurred in
maintaining Lot No. 88, as well as the monetary value

of their services in managing it to the extent that

respondents were benefited thereby.
Following Article 1187[24] of the Civil Code,
petitioners may keep whatever income or fruits they
may have obtained from Lot No. 88, and respondents
need not account for the interests that the amounts
they received as just compensation may have earned
in the meantime.
In accordance with Article 1190[25] of the Civil Code
vis--vis Article 1189, which provides that (i)f a thing
is improved by its nature, or by time, the
improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor
x x x, respondents, as creditors, do not have to pay, as
part of the process of restitution, the appreciation in
value of Lot No. 88, which is a natural consequence
of nature and time.[26]
WHEREFORE, the
petition
is DENIED. The
February 28, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the October 22, 1999 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Cebu City, and its
February
7,
2007
Resolution
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:

1. Respondents
are ORDERED to
return
to
petitioners the just compensation they received for the
expropriation of Lot No. 88, plus legal interest, in the
case of default, to be computed from the time
petitioners comply with their obligation to reconvey
Lot No. 88 to them;

pay petitioners in accordance with this Courts

decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

2. Respondents are ORDERED to pay petitioners the

necessary expenses the latter incurred in maintaining
Lot No. 88, plus the monetary value of their services
to the extent that respondents were benefited thereby;
3. Petitioners are ENTITLED to keep whatever
fruits and income they may have obtained from Lot
No. 88; and
4. Respondents
are
also ENTITLED to
keep
whatever interests the amounts they received as just
compensation may have earned in the meantime, as
well as the appreciation in value of Lot No. 88, which
is a natural consequence of nature and time;
In light of the foregoing modifications, the case
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
57, Cebu City, only for the purpose of receiving
evidence on the amounts that respondents will have to

NPC V HEIRS
BERSAMIN, J.:
Private property shall not be
taken for public use without just
compensation.
Section 9, Article III, 1987
Constitution
The application of this provision of the Constitution is
the focus of this appeal.
Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks
the review on certiorari of the decision promulgated
on October 5, 2004,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals

(CA) affirmed the decision dated August 13, 1999 and

the supplemental decision dated August 18, 1999,
ordering NPC to pay just compensation to the
respondents, both rendered by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 1, in Iligan City (RTC).
Antecedents
Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act No.
6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the National
Power Corporation), NPC undertook the Agus River
Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to
generate electricity for Mindanao. The project
included the construction of several underground
tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the
Agus River to the hydroelectric plants.[2]
On November 21, 1997, the respondents, namely:
Cebu, Bangowa-an, Sayana, Nasser, Manta, Edgar,
Putri, Mongkoy and Amir, all surnamed Macabangkit
(Heirs of Macabangkit), as the owners of land with an
area of 221,573 square meters situated in Ditucalan,
Iligan City, sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of
damages and of the property, with the alternative
prayer for the payment of just compensation. [3] They
alleged that they had belatedly discovered that one of

the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the

water flow of the Agus River for the operation of the
Hydroelectric Project in Agus V, Agus VI and Agus
VII traversed their land; that their discovery had
occurred in 1995 after Atty. Saidali C. Gandamra,
President of the Federation of Arabic Madaris School,
had rejected their offer to sell the land because of the
danger the underground tunnel might pose to the
proposed Arabic Language Training Center and
Muslims Skills Development Center; that such
rejection had been followed by the withdrawal by
Global Asia Management and Resource Corporation
from developing the land into a housing project for
the same reason; that Al-Amanah Islamic Investment
Bank of the Philippines had also refused to accept
their land as collateral because of the presence of the
underground tunnel; that the underground tunnel had
been constructed without their knowledge and
consent; that the presence of the tunnel deprived them
of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and
residential value of their land; and that their land had
also become an unsafe place for habitation because of
the loud sound of the water rushing through the tunnel
and the constant shaking of the ground, forcing them
and their workers to relocate to safer grounds.

In its answer with counterclaim,[4] NPC countered that

the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to
compensation under section 3(f) of Republic Act No.
6395, under which a mere legal easement on their
land was established; that their cause of action, should
they be entitled to compensation, already prescribed
due to the tunnel having been constructed in 1979;
and that by reason of the tunnel being an apparent and
continuous easement, any action arising from such
easement prescribed in five years.
Ruling of the RTC
On July 23, 1998, an ocular inspection of the
land that was conducted by RTC Judge Mamindiara P.
Mangotara and the representatives of the parties
resulted in the following observations and findings:
a. That a concrete post which is about
two feet in length from the ground
which according to the claimants is the
middle point of the tunnel.
b. That at least three fruit bearing durian
trees were uprooted and as a result of
the construction by the defendant of the

tunnel and about one hundred coconuts

planted died.
c. That underground
constructed therein.[5]

tunnel

was

After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs

(Heirs of Macabangkit),[6] decreeing:

WHEREFORE, premises considered:

1. The prayer for the removal or
dismantling of defendants tunnel is denied.
However, defendant is hereby directed and
ordered:
a)To pay plaintiffs land with a
total area of 227,065 square meters, at
the rate of FIVE HUNDRED
(P500.00) PESOS per square meter,
or a total of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTEEN
MILLION
FIVE
HUNDRED
THIRTY
TWO
THOUSAND
AND
FIVE
HUNDRED
(P113,532,500.00),

PESOS, plus interest, as actual

damages or just compensation;
b)
To pay plaintiff a monthly
rental of their land in the amount of
THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00)
PESOS from 1979 up to July 1999
with 12% interest per annum;
c)To pay plaintiffs the sum of
TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P200,000.00) PESOS, as moral
damages;
d) To pay plaintiffs, the sum of
TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P200,000.00) PESOS, as exemplary
damages;
e)To pay plaintiffs, the sum
equivalent to 15% of the total amount
awarded, as attorneys fees, and to pay
the cost.
SO ORDERED.

The RTC found that NPC had concealed the

construction of the tunnel in 1979 from the Heirs of

Macabangkit, and had since continuously denied its

existence; that NPC had acted in bad faith by taking
possession of the subterranean portion of their land to
construct the tunnel without their knowledge and prior
consent; that the existence of the tunnel had affected
the entire expanse of the land, and had restricted their
right to excavate or to construct a motorized deep
well; and that they, as owners, had lost the
agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential
value of the land.
The
RTC
fixed
the
just
compensation
at P500.00/square meter based on the testimony of
Dionisio Banawan, OIC-City Assessor of Iligan City,
to the effect that the appraised value of the adjoining
properties ranged from P700.00 to P750.00, while the
appraised value of their affected land ranged
from P400.00 to P500.00. The RTC also required
NPC to pay rentals from 1979 due to its bad faith in
concealing the construction of the tunnel from the
Heirs of Macabangkit.
On August 18, 1999, the RTC issued a supplemental
decision,[7] viz:
Upon a careful review of the original
decision dated August 13, 1999, a sentence

should be added to paragraph 1(a) of the

dispositive portion thereof, to bolster,
harmonize, and conform to the findings of
the Court, which is quoted hereunder, to
wit:
Consequently, plaintiffs land or
properties are hereby condemned in
favor of defendant National Power
Corporation, upon payment of the
aforesaid sum.
Therefore, paragraph 1(a) of the
dispositive portion of the original decision
should read, as follows:
a) To pay plaintiffs land with a total
area of 227,065 square meters, at
the rate of FIVE HUNDRED
(P500.00) PESOS per square
meter, or a total of ONE
HUNDRED
THIRTEEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
THIRTY TWO THOUSAND
AND
FIVE
HUNDRED
(P113,532,500.00) PESOS, plus
interest, as actual damages or just
compensation; Consequently,
plaintiffs land or properties are
hereby condemned in favor of
defendant
National
Power

Corporation, upon payment of the

aforesaid sum;
This supplemental decision shall be
considered as part of paragraph 1(a) of the
dispositive portion of the original decision.
Furnish copy of this supplemental decision
to all parties immediately.
SO ORDERED.

On its part, NPC appealed to the CA on August 25,

1999.[8]
Earlier, on August 18, 1999, the Heirs of
Macabangkit filed an urgent motion for execution of
judgment pending appeal.[9] The RTC granted the
motion and issued a writ of execution,[10] prompting
NPC to assail the writ by petition for certiorari in the
CA. On September 15, 1999, the CA issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin the RTC
from implementing its decision. The Heirs of
Macabangkit elevated the ruling of the CA (G.R. No.
141447), but the Court upheld the CA on May 4,
2006.[11]

Ruling of the CA
NPC raised only two errors in the CA, namely:

I
THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN RULING THAT NAPOCORS
UNDERGROUND TUNNEL IN ITS
AGUS RIVER HYDRO-ELECTRIC
PLANT
PROJECT
TRAVERSED
AND/OR
AFFECTED
APPELLEES
PROPERTY AS THERE IS NO CLEAR
EVIDENCE
INDUBITABLY
ESTABLISHING THE SAME
II
THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEES
CLAIMS IN THEIR ENTIRETY FOR
GRANTING
ARGUENDO
THAT
NAPOCORS
UNDERGROUND
TUNNEL
INDEED
TRAVERSED
APPELLEES
PROPERTY,
THEIR
CAUSE OF ACTION HAD ALREADY
BEEN BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION,
ESTOPPEL AND LACHES
On October 5, 2004, the CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC, holding that the testimonies of NPCs
witness Gregorio Enterone and of the respondents

witness Engr. Pete Sacedon, the topographic survey

map, the sketch map, and the ocular inspection report
sufficiently established the existence of the
underground tunnel traversing the land of the Heirs of
Macabangkit; that NPC did not substantiate its
defense that prescription already barred the claim of
the Heirs of Macabangkit; and that Section 3(i) of
R.A. No. 6395, being silent about tunnels, did not
apply, viz:
As regard Section 3(i) of R.A. No. 6395
(An Act Revising the Charter of the
National Power Corporation), it is
submitted that the same provision is not
applicable. There is nothing in Section 3(i)
of said law governing claims involving
tunnels. The same provision is applicable
to those projects or facilities on the surface
of the land, that can easily be discovered,
without any mention about the claims
involving tunnels, particularly those
surreptitiously constructed beneath the
surface of the land, as in the instant case.
Now, while it is true that Republic Act No.
6395 authorizes NAPOCOR to take water
from any public stream, river, creek, lake,
spring or waterfall in the Philippines for

the realization of the purposes specified

therein for its creation; to intercept and
divert the flow of waters from lands of
riparian owners (in this case, the Heirs),
and from persons owning or interested in
water which are or may be necessary to
said purposes, the same Act expressly
mandates
the
payment
of
just
compensation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant appeal is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. Accordingly, the appealed
Decision dated August 13, 1999, and the
supplemental Decision dated August 18,
1999, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[12]

Issue
NPC has come to the Court, assigning the lone error
that:
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE DECISION AND
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION OF THE
COURT A QUO DIRECTING AND

ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY JUST

COMPENSATION TO RESPONDENTS.

NPC reiterates that witnesses Enterone and Sacedon

lacked personal knowledge about the construction and
existence of the tunnel and were for that reason not
entitled to credence; and that the topographic and
relocation maps prepared by Sacedon should not be a
basis to prove the existence and location of the tunnel
due to being self-serving.
NPC contends that the CA should have applied
Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395, which
provided a period of only five years from the date of
the construction within which the affected landowner
could bring a claim against it; and that even if
Republic Act No. 6395 should be inapplicable, the
action of the Heirs of Macabangkit had already
prescribed due to the underground tunnel being
susceptible to acquisitive prescription after the lapse
of 10 years pursuant to Article 620 of the Civil
Code due to its being a continuous and apparent legal
easement under Article 634 of the Civil Code.
The issues for resolution are, therefore, as follows:
(1) Whether the CA and the RTC
erred in holding that there was an

underground tunnel traversing the Heirs

of Macabangkits land constructed by
NPC; and

CA affirmed them.[13] Bearing these doctrines in mind,

the Court should rightly dismiss NPCs appeal.

(2) Whether the Heirs of

Macabangkits right to claim just
compensation had prescribed under
section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395, or,
alternatively, under Article 620 and
Article 646 of the Civil Code.
Ruling

NPC argues, however, that this appeal should not be

dismissed because the Heirs of Macabangkit
essentially failed to prove the existence of the
underground tunnel. It insists that the topographic
survey map and the right-of-way map presented by
the Heirs of Macabangkit did not at all establish the
presence of any underground tunnel.

We uphold the liability of NPC for payment of just

compensation.
1.
Factual findings of the RTC,
when affirmed by the CA, are binding
The existence of the tunnel underneath the land of the
Heirs of Macabangkit, being a factual matter, cannot
now be properly reviewed by the Court, for questions
of fact are beyond the pale of a petition for review
on certiorari. Moreover, the factual findings and
determinations by the RTC as the trial court are
generally binding on the Court, particularly after the

NPC still fails to convince.

Even assuming, for now, that the Court may review
the factual findings of the CA and the RTC, for NPC
to insist that the evidence on the existence of the
tunnel was not adequate and incompetent remains
futile. On the contrary, the evidence on the tunnel was
substantial, for the significance of the topographic
survey map and the sketch map (as indicative of the
extent and presence of the tunnel construction) to the
question on the existence of the tunnel was strong, as
the CA correctly projected in its assailed decision, viz:
Among the pieces of documentary
evidence presented showing the existence
of the said tunnel beneath the subject

property is the topographic survey map.

The topographic survey map is one
conducted to know about the location and
elevation of the land and all existing
structures above and underneath it.
Another is the Sketch Map which shows
the location and extent of the land
traversed or affected by the said
tunnel. These two (2) pieces of
documentary evidence readily point the
extent and presence of the tunnel
construction coming from the power
cavern near the small man-made lake
which is the inlet and approach tunnel,
or at a distance of about two (2)
kilometers away from the land of the
plaintiffs-appellees, and then traversing
the entire and the whole length of the
plaintiffs-appellees property, and the
outlet channel of the tunnel is another
small man-made lake. This is a subterrain construction, and considering that
both inlet and outlet are bodies of water,
the tunnel can hardly be noticed. All
constructions done were beneath the
surface of the plaintiffs-appellees property.
This explains why they could never obtain
any knowledge of the existence of such
tunnel during the period that the same was

constructed and installed beneath their

property.[14]

The power cavern and the inlet and outlet channels

established the presence of the underground tunnel,
based on the declaration in the RTC by Sacedon, a
former employee of the NPC.[15] It is worthy to note
that NPC did not deny the existence of the power
cavern, and of the inlet and outlet channels adverted
to and as depicted in the topographic survey map and
the sketch map. The CA cannot be faulted for
crediting the testimony of Sacedon despite the effort
of NPC to discount his credit due to his not being an
expert witness, simply because Sacedon had personal
knowledge based on his being NPCs principal
engineer and supervisor tasked at one time to lay out
the tunnels and transmission lines specifically for the
hydroelectric projects,[16] and to supervise the
construction of the Agus 1 Hydroelectric Plant
itself[17]from 1978 until his retirement from NPC.
[18]
Besides, he declared that he personally experienced
the vibrations caused by the rushing currents in the
tunnel, particularly near the outlet channel .[19] Under
any circumstances, Sacedon was a credible and
competent witness.

The ocular inspection actually confirmed the

existence of the tunnel underneath the land of the
Heirs of Macabangkit. Thus, the CA observed:
More so, the Ocular inspection conducted
on July 23, 1998 further bolstered such
claim of the existence and extent of such
tunnel. This was conducted by a team
composed of the Honorable Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
01, Lanao del Norte, herself and the
respective lawyers of both of the parties
and found that, among others, said
underground tunnel was constructed
beneath the subject property.[20]

It bears noting that NPC did not raise any issue

against or tender any contrary comment on the ocular
inspection report.
2.
Five-year prescriptive period under
Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395
does not apply to claims for just
compensation

The CA held that Section 3(i) of Republic Act No.

6395 had no application to this action because it
covered facilities that could be easily discovered, not
tunnels that were inconspicuously constructed beneath
the surface of the land.[21]
NPC disagrees, and argues that because Article
635[22] of the Civil Code directs the application of
special laws when an easement, such as the
underground tunnel, was intended for public use, the
law applicable was Section 3(i) of Republic Act No.
6395, as amended, which limits the action for
recovery of compensation to five years from the date
of construction. It posits that the five-year prescriptive
period already set in due to the construction of the
underground tunnel having been completed in 1979
yet.
Without necessarily adopting the reasoning of the CA,
we uphold its conclusion that prescription did not bar
the present action to recover just compensation.
Section 3 (i) of Republic Act No. 6395, the cited law,
relevantly provides:
Section 3. Powers and General Functions
of the Corporation. The powers, functions,

rights and activities of the Corporation

shall be the following:
xxx
(i) To construct works across, or
otherwise,
any
stream,
watercourse, canal, ditch, flume,
street, avenue, highway or railway
of private and public ownership,
as the location of said works may
require:Provided, That said works
be constructed in such a manner as
not to endanger life or property;
And provided, further, That the
stream, watercourse, canal ditch,
flume, street, avenue, highway or
railway so crossed or intersected
be restored as near as possible to
their former state, or in a manner
not to impair unnecessarily their
usefulness. Every person or entity
whose right of way or property is
lawfully crossed or intersected by
said works shall not obstruct any
such crossings or intersection and
shall grant the Board or its
representative,
the
proper
authority for the execution of such
work. The Corporation is hereby
given the right of way to locate,

construct and maintain such works

over and throughout the lands
owned by the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its branches
and political subdivisions. The
Corporation or its representative
may also enter upon private
property in the lawful performance
or prosecution of its business and
purposes,
including
the
construction of the transmission
lines thereon; Provided, that the
owner of such property shall be
indemnified for any actual damage
caused
thereby;Provided,
further,That said action for
damages is filed within five
years after the rights of way,
transmission lines, substations,
plants or other facilities shall
have been established; Provided,
finally, That after said period, no
suit shall be brought to question
the
said
rights
of
way,
transmission lines, substations,
plants or other facilities;

A cursory reading shows that Section 3(i) covers the

construction of works across, or otherwise, any
stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume, street,
avenue, highway or railway of private and public
ownership, as the location of said works may require.
It is notable that Section 3(i) includes no limitation
except those enumerated after the term works.
Accordingly, we consider the term works as
embracing all kinds of constructions, facilities, and
other developments that can enable or help NPC to
meet its objectives of developing hydraulic power
expressly provided under paragraph (g) of Section 3.
[23]
The CAs restrictive construal of Section 3(i) as
exclusive of tunnels was obviously unwarranted, for
the provision applies not only to development works
easily discoverable or on the surface of the earth but
also to subterranean works like tunnels. Such
interpretation accords with the fundamental guideline
in statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, so must we not.[24] Moreover, when the
language of the statute is plain and free from
ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and
sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively
presumed to be the meaning that the Congress
intended to convey.[25]
Even so, we still cannot side with NPC.

We rule that the prescriptive period provided

under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is
applicable only to an action for damages, and does not
extend to an action to recover just compensation like
this case. Consequently, NPC cannot thereby bar the
right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just
compensation for their land.
The action to recover just compensation from
the State or its expropriating agency differs from the
action for damages. The former, also known
as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover
the value of property taken in fact by the
governmental defendant, even though no formal
exercise of the power of eminent domain has been
attempted by the taking agency.[26] Just compensation
is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not
the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word just is
used
to
intensify
the
meaning
of
the
word compensation in order to convey the idea that
the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.[27] On
the other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a
legal wrong through damages, which may be actual,

moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary.

When a right is exercised in a manner not
conformable with the norms enshrined in Article
19[28] and like provisions on human relations in
the Civil Code, and the exercise results to the damage
of another, a legal wrong is committed and the
wrongdoer is held responsible.[29]
The two actions are radically different in nature
and purpose. The action to recover just compensation
is based on the Constitution[30] while the action for
damages is predicated on statutory enactments.
Indeed, the former arises from the exercise by the
State of its power of eminent domain against private
property for public use, but the latter emanates from
the transgression of a right. The fact that the owner
rather than the expropriator brings the former does not
change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse
condemnation,[31] for the suit is not based on tort, but
on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of
property without just compensation.[32] It would very
well be contrary to the clear language of the
Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation
for private property taken for a public use solely on
the basis of statutory prescription.

Due to the need to construct the underground tunnel,

NPC should have first moved to acquire the land from
the Heirs of Macabangkit either by voluntary tender to
purchase
or
through
formal
expropriation
proceedings. In either case, NPC would have been
liable to pay to the owners the fair market value of the
land, for Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395
expressly requires NPC to pay the fair market value of
such property at the time of the taking, thusly:
(h) To acquire, promote, hold, transfer,
sell, lease, rent, mortgage, encumber and
otherwise dispose of property incident to,
or necessary, convenient or proper to
carry out the purposes for which the
Corporation was created: Provided, That
in case a right of way is necessary for its
transmission lines, easement of right of
way shall only be sought:Provided,
however, That in case the property itself
shall be acquired by purchase, the cost
thereof shall be the fair market value at
the time of the taking of such property.

This was what NPC was ordered to do

in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim,[33] where
NPC had denied the right of the owners to be paid just

compensation despite their land being traversed by the

underground tunnels for siphoning water from Lake
Lanao needed in the operation of Agus II, Agus III,
Agus IV, Agus VI and Agus VII Hydroelectric
Projects in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur, in Nangca and
Balo-I in Lanao del Norte and in Ditucalan and
Fuentes in Iligan City. There, NPC similarly argued
that the underground tunnels constituted a mere
easement that did not involve any loss of title or
possession on the part of the property owners, but the
Court resolved against NPC, to wit:
Petitioner
contends
that
the
underground tunnels in this case constitute
an easement upon the property of the
respondents which does not involve any
loss of title or possession. The manner in
which the easement was created by
petitioner, however, violates the due
process rights of respondents as it was
without notice and indemnity to them and
did not go through proper expropriation
proceedings. Petitioner could have, at any
time, validly exercised the power of
eminent domain to acquire the easement
over respondents property as this power
encompasses not only the taking or
appropriation of title to and possession of

the expropriated property but likewise

covers even the imposition of a mere
burden upon the owner of the condemned
property. Significantly, though, landowners
cannot be deprived of their right over their
land until expropriation proceedings are
instituted in court. The court must then see
to it that the taking is for public use, that
there is payment of just compensation and
that there is due process of law.[34]

3.
NPCs construction of the tunnel
constituted taking of the land, and
entitled owners to just compensation

The Court held in National Power Corporation

v. Ibrahim that NPC was liable to pay not merely an
easement fee but rather the full compensation for land
traversed by the underground tunnels, viz:
In disregarding this procedure and
failing to recognize respondents ownership
of the sub-terrain portion, petitioner took a
risk and exposed itself to greater liability
with the passage of time. It must be
emphasized that the acquisition of the

easement is not without expense. The

underground tunnels impose limitations on
respondents use of the property for an
indefinite period and deprive them of its
ordinary use. Based upon the foregoing,
respondents are clearly entitled to the
payment
of
just
compensation. Notwithstanding the fact
that petitioner only occupies the subterrain portion, it is liable to pay not
merely an easement fee but rather the
full compensation for land. This is so
because in this case, the nature of the
easement practically deprives the
owners of its normal beneficial use.
Respondents, as the owner of the
property thus expropriated, are entitled
to a just compensation which should be
neither more nor less, whenever it is
possible to make the assessment, than
the money equivalent of said property.[35]

Here, like in National Power Corporation v.

Ibrahim, NPC constructed a tunnel underneath the
land of the Heirs of Macabangkit without going
through formal expropriation proceedings and without
procuring their consent or at least informing them
beforehand of the construction. NPCs construction

adversely affected the owners rights and interests

because the subterranean intervention by NPC
prevented them from introducing any developments
on the surface, and from disposing of the land or any
portion of it, either by sale or mortgage.
Did such consequence constitute taking of the land as
to entitle the owners to just compensation?
We agree with both the RTC and the CA that
there was a full taking on the part of NPC,
notwithstanding that the owners were not completely
and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking
of private property for public use, to be compensable,
need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation.
[36]
Indeed, the expropriators action may be short of
acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy
but may still amount to a taking.[37] Compensable
taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or
interruption of the rights of ownership or of the
common and necessary use and enjoyment of the
property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying
its value.[38] It is neither necessary that the owner be
wholly deprived of the use of his property,[39] nor
material whether the property is removed from the

possession of the owner, or in any respect changes

hands.[40]
As a result, NPC should pay just compensation
for the entire land. In that regard, the RTC pegged just
compensation at P500.00/square meter based on its
finding on what the prevailing market value of the
property was at the time of the filing of the complaint,
and the CA upheld the RTC.
We affirm the CA, considering that NPC did not assail
the valuation in the CA and in this Court. NPCs
silence was probably due to the correctness of the
RTCs valuation after careful consideration and
weighing of the parties evidence, as follows:
The matter of what is just
compensation for these parcels of land is a
matter of evidence. These parcels of land
is (sic) located in the City of Iligan, the
Industrial City of the South. Witness
Dionisio Banawan, OIC- City Assessors
Office, testified, Within that area, that area
is classified as industrial and residential.
That plaintiffs land is adjacent to many
subdivisions and that is within the
industrial classification. He testified and

identified Exhibit AA and AA-1, a

Certification, dated April 4, 1997, showing
that the appraised value of plaintiffs land
ranges from P400.00 to P500.00 per square
meter (see, TSN, testimony of Dionisio
Banawan, pp. 51, 57, and 71, February 9,
1999). Also, witness Banawan, testified
and identified Two (2) Deeds of Sale,
marked as Exhibit AA-2 and AA-3,[]
showing that the appraised value of the
land adjoining or adjacent to plaintiff land
ranges from P700.00 to P750.00 per square
meter. As between the much lower price of
the land as testified by defendants witness
Gregorio Enterone, and that of the City
Assessor of Iligan City, the latter is more
credible. Considering however, that the
appraised value of the land in the area as
determined by the City Assessors Office is
not uniform, this Court, is of the opinion
that the reasonable amount of just
compensation of plaintiffs land should be
fixed at FIVE HUNDRED (500.00)
PESOS, per square meter. xxx.[41]

The RTC based its fixing of just compensation

ostensibly on the prevailing market value at the time
of the filing of the complaint, instead of reckoning
from the time of the taking pursuant to Section 3(h) of

Republic Act No. 6395. The CA did not dwell on the

reckoning time, possibly because NPC did not assign
that as an error on the part of the RTC.
We rule that the reckoning value is the value at
the time of the filing of the complaint, as the RTC
provided in its decision. Compensation that is
reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time
either when NPC entered or when it completed the
tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it
would compound the gross unfairness already caused
to the owners by NPCs entering without the intention
of formally expropriating the land, and without the
prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of
Macabangkit. NPCs entry denied elementary due
process of law to the owners since then until the
owners commenced the inverse condemnation
proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the
necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from
its deliberate acts of denying due process of law to the
owners. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary
fairness to them, therefore, reckoning just
compensation on the value at the time the owners
commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings
is entirely warranted.

In National Power Corporation v. Court of

Appeals,[42] a case that involved the similar
construction of an underground tunnel by NPC
without the prior consent and knowledge of the
owners, and in which we held that the basis in fixing
just compensation when the initiation of the action
preceded the entry into the property was the time of
the filing of the complaint, not the time of taking,
[43]
we pointed out that there was no taking when the
entry by NPC was made without intent to expropriate
or was not made under warrant or color of legal
authority.
4.
Awards for rentals, moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees are deleted
for insufficiency of factual and legal bases
The CA upheld the RTCs granting to the Heirs of
Macabangkit of rentals of P 30,000.00/month from
1979 up to July 1999 with 12% interest per annum by
finding NPC guilty of bad faith in taking possession
of the land to construct the tunnel without their
knowledge and consent.

Granting rentals is legally and factually bereft

of justification, in light of the taking of the land being
already justly compensated. Conformably with the
ruling in Manila International Airport Authority v.
Rodriguez,[44] in which the award of interest was held
to render the grant of back rentals unwarranted, we
delete the award of back rentals and in its place
prescribe interest of 12% interest per annum from
November 21, 1997, the date of the filing of the
complaint, until the full liability is paid by NPC. The
imposition
of interest
of
12%
interest per
annum follows a long line of pertinent jurisprudence,
[45]
whereby the Court has fixed the rate of interest on
just compensation at 12% per annum whenever the
expropriator has not immediately paid just
compensation.

There was, to begin with, no factual and legal bases

mentioned for the awards. It is never trite to remind
that moral and exemplary damages, not by any means
liquidated or assessed as a matter of routine, always
require evidence that establish the circumstances
under which the claimant is entitled to them.
Moreover, the failure of both the RTC and the CA to
render the factual and legal justifications for the moral
and exemplary damages in the body of their decisions
immediately demands the striking out of the awards
for being in violation of the fundamental rule that the
decision must clearly state the facts and the law on
which it is based. Without the factual and legal
justifications, the awards are exposed as the product
of conjecture and speculation, which have no place in
fair judicial adjudication.

The RTC did not state any factual and legal

justifications for
awarding to
the
Heirs
of
Macabangkit moral and exemplary damages each in
the amount of P200,000.00. The awards just appeared
in the fallo of its decision. Neither did the CA proffer
any justifications for sustaining the RTC on the
awards. We consider the omissions of the lower courts
as pure legal error that we feel bound to correct even
if NPC did not submit that for our consideration.

We also reverse and set aside the decree of the

RTC for NPC to pay to the Heirs of Macabangkit the
sum equivalent to 15% of the total amount awarded,
as attorneys fees, and to pay the cost. The body of the
decision did not state the factual and legal reasons
why NPC was liable for attorneys fees. The
terse statement found at the end of the body of the
RTCs decision, stating: xxx The contingent attorneys
fee is hereby reduced from 20% to only 15% of the

total amount of the claim that may be awarded to

plaintiffs, without more, did not indicate or explain
why and how the substantial liability of NPC for
attorneys fees could have arisen and been determined.
In assessing attorneys fees against NPC and in
favor of the respondents, the RTC casually
disregarded the fundamental distinction between the
two concepts of attorneys fees the ordinary and the
extraordinary. These
concepts
were
aptly
distinguished in Traders Royal Bank Employees
Union-Independent v. NLRC,[46]thuswise:
There are two commonly accepted
concepts of attorneys fees, the so-called
ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary
concept, an attorneys fee is the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his
client for the legal services he has rendered
to the latter. The basis of this
compensation is the fact of his
employment by and his agreement with the
client.
In its extraordinary concept, an
attorneys fee is an indemnity for damages
ordered by the court to be paid by the
losing party in a litigation. The basis of

this is any of the cases provided by law

where such award can be made, such as
those authorized in Article 2208, Civil
Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but
to the client, unless they have agreed that
the award shall pertain to the lawyer as
additional compensation or as part thereof.

By referring to the award as contingency fees,

and reducing the award from 20% to 15%, the RTC
was really referring to a supposed agreement on
attorneys fees between the Heirs of Macabangkit and
their counsel. As such, the concept of attorneys fees
involved was the ordinary. Yet, the inclusion of the
attorneys fees in the judgment among the liabilities of
NPC converted the fees to extraordinary. We have to
disagree with the RTC thereon, and we express our
discomfort that the CAdid not do anything to
excise the clearly erroneous and unfounded grant.

An award of attorneys fees has always been the

exception rather than the rule. To start with, attorneys
fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a
suit.[47] Nor should an adverse decision ipso
facto justify an award of attorneys fees to the winning

party.[48] The policy of the Court is that no premium

should be placed on the right to litigate. [49] Too, such
fees, as part of damages, are assessed only in the
instances specified in Art. 2208, Civil Code.
[50]
Indeed, attorneys fees are in the nature of actual
damages.[51] But even when a claimant is compelled to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his rights, attorneys fees may still be
withheld where no sufficient showing of bad faith
could be reflected in a partys persistence in
a suit other than an erroneous conviction of the
righteousness of his cause.[52] And, lastly, the trial
court must make express findings of fact and law that
bring
the suit within
the
exception.
What
this demands is
that
the factual,
legal
or
equitable justifications for the award must be set forth

not only in the fallo but also in the text of the

decision, or else, the award should be thrown out for
being speculative and conjectural.[53]
Sound policy dictates that even if the NPC
failed to raise the issue of attorneys fees, we are not
precluded
from
correcting the
lower

courts patently erroneous application of the law.

[54]
Indeed, the Court, in supervising the lower courts,
possesses
the
ample authority
to
review legal matters like this one even if not
specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties.
5.
Attorneys fees under quantum meruit principle
are fixed at 10% of the judgment award
Based on the pending motions of
Atty. Macarupung Dibaratun and Atty. Manuel D.
Ballelos to assert their respective rights to attorneys
fees, both contending that they represented the Heirs
of Macabangkit in this case, a conflict would ensue
from the finality of the judgment against NPC.
A look at the history of the legal representation
of the Heirs of Macabangkit herein provides a helpful
predicate for resolving the conflict.
Atty. Dibaratun was the original counsel of the Heirs
of Macabangkit. When the appeal was submitted for
decision in the CA,[55] Atty. Ballelos filed his entry of
appearance,[56] and a motion for early decision.[57] Atty.

Ballelos
subsequently filed also a manifestation,
[58]
supplemental manifestation,[59]

arguments contained in the pleadings previously filed

by Atty. Dibaratun.[68]

reply,[60] and ex parte motion reiterating the motion for

early decision.[61] It appears that a copy of the CAs
decision was furnished solely to Atty. Ballelos.
However, shortly before the rendition of the decision,
Atty. Dibaratun filed in the CA a motion to register
attorneys lien,[62] alleging that he had not withdrawn
his appearance and had not been aware of the entry of
appearance by Atty. Ballelos. A similar motion was
also received by the Court from Atty. Dibaratun a few
days after the petition for review was filed.[63] Thus, on
February 14, 2005,[64] the Court directed Atty.
Dibaratun to enter his appearance herein. He complied
upon filing the comment.[65]

On September 11, 2008, Atty. Ballelos submitted two

motions, to wit: (a) a manifestation and motion
authorizing a certain Abdulmajeed Djamla to receive
his attorneys fees equivalent of 15% of the judgment
award,[69] and (b) a motion to register his attorneys lien
that he claimed was contingent.[70]

Amir Macabangkit confirmed Atty. Dibaratuns

representation through an ex parte manifestation that
he filed in his own behalf and on behalf of his siblings
Mongkoy
and
Putri.[66] Amir
reiterated
his
manifestation on March 6, 2006,[67] and further
imputed malpractice to Atty. Ballelos for having filed
an entry of appearance bearing Amirs forged signature
and for plagiarism, i.e., copying verbatim the

Both Atty. Dibaratun and Atty. Ballelos posited that

their entitlement to attorneys fees was contingent. Yet,
a contract for a contingent fees is an agreement in
writingby which the fees, usually a fixed percentage
of what may be recovered in the action, are made to
depend upon the success in the effort to enforce or
defend a supposed right. Contingent fees depend upon
an express contract, without which the attorney can
only recover on the basis of quantum meruit.[71] With
neither Atty. Dibaratun nor Atty. Ballelos presenting a
written agreement bearing upon their supposed
contingent fees, the only way to determine their right
to appropriate attorneys fees is to apply the principle
of quantum meruit.

Quantum meruit literally meaning as much as he

deserves is used as basis for determining an attorneys
professional fees in the absence of an express
agreement.[72]The recovery of attorneys fees on the
basis of quantum meruit is a device that prevents an
unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits
of the legal services of counsel without paying for it
and also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the
attorney himself.[73] An attorney must show that he is
entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in
pursuing the clients cause, taking into account certain
factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.[74]
Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility lists the guidelines for determining the
proper amount of attorney fees, to wit:
Rule 20.1 A lawyer shall be guided by the
following factors in determining his fees:
a) The time spent and the extent of the
services rendered or required;
b) The novelty and difficult of the
questions involved;
c) The important of the subject matter;

d) The skill demanded;

e) The probability of losing other
employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case;
f) The customary charges for similar
services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
chapter to which he belongs;
g) The amount involved in the
controversy and the benefits resulting to the
client from the service;
h) The contingency or certainty of
compensation;
i) The character of the employment,
whether occasional or established; and
j)
lawyer.

The professional standing of the

In the event of a dispute as to the amount of

fees between the attorney and his client, and the
intervention of the courts is sought, the determination
requires that there be evidence to prove the amount of
fees and the extent and value of the services rendered,
taking into account the facts determinative thereof.
[75]
Ordinarily, therefore, the determination of the

attorneys fees on quantum meruit is remanded to the

lower court for the purpose. However, it will be just
and equitable to now assess and fix the attorneys fees
of both attorneys in order that the resolution of a
comparatively simple controversy, as Justice
Regalado put it in Traders Royal Bank Employees
Union-Independent v. NLRC,[76] would not be
needlessly prolonged, by taking into due
consideration the accepted guidelines and so much of
the pertinent data as are extant in the records.
Atty. Dibaratun and Atty. Ballelos each claimed
attorneys fees equivalent to 15% of the principal
award of P113,532,500.00, which was the amount
granted by the RTC in its decision. Considering that
the attorneys fees will be defrayed by the Heirs of
Macabangkit out of their actual recovery from NPC,
giving to each of the two attorneys 15% of the
principal award as attorneys fees would be excessive
and unconscionable from the point of view of the
clients. Thus, the Court, which holds and exercises the
power to fix attorneys fees on a quantum meruit basis
in the absence of an express written agreement
between the attorney and the client, now fixes
attorneys fees at 10% of the principal award
of P113,532,500.00.

Whether it is Atty. Dibaratun or Atty. Ballelos,

or both, who should receive attorneys fees from the
Heirs of Macabangkit is a question that the Court
must next determine and settle by considering the
amount and quality of the work each performed and
the results each obtained.
Atty. Dibaratun, the attorney from the outset,
unquestionably carried the bulk of the legal demands
of the case. He diligently prepared and timely filed in
behalf of the Heirs of Macabangkit every pleading
and paper necessary in the full resolution of the
dispute, starting from the complaint until the very last
motion filed in this Court. He consistently appeared
during the trial, and examined and cross-examined all
the witnesses presented at that stage of the
proceedings. The nature, character, and substance of
each pleading and the motions he prepared for the
Heirs of Macabangkit indicated that he devoted
substantial time and energy in researching and
preparing the case for the trial. He even
advanced P250,000.00 out of his own pocket to defray
expenses from the time of the filing of the motion to
execute pending appeal until the case reached the
Court.[77] His representation of all the Heirs of
Macabangkit was not denied by any of them.

We note that Atty. Dibaratun possessed some

standing in the legal profession and in his local
community. He formerly served as a member of
the Board of Director of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Lanao del Norte-Iligan City
Chapter, and was an IBP national awardee as Best
Legal Aid Committee Chairman. He taught at
Mindanao State University College of Law Extension.
He was a Municipal Mayor of Matungao, Lanao del
Norte, and was enthroned Sultan a Gaus.
In contrast, not much about the character and standing
of Atty. Ballelos, as well as the nature and quality of
the legal services he rendered for the Heirs of
Macabangkit are in the records. The motions he filed
in the
Court and in the CA lacked enlightening research and
were insignificant to the success of the clients cause.
His legal service, if it can be called that, manifested
no depth or assiduousness, judging from the quality of
the pleadings from him. His written submissions in
the case appeared either to have been lifted verbatim
from the pleadings previously filed by Atty.
Dibaratun, or to have been merely quoted from the

decisions and resolutions of the RTC and the CA. Of

the Heirs of Macabangkit, only Cebu, Batowa-an,
Sayana, Nasser, Manta, Mongkoy[78] and Edgar gave
their consent to Atty. Ballelos to appear in their behalf
in the CA, which he did despite Atty. Dibaratun not
having yet filed any withdrawal of his appearance.
The Court did not receive any notice of appearance
for the Heirs of Macabangkit from Atty. Ballelos, but
that capacity has meanwhile become doubtful in the
face of Amirs strong denial of having retained him.
In fairness and justice, the Court accords full
recognition to Atty. Dibaratun as the counsel de
parte of the Heirs of Macabangkit who discharged his
responsibility in the prosecution of the clients cause to
its successful end. It is he, not Atty. Ballelos, who was
entitled to the full amount of attorneys fees that the
clients ought to pay to their attorney. Given the
amount and quality of his legal work, his diligence
and the time he expended in ensuring the success of
his prosecution of the clients cause, he deserves the
recognition, notwithstanding that some of the clients
might appear to have retained Atty. Ballelos after the
rendition of a favorable judgment.[79]

Atty. Ballelos may claim only from Cebu, Batowa-an,

Sayana, Nasser, Manta and Edgar, the only parties
who engaged him. The Court considers his work in
the case as very minimal. His compensation under
the quantum meruit principle is fixed at P5,000.00,
and only the Heirs of Macabangkit earlier named are
liable to him.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision

promulgated on October 5, 2004 by the Court of
Appeals,
subject
to
the
following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
(a) Interest at the rate of 12% per
annum is IMPOSED on the principal
amount of P113,532,500.00 as just
compensation, reckoned from the
filing of the complaint on November
21, 1997 until the full liability is paid;
(b) The awards of P30,000.00 as rental
fee, P200,000.00 as moral damages,
and P200,000.00
as
exemplary
damages are DELETED; and

(c) The award of 15% attorneys fees

decreed to be paid by National Power
Corporation to the Heirs of
Macabangkit is DELETED.
The Court PARTLY GRANTS the motion to register
attorneys lien filed by Atty. Macarupung Dibaratun,
and FIXES Atty. Dibaratuns attorneys fees on the
basis ofquantum meruit at 10% of the principal award
of P113,532,500.00.
The motion to register attorneys lien of Atty.
Manuel D. Ballelos is PARTLY GRANTED, and
Atty. Ballelos is DECLARED ENTITLED TO
RECOVERfrom Cebu, Batowa-an, Sayana, Nasser,
Manta and Edgar, all surnamed Macabangkit, the
amount of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees on the basis
of quantum meruit.
Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC V CA
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new
ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to
assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based
on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning
of psychological incapacity in the recent case ofSantos vs. Court
of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying
said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in
the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be
sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration Article 36 as
the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this
Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to
lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14,
1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet,
which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina
to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration
of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the

petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April

14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre
O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed
signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father
since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on
whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents
for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard
to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that
sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the
family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as
a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with
her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of
himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's
best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to
free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from
the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that
he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife,
but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels
were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2)
Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and
handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were
stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on

April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine,
Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert
Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29,
1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more
than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and
her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the
custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own
testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria
Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents
marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court
of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of

Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the
phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the
facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to
establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between
the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code
Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended
to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family
rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view
psychologically incapacity as a broad range of
mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one
spouse indicative of how he or she regards the
marital union, his or her personal relationship with
the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in
the long haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed
and considered as a whole, tends to cause the
union to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, then there is enough
reason to leave the spouses to their individual
fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge
committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find
no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of

the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and
conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities
and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities
and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru
Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing
to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their

responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that

they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she
and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had
been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility,
not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on
your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit
with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged

personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity
existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort
was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's
part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely
ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-visexisting law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code
and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and
applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely,
the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding
Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member
of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and
interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3,
1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36
of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of
the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from

dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and

the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert
evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption

of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to

marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting
marriage: Those who are unable to assume the

essential obligations of marriage due to causes of

psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart
from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and
the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already
ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more
cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

the March 2, 1994 and the July 25, 1994 Resolutions4 of the CA
also in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 10200-10212.
The three-decade saga of the parties herein has for its subject
parcels of land forming part of what was originally known as the
Grace Park Subdivision in Caloocan City and formerly owned by
the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) and/or the
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).

SO ORDERED.

The Facts
Sometime in the 1960s, RCAM allowed a number of individuals
to occupy the Grace Park property on condition that they would
vacate the premises should the former push through with the plan
to construct a school in the area. The plan, however, did not
materialize, thus, the occupants offered to purchase the portions
they occupied. Later, as they could not afford RCAMs proposed
price, the occupants, organizing themselves as exclusive
members of the Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr. Tenants Association, Inc.,
petitioned the Government for the acquisition of the said property,
its subdivision into home lots, and the resale of the subdivided
lots to them at a low price.5

MANAPAT V CA
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
For the resolution of the Court are three consolidated petitions for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. G.R. No.
110478 assails the May 27, 1993 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 10200-10212. G.R. No.
116176 questions the June 28, 1994 Decision3 of the appellate
court in CA-G.R. CV No. 27159. G.R. Nos. 116491-503 assails

Acting on the associations petition, the Government, in 1963,

through the Land Tenure Administration (LTA), later succeeded by
the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC),
negotiated for the acquisition of the property from RCAM/PRC.
But because of the high asking price of RCAM and the budgetary
constraints of the Government, the latters effort to purchase
and/or to expropriate the property was discontinued. RCAM then
decided to effect, on its own, the subdivision of the property and
the sale of the individual subdivided lots to the public.6Petitioners
Manapat and Lim and respondents Loberanes, Quimque, Vega,
Santos, Oracion and Mercado in these consolidated cases were

among those who purchased individual subdivided lots of Grace

Park directly from RCAM and/or PRC.7
A significant turn of events however happened in 1977 when the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1072,8 appropriating P1.2M out of the Presidents
Special Operations Funds to cover the additional amount needed
for the expropriation of Grace Park. The National Housing
Authority (NHA), PHHCs successor, then filed several
expropriation proceedings over the already subdivided lots for the
purpose of developing Grace Park under the Zonal Improvement
Program (ZIP) and subdividing it into small lots for distribution
and resale at a low cost to the residents of the area.9 The
following cases were filed by the NHA with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Caloocan City: C-6225, C-6226, C-6227, C-6228,
C-6229, C-6230, C-6231, C-6232, C-6233, C-6234, C-6235, C6236, C-6237, C-6238, C-6255 and C-6435.10
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered separate decisions
dismissing the expropriation cases, with the exceptions of Cases
Nos. C-6233 and C-6236 in which it ordered the condemnation of
the involved lots.11 On motion for reconsideration by the NHA in
Cases Nos. C-6227, C-6228, C-6230, C-6234, C-6235, C-6238
and C-6255, the trial court later amended its decision, set aside
its dismissal of the said cases, ordered the condemnation of the
involved lots and fixed the amount of just compensation
at P180.00 per square meter. In Cases Nos. C-6225, C-6229, C6231, C-6232, C-6237 and C-6435, the RTC however denied
NHAs motion for reconsideration.12
NHA eventually appealed to the CA the decisions in Cases Nos.
C-6225, C-6229, C-6231, C-6232, C-6237 and C-6435 on the
issue of the necessity of the taking, and the amended ruling in
Cases Nos. C-6227, C-6228, C-6230, C-6234, C-6235, C-6238
and C-6255 on the issue of just compensation.13 The CA

consolidated the appeals and docketed them as CA-G.R. CV No.

10200-10212. NHA likewise filed with the CA an appeal from the
decision in C-6226, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
27159.
On May 27, 1993, the appellate court rendered its Decision14 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212 disposing of the appealed cases
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1) Reversing and setting aside the decisions of dismissal
in Cases Nos. C-6225, C-6229, C-6231, C-6232, C-6237
and C-6435; and in lieu thereof an order of condemnation
is entered declaring that plaintiff-appellant NHA has a
lawful right to take the lots involved for the public use
described in the complaints;
2) Affirming the decisions in Case Nos. C-6227, C-6228,
C-6234, C-6235, C-6238 and C-6255 insofar as said
decision granted the expropriation; declaring that plaintiffappellant NHA has a lawful right to take the lots involved
for the public use stated in the complaint; but annulling
and setting aside the just compensation fixed by the trial
court at P180.00 per square meter in the said cases;
3) Ordering the remand of all the appealed cases, except
for Case No. C-6230, to the trial court for determination of
the just compensation to which defendants are entitled in
accordance with Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court;
4) Finding the compromise agreement in Case No. C6230, entitled, "NHA v. Aurora Dy dela Costa, et al." in

accordance with law, and not contrary to morals or public

policy, and rendering judgment in accordance therewith;
5) Ordering Remedios Macato to be joined as defendant
with Julia C. Diaz in Case No. C-6227.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.15
Rosemarie and Dolores Guanzon, two of the owners of the lots in
C-6225, filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari of
the aforesaid decision of the appellate court [Their petition was
docketed as G.R. Nos. 110462-74]. On September 5, 1994, we
dismissed their petition for failure to sufficiently show that the CA
had committed any reversible error in the challenged
decision.16 An Entry of Judgment was issued on February 2,
1995.17
Likewise, Julia Diez and Remedios Macato, the owners of the lots
in C-6227, assailed before us the afore-quoted CA decision
through a petition under Rule 45. On July 28, 1993, however, in
G.R. No. 110770, we denied their Motion for Extension of Time to
file a petition for review on certiorari for their failure to submit an
affidavit of service of the motion as required by
Circular No. 19-91.18 After denying their motion for
reconsideration,19 we issued an Entry of Judgment on August 27,
1993.20
Petitioner Manapat, the defendant-landowner in C-6229, also
elevated the case before us via a petition for review on certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 110478.21 We initially dismissed this petition
for having been filed out of time,22but we reinstated it on motion
for reconsideration.23

In the meantime, the other defendants-landowners in the

expropriation casesRCAM/PRC in C-6225, Maximo Loberanes
and Eladio Quimque in C-6231, Alejandro Oracion, Gonzalo
Mercado, Cesario Vega and Juanito Santos in C-6435, and
Remedios Macato in C-6227moved for the reconsideration of
the said May 27, 1993 Decision of the CA.24 In the March 2, 1994
Resolution,25 the appellate court resolved the motions in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for
reconsideration of movants Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
and Philippine Realty Corporation (in Special Civil Action No.
6225) and movant-intervenor Remedios Macato (in Special Civil
Action No. 6227) are DENIED.
The motions for reconsideration of movants Gonzalo Mercado,
Cesario Vega and Juanito Santos (in Special Civil Action No.
6435) and movants Maximo Loberanes and Eladio Quimque (in
Special Civil Action No. 6231) are GRANTED. The motion for
reconsideration of movant Alejandro Oracion (in Special Civil
Action No. 6435) is partially granted to the extent of Three
Hundred (300) square meters of Lot 22, Block 157. The decision
of this Court promulgated May 27, 1993 is accordingly
MODIFIED. Lot No. 26, Block No. 157 owned by Cesario Vega
and Juanito Santos, and Lot No. 4, Block No. 157 owned by
Maximo Loberanes and Eladio Quimque are declared exempt
from expropriation and the corresponding complaints for
expropriation (sic) DISMISSED insofar as said lots are
concerned. Lot No. 22, Block No. 157 owned by movant
Alejandro Oracion is declared exempt from expropriation to the
extent of Three Hundred (300) square meters. Only the remaining
Ninety (90) square meters shall be the subject of expropriation,
the portion to be determined by the lower court in the manner
most beneficial to the owner and consistent with the objective of
PD 1072.

SO ORDERED.26

IT IS SO ORDERED.31

Aggrieved by the said March 2, 1994 CA Resolution specifically

with regard to the exemption from expropriation of the lots of
Loberanes, Quimque, Mercado, Vega and Santos, and the partial
exemption of the lot of Oracion, NHA moved for the
reconsideration of the same. In the subsequent July 25, 1994
Resolution,27 the appellate court denied NHAs motion, together
with the belated motion of Vivencio S. de Guzman, the defendantlandowner in C-6255. The dispositive portion of the July 25, 1994
Resolution reads:

Discontented with the appellate courts ruling, petitioner Domingo

Lim, one of the owners of the lots subject of C-6226, elevated the
case to us via a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R.
No. 116176.32

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration of defendantappellant Vivencio S. de Guzman of the decision promulgated
May 27, 1993 and of plaintiff-appellant National Housing Authority
of the resolution promulgated March 2, 1994 are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.28
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, NHA filed with
this Court a Consolidated Petition for Review29under Rule 45, as
aforesaid, assailing the March 2, 1994 and the July 25, 1994
Resolutions of the appellate court. NHAs petition was docketed
as G.R. Nos. 116491-503 against respondents Loberanes and
Quimque (in C-6231), Vega, Santos, Oracion and Mercado (in C6435).
In a separate development, the CA, on June 28, 1994, rendered
its Decision30 in CA-G.R. CV No. 27159, reversing the RTCs
ruling in C-6226. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
appealed decision dated October 29, 1986 is hereby REVERSED
for want of merit. Let the record of this case be remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings.

The Issues
Thus, for resolution by this Court are the following consolidated
cases: (1) G.R. No. 110478 of Manapat; (2) G.R. Nos. 116491503 of the NHA; and (3) G.R. No. 116176 of Lim.
In G.R. No. 110487, petitioner Manapat argues in the main that,
as he is also a member of the tenant association, the beneficiary
of the expropriation, it would be incongruous to take the land
away from him only to give it back to him as an intended
beneficiary. Accordingly, the CA, in its May 27, 1993 Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212, should not have allowed the
expropriation of his lot. To further support his stance, Manapat
raises the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE ISSUANCE MADE IN THE EXERCISE OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER, SPECIFYING THE LOTS TO BE
EXPROPRIATED AND THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH
THEY ARE INTENDED, REMOVES FROM THE
JUDICIARY THE DETERMINATION OF THE
NECESSITY OF THE TAKING, THERE BEING NO
SHOWING OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION.33
II

SUPERVENING EVENT RENDERS IMPROPER THE

DISPOSITION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR AN
ORDER OF CONDEMNATION DECLARING THAT NHA
HAS A LAWFUL RIGHT TO TAKE THE LOT OF FERMIN
MANAPAT FOR SUPPOSED PUBLIC USE AND FOR
REMAND OF HIS CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR
DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION.34
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE
CONSIDERED THAT FERMIN MANAPAT IS NOT ONLY
A BONA FIDE OCCUPANT IN THE GRACE PARK
SUBDIVISION FOR PURPOSES OF P.D. 1072 BUT
LIKEWISE HAS A TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. 42370 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE
CITY OF CALOOCAN OVER THE SAME LOT SOUGHT
TO BE EXPROPRIATED WHICH SHOULD NOT BE
SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK AS DISPOSED BY
THE COURT OF APPEALS.35
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE
CONSIDERED THAT THE EVENTUAL BENEFICIARIES
OF ITS BENEVOLENT EXPROPRIATION ARE
SQUATTERS.36
NHA, in its petition in G.R. Nos. 116491-503, primarily contends
that the CA erred when it issued its March 2, 1994 Resolution and
modified the May 27, 1993 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 1020010212 to the extent that it applied retroactively Article VI, Section
10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279, thus exempting from
expropriation the 300-sq m lots of respondents Loberanes,

Quimque, Vega, Santos, Oracion and Mercado. NHA summarized

its arguments as follows:
I
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in applying retroactively
Article VI, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7279 to the subject
expropriation cases instituted back in 1977 by petitioner-appellant
NHA.37
A. Republic Act 7279 passed in 1992 should operate
prospectively and, therefore, should not be given
retroactive effect.38
Republic Act 7279 is a substantive and penal law with a
penalty clause which cannot apply retroactively especially
to pending actions.39
B. Republic Act No. 7279 and PD 1072 are not in pari
materia.40
The retroactive application of Article VI, Section 10 of RA 7279
will affect vested rights of petitioner-appellant NHA arising from its
exercise of the power of eminent domain.41
II
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the impractical
consequences resulting from a selective expropriation of lots.42
In G.R. No. 116176, petitioner Lim, a non-member of the tenant
association who bought from RCAM/PRC four lots of the
subdivided Grace Park Subdivision,43 argues as follows:
1

Respondent NHA may not, as it would herein, legally regroup several smaller lots into which a much bigger lot
had previously been subdivided, and consider and treat
them as one again for the purpose of subdividing it once
more into still smaller lots for distribution to its supposed
or intended beneficiaries.44
2
There really was no genuine necessity for the
expropriation of the lots in question to satisfy the purpose
thereof as alleged in the complaint therefor.45
3
Respondent Court did not sustain the clear finding of the
trial court that no evidence sufficient to prove its claim that
the expropriation of said lots and subdividing them again
into much smaller lots for resale to their present
occupants would provide the latter with more healthful,
decent and peaceful surroundings and thus improve the
quality of their lives was ever presented by respondent
NHA.46
Stripped of non-essentials, the petitions raise only one
fundamental issue, and that is, whether the NHA may validly
expropriate the parcels of land subject of these cases.
The Courts Ruling
The power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable
power of the State. Also called the power of expropriation, it is
described as "the highest and most exact idea of property
remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some
public purpose through a method "in the nature of a compulsory

sale to the State."47 By virtue of its sovereign character, the

exercise of the power prevails over the non-impairment
clause,48 and is clearly superior to the final and executory
judgment rendered by a court in an ejectment case.49
Being inherent, the power need not be specifically conferred on
the government by the Constitution. Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, which mandates that "private property shall not be
taken for a public use without just compensation," merely
imposes a limit on the governments exercise of the power and
provides a measure of protection to the individuals right to
property.50
Just like its two companion fundamental powers of the State, 51 the
power of eminent domain is exercised by the Legislature.
However, it may be delegated by Congress to the President,
administrative bodies, local government units, and even to private
enterprises performing public services.52
Albeit the power partakes of a sovereign character, it is by no
means absolute. Its exercise is subject to limitations, one of which
is, precisely, Section 9, Article III of the Constitution.
Over the years and in a plethora of cases, this Court has
recognized the following requisites for the valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain: (1) the property taken must be private
property; (2) there must be genuine necessity to take the private
property; (3) the taking must be for public use; (4) there must be
payment of just compensation; and (5) the taking must comply
with due process of law.53 Accordingly, the question that this Court
must resolve is whether these requisites have been adequately
addressed.

It is incontrovertible that the parcels of land subject of these

consolidated petitions are private property. Thus, the first
requisite is satisfied.
With respect to the second, it is well to recall that in Lagcao v.
Judge Labra,54 we declared that the foundation of the right to
exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity, and that necessity
must be of a public character. As a rule, the determination of
whether there is genuine necessity for the exercise is a justiciable
question.55 However, when the power is exercised by the
Legislature, the question of necessity is essentially a political
question.56 Thus, in City of Manila v. Chinese Community,57 we
held:
The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, may directly determine the necessity for
appropriating private property for a particular improvement for
public use, and it may select the exact location of the
improvement. In such a case, it is well-settled that the utility of the
proposed improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its
construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of
the location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the
land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for the
legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to
interfere, or to substitute their own views for those of the
representatives of the people.
In the instant cases, the authority to expropriate came from
Presidential Decree No. 1072, issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1977. At that time, and as explicitly
recognized under the 1973 Constitution, President Marcos had
legislative powers. Perforce, the expropriation of the subject
properties identified with specificity in the P.D. --- was directed
by legislation. The issue of necessity then assumed the nature of
a political question.

As to the third requisite of "public use," we examine the purpose

for which the expropriation was undertaken by NHA. As set forth
in its petition, NHA justifies the taking of the subject property for
the purpose of improving and upgrading the area by constructing
roads and installing facilities thereon under the Governments
zonal improvement program and subdividing them into much
smaller lots for distribution and sale at a low cost to qualified
beneficiaries, mostly underprivileged long-time occupants of
Grace Park. Around 510 families with approximately 5 members
each will be benefited by the project.58 The only remaining
obstacle in the completion of this project is the lots subject of
these consolidated petitions as the other lots in Grace Park have
already been expropriated.59
The Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP), being implemented for
government by NHA, draws breath from policy mandates found in
the 1987 Constitution.60 It is an integral part of the governments
"socialized housing" program which, in Sumulong v.
Guerrero,61 we deemed compliant with the "public use"
requirement, it being a program clearly devoted to a "public
purpose." Justice Irene R. Cortes, speaking eloquently for the
Court, said:
"Socialized housing" is defined as, "the construction of dwelling
units for the middle and lower class members of our society,
including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and
other facilities" (Pres. Decree No. 1224, par. 1). This definition
was later expanded to include among others:
a) The construction and/or improvement of dwelling units
for the middle and lower income groups of the society,
including the construction of the supporting infrastructure
and other facilities;

b) Slum clearance, relocation and resettlement of

squatters and slum dwellers as well as the provision of
related facilities and services;
c) Slum improvement which consists basically of
allocating homelots to the dwellers in the area or property
involved, rearrangement and re-alignment of existing
houses and other dwelling structures and the construction
and provision of basic community facilities and services,
where there are none, such as roads, footpaths, drainage,
sewerage, water and power system, schools, barangay
centers, community centers, clinics, open spaces, parks,
playgrounds and other recreational facilities;
d) The provision of economic opportunities, including the
development of commercial and industrial estates and
such other facilities to enhance the total community
growth; and
e) Such other activities undertaken in pursuance of the
objective to provide and maintain housing for the greatest
number of people under Presidential Decree No. 757.
(Pres. Decree No. 1259, sec. 1)

The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will
ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free
the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate
social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of
living and an improved quality of life for all. [Art. II, sec. 9]
The state shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in
cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban
land reform and housing which will make available at affordable
cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and
homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It
shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such
citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall
respect the rights of small property owners. (Art. XIII, sec. 9,
Emphasis supplied)
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter
of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public
health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare.
The public character of housing measures does not change
because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but
only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning
has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all
who need it, all at once.

xxxx
Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the
construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public
purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use
but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The
1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish,
maintain and ensure adequate social services including housing
[Art. II, sec. 7]. The 1987 Constitution goes even further by
providing that:

Population growth, the migration to urban areas and the

mushrooming of crowded makeshift dwellings is a worldwide
development particularly in developing countries. So basic and
urgent are housing problems that the United Nations General
Assembly proclaimed 1987 as the "International Year of Shelter
for the Homeless" "to focus the attention of the international
community on those problems". The General Assembly is
"[s]eriously concerned that, despite the efforts of Governments at
the national and local levels and of international organizations,
the living conditions of the majority of the people in slums and

squatter areas and rural settlements, especially in developing

countries, continue to deteriorate in both relative and absolute
terms." [G.A. Res. 37/221, Yearbook of the United Nations 1982,
Vol. 36, p. 1043-4]
In the light of the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that "socialized
housing" falls within the confines of "public use". It is, particularly
important to draw attention to paragraph (d) of Pres. Dec. No.
1224 which should be construed in relation with the preceding
three paragraphs. Provisions on economic opportunities
inextricably linked with low-cost housing, or slum clearance,
relocation and resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize the
public purpose of the project.62
It need only be added, at this juncture, that the "public use"
requisite for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is
a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing
conditions. At present, it may not be amiss to state that whatever
is beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use.63
Still, petitioner Manapat insists that, being himself a beneficiary of
the expropriation (because he has been a long-time resident of
Grace Park), it would be incongruous for government to take his
land away from him only to give it back to him. This contention
sadly fails to comprehend the public purpose for the taking under
the "socialized housing" program. The parcels of land subject of
the expropriation are, precisely, being taken so that they can be
subdivided into much smaller lots --- at an average of 66.5 square
meters per lot64 --- for distribution to deserving dwellers in the
area. Upon the completion of the project, Manapat, and those
similarly situated as he, cannot assert any right to be awarded the
very same lots they currently occupy, nor be entitled to the same
area of the land they now have.

Then, we have petitioner Lim and respondents Vega, Santos,

Oracion, and Mercado, who argue that the lots they own should
not be expropriated are already titled in their names and are very
small in area, being already the subdivided portions of the original
Grace Park Subdivision.
We are not persuaded.
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration65 is
instructive. In that case, this Court adopted the dissenting opinion
of Justice J. B. L. Reyes in Republic v. Baylosis,66 that the
propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain cannot be
determined on a purely quantitative or area basis, given that the
Constitution speaks of lands, not of landed estates. Speaking
through Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique M. Fernando, the
Court said:
This is not to say of course that property rights are disregarded.
This is merely to emphasize that the philosophy of our
Constitution embodying as it does what Justice Laurel referred to
as its "nationalistic and socialist traits discoverable upon even a
sudden dip into a variety of [its] provisions" although not
extending as far as the "destruction or annihilation" of the rights to
property, negates the postulate which at one time reigned
supreme in American constitutional law as to their well-nigh
inviolable character. This is not so under our Constitution, which
rejects the doctrine of laissez faire with its abhorrence for the
least interference with the autonomy supposed to be enjoyed by
the property owner. Laissez faire, as Justice Malcolm pointed out
as far back as 1919, did not take too firm a foothold in our
jurisprudence. Our Constitution is much more explicit. There is no
room for it for laissez faire. So Justice Laurel affirmed not only in
the above opinion but in another concurring opinion quoted with
approval in at least two of our subsequent decisions. We had

occasion to reiterate such a view in the ACCFA case, decided

barely two months ago.
This particular grant of authority to Congress authorizing the
expropriation of land is a clear manifestation of such a policy that
finds expression in our fundamental law. So is the social justice
principle enshrined in the Constitution of which it is an
expression, as so clearly pointed out in the respective dissenting
opinions of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and Chief Justice Paras in the
Baylosis case. Why it should be thus is so plausibly set forth in
the ACCFA decision, the opinion being penned by Justice
Makalintal. We quote: "The growing complexities of modern
society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of
the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete.
The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative
and which the government was called upon to enter optionally,
and only because it was better equipped to administer for the
public welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals, continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to
be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake
in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the
tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of
economic forces. Here of course this development was
envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the
promotion of social justice."
In a more recent decision,67 we had occasion to declare that the
fact that the property is less than -hectare and that only a few
would actually benefit from the expropriation does not diminish its
public use character, inasmuch as "public use" now includes the
broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in
particular, urban land reform and housing.

The Courts departure from the land size or area test finds further
affirmation in its rulings in Mataas na Lupa Tenants Association,
Inc. v. Dimayuga68 and the aforecited Sumulong v. Guerrero.69
Given this discussion, it is clear that "public use," as a requisite
for the exercise of eminent domain in the instant cases, has been
adequately fulfilled.
To satisfy the fourth requisite, we affirm the appellate courts
disposition that the subject cases be remanded to the trial court
for the determination of the amount of just compensation. Under
case law, the said determination is a judicial prerogative. 70 As to
the observance of the fifth requisite, the due process clause, in
the expropriation proceedings, all the parties have been given
their day in court. That they are now before this Court is
attestation enough that they were not denied due process of law.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it is unmistakable that all the
requirements for the valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain have been complied with. Thus, our answer to the
singular and fundamental issue in these consolidated cases is:
YES, the NHA may validly expropriate the subject parcels of land.
One final matter: the propriety of the application by the CA of R.A.
No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and
Housing Act of 1992.
The Court is not unaware of the condition now imposed by R.A.
No. 727971 that, for purposes of urban development and housing
under the Act, where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land
owned by small property owners shall be exempted.72 "Small
property owners" are owners of residential lands with an area not
exceeding 300 sq m in highly urbanized cities and 800 sq m in
other urban areas and who do not own any other real
property.73 Invoking this limitation under the said law, the appellate

court in the questioned rulings exempted from expropriation the

lots owned by Loberanes, Quimque, Mercado, Vega and Santos,
and partially exempted the lot of Oracion.
1wphi1

The CAs ruling on this point is incorrect. R.A. No. 7279 was
enacted in 1992, almost two decades after the expropriation
cases against the property owners herein were instituted with the
RTC in 1977. Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet,
non praeteritis. A new statute should affect the future, not the
past. The law looks forward, not backward.74 Article 4 of the Civil
Code even explicitly declares, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided."75 In these consolidated
cases, the Court finds that the language of R.A. No. 7279 does
not suggest that the Legislature has intended its provisions to
have any retroactive application. On the contrary, Section 49 of
the said law indicates that it "shall take effect upon its publication
in at least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation."76 The laws prospective application being clearly
stated, the Court cannot agree with the disposition of the
appellate court that the subject lots not exceeding 300 sq m are
exempt from expropriation.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the May 27, 1993
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212
and the June 28, 1994 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 27159 are
AFFIRMED; and the March 2, 1994 and the July 25, 1994
Resolutions in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 10200-10212 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC V ASIA PACIFIC INTEGRATED

STEEL CORP
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing
the July 21, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 90539. The CA partially affirmed the September 21,
2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, of
Macabebe, Pampanga, and reduced the annual legal interest
awarded from 12% to 6% per annum. Also assailed is the
appellate court's April 28, 2010 Resolution denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
2

As culled from the records, the following are the pertinent facts:
Asia Pacific Integrated Steel Corporation (respondent) is the
registered owner of a 17,175-square meter property situated in
Barangay Sta. Monica, Municipality of San Simon, Province of
Pampanga and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
271813-R.
5

On March 1, 2002, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner)

through the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) instituted expropriation
proceedings against the respondent over a portion of their
property. The affected area, consisting of 2,024 square meters,
shall be traversed by the expansion of the San Simon
Interchange, an integral component of the construction,
rehabilitation and expansion of the North Luzon Expressway
(NLEX Project). Subsequently, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte
motion for issuance of writ of possession, stating that it deposited
with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) the amount
of P607,200.00 (100% of the value of the property based on

current zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue [BIR])

in accordance with Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 8974 (R.A.
8794), and hence the court has the ministerial duty to place
petitioner in possession pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
6

On March 19, 2002, the trial court issued an order granting

petitioners motion and directing the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga to cause the annotation of the writ of possession on
TCT No. 271813-R.
8

In its Answer with Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of

Possession, respondent questioned the TRBs authority to
expropriate the subject property and objected to petitioners
offered compensation which respondent deems unjust because
the basis thereof - the BIR zonal valuation - was an unofficial
valuation, being merely based on an internal memorandum
issued by BIR Revenue District No. 21, not by the Asset Valuation
Department of the BIR National Office. Respondent asserted that
just compensation should be at P3,036,000.00 or at P1,500.00
per square meter plus consequential damages, considering the
fair market value and the industrial classification of the subject
property.
9

During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on TRBs

authority to expropriate the subject property but disagreed as to
the amount of just compensation. Petitioner offered to
pay P607,200.00 for the portion taken but respondent made a
counter-offer of P1,821,600.00. The parties eventually agreed to
submit the issue of just compensation to three Commissioners
composed of the Municipal Assessor of San Simon as Chairman,
and the RTC Branch Clerk of Court and the Register of Deeds for
the Province of Pampanga as Members.
10

On June 1, 2004, the trial court granted respondents motion to

withdraw the P607,200.00 deposited by petitioner with the LBP as
partial payment for just compensation.
11

On June 9, 2004, the Commissioners submitted their Report with

the following findings and recommendation:
The affected lot is within the area wherein the land use are
residential, commercial, and industrial (mixed land use), as per
Vicinity Map hereto attached as Annex "B". The area is along
MacArthur Highway, Quezon Road, Municipal and Barangay
Roads[.]
In the absence of bonafide sales transaction in the area, the
Assessors Office being aware of the actual conditions of subject
property decided to use opinion values in the determination of the
current and fair market value for the purpose of payment of just
compensation.
OPINION VALUES
A. Real Estate Brokers/Independent Appraisers/Owners,
etc.
1. Residential - ranging from P2,000.00
to P2,500.00 per square meter
2. Commercial - ranging from P2,500.00
to P3,000.00 per square meter
3. Industrial - ranging from P1,000.00 above per
square meter
B. Banks and Financial Institutions
1. Residential - ranging from P1,000.00
to P2,000.00 per square meter
2. Commercial - ranging from P2,000.00
to P3,000.00 per square meter

3. Residential - ranging from P1,000.00

to P1,500.00 per square meter

because the expressway was upgraded. It is immediately

adjacent to the existing expressway, located as it is, on its
right side facing Manila. It is swampy with little water.
13

Appraisal conducted by the Assessor of San Simon, Pampanga

for various properties within the area, recommended an amount
ranging from P1,000.00 to P1,500.00, Philippine currency, per
square meter, depending on their proximity to the national roads,
municipal roads, and barangay roads, and the
improvement/development put in place. The amount of P1,000.00
to P1,500.00 was arrived at by the undersigned commissioners
due to the conversion of the subject property from agricultural to
industrial use as evidenced by the Order of Conversion dated
July 8, 1991, issued by Renato B. Padilla, Undersecretary,
Department of Agrarian Reform, a xerox copy of which is hereto
attached [as] Annex "C".
12

On September 23, 2004, an ocular inspection was conducted in

the presence of the parties representatives and their respective
counsels, during which the trial court noted the following:
1. There is an existing toll plaza on the right lane of the
expressway facing the direction of Manila with blue
colored roofing.
2. Comprised in the aforesaid toll plaza are three toll
booths. The third booth located on the extreme right
facing Manila occupies a portion of the expropriated
portion of defendants property.
3. The expropriated portion which is shown in a sketch
which was marked as Exhibit H is indicated by its color:
green. It has an area of 2,021 square meters. The
remaining unexpropriated portion of defendants land has
an area of 15,151 square meters.
4. The unexpropriated portion of the land of defendant is
presently very much below the level of the expressway

In its Decision, the trial court ruled as follows:

x x x Although there was no documentary evidence attached to
substantiate the opinions of the banks and the realtors indicated
in the Commissioners Report, the Court finds the commissioners
recommendation of the valuation of industrial lands at P1,000.00
to P1,500.00 to be fair, absent any showing that the valuation is
exorbitant or otherwise unjustified. There was no fraud or
prejudice that tainted the report.
The Court finds the valuation of the Republic of the Philippines
which was pegged at Php300.00 per square meter to be very low.
The zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (Exhibits A
and B with submarkings) is merely a gauge or is necessary in the
assessment of correct transfer taxes by the said office.
Furthermore the Department Order No. 23-98 took effect only last
February 2, 1998 which was four (4) years prior to the filing of the
complaint. The same is true with Ordinance No. 17, Series of
1994 issued by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga
(Exhibit E) which was issued eight (8) years also prior to the filing
of the complaint.
Concerning the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit C) notarized on
July 19, 2002, the same was undated and pertains only to a right
of way. An easement of right of way transmits no rights except the
easement itself. Hence, the just compensation pertaining to
easement of right of way should be lower than that in the Deed of
Absolute Sale. x x x
xxxx
Using the recommendation of the three (3) commissioners as
guide, the Court finds the amount of ONE THOUSAND THREE

HUNDRED PESOS (Php1,300.00) per square meter as just

compensation for the property subject of expropriation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered:
1) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant in the
amount of TWO MILLION TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND
PESOS (Php2,024,000.00) representing the net amount
of just compensation after deducting the partial payment
of P607,200.00 based on the valuation of Php1,300.00
per square meter on the expropriated portion of the parcel
of land [Lot 329-A of the subdivision, plan (LRC) Psd246403, being a portion of lot 329, San Simon, LRC. Cad
Rec. No. 1316] with an area of 2,024 square meters
situated in Sta. Monica, San Simon, Pampanga covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 271813-R plus legal
interest of 12% per annum from the time of taking (March
21, 2002) until fully paid less taxes due on the land.
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs and/or expenses
in relation to the transfer of ownership of the property in
its favor from defendant Asia Pacific Integrated Steel
Corporation.
3) Condemning the property subject of expropriation free
from all liens and encumbrances for the construction,
rehabilitation and expansion of the North Luzon
Expressway.
SO ORDERED.

14

Petitioner appealed to the CA, arguing that the just compensation

should not be more than P300.00 per square meter and that the
correct rate of interest is 6% per annum.
The CA upheld the trial courts ruling, reiterating the principle that
the determination of just compensation is an inherently judicial

function. It stressed that any valuation for just compensation laid

down in statutes merely serve as guides or factors and may not
substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be
awarded and how to arrive at such amount.
15

Further, the CA noted that petitioner itself admitted that the BIR
zonal valuation is only for the purpose of determining the correct
amount of transfer taxes. It held that while BIR zonal valuation
may be a factor in determining just compensation, the same is not
a competent basis thereof. Citing R.A. 8974, the CA pointed out
the distinction between provisional value as a precondition for the
issuance of a writ of possession and the payment of just
compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional
value is based on the zonal value as may be determined by the
BIR, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market
value of the property. Necessarily, the zonal valuation of
properties is not equivalent to their fair market value.
16

After examining the records, the CA found no reversible error in

the trial courts determination of just compensation and held that
the valuation of P1,500.00 per square meter is more in
consonance with the concept of just compensation based upon
due consideration of all evidence. Thus:
It is equally settled that the valuation of a property in tax
declarations cannot be a substitute to just compensation.
Elsewise stated, the market value reflected in the tax declaration
of the condemned property is no longer conclusive. Accordingly,
we cannot appreciate the herein tax declaration in favor of the
Republic.
Further, it is uncontested that the deed of sale dated July 19,
2002 between San Simon Realty, Inc. and the Republic pertained
only to a right of way, hence, the value thereof should be
considerably lower. Ordinance No. 17, as correctly found by the
RTC, was issued on June 22, 1994 or eight (8) years prior to the
institution of the herein complaint. Certainly, the valuation of
properties therein can by no means be reflective of the current,

prevailing and fair value of the subject property. The Republic

failed to present evidence to controvert he RTCs finding on the
matter. Neither has it shown that the property sold thereunder
shares the same features as the herein subject property as to
warrant a similar valuation. We cannot, thus, yield to the
Republics submission that its evidence are the proper basis in
determining just compensation for Asia Pacifics property.
17

However, the CA modified the rate of interest imposed on the

amount due as just compensation from 12% to 6% in conformity
with prevailing jurisprudence.
On April 28, 2010, the CA denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, stating that the argument on valuation by
petitioner was merely a rehash of what the CA had already
passed upon.
Hence, this petition assailing the CAs affirmance of the trial
courts award of just compensation, the legal basis of which is
allegedly insufficient.

after considering all the arguments raised by petitioner and the

evidence on record. It asserts that the main issue of just
compensation and the findings thereon by the trial court as
affirmed by the CA is a question of fact which should not be
disturbed by this Court. Moreover, respondent asserts that the
determination by the trial court is entitled to the highest respect
considering that the judge has personal knowledge of the
condition of the subject property, having conducted an ocular
inspection on September 23, 2004.
We grant the petition.
As a rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court covers only questions of law. Questions of fact are not
reviewable and cannot be passed upon by this Court in the
exercise of its power to review. The distinction between questions
of law and questions of fact is established. A question of law
exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on
a certain state of facts. A question of fact, on the other hand,
exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. This being so, the findings of fact of the CA are final and
conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal.
18

Petitioner argues that the evidence for determining the amount of

just compensation in expropriation cases should be on those
factors provided in Section 5 of R.A. 8974. Considering such
factors and the evidence submitted by the parties before the trial
court, petitioner maintains that just compensation for the subject
property should be no more than the zonal valuation (P300.00 per
square meter), and in no case should it amount to the market
value ofP1,300.00 per square meter adjudged by the trial and
appellate courts. Petitioner claims that such huge sum for only
2,024-square meter portion of respondents 17,175-square meter
property, is unbelievably 433.4% more than the 1998 BIR zonal
value for an underdeveloped industrial land at the time of its
taking.
On the other hand, respondent contends that no reversible error
was committed by the CA in affirming the trial courts decision

19

For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an

examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. In this case, the only legal issue raised by
petitioner is whether the trial court based its determination of just
compensation on the factors provided under existing laws and
jurisprudence.
20

Section 5 of R.A. 8974 enumerates the standards for assessing

the value of expropriated land taken for national government
infrastructure projects, thus:

SECTION 5. Standards for the Assessment of the Value of the

Land Subject of Expropriation Proceedings or Negotiated Sale.
In order to facilitate the determination of just compensation, the
court may consider, among other well-established factors, the
following relevant standards:
(a) The classification and use for which the property is
suited;
(b) The developmental costs for improving the land;
(c) The value declared by the owners;
(d) The current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity;
(e) The reasonable disturbance compensation for the
removal and/or demolition of certain improvements on the
land and for the value of the improvements thereon;
(f) The size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal
valuation of the land;
(g) The price of the land as manifested in the ocular
findings, oral as well as documentary evidence presented;
and
(h) Such facts and events as to enable the affected
property owners to have sufficient funds to acquire
similarly-situated lands of approximate areas as those
required from them by the government, and thereby
rehabilitate themselves as early as possible.
In this case, the trial court considered only (a) and (d): (1) the
classification of the subject property which is located in an area
with mixed land use (commercial, residential and industrial) and
the propertys conversion from agricultural to industrial land, and
(2) the current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity the

only factors which the commissioners included in their Report. It

also found the commissioners recommended valuation
of P1,000.00 to P1,500.00 per square to be fair and just despite
the absence of documentary substantiation as said prices were
based merely on the opinions of bankers and realtors.
In National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial
Development Corporation, the recommended price of the city
assessor was rejected by this Court. The opinions of the banks
and the realtors as reflected in the computation of the market
value of the property and in the Commissioners Report, were not
substantiated by any documentary evidence.
21

Similarly, in National Power Corporation v. Diato-Bernal, this

Court rejected the valuation recommended by court-appointed
commissioners whose conclusions were devoid of any actual and
reliable basis. The market values of the subject propertys
neighboring lots were found to be mere estimates and
unsupported by any corroborative documents, such as sworn
declarations of realtors in the area concerned, tax declarations or
zonal valuation from the BIR for the contiguous residential
dwellings and commercial establishments. Thus, we ruled that a
commissioners report of land prices which is not based on any
documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be
disregarded by the court.
22

We find that the trial court did not judiciously determine the fair
market value of the subject property as it failed to consider other
relevant factors such as the zonal valuation, tax declarations and
current selling price supported by documentary evidence. Indeed,
just compensation must not be arrived at arbitrarily, but
determined after an evaluation of different factors.
23

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the

property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is
not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word "just" is used
to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to
convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the

property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.

Such "just"-ness of the compensation can only be attained by
using reliable and actual data as bases in fixing the value of the
condemned property. Trial courts are required to be more
circumspect in its evaluation of just compensation due the
property owner, considering that eminent domain cases involve
the expenditure of public funds.
24

The Republic is incorrect, however, in alleging that the values

were exorbitant, merely because they exceeded the maximum
zonal value of real properties in the same location where the
subject properties were located. The zonal value may be one, but
not necessarily the sole, index of the value of a realty. National
Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial held thus:

25

We agree with the trial court that it was not bound by the
assessment report of the commissioners and that it had the
discretion to reject the same and substitute its own judgment on
its value as gathered from the record, or it may accept the
report/recommendation of the commissioners in toto and base its
judgment thereon. However, the decision of the court must be
based on all established rules, upon correct legal principles and
competent evidence. The court is proscribed from basing its
judgment on speculations and surmises.
26

"x x x [Market value] is not limited to the assessed value of the

property or to the schedule of market values determined by the
provincial or city appraisal committee. However, these values
may serve as factors to be considered in the judicial valuation of
the property."
The above ruling finds support in EPZA v. Dulay in this wise:
"Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific
properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by
provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas
covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception
of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into
account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its
possible cultivation for rice, com, coconuts or other crops. Very
often land described as 'cogonal' has been cultivated for
generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three
classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more
often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but
cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation." (Emphasis
supplied.)
1wphi1

Nonetheless, we cannot subscribe to petitioners argument that

just compensation for the subject property should not exceed the
zonal valuation (P300.00 per square meter).
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, we held that -27

The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered

to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property,
broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open
market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition or the fair value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the
actual taking by the government. x x x
Zonal valuation is just one of the indices of the fair market value
of real estate. By itself, this index cannot be the sole basis of "just
compensation" in expropriation cases. As this Court ruled in
Leca Realty Corporation v. Rep. of the Phils. :
28

29

Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market

value of the property are the cost of acquisition, the current value
of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular
case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax declarations
thereon. The measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's
loss. To be just, the compensation must be fair not only to the
owner but also to the taker.
30

31

It is settled that the final conclusions on the proper amount of just

compensation can only be made after due ascertainment of the
requirements set forth under R.A. 8974 and not merely based on
the declarations of the parties. Since these requirements were
not satisfactorily complied with, and in the absence of reliable and
actual data as bases in fixing the value of the condemned
property, remand of this case to the trial court is in order.

NPC V CA

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.

The Decision dated July 21, 2009 and Resolution dated April 28,
2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90539 are
hereby SET ASIDE.

ROMERO, J.:

THIRD DIVISION

32

This case is remanded to the trial court for the proper

determination of just compensation, in conformity with this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.

DECISION

On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four (4) dump trucks

owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left
Marawi city bound for Iligan city. Unfortunately, enroute to
its destination, one of the trucks with plate no. RFT-9-6673 driven by a certain Gavino Ilumba figured in a headon-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted
in the death of three (3) persons riding in the Toyota
Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to seventeen other
passengers.
On June 10, 1980, the heirs of the victims filed a
complaint for damages against National Power
Corporation
(NPC) and
PHESCO Incorporated
(PHESCO) before the then Court of First Instance of
Lanao del Norte, Marawi City. When defendant PHESCO
filed its answer to the complaint it contended that it was
not the owner of the dump truck which collided with the
Toyota Tamaraw but NPC. Moreover, it asserted that it
was merely a contractor of NPC with the main duty of
supplying workers and technicians for the latters
projects. On the other hand, NPC denied any liability and
countered that the driver of the dump truck was the
employee of PHESCO.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a

decision dated July 25, 1988 absolving NPC of any
liability. The dispositive portion reads:

Consequently, in view of the foregoing

consideration, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering PHESCO, Inc. and Gavino Ilumba upon
receipt hereof:
1. To pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs thru the
Dansalan College the sum of P954,154.55
representing the actual or compensatory damages
incurred by the plaintiffs; and
2. To pay the sum of P50,000.00 representing
Attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied, PHESCO appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which on November 10, 1994 reversed the trial
courts judgment. We quote the pertinent portion of the
decision:

A labor only contractor is considered merely as an

agent of the employer (Deferia vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 194 SCRA 525). A finding
that a contractor is a labor only contractor is
equivalent to a finding that there is an employer-

employee relationship between the owner of the

project and the employees of the labor only
contractor (Industrial Timer Corporation vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 202 SCRA
465). So, even if Phesco hired driver Gavino
Ilumba, as Phesco is admittedly a labor only
contractor of Napocor, the statute itself establishes
an employer-employee relationship between the
employer (Napocor) and the employee (driver
Ilumba) of the labor only contractor (Phesco). (Ecal
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 195
SCRA 224).
Consequently, we hold Phesco not liable for the
tort of driver Gavino Ilumba, as there was no
employment relationship between Phesco and
driver Gavino Ilumba. Under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, to hold the employer liable for torts
committed by his employees within the scope of
their assigned task, there must exist an employeremployee relationship. (Martin vs. Court of
Appeals, 205 SCRA 591).
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the appealed
decision. In lieu thereof, the Court renders
judgment sentencing defendant National Power
Corporation to pay plaintiffs the sum of

P174,889.20 plus P20,000.00 as attorneys fees

and costs.
SO ORDERED.
Chagrined by the sudden turnaround, NPC filed a
motion for reconsideration of said decision which was,
however, denied on February 9, 1995. [1] Hence, this
petition.
The principal query to be resolved is, as between
NPC and PHESCO, who is the employer of Ilumba, driver
of the dumptruck which figured in the accident and which
should, therefore, would be liable for damages to the
victims. Specifically, NPC assigns the sole error that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION FINDING THAT
PETITIONER NPC AS THE EMPLOYER OF THE
DRIVER GAVINO ILUMBA, AND CONSEQUENTLY,
SENTENCING IT TO PAY THE ACTUAL AND
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY
COMPLAINANTS, IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW
OR WITH THE APPLICABLE RULINGS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT.[2]
As earlier stated, NPC denies that the driver of the
dump truck was its employee. It alleges that it did not
have the power of selection and dismissal nor the power
of control over Ilumba.[3] PHESCO, meanwhile, argues
that it merely acted as a recruiter of the necessary
workers for and in behalf of NPC.[4]

Before we decide who is the employer of Ilumba, it is

evidently necessary to ascertain the contractual
relationship between NPC and PHESCO. Was the
relationship one of employer and job (independent)
contractor or one of employer and labor only contractor?
Job (independent) contracting is present if the
following conditions are met: (a) the contractor carries on
an independent business and undertakes the contract
work on his own account under his own responsibility
according to his own manner and method, free from the
control and direction of his employer or principal in all
matters connected with the performance of the work
except to the result thereof; and (b) the contractor has
substantial capital or investments in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises and other
materials which are necessary in the conduct of his
business.[5] Absent these requisites, what exists is a labor
only contract under which the person acting as contractor
is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the
principal who is responsible to the workers in the same
manner and to the same extent as if they had been
directly employed by him.[6] Taking into consideration the
above distinction and the provisions of the Memorandum
of Understanding entered into by PHESCO and NPC, we
are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in labor only
contracting.
It must be noted that under the Memorandum, NPC
had mandate to approve the critical path network and
rate of expenditure to be undertaken by PHESCO.

Likewise, the manning schedule and pay scale of the

workers hired by PHESCO were subject to confirmation
by NPC.[8] Then too, it cannot be ignored that if PHESCO
enters into any sub-contract or lease, again NPCs
concurrence is needed.[9] Another consideration is that
even in the procurement of tools and equipment that will
be used by PHESCO, NPCs favorable recommendation
is still necessary before these tools and equipment can
be purchased.[10] Notably, it is NPC that will provide the
money or funding that will be used by PHESCO to
undertake the project.[11] Furthermore, it must be
emphasized that the project being undertaken by
PHESCO, i.e., construction of power energy facilities, is
related to NPCs principal business of power
generation. In sum, NPCs control over PHESCO in
matters concerning the performance of the latters work is
evident. It is enough that NPC has the right to wield such
power to be considered as the employer.[12]

employees of NPC.[14] After all, it is axiomatic that any

person (the principal employer) who enters into an
agreement with a job contractor, either for the
performance of a specified work or for the supply of
manpower, assumes responsibility over the employees of
the latter.[15]

Under this factual milieu, there is no doubt that

PHESCO was engaged in labor-only contracting vis--vis
NPC and as such, it is considered merely an agent of the
latter. In labor-only contracting, an employer-employee
relationship between the principal employer and the
employees
of
the
labor-only
contractor
is
created. Accordingly,
the
principal
employer
is
responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor
as if such employees had been directly employed by the
principal employer.[13] Since PHESCO is only a labor-only
contractor, the workers it supplied to NPC, including the
driver of the ill-fated truck, should be considered as

(b) Labor only contracting as defined herein is

hereby prohibited and the person acting as
contractor shall be considered merely as an agent
or intermediary of the employer who shall be
responsible to the workers in the same manner
and extent as if the latter were directly employed
by him.

[7]

However, NPC maintains that even assuming that a

labor only contract exists between it and PHESCO, its
liability will not extend to third persons who are injured
due to the tortious acts of the employee of the labor-only
contractor.[16] Stated otherwise, its liability shall only be
limited to violations of the Labor Code and not quasidelicts.
To bolster its position, NPC cites Section 9(b), Rule
VII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code which reads:

In other words, NPC posits the theory that its liability

is limited only to compliance with the substantive labor
provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and

wages and shall not extend to liabilities suffered by third

parties, viz.:

Consequently, the responsibilities of the employer

contemplated in a labor only contract, should,
consistent with the terms expressed in the rule, be
restricted to the workers.The same can not be
expanded to cover liabilities for damages to third
persons resulting from the employees tortious acts
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.[17]
The reliance is misplaced. It bears stressing that the
action was premised on the recovery of damages as a
result of quasi-delict against both NPC and PHESCO,
hence, it is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code which
is the applicable law in resolving this case.
To be sure, the pronouncement of this Court
in Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC,[18] is most instructive:

The present case does not deal with a labor

dispute on conditions of employment between an
alleged employee and an alleged employer. It
invokes a claim brought by one for damages for
injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a
person, against both doer-employee and his
employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing
rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is

misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot

be used by an employer as a shield to avoid
liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil
Code.
Corollarily from the above doctrine, the ruling
in Cuison v. Norton & Harrison Co.,[19] finds applicability in
the instant case, viz.:

It is well to repeat that under the civil law an

employer is only liable for the negligence of his
employees in the discharge of their respective
duties. The defense of independent contractor
would be a valid one in the Philippines just as it
would be in the United States. Here Ora was a
contractor, but it does not necessarily follow that
he was an independent contractor. The reason for
this distinction is that the employer retained the
power of directing and controlling the work. The
chauffeur and the two persons on the truck were
the employees of Ora, the contractor, but Ora, the
contractor, was an employee of Norton & Harrison
Co., charged with the duty of directing the loading
and transportation of the lumber. And it was the
negligence in loading the lumber and the use
of minors on the truck which caused the death of
the unfortunate boy. On the facts and the law, Ora
was not an independent contractor, but was the

servant of the defendant, and for his negligence

defendant was responsible.
Given the above considerations, it is apparent that
Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code will
determine the liability of NPC in a civil suit for damages
instituted by an injured person for any negligent act of the
employees of the labor only contractor. This is consistent
with the ruling that a finding that a contractor was a laboronly contractor is equivalent to a finding that an
employer-employee relationship existed between the
owner (principal contractor) and the labor-only contractor,
including the latters workers.[20]
With respect to the liability of NPC as the direct
employer, Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly
provides:

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused

by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry.
In this regard, NPCs liability is direct, primary and
solidary with PHESCO and the driver.[21] Of course, NPC,
if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shall have
recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed
the negligence which gave rise to the action.[22]

Finally, NPC, even if it truly believed that it was not

the employer of the driver, could still have disclaimed any
liability had it raised the defense of due diligence in the
selection or supervision of PHESCO and Ilumba.
[23]
However, for some reason or another, NPC did not
invoke said defense. Hence, by opting not to present any
evidence thatit exercised due diligence in the supervision
of the activities of PHESCO and Ilumba, NPC has
foreclosed its right to interpose the same on appeal in
conformity with the rule that points of law, theories,
issues of facts and arguments not raised in the
proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time
on appeal.[24] Consequently, its liability stands.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 10,
1994 and its accompanying resolution dated February 9,
1995 are AFFIRMED without prejudice to the right of
NPC to demand from PHESCO and Ilumba
reimbursement of the damages it would be adjudged to
pay to complainants. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ARDONA V REYES
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
challenging the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 564,
the Revised Charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority, and
Proclamation No. 2052 declaring the barangays of Sibugay,
Malubog, Babag and Sirao including the proposed Lusaran Dam
in the City of Cebu and in the municipalities of Argao and
Dalaguete in the province of Cebu as tourist zones. The
petitioners ask that we restrain respondent Court of First Instance
of Cebu and the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) from
enforcing and implementing the writs of possession issued in four
(4) expropriation cases filed by PTA against the petitioners: Civil
Cases Nos. R-19562, R-19684, R-20701, and R-21608 of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch 1).
The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the
Court of First Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some
282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and
Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority "to acquire by
purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any
private land within and without the tourist zones" for the purposes
indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD
564), more specifically, for the development into integrated resort
complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with
potential tourism value. As uniformly alleged in the complaints,
the purposes of the expropriation are:

Plaintiff, in line with the policy of the government

to promote tourism and development of tourism
projects will construct in Barangays Malubog,
Busay and Babag, all of Cebu City, a sports
complex (basketball courts, tennis courts,
volleyball courts, track and field, baseball and
softball diamonds, and swimming pools),
clubhouse, gold course, children's playground and
a nature area for picnics and horseback riding for
the use of the public.
The development plan, covering approximately
1,000 hectares, includes the establishment of an
electric power grid in the area by the National
Power Corporation, thus assuring the supply of
electricity therein for the benefit of the whole
community. Deep wells will also be constructed to
generate water supply within the area. Likewise, a
complex sewerage and drainage system will be
devised and constructed to protect the tourists
and nearby residents from the dangers of
pollution.
Complimentary and support facilities for the
project will be constructed, including public rest
houses, lockers, dressing rooms, coffee shops,
shopping malls, etc. Said facilities will create and
offer employment opportunities to residents of the
community and further generate income for the
whole of Cebu City.

xxx xxx xxx

V

Plaintiff needs the property above described

which is directly covered by the proposed golf
court.

xxx xxx xxx

The defendants in Civil Cases Nos. R-20701 and R-21608 filed
their respective Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or
Reconsideration. The defendants in Civil Case No. R-19562 filed
a manifestation adopting the answer of defendants in Civil Case
No. R-19864. The defendants, now petitioners, had a common
allegation in that the taking is allegedly not impressed with public
use under the Constitution.
In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to
the issue of public use, that there is no specific constitutional
provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism
purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the intended
use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a
land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by
Legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the
land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian
Relations and not the Court of First Instance that has jurisdiction
over the expropriation cases.
The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with The
Philippine National Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount
equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1533. the lower court issued separate
orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the
premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession.
On May 25, 1982, petitioners filed this petition questioning the
orders of the respondent Judge, The respondents have correctly
restated the grounds in the petition as follows:

A. The complaints for expropriation lack basis

because the Constitution does not provide for the
expropriation of private property for tourism or
other related purposes;
B. The writs of possession or orders authorizing
PTA to take immediate possession is premature
because the "public use" character of the taking
has not been previously demonstrated;
C. The taking is not for public use in
contemplation of eminent domain law;
D. The properties in question have been
previously declared a land reform area;
consequently, the implementation of the social
justice pro- ,vision of the Constitution on agrarian
reform is paramount to the right of the State to
expropriate for the purposes intended;
E. Proclamation No. 2052 declaring certain
barangays in Cebu City, which include the lands
subject of expropriation as within a tourist zone, is
unconstitutional for it impairs the obligation of
contracts; "F. Since the properties are within a
land reform area, it is the Court of Agrarian
Relations, not the lower court, that has jurisdiction
pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 946;
F. The forcible ejectment of defendants from the
premises constitutes a criminal act under Pres.
Decree No. 583;

xxx xxx xxx

In their memorandum, the petitioners have summarized the
issues as follows:

I. Enforcement of the Writ of Possession is

Premature:
II. Presidential Decree 564 Amending Presidential
Decree l89 is Constitutionally Repugnant:
III. The Condemnation is not for Public Use,
Therefore, Unconstitutional:
IV. The Expropriation for Tourism Purposes of
Lands Covered by the Land Reform Program
Violates the Constitution:
V. Presidential Proclamation 2052 is
Unconstitutional:
VI. Presidential Decree No 1533 is
Unconstitutional:
VII. The Court of First Instance has no
Jurisdiction:
VIII. The Filing of the Present Petition is not
Premature.
The issues raised by the petitioners revolve around the
proposition that the actions to expropriate their properties are
constitutionally infirm because nowhere in the Constitution can a
provision be found which allows the taking of private property for
the promotion of tourism.
The petitioners' arguments in their pleadings in support of the
above proposition are subsumed under the following headings:

1. Non-compliance with the "public use"

requirement under the eminent domain provision
of the Bill of Rights.
2. Disregard of the land reform nature of the
property being expropriated.
3. Impairment of the obligation of contracts.
There are three provisions of the Constitution which directly
provide for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Section
2, Article IV states that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. Section 6, Article XIV
allows the State, in the interest of national welfare or defense and
upon payment of just compensation to transfer to public
ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be operated
by the government. Section 13, Article XIV states that the
Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just
compensation the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided
into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens.
While not directly mentioning the expropriation of private
properties upon payment of just compensation, the provisions on
social justice and agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of
police power together with the power of eminent domain in the
implementation of constitutional objectives are even more farreaching insofar as taking of private property is concerned.
Section 6, Article II provides:
Sec. 6. The State shall promote social justice to
ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the
people. Towards its end, the State shall regulate
the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and

disposition of private property, and equitably

diffuse property ownership and profits.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 12, Article XIV provides:
See. 12. The State shall formulate and implement
an agrarian reform program aimed at
emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the
soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this
Constitution.
The equitable diffusion of property ownership in the promotion of
social justice implies the exercise, whenever necessary, of the
power to expropriate private property. Likewise there can be no
meaningful agrarian reform program unless the power to
expropriate is utilized.
We cite all the above provisions on the power to expropriate
because of the petitioners' insistence on a restrictive view of the
eminent domain provision. The thrust of all constitutional
provisions on expropriation is in the opposite direction.
As early as 1919, this Court in Visayan Refining Co. v. Samus (40
Phil. 550) categorized the restrictive view as wholly erroneous
and based on a misconception of fundamentals.
The petitioners look for the word "tourism" in the Constitution.
Understandably the search would be in vain. The policy
objectives of the framers can be expressed only in general terms
such as social justice, local autonomy, conservation and
development of the national patrimony, public interest, and
general welfare, among others. The programs to achieve these
objectives vary from time to time and according to place, To

freeze specific programs like Tourism into express constitutional

provisions would make the Constitution more prolix than a bulky
code and require of the framers a prescience beyond Delphic
proportions. The particular mention in the Constitution of agrarian
reform and the transfer of utilities and other private enterprises to
public ownership merely underscores the magnitude of the
problems sought to be remedied by these programs. They do not
preclude nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent domain for
such purposes like tourism and other development programs.
In the leading case of Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus (supra), this
Court emphasized that the power of eminent domain is
inseparable from sovereignty being essential to the existence of
the State and inherent in government even in its most primitive
forms. The only purpose of the provision in the Bill of Rights is to
provide some form of restraint on the sovereign power. It is not a
grant of authority The power of eminent domain does not depend
for its existence on a specific grant in the
constitution. It is inherent in sovereignty and
exists in a sovereign state without any recognition
of it in the constitution. The provision found in
most of the state constitutions relating to the
taking of property for the public use do not by
implication grant the power to the government of
the state, but limit a power which would otherwise
be without limit.
The constitutional restraints are public use and just
compensation.
Do the purposes of the taking in this case constitute "public use"?

The petitioners ask us to adopt a strict construction and declare

that "public use" means literally use by the public and that "public
use" is not synonymous with "public interest", "public benefit", or
"public welfare" and much less "public convenience. "
The petitioners face two major obstacles. First, their contention
which is rather sweeping in its call for a retreat from the public
welfare orientation is unduly restrictive and outmoded. Second,
no less than the lawmaker has made a policy determination that
the power of eminent domain may be exercised in the promotion
and development of Philippine tourism.
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation
which circumscribes the scope of government activities and
public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located
public lands that obviate the need to take private property for
public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines.
We have never been a laissez faire State, And the necessities
which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often
found in areas of scarce public land or limited government
resources.
Certain aspects of parliamentary government were introduced by
the 1973 amendments to the Constitution with further
modifications in the 1976 and 1981 amendments. Insofar as the
executive and legislative departments are concerned, the
traditional concept of checks and balances in a presidential form
was considerably modified to remove some roadblocks in the
expeditious implementation of national policies. There was no
such change for the judiciary. We remain as a checking and
balancing department even as all strive to maintain respect for
constitutional boundaries. At the same time, the philosophy of
coordination in the pursuit of developmental goals implicit in the
amendments also constrains in the judiciary to defer to legislative
discretion iii the judicial review of programs for economic

development and social progress unless a clear case of

constitutional infirmity is established. We cannot stop the
legitimate exercise of power on an invocation of grounds better
left interred in a bygone age and time.* As we review the efforts of
the political departments to bring about self-sufficiency, if not
eventual abundance, we continue to maintain the liberal approach
because the primary responsibility and the discretion belong to
them.
There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditions'
purposes as the construction of roads, bridges, ports,
waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunications systems,
hydroelectric power plants, markets and slaughterhouses, parks,
hospitals, government office buildings, and flood control or
irrigation systems is valid. However, the concept of public use is
not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the Idea
that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the
public" has been discarded.
In the United States, the rule was enunciated in Berman v.
Parker (348 U.S. 25; 99 L. ed. 27) as follows:
We do not sit to determine whether a particular
housing project is or is not desirable. The concept
of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. See
DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US 421,
424, 96 L ed 469, 472, 72 S Ct 405. The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical,
aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the
power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well
as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the
Congress and its authorized agencies have made
determinations that take into account a wide

variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise

them. If those who govern the District of Columbia
decide that the Nation's Capital should be
beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the
Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of
Congress, the right to realize it through the
exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the
power of eminent domain is merely the means to
the end. See Luxton v. North River Bridge Co. 153
US 525, 529, 530, 38 L ed 808, 810, 14 S Ct 891;
United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co. 160
US 668, 679, 40 L ed 576, 580, 16 S Ct 427.
In an earlier American case, where a village was isolated from the
rest of North Carolina because of the flooding of the reservoir of a
dam thus making the provision of police, school, and health
services unjustifiably expensive, the government decided to
expropriate the private properties in the village and the entire
area was made part of an adjoining national park. The district
court and the appellate court ruled against the expropriation or
excess condemnation. The Court of Appeals applied the "use by
the public" test and stated that the only land needed for public
use was the area directly flooded by the reservoir. The village
may have been cut off by the dam but to also condemn it was
excess condemnation not valid under the "Public use"
requirement. The U.S. Supreme Court inUnited States ex rel TVA
v. Welch (327 U.S, 546; 90 L. ed 843) unanimously reversed the
lower courts. It stated:
The Circuit Court of Appeals, without expressly
relying on a compelling rule of construction that
would give the restrictive scope to the T.V.A. Act
given it by the district court, also interpreted the

statute narrowly. It first analyzed the facts by

segregating the total problem into distinct parts,
and thus came to the conclusion that T.V.A.'s
purpose in condemning the land in question was
only one to reduce its liability arising from the
destruction of the highway. The Court held that
use of the lands for that purpose is a "private" and
not a "public use" or, at best, a "public use" not
authorized by the statute. we are unable to agree
with the reasoning and conclusion of the Circuit
Court of Appeals.
We think that it is the function of Congress to
decide what type of taking is for a public use and
that the agency authorized to do the taking may
do so to the still extent of its statutory authority,
United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co. 160
US 668, 679, 40 L ed 576, 580, 16 S Ct 427. ...
xxx xxx xxx
... But whatever may be the scope of the judicial
power to determine what is a "public use" in
Fourteenth Amendment controversies, this Court
has said that when Congress has spoken on this
subject "Its decision is entitled to deference until it
is shown to involve an impossibility." Old
Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269, US 55,
66, 70 L ed 162, 46 S Ct 39. Any departure from
this judicial restraint would result in courts
deciding on what is and is not a governmental
function and in their invalidating legislation on the
basis of their view on that question at the moment
of decision, a practice which has proved
impracticable in other fields. See Case v. Bowles

decided February 4, 1946, 437 US 92, 101, ante,

552, 559, 66 S Ct 438. New York v. United States,
326 US 572 ante 326, 66 S Ct 310). We hold that
the T.V.A. took the tracts here involved for a public
purpose, if, as we think is the case, Congress
authorized the Authority to acquire, hold, and use
the lands to carry out the purposes of the T.V.A.
Act.
In the Philippines, Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando has aptly
summarized the statutory and judicial trend as follows:
The taking to be valid must be for public use.
There was a time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a
requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must
be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets
or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
allowable. It is not any more. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of
eminent domain comes into play. As just noted,
the constitution in at least two cases, to remove
any doubt, determines what is public use. One is
the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The
other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this
power, of utilities and other private enterprise to
the government. It is accurate to state then that at
present whatever may be beneficially employed
for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
public use. (Fernando, The Constitution of the
Philippines, 2nd ed., pp. 523-524)
The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is not
"public use" because private concessioners would be allowed to

maintain various facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc.

inside the tourist complex is impressed with even less merit.
Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other
private businesses using public streets end highways do not
diminish in the least bit the public character of expropriations for
roads and streets. The lease of store spaces in underpasses of
streets built on expropriated land does not make the taking for a
private purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private
airlines and shipping companies are still for public use. The
expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban
development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is
later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms,
entertainment and service companies, and other private
concerns.
The petitioners have also failed to overcome the deference that is
appropriately accorded to formulations of national policy
expressed in legislation. The rule in Berman u. Parker (supra) of
deference to legislative policy even if such policy might mean
taking from one private person and conferring on another private
person applies as well as in the Philippines.
... Once the object is within the authority of
Congress, the means by which it will be attained
is also for Congress to determine. Here one of the
means chosen is the use of private enterprise for
redevelopment of the area. Appellants argue that
this makes the project a taking from one
businessman for the benefit of another
businessman. But the means of executing the
project are for Congress and Congress alone to
determine, once the public purpose has been
established. Selb Luxton v. North River Bridge Co.
(US) supra; cf. Highland v. Russel Car & Snow
Plow Co. 279 US 253, 73 L ed 688, 49 S Ct 314.

The public end may be as well or better served

through an agency of private enterprise than
through a department of government-or so the
Congress might conclude. We cannot say that
public ownership is the sole method of promoting
the public purposes of community redevelopment
projects. What we have said also disposes of any
contention concerning the fact that certain
property owners in the area may be permitted to
repurchase their properties for redevelopment in
harmony with the over-all plan. That, too, is a
legitimate means which Congress and its
agencies may adopt, if they choose. (Berman v.
Parker, 99 L ed 38, 348 US 33, 34)
An examination of the language in the 1919 cases of City of
Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila (40 Phil, 349)
and Visayan Refining Co. vs. Camus, earlier cited, shows that
from the very start of constitutional government in our country
judicial deference to legislative policy has been clear and
manifest in eminent domain proceedings.
The expressions of national policy are found in the revised
charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority, Presidential Decree
No. 564:
WHEREAS, it is the avowed aim of the
government to promote Philippine tourism and
work for its accelerated and balanced growth as
well as for economy and expediency in the
development of the tourism plant of the country;
xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby

declared to be the policy of the State to promote,
encourage, and develop Philippine tourism as an
instrument in accelerating the development of the
country, of strengthening the country's foreign
exchange reserve position, and of protecting
Philippine culture, history, traditions and natural
beauty, internationally as well as domestically.
The power of eminent domain is expressly provided for under
Section 5 B(2) as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Acquisition of Private Lands, Power of Eminent
Domain. To acquire by purchase, by
negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any
private land within and without the tourist zones
for any of the following reasons: (a) consolidation
of lands for tourist zone development purposes,
(b) prevention of land speculation in areas
declared as tourist zones, (c) acquisition of right
of way to the zones, (d) protection of water shed
areas and natural assets with tourism value, and
(e) for any other purpose expressly authorized
under this Decree and accordingly, to exercise the
power of eminent domain under its own name,
which shall proceed in the manner prescribed by
law and/or the Rules of Court on condemnation
proceedings. The Authority may use any mode of
payment which it may deem expedient and
acceptable to the land owners: Provided, That in
case bonds are used as payment, the conditions
and restrictions set forth in Chapter III, Section 8
to 13 inclusively, of this Decree shall apply.

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioners rely on the Land Reform Program of the
government in raising their second argument. According to them,
assuming that PTA has the right to expropriate, the properties
subject of expropriation may not be taken for the purposes
intended since they are within the coverage of "operation land
transfer" under the land reform program. Petitioners claim that
certificates of land transfer (CLT'S) and emancipation patents
have already been issued to them thereby making the lands
expropriated within the coverage of the land reform area under
Presidential Decree No. 2; that the agrarian reform program
occupies a higher level in the order of priorities than other State
policies like those relating to the health and physical well- being
of the people; and that property already taken for public use may
not be taken for another public use.
We have considered the above arguments with scrupulous and
thorough circumspection. For indeed any claim of rights under the
social justice and land reform provisions of the Constitution
deserves the most serious consideration. The Petitioners,
however, have failed to show that the area being developed is
indeed a land reform area and that the affected persons have
emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer.
The records show that the area being developed into a tourism
complex consists of more than 808 hectares, almost all of which
is not affected by the land reform program. The portion being
expropriated is 282 hectares of hilly and unproductive land where
even subsistence farming of crops other than rice and corn can
hardly survive. And of the 282 disputed hectares, only 8,970
square meters-less than one hectare-is affected by Operation
Land Transfer. Of the 40 defendants, only two have emancipation
patents for the less than one hectare of land affected. And this
8,970 square meters parcel of land is not even within the sports

complex proper but forms part of the 32 hectares resettlement

area where the petitioners and others similarly situated would be
provided with proper housing, subsidiary employment, community
centers, schools, and essential services like water and electricitywhich are non-existent in the expropriated lands. We see no need
under the facts of this petition to rule on whether one public
purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a
balancing of competing public interests. The petitioners have also
failed to overcome the showing that the taking of the 8,970
square meters covered by Operation Land Transfer forms a
necessary part of an inseparable transaction involving the
development of the 808 hectares tourism complex. And certainly,
the human settlement needs of the many beneficiaries of the 32
hectares resettlement area should prevail over the property rights
of two of their compatriots.
The invocation of the contracts clause has no merit. The nonimpairment clause has never been a barrier to the exercise of
police power and likewise eminent domain. As stated
in Manigault v. Springs (199 U.S. 473) "parties by entering into
contracts may not stop the legislature from enacting laws
intended for the public good."
The applicable doctrine is expressed in Arce v. Genato (69 SCRA
544) which involved the expropriation of land for a public plaza.
The Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
... What is claimed is that there must be a
showing of necessity for such condemnation and
that it was not done in this case in support of such
a view, reliance is placed on City of Manila v.
Arenano Law Colleges. (85 Phil. 663 [1950]) That
doctrine itself is based on the earlier case of City

of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, (50

Phil. 349) also, like Camus, a 1919 decision. As
could be discerned, however, in the Arellano Law
Colleges decision. it was the antiquarian view of
Blackstone with its sanctification of the right to
one's estate on which such an observation was
based. As did appear in his Commentaries: "So
great is the regard of the law for private property
that it will not, authorize the least violation of it,
even for the public good, unless there exists a
very great necessity thereof." Even the most ,
cursory glance at such well-nigh absolutist
concept of property would show its obsolete
character at least for Philippine constitutional law.
It cannot survive the test of the 1935 Constitution
with its mandates on social justice and protection
to labor. (Article II, Section 5 of the 1935
Constitution reads: "The promotion of social
justice to unsure the well-being and economic
security of all the people should be the concern of
the State." Article XI, Section 6 of the same
Constitution provides: "The State shall afford
protection to labor, especially to working women
and minors, and shall regulate the relation
between landowner and tenant, and between
labor and capital in industry and in agriculture.
The State may provide for compulsory
arbitration.") What is more, the present
Constitution pays even less heed to the claims of
property and rightly so. After stating that the State
shall promote social justice, it continues: "Towards
this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of
private property, and equitably diffuse property
ownership and profits." (That is the second

sentence of Article II, Section 6 of the

Constitution) If there is any need for explicit
confirmation of what was set forth in Presidential
Decree No. 42, the above provision supplies it.
Moreover, that is merely to accord to what of late
has been the consistent course of decisions of
this Court whenever property rights are pressed
unduly. (Cf. Alalayan v. National Power
Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA
172; Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
Financing Administration v. Confederation of
Unions, L-21484, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 649;
Edu v. Ericta, L-32096, Oct. 24, 1970, 35 SCRA
481; Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Court
of Industrial Relations, L-32052, July 25, 1975, 65
SCRA 416) The statement therefore, that there
could be discerned a constitutional objection to a
lower court applying a Presidential Decree, when
it leaves no doubt that a grantee of the power of
eminent domain need not prove the necessity for
the expropriation, carries its own refutation.
xxx xxx xxx
The issue of prematurity is also raised by the petitioners. They
claim that since the necessity for the taking has not been
previously established, the issuance of the orders authorizing the
PTA to take immediate possession of the premises, as well as the
corresponding writs of possession was premature.
Under Presidential Decree No. 42, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1533, the government, its agency or instrumentality,
as plaintiff in an expropriation proceedings is authorized to take
immediate possession, control and disposition of the property and
the improvements, with power of demolition, notwithstanding the

pendency of the issues before the court, upon deposit with the
Philippine National Bank of an amount equivalent to 10% of the
value of the property expropriated. The issue of immediate
possession has been settled in Arce v. Genato (supra). In answer
to the issue:
... whether the order of respondent Judge in an
expropriation case allowing the other
respondent, ... to take immediate possession of
the parcel of land sought to be condemned for the
beautification of its public plaza, without a prior
hearing to determine the necessity for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, is
vitiated by jurisdictional defect, ...
this Court held that:
... It is not disputed that in issuing such order,
respondent Judge relied on Presidential Decree
No. 42 issued on the 9th of November, 1972.
(Presidential Decree No. 42 is entitled
"Authorizing the Plaintiff in Eminent Domain
Proceedings to Take Possession of the Property
involved Upon Depositing the Assessed Value for
Purposes of Taxation.") The question as thus
posed does not occasion any difficulty as to the
answer to be given. This petition for certiorari
must fail, there being no showing that compliance
with the Presidential Decree, which under the
Transitory Provisions is deemed a part of the law
of the land, (According to Article XVII, Section 3
par. (2) of the Constitution: "All proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions and acts
promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent
President shall be part of the law of the land, and

shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective

even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of
this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or
superseded by subsequent proclamations. orders,
decrees instructions, or other acts of the
incumbent President, or unless expressly and
explicitly modified or repealed by the regular
National Assembly") would be characterized as
either an act in excess of jurisdiction or a grave
abuse of discretion. So we rule.
Likewise in Ramos v. Philippine Tourism Authority (G.R. Nos.
52449-50, June 9, 1980), this Court held:
... condemnation or expropriation proceedings is
in the nature of one that is quasi-in-rem wherein
the fact that the owner of the property is made a
party is not essentially indispensable insofar was
least as it conncerns is the immediate taking of
possession of the property and the preliminary
determination of its value, including the amount to
be deposited.
In their last argument, the petitioners claim that a consequence of
the expropriation proceedings would be their forcible ejectment.
They contend that such forcible ejectment is a criminal act under
Presidential Decree No. 583. This contention is not valid.
Presidential Decree No. 583 prohibits the taking cognizance or
implementation of orders designed to obstruct the land reform
program. It refers to the harassment of tenant- farmers who try to
enforce emancipation rights. It has nothing to do with the
expropriation by the State of lands needed for public purposes.
As a matter of fact, the expropriated area does not appear in the
master lists of the Ministry of Agrarian Reforms as a teranted
area. The petitioners' bare allegations have not been supported

with particulars pointing to specific parcels which are subject of

tenancy contracts. The petitioners may be owner-tillers or may
have some form of possessory or ownership rights but there has
been no showing of their being tenants on the disputed lands.
The petitioners have failed to overcome the burden of anyone
trying to strike down a statute or decree whose avowed purpose
is the legislative perception is the public good. A statute has in its
favor the presumption of validity. All reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a law. The courts will
not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a
clear case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). And in the absence of
factual findings or evidence to rebut the presumption of validity,
the presumption prevails (Ermita-Malate Hotel, etc. v. Mayor of
Manila, 20 SCRA 849; Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424).
The public respondents have stressed that the development of
the 808 hectares includes plans that would give the petitioners
and other displaced persons productive employment, higher
incomes, decent housing, water and electric facilities, and better
living standards. Our dismissing this petition is, in part, predicated
on those assurances. The right of the PTA to proceed with the
expropriation of the 282 hectares already Identified as fit for the
establishment of a resort complex to promote tourism is,
therefore, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSE D for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

SUMULONG V GUERRERO
CORTES, J.:
On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed
a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering
approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal)
including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia
Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333
square meters respectively. The land sought to be expropriated
were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter
adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in
accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of
property in expropriation proceedings.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate

possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of
P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the
"total market value" of the subject twenty five hectares of land,
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the
policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized
housing upon payment of just compensation."

notice and without hearing and in issuing the

Order dated June 28, 1978 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
2) Pres. Decree l224, as amended, is
unconstitutional for being violative of the due
process clause, specifically:

On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge issued the following

Order:

a) The Decree would allow the taking of property regardless of

size and no matter how small the area to be expropriated;

Plaintiff having deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Heart

Center Extension Office, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila, the
amount of P158,980.00 representing the total market value of the
subject parcels of land, let a writ of possession be issued.

b) "Socialized housing" for the purpose of condemnation

proceeding, as defined in said Decree, is not really for a public
purpose;
c) The Decree violates procedural due process as it allows
immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of
property without giving the owner his day in court;

SO ORDERED.
Pasig, Metro Manila, January 17, 1978.

d) The Decree would allow the taking of private property upon

payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by
government assessors;

(SGD) BUENAVENTURA S. GUERRERO

Judge
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that
they had been deprived of the possession of their property
without due process of law. This was however, denied.
Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge
and assailing the constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1224, as
amended. Petitioners argue that:
1) Respondent Judge acted without or in excess
of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
by issuing the Order of January 17, 1978 without

e) The Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion

to determine what would be the "just compensation" in each and
every raise of expropriation.
Indeed, the exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to
certain limitations imposed by the constitution, to wit:
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation (Art. IV, Sec. 9);

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws (Art. IV, sec. 1).

b) Slum clearance, relocation and resettlement of squatters and

slum dwellers as well as the provision of related facilities and
services;

Nevertheless, a clear case of constitutional infirmity has to be

established for this Court to nullify legislative or executive
measures adopted to implement specific constitutional provisions
aimed at promoting the general welfare.

c) Slum improvement which consists basically of allocating

homelots to the dwellers in the area or property involved,
rearrangemeant and re-alignment of existing houses and other
dwelling structures and the construction and provision of basic
community facilities and services, where there are none, such as
roads, footpaths, drainage, sewerage, water and power system
schools, barangay centers, community centers, clinics, open
spaces, parks, playgrounds and other recreational facilities;

Petitioners' objections to the taking of their property subsumed

under the headings of public use, just compensation, and due
process have to be balanced against competing interests of the
public recognized and sought to be served under declared
policies of the constitution as implemented by legislation.
1. Public use
a) Socialized Housing
Petitioners contend that "socialized housing" as defined in Pres.
Decree No. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation
proceedings is not "public use" since it will benefit only "a handful
of people, bereft of public character."
"Socialized housing" is defined as, "the construction of dwelling
units for the middle and lower class members of our society,
including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and
other facilities" (Pres. Decree No. 1224, par. 1). This definition
was later expanded to include among others:
a) The construction and/or improvement of dwelling units for the
middle and lower income groups of the society, including the
construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities;

d) The provision of economic opportunities, including the

development of commercial and industrial estates and such other
facilities to enhance the total community growth; and
e) Such other activities undertaken in pursuance of the objective
to provide and maintain housing for the greatest number of
people under Presidential Decree No, 757, (Pres. Decree No.
1259, sec. 1)
The "public use" requirement for a and exercise of the power of
eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by
changing conditions. In this jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial
trend has been summarized as follows:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time
when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such
a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the
public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two
cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One

is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for

resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through
the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise
to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use [Heirs of Juancho Ardona
v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 60549, 60553-60555 October 26, 1983, 125
SCRA 220 (1983) at 234-5 quoting E. FERNANDO, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 523-4, (2nd ed., 1977)
Emphasis supplied].The term "public use" has acquired a more
comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term
signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added
the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. As
discussed in the above cited case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona:
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation
which circumscribes the scope of government activities and
public concerns and which possesses big and correctlylocated
public lands that obviate the need to take private property for
public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines.
We have never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities
which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often
found in areas of scarce public land or limited government
resources. (p. 231)
Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the
construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public
purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use
but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The
1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish,
maintain and ensure adequate social services including housing
[Art. 11, sec. 7]. The 1987 Constitution goes even further by
providing that:

The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will
ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free
the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate
social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of
living and an improved quality of life for all. [Art. II, sec. 9]
The state shall by law, and for the common good, undertake, in
cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of
urban land reform and housing which will make available at
affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment
opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such
program the State shall respect the rights of small property
owners. (Art. XIII, sec. 9, Emphaisis supplied) Housing is a basic
human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern
since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the
environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public
character of housing measures does not change because units in
housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who
satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for
it is not possible to provide housing for are who need it, all at
once.
Population growth, the migration to urban areas and the
mushrooming of crowded makeshift dwellings is a worldwide
development particularly in developing countries. So basic and
urgent are housing problems that the United Nations General
Assembly proclaimed 1987 as the "International Year of Shelter
for the Homeless" "to focus the attention of the international
community on those problems". The General Assembly is
Seriously concerned that, despite the efforts of Governments at
the national and local levels and of international organizations,
the driving conditions of the majority of the people in slums and
squatter areas and rural settlements, especially in developing

countries, continue to deteriorate in both relative and absolute

terms." [G.A. Res. 37/221, Yearbook of the United Nations 1982,
Vol. 36, p. 1043-4]
In the light of the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that "socialized
housing" fans within the confines of "public use". It is, particularly
important to draw attention to paragraph (d) of Pres. Dec. No.
1224 which opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost
housing, or slum clearance, relocation and resettlement, or slum
improvement emphasize the public purpose of the project.
In the case at bar, the use to which it is proposed to put the
subject parcels of land meets the requisites of "public use". The
lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for the
expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide housing
facilities to low-salaried government employees. Quoting
respondents:
1. The Bagong Nayong Project is a housing and community
development undertaking of the National Housing Authority.
Phase I covers about 60 hectares of GSIS property in Antipolo,
Rizal; Phase II includes about 30 hectares for industrial
development and the rest are for residential housing
development.
It is intended for low-salaried government employees and aims to
provide housing and community services for about 2,000 families
in Phase I and about 4,000 families in Phase II.
It is situated on rugged terrain 7.5 kms. from Marikina Town
proper; 22 Kms. east of Manila; and is within the Lungs Silangan
Townsite Reservation (created by Presidential Proclamation No.
1637 on April 18, 1977).

The lands involved in the present petitions are parts of the

expanded/additional areas for the Bagong Nayon Project totalling
25.9725 hectares. They likewise include raw, rolling hills. (Rollo,
pp. 266-7)
The acute shortage of housing units in the country is of public
knowledge. Official data indicate that more than one third of the
households nationwide do not own their dwelling places. A
significant number live in dwellings of unacceptable standards,
such as shanties, natural shelters, and structures intended for
commercial, industrial, or agricultural purposes. Of these
unacceptable dwelling units, more than one third is located within
the National Capital Region (NCR) alone which lies proximate to
and is expected to be the most benefited by the housing project
involved in the case at bar [See, National Census and Statistics
Office, 1980 Census of Population and Housing].
According to the National Economic and Development Authority
at the time of the expropriation in question, about "50 per cent of
urban families, cannot afford adequate shelter even at reduced
rates and will need government support to provide them
with social housing, subsidized either partially or totally" [NEDA,
FOUR YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN For 1974-1977, p. 357]. Up
to the present, housing some remains to be out of the reach of a
sizable proportion of the population" [NEDA, MEDIUM-TERM
PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1987-1992, p. 240].
The mushrooming of squatter colonies in the Metropolitan Manila
area as well as in other cities and centers of population
throughout the country, and, the efforts of the government to
initiate housing and other projects are matters of public
knowledge [See NEDA, FOUR YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN For
1974-1977, pp. 357-361; NEDA, FIVE-YEAR PHILIPPINE
DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1978-1982, pp. 215-228 NEDA, FIVE
YEAR PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1983-1987, pp. 109-

117; NEDA, MEDIUM TERM PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

1987-1992, pp. 240-254].
b) Size of Property
Petitioners further contend that Pres. Decree 1224, as amended,
would allow the taking of "any private land" regardless of the size
and no matter how small the area of the land to be expropriated.
Petitioners claim that "there are vast areas of lands in Mayamot,
Cupang, and San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal hundred of hectares of
which are owned by a few landowners only. It is surprising
[therefore] why respondent National Housing Authority [would]
include [their] two man lots ..."
In J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration [G. R.
No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413 (1970) at 428]
this Court earlier ruled that expropriation is not confined to landed
estates. This Court, quoting the dissenting opinion of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in Republic vs. Baylosis, [96 Phil. 461 (1955)], held
that:
The propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain under
Article XIII, section 4 of our Constitution cannot be determined on
a purely quantitative or area basis. Not only does the
constitutional provision speak of lands instead of landed estates,
but I see no cogent reason why the government, in its quest for
social justice and peace, should exclusively devote attention to
conflicts of large proportions, involving a considerable number of
individuals, and eschew small controversies and wait until they
grow into a major problem before taking remedial action.
The said case of J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. departed from the ruling
in Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration [84 Phil. 847 (1949)]
which held that the test to be applied for a valid expropriation of
private lands was the area of the land and not the number of

people who stood to be benefited. Since then "there has evolved

a clear pattern of adherence to the "number of people to be
benefited test" " [Mataas na Lupa Tenants Association, Inc. v.
Dimayuga, G.R. No. 32049, June 25,1984, 130 SCRA 30 (1984)
at 39]. Thus, in Pulido vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 57625, May
3, 1983, 122 SCRA 63 (1983) at 73], this Court stated that, "[i]t is
unfortunate that the petitioner would be deprived of his
landholdings, but his interest and that of his family should not
stand in the way of progress and the benefit of the greater may
only of the inhabitants of the country."
The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion
to designate the particular property/properties to be taken for
socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may be
expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross
abuse of discretion, which petitioners herein failed to
demonstrate, the Court will give due weight to and leave
undisturbed the NHA's choice and the size of the site for the
project. The property owner may not interpose objections merely
because in their judgment some other property would have been
more suitable, or just as suitable, for the purpose. The right to the
use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by
and has to yield to the demands of the common good. The
Constitutional provisions on the subject are clear:
The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development. (Art. II, sec. 10)
The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities,
and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good. To this end, the State shall
regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of
property and its increments. (Art, XIII, sec. 1)

Indeed, the foregoing provisions, which are restatements of the

provisions in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, emphasize:

In said case of Export Processing Zone Authority, this Court

pointed out that:

...the stewardship concept, under which private property is

supposed to be held by the individual only as a trustee for the
people in general, who are its real owners. As a mere steward,
the individual must exercise his rights to the property not for his
own exclusive and selfish benefit but for the good of the entire
community or nation [Mataas na Lupa Tenants Association,
Inc. supra at 42-3 citing I. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW,
70 (1983 ed.)].

The basic unfairness of the decrees is readily apparent.

Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of
the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained. ALL the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be
considered.
xxx xxx xxx

2. Just Compensation
Petitioners maintain that Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended,
would allow the taking of private property upon payment of unjust
and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors. In
addition, they assert that the Decree would deprive the courts of
their judicial discretion to determine what would be "just
compensation".
The foregoing contentions have already been ruled upon by this
Court in the case of Ignacio vs. Guerrero (G.R. No. L-49088, May
29, 1987) which, incidentally, arose from the same expropriation
complaint that led to this instant petition. The provisions on just
compensation found in Presidential Decree Nos. 1224, 1259 and
1313 are the same provisions found in Presidential Decree Nos.
76, 464, 794 and 1533 which were declared unconstitutional
in Export Processing Zone All thirty vs. Dulay (G.R. No. 5960
April 29, 1987) for being encroachments on prerogatives.
This Court abandoned the ruling in National Housing Authority vs.
Reyes [G.R. No. 49439, June 29,1983, 123 SCRA 245 (1983)]
which upheld Pres. Decree No. 464, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 794, 1224 and 1259.

Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific

properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by
provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas
covering several barrios or even an entire total with the exception
of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into
account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its
possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very
often land described as directional has been cultivated for
generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three
classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more
often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but
cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation.
To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations
made by assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is
illusory. The overwhelming mass of landowners accept
unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by
local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even
look at, much less analyze, the statements. The Idea of
expropriation simply never occurs until a demand is made or a
case filed by an agency authorized to do so. (pp. 12-3)

3. Due Process
Petitioners assert that Pres. Decree 1224, as amended, violates
procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of
possession, control and disposition of property without giving the
owner his day in court. Respondent Judge ordered the issuance
of a writ of possession without notice and without hearing.
The constitutionality of this procedure has also been ruled upon in
the Export Processing Zone Authority case, viz:
It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity
to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or
wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness
to allow the haphazard work of minor bureaucrat or clerk to
absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only
after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property,
after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented,
and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just
determination have been judiciously evaluated. (p. 13)
On the matter of the issuance of a writ of possession, the ruling in
the Ignacio case is reiterated, thus:
[I]t is imperative that before a writ of possession is issued by the
Court in expropriation proceedings, the following requisites must
be met: (1) There must be a Complaint for expropriation sufficient
in form and in substance; (2) A provisional determination of just
compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated must
be made by the trial court on the basis of judicial (not legislative
or executive) discretion; and (3) The deposit requirement under
Section 2, Rule 67 must be complied with. (p. 14)
This Court holds that "socialized housing" defined in Pres. Decree
No. 1224, as amended by Pres. Decree Nos. 1259 and 1313,

constitutes "public use" for purposes of expropriation. However,

as previously held by this Court, the provisions of such decrees
on just compensation are unconstitutional; and in the instant case
the Court finds that the Orders issued pursuant to the corollary
provisions of those decrees authorizing immediate taking without
notice and hearing are violative of due process.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of the lower court dated January 17,
1978 and June 28, 1978 issuing the writ of possession on the
basis of the market value appearing therein are annulled for
having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. Let this case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings to
determine the compensation the petitioners are entitled to be
paid. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

(5) The petitioners' properties are not proper

subjects for expropriation considering their
location and other relevant circumstances.

MANOTOK V NHA
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Before us are two petitions. The first one challenges the
constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1669 which provides
for the expropriation of the property known as the "Tambunting
Estate" and the second challenges the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No.1670 which provides for the expropriation
of the property along the Estero de Sunog-Apog. In both cases,
the petitioners maintain that the two decrees are unconstitutional
and should be declared null and void because:
(1) They deprived the petitioners of their
properties without due process of law.
(2) The petitioners were denied to their right to
just compensation
(3) The petitioners' right to equal protection of the
law was violated.
(4) The decrees are vague, defective, and
patently erroneous.

On June 11, 1977, the President of the Philippines issued Letter

of Instruction (LOI) No. 555 instituting a nationwide slum
improvement and resettlement program (SIR). On the same date,
the President also issued LOI No. 557, adopting slum
improvement as a national housing policy.
In compliance with LOI No. 555, the Governor of Metro Manila
issued, on July 21, 1977, Executive Order No.6-77 adopting the
Metropolitan Manila Zonal Improvement Program which included
the properties known as the Tambunting Estate and the SunogApog area in its priority list for a zonal improvement program
(ZIP) because the findings of the representative of the City of
Manila and the National Housing Authority (NHA) described these
as blighted communities.
On March 18, 1978, a fire razed almost the entire Tambunting
Estate. Following this calamity, the President and the Metro
Manila Governor made public announcement that the national
government would acquire the property for the fire victims. The
President also designated the NHA to negotiate with the owners
of the property for the acquisition of the same. This, however, did
not materialize as the negotiations for the purchase of the
property failed.
On December 22, 1978, the President issued Proclamation No.
1810 declaring all sites Identified by the Metro Manila local
governments and approved by the Ministry of Human Settlements
to be included in the ZIP upon proclamation of the President. The
Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area were among the
sites included.

On January 28, 1980, the President issued the challenged

Presidential Decrees Nos. 1669 and 1670 which respectively
declared the Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area
expropriated.
Presidential Decree No. 1669, provides, among others:
Section 1. The real properties known as the
"Tambunting Estate" and covered by TCT Nos.
119059, 122450, 122459, 122452 and Lots Nos.
1- A, 1-C, 1-D, l-E, 1-F and 1-H of (LRC) Psd230517 (Previously covered by TCT No. 119058)
of the Register of Deeds of Manila with an area of
52,688.70 square meters, more or less are hereby
declared expropriated. The National Housing
Authority hereinafter referred to as the "Authority"
is designated administrator of the National
Government with authority to immediately take
possession, control, disposition, with the power of
demolition of the expropriated properties and their
improvements and shall evolve and implement a
comprehensive development plan for the
condemned properties.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. Notwithstanding any provision of law or
decree to the contrary and for the purpose of
expropriating this property pegged at the -.market
value determined by the City Assessor pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 76, as amended,
particularly by Presidential Decree No. 1533
which is in force and in effect at the time of the
issuance of this decree. In assessing the market
value, the City Assessor pursuant consider

existing conditions in the area notably, that no

improvement has been undertaken on the land
and that the land is squatted upon by resident
families which should considerably depress the
expropriation cost. Subject to the foregoing, the
just compensation for the above property should
not exceed a maximum of SEVENTEEN MILLION
PESOS (Pl7,000,000.00) which shall be payable
to the owners within a period of five (5) years in
five (5) equal installments.
Presidential Decree No. 1670, on the other hand, provides:
Section 1. The real property along the Estero de
Sunog-Apog in Tondo, Manila formerly consisting
of Lots Nos 55-A, 55-B and 55-C, Block 2918 of
the subdivision plan Psd-1 1746, covered by TCT
Nos. 49286, 49287 and 49288, respectively, of the
Registry of Deeds of Manila, and formerly owned
by the Manotok Realty, Inc., with an area of
72,428.6 square meters, more or less, is hereby
declared expropriated. The National Housing
Authority hereinafter referred to as the 'Authority'
is designated administrator of the National
Government with authority to immediately take
possession, control and disposition, with the
power of demolition of the expropriated properties
and their improvements and shall evolve and
imagine implement a comprehensive
development plan for the condemned properties.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. Notwithstanding any provision of law or
decree to the contrary and for the purpose of

expropriating this property pegged at the market

value determined by the City Assessor pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 76, as amended,
particularly by Presidential Decree No. 1533
which is in force and in effect at the time of the
issuance of this decree. In assessing the market
value, the City Assessor shall consider existing
conditions in the area notably, that no
improvement has been undertaken on the land
and that the land is squatted upon by resident
families which should considerably depress the
expropriation cost. Subject to the foregoing, the
just compensation for the above property should
not exceed a maximum of EIGHT MILLION
PESOS (P8,000,000.00), which shall be payable
to the owners within a period of five (5) years in
five equal installment.
On April 4, 1980, the National Housing Authority, through its
general-manager, wrote the Register of Deeds of Manila,
furnishing it with a certified copy of P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 for
registration, with the request that the certificates of title covering
the properties in question be cancelled and new certificates of
title be issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
However, the Register of Deeds in her letter to NHA's generalmanager, requested the submission of the owner's copy of the
certificates of title of the properties in question to enable her to
implement the aforementioned decrees.
Subsequently, petitioner Elisa R. Manotok, one of the owners of
the properties to be expropriated, received from the NHA a letter
informing her that the latter had deposited, on July 16, 1980, with
the Philippine National Bank the total amount of P5,000,000.00
which included the amount of P3,400,000.00 representing the first

annual installment for the Tambunting Estate pursuant to P.D. No.

1669; and another P5,000,000.00 which also included the amount
of P1,600,000.00 representing the first annual installment for the
Sunog-Apog area under P.D. No. 1670. The petitioner was also
informed that she was free to withdraw her share in the properties
upon surrender by her of the titles pertaining to said properties
and that if petitioner failed to avail herself of the said offer, the
NHA would be constrained to take the necessary legal steps to
implement the decrees.
On August 19, 1980, petitioner Elisa R. Manotok wrote a letter to
the NHA alleging, inter alia, that the amounts of compensation for
the expropriation of the properties of the petitioners as fixed in the
decrees do not constitute the "just compensation" envisioned in
the Constitution. She expressed veritable doubts about the
constitutionality of the said decrees and informed the NHA that
she did not believe that she was obliged to withdraw the amount
of P5,000,000.00 or surrender her titles over the properties.
In the meantime, some officials of the NHA circulated instructions
to the tenants-occupants of the properties in dispute not to pay
their rentals to the petitioners for their lease-occupancy of the
properties in view of the passage of P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670.
Hence, the owners of the Tambunting Estate filed a petition to
declare P.D. No. 1669 unconstitutional. The owners of the SunogApog area also filed a similar petition attacking the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 1670.
On September 27, 1982, the lessees of the Tambunting Estate
and the Sunog-Apog area filed a motion for leave to intervene
together with their petition for intervention alleging that they are
themselves owners of the buildings and houses built on the
properties to be expropriated and as such, they are real partiesin-interest to the present petitions.

The petitioners maintain that the Presidential Decrees providing

for the direct expropriation of the properties in question violate
their constitutional right to due process and equal protection of
the law because by the mere passage of the said decrees their
properties were automatically expropriated and they were
immediately deprived of the ownership and possession thereof
without being given the chance to oppose such expropriation or to
contest the just compensation to which they are entitled.
The petitioners argue that the government must first have filed a
complaint with the proper court under Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court in order to fulfill the requirements of due process.
'They contend that the determination of just compensation should
not have been vested solely with the City Assessor and that a
maximum or fixed amount of compensation should not have been
imposed by the said decrees. Petitioners likewise state that by
providing for the maximum amount of just compensation and by
directing the City Assessor to take into consideration the alleged
existing conditions of the properties in question, namely: that no
"improvement has been undertaken on the land and that the land
is squatted upon by resident families which should considerably
depress the expropriation costs," the City Assessor is forced to
accept, as actual and existing conditions of the property, the
foregoing statements in the decrees when in fact the Sunog-Apog
area has been subdivided into subdivision lots and leased to the
occupants thereof under contracts of lease, making them lessees
and not squatters as assumed by Presidential Decree No. 1670.
Moreover, each subdivision lot is surrounded by adobe walls
constructed by the particular owner of the property: the houses
were required to have septic tanks by the City Hall and the,
owners themselves: there is a drainage system; and there are
adequate water facilities.
As far as the Tambunting Estate is concerned, the petitioners
maintain that aside from the residential houses in the area, there

are buildings and structures of strong materials on the lots

fronting Rizal Avenue Extension, most of which are leased to
proprietors of business establishments under long term contracts
of lease which use the same for their furniture business from
which they secure substantial income.
The Government as represented by the Solicitor-General and the
NHA, on the other hand, contends that the power of eminent
domain is inherent in the State and when the legislature itself or
the President through his law-making prerogatives exercises this
power, the public use and public necessity of the expropriation,
and the fixing of the just compensation become political in nature,
and the courts must respect the decision of the law-making body,
unless the legislative decision is clearly and evidently arbitrary,
unreasonable, and devoid of logic and reason; and that all that is
required is that just compensation be determined with due
process of law which does not necessarily entail judicial process.
The public respondents, further argue that since the Constitution
lays down no procedure by which the authority to expropriate may
be carried into effect, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court
which is invoked by the petitioners may be said to have been
superseded by the challenged decrees insofar as they are
applicable to the properties in question and, therefore, there is no
need to follow the said rule for due process to be observed.
Moreover, the public respondents maintain that it cannot be fairly
said that the petitioners' valuations were ignored in fixing the
ceiling amount of the properties in question because the only
reason why the determination appeared unilateral was because
said petitioners did not actually state any valuation in their sworn
declaration of true market value of their respective properties, and
as far as payment in installments is concerned, the same can be
justified by the fact that the properties in question are only two of
the four hundred and fifteen (415) slums and blighted areas in
Metro Manila and two of the two hundred and fifty one (251) sites

for ungrading under the ZIP and that to immediately acquire and
upgrade all those sites would obviously entail millions and
millions of pesos. The financial constraints, therefore, require a
system of payment of just compensation. Thus, the respondent
states that the payment of just compensation in installments did
not arise out of ill will or the desire to discriminate.
We start with fundamentals.
The power of eminent domain is inherent in every state and the
provisions in the Constitution pertaining to such power only serve
to limit its exercise in order to protect the individual against whose
property the power is sought to be enforced. We pointed out the
constitutional limitations in the case of Republic vs. Juan (92
SCRA 26, 40):
To begin with, it must be emphasized that plaintiffappellee in this instant case is the Republic of the
Philippines which is exercising its right of eminent
domain inherent in it as a body sovereign. In the
exercise of its sovereign right the State is not
subject to any limitation other than those imposed
by the Constitution which are: first, the taking
must be for a public use; secondly, the payment of
just compensation must be made: and thirdly, due
process must be observed in the taking...
The challenged decrees are uniquely unfair in the procedures
adopted and the powers given to the respondent NHA.
The Tambunting subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted
area and directly expropriated by decree without the slightest
semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. The
expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately
upon the signing of the decree. No deposit before taking is

required under the decree. The P3,400,000.00 appropriated from

the general fund is not a deposit but constitutes an installment
payment for the property, the maximum price of which is fixed so
as not to exceed P17,000,000.00. There is no provision for any
interests to be paid on the unpaid installments spread out over a
period of five years. Not only are the owners given absolutely no
opportunity to contest the expropriation, plead their side, or
question the amount of payments fixed by decree, but the
decisions, rulings, orders, or resolutions of the NHA are expressly
declared as beyond the reach of judicial review. An appeal may
be made to the Office of the President but the courts are
completely enjoined from any inquiry or participation whatsoever
in the expropriation of the subdivision or its incidents.
In some decisions promulgated before the February, 1986
political upheaval, this Court presumed the validity of the beautiful
"whereases" in presidential decrees governing expropriations and
legitimated takings of private property which, in normal times,
would have been constitutionally suspect. There were then the
avowed twin purposes of martial law to first quell the Communist
rebellion and second to reform society. Thus, in Haguisan v.
Emilia (131 SCRA 517) the Court sustained the contention that
prior hearing is no longer necessary under P.D. No. 42 in
ascertaining the value of the property to be expropriated and
before the government may take possession. There was a
disregard in the decree for Section 2 of Rule 67 which requires
the court having jurisdiction over the proceedings to promptly
ascertain and fix the provisional value of the property for
purposes of the initial taking or entry by the Government into the
premises. In National Housing Authority v. Reyes (123 SCRA
245) the Court upheld the decrees which state that the basis for
just compensation shall be the market value declared by the
owner for tax purposes or such market value as determined by
the government assessor, whichever is lower.

Subsequent developments have shown that a disregard for basic

liberties and the shortcut methods embodied in the decrees on
expropriation do not achieve the desired results. Far from
disappearing, squatter colonies and blighted areas have
multiplied and proliferated. It appears that constitutionally suspect
methods or authoritarian procedures cannot, be the basis for
social justice. A program to alleviate problems of the urban poor
which is well studied, adequately funded, genuinely sincere, and
more solidly grounded on basic rights and democratic procedures
is needed.
We re-examine the decisions validating expropriations under
martial law and apply established principles of justice and
fairness which have been with us since the advent of
constitutional government. We return to older and more sound
precedents.
The due process clause cannot be rendered nugatory everytime
a specific decree or law orders the expropriation of somebody's
property and provides its own peculiar manner of taking the
same. Neither should the courts adopt a hands-off policy just
because the public use has been ordained as existing by the
decree or the just compensation has been fixed and determined
beforehand by a statute.
The case of Dohany v. Rogers, (74 L.ed. 904.'912, 281. U.S. 362370) underscores the extent by which the due process clause
guarantees protection from arbitrary exercise of the power of
eminent domain.
The due process clause does not guarantee to
the citizen of a state any particular form or method
of state procedure. Under it he may neither claim
a right to trial by jury nor a right of appeal. Its
requirements are satisfied if he has reasonable

opportunity to be heard and to present his claim

or defense, due regard being had to the nature of
the proceeding and the character of the rights
which may be affected by it. Reetz v. Michigan,
188 U.S. 505, 508, 47 L.ed. 563, 566, 23 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 390; Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271
U.S. 40, 70 L.ed. 818, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 384:
Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 593, 42 L.ed. 270,
289, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 966; A. Backus Jr. & Sons
v. Fort Street Union Depot Co. 169 U.S. 569, 42 L.
ed. 859, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445.
In other words, although due process does not always
necessarily demand that a proceeding be had before a court of
law, it still mandates some form of proceeding wherein notice and
reasonable opportunity to be heard are given to the owner to
protect his property rights. We agree with the public respondents
that there are exceptional situations when, in the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, the requirement of due process may
not necessarily entail judicial process. But where it is alleged that
in the taking of a person's property, his right to due process of law
has been violated, the courts will have to step in and probe into
such an alleged violation.
Thus, certain portions of the decision in De Knecht v. Bautista,
(100 SCRA 660, 666-667) state:
There is no question as to the right of the
Republic of the Philippines to take private
property for public use upon the payment of just
compensation. Section 2, Article IV of the
Constitution of the Philippines provides: 'Private
property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation.

It is recognized, however, that the government

may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what
private property should be taken. In J.M. Tuazon
& Co., Inc. v. Land tenure Administration, 31
SCRA 413, 433, the Supreme Court said:

The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain is

necessity. This Court stated in City of Manila v. Chinese
Community of Manila (40 Phil. 349) that "(t)he very foundation of
the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and
that necessity must be of a public character.

xxx xxx xxx

In City of Manila v. Arellano Law Colleges (85 Phil. 663), we

reiterated that a necessity must exist for the taking of private
property for the proposed uses and purposes but accepted the
fact that modern decisions do not call for absolute necessity. It is
enough if the condemnor can show a reasonable or practical
necessity, which of course, varies with the time and peculiar
circumstances of each case.

It is obvious then that a land-owner is covered by

the mantle of protection due process affords. It is
a mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness, it
is the antithesis of any governmental act that
smacks of whim or caprice. It negates state power
to act in an oppressive manner. It is, as had been
stressed so often, the embodiment of the sporting
Idea of fair play. In that sense, it stands as a
guaranty of justice. 'That is the standard that must
be met by any governmental agency in the
exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to it
As was so emphatically stressed by the present
Chief Justice, 'Acts of Congress, as well as those
of the Executive, can deny due process only
under pain of nullity...
In the same case the Supreme Court concluded:
With due recognition then of the power of
Congress to designate the particular property to
be taken and how much thereof may be
condemned in the exercise of the power of
expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether
in the exercise of such competence, the party
adversely affected is the victim of partiality and
prejudice, That the equal protection clause will not
allow. (p. 436)

In the instant petitions, there is no showing whatsoever as to why

the properties involved were singled out for expropriation through
decrees or what necessity impelled the particular choices or
selections. In expropriations through legislation, there are, at
least, debates in Congress open to the public, scrutiny by
individual members of the legislature, and very often, public
hearings before the statute is enacted. Congressional records
can be examined. In these petitions, the decrees show no
reasons whatsoever for the choice of the properties as housing
projects. The anonymous adviser who drafted the decrees for the
President's signature cannot be questioned as to any possible
error or partiality, act of vengeance, or other personal motivations
which may have led him to propose the direct expropriation with
its onerous provisions.
The Tambunting estate or at least the western half of the
subdivision fronting Rizal Avenue Extension is valuable
commercial property. It is located at the junction where three main
city streets converge Rizal Avenue from downtown Manila,
Jose Abad Santos Street from Binondo, and Aurora Boulevard
leading to Retiro Street and other points in Quezon City. The

Libiran Furniture Company, alone, which fronts the entrance to

Jose Abad Santos Street is clearly a multi-million peso enterprise.
It is a foregone conclusion that the favored squatters allowed to
buy these choice lots would lose no time, once it is possible to do
so, to either lease out or sell their lots to wealthy merchants even
as they seek other places where they can set up new squatter
colonies. The public use and social justice ends stated in the
whereas clauses of P.D. 1669 and P.D. 1670 would not be served
thereby.
The provision of P.D. 1669 which allows NHA, at its sole option,
to put portions of the expropriated area to commercial use in
order to defray the development costs of its housing projects
cannot stand constitutional scrutiny. The Government, for
instance, cannot expropriate the flourishing Makati commercial
area in order to earn money that would finance housing projects
all over the country. The leading case of Guido v. Rural Progress
Administration (84 Phil. 847) may have been modified in some
ways by the provisions of the new Constitution on agrarian and
urban land reform and on housing. The principle of nonappropriation of private property for private purposes, however,
remains. The legislature, according to the Guido case, may not
take the property of one citizen and transfer it to another, even for
a full compensation, when the public interest is not thereby
promoted. The Government still has to prove that expropriation of
commercial properties in order to lease them out also for
commercial purposes would be "public use" under the
Constitution.
P.D. No. 1670 suffers from a similar infirmity. There is no showing
how the President arrived at the conclusion that the Sunog-Apog
area is a blighted community. The many pictures submitted as
exhibits by the petitioners show a well-developed area subdivided
into residential lots with either middle-income or upper class
homes. There are no squatters. The provisions of the decree on

the relocation of qualified squatter families and on the re-blocking

and re-alignment of existing structures to allow the introduction of
basic facilities and services have no basis in fact The area is welldeveloped with roads, drainage and sewer facilities, water
connection to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System electric connections to Manila Electric Company, and
telephone connections to the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company. There are many squatter colonies in Metro Manila in
need of upgrading. The Government should have attended to
them first. There is no showing for a need to demolish the existing
valuable improvements in order to upgrade Sunog-Apog.
After a careful examination of the questioned decrees, we find
P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 to be violative of the petitioners' right to
due process of law and, therefore, they must fail the test of
constitutionality.
The decrees, do not by themselves, provide for any form of
hearing or procedure by which the petitioners can question the
propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the
reasonableness of the just compensation. Having failed to
provide for a hearing, the Government should have filed an
expropriation case under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court
but it did not do so. Obviously, it did not deem it necessary
because of the enactment of the questioned decrees which
rendered, by their very passage, any questions with regard to the
expropriation of the properties, moot and academic. In effect, the
properties, under the decrees were "automatically expropriated."
This became more evident when the NHA wrote the Register of
Deeds and requested her to cancel the certificate of titles of the
petitioners, furnishing said Register of Deeds only with copies of
the decrees to support its request.
This is hardly the due process of law which the state is expected
to observe when it exercises the power of eminent domain.

The government states that there is no arbitrary determination of

the fair market value of the property by the government assessors
because if the owner is not satisfied with the assessor's action,
he may within sixty (60) days appeal to the Board of Assessment
Appeals of the province or city as the case may be and if said
owner is still unsatisfied, he may appeal further to the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals pursuant to P.D. No. 464. The
Government argues that with this procedure, the due process
requirement is fulfilled.
We cannot sustain this argument.
Presidential Decree No. 464, as amended, otherwise known as
the Real Property Tax Code, provides for the procedure on how to
contest assessments but does not deal with questions as to the
propriety of the expropriation and the manner of payment of just
compensation in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
We find this wholly unsatisfactory. It cannot in anyway substitute
for the expropriation proceeding under Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Another infirmity from which the questioned decrees suffer is the
determination of just compensation.
Pursuant to P.D. 1533, the basis of the just compensation is the
market value of the property "prior to the recommendation or
decision of the appropriate Government Office to acquire the
property." (see also Republic v. Santos, (1 41 SCRA 30, 35).
In these petitions, a maximum amount of compensation was
imposed by the decrees and these amounts were only a little
more than the assessed value of the properties in 1978 when,
according to the government, it decided to acquire said
properties.

The fixing of the maximum amounts of compensation and the

bases thereof which are the assessed values of the properties in
1978 deprive the petitioner of the opportunity to prove a higher
value because, the actual or symbolic taking of such properties
occurred only in 1980 when the questioned decrees were
promulgated.
According to the government, the cut-off year must be 1978
because it was in this year that the government decided to
acquire the properties and in the case of the Tambunting Estate,
the President even made a public announcement that the
government shall acquire the estate for the fire victims.
The decision of the government to acquire a property through
eminent domain should be made known to the property owner
through a formal notice wherein a hearing or a judicial proceeding
is contemplated as provided for in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
This shall be the time of reckoning the value of the property for
the purpose of just compensation. A television or news
announcement or the mere fact of the property's inclusion in the
Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) cannot suffice because for the
compensation to be just, it must approximate the value of the
property at the time of its taking and the government can be said
to have decided to acquire or take the property only after it has, at
the least, commenced a proceeding, judicial or otherwise, for this
purpose.
In the following cases, we have upheld the determination of just
compensation and the rationale behind it either at the time of the
actual taking of the government or at the time of the judgment by
the court, whichever came first.
Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, (93 SCRA 503, 506,
519):

...And in the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.

Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, the
Court, speaking thru now Chief Justice Fernando,
reiterated the 'wen-settled (rule) that just
compensation means the equivalent for the value
of the property at the time of its taking. Anything
beyond that is more and anything short of that is
less, than just compensation. It means a fair and
full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the
measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain
would accrue to the expropriating entity.
xxx xxx xxx
We hold that the decision of the Court of Appeals
fixing the market value of the property to be that
obtaining, at least, as of the date of the rendition
of the judgment on December 2, 1969 as prayed
by private respondent, which the Court fixed at
P200.00 per square meter is in conformity with
doctrinal rulings hereinabove cited that the value
should be fixed as of the time of the taking of the
possession of the property because firstly, at the
time judgment was rendered on December 2,
1969, petitioner had not actually taken possession
of the property sought to be expropriated and
secondly, We find the valuation determined by the
Court of Appeals to be just, fair and reasonable.
National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, (1 29 SCRA 665,
673):
xxx xxx xxx

(5) And most importantly,on the issue of just

compensation, it is now settled doctrine, following
the leading case of Alfonso v. Pasay City, (1,06
PhiL 1017 (1960)), that no determine due
compensation for lands appropriated by the
Government, the basis should be the price or
value at the time it was taken from the owner and
appropriated by the Government.
The owner of property expropriated by the State is
entitled to how much it was worth at the time of
the taking. This has been clarified in Republic v.
PNB (1 SCRA 957) thus: 'It is apparent from the
foregoing that, when plaintiff takes possession
before the institution of the condemnation
proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the
time of the taking of said possession, not of filing
of the complainant, and that the latter should be
the basis for the determination of the value, when
the of the property involved coincides with or is
subsequent to, the commencement of the
proceedings. Indeed, otherwise, the provision of
Rule 619, section 3, directing that compensation
"be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaints" would never be operative.
municipality of La Carlota v. The Spouses
Baltazar, et al., 45 SCRA 235 (1972)).
Furthermore, the so-called "conditions" of the properties should
not be determined through a decree but must be shown in an
appropriate proceeding in order to arrive at a just valuation of the
property. In the case of Garcia v. Court of Appeals, (102 SCRA
597, 608) we ruled:

...Hence, in estimating the market value, all the

capabilities of the property and all the uses to
which it may be applied or for which it is adapted
are to be considered and not merely the condition
it is in at the time and the use to which it is then
applied by the owner. All the facts as to the
condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities may be shown and
considered in estimating its value.
In P.D. No. 76, P.D. No. 464, P.D. No. 794, and P.D. No. 1533, the
basis for determining just compensation was fixed at the market
value declared by the owner or the market value determined by
the assessor, whichever is lower.
P.D.s 1669 and 1670 go further. There is no mention of any
market value declared by the owner. Sections 6 of the two
decrees peg just compensation at the market value determined
by the City Assessor. The City Assessor is warned by the decrees
to "consider existing conditions in the area notably, that no
improvement has been undertaken on the land and that the land
is squatted upon by resident families which should considerably
depress the expropriation costs."
In other cases involving expropriations under P.D. Nos. 76, 464,
794, and 1533, this Court has decided to invalidate the mode of
fixing just compensation under said decrees. (See Export
Processing Zone Authority v. Hon. Ceferino E. Dulay, et al. G.R.
No. 59603) With more reason should the method in P.D.s 1669
and 1670 be declared infirm.
The market value stated by the city assessor alone cannot
substitute for the court's judgment in expropriation proceedings. It
is violative of the due process and the eminent domain provisions
of the Constitution to deny to a property owner the opportunity to

prove that the valuation made by a local assessor is wrong or

prejudiced. The statements made in tax documents by the
assessor may serve as one of the factors to be considered but
they cannot exclude or prevail over a court determination made
after expert commissioners have examined the property and all
pertinent circumstances are taken into account and after the
parties have had the opportunity to fully plead their cases before
a competent and unbiased tribunal. To enjoin this Court by decree
from looking into alleged violations of the due process, equal
protection, and eminent domain clauses of the Constitution is
impermissible encroachment on its independence and
prerogatives.
The maximum amounts, therefore, which were provided for in the
questioned decrees cannot adequately reflect the value of the
property and, in any case, should not be binding on the property
owners for, as stated in the above cases, there are other factors
to be taken into consideration. We, thus, find the questioned
decrees to likewise transgress the petitioners' right to just
compensation. Having violated the due process and just
compensation guarantees, P. D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 are
unconstitutional and void.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 55166 and G.R. No.
55167 are hereby GRANTED. Presidential Decree Numbers 1669
and 1670 which respectively proclaimed the Tambunting Estate
and the Estero de Sunog-Apog area expropriated, are declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
SO ORDERED.

be considered to be for public use. Its expropriation is

not valid. In this case, the Court defines what
constitutes a genuine necessity for public use.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated October 31,
1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 affirming the
Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 165,
Pasig City, dated May 7, 1996 in S.C.A. No. 873.
Likewise assailed is the Resolution[3] of the same
court dated November 20, 1998 denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case are:
Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered
owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4,521 square
meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City,
Metro Manila.
MASIKIP V CITY OF PASIG
SANDOVAL GUTIERREZ, J.:
Where the taking by the State of private property is
done for the benefit of a small community which
seeks to have its own sports and recreational facility,
notwithstanding that there is such a recreational
facility only a short distance away, such taking cannot

In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then

Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, respondent,
notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a
1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used
for the sports development and recreational activities
of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was
pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted
by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.

Again, on March 23, 1994, respondent wrote another

letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was
allegedly in line with the program of the Municipal
Government to provide land opportunities to
deserving poor sectors of our community.
On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent
stating that the intended expropriation of her property
is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area
of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to provide
land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our
community.
In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent
reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of
petitioners property is to provide sports and
recreational facilities to its poor residents.
Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed
with the trial court a complaint for expropriation,
docketed as SCA No. 873. Respondent prayed that the
trial court, after due notice and hearing, issue an order
for the condemnation of the property; that
commissioners be appointed for the purpose of
determining the just compensation; and that judgment
be rendered based on the report of the commissioners.
On April 25, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

I
PLAINTIFF HAS NO CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR THE EXERCISE
OF THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN,
CONSIDERING
THAT:
(A) THERE IS NO
GENUINE
NECESSITY
FOR
THE TAKING OF
THE
PROPERTY
SOUGHT TO BE
EXPROPRIATED.
(B) PLAINTIFF HAS
ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY
CHOSEN
THE
PROPERTY
SOUGHT TO BE
EXPROPRIATED.
(C)
EVEN
ASSUMING ARGUE
NDO THAT
DEFENDANTS
PROPERTY MAY BE

EXPROPRIATED
BY PLAINTIFF, THE
FAIR
MARKET
VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY TO BE
EXPROPRIATED
FAR
EXCEEDS
SEVENTY-EIGHT
THOUSAND PESOS
(P78,000.00)

II
PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT IS
DEFECTIVE IN FORM AND
SUBSTANCE, CONSIDERING
THAT:
(A)
PLAINTIFF
FAILS TO ALLEGE
WITH CERTAINTY
THE PURPOSE OF
THE
EXPROPRIATION.

(B) PLAINTIFF HAS

FAILED
TO
COMPLY
WITH
THE
PREREQUISITES
LAID DOWN IN
SECTION 34, RULE
VI OF THE RULES
AND
REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING
THE
LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
CODE; THUS, THE
INSTANT
EXPROPRIATION
PROCEEDING
IS
PREMATURE.
III
THE GRANTING OF THE
EXPROPRIATION
WOULD
VIOLATE SECTION 261 (V) OF
THE OMNIBUS ELECTION
CODE.
IV

PLAINTIFF CANNOT TAKE

POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY
BY
MERELY
DEPOSITING AN AMOUNT
EQUAL TO FIFTEEN PERCENT
(15%) OF THE VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY BASED ON THE
CURRENT TAX DECLARATION
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.[4]
On May 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order
denying the Motion to Dismiss,[5] on the ground
that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the
property for the sports and recreational activities
of the residents of Pasig. As to the issue of just
compensation, the trial court held that the same is to
be determined in accordance with the Revised Rules
of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by the trial court in its Order of July 31, 1996.
Forthwith, it appointed the City Assessor and City
Treasurer of Pasig City as commissioners to ascertain
the just compensation. This prompted petitioner to file
with the Court of Appeals a special civil action
forcertiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41860. On
October 31, 1997, the Appellate Court dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. Petitioners Motion for

Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated

November 20, 1998.
Hence, this petition anchored on the following
grounds:
THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED 31
OCTOBER
1997
(ATTACHMENT A)
AND RESOLUTION DATED 20 NOVEMBER
1998 (ATTACHMENT B) ARE CONTRARY
TO LAW, THE RULES OF COURT AND
JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERING THAT:
I
A. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO
PROVE THAT THERE IS GENUINE
NECESSITY FOR THE TAKING OF
THE PETITIONERS PROPERTY.
B. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO
PROVE THAT THE PUBLIC USE
REQUIREMENT FOR THE EXERCISE
OF THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN HAS BEEN COMPLIED
WITH.
C. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO
PROVE THAT RESPONDENT CITY
OF PASIG HAS COMPLIED WITH
ALL CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR

THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF

EMINENT DOMAIN.
THE COURT A QUOS ORDER DATED 07
MAY 1996 AND 31 JULY 1996, WHICH
WERE AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS, EFFECTIVELY AMOUNT TO
THE
TAKING
OF
PETITIONERS
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF
LAW:
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN APPLYING OF RULE ON
ACTIONABLE DOCUMENTS TO THE
DOCUMENTS
ATTACHED
TO
RESPONDENT
CITY
OF
PASIGS COMPLAINT DATED
07
APRIL 1995 TO JUSTIFY THE
COURT A
QUOS
DENIAL
OF
PETITIONERS
RESPONSIVE
PLEADING TO THE COMPLAINT
FOR
EXPROPRIATION
(THE
MOTION TO DISMISS DATED 21
APRIL 1995)
III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY

ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULE ON
HYPOTHETICAL ADMISSION OF
FACTS ALLEGED IN A COMPLAINT
CONSIDERING THAT THE MOTION
TO DISMISS FILED BY PETITIONER
IN THE EXPROPRIATION CASE
BELOW WAS THE RESPONSIVE
PLEADING REQUIRED TO BE FILED
UNDER THE THEN RULE 67 OF THE
RULES OF COURT AND NOT AN
ORIDNARY MOTION TO DISMISS
UNDER RULE 16 OF THE RULES OF
COURT.
The foregoing arguments may be synthesized
into two main issues one substantive and one
procedural. We will first address the procedural
issue.
Petitioner filed her Motion to Dismiss the complaint
for expropriation on April 25, 1995. It was denied by
the trial court on May 7, 1996. At that time, the rule
on expropriation was governed by Section 3, Rule 67
of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 3. Defenses and objections. Within the
time specified in the summons, each defendant,
in lieu of an answer, shall present in a single
motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief,

all his objections and defenses to the right of the

plaintiff to take his property for the use or
purpose specified in the complaint. All such
objections and defenses not so presented are
waived. A copy of the motion shall be served on
the plaintiffs attorney of record and filed with
the court with proof of service.

The motion to dismiss contemplated in the above Rule

clearly constitutes the responsive pleading which
takes the place of an answer to the complaint for
expropriation. Such motion is the pleading that puts in
issue the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the
defendants property for the use specified in the
complaint. All that the law requires is that a copy of
the said motion be served on plaintiffs attorney of
record. It is the court that at its convenience will set
the case for trial after the filing of the said pleading.[6]
The Court of Appeals therefore erred in holding that
the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner
hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged
in the complaint, specifically that there is a genuine
necessity to expropriate petitioners property for public
use. Pursuant to the above Rule, the motion is a
responsive pleading joining the issues. What the trial
court should have done was to set the case for the
reception of evidence to determine whether there is
indeed a genuine necessity for the taking of the

property, instead of summarily making a finding that

the taking is for public use and appointing
commissioners to fix just compensation. This is
especially so considering that the purpose of the
expropriation was squarely challenged and put in
issue by petitioner in her motion to dismiss.
Significantly, the above Rule allowing a defendant in
an expropriation case to file a motion to dismiss in
lieu of an answer was amended by the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997.
Section 3, Rule 67 now expressly mandates that any
objection or defense to the taking of the property of a
defendant must be set forth in an answer.
The fact that the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 on October 31,
after the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect, is
of no moment. It is only fair that the Rule at the time
petitioner filed her motion to dismiss should govern.
The new provision cannot be applied retroactively to
her prejudice.
We now proceed to address the substantive issue.
In the early case of US v. Toribio,[7] this Court defined
the power of eminent domain as the right of a
government to take and appropriate private property
to public use, whenever the public exigency requires

it, which can be done only on condition of providing a

reasonable compensation therefor. It has also been
described as the power of the State or its
instrumentalities to take private property for public
use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent
in government.[8]
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the
legislative branch of the government. It delegates the
exercise thereof to local government units, other
public entities and public utility corporations,
[9]
subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local
governments have no inherent power of eminent
domain and may exercise it only when expressly
authorized by statute.[10] Section 19 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160)
prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of
eminent domain to local government units and lays
down the parameters for its exercise, thus:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government
unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, purpose or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution
and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That, the
power of eminent domain may not be exercised
unless a valid and definite offer has been

previously made to the owner and such offer

was not accepted:Provided, further, That, the
local government unit may immediately take
possession of the property upon the filing of
expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of
the
property
to
be
expropriated: Provided, finally,
That,
the
amount to be paid for expropriated property
shall be determined by the proper court, based
on the fair market value at the time of the taking
of the property.

Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is

limited to the following areas of concern: (a) the
adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the
taking, and (c) the public use character of the purpose
of the taking.[11]
In this case, petitioner contends that respondent City
of Pasig failed to establish a genuine necessity which
justifies the condemnation of her property. While she
does not dispute the intended public purpose,
nonetheless, she insists that there must be a genuine
necessity for the proposed use and purposes.
According to petitioner, there is already an established
sports development and recreational activity center at
Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully operational and
being utilized by its residents, including those from

Barangay Caniogan. Respondent does not dispute this.

Evidently, there is no genuine necessity to justify the
expropriation.
The right to take private property for public purposes
necessarily originates from the necessity and the
taking must be limited to such necessity. In City of
Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila,[12] we held
that the very foundation of the right to exercise
eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that
necessity must be of a public character. Moreover,
the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or
accompany and not follow, the taking of the land.
In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College,[13] we ruled
that necessity within the rule that the particular
property to be expropriated must be necessary, does
not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or
practical necessity, such as would combine the
greatest benefit to the public with the least
inconvenience and expense to the condemning party
and the property owner consistent with such benefit.
Applying this standard, we hold that respondent
City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a
genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners property.
Our scrutiny of the records shows that the
Certification[14] issued by the Caniogan Barangay
Council dated November 20, 1994, the basis for the
passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the

expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary

is the Melendres Compound Homeowners
Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the
residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the
members of the said Association are desirous of
having their own private playground and recreational
facility. Petitioners lot is the nearest vacant space
available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and
categorically public. The necessity has not been
shown, especially considering that there exists an
alternative facility for sports development and
community recreation in the area, which is the
Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig
City, including those of Caniogan.
The right to own and possess property is one of
the most cherished rights of men. It is so fundamental
that it has been written into organic law of every
nation where the rule of law prevails. Unless the
requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of
ones property is clearly established, it shall be the
duty of the courts to protect the rights of individuals
to their private property. Important as the power of
eminent domain may be, the inviolable sanctity which
the Constitution attaches to the property of the
individual requires not only that the purpose for the
taking of private property be specified. The genuine
necessity for the taking, which must be of a public
character, must also be shown to exist.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review

is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 41860 are REVERSED. The complaint for
expropriation filed before the trial court by respondent
City of Pasig, docketed as SCA No. 873, is
ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

FREE ACCESS TO COURTS AND RIGHT TO SPEEDY

DISPOSITUION OF CASES
PEOPLE V SANDIGANBAYAN 2011

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The guarantee of the speedy disposition of cases under Section
16 of Article III of the Constitution applies to all cases pending
before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. Thus,
the fact-finding investigation should not be deemed separate from
the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman if the aggregate time spent for both constitutes
inordinate and oppressive delay in the disposition of any case.
The Case
The Court resolves the petitions for certiorari the State instituted
to assail and nullify, in G.R. No. 188165, the Sandiganbayans
dismissal of Criminal Case SB-08-CRM-0265 entitled People of
the Philippine v. Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario S. Perez,
Ernest Escaler, and Ramon A. Arceo, for violation of Section 3 (b)
of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended; and, in G.R. No. 189063,

the Sandiganbayans dismissal of SB-08-CRM- 0266

entitled People of the Philippine v. Hernando Benito
Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest Escaler, and Ramon A. Arceo,
for robbery under Article 293, in relation to Article 294, of
the Revised Penal Code.

Fact Finding and Intelligence Research Office (FIRO) of the

Office of the Ombudsman referred Cong. Jimenezs complaintaffidavit to the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau
and to the Administrative Adjudication Board, both of the Office of
the Ombudsman, for preliminary investigation and administrative
adjudication, respectively.
8

Common Factual and Procedural Antecedents

On November 12, 2002, Congressman Wilfrido B. Villarama of
Bulacan (Cong. Villarama) delivered a privilege speech in the
House of Representatives denouncing acts of bribery allegedly
committed by a high ranking government official whom he then
called the "2 Million Dollar Man." In reaction, the Office of the
President directed the Presidential Anti- Graft and Commission
(PAGC) to conduct an inquiry on the expos of Cong. Villarama.
PAGC sent written communications to Cong. Villarama, Cong.
Mark Jimenez, Senator Panfilo Lacson and respondent Secretary
of Justice Hernando B. Perez inviting them to provide information
and documents on the alleged bribery subject of the expos. On
November 18, 2002, Cong. Villarama responded by letter to
PAGCs invitation by confirming that Secretary Perez was the
government official who "ha[d] knowledge or connection with the
bribery subject of his expose." In his own letter of November 18,
2002, however, Secretary Perez denied being the Million-Dollar
Man referred to in Cong. Villaramas privilege speech. On
November 25, 2002, Cong. Jimenez delivered a privilege speech
in the House of Representatives confirming Cong. Villaramas
expos, and accusing Secretary Perez of extorting US$2 Million
from him in February 2001.

The complaint-affidavit of Jimenez was re-docketed as OMB-C-C02- 0857L, for the criminal case in which the respondents were
Secretary Perez, Ernest L. Escaler and Ramon C. Arceo, Jr.; and
as OMB-C-A-02-0631L, for the administrative case involving only
Secretary Perez as respondent.
9

On November 25, 2002, then Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo

requested PAGC to submit documents relevant to the
expos. On November 26, 2002, Ombudsman Marcelo formally
requested Cong. Jimenez to submit a sworn statement on his
expos. Cong. Jimenez complied on December 23, 2002 by
submitting his complaint-affidavit to the Office of the
Ombudsman. The complaint-affidavit was initially docketed as
CPL-C-02-1992. On the same day, the Special Action Team of the
6

On January 2, 2003, a Special Panel composed of Atty. Evelyn

Baliton, Atty. Mary Susan Guillermo and Atty. Jose de Jesus was
created to evaluate and conduct an investigation of CPL-C-021992.
On even date, Secretary Perez, through counsel, requested
Ombudsman Marcelo that the Office of the Ombudsman itself
directly verify from the Coutts Bank whether he (Secretary Perez)
had ever held any account in that bank to which the sum of US$2
Million had been remitted by Cong. Jimenez.
10

On January 15, 2003, Ombudsman Marcelo approved the

recommendation of the Special Panel to refer the complaint of
Cong. Jimenez to FIRO for a full-blown fact-finding investigation.

11

On June 4, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received the

letter dated May 30, 2003 from the counsel of Cong. Jimenez,
submitting the supplemental complaint-affidavit dated April 4,
2003 of Cong. Jimenez.
In his letter dated July 3, 2003, Secretary Perez, through counsel,
sought the dismissal of the complaint for lack of probable cause.
12

On July 17, 2003, Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio S. Apostol

informed Secretary Perez about the letter from Coutts Bank
stating that "Hernando B. Perez" had no account with it, and
assured that the letter would be considered in the final resolution
of the case.
13

On August 22, 2005, Ombudsman Marcelo created a new Special

Panel to evaluate CPL-C-02-1992, and, if warranted, to conduct
administrative and preliminary investigations, thereby
superseding the creation of the Special Panel formed on January
2, 2003.
14

On November 14, 2005, the Field Investigation Office (FIO)

completed its fact-finding investigation and filed complaints
against the following individuals, namely:

On November 23, 2005, the Special Panel directed Secretary

Perez (who had meanwhile resigned from office), his wife Rosario
S. Perez (Mrs. Perez), Escaler and Arceo to submit their counteraffidavits in OMB-C-C-02-0857-L, OMB-C-C-05-0633-K, OMB-CC-05-0634-K and OMB-C-C-05-0635-K (criminal cases). In
another order of the same date, the Special Panel directed former
Secretary Perez to file his counter-affidavit in OMBC-A-02-0631-L
(administrative case).
16

On November 29, 2005, the respondents filed an urgent motion

for extension of time to file their counter-affidavits.
On December 2, 2005, the counsel for Escaler entered his
appearance and sought the extension of the time to file Escalers
counter-affidavit.
17

A. Former Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario

S. Perez, Ernesto L. Escaler, Ramon C. Arceo and John
Does for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019;

On December 5, 2005, the Special Panel ordered the

respondents to file their counter-affidavits within ten days from
December 4, 2005, or until December 14, 2005.

B. Former Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez for

violation of the following: Section 8 in relation to Section
11 of R.A. No. 6713, Article 183 (Perjury) of the Revised
Penal Code, and Article 171, par. 4 (Falsification) of the
RPC; and

On December 7, 2005, Asst. Ombudsman Apostol issued PAMO

Office Order No. 22, Series of 2005, creating a new team of
investigators to assist in the preliminary investigation and
administrative adjudication of OMB-C-C-02-0857L, OMB-C-A-020631L (administrative case), OMB-CC-05-0633K to OMB-C-C0635K (forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379). The
office order cancelled and superseded PAMO Office Order No.
01-2003, Series of 2003.

C. Former Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario

S. Perez, Ernest L. Escaler, Ramon C. Arceo and John
Does for violation of the provisions of R.A. 1379.

18

19

15

On December 12, 2005, former Secretary Perez, Mrs. Perez and

Arceo filed an urgent motion to be furnished copies of the
complaints. On December 13, 2005, they submitted a
consolidated joint counter-affidavit dated December 12, 2005.
20

21

On December 15, 2005, the respondents filed a manifestation to

which they attached the affidavit of Atty. Chona Dimayuga.
22

On December 20, 2005, Escaler, instead of filing his counteraffidavit, moved to disqualify the Office of the Ombudsman from
conducting the preliminary investigation, and to require the
Special Panel to turn over the investigation to the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
23

On May 25, 2006, the Special Panel denied Escalers motion for
reconsideration; directed the FIO "to let respondent Escaler
examine, compare, copy and obtain any and all documentary
evidence described, attached to and forming part of the
complaints" of the cases; and granted Escaler an extension of
five days within which to submit his counter-affidavit.
34

On December 22, 2005, the respondents submitted the affidavit

of Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo.
24

On December 29, 2005, the Special Panel denied the motion to

disqualify the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting the
preliminary investigation, and ordered Escaler to submit his
counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
25

After Escaler failed to submit his counter-affidavit despite the

lapse of the five day period given to him, the preliminary
investigation was terminated.
35

On August 23, 2006, Escaler commenced in this Court a special

civil action for certiorari with application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) docketed as G.R. No. 173967-71. On
September 4, 2006, the Court required the Office of the
Ombudsman to comment on the petition of Escaler.
36

On January 4, 2006, Cong. Jimenez filed an urgent motion for

extension of the period to file his opposition to the motion earlier
filed by Escaler, and to be granted a new period to reply to the
consolidated joint counter-affidavit of the Perezes and Arceo.
26

Between January 9, 2006 and February 10, 2006, Cong. Jimenez

filed urgent motions for time to file his opposition, the last of them
seeking an extension until February 10, 2006.
27

On February 21, 2006, the Perezes and Arceo reiterated their

urgent motion to be furnished copies of the complaints.
28

37

On November 6, 2006, the Special Panel issued a joint

resolution, finding probable cause and recommending that
criminal informations be filed against the respondents, as follows:
1) Former Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S.
Perez, Ernest L. Escaler and Ramon S. Arceo, Jr. for
Extortion (Robbery) under par. 5 of Article 294 in relation
to Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code;

On February 22, 2006, Cong. Jimenez opposed Escalers motion

to disqualify the Office of the Ombudsman. On the same date,
Escaler asked for at least 20 days from February 17, 2006 (or
until March 9, 2006) within which to reply to Cong. Jimenezs
opposition to his motion. On March 9, 2006, Escaler replied to
Cong. Jimenezs opposition. On March 28, 2006, Cong. Jimenez
sought leave to file a rejoinder to Escalers reply.

2) Former Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S.

Perez, Ernest L. Escaler and Ramon S. Arceo, Jr. for
violation of Section 3 (b) of Rep. Act. 3019.

On May 15, 2006, Escaler moved for the reconsideration of the

order of December 29, 2005.

4) Former Secretary Hernando B. Perez for violation of

Sec. 7, R.A. 3019 in relation to Section 8 of R.A. 6713.

29

30

31

32

33

3) Former Secretary Hernando B. Perez for Falsification

of Public Documents under Article 171 par. 4 of the
Revised Penal Code.

38

On January 5, 2007, Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez

(Ombudsman Gutierrez), who had meanwhile replaced the
resigned Ombudsman Marcelo, approved the joint resolution of
the Special Panel.
39

On January 11, 2007, the Perezes and Arceo sought the

reconsideration of the joint resolution, and supplemented their
motion for that purpose with additional arguments on January 15,
2007.

On January 25, 2008, the Special Panel issued an omnibus

resolution denying the original and supplemental motions for
reconsideration of the Perezes and Arceo; their motion to
suspend the proceedings; Escalers motion to suspend
proceedings ex abundanti ad cautelam; and the Perezes motion
to dismiss.
48

40

41

On April 18, 2008, the Perezes brought a petition

for certiorari with an application for a writ of preliminary injunction
in this Court (G.R. No. 182360-63). In due time, the Court
required the respondents in G.R. No. 182360-63 to file their
comments on the petition.
49

On January 17, 2007, Arceo filed an ex parte motion for leave to

admit attached supplemental motion for reconsideration.
42

On January 24, 2007, the Perezes and Arceo filed an urgent

motion to suspend proceedings. On February 6, 2007, Escaler
also filed a motion to suspend proceedings ex abundanti ad
cautelam.
43

On March 15, 2007, Cong. Jimenez asked for time to comment

on the respondents motion for reconsideration. He filed another
motion for extension of the time to comment on April 27, 2007.
44

On September 18, 2007, the Perezes prayed that the

proceedings be held in abeyance to await the ruling on their
application for intervention in Escalers action in the Court. On
October 1, 2007, they filed a motion to dismiss.
45

50

On April 18, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman filed in the

Sandiganbayan four informations against respondents, namely:
1. for violation of Sec. 3 (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as
amended;
2. for Robbery (Art. 293, in relation to Art. 294, Revised
Penal Code;
3. for Falsification of Public/Official Document under Art.
171 of the Revised Penal Code; and
4. for violation of Section 7, Rep. Act 3019, as amended,
in relation to Section 8, Rep. Act 6713.
51

On October 2, 2007, Cong. Jimenez submitted his affidavit of

desistance. Thus, on October 4, 2007, the Perezes filed an ex
parte motion for resolution on the basis of the desistance by
Cong. Jimenez.
46

47

Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265

[Violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019]
The information alleging the violation of Section 3(b) of Republic
Act No. 3019, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-08CRM-0265 entitled People v. Hernando Benito Perez, et. al., and
was raffled to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan, averred:
52

That during the month of February, 2001 and sometime prior or

subsequent thereto in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Hernando B.
Perez, a high ranking public officer, being then the Secretary of
the Department of Justice, while in the performance of his official
function, committing the offense in relation to his office and taking
advantage thereof, conspiring, confabulating and confederating
with accused Ernest L. Escaler, Rosario S. Perez and Ramon C.
Arceo, all private individuals, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and criminally request and demand the amount of US TWO
MILLION DOLLARS ($2,000,000.00) for himself and/or other
persons from Mark Jimenez a.k.a. Mario B. Crespo, and
thereafter succeeded in receiving from the latter the sum of
US$1,999,965.00 in consideration of accused Hernando S.
Perezs desisting from pressuring Mark Jimenez to execute
affidavits implicating target personalities involved in the plunder
case against former President Joseph Erap Estrada and in
connection with the pending application of Mark Jimenez for
admission into the Witness Protection Program of the
government, over which transaction accused Hernando S. Perez
had to intervene in his official capacity under the law, to the
damage and prejudice of Mark Jimenez.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Ex- Abudanti Ad Cautelam Motion to Quash of accused Ernest

Escaler are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, let the arraignment of the accused herein proceed on
July 18, 2008 at 8:30 in the morning as previously set by the
Court.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents separately sought the reconsideration of the
resolution of denial of their motions to quash.
On November 13, 2008, the Sandiganbayan First Division
granted the motions for reconsideration, rendering the following
ratiocination, to wit:
59

xxxx
After a second hard look on the respective contentions of the
parties, the Court is inclined to grant the Motions for
Reconsideration of the accused and perforce grant their motion to
quash the Information filed against them in this case.

53

On May 8, 2008, the Perezes moved to quash the

information. Escaler presented a similar motion to quash ex
abundanti ad cautelam on May 12, 2008, while Arceo adopted
the motions of the Perezes and Escaler on May 13, 2008. On
June 4, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman countered with a
consolidated opposition.
54

55

56

57

On July 17, 2008, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan

promulgated its resolution denying the motions to
quash, disposing thusly:

It is axiomatic that as a general rule prerequisite, a motion to

quash on the ground that the Information does not constitute the
offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should be
resolved on the basis of the factual allegations therein whose
truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted; and on additional
facts admitted or not denied by the prosecution. If the facts in the
Information do not constitute an offense, the complaint or
information should be quashed by the court.
xxxx

58

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Quash of

accused Hernando B. Perez and Rosario S. Perez and the urgent

It is clear that the ambit of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 is specific. It

is limited only to contracts or transaction involving monetary
consideration where the public officer has authority to intervene

under the law. Thus, the requesting or demanding of any gift,

present, share, percentage, or benefit covered by said Section
3(b) must be in connection with a "contract or transaction"
involving "monetary consideration" with the government wherein
the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the
law. In this regard, the Supreme Court in Soriano, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan construed the term "contract" or "transaction"
covered by Section 3(b) of RA 3019, as follows
"It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner
was not a contract. Neither was it a transactionbecause this term
must be construed as analogous to the terms which precedes
it. A transaction like a contract, is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions and this element
(consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by
the petitioner." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, applying the above construction of the Supreme Court in
the case at bench, the Court believes and so holds that the
alleged desistance of accused Hernando B. Perez "from
pressuring Mark Jimenez to execute affidavits implicating target
personalities involved in the plunder case against former
President Joseph Erap Estrada and in connection with the
pending application of Mark Jimenez for admission into the WPP
of the government", cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be
considered as"contract" or "transaction" as defined within the
ambit of the fourth element of the offense under Section 3(b) of
RA 3019 because no "monetary consideration" as in credit
transaction is involved.
The Court finds untenable the prosecutions contention that the
execution by Mark Jimenez of the affidavits in connection with his
pending application for admission in the WPP (and not the
alleged desistance of accused Hernando B. Perez from
pressuring Mark Jimenez to execute affidavits implicating target
personalities involved in the plunder case against President
Estrada) is the very contract or transaction required by the
offense charged in this case; and that all the elements of a

contract contemplated therein are present as there is allegedly

consent between the government and Mark Jimenez, object or
subject matter which is the execution of affidavits in connection
with his application for admission in the WPP, and a cause or
consideration which consists of security and monetary benefits to
be given by the government to Mark Jimenez in exchange for his
participation as a witness under the WPP.
For even assuming for the sake of argument that the pending
application of Mark Jimenez for admission in the WPP can be
considered as a contract or transaction, it bears stressing that the
principal consideration for the said application of Mark Jimenez is
the latters obligation to testify as a witness under the WPP on
one hand and his entitlement to the protection granted to a
witness in the WPP on the other hand and as such, does not
entail any money consideration. Certainly, this is not the
(monetary) consideration which is essential or involved in credit
transactions. Any pecuniary or monetary expense that may be
incurred by the Government as a result of the implementation of
the program in favour of Mark Jimenez is purely incidental. Such
alleged monetary benefit is definitely not the reason that impelled
Mark Jimenez to allegedly avail of the WPP of the government.
More precisely, however, what appears as the main consideration
of the alleged demand or receipt of accused Hernando B. Perez
of the sum of US$2,000,000.00 from Mark Jimenez is the
formers alleged desistance from pressuring the latter to execute
affidavits implicating targeted personalities in the plunder case
against former President Estrada. In the light of the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Soriano vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, such
alleged desistance of accused Hernando B. Perez (and even the
application of Mark Jimenez for admission into the WPP as
argued by the prosecution) can hardly be considered as a
"contract" or "transaction" that is contemplated in Section 3(b) of
RA 3019, as amended.
Moreover, the Court takes note of the admission made by the
prosecution in its Memorandum that the transaction involving

Mark Jimenezs execution of affidavits for his admission to the

WPP is not yet a perfected contract between the Government and
Mark Jimenez since it is still in its "negotiation phase" because of
the refusal of Mark Jimenez to execute the affidavits against
certain individuals. This admission is another indication that there
is indeed no contract or transaction to speak of that is covered
under the fourth element of the offense of violation of Section 3(b)
of RA 3019.

All told, with the absence of the fourth element, the Court finds
that the factual/material allegations in the subject Information do
not constitute the offense of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019,
as amended, and therefore, It is constrained to quash the said
Information. In this regard, the Court deems it unnecessary to
discuss/resolve the other issues raised in the subject motions for
reconsideration of the herein accused and/or disturb the other
findings contained in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered.

Finally, it may be argued that while the material allegations in the

subject information may not constitute the offense of violation of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019, as amended, the same material/factual
allegations nevertheless constitute Direct Bribery or another
felony which is necessarily included in the offense charged herein
so that the subject information in this case should not be
quashed. It is believed, however, that the filing of the Information
charging the accused with Robbery in SB-08-CRM-00266
pending before the Second Division of this Court on the basis of
the same acts complained of in this case, constitutes a bar
against the information for said lesser felony as it would result
into two differently charged felonies from a single act and thus,
would unnecessarily or unjustifiably expose the accused to the
danger of suffering two penalties for a single offense if the subject
information is not quashed. If a single act results into two or more
offenses, they should not be charged and/or punished separately
unless the other offense with different elements is penalized
under a special law. To do so would violate, if not the principle of
double jeopardy, the rule against splitting a single act into various
charges. It is settled that a defendant should not be harassed with
various prosecutions upon the same act by splitting the same into
various charges, all emanating from the same law violated, when
the prosecution could easily and well embody them in a single
information because such splitting of the action would work
unnecessary inconvenience to the administration of justice in
general and to the accused in particular, for it would require the
presentation of substantially the same evidence before different
courts.

WHEREFORE, the instant Motions for Reconsideration of the

herein accused are resolved accordingly and the subject
Information for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019, as
amended, is hereby QUASHED.
SO ORDERED.
The State moved for the reconsideration of the resolution
quashing the information in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265.
During the pendency of the States motion for reconsideration,
Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 was re-raffled to the Third
Division of the Sandiganbayan.
On April 21, 2009, the Third Division denied the Ombudsmans
motion for reconsideration, holding thusly:
60

xxxx
The core issue raised in the submission of the parties relates to
the meaning of the word "transaction" as it is used in Sec. 3 (b) of
RA 3019 to constitute an element of the offense. More
particularly, has the meaning of the term "transaction" as
enunciated in the Soriano case been modified by subsequent
rulings of the Supreme Court?
The meaning of "transaction" in Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 was
enunciated in the Soriano case when the Supreme Court stated:

As stated above, the principal issue is whether or not the

investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as a
"contract or transaction" within the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A.
No. 3019. On this issue the petition is highly impressed with
merit.
The afore-mentioned provision reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a)
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for
any other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the Government and any other party,
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law.
The petitioner states:
Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioners guilt, the facts make
out a case of Direct Bribery defined and penalized under the
provision of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not a
violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as
amended.
The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly
support, if at all the offense of Direct Bribery, which is not the
offense charged and is not likewise included in or is necessarily
included in the offense charged, which is for violation of Section
3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The
prosecution showed that: the accused is a public officer; in
consideration of P4,000.00 which was allegedly

solicited, P2,000.00 of which was allegedly received, the

petitioner undertook or promised to dismiss a criminal complaint
pending preliminary investigation before him, which may or may
not constitute a crime; that the act of dismissing the criminal
complaint pending before petitioner was related to the exercise of
the function of his office. Therefore, it is with pristine clarity that
the offense proved, if at all is Direct Bribery. (Petition, p. 5.)
Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:
A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term
transaction as used thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning
to a commercial or business transaction but includes all kinds of
transaction, whether commercial, civil or administrative in nature,
pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act
would have so stated in the "Definition of Terms", Section 2
thereof. But it did not, perforce leaving no other interpretation
than that the expressed purpose and object is to embrace all
kinds of transaction between the government and other party
wherein the public officer would intervene under the law.
(Comment, p. 8.)
It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the
petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it
atransaction because this term must be construed as
analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a
contract, is one which involves some consideration as in
credit transactions and this element (consideration) is
absent in the investigation conducted by the
petitioner. (Emphasis Supplied)
The argument of the Prosecution that the interpretation of the
term "transaction" defined in the Soriano case has been modified
by the Mejia, Pelegrino and Chang cases does not persuade.
A review of the Mejia, Peligrino and Chang cases reveals that the
main issue adjudicated in those cases involved an interpretation

of the element of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019, namely: the right to

intervene of the public officer in the contract or transaction and
not the element of what is a contract or transaction with the
government.
Thus, in the Mejia case, the Supreme Court ruled:
Under the sixth assigned error petitioner alleges that she does
not intervene in the setting of the hearing of cases and she does
not formulate resolutions thereof. The branch clerk of court is the
administrative assistant of the presiding judge whose duty is to
assist in the management of the calendar of the court and in all
other matters not involving the exercise of discretion or judgment
of the judge. It is this special relation of the petitioner with the
judge who presumably has reposed confidence in her which
appears to have been taken advantage of by the petitioner in
persuading the complainants to give her money in consideration
of a promise to get a favorable resolution of their cases.
In the Peligrino case, the Supreme Court ruled:
Petitioner is a BIR Examiner assigned to the Special
Project Committee tasked "xxx to undertake verification of tax
liabilities of various professionals particularly doctors within the
jurisdiction of Revenue Region 4-A, Manila xxx" Since the subject
transaction involved the reassessment of taxes due from private
complainant, the right of petitioner to intervene in his official
capacity is undisputed.Therefore, elements (1), (4) and (5) of
the offense are present. (Emphasis Supplied)
In the Chang case, the Supreme Court ruled:
San Mateos justification behind such refusal- that he had no
authority to accept an amount less than the assessment amountis too shallow to merit belief, he being the Chief Operations,
Business Revenue Examination, Audit Division of the Treasurers

Office, who had, on those various meetings, gone out of his way
to negotiate the settlement of the assessed deficiency tax.
In the recent case of Merencillo vs. People, the Supreme Court
identified the issues raised in the Petition as follows: (1) the
Sandiganbayans refusal to believe petitioners evidence over that
of the prosecution and (2) the Sandiganbayans failure to
recognize that Petitioner was placed in double jeopardy.
In addressing the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled:
Clearly, the violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither
identical nor necessarily inclusive of direct bribery. While they
have common elements, not all the essential elements of one
offense are included among or form part of those enumerated in
the other. Whereas the mere request or demand of a gift, present,
share, percentage or benefit is enough to constitute a violation of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019, acceptance of a promise or offer or
receipt of a gift or present is required in direct bribery. Moreover,
the ambit of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is limited
only to contracts or transactions involving monetary
consideration where the public officer has the authority to
intervene under the law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a
wider and more general scope: (a) performance of an act
constituting a crime; (b) execution of an unjust act which does not
constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or refraining from
doing an act which is his official duty to do. Although the two
charges against petitioner stemmed from the same transaction,
the same act gave rise to two separate and distinct offenses. No
double jeopardy attached since there was a variance between the
elements of the offenses charged. The constitutional protection
against double jeopardy proceeds from a second prosecution for
the same offense, not for a different one. (Emphasis Supplied)
Prosecutions argument that the statement of the Supreme Court
above-quoted is an obiter dictum is specious.

An obiter dictum is a "judicial comment made while delivering a

judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the
case and therefore not precedential (although it may be
considered persuasive)." In the Merencillo case, one issue raised
by Petitioner was precisely the issue of double jeopardy which the
Supreme Court resolved by distinguishing the elements of
violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and Direct Bribery. As one of
the elements of the offense of violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019,
the Court adopted the meaning given to the term "transaction" in
the Soriano case. The above-quoted resolution was not a
mere obiter dictum but the ratio decidendi which is defined as:
"1. the principle or rule of law on which a courts decision is
founded; 2. The rule of law on which a later court thinks that a
previous court founded its decision xx"
The Prosecution argued that it is a maxim in statutory
construction that a law must be read in its entirety and no single
provision should be interpreted in isolation with respect to the
other provisions of the law. The Prosecution further argued that a
close examination of RA 3019 in its entirety would show that the
term "transaction" appears several times and was never confined
to transactions involving monetary consideration. Suffice it to say
that a maxim in statutory construction cannot be superior to an
express interpretation of the law made by the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the provisions in RA 3019 cited by Prosecution
constitute different offenses with their own different elements, with
their own different modalities of commission.
The reference to the Congressional record by the Prosecution
does not disprove the fact that for violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA
3019, the transaction must involve monetary consideration. As
pointed out earlier, no less than the Supreme Court has
interpreted the meaning of the term "transaction" as an element
of violation of the said section. Likewise, as admitted by the
Prosecution, the reference to the deliberations of Congress which
it cited involved deliberations on Sec. 5 of RA 3019 and not on
Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019. The two sections, i.e. Sec. 5 and Sec. 3

(b) of RA 3019 are different offenses with their own different

elements.
Having resolved the core issue in the Motion For Reconsideration
of the Prosecution, there is no further need to discuss the other
arguments of the Prosecution in its Motion.
WHEREFORE, Prosecutions Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of the First Division dated November 13, 2008
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
On June 22, 2009, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
assailed in this Court via petition for certiorari the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan promulgated on July 17, 2008 quashing the
information in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 and the
resolution promulgated on April 21, 2009 denying the States
motion for reconsideration.
On November 18, 2009, the Court denied the Perezes urgent
motion for leave to file a motion to dismiss for being a prohibited
pleading, and instead required the respondents to comment on
the petition, among other things.
61

Criminal Case SB-08-CRM-0266

[Robbery under Art. 293, in relation to
Art. 294, Revised Penal Code]
The information charging robbery under Article 293, in relation to
Article 294, Revised Penal Code was raffled to the Second
Division (Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266).
62

On May 6, 2008, Escaler filed a motion to quash ex abundanti ad

cautelam, alleging that the facts charged did not constitute an
offense. On May 2, 2008, the Perezes filed their own motion to
quash the information. On May 6, 2008, Arceo filed an ex
63

64

parte motion to adopt the Perezes motion as well as Escalers

motion to quash.
65

On June 26, 2008, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan

denied the respective motions to quash of respondents.
66

On June 30, 2008, Escaler moved to reconsider the denial. On

July 10, 2008, Arceo also moved to reconsider the denial. The
Perezes filed their own motion for reconsideration on July 11,
2008.
67

68

69

On November 20, 2008, the Second Division of the

Sandiganbayan granted the motions for reconsideration, quashed
the information charging respondents with robbery, and dismissed
Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266, holding as follows:
70

xxxx
The Court after a careful perusal of the issue and the record on
hand, is persuaded. Extant in the record and which the
prosecution admits or at least does not deny are the following:
1. The alleged Robbery (extortion) was committed on
February 13, 2001 (Joint Resolution signed by members
of the Special Panel composed of Orlando Ines,
Adoracion Agbada, Mary Susan Geronimo, Jose de Jesus
Jr., signed by Asst. Ombudsman Pelagio Apostol, and
approved by Ombudsman Mr. (sic) Merceditas N.
Gutierrez.) (pp. 4-69, Vol. 1, Records; pp. 70-88,
Complaint-Affidavit of Mark Jimenez, Vol. 1, Records)
2. On February 23, 2001 the amount of US $1,999,965.00
was transferred to Coutts Bank Hongkong in favour of the
beneficiary of Account No. HO 13706, from Trade and
Commerce Bank, Cayman Island through the Chase
Manhattan Bank in New York. Subsequently from March
6, 2001 to May 23, 2001 funds were transferred from

Coutts Bank to other accounts, among them a

$250,000.00 bank draft/cheque issued to Ramon C.
Arceo (pp. 10-11 Records).
3. On December 23, 2002 Congressman Mark Jimenez
filed his complaint with the Ombudsman charging
Hernando Perez, Ernest Escaler, Ramon Arceo and
several John Does (Mrs. Rosario Perez was not among
those charged) with criminal offenses of Plunder,
Extortion, Graft and Corruption, Obstruction of Justice,
Violation of the Penal Provision of the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards R.A. 6713, and Administrative
Offenses of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Oppression,
Committing acts Punishable under the Anti-Graft Law,
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the service,
and Violation of Section 5 (2) of R.A. 6713. It was
subscribed and sworn to on (the ) 23rd day of December
2002 (Complaint-Affidavit of Mario Mark (MJ) Jimenez B.
Crespo pp. 70-88 Records).
4. On December 23, 2002, the FIRO (Fact Finding and
Intelligence Research Office) recommended that the case
be referred to the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau and the Administrative Adjudication
Bureau (p. 6 of the Records)
5. The information was filed with this Court only on April
18, 2008.
Having established, or at least as claimed by Complainant Mark
Jimenez, that the Robbery (extortion) took place on February 13,
2001, the Ombudsman should have demanded a reasonable
explanation from the complainant who was then a Congressman,
wealthy and influential and in whose house the alleged
intimidation took place, why he was filing the complaint only on
December 23, 2002 a matter of more than eighteen (18) months.
This should have cautioned the Ombudsman as to the possible
motive in filing the complaint.

At any rate, the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the office of the
Ombudsman as nominal complainant filed a complaint with the
Ombudsman on November 14, 2005 charging Hernando Benito
Perez, Rosario Salvador Perez, Ernest L. Escaler, Ramon
Antonio C. Arceo Jr. and John Does with Violation of Sec. 3(b)
R.A. 3019, Sec. 8 in relation to Sec. 11 of R.A. 6713, Perjury (Art.
183 RPC) and Art. 171 par. 4 Falsification, RPC and violation of
R.A. 1379. (Pp. 132 to 170 of Records) Robbery is NOT one of
the charges.
With the Ombudsmans finding that the extortion (intimidation)
was perpetrated on February 13, 2001 and that there was
transfer of Mark Jimenez US $1,999,965.00 to Coutts Bank
Account HO 133706 on February 23, 2001 in favour of the
accused, there is no reason why within a reasonable period from
these dates, the complaint should not be resolved. The act of
intimidation was there, the asportation was complete as of
February 23, 2001 why was the information filed only on April 18,
2008. For such a simple charge of Robbery there is nothing more
to consider and all the facts and circumstances upon which to
anchor a resolution whether to give due course to the complaint
or to dismiss it are on hand. The case is more than ripe for
resolution. Failure to act on the same is a clear transgression of
the constitutional rights of the accused. A healthy respect for the
constitutional prerogative of the accused should have prodded
the Ombudsman to act within a reasonable time.
The long wait of the accused is without valid cause or justifiable
motive and has unnecessarily trampled upon their constitutional
prerogatives to a speedy disposition of the case. This is an
impermissible course of action that our fundamental law loathes.
As Justice Laurel said, the government should be the last to set
an example of delay and oppression in the administration of
justice. It is the moral and legal obligation of the Court to see that
criminal proceedings come to an end (People vs. Calamba 63
Phil 496).

The Constitution of the Philippines provides:

Art. 3 Sec. 16: All persons shall have a right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial(,) quasijudicial or
administrative bodies.
Thus under our present fundamental law, all persons are entitled
to a speedy resolution of their cases be it civil, administrative or
criminal cases. It is, in criminal cases however where the need to
a speedy disposition of their cases is more pronounced. It is so,
because in criminal cases, it is not only the honor and reputation
but even the liberty of the accused (even life itself before the
enactment of R.A. 9346) is at stake.
The charge is a simple case for Robbery. Certainly it does not
involve complicated and factual issues that would necessitate
painstaking and gruelling scrutiny and perusal on the part of the
Ombudsman. It may have its novel, and to it, valid reason for
departing from the established procedure and rules, but virtually
in doing so, it has failed to discharge its duty as mandated by the
Constitution to promptly act on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officers and employees.
The totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances bears
unmistakably the earmarks of inordinate delay, making the
applicability of the doctrine enunciated in Anchangco Jr. and
Duterte cases cited in the parties pleadings irrefragable.
Accordingly, there being a clear violation of the constitutional right
of the accused, the prosecution is ousted of any authority to file
the information and we hereby order the quashing of the
information and the consequent dismissal of this case.
While the ground upon which the Court banked and relied this
dismissal order was not invoked in the motions for
reconsideration of accused Escaler and Arceo, since they are

similarly situated with their coaccused spouses Perez, this

resolution applies to them with equal force and effect.

accused Perezes() Manifestation and Plaintiffs Comment dated

February 16, 2009 to Perezes() Manifestation.

On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, We hereby consider

the Motion for Reconsideration of our resolution denying the
motion for consolidation moot and academic; even as, We rule
that the said motion lacks persuasiveness considering that, per
Manifestation of accused Escaler he is not in any way a party to
all the cases pending, the accused in each of the cases were
charged with different offenses, and the different cases are
already at different stages of the proceedings, and considering
the argument of the prosecution that the different offenses in the
four (4) cases consist of different elements necessitating
presentation of different proofs and evidence for each case.

All these shall be considered and taken up by the Court in

seriatim.

Accused(s) bonds are ordered cancelled and the Hold-Departure

Order issued against them in this case is lifted and set aside.
So ordered.
The State moved to reconsider the resolution of November 20,
2008, but the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the
motion for reconsideration on June 19, 2009, stating thusly:
71

72

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the People of the

Philippines dated December 8, 2008 seeking to reconsider the
Resolution of this Court promulgated on November 20, 2008
dismissing the case, as well as accused-spouses Perez
Opposition dated December 22, 2008, accused Arceos
Comment/Opposition of even date, and the Opposition dated
January 5, 2009 of accused Ernest L. Escaler.
On record too, are the Plaintiffs Consolidated Reply dated
January 19, 2009 to the three (3) Opposition/Comment of the
accused, the three (3) Rejoinders of the accused of different
dates, the plaintiffs sub-rejoinder dated February 9, 2009,

The first issue brought up by the accused is a supposed

procedural lapse of the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration in
that the same was filed in violation of Sec. 4 Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court which provides in substance that in every written motion
required to be heard, the notice of hearing thereof shall be served
in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at
least three (3) days before the date of hearing.
Of course, it is not disputed that the accused-spouses received
through registered mail their copy of plaintiffs motion only on
December 16, 2008 while it set the date of hearing on December
12, 2007 thus the motion was set for hearing before the other
party received it. Accused Ramon Arceo received his copy of the
motion only on December 17, 2008 while accused Ernest Escaler
received his copy after December 18, 2008 giving the same
situation as accused Perezes. It must be taken note of that the
Court set the hearing of the plaintiffs motion on December 18,
2008, as on December 12, 2008 the date specified on plaintiffs
motion, no accused has received his copy of the said motion.
Considering thus, the situation, there seems plausibility for the
accused claim of transgression of the aforecited provision of the
Rules of Court.
Nonetheless, considering the transfer of the date of hearing, and
that all the parties were given ample time to file and submit their
respective pleadings which at the time the issue was to be
resolved had grown voluminous, the Court is not inclined to give
due consideration for this procedural impropriety.

The Court takes note however that the plaintiffs motion for
reconsideration was filed only on December 8, 2008 beyond the
fifteenth day period within which it should be filed, since it
received a copy of the Resolution of this Court on November 21,
2008. Thus, the fifteenth day fell on December 6, 2008 after
which the said Resolution has become final and executory. The
Resolution in question therefore which finally disposes of the
case is not only final but executory as well which is virtually
beyond the reach of the motion for reconsideration belatedly filed.
We will now tackle the merits of the grounds invoked by the
People.
The first ground cited in the Peoples motion was that the filing of
complaint against former secretary Hernando B. Perez was not
attended by ill motive since it reasoned out that it was the
intimation of the Court when it stated in its Resolution the
Ombudsman xxx "should have demanded a reasonable
explanation from the complainant who was then a congressman,
wealthy and influential and in whose house the alleged
intimidation took place, why he was filing the complaint only on
December 23, 2002 a matter of more than eighteen (18) months.
This should have cautioned the Ombudsman as to the possible
motive in filing the complaint. xxx "We take note of the response
of the prosecution "Jimenez thought that after the pay-off,
Secretary Perez would stop threatening him and would leave him
in peace for good. This was the reason why Jimenez did not
immediately file a complaint against Secretary Perez and his coaccused."
The first and foremost impression We can gather is that the
alleged about two million dollars which supposedly was the result
of accused Perez alleged extortion was delivered already to the
accused. All along therefore, if the claim of the prosecution is to
be believed, Robbery has long been committed that was on or
about February 2001 as alleged in the information. With or
without ill-motive, the Ombudsman should have acted within a
reasonable time. Certainly eighteen (18) long months from the

filing of the complaint can not be considered within a reasonable

time.
The movant then argued that the filing of the information only on
April 18, 2008 were due to legal impediments which were beyond
the control of the office of the Ombudsman.
The Court can not understand those alleged "legal impediments"
in the prosecution for Robbery. Here is the prosecution claiming
strongly that the filing of the complaint was not attended by illmotive and that after the pay-off even if a crime has been
committed against complaint Congressman Mark Jimenez, the
latter delayed his filing of the complaint because he thought the
accused would leave him in peace. This is the only impediment
we can think of, and this definitely is not a legal impediment;
certainly too this is not beyond the control of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
But the Court shall keep track of the movants argument about
this supposed legal impediment. Admitting that the asportation
was complete on February 23, 2001, the prosecution reasoned
out that the case can not be filed in Court at that time due to
insufficiency of evidence. As averred in the Opposition of accused
Ernest Escaler, "xxx the plaintiffs duty is to determine whether
there exists probable cause to hold the accused for trial for simple
robbery", and those documents which the prosecution so
capitalized it exerted so much offer to obtain, are mere
evidentiary matters. This is even admitted in the prosecutions
motion for reconsideration.
Consider these facts all explicitly admitted by the prosecution:
On February 13, 2001 accused former Justice Secretary
Hernando Perez accompanied by accused Ernest Escaler
supposedly threatened complainant Congressman Mark Jimenez
to send him to jail where he will die of boil (Putang ina mo,
sinasalsal mo lang ako. Hindot ka. Ipakukulong kita sa Quezon

City Jail. Doon mamamatay ka sa pigsa). On February 23, 2001

the amount of US $1,999,965 owned by Congressman Mark
Jimenez was transferred to Coutts Bank, Hongkong in favour of
Account Number 13706 in the name of Ernest Escaler (confirmed
by Trade and Commerce Bank Payment Detail Report dated
February 23, 2001)
Congressman Mark Jimenez did not file my complaint against the
accused in any Court or prosecutor office. This, despite his claim
in his counter-affidavit that:
"12. Meanwhile, Pres. Estrada stepped down as President after
the Armed Forces of the Philippines withdrew its support to him,
and the Arroyo Administration was installed on January 19, 2001.
The new Secretary of Justice, Hernando B. Perez, was appointed
by Pres. Arroyo. Soon after his appointment. Sec. Perez sent
feelers that I am his first target for inclusion in the criminal cases
that he will file against Pres. Estrada. He also threatened and
intimidated me and my family with bodily harm and incarceration
in a city jail with hardened criminals and drug addicts unless I
execute damaging affidavits against Pres. Estrada and his
cronies and associates. Because of the intense pressure upon
me and my family, I was forced to come across with US $2.0
Million. (Page 73 of the Records)
It was only on December 23, 2002 as stated in our Resolution
that Congressman Mark Jimenez filed his complaint with the
Ombudsman, even if the said offense was alleged to have been
committed on Feb. 13, 2001 and it was only on April 18, 2008 that
the Ombudsman presented the information with this Court.
The complainant had hesitated into filing his complaint for about
eighteen (18) months while the Ombudsman with double
hesitation dillydallied for about six (6) years. All in all, the delay
from the supposed commission of such a simple offense of
Robbery took more than seven years that is from February 13,
2001 to April 18, 2008. It is clear the socalled legal impediments

are but empty assertion to belatedly justify an impermissible

action.
Taking exception to our ruling that the totality of facts and
surrounding circumstances bear unmistakably the earmarks of
inordinate delay, the movant made a comparison of those cases
dismissed by the Supreme Court for violation of the Constitutional
right of the accused to speedy disposition of cases, and this case,
and wrongfully conclude there was no delay in their handling of
the case at bar.
We have already resolved and passed upon rather adequately
this issue in our Resolution with the observation that not anyone
of the cases cited involved the charge of Robbery. The movants
discussion asserted no new and substantial reason and argument
to persuade us to reverse or modify our considered opinion. We
however pose this question to the prosecution. If Asst.
Ombudsman Pelagio Apostol recommended the filing of the
information against the accused on November 7, 2006 why did it
take the Ombudsman only on January 5, 2007 to approve the
recommendation. And if, on January 11, 2007 the accused
submitted their Motion for Reconsideration, why did it take the
Ombudsman up to April 15, 2008 a matter of about fifteen (15)
months to resolve the same when there was NO OPPOSITION
nor comment from the other party?
The argument that "the authority of the Ombudsman is not
divested by the claimed delay in filing the information as this
authority is vested by law" is a reckless reasoning that only
shows that while admitting there was undue delay in the
disposition of the case, it could still proceed with its information to
charge the accused.
The prosecution need not be reminded of the uniform ruling of the
Honorable Supreme Court dismissing the cases of Tatad,
Angchangco, Duterte and other cases for transgressing the
constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy disposition of
cases. To argue "that the authority of the Ombudsman is not

divested by the claimed delay in filing the information xxx" is to

limit the power of the Court to act on blatant transgression of the
constitution.
As to fact-finding investigation, the Court finds it so baseless for
the movant to capitalize on what it supposedly did in the process
of the fact-finding stance; and then reasoning out as if clutching
on straws that the sequences of events should excuse it from
lately filing the information. But it took the movant six (6) years to
conduct the said fact-finding investigation, and then unabashedly
it argues that is not part of the preliminary investigation.
Determining probable cause should usually take no more than
ninety (90) days precisely because it only involves finding out
whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the persons
charged could be held for trial or not. It does not require sifting
through and meticulously examining every piece of evidence to
ascertain that they are enough to convict the persons involved
beyond reasonable doubt. That is already the function of the
Courts.
As argued by accused Ramon Arceo, the claim of the movant that
the preliminary investigation of the instant case commenced only
on November 14, 2005 when the Field Investigation Office (FIO)
filed its complaint, and not on December 23, 2002 when Mark
Jimenez filed his complaint-affidavit, is rather specious and does
not hold water as Robbery was not among the offenses included
in the charge of the FIO. As such, it is not correct to say that the
counting of the period for delay should commence only in
November 2005.
The conclusion thus, that the long waiting of six (6) years for the
Office of the Ombudsman to resolve the simple case of Robbery
is clearly an inordinate delay, blatantly intolerable, and grossly
prejudicial to the constitutional right of speedy disposition of
cases, easily commands assent. This Court, it must be made
clear, is not making nor indulging in mere mathematical reckoning
of the time involved.

In its sixth ground the movant argued that the First, Third and
Fourth Divisions all junked the claimed inordinate delay of the
accused and asked that the Second Division should "xxx co-exist
not work on cross-purposes with the other Courts Division xxx".
The argument begs the question! Suppose if and when the
incident reaches the Supreme Court, the highest Court of the land
ruled that it is the Second Division which is correct, and the other
Divisions in error, what would happen now to the argument of the
movant that "xxx there is rhyme or reason for the Sandiganbayan,
Second Division to co-exist xxx with the other Courts Division
xxx".
Moreover, the information in the first division charges the accused
of Violation of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. 3019, in the third division the
accusation was for Falsification of Public Document under Art.
171 of the Revised Penal Code, while the accused have been
indicted for violating Sec. 7 R.A. 3019 in relation to Sec. 8 of R.A.
6713 before the Fourth Division. The Court can not say whether
there is need for paper trail or monitoring of documents in those
cases, as the Divisions concerned can competently resolve and
pass upon it but certainly in this instant case of Robbery, to
indulge in a prolonged fact-finding process is not a boon but a
bane on the part of the prosecution
In a distasteful exhibition of unsavoury language, bordering on
derision and contempt, the prosecution argued that "xxx the
assailed resolution is a wanton display of arrogance,
contemptuous and outright illegal for it mooted the same issue of
inordinate delay pending with the Honorable Supreme Court xxx".
This only goes to show that the prosecution is totally ignorant of
the hierarchy of Courts in our judicial system.
xxx It must be remembered that delay in instituting prosecutions
is not only productive of expense to the State, but of peril to
public justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere
natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of the law
that prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes, enforcing
such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not

merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the State upon itself,
to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns, and to secure for
criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecutions Motion for
Reconsideration dated December 8, 2008 is denied for lack of
merit.

On February 11, 2013, the Court deconsolidated G.R. No.

173967-71 and G.R. No. 182360-63 from G.R. No. 188165 and
G.R. No. 189063 on the ground that the intervening filing of the
informations in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 and Criminal
Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266 had rendered the petitions in G.R.
No. 173967-71 and G.R. No. 182360-63 moot.
76

Issues
So ordered.
In G.R. No. 188165, the State raises the following issues:
On August 24, 2009, the State assailed the resolutions of the
Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in this Court (G.R. No.
189063).

I.

73

Consolidation of the petitions

On October 26, 2009, the Court directed that G.R. No. 189063 be
consolidated with G.R. No. 182360-63 (entitledHernando B.
Perez and Rosario S. Perez v. The Ombudsman, Field
Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman and Mario B. Crespo
a.k.a. Mark Jimenez) and G.R. No. 173967-71 (Ernest B. Escaler
v. The Office of the Ombudsman, et al.).

WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN QUASHING
THE INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL CASE SB-08-CRM265, BY CONFINING THE DEFINITION OF THE WORD
"TRANSACTION" IN SECTION 3(B) OF R.A. 3019 AS
TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING MONETARY
CONSIDERATION.

74

II.
On April 7, 2010, the Court consolidated G.R. No. 188165 with
G.R. Nos. 173967-71, G.R. Nos. 182360-63 and G.R. No.
189063 (People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 2nd
Division, et al.).
75

G.R. No. 173967-71 and G.R. No. 182360-63 were special civil
actions for certiorari to prevent the filing of the criminal
informations against the respondents.
Deconsolidation and dismissal of
G.R. No. 173967-71 and G.R. No. 182360-63
on the ground of their intervening mootness

WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RELYING
SOLELY ON THE CASE OF SORIANO, JR. VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND DISREGARDED
JURISPRUDENCE THAT SHOWS SECTION 3 (B) OF
RA 3019 EXTENDS TO ANY DEALING WITH THE
GOVERNMENT.
III.
WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WTH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RESOLVED

THE MOTIONS TO QUASH (ON THE GROUND THAT

THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE INFORMATION DO NOT
CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE) BY GOING BEYOND THE
ALLEGATIONS IN THE INFORMATION AND
CONSIDERING SUPPOSED FACTS WITHOUT ANY
BASIS.

Whether or not it was the Office of the Solicitor General,

not the Office of the Ombudsman, that had the authority
to file the petitions to assail the Sandiganbayan
resolutions.
II.

77

In G.R. No. 189063, the State submits the following issues:

A. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT
SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN QUASHING THE INFORMATION IN
CRIMINAL CASE SB-08-CRM-0266 BY HOLDING THAT
"THERE BEING A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED, THE
PROSECUTION IS OUSTED OF ANY AUTHORITY TO
FILE THE INFORMATION."
B. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT
SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN FINDING THE TOTALITY OF THE
FACTS AND THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES
BEARS UNMISTAKABLY THE EARMARKS OF
INORDINATE DELAY, MAKING THE APPLICABILITY OF
THE DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN ANGCHONGCO JR.
AND DUTERTE CASES CITED IN THE PARTIES
PLEADINGS IRREFRAGABLE.
78

The foregoing issues are restated thuswise:

I.

Whether the State, as the petitioner in G.R. No. 188165 and G.R.
No. 189063, resorted to the wrong remedy in assailing the
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dismissing the criminal charges
against the respondents through petitions for certiorari instead of
petitions for review on certiorari.
Specific Issue in G.R. No. 188165
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in
quashing the information by applying the definition
of transaction in Soriano, Jr. v Sandiganbayan, 131 SCRA 188.
Specific Issue in G.R. No. 189063
Whether or not the Sandiganabayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the criminal case due to the inordinate delay of the
Office of the Ombudsman in bringing the criminal action against
respondents as to violate their constitutional right to the speedy
disposition of cases.
Ruling
The petitions for certiorari are devoid of merit.
I.

The Office of the Ombudsman is empowered to

file an appeal or certiorari from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court.
Respondents contend that the Office of the Ombudsman has no
authority to file the petitions for certiorari because only the
Solicitor General could file the petitions in this Court pursuant to
Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative
Code as amended by E.O. No. 292 ,which pertinently states:
Section 35. Powers and Functions.The Office of the Solicitor
General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceedings, investigation or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of
the office concerned, it shall also represent government-owned or
controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall
constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have
the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
special proceedings in which the Government or any officer
thereof in his official capacity is a party.
xxxx
The contention of the respondents is grossly erroneous.
That only the Solicitor General may represent the People on
appeal or certiorari in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings is the general rule, but the
rule admits the exception concerning "all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme
79

Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special

prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except
in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986." More specifically, Section 4(c) of Republic Act
No. 8249 authorizes the exception, viz:
xxxx
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
xxxx
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well
as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has
promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to
appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In
all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent
the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold
emphasis provided)
xxxx
Consequently, the filing of the petitions in these cases by the
Office of the Ombudsman, through the OSP, was authorized by
law.
II.
Petitioner did not establish grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Sandiganbayan

The petitions for certiorari brought by the State must nonetheless

be dismissed for failure to show any grave abuse of discretion on
the part of Sandiganbayan in issuing the assailed resolutions.
A special civil action for certiorari is an independent action based
on the specific grounds provided in Section 1, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, and can prosper only the jurisdictional error,
or the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the inferior court or judge is alleged and
proved to exist.
In De los Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, the
Court has expounded on the nature and reach of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, to wit:

not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and

would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.
1wphi1

The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system

remains much the same as it has been in the common law. In this
jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ
of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or
situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may
issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the
requirements for that purpose, viz:

80

We remind that the writ of certiorari being a remedy narrow in

scope and inflexible in character, whose purpose is to keep an
inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction, or to prevent an
inferior court from committing such grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from
arbitrary acts of courts (i.e., acts that courts have no power or
authority in law to perform) is not a general utility tool in the
legal workshop, and cannot be issued to correct every error
committed by a lower court.
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved,
the writ certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the Kings
Bench, commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to
return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to give
the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable
the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record
whether the inferior courts judgment was rendered without
authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to
stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to
whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted
without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in
matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which
the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or

officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (1a)
Pursuant to Section 1, supra, the petitioner must show that, one,
the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of
amending or nullifying the proceeding.

Considering that the requisites must concurrently be attendant,

the herein petitioners stance that a writ of certiorarishould have
been issued even if the CA found no showing of grave abuse of
discretion is absurd. The commission of grave abuse of discretion
was a fundamental requisite for the writ of certiorari to issue
against the RTC. Without their strong showing either of the RTCs
lack or excess of jurisdiction, or of grave abuse of discretion by
the RTC amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the writ
of certiorari would not issue for being bereft of legal and factual
bases. We need to emphasize, too, that with certiorari being an
extraordinary remedy, they must strictly observe the rules laid
down by law for granting the relief sought.
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere
abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the
writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either
that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or
to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal
or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. (citations omitted)
Did the petitioner show grave abuse of discretion that would
warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari prayed for?
A.
G.R. No. 188165

The Sandiganbayan correctly applied the

restrictive meaning of the term transaction as
used in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019
adopted in Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan
In its questioned resolution dismissing Criminal Case No. SB-08CRM-0265, the Sandiganbayan relied on the ruling in Soriano, Jr.
v. Sandiganbayan, in which the principal issue was whether or
not the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint
conducted by petitioner Soriano, Jr., then a Fiscal, was a
"contract or transaction" as to bring the complaint within the ambit
of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, which punished any
public officer for "[d]irectly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any
other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the Government and any other party,
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law." The Soriano, Jr. Court ruled in the negative, and
pronounced:
81

It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner

was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this
term must be construed as analogous to the term which
precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which
involves some consideration as in credit transactions and
this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation
conducted by the petitioner.
In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it
was error for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of
violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. (Emphasis supplied)
The State now argues, however, that the Sandiganbayan thereby
committed grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction for applying the interpretation of the
term transaction in Soriano, Jr. considering that the
term transaction should be construed more liberally, and positing
that Soriano, Jr. was already abandoned by the Court, citing for

that purpose the rulings in Mejia v. Pamaran, Peligrino v.

People, and Chang v. People.
82

83

84

We disagree with the petitioner, and find for the respondents.

First of all, the interpretation in Soriano, Jr. of the
term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019
has not been overturned by the Court.
In Mejia v. Pamaran, decided en banc on April 15, 1988, Mejia
had demanded and received money from some persons involved
in certain cases in a trial court where Mejia was then serving as
the branch clerk of court in consideration of a promise that she
would help in getting a favorable judgment for them. The issue
was whether or not Mejia could be convicted under the
information that alleged that she had demanded a certain
amount, although the Sandiganbayan found that the amount was
different from that charged in the information. The Court
dismissed her petition, and ruled that "[i]n a prosecution under the
foregoing provision of the Anti-Graft Law the value of the gift,
money or present, etc. is immaterial xxx [w]hat is penalized is the
receipt of any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit by a
public officer in connection with a contract or transaction with the
Government, wherein the public officer has to intervene in his
official capacity." The Court nowhere ruled on the proper
interpretation of the termtransaction.
In Peligrino v. People, decided on August 13, 2001, Peligrino, an
examiner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, was convicted of
violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 for demanding the
amount of P200,000.00 from the complainant in connection with
the latters tax liabilities. Peligrinos defense was that he did not
"demand" the money, but the money was just given to him. He
argued that he had only informed the complainant of his tax
deficiencies, and that the complainant had then requested the
reduction of the amount claimed as his tax deficiencies. The
Court found no merit in Peligrinos argument. The ruling had
nothing to do with the interpretation of the term transaction.

Chang v. People, decided on July 21, 2006, was a case in which

two persons Chang and San Mateo were convicted of
violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 after being found
to have received P125,000.00 in consideration of their issuance
of a Certificate of Examination to the effect that the complainant
had "no tax liability" in favour of the municipality, notwithstanding
that it had not settled with them on their assessed deficiency tax
ofP494,000.00. Chang and San Mateo contended that the charge
had resulted from an involuntary contact whereby complainant
Magat had simply tossed to them the brown envelope; that there
had been no conspiracy between them; and that what had
transpired had been an instigation, not an entrapment. In
affirming their conviction, the Court did not touch on the proper
interpretation of the term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019.
The three rulings the State has cited here did not overturn the
interpretation made in Soriano, Jr. of the termtransaction as used
in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 because the proper
interpretation of the term was clearly not decisive in those cases.
On the contrary, in the later ruling in Merencillo v.
People, promulgated in 2007, the Court reiterated the restrictive
interpretation given in Soriano, Jr. to the term transaction as used
in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 in connection with a
differentiation between bribery under the Revised Penal
Code and the violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019
by holding that the latter is "limited only to contracts or
transactions involving monetary consideration where the public
officer has the authority to intervene under the law."
85

And, secondly, it does not help the State any that the
term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019
is susceptible of being interpreted both restrictively and liberally,
considering that laws creating, defining or punishing crimes and
laws imposing penalties and forfeitures are to be construed
strictly against the State or against the party seeking to enforce
them, and liberally against the party sought to be charged.
86

Clearly, the Sandiganbayan did not arbitrarily, or whimsically, or

capriciously quash the information for failing to properly state the
fourth element of the violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No.
3019.

The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not

limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all
parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and
in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings. While the concept of speedy disposition is relative or
flexible, such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient, the right to the speedy disposition of a
case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial
are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried.
88

B.

89

G.R. No. 189063

The Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in finding that there had
been an inordinate delay in the resolution
against respondents of the charge in
Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266
Upon its finding that the Office of the Ombudsman had incurred
inordinate delay in resolving the complaint Cong. Jimenez had
brought against the respondents, the Sandiganbayan dismissed
Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266 mainly to uphold their
constitutional right to the speedy disposition of their case.
But now comes the State contending that the delay in the
resolution of the case against the respondents was neither
inordinate nor solely attributable to the Office of the Ombudsman.
Citing Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, in which the Court held
that speedy disposition of cases was also consistent with
reasonable delays, the State supported its contention by listing
the various incidents that had caused the delay in the
investigation, and then laying part of the blame on the
respondents themselves.

90

According to Angchonco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, inordinate delay in

resolving a criminal complaint, being violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to the
speedy disposition of cases, warrants the dismissal of the
criminal case.
91

92

Was the delay on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman

vexatious, capricious, and oppressive?
We answer in the affirmative.

87

The right to the speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in Article

III of the Constitution, which declares:
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.

The acts of the respondents that the Office of the Ombudsman

investigated had supposedly occurred in the period from February
13, 2001 to February 23, 2001. Yet, the criminal complaint came
to be initiated only on November 25, 2002 when Ombudsman
Marcelo requested PAGC to provide his office with the documents
relevant to the expos of Cong. Villarama. Subsequently, on
December 23, 2002, Cong. Jimenez submitted his complaintaffidavit to the Office of the Ombudsman. It was only on
November 6, 2006, however, when the Special Panel created to
investigate Cong. Jimenezs criminal complaint issued the Joint
Resolution recommending that the criminal informations be filed
against the respondents. Ombudsman Gutierrez approved the
Joint Resolution only on January 5, 2007. The Special Panel
93

issued the second Joint Resolution denying the respondents

motion for reconsideration on January 25, 2008, and
Ombudsman Gutierrez approved this resolution only on April 15,
2008. Ultimately, the informations charging the respondents with
four different crimes based on the complaint of Cong. Jimenez
were all filed on April 15, 2008, thereby leading to the
commencement of Criminal Case No. SB-08- CRM-0265 and
Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266. In sum, the fact-finding
investigation and preliminary investigation by the Office of the
Ombudsman lasted nearly five years and five months.

the evidence to establish probable cause, like not having a

document showing that the funds (worth US$1,999,965.00 as
averred in the complaint of Cong. Jimenez) had reached
Secretary Perez; and that it could not obtain the document, and
to enable it to obtain the document and other evidence it needed
to await the ratification of the Agreement Concerning Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters with the Hongkong Special
Administrative Region (RP-HKSAR Agreement), and the Treaty
on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Swiss Confederation (RPSwiss MLAT).
95

96

97

It is clear from the foregoing that the Office of the Ombudsman

had taken an unusually long period of time just to investigate the
criminal complaint and to determine whether to criminally charge
the respondents in the Sandiganbayan. Such long delay was
inordinate and oppressive, and constituted under the peculiar
circumstances of the case an outright violation of the
respondents right under the Constitution to the speedy
disposition of their cases. If, in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, the
Court ruled that a delay of almost three years in the conduct of
the preliminary investigation constituted a violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to the
speedy disposition of his case, taking into account the following,
namely: (a) the complaint had been resurrected only after the
accused had a falling out with former President Marcos, indicating
that political motivations had played a vital role in activating and
propelling the prosecutorial process; (b) the Tanodbayan had
blatantly departed from the established procedure prescribed by
law for the conduct of preliminary investigation; and (c) the simple
factual and legal issues involved did not justify the delay, there is
a greater reason for us to hold so in the respondents case.
To emphasize, it is incumbent for the State to prove that the delay
was reasonable, or that the delay was not attributable to it. In
both regards, the State miserably failed.

To us, however, the States dependence on the ratification of the

two treaties was not a sufficient justification for the delay. The
fact-finding investigation had extended from January 15, 2003,
when Ombudsman Marcelo approved the recommendation of the
Special Panel and referred the complaint of Cong. Jimenez for
fact-finding investigation, until November 14, 2005, when the FIO
completed its fact-finding investigation. That period accounted for
a total of two years and 10 months. In addition, the FIO submitted
its report only on November 14, 2005, which was after the
Department of Justice had received on September 8, 2005 the
letter from Wayne Walsh, the Deputy Government Counsel of the
Hongkong Special Administrative Region in response to the
request for assistance dated June 23, 2005, and the reply of the
Office of Justice of Switzerland dated February 10, 2005 and a
subsequent letter dated February 21, 2005 from Liza Favre, the
Ambassador of Switzerland, to Atty. Melchor Arthur Carandang,
Acting Assistant Ombudsman, FIO, together with documents
pertaining to the bank accounts relevant to the investigation. For
the Office of the Ombudsman to mark time until the HKSAR
Agreement and the Swiss-RP MLAT were ratified by the Senate
before it would proceed with the preliminary investigation was
oppressive, capricious and vexatious, because the respondents
were thereby subjected to a long and unfair delay.

For one, the State explains that the criminal cases could not be
immediately filed in court primarily because of the insufficiency of

We should frown on the reason for the inordinate delay because

the State would thereby deliberately gain an advantage over the

94

98

99

respondents during the preliminary investigation. At no time

should the progress and success of the preliminary investigation
of a criminal case be made dependent upon the ratification of a
treaty by the Senate that would provide to the prosecutorial arm
of the State, already powerful and overwhelming in terms of its
resources, an undue advantage unavailable at the time of the
investigation. To allow the delay under those terms would
definitely violate fair play and nullify due process of law fair play,
because the field of contest between the accuser and the
accused should at all times be level; and due process of law,
because no less that our Constitution guarantees the speedy
disposition of the case.
The State further argues that the fact-finding investigation should
not be considered a part of the preliminary investigation because
the former was only preparatory in relation to the latter; and that
the period spent in the former should not be factored in the
computation of the period devoted to the preliminary
investigation.
100

The argument cannot pass fair scrutiny.

The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article
III of the Constitution applies to all cases pending
before all judicial, quasijudicial or administrative bodies. The
guarantee would be defeated or rendered inutile if the hairsplitting distinction by the State is accepted. Whether or not the
fact-finding investigation was separate from the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should
not matter for purposes of determining if the respondents right to
the speedy disposition of their cases had been violated.
There was really no sufficient justification tendered by the State
for the long delay of more than five years in bringing the charges
against the respondents before the proper court. On the charge of
robbery under Article 293 in relation to Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, the preliminary investigation would not require more
than five years to ascertain the relevant factual and legal matters.

The basic elements of the offense, that is, the intimidation or

pressure allegedly exerted on Cong. Jimenez, the manner by
which the money extorted had been delivered, and the
respondents had been identified as the perpetrators, had been
adequately bared before the Office of the Ombudsman. The
obtention of the bank documents was not indispensable to
establish probable cause to charge them with the offense. We
thus agree with the following observation of the
Sandiganbayan, viz:
With the Ombudsmans finding that the extortion (intimidation)
was perpetrated on February 13, 2001 and that there was
transfer of Mark Jimenez US $1,999,965.00 to Coutts Bank
Account HO 133706 on February 23, 2001 in favor of the
accused, there is no reason why within a reasonable period from
these dates, the complaint should not be resolved. The act of
intimidation was there, the asportation was complete as of
February 23, 2001 why was the information filed only on April 18,
2008. For such a simple charge of Robbery there is nothing more
to consider and all the facts and circumstances upon which to
anchor a resolution whether to give due course to the complaint
or dismiss it are on hand. The case is more than ripe for
resolution. Failure to act on the same is a clear transgression of
the constitutional rights of the accused. A healthy respect for the
constitutional prerogative of the accused should have prodded
the Ombudsman to act within reasonable time.
101

In fine, the Office of the Ombudsman transgressed the

respondents' right to due process as well as their right to the
speedy disposition of their case.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions
for certiorari for their lack of merit.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

the Court of the Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87776

entitled, Capt. Wilfredo G. Roquero v. The Chancellor
of the University of the Philippine-Manila (UP
Manila), et al., a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Civil Procedure with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
which sought to reverse and set aside the Orders dated
8 June 2004[3] and 9 November 2004[4] of the
Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) of UPManila, chaired by Atty. Zaldy B. Docena with Eden
Perdido and Isabella Lara as members.
The undisputed facts of the case as found by the Court
of Appeals are as follows:

ROQUERO V UP MANILA

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 seeking to set aside the Decision[1] dated 22 March
2007, and the Resolution[2] dated 1 February 2008, of

Petitioner Wildredo G. Roquero is an

employee of UP-Manila assigned at the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH)
Security Division as Special Police
Captain. Private respondent Imelda O.
Abutal is a Lady Guard of Ex-Bataan
Security Agency who was applying for a
position in the security force assigned at
UP-PGH.
The instant controversy arose from a
complaint by private respondent Abutal

with then Chancellor of UP-Manila Perla

D. Santos-Ocampo for Grave Misconduct
against petitioner Capt. Roquero. The
formal charge filed on 1 October 1998 and
docketed as ADM Case No. UPM-AC 97007 reads as follows:
After
preliminary
investigation duly conducted
in accordance with the Rules
and Regulations on the
Discipline of UP Faculty and
Employees, a prima facie
case has been found to exist
against you for GRAVE
MISCONDUCT punishable
under the University Rules
and Regulations on the
Discipline of UP Faculty and
Employees in relation to the
Civil Service Law, committed
as follows:
That
you,
Capt.
Wilfredo Roquero of
the UP Manila Police
Force, sometime in
April 1996, while
conducting
an
interview on MS.

IMELDA
ABUTAL
who was then applying
for the position of
Lady Guard of ExBataan
Security
Agency to be assigned
at UP-PGH, proposed
to her that if she
agreed to be your
mistress, you would
facilitate
her
application and give
her
a
permanent
position; that despite
the fact the MS.
ABUTAL
rejected
your proposal, you still
insisted on demanding
said sexual favor from
her;
that
you,
therefore, are liable for
GRAVE
MISCONDUCT under
Section 22, paragraph
(c) of Rule XIV of the
Omnibus
Rules
Implementing Book V
of E.O. 292 on Civil
Rules.

x x x x.
On 1 October 1998, the petitioner was
placed under preventive suspension for
ninety (90) days by Chancellor SantosOcampo, the material portion of said Order
reads:
Considering the gravity of the
offense charged and pursuant
to Section 19 of Rules and
Regulations on the Discipline
of UP Faculty Members and
Employees and Section 26
and 27 Rule XIV of Book V
of Executive Order No. 292
and Omnibus Rules, you are
hereby
preventively
suspended for ninety (90)
days effective upon receipt
hereof.

Thereafter, the Administrative Disciplinary

Tribunal (ADT) composed of Atty. Zaldy
B. Docena, Eden Perdido and Isabella
Lara, was organized to hear the instant
case. Atty. Paul A. Flor, as University
Prosecutor,
represented
the
prosecution. He was later on replaced by
Atty. Asteria Felicen. Petitioner was
represented by Atty. Leo G. Lee of the
Public Attorneys Office (PAO) who was
then replaced by Public Attorney Philger
Inovejas.
The Prosecution presented its only witness,
private respondent Abutal. After the
completion of the cross-examination on
the prosecutions only witness, the
prosecution agreed to submit its Formal
Offer of Evidence on or before 16 July
1999.
xxxx

While
on
preventive
suspension, you are hereby
required to appear before the
Administrative Disciplinary
Tribunal (ADT) whenever
your presence is necessary.

The prosecution, however, failed to submit

its formal offer of evidence within the
period agreed upon.
Thereafter, on 10 August 1999, when the
case was called, only petitioner and his
counsel appeared. Atty. Flor merely called

by telephone and requested Atty. Docena

to reset the case to another date. Atty.
Docena then ordered the resetting of the
hearing on the following dates: 11 August
and 21 August 1999. On 11 August 1999,
only petitioner and his counsel came. No
representative from the prosecution
appeared before the ADT. Atty. Flor again
called and asked for the postponement of
the hearing. By reason thereof, Atty.
Docena issued an Order, which reads as
follows:

On said date, the representative from the

prosecution again failed to appear.

The continuation of the

hearing of this case is hereby
set
to September
29,
1999 at 2:00 p.m., with the
understanding that if and
when the parties fail to
appear at said hearing date,
this case shall be deemed
submitted for resolution
based on the evidences
already obtaining in the
record of the case.

The ADT was not able to act on the said

Motion for almost five (5) years. Due to
the unreasonable delay, petitioner, on 19
May 2004 filed another Motion asking for
the dismissal of the administrative case
against him. The Motion to Dismiss was
anchored on the following reasons: that the
prosecution had not formally offered its
evidence; that the ADT had failed to act on
the motion filed on 22 October 1999; that
the
unfounded
charges
in
the
administrative complaint were filed just to
harass him; and that he is entitled to a just
and speedy disposition of the case.

SO ORDERED.
11 August 1999.

On 22 October 1999, petitioner filed a

Motion through counsel praying that
complainant (private respondent herein)
be declared to have waived her rights to
formally offer her exhibits since
complainant was not able to file her
Formal Offer within the given period of
fifteen (15) days from 1 July 1999 or up
to 16 July 1999.

On 26 May 2004, the prosecution,

represented by Atty. Felicen in view of the

resignation of Atty. Flor in August 1999,

filed its Comment/Opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss.The prosecution alleged
that a Formal Offer of Documentary
Exhibits had been filed on 24 January
2004, of which a copy thereof was
received by Atty. Lee, petitioners counsel,
on 30 January 2004, per registry return
receipt. However, petitioner has not filed
his comment to the said Formal Offer.
Furthermore, the prosecution explained in
its Comment/Opposition that in view of
the resignation of Atty. Flor in August
1999 but who had been on leave by midJuly 1999, the Formal Offer could not be
prepared by another counsel until all the
transcript of stenographic notes have been
furnished to the counsel that replaced Atty.
Flor. Meanwhile, the stenographer, Jamie
Limbaga, had been in and out of the
hospital due to a serious illness, thus the
delay in the filing of the prosecutors
Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits.
On 8 June 2004, Atty. Docena issued the
assailed Order denying petitioners motion
to dismiss, to wit:

Acting
on
respondents
Motion to Dismiss, as well as
the University Prosecutors
Comment and/or Opposition
to said Motion, and finding
that said Motion to Dismiss
to be bereft of merit, the
same is hereby DENIED.
In view of the failure of the
respondent to file his
comment on the Prosecutions
Formal Offer of Evidence,
the Exhibits (A to G-1) of the
Prosecution
are
hereby
ADMITTED for the purpose
for which the same have been
offered.
The respondent is hereby
directed to present his
evidence
on June
22,
2004 at 10:30 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by
petitioner but the same was denied in an
Order dated 9 November 2004.[5]

Petitioner Captain Wilfredo Roquero then filed with

the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87776, alleging
therein that the ADT committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss the
administrative case filed against him.
In a Decision dated 22 March 2007, the Honorable
Court of Appeals denied the petition with prayer for
TRO of Roquero reasoning that the ADT did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed orders.
The Court of Appeals ruled, thus:
The main issue to be resolved is whether
the ADT gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it issued the Order denying
petitioners motion to dismiss the
administrative case filed against him.
We rule in the negative.
Petitioner argues that the administrative
case against him should be dismissed
because of the failure of the prosecution to

file its Formal Offer of Evidence within

the agreed period.
We do not agree.
The appropriate rule in this case is Section
27 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, which provides,
to wit:
When the presentation of
evidence has been concluded,
the parties shall formally
offer their evidence either
orally or in writing and
thereafter objections thereto
may also be made either
orally or in writing. After
which, both parties may be
given time to submit their
respective
memorandum
which in no case shall [be]
beyond five (5) days after the
termination
of
the
investigation. Failure
to
submit the same within the
given period shall be
considered a waiver thereof.

The failure to file a formal offer of

evidence amounts to no more than a
waiver of the right to file the same. In
administrative cases, particularly, where
the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service applies, the
absence of a formal offer of evidence does
not bar the adverse party from presenting
its evidence.
Section 3 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
provides:
Administrative investigations
shall be conducted without
necessarily adhering strictly
to the technical rules of
procedure
and
evidence
applicable
to
judicial
proceedings.
While under the Rules of Court, a
formal offer may be indispensable because
the rules on evidence so require it, the
same is not true in administrative
cases. There is no provision in the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service akin to Section 34, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.

Furthermore, Section 27 of the

Uniform Rules states that the failure to file
a formal offer of evidence amounts to a
mere waiver thereof, and not a dismissal of
the action.As such, petitioner cannot claim
a vested right to a dismissal of his case
below just because a formal offer was not
filed within the agreed period.
In addition thereto, the Uniform
Rules give the hearing officer a leeway
when it provided that x x x the hearing
officer shall accept all evidence deemed
material and relevant to the case. In case of
doubt, he shall allow the admission of
evidence subject to the objection
interposed against its admission.
In the case at bar, records show that
in fact, a formal offer of evidence was
filed by the prosecution, a copy of which
was received by petitioners counsel. The
action of the ADT in admitting the
prosecutions exhibits was consistent with
the above-mentioned Rules. Thus, the
tribunal acted within the bounds of its
authority.

Grave abuse of discretion implies

such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law.
To reiterate, the admission of the
exhibits for the prosecution is in
accordance with Section 3, 27, and 28 of
the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service. In admitting the
exhibits for the prosecution, petitioner was
not denied the opportunity to present his
evidence. In fact, he could have presented
his evidence as early as 11 August
1999 but he did not do so.
WHEREFORE, for utter lack of
merit, the instant petition with prayer for
temporary restraining order is hereby
DENIED.[6]

Roquero moved for reconsideration of the

Decision, but the same was likewise denied by the
Court of Appeals in its Resolution promulgated on 1
February 2008.
Roquero is now before us seeking the reversal
of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The core issue of this case is whether the failure
of the ADT to resolve Roqueros Motion (to declare
complainant Imelda Abutal to have waived her right
to submit her Formal Offer of Exhibit) which he
seasonably filed on 22 October 1999 and the assailed
Order of the ADT dated 8 June 2004 admitting the
Formal Offer of Exhibit of complainant Imelda
Abutal despite having filed after almost five years
violated the constitutional right of Roquero to a
speedy disposition of cases.
We find merit in the petition.
The Court of Appeals faulted petitioner for his
failure to present his own evidence which he could
have done as early as 11 August 1999.[7] It must be
noted, however, that petitioners 22 October
1999 motion to declare complainant to have waived
her right to submit her Formal Offer of Exhibit

remained unresolved. This is reason enough for

Roquero to defer presentation of his own evidence.
Indeed, while Section 27 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in Civil Service states that the
failure to submit the formal offer of evidence
within the given period shall be considered as
waiver thereof, the ADT in fact allowed the
prosecution to present its formal offer almost five (5)
years later or on 24 January 2004. Starting on that
date, petitioner was presented with the choice to either
present his evidence or to, as he did, file a motion to
dismiss owing to the extraordinary length of time that
ADT failed to rule on his motion.
We cannot accept the finding of the Court of Appeals
that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the ADT because a formal offer of evidence was
filed by the prosecution, a copy of which was
received by petitioners counsel.[8] The admission by
ADT on 8 June 2004 of the formal offer of exhibits
belatedly filed did not cure the 5-year delay in the
resolution of petitioners 1999 motion to deem as
waived such formal offer of evidence. Indeed, the
delay of almost five (5) years cannot be justified.

The prosecution tried to explain in its

Comment/Opposition dated 26 May 2004, that the
resignation of Atty. Paul Flor in August 1999, who
had by then already been on leave since mid-July
1999, contributed to the delay of the filing of the
formal offer and that the formal offer could not be
prepared by another counsel until all the transcripts of
stenographic notes had been given to him. Also, it
was pointed out that the stenographer, Jaime Limbaga,
had been in and out of the hospital due to a serious
illness.[9]
The ADT admitted this explanation of the prosecutor
hook, line and sinker without asking why it took him
almost five (5) years to make that explanation. If the
excuses were true, the prosecution could have easily
manifested with the ADT of its predicament right after
Roquero filed his motion to declare the waiver of the
formal offer. It is evident too that the prosecution
failed to explain why it took them so long a time to
find a replacement for the original prosecutor. And,
the stenographer who had been in and out of the
hospital due to serious illness should have been
replaced sooner.

While it is true that administrative investigations

should not be bound by strict adherence to the
technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable
to judicial proceedings,[10] the same however should
not violate the constitutional right of respondents to a
speedy disposition of cases.
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Section 16. All person shall have the
right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.

The constitutional right to a speedy disposition

of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
including civil and administrative cases, and in all
proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to
a case may demand expeditious action by all officials
who are tasked with the administration of justice.[11]
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like
the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only

when the proceedings are attended by vexatious,

capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured;
or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the
balancing test used to determine whether a defendant
has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy
disposition of a case for that matter, in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is
weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay,
the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to
assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice
caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy
disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept.[12]
Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the
determination of whether that right has been violated,
the factors that may be considered and balanced are as
follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the
delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right
by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the
delay.[13]

Applying the doctrinal ruling vis-a-vis the

factual milieu of this case, the violation of the right to
a speedy disposition of the case against petitioner is
clear for the following reasons: (1) the delay of almost
five (5) years on the part of ADT in resolving the
motion of petitioner, which resolution petitioner
reasonably found necessary before he could present
his defense; (2) the unreasonableness of the delay; and
(3) the timely assertions by petitioner of the right to
an early disposition which he did through a motion to
dismiss. Over and above this, the delay was
prejudicial to petitioners cause as he was under
preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, and during
the interregnum of almost five years, the trial of the
accusation against him remained stagnant at the
prosecution stage.
The
Constitutional
guarantee
against
unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was
intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among
the people in the administration of justice by our
judicial
and
quasi-judicial
tribunals.[14] The
adjudication of cases must not only be done in an
orderly manner that is in accord with the established
rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided
to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in

the disposition of cases renders the rights of the

people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various
legislations inutile.[15]
WHEREFORE, the
Petition
is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 22
March 2007 and Resolution dated 1 February 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87776 are
hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The
Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) of the
University of the Philippines-Manila, Atty. Zaldy B.
Docena, Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara, in their
capacities as Chairman and Members of the ADT
respectively, are hereby ORDERED to DISMISSthe
administrative case against Capt. Wilfredo G.
Roquero for violation of his constitutional right to a
speedy disposition of cases.

SO ORDERED.

right," granted by the same provision. The relevant facts are not
disputed.
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the
Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It
having allegedly come to light that he was involved in
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, 1 the PAL management
notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of
February 9, 1986. That investigation was scheduled in accordance
with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines
Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. 2
On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos
gave to his superiors a handwritten notes 3 reading as follows:
2-8-86
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION RIGHTS

People v judge Ayson

NARVASA, J.:
What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by
the respondent Judge of the right of an individual not to "be
compelled to be a witness against himself" accorded by Section
20, Article III of the Constitution, with the right of any
person "under investigation for the commission of an offense . . .
to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such

THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE

THAT HE IS WILLING TO SETTLE
IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS.
HIM IN THE AMT. OF P 76,000 (APPROX.)
SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY BE
IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR BEFORE 1700/9 FEB
86.

(s) Felipe Ramo

(Printed) F. Ram
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL
Branch Manager in Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the
presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk

Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo,

Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team."
Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were
taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter
alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets
mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had
been "misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying
back the money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps
(by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and
proferred a "compromise x x to pay on staggered basis, (and) the
amount would be known in the next investigation;" that he desired
the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and
that he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR
Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his statement (as
he in fact afterwards did). 4 How the investigation turned out is not
dealt with the parties at all; but it would seem that no compromise
agreement was reached much less consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against
Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa allegedly
committed in Baguio City during the period from March 12, 1986
to January 29, 1987. In that place and during that time, according
to the indictment, 5 he (Ramos)
.. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence,
did then and there willfully ... defraud the
Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, ... in the
following manner, to wit: said accused ... having
been entrusted with and received in trust fare
tickets of passengers for one-way trip and roundtrip in the total amount of P76,700.65, with the
express obligation to remit all the proceeds of the
sale, account for it and/or to return those
unsold, ... once in possession thereof and instead
of complying with his obligation, with intent to

defraud, did then and there ... misappropriate,

misapply and convert the value of the tickets in
the sum of P76,700.65 and in spite of repeated
demands, ... failed and refused to make good his
obligation, to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party .. .
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of
"Not Guilty," and trial thereafter ensued. The prosecution of the
case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the direction and
supervision of the Fiscal.
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a
written offer of evidence dated June 21, 1988, 6which included "the
(above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on
February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been
marked as Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten admission x x given
on February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which had been
marked as Exhibit K.
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiff
s Evidence." 7 Particularly as regards the peoples' Exhibit A, the
objection was that "said document, which appears to be a
confession, was taken without the accused being represented by a
lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the same reasons interposed
under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.'
By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge admitted all
the exhibits "as part of the testimony of the witnesses who testified in
connection therewith and for whatever they are worth," except
Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A
"inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that it is the statement of
accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio
City Ticket Office, in an investigation conducted by the Branch
Manager x x since it does not appear that the accused was reminded
of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and

that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with
the assistance actually of a counsel." He also declared inadmissible
"Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J.
Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 x x for the same reason stated in
the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that the accused
was assisted by counsel when he made said admission."

The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. 9 It was

denied, by Order dated September 14, 1988. 10 In justification of said
Order, respondent Judge invoked this Court's rulings in Morales, Jr.
v. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 121 SCRA 538, People v. Galit, 135
SCRA 467, People. v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219, and People v.
Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496, among others, to the effect that "in
custodial investigations the right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel," and the explicit precept in the present Constitution that the
rights in custodial investigation "cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel." He pointed out that the investigation
of Felipe Ramos at the PAL Baguio Station was one "for the offense
of allegedly misappropriating the proceeds of the tickets issued to
him' and therefore clearly fell "within the coverage of the
constitutional provisions;" and the fact that Ramos was not detained
at the time, or the investigation was administrative in character could
not operate to except the case "from the ambit of the constitutional
provision cited."
These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are
now assailed in the petition for certiorari and prohibition at bar,
filed in this Court by the private prosecutors in the name of the
People of the Philippines. By Resolution dated October 26, 1988,
the Court required Judge Ayson and Felipe Ramos to comment
on the petition, and directed issuance of a "TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER . . . ENJOINING the respondents from
proceeding further with the trial and/or hearing of Criminal Case
No. 3488-R (People ... vs. Felipe Ramos), including the issuance
of any order, decision or judgment in the aforesaid case or on any

matter in relation to the same case, now pending before the

Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Br. 6, First Judicial Region."
The Court also subsequently required the Solicitor General to
comment on the petition. The comments of Judge Ayson, Felipe
Ramos, and the Solicitor General have all been filed. The
Solicitor General has made common cause with the petitioner
and prays "that the petition be given due course and thereafter
judgment be rendered setting aside respondent Judge's Orders . .
. and ordering him to admit Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the prosecution."
The Solicitor General has thereby removed whatever impropriety
might have attended the institution of the instant action in the
name of the People of the Philippines by lawyers de parte of the
offended party in the criminal action in question.
The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue
of whether or not it was grave abuse of discretion for
respondent Judge to have excluded the People's Exhibits A and
K. It will now proceed to resolve it.
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, 11 to which respondent Judge has given a construction
that is disputed by the People. The section reads as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained in violation
of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets
of rights, dealt with in the section, namely:

1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the

right of a person not to be compelled to be a
witness against himself set out in the first
sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of
Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and
is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment
of the American Constitution, 12 and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation,
i.e., the rights of every suspect "under
investigation for the commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more
clearly the individuality and disparateness of these rights. It has
placed the rights in separate sections. The right against selfincrimination, "No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. The lights of a person in custodial
interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now
contained in Section 12 of the same Article III. 13
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person
who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of
subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative
proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness
against himself"
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled
meaning. 15 It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating
questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." 16 It simply secures to a
witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refue to answer
any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which

has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right
can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in
character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any
other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a
subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a
subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn
and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is
addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some
offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the
constitutional guaranty.

That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973

Constitution does not impose on the judge, or other officer
presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative
obligation to advise a witness of his right against selfincrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in
accordance with the well known axiom that every one is
presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no
one. Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge
nor the witness can be expected to know in advance the
character or effect of a question to be put to the latter. 17
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or
automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or
in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It
follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by
a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. 18
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a
second right, or better said, group of rights. These rights apply to
persons "under investigation for the commission of an offense,"
i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police authorities; and this
is what makes these rights different from that embodied in the

first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as

aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in
any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under
investigation for an offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. It is
avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Miranda v. Arizona, 19 a decision described as an "earthquake in the
world of law enforcement." 20
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under
investigation for the commission of an offense"-1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right, 21
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him; 22 and

3) any confession obtained in violation of x x

(these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. 23
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural
safeguards laid down for a person in police custody, "in-custody
interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an
adversary proceeding against the suspect. 24
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in
a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to
exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such

opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and

intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of
individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in selfincriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional
rights." 25
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial
interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused
persons." 26 And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial
interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 27 The
situation contemplated has also been more precisely described by
this Court." 28
.. . After a person is arrested and his custodial
investigation begins a confrontation arises which
at best may be tanned unequal. The detainee is
brought to an army camp or police headquarters
and there questioned and "cross-examined" not
only by one but as many investigators as may be
necessary to break down his morale. He finds
himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings,
and every person he meets he considers hostile
to him. The investigators are well-trained and
seasoned in their work. They employ all the
methods and means that experience and study
have taught them to extract the truth, or what may
pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are
unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional

rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and

coercive presence of the officers of the law in
such an atmosphere overwhelms them into
silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks to
remedy this imbalance.
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in
some crime is within the scope of the constitutional protection. If
not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation
for the commission of an offense," the statement is not protected.
Thus, in one case, 29 where a person went to a police precinct and
before any sort of investigation could be initiated, declared that he
was giving himself up for the killing of an old woman because she
was threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this Court ruled
that such a statement was admissible, compliance with the
constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation not being exigible
under the circumstances.
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
As Regards Giving of Testimony
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just
discussed, i.e., (1) that against self-incrimination and (2) those
during custodial interrogation apply to persons under preliminary
investigation or already charged in court for a crime.
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under
preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation. His
interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already
have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in
court (or the public prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a
defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the
public prosecutor's office), there is no occasion to speak of his
right while under "custodial interrogation" laid down by the second

and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973

Constitution, for the obvious reason that he is no longer under
"custodial interrogation."
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing
preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor), in
common with all other persons, possesses the right against selfincrimination set out in the first sentence of Section 20 Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to answer a
specific incriminatory question at the time that it is put to him. 30
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other
rights in the matter of giving testimony or refusing to do so. An
accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary
witness." Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions
the defendant is entitled among others1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, 31 and 2) to
testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a
witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however,
his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner
prejudice or be used against him. 32
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from
being a witness against himself' signifies that he cannot be
compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in
which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be
compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order
of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the
prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself. 33 In other
words unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who
may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to
refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is
put to him-the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify
altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn,
answer any question. 34 And, as the law categorically states, "his

neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice

or be used against him." 35

If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do

so. This is his right. But if he does testify, then he "may be crossexamined as any other witness." He may be cross-examined as
to any matters stated in his direct examination, or connected
therewith . 36 He may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any
question on the ground that the answer that he will give, or the
evidence he will produce, would have a tendency to incriminate him
for the crime with which he is charged.
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal
action be asked a question which might incriminate him, not for
the crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime,
distinct from that of which he is accused, he may decline to
answer that specific question, on the strength of the right against
self-incrimination granted by the first sentence of Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution). Thus, assuming that in a prosecution for murder,
the accused should testify in his behalf, he may not on crossexamination refuse to answer any question on the ground that he
might be implicated in that crime of murder; but he may decline to
answer any particular question which might implicate him for a
different and distinct offense, say, estafa.
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and
subsequently charged with its commission in court, has the
following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing
evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or
with the public prosecutor, for preliminary
investigation), but after having been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in

some significant way, and on being interrogated

by the police: the continuing right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to
be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation
or any other means which vitiates the free will;
and to have evidence obtained in violation of
these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT 37
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice
whatsoever result to him by such
refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf,
subject to cross-examination by
the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse
to answer a specific question
which tends to incriminate him for
some crime other than that for
which he is then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge
has misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights
set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has
taken them as applying to the same juridical situation, equating
one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred. To be sure,
His Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took
to be cogent and logical. The thesis was however so far divorced
from the actual and correct state of the constitutional and legal
principles involved as to make application of said thesis to the

case before him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or

capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus rendered with
grave abuse of discretion. They should be as they are hereby,
annulled and set aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe
Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the
term should be properly understood, prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket
sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The
constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation
under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not
therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is
also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions
posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation,
February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be
recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the
trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as
Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as
Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the
day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in
the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act
on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the socalled "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger
x x (of) the violation of the right of any person against selfincrimination when the investigation is conducted by the
complaining parties, complaining companies, or complaining
employers because being interested parties, unlike the police
agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary interest to protect,
they may in their over-eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on
their hapless suspects, whether employees or not, to give
statements under an atmosphere of moral coercion, undue
ascendancy and undue influence." It suffices to draw attention to

the specific and peremptory requirement of the law that

disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on any employee by
his employer until and unless the employee has been accorded
due process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed
of the offenses ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and
opportunity to explain his side. The requirement entails the
making of statements, oral or written, by the employee under
such administrative investigation in his defense, with opportunity
to solicit the assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and friends.
The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at
the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do
so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be
absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative
investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought against
him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and
presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel
and to be informed thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant
only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the
employee's statements, whether called "position paper," "answer,"
etc., are submitted by him precisely so that they may be admitted
and duly considered by the investigating officer or committee, in
negation or mitigation of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain
instances the judge's expressed apprehensions may be realized,
that violence or intimidation, undue pressure or influence be
brought to bear on an employee under investigation or for that
matter, on a person being interrogated by another whom he has
supposedly offended. In such an event, any admission or
confession wrung from the person under interrogation would be
inadmissible in evidence, on proof of the vice or defect vitiating
consent, not because of a violation of Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, but simply on the general, incontestable
proposition that involuntary or coerced statements may not in

justice be received against the makers thereof, and really should

not be accorded any evidentiary value at all.

was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the Sandiganbayan

of malversation of public funds. He appealed to this Court.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and

setting aside the Orders of the respondent Judge in Criminal
Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9, 1988 and September 14,
1988, and he is hereby ordered to admit in evidence Exhibits "A"
and "K" of the prosecution in said Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and
thereafter proceed with the trial and adjudgment thereof. The
temporary restraining order of October 26, 1988 having become
functus officio, is now declared of no further force and effect.

The case was initiated by Special Prosecution Officer Mothalib C.

Onos who, on 29 March 1989, filed with the Sandiganbayan an
information charging petitioner with having committed the
following offense:

Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

That on or about April 30, 1985 and/or sometime

prior thereto, in General Santos city, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Luciano Kimpo, a public officer, being the Special
Collecting Officer, Bureau of Domestic Trade,
General Santos City, and as such is an
accountable officer responsible for the funds
collected by him by reason of the duties of his
office, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence,
appropriate, embezzle and convert to his personal
use and benefit the sum of Fifteen Thousand
Three Hundred Nine Pesos (P15,309.00), which
amount constitutes his collection, to the damage
and prejudice of the Government in the aforesaid
amount.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel, 1 pleaded, "not
guilty."

Kimpo v Sandigan
Petitioner Luciano Kimpo y Nianuevo, a Special Collecting
Officer of the Bureau of Domestic Trade at General Santos City,

At the pre-trial inquest conducted by the Sandiganbayan, the

following exhibits were admitted:
1. Exhibits A and A-1, as well as the fact that they
are faithful reproductions of the originals. In

connection therewith, the accused admitted that

he was on or before April 30, 1985, Special
Collecting Officer, Bureau of Trade, General
Santos City;
2. That an audit-examination of the cash and
accounts of the accused was conducted on April
30, 1985; that the corresponding Report of
Examination (Exhibit B), Statement of
Accountability for Accountable Forms without
Money Value (Exhibit B-1), and Reconciliation
Statement of Accountability (Exhibit B-3) were
made and signed, and that the signatures
appearing on the dorsal side of Exhibits B and B-1
are those of the accused, all these admissions
being subject to the qualification that the accused
is questioning the validity of the audit examination
and the accuracy of the results thereof on
constitutional grounds;
3. The existence of Exhibits C, E, F, M and M-1,
including the fact that they are faithful copies of
the originals, subject to the same qualification
made with respect to Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2;
4. The existence of Exhibits D and D-1, including
the fact that they are correct copies of the
originals, but not their relevance;
5. Exhibit H as the Official Cash Book of the
accused and his signatures appearing between
the entries therein beginning August 1, 1984 and
up to April 31, 1985, with the qualification that the
said entries were not made by him;

6. The existence of Exhibits I, I-1 to I- 40, J, J-1 to

J-95, K,
K-1 to K-26, and L, L-1 to L-44 (carbon copies of
official receipts) and his signatures thereon,
subject to the qualification that the entries therein
were not made by him;
7. Exhibit N, subject to the qualification that the
data mentioned therein were based on the results
of the audit examination, the validity and accuracy
of which are questioned;
8. Exhibits A 1-1, N 2-2, T 2-1, L 3-1, F 4-2, A 5, L 7, N 7-1,
U 7-2, B 8-1, C 8, D 8, E 8, G 8, G 8, H 8, M 8-2, Y8-2 AND
Y 8-2 AND Y 8-3 (xerox copies of official receipts),
including the fact that they are faithful reproductions
of the originals;
9. Exhibits J 8 to O 8, as well as the signatures
appearing on the last page of each exhibit and the
fact that they are true copies of the originals.
The testimonial evidence consisted of the testimonies of Lydia
Mendoza, State Audit Examiner of the Commission on Audit, for
the prosecution, and of Milda de la Pea, Trade and Industry
Analyst of the Department of Trade and Industry at its South
Cotabato Provincial Office, as well as that of petitioner Kimpo
himself, for the defense.
From all the evidence adduced, the Sandiganbayan concluded,
thus:
Accused herein having admitted his public
position as alleged in the information and the
existence of a shortage of P15,309.00 upon audit

examination of his accountabilities, then what

remains to be resolved only is whether any
criminal liability is attributable to him by reason of
such shortage. As can be deduced from the
defense evidence, testimonial and documentary,
accused lays the blame for the shortage on one
Yvette Samaranos, whom he admitted to have
been retained by him as his unofficial
clerk/collector in his office and who attended to
the receipt of payments for the registration of
business names and issuance of certifications
and official receipts for such payments, including
penalties, and fees for repair shop
establishments. While the certifications and official
receipts were pre-signed by him, the collections
thereunder were made by Samaranos, who also
entered the amounts collected by her in accused's
cashbook.
The amounts collected between the period from
July 17, 1984 to April 30, 1985 totalled
P100,486.50, from which should be deducted total
remittances of P85,177.50, leaving a balance of
P16,221.50. An Inventory of Cash and/or allowed
Cash Items produced P912.50, leaving a shortage
of P15,309.00 which was determined by Auditor
Lydia R. Mendoza as the difference between the
amounts appearing in the originals of the Official
Receipts/Letter of Confirmation and the duplicate
Official Receipts. In other words, what were
collected and reflected in the duplicate ORs were
not the correct amounts appearing in the original
ORs issued to the payees and which were verified
and confirmed later by the payees.

Auditor Mendoza supported her findings of a

shortage and the reasons for such shortage thru a
formal "Comparison of Duplicate Official Receipts
of P2.00 per Report of Collections with the
Confirmation Letter and/or Original Official
Receipts" for the period from July 17, 1984 to April
30, 1985. Therein, it clearly appeared that while
the amounts to be officially collected should be
P110.00 or P112.00, the amounts reported to
have been collected and which were reflected in
the duplicate ORs were only P2.00. The
unreported and unrecorded collections of P108.00
or P110.00 from individual payees were reflected
in the original ORs which were confirmed by said
payees through confirmation letters and which
totalled P15,309.00.
After the cash count made by Auditor Mendoza as
a prelude to her Report of Examination and
subsequent verification/confirmation, she sent a
letter of demand to the accused on October 14,
1985, which the accused received on the same
date. Therein, he was required to produce
immediately the balance of P3,418.50, due to the
fact that he had made deposits amounting to
P11,890.50, "after cash count and confirmed by
us (Please see Scheduled 2)." On October 17,
1985, accused submitted his letter-explanation to
Auditor Mendoza wherein he laid the blame for
the shortage on his office clerk whom he had
already relieved and alleged that he had not
benefited, directly or indirectly, from the missing
funds. On October 18, 1985 and November 7,
1985, accused "restituted and deposited with the
Bureau of Treasury thru PNB, GSC" the amounts

of P2,933.50 and P485.00, respectively, which, if

added to his previous deposits from June 2, 1985
to August 23, 1985 amounting to P11,890.50,
would total P15,309.50.
There being no dispute, therefore, as to the
existence of the shortage in the accounts of the
accused, as found by Auditor Mendoza as of April
30, 1985, amounting to P15,309.00 and the fact of
accused's settlement for such shortage through
installments deposited with the PNB, General
Santos City between June 2, 1985 to November
7, 1985, then it behooves the Court to determine if
accused herein had rendered himself liable or not
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code by
reason of such shortage. Such determination
must perforce go into the merits of his claim that
the responsibility for such shortage should be laid
on the doorstep of Yvette Samaranos, a private
individual, whom he inherited from his
predecessor who had allowed her to work in the
office as clerk-collector and whom he retained for
the following reasons: (1) the Office of the Bureau
of Domestic Trade at General Santos City, of
which he was the Provincial Trade Development
Officer, was a one-man operation, hence,
understaffed; (2) he had to go out to the field to
campaign for increased registration of business
names, hold symposiums of consumers' groups,
conduct meetings for retailers and consumers and
repair shop establishments; (3) he occasionally
goes out to attend raffles conducted by private
establishments as representative of the Bureau of
Domestic Trade; and (4) he had to leave someone
in the office to attend to the general public in the

registration and/or renewal of business names

and the issuance of certifications and official
receipts for the collection of the proper fees. For
the reason that he was out in the field for days at
times, he pre-signed official receipts in blank, as
well as certifications, which he entrusted to
Samaranos who then fills up the said receipts and
certifications and makes the corresponding
entries in his cashbook. As it turned out, however,
Samaranos collected the proper official fees,
issued the original receipts with the proper
amounts, filled up the duplicates thereof with
reduced amounts, made the corresponding
entries in the cashbook based on the amounts
reflected in the duplicates and made the proper
remittances based on the improper entries.
Accused's defense cannot be accepted, nor can it
absolve him from criminal liability for the missing
public funds which the audit examination on his
accountabilities as of April 30, 1985 had revealed.
As Special Disbursing Officer, he was the primary
accountable officer for such funds and the fact,
which was not definitely or conclusively
established by his evidence, that another person,
albeit a private individual, was responsible for the
misappropriation thereof, cannot be considered in
exculpation or justification of such primary
accountability.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, accused herein cannot blame
anyone else for the predicament that he found
himself in. First of all, he should not have allowed

Yvette Samaranos, who did not possess any

appointment, to perform official acts which he was
ordained to do. Secondly, since the collection of
official fees was a sensitive area, he should have
refrained from pre-signing official receipts and
certifications. Thirdly, if he were that desirous of
rendering conscientious public service, he should
have ensured that the collection of official fees
was properly made, recorded and remitted.
Fourthly, his admission that he had to pay the
salaries of Samaranos through honoraria received
by him from raffles is fatal to his cause since he
should have realized that, under such
circumstance, Samaranos would be subject to the
most severe temptation to fool around with the
agency's collections. Apparently, accused was
more interested in conducting field trips and
raffles whereby he would be able to collect per
diems, travelling allowances and honoraria from
private firms. To allow public accountable officers
to adopt the practice resorted to by the accused in
allowing private individuals to perform public
functions would lead to chaos and anarchy and
would render nugatory all applicable norms of
public trust and accountability. His bare and
unsupported claim that, after discovery of the
shortage upon audit examination, he took steps to
charge Yvette Samaranos for Estafa Thru
Falsification of Public Documents does not, in any
way, erase his criminal liability which could be
characterized as malversation of Public Funds
through negligence. In his case, such negligence
may be described as gross and inexcusable,
amounting to a definite laxity resulting in the
deliberate non-performance of his duties.

On the basis of the above findings, judgment was rendered by the

Sandiganbayan convicting petitioner Kimpo and sentencing him,
accordingly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
finding accused Luciano Kimpo y Nianuevo
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of Malversation of Public Funds, as defined and
penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, and favorably appreciating
the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and full restitution, after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from SEVEN (7) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the minimum, to
ELEVEN (11) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS and
TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS, likewise of prision
mayor as the maximum; to further suffer perpetual
special disqualification; to pay a fine of
P15,309.00 equal to the amount malversed and to
pay the costs of this action. No civil liability is
awarded in view of the full restitution of the
amount involved.
SO ORDERED.
In this appeal, petitioner submitted the following assignment of
errors: That
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN LAW
WHEN IT CONSIDERED EXHIBITS B TO B-3
AGAINST THE ACCUSED OVER ACCUSED'S

OBJECTIONS ANCHORED ON ARTICLE III,

SECTIONS 12 & 17 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN LAW
WHEN IT CONSIDERED OVER
PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS ALLEGED
CONFIRMATION LETTERS NOT SIGNED OR
NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED, AS EVIDENCE
TO PROVE ALLEGED SHORTAGE.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN LAW
WHEN IT RULED THAT ACCUSED IS
PRESUMED TO HAVE MALVERSED P15,309.00
BECAUSE HE FAILED TO HAVE THE AMOUNT
FORTHCOMING UPON DEMAND.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN LAW IN
HOLDING ACCUSED LIABLE FOR
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THROUGH
NEGLIGENCE.
The appeal has no merit.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for having considered
Exhibits "B" to "B-3," inclusive, despite what he claims to be an
impairment of his constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12
paragraphs (1) and (3), and Section 17, 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
We cannot agree. The questioned exhibits pertain to the Report of

Examination, the Statement of Accountability for Accountable Forms

without Money Value, and a Reconciliation Statement of
Accountability, which are official forms prepared and accomplished in
the normal course of audit regularly conducted by the Commission
on Audit. Petitioner, not being at the time under investigation for the
commission of a criminal offense, let alone under custodial
investigation, clearly cannot be said to have been deprived of the
constitutional prerogatives he invokes (Villaroza vs. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 79636, 17 December 1987; People vs. Olivares, 186 SCRA
536).

On the so-called confirmatory letters, respondent court concluded

thus
III. The Letters of Confirmation (Exhibits Z to II, JJ
to SS, TT to GGG, HHH to WWW, XXX to ZZZZ,
AAAA to JJJJJ, KKKKK to KKKKKKK to JJJJJJJJ
and JJJJJJJJ) were not the primary evidence
presented by the prosecution to prove the
manipulations and irregularities in question but
the originalsand duplicates of the Official Receipts
(Exhibits L to I-40, J to J-95, K to K-26 and L to L44), all of which were admittedly signed by the
accused, wherein it could clearly be seen that
payments for P110.00 were reflected as P2.00
only. Thus, the Letters of Confirmation are only
secondary evidence to support and prove the
principal facts in issue. Accused had not,
REPEAT, had not, denied that the abovementioned official receipts, originals and
duplicates, are genuine and correctly reflect the
amounts which appear to be listed therein.
Hardly can the above findings be validly challenged. Indeed,
considering all the evidence on record, there is not much that the

questioned letters could have lent to augment the case for the
prosecution.
Petitioner has been charged with having violated Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code, which, in full, reads:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property.
Presumption of malversation. Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same, or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, or through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any
other person to take such public funds or property,
wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved in the misappropriation or malversation
does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
and medium periods, if the amount involved is
more than two hundred pesos but does not
exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, if the amount involved is more than six
thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand
pesos.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium

and maximum periods, if the amount involved is
more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than
twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount
exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall
also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of
the funds malversed or equal to the total value of
the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with
which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence
that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use.
The validity and constitutionality of the presumption of evidence
provided in the above Article, which petitioner questions, has long
been settled affirmatively in a number of cases heretofore
decided by this Court; 3 that point need not again be belabored.
Even while an information charges willful malversation, conviction
for malversation through negligence may, nevertheless, be
adjudged as the evidence so yields. Malversation, unlike other
felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is
consummated, and the same penalty is imposed, regardless of
whether the mode of commission is with intent or due to
negligence. 4

Petitioner argues that the restitution made by him of the full

amount should exonerate him from criminal liability. The
argument not only is an inappropriate defense in criminal cases
but it also even at times tightens a finding of guilt. In malversation
of public funds, payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of
funds misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does
not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender which, at most,
can merely affect the accused's civil liability thereunder 5 and be
considered a mitigating circumstance being analogous to voluntary
surrender. 6
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, and the appealed
decision of respondent Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMEDin toto.

and Leo to an indeterminate penalty within the range of reclusion

temporal and ordering them to pay solidarily damages of P32,000
to each set of heirs of the three victims, Bernarda Salvador, Lito
Siao and Jose Magdaraog. (Crim. Case No. 927.) Leo did not
appeal.
In the morning of January 23, 1980, Andrea Magdaraog-Siao and
her nephew, Luis Magdaraog, who were residing in the barrio
proper of Agban, Baras, Catanduanes, went to her hut located in
Sitio Banog, a mountainous portion of Agban. They wanted to find
out what happened to her mother, Bernardo da Salvador
Magdaraog, 79, and her two grandchildren who were staying with
the old woman. The horrible and gory sight, which greeted them,
beggars description (Exh. F):

SO ORDERED.
Sprawled on the floor of the humble abode, four by two and a half
meters, were the dead bodies of Bernarda, Andrea's son Lito
Siao, 13, and Luis' brother Jose, 15, bathed in their own blood
(Exh. B).
Bernarda had six stab wounds in the chest, two stab wounds in
the abdomen (one gaping), a hack wound in the forehead,
fractures on the left temple, mandible and ribs and a hack wound
in the lower left leg, severing the bone with only a thread of skin
remaining, or fourteen wounds in all (Exh. A).

People v Tawat
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Catanduanes, finding Felicito Tawat and Leo Tawat
guilty of robbery with triple homicide, sentencing Felicito to death

Lito had eight stab, gaping wounds in the chest, which penetrated
his lungs, six stab wounds in the neck, cutting the carotid arteries,
and a hack wound in the head, fracturing the skull, fifteen wounds
in all (Exh. A-1 and A-3, p. 202, Record).
Jose Magdaraog had three stab wounds in the chest which
injured his lungs, a hack wound in the occipital region, fracturing
the bone, and a stab wound which penetrated his heart, five
serious wounds in all (Exh. A-2).

Bernarda was prostrate on the floor with her teeth showing. Her
waist was slashed. She was naked from the waist down. The
cloth-belt, where she kept her money, was missing. Also missing
were a pig, four chickens, a mosquito net, three kettles, one frying
pan and plates and spoons, all valued at P705.
The door of the hut wits destroyed. The belongings were
scattered on the floor. There was a black underwear with garter
belt marked "Armin" and "No. 7" (Exh. D) which was later proven
to have been worn by accused Felicito Tawat.
Who were the perpetrators of the dastardly misdeeds? They were
Felicito Tawat, 23, and his first cousin, Leo Tawat, 16. At about
three o'clock in the afternoon of the following day January 23,
1980, they unexpectedly arrived at the hut of Floro Ogalesco,
'"15, an abaca and rattan stripper, in the remote and isolated
forest of Sitio Capipian, Barrio Paraiso, San Miguel,
Catanduanes,
Felicito, in the presence of Leo, confessed to Ogalesco that they
were taking refuge in his secluded hut because the night
before they had killed at Sitio Banog, Barrio Agban, Baras an old
woman and two boys, one of whom was Andrea Siao's son.
Felicito recounted that they were drunk. As they passed Siao's
hut, a dog barked. Felicito killed the dog. This provoked an old
woman to shout at Felicito. He stabbed and killed her. The two
boys shouted also. Felicito killed one while Leo killed the other.
They took the dead dog, chickens, pork and other belongings in
the hut and proceeded to the house of Julio Tawat, father of Leo,
in Barrio Agban, and from there they repaired to Capipian. that
was the story narrated in court by Ogalesco, linking Felicito and
Leo to the robbery with triple homicide committed on the evening
of January 22, 1980.

The accused's confession to Ogalesco is in part corroborated by

the sworn statement of Alejo Tawat, father of Felicito. Alejo
declared that at about eight o'clock in the morning of January 23,
1980 he and his brother, Julio (father of Leo), went to their abaca
plantation in Sitio Calabiga. He found Felicito and Leo cooking
chickens in a kettle. He saw a mosquito net in the hut. A pig had
been killed and was about to be cooked. (Nos. 11 and 12, Exh.
C.)
After Felicito and Leo had finished eating, Alejo and Julio
accompanied their sons to the forest of Capipian. Alejo and Julio
left them there and returned to Barrio J. M. Alberto, Baras.
From his neighbors, Alejo learned that the mother-in-law of Jovito
Siao, his son Lito and his wife's nephew Jose were killed and that
the pig, blanket, mosquito net, kettle and chickens of Jovito Siao
were stolen (Nos. 15-17 and 22-23, Exh. C).
Any doubt as to the connection of Felicito with the robbery with
triple homicide was removed by the finding at the scene of the
crime of black shorts with belt (Exh. D). Luis Magdaraog testified
that the shorts were worn by Felicito in the morning of January
22, 1980 (the crime was committed at night) when he gave
cigarettes to Felicito and Leo (4 tsn October 8, 1981). Leo in his
sworn statement confirmed that the shorts belonged to Felicito
(No. 32, Exh. G).
Felicito relied on an alibi. He testified that he was in Mercedes,
Camarines Norte from 1963 to October 1980. This claim is
manifestly false because he was only seven years old in 1963.
He finished the sixth grade at Barrio Agban, Baras in 1972 (Exh.
I, p. 211, Rollo). His father saw him on January 22, 1980 at Barrio
J.M. Alberto, Baras (No. 5, Exh. C; p. 46, Record; 26 tsn Oct. 6,
1982).

The trial court concluded that although there was no eyewitness

testimony to the perpetration of the crime, nevertheless, the
totality of the circumstantial evidence is so overwhelming as to
prove Felicito's guilt to a moral certainty.
Felicito was not immediately arrested. He, with Nestor Rojo and
Jimmy Tarraya, committed another robbery with homicide and
frustrated homicide on November 30, 1980 at Barrio Bugao,
Bagamanoc, Catanduanes. Felicito stabbed to death with a
dagger Jovita Lim, a storekeeper, while a companion got the loot
of P110.
He was convicted and sentenced to death. This court affirmed the
judgment of conviction but commuted the death penalty
to reclusion perpetua (People vs. Tawat, G.R. No. 62547,
December 21, 1983).
In connection with that case, Felicito executed a confession on
January 9, 1981 before the chief of police of Bagamanoc,
Catanduanes. Incidentally, he stated therein that he wanted to get
out of Catanduanes because he was wanted by the police for the
killing of three persons in Barrio Agban, Baras. he had hidden
himself in the hut of Ogalesco in Capipian, San Miguel. (Nos. 13
and 18, Exh. H-6, p. 163, Record.)
Counsel de oficio contends that the trial court erred in relying on
that admission of Felicito in his confession which he later
repudiated. He argues that the confession during custodial
interrogation cannot be admissible in evidence, as held
in Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, G. R. No. 61016, April 26, 1983, 121
SCRA 538.
That admission was only alluded to in passing by the trial court. It
was not the basis for Felicito's conviction in this case. His guilt
was predicated on his confession to Ogalesco which was not

taken during custodial interrogation. Ogalesco was not a peace

officer.
While still a teenager, Felicito, who, as already stated, finished
the elementary course in 1972, embarked on a criminal career. In
1975, he was charged in the Baras municipal court with theft of
two cocks, alimbuyogon andbalawon (Exh. J). He pleaded guilty.
He was sentenced to 15 days' imprisonment (Exh. J-2).
He was suspected of being implicated in a case of murder and
frustrated murder committed in December, 1979 in Tigaon,
Camarines Sur (Exh. K and HH).
As already noted, for another robo con homicidio committed on
November 30, 1980 (subsequent to the instant case), he was
convicted and the judgment was affirmed in People vs.
Tawat, G.R. No. 62547, December 21, 1983,supra, where the
death penalty was commuted to reclusion perpetua.
The crime in this case may be mitigated by drunkenness but it
was aggravated by dwelling, abuse of superiority,despoblado and
disregard of sex and old age in the case of the 79-year-old
woman victim. The second and third homicides may be also
regarded as an additional aggravating circumstance (People vs.
Pedroso, L-32997, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 599, 609).
We agree with the learned trial judge that the guilt of the accused
was established beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of
Ogalesco on Felicito's oral confession is competent evidence.
"The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt
of the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him"
(Sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court). What Felicito told Ogalesco
may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae.

The rule is that "any person, otherwise competent as a witness,

who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the
substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it.
An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such
case it must be given in its substance." (23 C.J.S. 196.)
"Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be
made by the testimony of a person who testifies that he was
present, heard, understood, and remembers the substance
of the conversation or statement made by the accused."
(Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th. Ed., Niblack, sec. 278, p.
551.)
In U.S. vs. Corrales, 28 Phil. 362, a malversation case, Jose
Corrales, clerk of the Court of First Instance, received on June 6,
1913 P321.88 from a man named Melliza as payment of the fine
and costs imposed on Melizza. Corrales did not issue any receipt
but merely gave Melliza a copy of the judgment of conviction with
a note at the bottom: "Multas y costas pagadas".
A week later, or on June 13, the auditor examined Corrales'
accounts. The sum paid by Melliza was not turned over to him.
On June 14, an information for misappropriation was filed against
Corrales. In the afternoon of that day, Corrales went to the
auditor's house and confessed to him that he placed that amount
of P321.88 in the office safe only in the afternoon of June 13 after
the auditor's examination.
On the witness stand, the accused claimed that the amount .had
always been in the drawer for personal funds in his office safe.
This testimony was contradicted by the auditor who testified on
Corrales' confession that he placed the amount only in the
afternoon of June 13. Corrales' counsel assailed the admissibility
of the auditor's testimony.

It was held that the auditor's testimony was admissible and

properly taken into consideration by the trial. court.
Judge Graciano P. Gayapa. Jr. acted corrective in imposing the
death penalty. In the annals of criminal law, no one deserved the
death penalty more than Felicito Tawat. Society must protect itself
against a dangerous criminal like him "by taking his life in
retribution for his offense and as an example and warning to
others". "In these days of rampant criminality, it should have a
salutary effect upon the criminally minded to know that the courts
do not shirk their disagreeable duty to impose the death penalty
in cases where the law so requires" (People vs. Carillo and
Raquenio, 85 Phil. 611; 635).
Justice Montemayor says: "We have no quarrel with the trial
judge or with anyone else, layman or jurist as to the wisdom or
folly of the death penalty Today, there are quite a number of
people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either
morally wrong or unwise or ineffective.
"However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books,
and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in
certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply
the law regardless of their private opinions" (People vs. Limaco,
88 Phil. 35,43).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the slight
modification that Felicito Tawat is also ordered to pay the heirs of
Bernarda Magdaraog the value of the articles taken in the sum of
P705. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The accused, Tampus, 27, and Avila, 28, prisoners in the same
penal institution, who were tubercular patients in the hospital,
followed Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed
weapons, assaulted him. Tampus inflicted eight incised wounds
on Saminado while Avila stabbed him nine times. Saminado died
upon arrival at eleven o'clock on that same morning in the prison
hospital.

People v Tampus

After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a

prison guard with their knives (Exh. B and D). They told the
guard: "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami."

AQUINO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch 36, convicting Jose Tampus of
murder, sentencing him to death and ordering him to pay the
heirs of the victim Celso Saminado, an indemnity of twelve
thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. 18510).
In the same decision, Rodolfo Avila, the co-accused of Tampus,
was convicted of the same offense and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of fourteen years and eight months of reclusion
temporal as minimum to twenty years of reclusion temporal as
maximum and to pay the same indemnity. Avila did not appeal.
(He was sentenced to death, together with Frankisio Aro and
Pedro Lasala, in another case. Criminal Case No. 1187. The
death sentence is under review in L-38141).
The evidence shows that at around ten o'clock in the morning of
January 14, 1976, Celso Saminado, 37, a prisoner in the national
penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal and a patient in the emergency
ward of the prison hospital, went to the toilet to answer a call of
nature and to fetch water.

The motive of the killing was revenge. Tampus and Avila, both
members of the Oxo gang, avenged the stabbing of Eduardo
Rosales in December, 1975 by a member of the Batang
Mindanao gang, a group hostile to the Oxo gang. Saminado was
a member of the Batang Mindanao gang. Rosales was a member
of the Oxo gang.
The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his
written report submitted on the same day when the tragic
occurrence transpired, he stated that, according to his on-thespot investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was
armed in the comfort room and his back was turned to Avila, while
Tampus stabbed the victim on the chest and neck (Exh. J dated
January 14, 1976).
Two days after the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard
investigated Tampus and Avila and obtained their extrajudicial
confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted Saminado
(Exh. A and C).
There is no question that the guilt of Tampus was established
beyond reasonable doubt. He and Avila, with the assistance of
counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty to the charge of murder

aggravated by treachery, evident premeditation and quasi

recidivist
At the arraigmment or after they had pleaded guilty, the trial court
called their attention to the gravity of the charge and informed
them that the death penalty might be imposed upon them. They
reiterated their plea of guilty. The trial court required the fiscal to
present the prosecution's evidence. Tampus and Avila took the
witness stand, affirmed their confessions and testified as to the
manner in which they repeatedly wounded Saminado.
In this review of the death sentence, the counsel de
oficio, assigned to present the side of defendant Tampus,
contends that he was denied his right to a public trial because the
arraignment and hearing were held at the state penitentiary.
The New Bilibid Prison was the venue of the arraignment and
hearing, and not the trial court's session hall at Makati, Rizal
because this Court in its resolution of July 20, 1976 in L-38141,
where Rodolfo Avila was one of the accused-appellants, refused,
for ty reasons, to allow him to be brought to Makati. So, this Court
directed that the arraignment and trial in the instant case, where
Avila was a co-accused of Tampus, be held at the national
penitentiary in Muntinlupa.
The record does not show that the public was actually excluded
from the place where the trial was held or that the accused was
prejudiced by the holding of the trial in the national penitentiary.
There is a ruling that the fact that for the convenience of the
witnesses a case is tried in Bilibid Prison without any objection on
the part of the accused is not a ground for reversal of the
judgment of conviction (U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304).

The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown
in the rule that the trial court may motu propioexclude the public
from the courtroom when the evidence to be offered is offensive
to decency or public morals. The court may also, upon request of
the defendant, exclude from the trial every person except the
officers of the court and the attorneys for the prosecution and
defense. (Sec. 14, Rule 119, Rules of Court. See 21 Am Jur 2d
305, sec. 270).
The other contention of counsel de oficio is that the confession of
Tampus was taken in violation of Article IV of the Con constitution
which provides:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a
witness at himself. Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain anent and to court and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other m which vitiates the free
will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
As the confession in this case was obtained after the Constitution
took effect, section 20 applies thereto (People vs. Dumdum, L35279, July 30, 1979).
There is no doubt that the confession was voluntarily made. The
investigator in taking it endeavored, according to his
understanding, to comply with section 20, as shown in the
following parts of the confession.
Ang may salaysay matapos maipabatid sa kanya
ang kanyang mga karapatan tungkol sa
pagbibigay ng malayang salaysay sa ngayon sa

ipinag-uutos ng panibagong Saligang Batas ay

kusang loob na nagsasabi ng mga sumusunod
bilang sagot sa mga tanong ng tagasiyasat:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Katulad sa mga bagay-bagay na ipinaliwanag
ko saiyo kanina ay uulitin ko sa iyo na ikaw ay
aking tinawagan dito sa aming tanggapan dahil sa
ibig kitang maimbistiga tungkol sa pagkakapatay
sa isang bilanggo rin na nagngangalan ng Celso
Saminado noong petsa 14 ng buwan ding ito
ngunit bago tayo magpatuloy ay uulitin ko rin
saiyo na sa imbistigasyon naito, ikaw ay hindi ko
maaaring pilitin, takutin o gamitan ng puwersa
para makapagbigay ng salaysay o statement.
Na sa imbistigasyon naito ikaw ay may karapatan
na magkaruon ng isang abogado na
magtatanggol saiyo.
Na ikaw ay may karapatan na manahimik o
tumanggi na paimbistiga.
Ngayon at maulit ko saiyo ang mga karapatan
mong ito, ikaw bay magpapatuloy pa sa
pagbibigay ng salaysay bilang sagot sa alin mang
itatanong ko saiyo Sagot Opo, sir. (Exh. A).
However, counsel de oficio points out that before the confession
was taken by investigator Buenaventura de la Cuesta on January
16, 1976, Tampus was interrogated two days before, or on the
day of the killing, by the officer of the day, Vivencio C. Lahoz, and
that at that alleged custodial interrogation, Tampus was not
informed as to his rights to have counsel and to remain silent.

The truth is that, even before Lahoz investigated the killing,

Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when, after coming out
of the toilet, the scene of the crime, they surrendered to Reynaldo
S. Eustaquio, the first guard whom thuy encountered, and they
revealed to him that they had committed an act of revenge. That
spontaneous statement, elicited without any interrogation, was
part of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary
confession of guilt.
Not only that. The two accused, by means of that statement given
freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or
suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to have the
right to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their
extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court.
They did not appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Under the circumstances, it is not appropriate for counsel de
oficio to rely on the rulings in Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478,12 L. ed. 2nd 977 and Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16
L. ed. 2nd 694, regarding the rights of the accused to be assisted
by counsel and to remain silent during custodial interrogation.
It should be stressed that, even without taking into account
Tampus' admission of guilt, confession, plea of guilty and
testimony, the crime was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the
evidence of the prosecution.
It is further contended that after the fiscal had presented the
prosecution's evidence and when counsel de oficio called upon
Tampus to testify, the trial court should have advised him of his
constitutional right to remain silent. That contention is not welltaken considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed
an extrajudicial confession (U.S. vs. Binayoh, 35 Phil. 23).

The court during the trial is not duty-bound to apprise the accused
that he has the right to remain silent. It is his counsel who should
claim that right for him. If he does not claim it and he calls the
accused to the witness stand, then he waives that right (U.S. vs.
Rota, 9 Phil. 426; U.S. vs. Grant, 18 Phil. 122; 4 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 196).
The crime was correctly characterized by the prosecutor and the
trial court as murder. The two accused, Tampus and Avila, as coconspirators, made a deliberate and sudden attack upon the
unarmed victim, while he was inside the toilet, three meters wide
and three meters long. The accused resorted to a mode of
assault which insured the consummation of the killing without any
risk to themselves arising from any defense which the victim
could have made. Indeed, because of the unexpected attack, he
was not able to make any defense at all (61 tsn).
Hence,alevosia qualifies the killing as murder.
Evident premeditation is also aggravating. The evidence shows
beyond peradventure of doubt that Tampus and Avila planned the
killing by providing themselves with bladed weapons and waiting
for an opportunity to kill Saminado and thus satisfy their desire for
revenge.
As alleged in the information and as shown in his prison record,
Exhibit H, Tampus was a quasi-recidivist. At the time of the
assault, he was serving sentences for homicide and evasion of
service of sentence. Because of the special aggravating
circumstance of quasi recidivist the penalty for murder, which
is reclusion temporal to death, should be imposed in its maximum
period and that is death (Art. 160, Revised Penal Code).
The mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary
surrender to the authorities, which can be appreciated in favor of
Tampus, cannot offset quasi-recidivism nor reduce the penalty.

When death is prescribed as a single indivisible penalty, it shall

be applied regardless of any generic mitigating circumstances
(Art. 63, Revised Penal Code).
However, for lack of the requisite ten votes, the death penalty
cannot be affirmed. Hence, it should be commuted toreclusion
perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's judgment as to Jose Tampus is
modified. He is sentenced to reclusion perpetua.The lower court's
judgment as to his civil liability is affirmed. Costs de officio
SO ORDERED.

People v Chavez

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

This is an appeal from the February 24, 1994

Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete
City, Branch 32, in Criminal Case No. 10499
finding herein appellant Antonio Chavez y
Estamante alias Tony guilty of the crime of murder
[1]

committed against the person of one Bernabe Jaos

and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion
perpetuaand the payment of civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00, interment expenses
of P10,000.00, moral damages of P16,000.00
and the costs of suit.
The information for murder was filed against
appellant on November 26, 1992. Appellant
pleaded not guilty to the murder charge. As the
accused was then on probation for the crime of
robbery, his probation was revoked by the trial
court.
[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

The prosecution, through its principal witness

Agripina Ablejina, sought to establish the following
facts:
The victim, Bernabe Jaos, 23 years old, lived
with his common-law wife, Agripina Ablejina, in
Sitio Tampaga, Barrio Mantiquel, Siaton, Negros
Oriental. Their nearest neighbor was Efraim
Navarez whose wife was the sister of Jaos. The
house of Jaos was about two (2) meters away from
that of Navarez so that from there, one could look
down on the front door of Navarez who sold goods
to his neighbors.
[6]

At around 8:00 oclock in the evening

of October 18, 1992, Agripina was standing by the
window of her home, where she could observe the
Navarez household. Her husband Jaos was buying
cigarettes
at
the
house cum store
of
Navarez. Agripina saw that Efraim Navarez was
with his wife and younger brother. Navarez and
Jaos were smoking and conversing with each
other when appellant, first cousin of Navarez,
arrived and stabbed Jaos with a knife. Jaos was
stabbed above his umbilical cord, causing his
blood to spurt and his intestines to come out. The
victim was then squatting near the door inside the
house of Navarez. Chavez pushed Jaos, who fell
to the ground. Chavez then ran to the house of his
mother.
Agripina went to Jaos and removed the knife
which was left sticking out of his body. She
delivered the knife to the PNP station in
Mantiquel. When she was investigated at the
police station, Agripina could not finish her
statement because her child was crying. She then
requested Navarez to finish her statement. His
body was brought to the Siaton morgue.
[7]

[8]

[9]

Dr. Mitylene B. Tan, municipal health officer,

was also presented as a witness. Dr. Tan testified

that she conducted a postmortem examination on

the body of Jaos at the morgue of the Siaton
District Hospital at 8:00 p.m. of October 19,
1992. She found the body rigid and had been dead
for
approximately
fifteen
(15)
hours. Her
examinationrevealed that the victim had sustained
a perforating 2 1/2 inches long stab wound with
intestinal herniation at the mid-upper abdominal
region.
[10]

PO3 Marcial Dingal in his testimony stated that

he reflected the stabbing incident on the police
blotter in the afternoon of October 19, 1992. He
identified the weapon used, a 10-inch long bolo,
which was surrendered by CAA Atanacio
Caminade who was also a member of the CAFGU.
[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

The defense interposed denial.

Appellant testified on his behalf, and his
version of the events that transpired on October
18, 1992 is as follows:
At around 6:30 in the evening of October 18,
1992, he went to Navarezs place to buy
bread. With Navarez then were Melvin and Henry
Jaos, a first cousin of the victim.Navarez invited
appellant to take a meal. While appellant was

eating, Jaos arrived and, addressing Navarez

said, Its good that you are here, let us finish each
other.
Having heard Jaos utterance, Navarez pulled
out a weapon and stabbed Jaos stomach. As Jaos
fell downstairs, appellant stood up and at this
juncture, Navarez faced him and stabbed him in
the right arm. Appellant leaned on the wall, parried
the blows and kicked Navarez, hitting his
chest. Then appellant jumped downstairs and ran
to the house of his elder brother, Sebastian
Chavez, Jr., who was at home with their sister,
mother and appellants wife. Appellant told his
brother, Nong, please help me because Bernabe
was killed. However, appellant did not report the
incident to the police because it is very far.
That same evening, PNP members came for
appellant. They told him that he was responsible
for the death of Jaos. Appellant informed the police
that it was Navarez who killed Jaos but the police
replied, Just go with us and relay the incident to
our higher up.
[15]

Appellants story was corroborated by Melvin

Quimada. Quimada, who was from Sitio Saksak,
Malabuhan, claimed that he had gone to Mantiquel

to help out in the harvest of crops and was staying

with his uncle, Agapito Quimada. In the evening
of October 18, 1992, Melvin was in the house
of Navarez when he heard Jaos shout at Navarez,
You have eluded before and ran away but now I
will kill you. Jaos made one step and shouted, I will
kill you. Navarez got a knife, went to the front door
and stabbed Jaos. As Jaos fell to the ground,
appellant and Melvin both tried to jump from the
house. However,
appellant
was
stabbed
by Navarez so that Melvin stepped back to hide
behind the door.When he noticed that he had a
way out, Melvin jumped out of the door and ran to
the house of his uncle. He learned the following
day that Jaos was dead. Melvin did not report the
incident to the police because he knew that they
would not believe him.
[16]

Appellants brother, Sebastian Chavez, Jr.,

testified that he let appellant into his house and
applied herbal medicine to his right arm. Later,
CAFGU
members
fetched
appellant
because Navarez had reported that appellant was
responsible for the stabbing of Jaos. Sebastian
protested that his brother was even wounded
during the incident but the CAFGUs did not listen
to him. Instead, they took appellant to the CAFGU
headquarters. Sebastian, who accompanied his

brother, saw Navarez at the headquarters, sitting

with Agapito Quimada.
[17]

Agapito investigated Navarez and then, after

the investigation, informed everyone that since
appellant had run away from the crime scene, the
matter
should
be
investigated
by
the
police. Sebastian reiterated that it was Navarez
who stabbed the victim but Agapito repeated
the standing order that both appellant and Navarez
should be brought to the police station. He did not
accompany appellant to the police station because
he had fever then.
[18]

On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Agapito

Quimada, father-in-law of Sebastian Chavez, Jr.,
Agapito testified that it was Antonio Merlo and
Navarez who had requested for appellants arrest
at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, as they had
presented to him the letter of Serafin Sibol, a
barangay
councilman,
requesting
such
arrest. Agapito arrested appellant at the house of
his brother and later conducted an investigation at
the crime scene. He saw the body of the deceased
near the house of Navarez which was around one
(1)
meter
away
from
the house
of the
victim. Agapito even made a sketch of the
two houses.
[19]

[20]

Agapito likewise denied that his nephew,

Melvin Quimada, went to his place in Mantiquel.
When Agapito went to the crime scene, the
victims wife and Serafin Sibol were around. A
double-bladed knife, the weapon used in the crime,
was surrendered to him by Agripina but it
was Tating (Atanacio Caminade) who gave it up to
the police. According to Agapito, the bolo marked
as Exhibit E was not the murder weapon.
On his own volition, Agapito drew the
sketch of the crime scene showing the victim
lying between the houses of Jaos and Navarez. At
the house of Sebastian Chavez, Jr., Agapito asked
appellant why he stabbed Jaos. Appellant
answered that he was ganged up. It was in the
house of Sebastian that he arrested appellant.
[21]

On the trial courts initiative, Agripina was

recalled to the witness stand. The court verified
from her as to whom she surrendered the knife she
had pulled out of the victims body. Agripina told the
court that she gave the knife to Agapito Quimada
and that the bolo labelled as Exhibit E was not the
murder weapon.
[22]

Atanacio Caminade, a member of the CAFGU,

surrendered the weapon to the police. Another
CAFGU member, Antonio Fabillar, had given it to
him. The weapon that he surrendered was not a
bolo but a hunting knife. Upon learning that a bolo
was brought to the court and identified as the
murder weapon, he confronted policeman Marcial
Dingal. According to Caminade, the weapon
wrongly brought to the court by Dingal was the
bolo used in the killing of a certain Sayson in
Mantiquel. Caminade saw how the killer in that
case himself surrendered the bolo but it was he
(Caminade) who surrendered the hunting knife
used in killing Jaos.
[23]

Once again recalled to the witness stand,

Agripina
testified
that
she
pulled
the knife out of Jaos body in the presence of the
barangay councilman, Serafin Sibol and Elsa
Quitay. She gave the knife to Agapito Quimada, a
CAFGU, who was then in the company of Nelson
Apostol, Benedicto Trumata and Antonio Sombilon.
[24]

As a surrebuttal witness, Sebastian Chavez, Jr.

claimed that while it was true that he and his
father-in-law, Agapito Quimada, used to be in good
terms with each other, their relationship turned

sour when Agapito sided with his son, Toribio, with

whom Sebastian had an altercation when Toribios
horse nibbled Sebastians rice and corn plants.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING

THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ANTONIO CHAVEZ
Y ESTAMANTE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
[26]

When he himself returned to the witness stand,

Melvin Quimada insisted that he was in Mantiquel
in the month of October, 1992, harvesting rice. He
had gone there to harvest several times
already. When he returned to Cama after the
incident which resulted in the death of Jaos,
Agapito went to his house. Agapito murmured to
him, asking why he (Melvin) had become a witness
in this case. Melvin answered that he only wanted
to tell the truth.
[25]

Not satisfied with the trial courts decision,

appellant appealed to this Court assigning the
following errors:
I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES
AND IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THAT OF THE
DEFENSE.
II

Considering that the parties presented

contradictory facts, the issue in this appeal boils
down to credibility. As this Court has time and
again said, the trial courts evaluation on the
credibility of witnesses is viewed as correct and
entitled to the highest respect by appellate
courts. The trial court is more competent to so
conclude, having had the opportunity to observe
the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the
stand, and the manner in which they gave their
testimonies. Its findings on the issue of credibility
of witnesses and its consequent findings of fact
must be given great weight and respect on appeal,
unless certain facts of substance and value have
been overlooked which, if considered might affect
the result of the case.
[27]

[28]

After a careful scrutiny of the records and

evidence of the case, we find no persuasive
reason to depart from this well entrenched rule on
credibility as to warrant a reversal of the decision
of the trial court. Nevertheless, the issues raised
by the appellant should be faced squarely.

Appellant bewails the fact that the trial court

accorded great weight to the testimony of the
common-law wife of the victim. Appellant posits
that she could hardly be considered as an
eyewitness as she was in her house at the time of
the killing, while there were other persons at the
scene of the crime, who were not even presented
as witnesses.
[29]

This is argument has no basis in fact and in

law. In the first place, it is the prosecution which
determines who among the witnesses to a crime
should testify in court. The prosecutor handling the
case is given a wide discretion on this matter. It is
definitely not for the courts, much more the
defense, to dictate what evidence to present or
who should take the witness stand at the trial of a
case.
[30]

Secondly, the trial court did not err in finding

that
Agripina
was
a
credible
witness
whose testimony should be deemed as nothing but
the truth. The appellant himself admitted that there
was no reason why she should testify against him.
Well-settled is the rule that when there is no
evidence to indicate that the principal witness for
the prosecution was moved by improper
motive, the presumption is that such witness was
[31]

not so moved and that his testimony is entitled to

full faith and credit.
[32]

Thirdly, simply because Agripina was a

common-law wife of the victim, it does not
necessarily follow that her testimony is biased,
incredible or self-serving. This Court has held that
there is no legal provision that disqualifies relatives
of the victim of a crime from testifying, being
otherwise competent, regarding the facts and
circumstances of the crime. Mere relationship of
witnesses to the victim of a crime, whether by
consanguinity or affinity, does not necessarily
impair their credibility as witnesses. This is
specially so when the witnesses were present at
the scene of the crime.
[33]

Lastly, the defense further attacks Agripinas

credibility on the ground that her affidavit before
the police, does not even mention the stabbing
incident
itself. This omissionwas,
however,
explained by Agripina when she testified that she
could
not
finish
her
statement because she had to attend to her crying
child. Affidavits, being taken ex-parte,are almost
always incomplete and inaccurate.
[34]

[35]

[36]

Appellant points out that Agripinas testimony is

not credible because her claim that her house was
elevated and therefore higher than that of Navarez,
was
contradicted
by
prosecution
witness Agapito Quimada. However,
both
the
testimony of Agripina and Agapitos sketch show
that the window of the victims house faced the
front door of the Navarez residence. In other
words, Agripina had an unobstructed view of the
incident. This is the material aspect of the
prosecutions case which the defense failed to
disprove satisfactorily.
Another matter which appellant stresses as
indicative of Agripinas incredulous testimony is the
fact that while she claimed that the murder weapon
was a knife, the police presented a bolo. The
mistake on the part of witness Dingal in presenting
the wrong murder weapon was satisfactorily
explained by the prosecution. That it was not
Dingal himself who rectified the error on the
stand is of no moment. It would not be amiss to
point out that the production of the murder weapon
is not even essential for a conviction.This, the
Court emphasized in People v. Bello, when it
said:
[37]

[38]

For the purposes of conviction, it is enough that the

prosecution establishes by proof beyond reasonable
doubt that a crime was committed and the accused is the
author thereof. The production of the weapon used in
the commission of the crime is not a condition sine qua
non for the discharge of such burden, for the same may
not have been recovered at all from the
assailant (People v. Florida, 214 SCRA 227 [1992]).
Appellant attempts to support his denial of guilt
by asserting that he informed the police that it was
Navarez who killed Jaos but the police appeared to
have been bent on pinning him down as the culprit.
This bare assertion, unsupported as it is by other
evidence, is simply self-serving and deserves
scant consideration. Moreover, appellants claim
that Navarez had a motive for harming Jaos
because the latter allegedly disallowed (Navarez)
to use the carabao in plowing the fields cannot be
appreciated in the absence of independent proof
thereon duly presented at the trial. Furthermore,
the positive identification of appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime may not be overturned by
his denial. It is well-settled that between the
positive assertions of the prosecution witnesses
and the negative averments of the accusedappellant, the former indisputably deserve more
[39]

[40]

credence and are, therefore, entitled to greater

evidentiary weight.

Q Have you seen the act of stabbing?

[41]

Appellants last-ditch effort towards exoneration

is his allegation that the trial court was biased
against him because it was the same court which
convicted him of robbery inCriminal Case No. 9958
and, hence, there existed in the mind of the court
that the accused-appellant who is under probation
would be prone to commit the act imputed against
him. The Court finds this assertion misplaced. If
indeed there was reason for the appellant to doubt
the courts impartiality, his counsel could have
sought the inhibition of the presiding judge from
hearing the case.
[42]

The trial court correctly qualified the killing to

the crime of murder as treachery was duly
established by the prosecution. The testimony of
the
prosecution
eyewitness issignificant on this matter:

A Yes, I really saw it.

Q And when you saw the act of stabbing, what
weapon was used by Tony Chavez in stabbing
Bernabe Jaos?
A A knife.

xxx
Q. Now, when Tony Chavez stabbed your commonlaw husband, was your common-law husband
hit?
A. Yes, he was hit.
Q. Where was your common-law husband hit?
A. He was hit above the umbilical cord.
Q. And when your husband was hit above the
umbilical cord, did you see blood spurting?
A. Yes.

xxx
Q And when Tony Chavez arrived at the store
of Ephraim (sic) Navarez, what happened next?
A He then stabbed Bernabe Jaos.

Q. What else have you seen aside from blood

spurting?
A. His intestine.

Q. And since you saw the act of stabbing, did you not
warn your husband that there was an impending
assault on his person?

particularly in the store of Ephraim (sic) Navarez

was your husband situated?
A. Near the door.

A. No, because the stabbing of Tony Chavez was so

sudden.
Q. When your husband was hit, blood spurting, the
intestine came out, what happened to your
husband?
A. He died right away.
Q. When Tony Chavez stabbed your husband, what
was the position of your husband, was he sitting
or he was standing.

Q. When you said near the door, was he inside the

store or outside the the store of Navarez?
A. He was inside the store.
Q. When your husband was sitting and he was on a
squatting position, what happened to your
husband, did he remain squatting of did he
attempt to rise?
A. He fell down because he was pushed by Tony
Chavez.

A. He was sitting.
Q. On what was he sitting?

Q. Will you clarify that, he fell to the ground of he fell

to the floor?

A. He was squatting.

A. He fell to the ground.

Q. Was he talking with a friend Ephraim (sic) Navarez

at that time?

Q. You mean to say the store at the house of Ephraim

(sic) Navarez is elevated from the ground?

A. Yes, they were talking.

A. Yes, about two (2) feet.

Q. Was Ephraim (sic) Navarez also squatting?

Q. You have seen also how Tony Chavez pushed

your common-law husband?

A. Yes, he was also squatting.

A. Yes.
Q. And when Tony Chavez delivered that stabbing
blow on your common-law husband, where

Q. And when your husband fell to the ground, what

happened?
A. He was lying on the ground.

victim, the attack was frontal and, therefore, not

treacherous. It held that even a frontal attack can
be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected
and the victim was unarmed.
[45]

xxx
Q. After Tony Chavez pushed your husband and your
husband fell to the ground, what did Tony Chavez
do next?
A. He ran.
Q. Towards where did he ran?
A. Towards their house.

Treachery
clearly
characterized
the
commission of the crime. In this case, the assault
was undoubtedly made not only suddenly but also
while the victim was defenseless.The fact that the
victim was attacked frontally does not negate the
existence of treachery. The situation in this case is
similar
to
that
obtaining
in
People v.
Saliling where the victim was conversing with
another person when the accused emerged from
behind them, stabbed the victim twice and quickly
ran away. In holding that there was treachery, the
Court brushed aside the appellants contention that
by the location of the wounds inflicted upon the
[44]

In the absence of proof of other circumstances

attending the commission of the crime, whether
mitigating or aggravating, the penalty that should
be imposed upon the appellant for the crime
of murder is reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the
herein decision of the trial court finding Antonio
Chavez guilty of murder is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
Right to Remain Silent

People v Alvarez
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:p
With all three accused, namely, Ronald ALVAREZ, alias "Onie,"
Leopoldo SABERON, alias "Oyet," and Christopher ARANETA,
alias "Topper," convicted of Murder 1 for the death of Ismael

Magpantay, and sentenced to "life imprisonment three (3) times

each," they have filed before us their separate appeals.

The facts disclose that at about 6:30 A.M. on 13 June 1984, the
Valenzuela police station received a phone call from an
unidentified caller that a dead man was found inside the Palasan
Cemetery, Palasan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The police
proceeded to the place immediately and found "a lifeless body of
a male person lying on his belly with multiple stab wounds all over
his body." Only a brown-colored wallet was found on his person
with no other identification papers. The cadaver was then
photographed and taken to the NBI, through Funeraria Popular,
for autopsy.
According to the report of Pfc. Rolando Masanque, a Valenzuela
police officer, in the early morning of 13 June 1984, a "grapevine
source who refused to identify himself' called up P/Lt Carlos A.
Tiquia by phone and disclosed that the victim was killed by three
men, namely, "Onie" Alverez, a former resident of Bgy. Palasan,
Valenzuela, one alias "Oyet," and another alias "Topper."
Following the lead, Lt. Tiquia asked Alfonso Alverez, a former
Valenzuela policeman and father of Appellant ALVAREZ, to go to
the station to shed light on the investigation. The father was an
old friend of Lt. Tiquia. After their talk, forthrightly, Lt. Tiquia
created a team to apprehend the three Appellants.
At about 12:30 A.M. of 14 June 1984, the arrest was effected,
without a warrant, at the Alverez residence in Tangali St., Bo.
Manresa, Quezon City. Only ALVAREZ alias Onie and SABERON
alias "Boyet" were apprehended, as "Topper" (ARANETA) was
not around. A fan knife (Exh. C) was recovered from the person of
ALVAREZ, while a bamboo stick (Exh. D), identified as a
scabbard of an icepick, was discovered in front of the residence
(Tsn., 25 June 1986, p. 7).

ALVAREZ and SABERON were taken to the police station for

investigation that same morning. In the course thereof, ALVAREZ,
assisted by Atty. Reynaldo P. Garcia, executed a sworn
confession, which he signed in the presence of his father and
another lawyer, Atty. Antonio Dalag. Atty. Garcia signed as "Saksi
at gabay sa panahon ng pagsisiyasat" (Exhs. 5-12), while Atty.
Dalag and Alfonso Alverez, the father, separately signed as
"Saksi" (Exhs. B13 and 1-D). ALVAREZ signed his Sworn
Statement twice at the end thereof, once before the Investigating
Officer and the second time, on 15 June 1984, before Fiscal
Victoria F. Bernards, who had administered the oath (Exh. B10
ALVAREZ's signature further appears twice on the left hand
margin of pages 1, 2 and 3 of his Statement. Others present
during the investigation were SABERON, Lt. Tiquia, and
ALVAREZS brother.
In said extrajudicial confession, ALVAREZ disclosed:
16. T: Papaano ba naganap ang
pangyayaring pagpatay kay
ISMAEL?
S Ganito po iyon, dahilang sa ito
pong si ISMAEL ay nangholdap sa
Blumentritt, Manila na kung saan
ay nakuhanan niya ang biktimang
babae ng alahas, at pitaka at sa
dahilang parang niloloko kami ni
ISMAEL sa partihan ay ipinasiya ni
CHRISTOPHER na patayin si
ISMAEL. Itong si RODOLFO
SABERON JR., na kabarkada din
namin ay isinama namin sa
Palasan, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. Umalis kami sa Quezon

City ng alas 9:00 ng gabi, ika-12

ng Hunyo 1984 nina ISMAEL, Ako,
RODOLFO SABERON JR., at
CHRISTOPHER ARANETA.
Dumating kami sa Palasan,
Valenzuela, MM ng humigit
kumulang gawing alas 10:00 ng
gabi, ika-12 ng Hunyo 1984. Doon
sa may sementeryo ng Palasan,
Valenzuela, MM ng makatalikod si
ISMAEL ay bigla na lang siyang
sinakal mula sa likod ni
RODOLFO SABERON JR., Alias
BOYET at itong si
CHRISTOPHER ARANETA naman
ay pinagsasaksak si ISMAEL
hanggang sa mabali ang
panaksak rin CHRISTOPHER at
kinuha ni CHRISTOPHER ang
hawak kong patalim, at
ipinagpatuloy ang pananaksak kay
ISMAEL, si RODOLFO SABERON
JR., Alias BOYET ay
pinagsasaksak din si ISMAEL.
Nang makita ko na pinagsasaksak
nina CHRISTOPHER at BOYET si
ISMAEL ay umalis na ako,
nagkita-kita na lang kaming tatlo
sa Quezon City sa bahay nina
CHRISTOPHER sa bahay ng
kapatid ng kanyang Nanay.
Ipinauli sa akin CHRISTOPHER
ang aking patalim, matapos na
iyon ay kanyang hugasan para
maalis ang dugo. Tapos ay nag-

inuman na kami. kinabukasan, ika13 ng Hunyo 1984 doon sa aming

bahay ay dumating ang tatay ni
ISMAEL at tinanong ng Tatay rin
ISMAEL ang kanyang anak kina
CHRISTOPHER at BOYET, pero
sinabi nina CHRISTOPHER at
BOYET sa Tatay ni ISMAEL na
hindi nila alam kung nasaan si
ISMAEL. Noong gabi ng ika-1 3 ng
Hunyo 1984 ay hinuli na lang ako
ng mga Pulis at nahuli ko ding
kasama si RODOLFO SABERON
JR., Alias BOYET at isinama na
kami dito sa Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. (Exh. 1).
In the same confession, ALVAREZ Identified the slim bamboo
found in his house as the "baena" of the ice-pick belonging to
SABERON.
26. T: Anong uring ice-pick ba
naman ang dala nitong si
CHRISTOPHER?
S Iyon po ay g turnilyong
inilalagay sa trak na mahaba at
pinatulis at iyon ay ipinapasok sa
isang payat na ka wayan.
27. T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang
isang kawayan na payat, ano ang
masasabi mo tungkol dito?

S Iyan po ang pinakabaena ng

kanyang (Christopher) icepick (At
this juncture declarant identified a
slim bamboo stalk approximately
18 inches long). (Exh. 1-B)
As to his participation, ALVAREZ
claimed:
36. T Pansamantala ay wala na
akong itatanong sa iyo, mayroon
ka pa bang nais sabihin, Idagdag
o kaya ay bawasin sa salaysay na
ito?
S Wala na po, kundi kaya lamang
ako nagbigay ng salaysay ay sa
dahilang gusto ko pong patunayan
na ala akong kasalanan at malinis
ang aking konsiyensa sa naganap
na pagpatay kay ISMAEL. (Exh. 1C)
ARANETA, who turned out to be "Topper", was arrested on 14
June 1984 by the District Anti-Narcotics Command and turned
over to the Valenzuela police.
In no time at all, or on 15 June 1984, an Information charging all
three Appellants with Murder was filed. Having pleaded their
innocence upon arraignment, trial ensued. SABERON bolted jail
and was re-arrested only after the defense had rested its case.
He was represented throughout the proceedings, however, by
counsel.

The respective fathers of the victim and of ALVAREZ, who were

good friends, had their roles to play.
Rosauro Magpantay, the victim's father, recounted that he knew
ALVAREZ since 1984, as well as ARANETA who used to go to his
house before his son was killed; that he also knew SABERON
when the latter pawned his watch to their neighbor; he knew that
his son and Appellants were 'barkada;" that at around 12:00 noon
of 12 June 1984, he saw his son and the three (3) Appellants
together; when asked where he was going, the son replied that
they were going to Valenzuela (Exh. J that at around 12:00
o'clock midnight of 13 June 1984, because his son had not gone
home, he went to ALVAREZ's house to inquire about his son
knowing that the latter and the three (3) Appellants had gone to
Valenzuela around noon the previous day. In the ALVAREZ
residence, he found the three Appellants drinking Upon seeing
him, ALVAREZ shouted: "Anong ginagawa ng putang-inang
matandang iyan dito, tayo pa ang pinagbibintangang pumatay sa
anak niya" SABERON pacified ALVAREZ stating: "Pare,
nadudulas ka na" (Tsn., 23 October 1987, p. 11). Then, replying
to the victim's father, SABERON stated that they were together in
Valenzuela; that they had boarded a jeep when the victim robbed
a woman passenger of her necklace, after which they ran away
leaving the victim and hoping that nothing untoward had
happened to him. Apprehensive that some misfortune had
actually befallen his son, Rosauro Magpantay went home.
Continuing, Rosauro narrated that at around 2:00 o'clock A.M. of
14 June 1984, ALVAREZ's father, Alfonso, who was his good
friend, fetched him and together they proceeded to Valenzuela.
Alfonso wanted him to verify if the man that was killed was his
son. When told that the body was at Funeraria Popular, they
proceeded thereto and Rosauro confirmed that the dead man
was, in fact, his son Ismael. Rosauro and Alfonso then proceeded
to the police station where Alfonso told Rosauro that he had the

two persons who had killed his son arrested (ibid., p. 12). The two
persons referred to were his son ALVAREZ and SABERON.
ALVAREZ's father, Alfonso, who used to be a Valenzuela
policeman, had his own version. He stated that ARANETA and
SABERON were friends of his son; that the victim's father is his
childhood friend; that on 12 June, while he was at home at
around 8:00 P.M. the victim and the three (3) Appellants were
also there; that because his son was hooked on drugs, he left the
house with some members of the family and stayed at the
Premier Hotel; his son ALVAREZ was left behind and did not
seem his usual self; that when he (the father) returned home on
13 June at around 9:00 A.M., he saw the three (3) Appellants
"Ronald, Christopher and Saberon" conversing; that around 10:00
A.M., the victim's father arrived inquiring about his son; that he
replied he did not know and when the victim's father addressed
the Appellants, the latter also denied any knowledge; the victim's
father then left; that in the afternoon, noticing that the three (3)
Appellants were having a heated conversation and seemed to be
high on drugs, he went to the police precinct at about 10:00 P.M.
to ask for help from Capt. Tiquia, a friend of his; that he asked the
latter to incarcerate the boys because they were hooked on
drugs; that the Captain initially denied his request for lack of
basis; that while they were conversing Capt. Tiquia informed him
that an unidentified dead person was found in the Palasan,
Valenzuela cemetery and since he was a former resident thereat,
perhaps he could help in identification; the dead individual was
described as a "person with tattoos;" that the father called his son
at the house and asked for the possible identification of El
Magpantay," the son answered that the latter had a "bahala na
tattoo" on his body; that he then suggested to Capt. Tiquia that
Appellants be charged with the victim's death, since the
description of the dead person fitted that of the victim; to which
said officer acceded with a warning that he might be sorry for the
consequences of the request; that his intention was to help and to

avoid the circumstance that they (apparently referring to the boys)

might be lulled or might kill somebody; that he then went home
and waited for the boys to fall asleep; then he went to the police
station, fetched the police, who then arrested ALVAREZ and
SABERON from his residence at around midnight. At the time,
ARANETA had already left the house. After ALVAREZ and
SABERON were jailed, he went to the victim's father to ask him to
identify the man who was found dead. That done, they returned to
the precinct. He then told the elder Magpantay that he caused the
incarceration of ALVAREZ and SABERON just to punish them
and not because they were responsible for the victim's death.
Thereafter, he and Capt. Tiquia talked about the preparation of
the statement but the former told him to return the following
morning so that two (2) lawyers' could be present. At around 9:00
A.M. of 14 June, he forced his son, ALVAREZ, to give a written
statement but it was he (the father) who fabricated the story given
(Tsn., 2 March 1988, pp. 1-7).
On the second day of his testimony, Alfonso ted that at around
8:00 P.M. of 11 June 1984 he saw the barkada," that is, the victim
and the three (3) Appellants together at his house; that because
there was trouble in their place, he brought them to the Premier
Hotel to prevent their involvement, until the next day when they
checked out after he had signed the hotel bill; that he did not
know where their son was going but at about 5:00 P.M. of 12
June, he saw his son alone in the house without his friends and
that it seemed he was high on drugs again; since he would not
Haten to scolding he and family left the house at around 9:00
P.M. to return to his house only on 13 June where he saw the
three (3) Appellants, with other people.
Lastly, ALVAREZ's father admitted that he had signed his son's
extrajudicial statement but explained that although previously he
had wanted his son in jail that was not his wish any longer. His
son had been incarcerated for four (4) years and had promised

not to take drugs any more, because of which he had forgiven his
son.
The post-mortem findings of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI
revealed that the victim had been brutally attacked and killed; that
he suffered two (2) incised wounds in the forearm; four (4) stab
wounds on the left side of the neck; thirteen (13) wounds in the
chest, four (4) of which are punctured wounds caused by an ice
pick; and twenty-one (21) stab wounds in the back caused by a
single bladed weapon and inflicted when the victim was already
helpless or dying. Said physician further declared that there was
more than one assailant and that a double-bladed and a singlebladed weapon had both been used in addition to an ice pick.
On the part of the defense, ALVAREZ, 26, single, a soundman,
testified that he could not remember his "Sinumpaang Salaysay;"
that he had signed something without knowing its contents; that
although he admits his signatures, the contents of his statement
are not true and he does not affirm them; that although lawyers
were present, they were given by the police; that although he was
brought before the Investigating Fiscal, he does not remember
that the Fiscal had explained anything to him; that he was
compelled to sign by the police; and that he never complained to
the Fiscal because he was confused and bewildered as to why he
had been taken there.

ARANETA, 26, laborer, a house painter, gave an alibi as his

defense and declared that the charge of Murder against him is
false; that he was not in the house of ALVAREZ when the victim's
father went there because he was then finishing the painting job
of Jesse Reyes, about six (6) houses away from ALVAREZ's; that
he had known the victim since school days since their respective
schools were near each other; that he knows ALVAREZ and
SABERON as they play basketball together; that he also knows
the victim's father who forbade him from going to their house as
he was just teaching the son "katarantaduhan."
ARANETA's mother corroborated her son's alibi.
As heretofore stated, SABERON escaped from jail while trial was
in progress and was re-arrested only after the defense had rested
its case. He was accordingly unable to take the witness stand.
However, he was represented by Atty. Melody Javier during the
initial stages of the case and, thereafter, alternately by Attys.
Augusto Montilla and Ricardo Perez. An Appellant's Brief has also
been presented on his behalf by Atty. Augusto Montilla.
Mainly premised on ALVAREZ's extrajudicial confession, the Trial
Court found a clear indication of conspiracy and convicted
Appellants of Murder, attended by treachery, evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and nocturnity. Before
us now are their respective appeals, to refute which the Solicitor
General has also filed separate Briefs.
Allegedly, the Trial Court erred
Per ALVAREZ:
... in admitting and considering the extrajudicial
confession; ... in holding the presence or
existence of conspiracy;

... in sentencing accused to suffer life

imprisonment (3 times each).
Per ARANETA:
... in convicting (him) on the sole basis of the
extrajudicial confession of co-accused Ronald
Alvarez; ... in not declaring the extrajudicial
confession of accused Alvarez inadmissible; ... in
not giving credence to (his) defense of alibi.
PER SABERON:
... in not taking into consideration that there was
no motive by accused Saberon to lull the victim,
Ismael Magpantay;
... in finding that the escape of accused Leopoldo
Saberon from jail indicates his guilt;
... in convicting accused Leopoldo Saberon when
in its decision appear facts that will lead to his
acquittal.
Crucial to the determination of Appellants' culpability is
ALVAREZ's extrajudicial confession.
With the exception of SABERON, who admitted that the
confession was "executed legally and properly" (p. 6, Brief for
SABERON), ALVAREZ and ARANETA assail the admission of
said confession as evidence against them for having been
executed irregularly and involuntarily. For one, they maintain that
ALVAREZ's constitutional right to counsel was not protected, a
lawyer randomly picked by the police not being a sufficient
safeguard thereof. For another, they claim that ALVAREZ was in a
drunken and drugged state when he executed it such that he was
in no position to either read or comprehend the same, much less

provide the details contained therein. That being so, the elder
Alvarez's testimony that he had invented the story and thereafter
forced his son to sign the document "in order to give him a
lesson" should have been given credence and weight by the Trial
Court and the extrajudicial confession struck down as
inadmissible evidence.
The averments do not persuade. While it may be that a lawyer
was provided by the police, ALVAREZ never signified his desire to
have a lawyer of his choice. Besides, the evidence discloses that
Atty. Reynaldo P. Garcia, whom the police had called, was equal
to his duties as a lawyer. He testified that he was requested by
Capt. Tiquia, a friend of ALVAREZ's father, to assist his son in the
execution of his extrajudicial confession (Tsn., 12 December
1986). After asking the investigator to leave them alone, he
explained to ALVAREZ the consequences of any statement that
he would make and that it could be used against him but that
notwithstanding, ALVAREZ decided to give it just the same. Aside
from Atty. Garcia, Atty. Antonio Dalag, whom ALVAREZ knew, was
also on hand and signed as a witness to the confession. So did
ALVAREZ's father. Two others presented the execution of the
statement, SABERON and ALVAREZ's brother. Under the
circumstances, the Trial Court can not be faulted for holding that
the confession was "freely given, without force or intimidation,
and with aid of counsel."
What is sought to be protected is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts. The right is guaranteed merely to preclude the
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something
false (People v. Layuco G.R. No. 69210, 5 July 1989,175 SCRA
47), not to provide him with the best defense. A lawyer is an
officer of the Court and upon his shoulders lies the responsibility
to see to it that protection has been accorded the rights of the
accused and that no injustice to him has been committed. Absent
any showing that the lawyers who assisted ALVAREZ were

remiss in their duties, the Court holds that the proceedings during
the custodial interrogation of ALVAREZ, in the presence of
counsel, were regularly conducted.
The father's disclosure of having masterminded his son's
confession is a futile and late attempt on the part of a parent to
exonerate a child from criminal responsibility. The confession
speaks for itself. It gives the motive for the killing, the manner by
which it was accomplished, the kinds of weapon used, the relative
positions of the assailants and the victim, the exact location of the
crime, the clothes the assailants were wearing, the weather
condition that fateful evening all of which are particulars that
could have been supplied only by someone in the know. They
reflect spontaneity and coherence, leaving no room to doubt its
veracity, and particularly belying the elder Alvarez's claim that it
was he who had concocted the story.
The assertion that ALVAREZ was in, a drugged and drunken state
and was in no position to provide details nor read and
comprehend his Statement is shorn of merit. A comparison of his
signatures on the left-hand margin of the first three pages of his
written confession, as well as his two signatures on the last page
thereof, once during custodial interrogation and the other before
the subscribing Fiscal, shows that they are identical to the other,
with no tremors or unsteadiness which would have characterized
the handwriting of one under the influence of either liquor or
drugs. Besides, a confession made by an accused while
intoxicated is admissible, if he was physically able to re-collect
the facts and to state them truly (White v. State, Tex. Cr. App.
625,25 SW 784; People v. Farrington, 140 Cal., 656, 74 Pac. 288;
cited in 5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 Edition,
p. 250), as is the case with ALVAREZ's confession.
More, the details contained in the confession relative to the
knives and the icepick used by the assailants and the relative

positions of the actors conform to the testimony (Tsn., 13 October

1986) and autopsy report (Exh. G) of the medicolegal officer. The
weapons described in the statement were the same ones
recovered on the person of ALVAREZ and picked up in front of his
residence at the time of arrest. To top it all, the confession
contains exculpatory statements, which have been considered by
this Court as an index of voluntariness (People v. Balane, G.R.
Nos. 48319-20, 25 July 1983, 123 SCRA 614).
It should be borne in mind that a confession constitutes evidence
of high order because it is supported by the strong presumption
that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly
confess to a crime unless he is prompted by truth and his
conscience (People v. Salvador y Kiamco, G.R. No. 77964, 26
July 1988, 163 SCRA 574). This presumption of spontaneity and
voluntariness stands unless the defense proves otherwise.
Appellants' evidence falls short of the required quantum of proof
to overcome the presumption.
ARANETA contends, however, that said confession is not
admissible as specie of proof against him because firstly, the
same is hearsay as he never had any opportunity to crossexamine the confessant; and secondly, it lacks the indispensable
requisite of corroboration by other evidence (Brief for ARANETA,
pp. 8 & 9). He further states that the Trial Court erred in
convicting him based solely on ALVAREZ's confession.
The contentions are not tenable. ARANETA was represented by
counsel all throughout the trial, who could have taken all steps
necessary for his protection. As to the second ground, the
established doctrine is, indeed, that an extrajudicial confession is
binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against
his co-accused. That rule, however, admits of exceptions. Where
the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the
probability of participation by the conspirator, that confession is

receivable as evidence against a co-accused (People v.

Condemena, G. R. No. 22426, 29 May 1968, 23 SCRA 910;
People v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 54117, 27 April 1982, 113 SCRA
772).
The corroboration by other evidence is disclosed by the records,
which show that Appellants and the victim were close friends
(Tsn., 2 March 1988), or "barkada" (Tsn., 14 March 1988, p. 5);
that he usually plays basketball with ALVAREZ and SABERON on
Sundays (Tsn., 15 February 1988, pp. 12-13); that all three
Appellants and the victim were together in the Alvarez residence
in the evening of 11 June (Tsn., 14 March 1988, p. 5), or the night
immediately before the incident on 12 June at around midnight;
that the victim was last seen together with Appellants about to go
to Valenzuela (Exh. J the victim's father knew of his own personal
knowledge that the group was going to Valenzuela, so much so,
that when his son failed to return home, he went to the Alvarez
residence immediately the next evening to inquire and saw
thereat all three Appellants drinking; upon seeing him ALVAREZ
reacted with an outburst, "anong ginagawa ng putang-inang
matandang iyan dito, tayo pa ang pinagbibintangang pumatay sa
anak niya," actually an admission against interest, only to be
cautioned by SABERON stating "Pare, nadudulas ka na."
ARANETA was there (as separately testified to by the two fathers)
and said nothing. Additionally, a knife was also recovered from
the person of ALVAREZ, and a bamboo scabbard of an ice pick
found in front of his house.
All these corroborate the extrajudicial confession and prove that
ARANETA was, indeed, one of the malefactors. His defense of
alibi can not prevail over such convincing evidence.
With respect to SABERON, the confession is admissible against
him for two reasons. Firstly, he did not dispute its admissibility
and even admitted its proper execution (Brief for SABERON, p.

13). Secondly, he acquiesced in or adopted the confession since

he did not question its truthfullness considering that it was made
in his presence and he did not remonstrate against his being
implicated therein (People v. Amajul, G.R. Nos. 14626-27, 28
February 1961, 1 SCRA 682), even when ALVAREZ pointed to
him. There is, therefore, direct evidence to prove his participation
in the commission of the crime, and the requirement of motive for
conviction by circumstantial evidence needs no looking into.
SABERON, however, further disputes the Trial Court's finding that
his escape from jail was an indication of guilt. He alleges that the
lower Court should have given him the opportunity to present his
side of the charge and explain the reason for his escape instead
of haphazardly convicting him even after he was re-arrested.
Even assuming that his escape was not an indication of guilt,
once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, he loses
his standing in Court and is deemed to have waived any right to
seek relief from the Court unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the Court (People v. Mapalao and Magumnang,
G.R. No. 92415,14 May 1991; see Rule 11 5, Sec. 1 [c]). The
records neither disclose that SABERON moved for the reopening
of the case when he was re-arrested, hence, he should now be
held barred from seeking the same. The Trial Court, in including
SABERON in its judgment, acted within its competence.
The detailed narration contained in the ALVAREZ confession,
support the Trial Court's finding of conspiracy characterized by
treachery, abuse of superior strength and nocturnity. As aptly
pointed out by the Solicitor General:
Evidence adduced on record clearly shows that
appellant Alverez and his co-accused were close
friends (barkada) and that they were drug-addicts
(tsn, p. 23, Mar. 2, 1988; Oct. 23, 1987, p. 8).

Accused Araneta even admitted that he usually

played basketball with appellants Alvarez and
Saberon on Sundays (tsn, Feb. 15, 1988, pp. 1213). In fact, appellant Alverez together with his
two co-accused were last seen with the victim and
that they reportedly boarded a jeep and snatched
a necklace from a woman passenger (tsn, Oct.
23, 1987, pp. 11-12). The reason why appellant
Alvarez and his co-accused killed the victim was
their differences in the partition of the criminal
effects of their various robberies (see Question
No. 1 2, Exh. "B").
On June 13, 1984, one day after the murder of the
victim, appellant Alvarez and his two co-accused
were again seen drinking together by Rosauro
Magpantay who heard appellant Alverez saying
'Anong ginagawa ng putang inang matandang ito.
Tayo pa ang pinagbibintangan pumatay sa anak
niya.' To which statement, accused Saberon made
the following reply 'Pare nadudulas ka na (tsn,
Oct. 23, 1987, pp. 10-11).
Surely, Alfonso Alverez, a former policeman and
father of appellant Alvarez, was not lying when he
pointed to the three accused as the killers of the
victim (tsn, Oct. 23, 1987, pp. 12-14). Alfonso
Alverez even fetched Rosauro Magpantay (father
of the victim) to accompany him to Valenzuela, so
that he (Rosauro) could Identify the body of his
son (id.). Alfonso Alverez did not only point to the
three accused as the culprits, but he also gave
the information leading to the arrest of his own
son (appellant Ronald Alvarez), and his coaccused Leopoldo Saberon (tsn, July 14, 1986,

pp. 3- 4). At the time of their arrest, a life and a

bamboo scabbard were recovered from the
accused (pp. 12-13, Id.). When appellant Alverez
executed and signed his confession, his father
(Alfonso Alvarez) was present, and the latter also
signed the confession as witness (see Exhs. 'BN',
'B-l' to 'B-3').
All of the above, together with the detailed
narration in Questions Nos. 4 to 35 of the
confession of appellant Alverez (quoted in pages
9 to 12 of the lower court's Decision), clearly
shows that conspiracy among the three accused
was characterized by treachery, evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and
nocturnity as defined under Article 8 of the
Revised Penal Code (see p. 12, Decision).
Even assuming that ALVAREZ, as he claims in his Sworn
Statement, acted as a mere "look-out," that does not excuse him
from criminal liability as a principal. There being conspiracy, the
act of one is the act of all.
Appellants, however, also call attention to their warrantless arrest
effected at around midnight of 13 June 1984, contending that it
was in violation of their constitutional rights sufficient to nullify
subsequent proceedings.
Under Rule 113, Section 6 of the old Criminal Procedure (1964),
a warrantless arrest can be effected by a peace officer or private
person when an offense has, in fact, been committed and said
peace officer or private person has reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed it. In the instant
case, it was the elder Alverez who initiated the arrest a day after
the crime was committed. Having been once a policeman, he

may be said to have been equipped with knowledge of crime

detection. And having had the opportunity to observe the conduct
of the three Appellants, who were at his house the whole day
following the commission (Tsn., 2 March 1988, p. 3), it is logical to
infer that his act of going to the police, informing them that
Appellants were the perpetrators of the crime and even fetching
them to make the arrest sprang from a went grounded belief that
a crime had been committed and that Appellants had committed
it. In this regard, the arrests without a warrant were validly
effected.
Error is, however attributable to the Trial Court in imposing the
sentence of "life imprisonment, three times each." In the first
place, it is always desirabale to employ the proper legal
terminology in the imposition of imprisonment penalties as
provided in the Revised Penal Code because each penalty has its
distinct accessory penalties and effects (Aquino, the Revised
Penal Code, Vol. I, 1976 Edition, p. 540). Thus, the proper
penalty is not "life imprisonment" but "reclusion perpetua." In the
second place, since there is only one victim and only one offense
of murder, the imposition of multiple penalties is improper. This
being so, the proper penalty, considering the attendant
circumstances and in the light of the 1987 Constitution, is
reclusion perpetua for each of the Appellants. The death
indemnity of P50,000.00 should be required, for which appellants
should be held jointly and severally liable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Accused-appellants,
Ronald Alvarez, Christopher Araneta, and Leopoldo Saberon are
hereby each sentenced to suffer a single penalty of reclusion
perpetua; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the
victim, Ismael Magpantay, in the sum of P50,000.00; and to pay
the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Right to Counsel

People v Deneiga
KAPUNAN, J.:
The naked body of Marlyn Canoy was found on a heap of
garbage in an ill-frequented back corner on the left side of the Mt.
Carmel Church in New Manila, Quezon City. Her hands were tied
behind her back by a shoestring and pieces of her own clothing.
The body bore thirty nine (39) stab wounds. There was evidence
that she had been brutally assaulted, physically and sexually,
before she was murdered.
Police authorities investigating the gruesome crime on August 31,
1989, arrested Rey Daniega y Macoy on information that the
victim was last seen with Daniega, 1 a waiter at the Gathering Disco
where Canoy used to work. Friends of Canoy volunteered the

information that the former had just broken off from a stormy
relationship with Daniega. 2The latter, it was bruited, 3 desperately
tried to patch up the relationship.

Following the latter's arrest, and on the basis of a confession

obtained by police authorities from him during custodial
investigation (where he allegedly admitted raping and killing
Canoy), 4 appellant Hoyle Diaz y Urnillo was invited by the
investigators for questioning. A second sworn statement,
substantially similar and corroborating many of the details of
Daniega's sworn affidavit, was later extracted from Diaz. In the said
statement, Diaz admitted his participation in the rape of Canoy, but
denied that he had something to do with the victim's death. 5
Armed with the said extra-judicial confessions, an Information
was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,6 charging
petitioners with the crime of Rape with Homicide, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 29th day of August, 1989, in
Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each
other, with lewd designs, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
force, violence and/or intimidation have sexual
intercourse with MARLYN CANOY BENDO,
without her consent and against her will; and by
reason of and on the occasion thereof, said
accused, pursuant to their conspiracy, did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill and without any justifiable cause,
attack, assault and employ personal violence
upon the person of said victim, by then and there
stabbing her with an icepick several times,

thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal

wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of her death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of said Marlyn Canoy Bendo, in such
amount as may be awarded to them under the
provisions of the New Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At trial, the confessions obtained by law enforcement authorities
during their (separate) custodial investigations formed the
centerpiece of the prosecution's case for Rape with Homicide
against both accused. 7 These confessions allegedly disclosed
details of the killing, summarized by the trial court in its Decision
dated August 23, 1991, thus:
Rey Deniega's confession essentially stated:
On August 28, 1989, he and Marlyn were at her
house at Onyx Street, Sta. Ana Manila. There they
had an altercation because she wanted to break
up with her already. He accompanied Marlyn
afterwards to Rolando's Disco Pub where Marlyn
works. They agreed however, to meet again after
she gets (sic) out of the Disco Pub to have a final
talk about their relationship. They agreed to see
each other at 3:00 in the morning of August 29,
1989 at a waiting shed along Aurora Boulevard
near San Juan. He arrived there earlier than
Marlyn. While waiting, Rey saw Hoyle Diaz (a.k.a.
Boyet) pass by. Rey told Hoyle that he is going to
take Marlyn to the Mt. Carmel Church compound
and if Boyet wants to take revenge on Marlyn
(makaganti) Boyet can hold-up her there.

When Marlyn and Rey were already at the Mt.

Carmel Church compound, Boyet arrived with two
companions. Boyet berated Marlyn for choosing
Rey as her boyfriend instead of Boyet despite the
fact that he has already spent large sums for her.
Then, suddenly the two companions of Boyet by
the name of Tony and Carlos pulled with a jerk the
apparel of Marlyn and undressed her. The two tied
Marlyn's hands and got her necklace and
wristwatch. Boyet then took off his T-shirt and
pulled down his pants and raped Marlyn. After the
rape, Tony and Carlos stabbed Marlyn. Then
Boyet gave Rey an icepick and ordered him to
stab Marlyn whom he stabbed once in the
stomach. Rey left leaving the three men behind.
Hoyle Diaz confession essentially stated:
He came to know of both Rey Deniega and
Marlyn Canoy at Gathering House where Hoyle
used to take drinks. He was courting Marlyn there
and used to take her as a table partner.
He saw Rey Deniega on a bridge near Broadway
Avenue and Aurora Boulevard, Quezon City on
August 29, 1989 at around 2:00 in the morning.
There Rey told Hoyle that he will teach Marlyn a
lesson and will hold her up. He asked Hoyle to
accompany him. At between 3:00 and 4:00 that
morning Marlyn arrived at the waiting shed where
she and Rey were supposed to meet and Rey
took Marlyn to Mt. Carmel Church compound with
Hoyle Diaz following behind.

The two talked for about 20 minutes. Then they

had an altercation, hurling and hollering bad
words at each other. Rey tried to undress Marlyn
who resisted. Rey boxed Marlyn and was finally
able to take off her clothes. Then Rey raped
Marlyn. After Rey was through, Hoyle raped
Marlyn.
Afterwards, Rey told Hoyle that so that there will
be no more trouble (aberia) they better finish off
Marlyn. Rey took out an icepick and stabbed
Marlyn. Then he handed the icepick to Hoyle and
Hoyle stabbed Marlyn too. Then Rey faced Hoyle
(hinarap) and so Hoyle ran away as Rey chased
him. As Hoyle ran he threw away the icepick. He
does not know if Rey returned to get the necklace,
bag and wristwatch of Marlyn. Hoyle also stated
that he saw that Rey was heavily influenced by
drugs (sabog sa gamot). Hoyle also recalled that
on the way to Mt. Carmel a man followed them
but the man was no longer in the vicinity when
they reached the Mt. Carmel Church Compound.
When Rey ran after Hoyle, Rey was holding no
weapon. Marlyn was raped right where she was
found dead. 8
In their defense, appellants, during the course of the trial,
vehemently denied the claim that they had voluntarily executed
the said confessions. 9 Appellants Daniega and Diaz went to the
extent of seeking the assistance of the National Bureau of
Investigation, and there executed a sworn statement to the effect that
their respective confessions were coerced and obtained through
torture. 10 Both testified that they were subjected to electrocution and
water treatment. They contended that they were arrested without

warrants of arrest and that the confessions obtained from them

immediately thereafter were made without the assistance of counsel.

After the prosecution rested its case on December 14, 1990, the
accused-appellants moved for leave to file Demurrer to Evidence,
which the trial court granted. 11 In a demurrer submitted to the trial
court on December 28, 1990, appellants moved for the dismissal of
the information for Rape with Homicide on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence, stressing that: 1) the confessions obtained by police
authorities were acquired without the assistance of counsel in
violation of their constitutional rights and were hence, inadmissible in
evidence; 2) the same (confessions) "were obtained through torture,
force, threat and other means which vitiat[ed] (their) free will;" and 3)
except for the testimonies of the medico-legal officer and two IBP
lawyers who alleged that they assisted the accused during their
custodial investigation, the prosecution presented no other evidence
to warrant a conviction. 12
In an Order dated January 30, 1991, the Regional Trial Court
denied the motion for Demurrer to Evidence. 13Consequently, after
hearing the appellants' testimonies, the lower court, on August 31,
1991 rendered its Decision convicting the accused-appellants of the
crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing each of them to a
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.14 They were likewise ordered to pay
the heirs of Marlyn Canoy the amount of P50,000.00 in solidum. 15
In dismissing appellant's principal defense that their confessions
were obtained in violation of their constitutional rights, the trial
court held that:
The court finds it hard to believe that (Atty.
Sansano and Atty. Rous), both of whom are
officers of the Legal Aid Committee of the IBP and
are prominent practitioners of great integrity,
would act as the accused said they did. Over and
beyond this it appears that the confessions were

executed during daytime and the accused

themselves brought to the Quezon City IBP office
at noontime during office hours when several
employees of that chapter were working, there are
usually other lawyers there, and therefore, the
accused, if their confession were really
prevaricated beforehand, had ample atmosphere
to tell Atty. Sansano and Atty. Rous, respectively,
that their confession were coerced and untrue.
The two counsels testified that they precisely
segregated the accused from their police escorts
to cull out the truth and the accused volunteered
to confess to the crime at bar;
Rey Deniega was arrested at around 6:30 in the
morning and Hoyle Diaz at around 9:30 in the
morning. Rey was brought to the IBP at around
11:00 in the morning and Hoyle at around 2:00
p.m. of the same day of their arrest on August 31,
1990. Their confession were quite lengthily (4
page each) and filled with details. There is nothing
in the record to show that the apprehending
officers are clever and articulate enough to be
able to fabricate in a short a time the kind of
confessions submitted here . . . . 16
Considering that no eyewitnesses to the actual commission of the
crime were presented before the court, the issue of the
voluntariness and due execution of the extrajudicial confessions
of the appellants upon which their conviction was based, is pivotal
in the resolution of the instant appeal. Analyzing the appropriate
provisions of law in relation to the facts of the case at bench, we
find for appellants.

It is a settled rule that this Court will not normally overturn factual
conclusions of the trial court, unless factual evidence has either
been deliberately ignored or misapprehended. The confessions
which form part of the record of the case at bench are an
eloquent example of facts deliberately ignored: the legal
insufficiencies and inconsistencies in the documents in question
are so glaring, even from a cursory examination of the
confessions, that they should not escape even the untrained eye.
The statements evidencing the interrogation, including those
portions in which the appellants purportedly were informed of
their constitutional rights, were in typewritten form. However,
within the body of these documents, blank spaces were
conspicuously left at strategic areas (spaces) where the accused
were supposed to sign and acknowledge that they were
appraised of their rights and that they gave their statements
voluntarily. These were spaces obviously provided for the
accused to fill in the blank with the word "yes" ("opo") followed by
another blank space for their respective signatures. In addition to
these, the header of the disputed documents indicates that the
investigations were conducted at the police headquarters,
contradicting the prosecution witnesses' declarations that the
confessions were obtained in the Quezon City IBP office.

Apart from the defects evident on the face of the documents,

there exists evidence indicating that the actual custodial
investigation was conducted at the police headquarters in the
absence of counsel, as contended by appellants. While we have
no dispute with the trial court's observation that the appellants
were brought to the Quezon City IBP office during daytime when
other individuals were holding office in the IBP floor (who may
have witnessed the presence of the appellants in the area), 17 it is
one thing for appellants to be brought to the IBP office only for the
purpose of signing the confessions in plain view of the other
employees of the office, while compliance with the constitutional
mandate requiring the presence of counsel during the actual
custodial investigation is quite another.
There is convincing proof 18 that, while Attys. Sansano and Rous
may have been present at the signing of the documents, they were
not present at all during the actual custodial investigation of the
accused in the police headquarters.
For instance, Atty. Sansano placed the time of arrival of appellant
Deniega at the IBP Quezon City chapter office at "around 11:30 in
the morning" of August 31, 1989. 19 However, Deniega's
extrajudicial confession taken by Pat. Maniquis gives the time of its
execution as 11:20 A.M. also on August 31, 1989 or earlier than the
time they allegedly arrived at the IBP office.
Moreover, even assuming the possibility of error in recording the
actual time of the investigation, 20 there is conflict as to the place
where the custodial investigation was actually conducted. Atty.
Sansano for instance, testified that Daniega's extrajudicial
confession was taken at the QC-IBP office. 21 An examination of the
document's heading however reveals that the confessions were
given to the investigator (Maniquis) at the police headquarters of the
SID, QCPS (sa himpilan ng homicide ng SID, QCPS) not in the IBP
office of Atty. Sansano.

With respect to the extrajudicial confession of appellant Diaz, Atty.

Rous' declaration that "the custodial investigation was conducted
by the policeman in the (IBP chapter) office," 22 conflicts with the
statement in the actual document (sinumpaang salaysay) that he
(appellant) executed his confession at the police headquarters of the
SID, QCPS (himpilan nghomicide, SID, QCPS) and not the IBP
office.
Lastly, the probity of Pat. Maniquis, who testified in rebuttal was
certainly not enhanced by the information given the trial court by
prosecution witness P/Sgt. Rogelio Barcelona that he (Maniquis)
had been dismissed from the service for unspecified reasons. 23
A thorough reading of the transcripts of the testimonies of the two
lawyers, Atty. Sansano and Atty. Rous, indicates that they
appeared less as agents of the accused during the alleged
investigation than they were agents of the police authorities. In
the case before us, it was the police authorities who brought the
accused, handcuffed, to the IBP headquarters where the services
of the lawyers were supposedly "engaged." No details of the
actual assistance rendered during the interrogation process were
furnished or alleged during the entire testimony of the lawyers in
open court. The bulk of the lawyers' oral testimonies merely gave
the trial court assurance that they supposedly explained to the
appellants their constitutional rights, that the signatures present
were their signatures and those of the accused, and that the
accused agreed to having the lawyers assist them during the
process of custodial investigation. 24
Clearly, the standards utilized by police authorities (and the
lawyers) to assure the constitutional rights of the accused in the
case at bench fall short of the standards demanded by our case
law and the Constitution itself.

In Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, 25 the Court defined the procedure which

law enforcement officers must observe in custodial investigations as
follows:
At the time, a person is arrested, it shall be the
duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement he might make
could be used against him. The person arrested
shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means by telephone if possible
or by letter of messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it
that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The
right to counsel may be waived but the waiver
shall not be valid unless made with the assistance
of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of
the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be inadmissible in evidence. 26
The rules laid down in Morales were reiterated in 1985 case
of People vs. Galit. 27
The 1987 Constitution provided a stricter rule by mandating that
waiver of the right to counsel must be made not only in the

presence of counsel but also in writing. Article III, Section 12

provides:
1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of the right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Section 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court requires, moreover,
that a confession, to be admissible, must beexpress.
Finally, Republic Act 7438 mandates that the entire confession
must be in writing. 28
In all, under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law
and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all
of four fundamental requirements: 1) the confession must be
voluntary 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be
express and 4) the confession must be in writing.
It is noteworthy that the modifiers competent and independent
were terms absent in all organic laws previous to the 1987
Constitution. Their addition in the fundamental law of 1987 was
meant to stress the primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the
choice, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial
investigation, by according the accused, deprived of normal
conditions guaranteeing individual autonomy, an informed
judgment based on the choices given to him by a competent and
independent lawyer.

Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigations

should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the
individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one
furnished in the accused's behalf, it is important that he should be
competent and independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully
safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as
distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine,
peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's
constitutional rights. In People vs. Basay, this Court stressed that
an accused's right to be informed of the right to remain silent and
to counsel "contemplates the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." 29
Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing
custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) "should
be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter's relative or
person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court,
upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the
accused to file such petition." 30 Lawyers engaged by the police,
whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and
supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas,
the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities
can be symbiotic.
Conditions vary at every stage of the process of custodial
investigation. What may satisfy constitutional requirements of
voluntariness at the investigation's onset may not be sufficient as
the investigation goes on. There would be denial of the right to
the assistance of competent and independent counsel if the
investigation or, as in the case before us, during the process of
signing. The competent or independent lawyer so engaged
should be present from the beginning to end, i.e., at all stages of
the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every
turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a

while either to give advice to the accused that he may either

continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.
The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial
investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives
perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the
rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is
so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired. If the
lawyer's role is reduced to being that of a mere witness to the
signing of a pre-prepared document albeit indicating therein
compliance with the accused's constitutional rights, the
constitutional standard guaranteed by Article III, Section 12 (1) is
not met. The process above-described fulfills the prophylactic
purpose of the constitutional provision by avoiding "the pernicious
practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the
commission of the offense" 31 and ensuring that the accused's
waiver of his right to self incrimination during the investigation is an
informed one in all aspects.
The process of assisting appellants in the case at bench as
described by the lawyers in their testimony therefore hardly meets
the standard of effective and meaningful communication required
by the 1987 Constitution, when its framers decided to add the
modifiers competent and independent to the requirement for
counsel during the process of custodial investigations.
The failure to meet the constitutional requirement for competent
and independent counsel and the glaring inconsistencies in
documents purportedly executed under the trained and watchful
eyes of the lawyers who allegedly were of assistance to the
accused during the process of custodial investigation - taken
together with the manner in which the signatures of the accused
were affixed into the confessions cast a serious doubt on their
due execution, and support the contention that the sworn

statements executed by the appellants were already prepared

and signed at the police headquarters before the statements were
brought to the QC-IBP office for signing. During the trial, Daniega
testified to the following:
Q Was Atty. Sansano present when this alleged sinumpaang
salaysay was taken from you by questions and answers which
consist of 31 questions and 32 answers?
A No, because this statement was signed by me at the police
station and then we brought it to the IBP office. 32
In his cross-examination, the other accused, Diaz likewise
testified as follows:
Q Who told you to sign this document?
A That paper, we made that at the headquarters.
Q Do you know who prepared this at the headquarters?
A It was Pat. Maniquis.
Q And Pat. Maniquis was typing this while he was asking you this
question?
A. I did not see that paper while he was investigating me, it was
later, he showed that to me, maam.
Q For how long a time more or less (did) Pat. Maniquis
investigate(d) you?
A About one hour maam.

Q And after that one hour, how long a time elapse(d) before you
were brought to the IBP Bldg.

Q But can you read tagalog?

A Yes maam.

A Two or three in the afternoon.

Q And when you were told to sign this document, at the IBP
Bldg., Pat. Maniquis, who were the person(s) present aside from
you and Pat. Maniquis?
Atty. Gojar:

Q And you did not take any opportunity to read this before you
sign(ed) it?
A Everything went fast, sir.
Q After you signed this how long a time elapse(d) before you
went to Quezon City IBP?

He did not sign that in the IBP, your Honor. It was at the
headquarters.

Atty. Gojar:

A I signed that document(s) at the police headquarters.

It was already answered, your honor.

Q What time more or less was that, when you signed that
document?

Q What time did you sign this?

A About lunch time.

Q Was that after Pat. Maniquis investigated you?
A Yes maam.
Q Who were present at the time Pat. Maniquis told you to sign
this?
A I don't know them, I only remember Pat. Maniquis.
Q Did you have any occasion to read this before you sign(ed)
this?
A No maam, he just asked me to sign it.

A I signed it about ten to eleven in the morning ad we went to IBP

about two or three in the afternoon. 33 (Emphasis supplied.)
Together with all the legal deficiencies pointed out so far, it would
not be difficult for us to give credence to appellants' testimonies to
the effect that the investigation was actually conducted in the
absence of counsel in one place (the QC SID headquarters) and
signed in the presence of counsel in another (the QC IBP office).
Appellants, who were not trained in the law, would not have
understood the constitutional nuances of the fact that the
confessions and the signing of the documents evidencing the
confessions were obtained in different places. Assuming they
were couched, appellants were quite vehement as they were
consistent in their separate oral testimonies, and one or both of
them would have withered, in any case, on intense cross
examination.

These facts lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the

confessions of both defendants were obtained in the absence of
independent and competent counsel as mandated by the 1987
Constitution and that the same may have been acquired under
conditions negating voluntariness, as alleged by the accused. 34
In fine, the likelihood for compulsion is forcefully apparent in
every custodial investigation. A person compelled under the
circumstances obtaining in every custodial investigation is
surrounded by psychologically hostile forces and the threat of
physical violence so that the information extracted is hardly
voluntary. In the oftentimes highly intimidating setting of a police
investigation, the potential for suggestion is strong.
Every so often, courts are confronted with the difficult task of
taking a hard look into the sufficiency of extra-judicial confessions
extracted by law enforcement authorities as the sole basis for
convicting accused individuals. In cases of crimes notable for
their brutality and ruthlessness, the impulse to find the culprits at
any cost occasionally tempts these agencies to take shortcuts
and disregard constitutional and legal safeguards intended to
bring about a reasonable assurance that only the guilty are
punished. Our courts, in the process of establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, play a central role in bringing about this
assurance by determining whether or not the evidence gathered
by law enforcement agencies scrupulously meets exacting
standards fixed by the Constitution. If the standards are not met,
the Constitution provides the corresponding remedy by providing
a strict exclusionary rule,i.e., that "[a]ny confession or admission
obtained in violation of (Article III, Section 12[1]) . . . hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence." 35
There is a distinct possibility that the confessions given by the
appellants in the case at bench might speak the truth. Judges
face unimaginable pressures from all areas, including the

pressure of their heavy dockets. They are on the forefront of the

government's battle against crime. Were it not for the defects
inherent in the confessions, and the contradictions and
inconsistencies here noted, the trial court's well-written opinion in
the case at bench an eloquent example of the earnest
attempts judges make to battle crime, would have been readily
sustained by this Court. Yet again, there remains the possibility
that the real assailants lurk free somewhere, thanking their luck.
What can only be said, in relation to the unfortunate
circumstances of the case at bench has already been said, ad
nauseam, in a number of cases before this. In People
v. Javar, 36 for instance, we emphasized, conformably with Art. III,
Sec. 12 of the Constitution that:
Any statement obtained in violation of the
constitutional provision, or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession
speaks the truth, if it was made without the
assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in
evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or
even if it had been voluntarily given.
We stress, once again, that the exclusionary rules adopted by the
framers of the 1987 Constitution were designed, not to vindicate
the constitutional rights of lawbreakers but to protect the rights of
all citizens, especially the innocent, in the only conceivable way
those rights could be effectively protected, by removing the
incentive of law enforcement and other officials to obtain
confessions by the easy route, either by psychological and
physical torture, or by methods which fall short of the standard
provided by the fundamental law. Allowing any profit gained
through such methods furnishes an incentive for law enforcement
officials to engage in constitutionally proscribed methods of law
enforcement, and renders nugatory the only effective
constitutional protections available to citizens.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, appellants Rey

Daniega y Macoy and Hoyle Diaz y Urnillo are
herebyACQUITTED of the crime of Rape with Homicide. Their
immediate release from custody is hereby ordered unless they
are being held on other legal grounds.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE v LUCERO
PUNO, J.:
If the Constitution has any value, it is because it stands up for
those who cannot stand up for themselves. Thus, it protected
those under custodial investigation with the all-important right to
counsel. We hold that the right to counsel cannot be diluted
without tampering the scales of justice. For denial of his right to
counsel, we acquit accused-appellant.
Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter
Doe, Richard Doe and John Doe were charged with the crime of
robbery with homicide. The Information against them reads:
That on or about the 7th day of May, 1988, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one
another , did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously rob one DR. DEMETRIO Z.
MADRID, in the manner as follows: on the date
and in the place aforementioned, the said
accused, one armed with handgun, pursuant to
their conspiracy blocked the way of the said
complainant who was on board a Mercedez Benz
crusing along Road 14 near (the) corner (of)
Mindanao Avenue, Pag-asa, this City, and did
then and there, by means of violence and
intimidation against persons, take, rob and carry
away his cash money amounting to P6,600.00;
one gold necklace with cross pendant, 7 karat,

worth P45,000.00; one (1) gold Rolex watch worth

P155,000.00; one (1) 3 karat gold ring worth
P80,000.00; one 2 karat gold ring, domino style,
worth P27,000.00; one (1) solid gold bracelet
worth 363,600.00, Philippine Currency, belonging
to said DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended party
in the total amount aforementioned; that on the
occasion of the robbery and pursuant to their
conspiracy, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill, and taking advantage the(ir) superior
strength, with the use of handgun, shot
LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, a driver of the
said offended party, thus inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds which resulted to the
insta(n)taneous death of the said LORENZO
BERNALES y ALERIA, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said LORENZO
BERNALEZ y ALERIA in such amount as may be
awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil
Code.

the group of Balbino and Bienvenido Echavez would rob him on

his way home. He heeded the advice.

Contrary to law. 1

After driving them around the area for a couple of hours, the
malefactors stopped his car and alighted. The worst came. The
man at the right side of his driver shot the latter at the chest
before fleeing. Dr. Madrid and his driver were rushed by
concerned citizens to the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Two hours
later, his driver died of hemorrhage as a result of the gunshot
wound he sustained. 4 Dr. Madrid survived. 5 He reported the
incident to the Quezon City police. When no action was taken on his
case, he filed his complaint with the Special Operations Group of the
Central Intelligence Service (CIS). 6

Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were

apprehended. The others remained at large.
Trial proceeded only as against the three.
The evidence on record shows that on May 6, 1988, private
complainant DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID spent the night at his
boarding house, located at #35 Ilocos Norte Street, Bago-Bantay,
Quezon City. He wanted to return that night to his residence at
Project 6, Quezon City. However, his driver, Lorenzo Bernales,
advised him not to leave that night for Bernales overheard that

It was around 7:00 a.m., the next day, that Dr. Madrid again
asked his driver to bring him to his main residence in Project 6,
Quezon City. While traversing Road 14, a gray-reddish car
overtook the Mercedes Benz he was riding and blocked their way.
Three (3) men swiftly alighted from the car blocking them and
barged into his Benz. The first grabbed the driver's seat and
pushed his driver to the other side of the seat. The second
occupied the right side of his driver. The third sat beside Dr.
Madrid at the back sent and punched him. Simultaneously, the
man at the right side of his driver pulled out his gun and
announced a hold-up. 2
The man beside Dr. Madrid divested him of the following: a gold
Rolex watch, studded with diamonds, worth P155,000.00, a three
(3) carat diamond ring worth P80,000.00, another two (2) carat
domino-style ring, surrounded with diamonds worth P27,000.00, a
necklace worth P27,000.00, a bracelet worth P50,000.00, and his
wallet containing P6,600.00. 3

Two months later, the CIS efforts paid-off. On July 23, 1988, the
Special Operations Group headed by Capt. Raul Boac, after a

surveillance of the suspects, interrogated Bienvenido Echavez in

Camp Crame. Two days later, they apprehended Balbino
Echavez and Alejandro Lucero. They turned them over to the
Investigation Department of the CIS. 7
Pfc. Alberto Pursal was assigned to conduct the investigation of
the suspects. He declared that even before the investigation
started, Lucero verbally admitted his participation in the crime and
that he was the one who shot Bernales, the driver of Dr. Madrid. 8
In any event, Pfc. Pursal went thru the motions of investigation.
He informed Lucero of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel. When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer,
Pursal informed that CIS Legal Department about Lucero's need
for a lawyer. 9 In due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta appeared at the
investigator's office at around 9:00 p.m. He identified himself as the
lawyer who was requested to assist Lucero and inquired about the
latter's whereabouts. He was then directed to where Lucero was.
Atty. Peralta conferred with Lucero. He also apprised Lucero of
his constitutional rights. He explained to Lucero that he has the
right to remain silent, that he is not obliged to give any statement
to the investigators, and that even if he has already given a
statement, he may refuse to sign it. He observed no reaction from
Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that
Lucero understood his advice.
Thereafter, the CIS investigator began taking down Lucero's
statement. When the investigator started asking the preliminary
questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend, Capt.
Emilio Dacanay, at Fort Bonifacio. He gave word that in case of
need, he could be reached at his residence.
The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by two (2) CIS
agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The extrajudicial statement of

Lucero (Exhibit "C"), was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was

already signed by Lucero. In the presence of the two (2) CIS
agents, Atty. Peralta examined Exhibit "C" and explained to
Lucero its Legal implications. He asked Lucero whether he gave
the statements voluntarily. Lucero replied in the affirmative. Atty.
Peralta then signed Exhibit "C". 10
The three (3) accused denied complicity in the in the crime
charged.
Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that on May 7,
1988, he was at his house in Caloocan City. He woke up at 6:30
a.m., stayed at his house the whole day repairing the upholstery
of a customer's chair. He was then with his cousin Marcelino
Seneta and his wife Mylen Lucero. He worked until 5 p.m. that
day.
Lucero was apprehended on July 25, 1988, more than two (2)
months after the commission of the crime. He said he was
surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while he
was walking towards his house. They chased him, handcuffed
and blindfolded him and pushed him into a jeep. He was He was
blindfolded the whole night and did not know where he was taken.
The men turned out to be police officers. Later, he identified one
of the men to be Capt. Boak, head of the CIS Special Operations
Group.
The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed
that he was tortured. He was not informed of the offense for
which he was being investigated. Neither did they reveal the
identity of the complainant. A couple of days lapsed and a CIS
agent brought him to a clinic inside Camp Crame. The doctor saw
the contusions on his body. He advised that he be treated. The
CIS agent refused and they left the clinic.

Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the
other accused in this case. He said he only met Dr. Madrid at the
CIS Office during the police line-up. He was made to line-up four
(4) times before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth
time.

family; and b) to pay Dr. Demetrio Z. Madrid the

sum of P363,600.00 representing the cash
money, and money value of the jewelries and
wristwatch he lost due to the robbery at bar.
SO ORDERED. 14

Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession

(Exhibit "C") 11 under duress. He denied engaging the services of
Atty. Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not present
during his actual custodial interrogation. 12
After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for
insufficient evidence. The trial court, however, convicted accused
Lucero. The dispositive portion of the Decision 13 reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. The accused brothers BIENVENIDO ECHAVEZ
y VALIDA and BALBINO ECHAVEZ y VALIDA are
hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence;
and
2. Accused ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL is
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
as principal by direct participation of Robbery with
Homicide. Alejandro Lucero is hereby sentenced
to suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION
PERPETUA.
On the civil aspect, Alejandro Lucero is hereby
ordered a) to pay the heirs of the deceased victim
Lorenzo Bernales y Aleria the sum of P30,000.00
as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral
damages for the mental anguish suffered by his

Hence this appeal by Lucero, raising the following assignments of

error:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
MORE WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCES (SIC) OF
THE PROSECUTION WHICH WERE
INCONSISTENT, NOT CREDIBLE,
UNRELIABLE, DOUBTFUL AND INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
CONVICTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
ALLEGED CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT
CONSPIRACY WAS NOT PROVEN IN THIS
CASE.
3. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED ON THE BASIS OF HIS
ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION
(MADE IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION)
WHICH WAS OBTAINED THRU FORCE,
VIOLENCE AND WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF
COUNSEL OF HIS OWN CHOICE OR
ENGAGED BY ANY PERSON ON HIS BEHALF
OR APPOINTED BY THE LOWER COURT AND

THEREFORE SUFFERED CONSTITUTIONAL

INFIRMITIES.
4 THAT THE LOWER ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED WITH CERTITUDE BY THE
PROSECUTION.
5. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED PRIMARILY ON THE BASIS
OF THE WEAKNESS OF HIS DEFENSE OF
ALIBI AND NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE; AND INSPITE OF
THE LACK OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
6. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND NOT
ACQUITTING HIM LIKE HIS CO-ACCUSED AND
ALLEGED CO-CONSPIRATORS [THE ECHAVEZ
BROTHERS] OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
We find the appeal meritorious.
The conviction of appellant rests on two (2) facts: (a) his positive
identification by the complainant, and (b) his extra-judicial
confession admitting his participation in the crime. We find that
the evidence proving these facts cannot stand scrutiny.
Firstly, the credibility of the main prosecution eyewitness, Dr.
Demetrio Madrid who identified appellant, is seriously open to
doubt. It stands unrebutted on the record that appellant had to

participate at the police line-up four (4) timesbefore he was finally

identified by Dr. Madrid. There is no reason for the ambivalence.
The robbery took place in broad daylight and the three
malefactors wore no mask. They drove them around for three (3)
hours. Considering these circumstances, there is no reason for
Dr. Madrid's failure to immediately identify appellant.
We are also disconcerted by the vacillating testimony of Dr.
Madrid during the trial. Initially, Dr. Madrid claimed that he could
identify only one of the robbers who staged the hold-up. 15 At
another point, Dr. Madrid said he could identify two of the
malefactors. 16 In his affidavit, Dr. Madrid presented he could identify
all three. 17 Appellant's conviction cannot be made to rest on this
nebulous identification by Dr. Madrid.
Secondly, appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial confession.
The 1987 Constitution 18 requires that a person under investigation
for the commission of a crime should be provided with counsel. We
have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our hostility
against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting
confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and
render them inadmissible. 19 We take pride in constitutionalizing this
right to counsel even while other countries have desisted from
elevating this right to a higher pedestal. We have sustained the
inviolability of this precious right with vigor and without any apology.
The trial court did not display the required sensitivity to
appellant's right to counsel. Indeed, it did not impose a rigorous
respect for the right. It was satisfied that there was "substantial"
compliance with the requirements of right to counsel. This is far
from the intent of the Constitution. The records show that Atty.
Peralta's, who was not the counsel of choice of appellant, arrived
at the CIS Office an the second night of appellant's detention.
More exactly, he arrived at the CIS Office at around 9:00 p.m. and

talked with appellant about his rights. Atty. Peralta himself

admitted he received no reaction from appellant although his
impression was that appellant understood him. 20Worse, Atty.
Peralta left appellant in the custody of the CIS agents when his real
interrogation started. He said he had to attend the wake of a friend.
His attitude did not speak well of the importance he gave to his role
as counsel to a person under custodial interrogation for the
commission of a very serious offense. It was during his absence that
appellant gave an uncounselled confession. They tried to cure his
uncounselled confession for the next day, appellant was brought by
two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. In the presence of these
agents, Atty. Peralta asked appellant if he understood the statements
he gave and if he signed it voluntarily. Appellant, of course, affirmed
the voluntariness of the execution of the confession. Atty. Peralta
was satisfied and the trial court ruled that appellant's right to counsel
was not infringed. We disagree.
We hold that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel,
it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and
vigilant counsel. The circumstances in the case at bench clearly
demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from
Atty. Peralta. In People v. De Guzman, 21 we held that in custodial
investigation, the right to counsel attaches from the moment the
investigation starts, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from
the accused. In this case, at the crucial point when the interrogation
was just starting, Atty. Peralta left appellant to attend the wake of a
friend . At that critical stage, appellant gave his uncounselled extrajudicial a confession. Surely, such a confession where appellant was
unprotected from mischief cannot convict.
Neither can the trial court convict appellant on the ground that
alibi is inherently a weak defense. Chiseled in our jurisprudence
is the rule that the onus is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Given the uncertainty of
appellant's identification and the inadmissibility of his

uncounselled confession, there is no thread of evidence to

criminally inculpate appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. Q-88-201
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City , Branch CIII,
convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel of robbery with
homicide is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF HIS RIGHTS

PEOPLE V ROJAS
SCHAUER, J.
In a trial by the court, after proper waiver of jury,
defendants Rojas and Hidalgo were found guilty of a
charge of receiving stolen property. Defendants' motions
for new trial were denied. Rojas was granted probation

without imposition of sentence and Hidalgo was

On the day of March 4 Officer Lovold of the Los Angeles

sentenced to state prison. They appeal, respectively,

Police Department, who was investigating the Ventura

from the order granting probation, the judgment, and the

offense, saw William Hall sitting in an automobile on a

orders denying the motions for new trial.

Los Angeles street [55 Cal.2d 255] opposite a truck which

contained Taft's conduit. Hall was arrested and he and

Defendants urge that they were guilty of no crime (or, at

the truck were taken to a police station. Hall said that "he

most, of an attempt to receive stolen property) because

had an understanding with Mr. Hidalgo [one of the

when they received the property it had been recovered

defendants] that he would buy any and all electrical

by the police and was no longer in a stolen condition. The

appliances or electrical materials that he could get and

attorney general argues that because the thief stole the

that he had several transactions with him in the past."

property pursuant to prearrangement with defendants he

took it as their agent, and the crime of receiving stolen

On the afternoon of March 4 Hall made three telephone

property was complete when the thief began its

calls from the police station to Hidalgo's place of

asportation toward defendants and before the police

business. Officer Lovold listened to these conversations

intercepted him and recovered the property. fn. 1 We

on a telephone in another office. The person who

have concluded that defendants are guilty of attempting

answered the first call, at about 4:20 p. m., asked Hall to

to receive stolen goods; that other matters of which they

call back. Hall did so at about 4:35 and, according to

complain do not require a new trial; and that the appeal

Lovold's testimony, had the following conversation with a

should be disposed of by modifying the finding that

person who identified himself as "Joe" (which is Hidalgo's

defendants are guilty as charged to a determination that

first name): "Hall: "This is Bill. How about ... the conduit?

they are guilty of attempting to receive stolen property,

Are you ready for it?" Joe: "No, I don't have the money

and by reversing with directions to the trial court to enter

yet. Can you call me back around 7:00 o'clock? ... I have

such judgments or probation orders as it deems

to get some money ...."

appropriate based upon the modified finding.

Lovold further testified that at 7 p. m. Hall telephoned
During the night of March 3, 1959, electrical conduit

again, "had Hidalgo over the phone," and the following

worth about $4,500 was stolen from John Taft in Ventura.

conversation took place: Hall: "Hello, Joe .... This is Bill, ...

how about the material?" Joe: "Yes, you can bring it over.

day at noon and he would tell him where to get the truck

I don't have all the money now but I can give you a part

and ... the balance of the money which was $500.00."

of it now and the rest tomorrow. ... Bring the material but
don't bring the truck to my place of business.park it a

Officers Lovold and Bischonden, meanwhile, had followed

couple of blocks away. ... Come alone. Be here at 8:00

the truck from the police station. On Mott Street, after

o'clock."

Hall and Hidalgo left the truck, defendant Rojas arrived

and drove it to a lot by Rojas' place of business (a shop

On the night of March 4, Hall, accompanied by Police

and warehouse). The officers "staked out" the truck and

Officer Saville in plain clothes, drove the truck of conduit

later on the night of March 4 saw the two defendants

to about two blocks from Hidalgo's electrical shop. They

examine its contents and then leave.

walked to the shop. Hall introduced Officer Saville to

Hidalgo as "Rudy" (the name of Hall's cousin). Hidalgo

At 8 o'clock the following morning Rojas opened his shop

said that he did not want the truck brought to his shop

and began to unload the conduit from the truck. Rojas

because "his place was 'hot' and was being watched by

was then placed under arrest.

the police." At Hidalgo's request Hall and Saville returned

to the truck and drove it, following Hidalgo in his car, to
Mott Street, where they parked. There Hidalgo left for
about 30 minutes, returned and told Hall and Saville to
leave the keys in the truck, and drove them to still
another location in Hidalgo's car. Hidalgo referred to the
"last time I got stuff from you guys," and said that "I
know you guys will let me make money"; that he would
pay $700 for the present load; that "in the future he
would prefer ... doing business with Hall alone. Who Hall
split with was his business but for his protection, Hall's
protection, to come alone." Hidalgo [55 Cal.2d 256] paid
Hall $200 and "instructed Hall to call him the following

Lieutenant Lauritzen, one of the arresting officers, said,

"You know that this property was stolen." Rojas replied, "I
know that it was stolen but I'm not making any money
out of it myself. ... I'm not kidding and it's no use trying to
kid you. You know it's stolen and I know it's stolen."
The offense with which defendants were charged and of
which they were convicted was receiving "property which
has been stolen ..., knowing the same to be so stolen."
(Pen. Code, 496, subd. 1; italics added.) Defendants,
relying particularly upon People v. Jaffe (1906), 185 N.Y.
497, 501 [78 N.E. 169, 7 Ann.Cas. 348, 9 L.R.A. N.S. 263,

266], urge that they neither received stolen goods nor

[345 P.2d 543], "The rule of the Jaffe case has been the

criminally attempted to do so because the conduit, when

subject of much criticism and discussion." (See Smith,

defendants received it, was not in a stolen condition but

Two Problems in Criminal Attempts (1957), 70 Harv.L.Rev.

had been recovered by the police. In the Jaffe case the

422, 439; Sayre, Criminal Attempts (1928), 41 Harv.L.Rev.

stolen property was recovered by the owner while it was

821, 853; Keedy, Criminal Attempts at Common Law

en route to the would-be receiver and, by arrangement

(1954), 102 Pa.L.Rev. 464, 476; Strahorn, The Effect of

with the police, was delivered to such receiver as a

Impossibility on Criminal Attempts (1930), 78 Pa.L.Rev.

decoy, not as property in a stolen condition. The New

962, 990; Arnold, Criminal Attempts (1930), 40 Yale L.J.

York Court of Appeals held that there was no attempt to

53, 77; A.L.I. Model Penal Code, Tent. Draft No. 10 (1960),

receive stolen goods "because neither [defendant] nor

p. 30.) [1] In our opinion the following criticism (Hall,

anyone else in the world could know that the property

General Principles of Criminal Law (1947), p. 127) is

was stolen property inasmuch as it was not in fact stolen

sound: "The confusion between what the defendant

property. ... If all which an accused person intends to do

actually did and his intent is apparent. Intent is in the

would if done constitute no crime it cannot be a crime to

mind; it is not the external realities to which intention

attempt to do with the same purpose a part of the thing

refers. The fact that defendant was mistaken regarding

intended."

the external realities did not alter his intention, but

simply made it impossible to effectuate it."

Defendants also cited People v. Zimmerman (1909), 11

Cal.App. 115, 118 [104 P. 590], which contains the

The situation here is materially like those considered in

following dictum concerning a state of facts like that in

People v. Camodeca (1959), 52 Cal.2d 142, 146-147 [6-9]

the Jaffe case: "The circumstances of the transaction ...

[338 P.2d 903] (attempted theft by false pretenses); and

did not constitute an offense, as the goods were taken to

People v. Lavine (1931), 115 Cal.App. 289, 300-301 [11]

the defendant's house with the consent and at the

[1 P.2d 496] (attempted extortion). Each of those cases is

request of the owner." [55 Cal.2d 257]

decided on the hypothesis that the defendants had the

specific intent to commit the substantive offense and that

As pointed out by the District Court of Appeal in Faustina

under the circumstances as the defendants reasonably

v. Superior Court (1959), 174 Cal.App.2d 830, 833 [1]

saw them they did the acts necessary to consummate

the substantive offense; but because of circumstances

lost their "stolen" status, any more than the criminality of

unknown to defendants, essential elements of the

the attempt in the case of In re Magidson (1917), 32

substantive crime were lacking. [2] Here, the goods did

Cal.App. 566, 568 [163 P. 689], was destroyed by

not have the status of stolen property and therefore

impossibility caused by the fact that the police had

defendants, although believing them to be stolen, could

recovered the goods and taken them from the place

not have had actual knowledge of that condition. In

where the would-be receiver went to get them. In our

People v. Werner (1940), 16 Cal.2d 216, 225 [105 P.2d

opinion the consequences of intent and acts such as

927], overruled by Camodeca, the "victim" was not

those of defendants here should be more serious than

deceived by defendants' false representations and

pleased amazement that because of the timeliness of the

therefore there was no lack of consent to the taking of

police the projected criminality was not merely detected

the property. In the Lavine case, supra, the pretending

but also wiped out. (Cf. People v. Jelke (1956), 1 N.Y.2d

victim was not induced by fear to part with any money;

321, 329 [152 N.Y.S.2d 479, 135 N.E. 213], explaining the

rather, the "victim" told the district attorney of the

Jaffe decision, supra, 185 N.Y. 497, as a case "like selling

asserted or proposed attempt and by prior arrangement

oil stock and being surprised to discover that oil was

between the district attorney and the "victim" the

actually in the ground where the accused vendor had

"extorted" money was paid to defendants who were

represented but not believed it to be"--conduct which the

immediately thereafter arrested by officers who were

New York Court of Appeals apparently feels is not

awaiting the event. It is held (p. 300 [11] of 115 Cal.App.)

criminal.)

that "in attempted extortion the crime depends upon the

acts, mind [55 Cal.2d 258] and intent of the person

We approve the holding of the Faustina case (1959),

threatening and not upon the effect or result upon the

supra, page 834 of 174 Cal.App.2d, that upon a state of

person to be coerced."

facts such as that here, "Even though we say that,

technically, the [goods] were not 'stolen' nevertheless

[3] In the case at bench the criminality of the attempt is

the defendant did attempt to receive stolen property."

not destroyed by the fact that the goods, having been

The dictum in the Zimmerman case (1909), supra, p. 118

recovered by the commendably alert and efficient action

of 11 Cal.App., that such a state of facts does not

of the Los Angeles police, had, unknown to defendants,

constitute a crime is disapproved.

The People would have us go farther and hold that the

The People's second theory that the evidence supports

evidence here supports the finding that defendants are

the finding that the crime of receiving stolen property

guilty of the consummated offense of receiving stolen

was consummated proceeds as follows: The thief, Hall,

property. In this regard the People advance two theories.

stole pursuant to a prearranged "understanding with Mr.

[4] The first is that the goods, when they came into the

Hidalgo that he [defendant Hidalgo] would buy any and

hands of defendants, had not lost their stolen character

all electrical appliances or electrical materials that he

because Officer Saville, the "undercover man," was

[Hall] could get." Therefore, they were accomplices; both

acting as "agent" of the city and not of the true owner.

Hall and defendants, as members of the conspiracy, were

We believe that both the owner and the police would take

liable to prosecution as principals either in the crime of

unkindly to the suggestion that property which has been

theft or in the crime of receiving stolen property. (People

the subject of larceny and has then been recovered by

v. Lima (1944), supra, 25 Cal.2d 573, 578-579 [3, 4];

law enforcement officers remains "stolen" while it is

People v. Raven (1955), 44 Cal.2d 523, 526 [5] [282 P.2d

under the surveillance of the police. It seems obvious

866].) Upon this view of the situation, the People say, the

that stolen property, recaptured by the police, no longer

crime of receiving stolen goods was completed by Hall,

has the status of stolen goods but, rather, is held by the

as "agent" for defendants, when he put the goods in his

police in trust for, or for the account of, the owner. (The

truck in Ventura and started driving to Los Angeles.

precise [55 Cal.2d 259] nature of the bailment is not here

material.) State v. Marsalise (1931), 172 La. 796, 802-803

The People's attempt to apply rules of the law of agency

[5] [135 So. 361], cited by the People, concerns a feigned

to the law of crimes in this situation is inappropriate. [5]

accomplice who cooperated with but was not a member

The thief, even when he steals pursuant to a conspiracy

of the police; it does not discuss, and upon its facts does

with a prospective receiver, cannot receive the stolen

not raise, the problem of stolen goods which come into

goods from himself. It is true that, under the rule of the

actual possession of their owner or the police and are

Lima case (1944), supra, 25 Cal.2d 573, 578-579 [3, 4],

then sent on their way to the intended receiver as a

[6] Hall might have become criminally liable as a receiver

decoy.

if the crime of receiving stolen goods had been

completed by delivery of the goods to Hidalgo while they
were still in a stolen condition, but that crime was not

consummated. Hall was not a servant of Hidalgo whose

205 [1] [300 P.2d 837].) There is no evidence as to

possession or custody, under agency principles, was that

whether Hall did or did not know of or consent to Lovold's

of Hidalgo, nor was there some moment during Hall's

listening to the conversations, and defendants at the trial

asportation of the stolen property when he ceased to act

did not object to the admission of the evidence on the

as a thief and became, in contemplation of law, a

ground of their present contention. Therefore, the merits

receiver.

of the contention were not before the trial court and are
not before this court. (See Coy v. Superior Court

[7] Defendants urge that they were convicted upon the

(1959), 51 Cal.2d 471, 473 [2] [334 P.2d 569]; Robinson

uncorroborated admissions of the accomplice Hall. (Hall

v. Superior Court (1957),49 Cal.2d 186, 187 [1] [316 P.2d

was called as a witness by defendants, not by the

1].)

People.) The contention is without merit. Defendants

were firmly tied to the charged offense by the testimony

[9] Defendants (as an alternative to their contention that

of the police officers who heard defendants' own

there was no crime) urge that the evidence establishes

admissions and saw their conduct.

the defense of entrapment. Their reliance on this defense

is misplaced. The police here simply detected and

[8] Defendants contend that Officer Lovold's evidence of

observed the criminal activities of defendants without

the telephone calls of Hall to defendant Hidalgo was

calling them to a halt until they had come near to

obtained [55 Cal.2d 260] in violation of the Federal

apparent completion. There is no suggestion in the

Communications Act (47 U.S.C.A. 605) fn. 2 and section

evidence that the officers were carrying out "illegal or

640 of the California Penal Code fn. 3 and therefore was

unjust schemes designed to foster rather than prevent

inadmissible under the exclusionary rule of People v.

and detect crime." (People v. Benford (1959), 53 Cal.2d 1,

Cahan (1955), 44 Cal.2d 434, 445 [7] [282 P.2d 905, 50

9 [345 P.2d 928].)

A.L.R.2d 513]. (See Rathbun v. United States (1957), 355

U.S. 107, 110 [78 S.Ct. 161, 2 L.Ed.2d 134]; People v.

[10] Section 1159 of the Penal Code provides that a

Dement (1957), 48 Cal.2d 600, 605 [5, 6] [311 P.2d 505];

defendant may be found guilty of an attempt to commit

People v. Malotte (1956), 46 Cal.2d 59, 63-64 [1- 3] [292

the offense with which he is charged. fn. 4 Section 1181

P.2d 517]; People v. Graff (1956), 144 Cal.App.2d 199,

(subd. 6) provides, "When the ... finding is contrary to law

or evidence, but if the evidence shows the defendant to

be not guilty of the degree of the crime of which he was
convicted, but guilty of a ... lesser crime included therein,
the court [the [55 Cal.2d 261] appellate court as well as
the trial court] may modify the ... finding or judgment
accordingly ...." (See also Pen. Code, 1260; People v.
Bridgehouse (1956) 47 Cal.2d 406, 414 [5] [303 P.2d
1018]; People v. Jackson (1955), 44 Cal.2d 511, 521 [282
P.2d 898].)
The orders denying defendants' motions for new trial are
affirmed. The trial court's finding that defendants are
guilty as charged is modified to find them guilty of the
offense of attempting to receive stolen property. The
judgment and probation order are reversed and the
cause is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the views hereinabove
expressed, and with directions to enter such lawful
judgment or order against each defendant, based on the
modified finding, as the court deems appropriate.

WAIVER
PEOPLE V GALIT
CONCEPCION, JR., J:

1. The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion
of a robbery. He had been detained and interrogated almost
continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained
his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime.
Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A confession was
absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul
him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his
innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be
obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They
covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl
full of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His
body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the
indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted
what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed
the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for
pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a
reenactment.
2. This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in
Hitler's Germany. But no it did not. It happened in the Philippines.
In this case before Us.
3. The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of
prisoners as follows:
ART. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. The
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period
to prision correccional in its minimum period, in
addition to his liability for the physical injuries or
damage caused, shall be imposed upon any
public officer or employee who shall over do
himself in the correction or handling of a prisoner
or detention prisoner under his charge, by the
imposition of punishments in a cruel and
humiliating manner.
If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a
confession, or to obtain some information from the

prisoner, the offender shall be punished by prision

correccional in its minimum period, temporary
special disqualification and a fine not exceeding
500 pesos, in addition to his liability for the
physical injuries or damage caused.
4. This Court in a long line of decisions over the years, the latest
being the case of People vs. Cabrera, 1 has consistently and
strongly condemned the practice of maltreating prisoners to extort
confessions from them as a grave and unforgivable violation of
human rights. But the practice persists. Fortunately, such instances
constitute the exception rather than the general rule.
5. Before Us for mandatory review is the death sentence imposed
upon the accused Francisco Galit by the Circuit Criminal Court of
Pasig, Rizal, in Crim. Case No. CCC-VII-2589 of said court.
6. The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1977, Mrs.
Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the bedroom of
her house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a
result of seven (7) wounds inflicted upon different parts of her
body by a blunt instrument. 2 More than two weeks thereafter, police
authorities of Montalban picked up the herein accused, Francisco
Galit, an ordinary construction worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal,
on suspicion of the murder. On the following day, however,
September 8, 1977, the case was referred to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view of the alleged
limited facilities of the Montalban police station. Accordingly, the
herein accused was brought to the NBI where he was investigated
by a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. 3 NBI Agent Flores
conducted a preliminary interview of the suspect who allegedly gave
evasive answers to his questions. 4 But the following day, September
9, 1977, Francisco Galit voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting
participation in the commission of the crime. He implicated Juling
Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions in the crime. 5 As a
result, he was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in
an information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of August 1977 in

the municipality of Montalban, province of Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together with Juling
Doe and Pabling Doe, whose true Identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and three
of them mutually helping and aiding one another,
with intent of gain and by means of force,
intimidation and violence upon the person of one
Natividad Fernando while in her dwelling, did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
take, steal and carry away from the person of said
Natividad Fernando, cash money of an
undetermined amount, belonging to said
Natividad Fernando, thereby causing damage and
prejudice to the latter in an undetermined amount;
that by reason or on the occasion of said robbery,
and for purpose of enabling them (accused) to
take, steal and carry away the said cash money in
pursuance of their conspiracy and for the purpose
of insuring the success of their criminal act, with
intent to kill, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a
dagger said Natividad Fernando on the different
parts of her body, thereby inflicting multiple
injuries on the head and extremities, which
directly caused her death, and the total amount of
the loss is P10,000.00 including valuables and
cash.
Trial was held, and on August 11, 1978, immediately after the
accused had terminated the presentation of his evidence, the trial
judge dictated his decision on the case in open court, finding the
accused guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the death
penalty; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P110,000.00, and to pay the costs. Hence, the present recourse.

7. The incriminatory facts of the case, as found by the trial court,

are as follows:
From the evidence adduced in this case, it was
gathered that in the early morning of August 23,
1977, a 70-year old woman named Natividad
Fernando, widow, in the twilight of her life, was
robbed and then hacked to death by the accused
and two others in her (victim's) own residence at
Montalban, Rizal.
Prosecution witness Florentino Valentino testified
that he heard accused Francisco Galit and his
wife having an argument in connection with the
robbery and killing of the victim, Natividad
Fernando. It appears that on August 18, 1977,
accused Galit and two others, namely, Juling
Dulay and a certain "Pabling" accidentally met
each other at Marikina, Rizal, and in their
conversation, the three agreed to rob Natividad
Fernando; that it was further agreed among them
to enter the premises of the victim's house at the
back yard by climbing over the fence; that once
inside the premises, they will search every room,
especially the aparador and filing cabinets, with
the sole aim of looking for cash money and other
valuables.
Witness Valentino further testified that on August
22, 1977, at around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
accused Francisco Galit and his two companions,
Juling Dulay and Pabling, as per their previous
agreement, met at the place where they formerly
saw each other in Mariquina, Rizal; that the three
conspirators took a jeepney for Montalban and
upon passing the Montalban Municipal Building,
they stopped and they waited at the side of the
road until the hour of midnight; that at about 12:00

o'clock that night, the three repaired to the

premises of the victim, Natividad Fernando; that
they entered the said premises through the back
wall of the house; that while entering the premises
of said house, Juling Dulay saw a bolo, lying near
the piggery compound, which he picked up and
used it to destroy the back portion of the wall of
the house; that it was Juling Dulay who first
entered the house through the hole that they
made, followed by the accused Galit and next to
him was "Pabling", that it was already early dawn
of August 23, 1977 when the three were able to
gain entrance into the house of the victim; as the
three could not find anything valuable inside the
first room that they entered, Juling Dulay
destroyed the screen of the door of the victim,
Natividad Fernando; that upon entering the room
of the victim, the three accused decided to kill first
the victim, Natividad Fernando, before searching
the room for valuables; that Juling Dulay, who was
then holding the bolo, began hacking the victim,
who was then sleeping, and accused Galit heard
a moaning sound from the victim; that after the
victim was killed, the three accused began
searching the room for valuables; that they helped
each other in opening the iron cabinet inside the
room of the victim, where they found some
money; that when the three accused left the room
of the victim, they brought with them some papers
and pictures which they threw outside; that after
killing and robbing the victim, the three accused
went out of the premises of the house, using the
same way by which they gained entrance, which
was through the back portion of the wall; that the
three accused walked towards the river bank
where they divided the loot that they got from the
room of the victim; that their respective shares
amount to P70.00 for each of them; and that after

receiving their shares of the loot, the three

accused left and went home.
When witness Florentino Valentino was in his
room, which was adjoining that of accused
Francisco Galit, he overheard accused Galit and
his wife quarreling about the intention of accused
Galit to leave their residence immediately; that he
further stated that he overheard accused Galit
saying that he and his other two companions
robbed and killed Natividad Fernando.
As a result of the killing, the victim, Natividad
Fernando, suffered no less than seven stab
wounds. There was massive cerebral hemorrhage
and the cause of death was due to shock and
hemorrhage, as evidenced by the Medico-Legal
Necropsy Report (Exhs. 'C' and 'C-2'), and the
pictures taken of the deceased victim (Exhs. 'E',
'E-1' and 'E-2').
8. The accused, upon the other hand, denied participation in the
commission of the crime. He claimed that he was in his house in
Marikina, Rizal, when the crime was committed in Montalban,
Rizal. He also assailed the admissibility of the extra-judicial
confession extracted from him through torture, force and
intimidation as described earlier, and without the benefit of
counsel.
9. After a review of the records, We find that the evidence
presented by the prosecution does not support a conviction. In
fact, the findings of the trial court relative to the acts attributed to
the accused are not supported by competent evidence. The
principal prosecution witness, Florentino Valentino merely
testified that he and the accused were living together in one
house in Marikina, Rizal, on August 23, 1977, because the
mother of his wife is the wife of the accused; that when he
returned home at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning from the

police station of Marikina, Rizal, the accused and his wife were
quarreling (nagtatalo); that he heard that the accused was leaving
the house because he and his companions had robbed "Aling
Nene", the owner of a poultry farm and piggery in Montalban,
Rizal; that the wife of the accused was imploring him not to leave,
but the latter was insistent; that he saw the accused carrying a
bag containing about two handfuls (dakot) of coins which he had
taken from Aling Nene; that upon learning of what the accused
had done, he went to the Montalban police the next day and
reported to the police chief about what he had heard; and that a
week later, Montalban policemen went to their house and
arrested the accused. 6
10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 7 laid
down the correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making
an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation, and which We
reiterate:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the
duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement he might make
could be used against him. The person arrested
shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means by telephone if possible
or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it
that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The
right to counsel may be waived but the waiver
shall not be valid unless made with the assistance

of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of

the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
11. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the
accused, no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the
accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against the
accused is his alleged confession. It behooves Us therefore to
give it a close scrutiny. The statement begins as follows:

I. TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyo ang

inyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng SaligangBatas ng Pilipinas na kung inyong nanaisin ay
maaaring hindi kayo magbigay ng isang
salaysay, na hindi rin kayo maaaring pilitin o
saktan at pangakuan upang magbigay ng
naturang salaysay, na anuman ang inyong
sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring
laban sa inyo sa anumang usapin na maaaring
ilahad sa anumang hukuman o tribunal dito sa
Pilipinas, na sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay
maaaring katulungin mo ang isang
manananggol at kung sakaling hindi mo
kayang bayaran ang isang manananggol ay
maaaring bigyan ka ng isa ng NBI. Ngayon at
alam mo na ang mga ito nakahanda ka bang
magbigay ng isang kusang-loob na salaysay
sa pagtatanong na ito?

SAGOT: Opo.
12. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does
not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be
informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead
there should be several short and clear questions and every right
explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the
person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is
no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of
his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his

lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other

relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for
investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had
executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him.
His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to
counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by
one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not
assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross
violations of his rights.
13. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed reenactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were
obtained in a manner contrary to law.
14. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the
circumstances surrounding the taking of any confession,
especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into
giving one. Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the
same must be rejected in toto.
15. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice
for whatever action he may deem proper to take against the
investigating officers.
16. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it
is hereby, SET ASIDE, and another one entered ACQUITTING
the accused Francisco Galit of the crime charged. Let him be
released from custody immediately unless held on other charges.
With costs de oficio.
17. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE V OLVIS
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court to
Zamboanga Del Norte sitting in Dipolog City. 1 The case was certified to
this Court on January 19, 1985 following the death sentences imposed on each of the three

accused-appellants, Romulo Villarojo, Leonardo Cademas, and Dominador Sorela (the

accused first-named, Anacleto Olvis, was acquitted), over which, under the Constitution

we exercised exclusive appellate jurisdiction. 3 With the

promulgation of the 1987 Charter, abolishing the death penalty and
commuting death penalties already imposed to reclusion
perpetua 4 we, on May 14, 1987, issued a death penalty abolition
resolutionrequiring the three accused-appellants to file a statement,
personally signed by them with the assistance of counsel, stating
whether or not they wished to continue with the case as an appealed
case. 5 We have since observed this procedure with respect to all
pending capital cases.
then in force, 2

In compliance with our resolution, the three accused-appellants,

on May 28, 1987, filed a statement informing us that they desire
to continue with this case as an appealed case. 6
This appeal stemmed from an information dated November 11,
1976 charging all four accused with the murder of Discredit
Bagon. The same reads as follows:

bizarre plot and directly induced ROMULO

VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and
DOMINADOR SORELA to execute the conspiracy
and who, armed with boloes and a hunting knife,
with intent to kill by means of treachery and
evident premeditation, and for a consideration of a
price or reward, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack
and stab one DISCREDIT BAGON, thereby
inflicting upon him multiple inc. (hack) and stab
wounds which caused his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation and the generic aggravating
circumstances of superior strength, nighttime and
in consideration of a price or reward. 7
xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

The four accused entered Identical "not guilty" pleas.
The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal
accuses ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, as principal by
inducement, ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO
CADEMAS and DOMINADOR SORELA, as
principals by direct participation, of the crime of
murder, committed as follows:
That in the evening on or about the 7th day of
September 1975, in title Municipality of Polanco,
Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
consprising and confederating with one another
and acting upon the direction and instruction of
ANACLETO Q. OLVIS who mastermind the

After trial, the court a quo rendered the decision under appeal,
the dispositive portion whereof reads as follows:
FOREGOING CONSIDERED, and on the part of
accused ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, SR., there being
no evidence, direct or indirect, whether
testimonial, documentary or physical evidence,
that tend to establish his complicity in this case,
said accused has to be, as he hereby is,
ACQUITTED.
On the part of the three (3) remaining accused
ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS,

and DOMINADOR SORELA, the degree of moral,

certainty establishing their authorship of the crime
is irreversibly positive. The three (3) accused
conspired and confederated with one another to
successfully achieve their ghastly, evil ends. Their
guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

It was Captain Encabo himself who led a search party to mount

an inquiry. As a matter of police procedure, the team headed off
to Sitio Sebaca to question possible witnesses. There, Captain
Encabo's men chanced upon an unnamed volunteer, who
informed them that Deosdedit Bagon was last seen together with
Dominador Sorela, one of the accused herein.

Treachery and evident premeditation are

qualifying circumstances in this case of MURDER.
But said offense was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of superior strength and nighttime.
No mitigating circumstance has been shown to
offset the two (2) aggravating circumstances, as a
consequence of which, the Court hereby renders
judgment sentencing the accused ROMULO
VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS, and
DOMINADOR SORELA, to suffer the maximum
penalty of DEATH.

Encabo then instructed one of his patrolmen to pick up Sorela.

SO ORDERED. 8
We come to the facts.
On September 9, 1975, Alfredo and Estrella Bagon, brother and
sister, arrived at the local Integrated National Police station of
Barrio Polanco, in Zamboanga del Norte, to report their brother,
Deosdedit Bagon, missing. The station commander, Captain
Ruperto Encabo, received their report.
Bagon had been in fact missing since two days before. He was
last seen by his wife in the afternoon of September 7, 1975, on
his way home to Sitio Sebaca where they resided. She did three
probable places, but her efforts were in vain.

Sorela bore several scratches on his face, neck and arms when
the police found him. According to him, he sustained those
wounds while clearing his ricefield. Apparently unconvinced.
Captain Encabo had Sorela take them to the ricefield where he
sustained his injuries. But half way there, Sorela illegally broke
down, and, in what would apparently crack the case for the
police, admitted having participated in the killing of the missing
Bagon. By then, the police of Polanco knew that they had a
murder case in their hands. Sorela allegedly confessed having
been with Deosdedit Bagon, a friend of his, in the evening of
September 7, 1976 in Sitio Sebaca after some marketing. They
were met by Romulo Villarojo and Leonardo Cademas, Sorela's
co-accused herein and likewise friends of the deceased, who led
them to a secluded place in the ricefields. It does not appear from
the records how the three were able to have the deceased join
them.
It was then that Villarojo allegedly attacked Bagon with a bolo,
hacking him at several parts of the body until he, Bagon, was
dead. Moments later, Sorela fled, running into thick cogon
grasses where he suffered facial and bodily scratches.
The police soon picked up Villarojo and Cademas. Together with
Sorela, they were turned over to the custody of Captain Encabo.

The police thereafter made the three re-enact the crime.

Patrolman Dionisio Capito directed Sorela to lead them to the
grounds where Discredit Bagon was supposed to have been
buried. But it was Villarojo who escorted them to a watery spot
somewhere in the ricefields, where the sack-covered,
decomposing cadaver of Bagon lay in a shallow grave.

concealing the murder weapon behind a banana tree, apparently

after having done the victim in.

The actual exhumation of the body of the victim was witnessed by

Polanco policemen and Civilian Home Defense Forces
volunteers, numbering about thirty. The body was transported to
the Polanco municipal hand the following day, September 10,
1975. It was displayed, morbidly, in front of the building where
Mrs. Catalina Bagon, widow of the deceased, and her four
children viewed it. The exhumation, as well as the transfer of
Bagon's cadaver, were captured by the lens of a photographer.
(Exhibits "I", "J", "K", its "L", "M", and "N").

Initial findings of investigators disclosed that the threesome of

Solero, Villarojo, and Cademas executed Discredit Bagon on
orders of Anacleto Olvis, then Polanco municipal mayor, for a
reward of P3,000.00 each.

The "ceremonies" continued in the parish church of the Polanco,

where the body of the victim was transferred. It was laid on the
altar, in full public view. Again the proceedings were recorded by
the camera of a photographer. (Exhibits "R", "S".)
But it was only later on that the body itself was uncovered from
the sack that had concealed it. (Exhibits "T", "U", "VIP.)
Thereupon, it was readied for autopsy.
The necropsy report prepared by the provincial health officer
disclosed that the deceased suffered twelve stab and hack
wounds, six of which were determined to be fatal.
In the re-enactment, the suspects, the three accused herein,
demonstrated how the victim was boloed to death. Exhibit "Y," a
photograph, shows the appellant Villarojo in the posture of raising
a bolo as if to strike another, while Solero and Cademas look on.
Exhibit "X", another photograph, portrays Villarojo in the act of

The investigation yielded several effects of the offense: a twentyinch long bolo, the shovel used to inter the victim's remains, a
nylon rope with which the dead body was tied, and the sack itself.

While in custody, the three executed five separate written

confessions each. The first confessions were taken on
September 9, 1975 in the local Philippine Constabulary
headquarters. The second were made before the Polanco police.
On September 18, 1975, the three accused reiterated the same
confessions before the National Bureau of Investigation Dipolog
City sub-office. On September 21, 1975 and September 25, 1975,
they executed two confessions more, again before the Philippine
Constabulary and the police of Polanco.
In their confessions of September 9, 1975, September 14, 1975,
September 21, 1975, and September 25, 1975, the said accused
again pointed to the then accused Anacleto Olvis as principal by
inducement, who allegedly promised them a reward of P3,000.00
each.
In their confessions of September 18, 1975, sworn before agents
of the National Bureau of Investigation, however, they
categorically denied Olvis' involvement in the knowing. We note
that the three were transported to the Dipolog City NBI sub-office
following a request on September 10, 1975 by Mrs. Diolinda O.
Adaro daughter of Olvis, and upon complaint by her of
harassment against her father by his supposed political enemies.

Based on these subsequent statements, the court a quo rendered

separate verdicts on the three accused on the one hand, and
Anacleto Olvis on the other. As earlier stated Olvis was acquitted,
while the three were all sentenced to die for the crime of murder.
In acquitting Olvis, the trial court rejected the three accused's
earlier confessions pointing to him as the mastermind, and denied
the admissibility thereof insofar as far as he was concerned. It
rejected claims of witnesses that the three accused-appellants
would carry out Olvis' alleged order to kill Bagon upon an offer of
a reward when in fact no money changed hands. It likewise noted
that Olvis had, two days after the murder, been in Cebu City, and
who, upon arriving in Dipolog City, was in fact informed by the
Philippine Constabulary that he was a "wanted" man, "to which
said accused (Olvis) meekly complied" 9 (that is, he assented,
ambiguously, to the remark). According to the court, this was
inconsistent with a guilty mind.
The court repudiated claims that Olvis had motives to do away
with the deceased arising from alleged attempts on his (Olvis')
part to eject the deceased from his landholding (the deceased
having been a tenant of his), the case in fact having reached the
then Ministry of Agrarian Reform. It dismissed insinuations that
his children had a score to settle with the victim, who had earlier
brought a physical injuries suit against the former, that case
having been dismissed. It observed, furthermore, that he was not
questioned by the police after the killing, notwithstanding efforts
by the three herein accused-appellants to implicate him. It relied,
finally, on the retraction of the accused themselves, absolving
Olvis of any liability. It was satisfied, overall, that he had a "clean
bill of health" 10 in connection with the murder case.
With the acquittal of Olvis, we are left with the murder cases
against the three accused-appellants. The accused-appellants
subsequently repudiated their alleged confessions in open court

alleging threats by the Polanco investigators of physical harm if

they refused to "cooperate" in the solution of the case. They
likewise alleged that they were instructed by the Polanco police
investigators to implicate Anacieto Olvis in the case. They insisted
on their innocence. The acused Romulo Villarojo averred,
specifically, that it was the deceased who had sought to kill him,
for which he acted in self-defense.
The murder of Deosdedit Bagon was witnessed by no other
person. The police of Polanco had but the three accusedappellants' statements to support its claiming. The fundamental
issue then is whether or not these statements, as any
extrajudicial confession confronting us, can stand up in court.
We hold that, based on the recorded evidence, the three
accused-appellants' extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in
evidence.
It was on May 7, 1987 that we promulgated People v.
Decierdo.11 In that decision, we laid down the rule with respect to extrajudicial
confessions:

xxx xxx xxx

... Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant, may waive effectuation
of indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney
before speaking, there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in
any manner that he does not wish to be

interrogated, the police may not question him The

mere fact that he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some statements on his
own does not deprive him of the right to refrain
from answering any further inquiries until he has
converted with an attorney and thereafter consent
to be questioned.
xxx xxx xxx
In People v. Duero, we added:
xxx xxx xxx
At the outset, if a person in custody is to be
subjected to interrogation, he must first be
informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he
has the right to remain silent.
For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is
needed simply to make them aware of the
threshold requirement for an intelligent decision
as to its exercise.
More important, such a warning is an absolute
pre-requisite in overcoming the inherent
pressures of the interrogation atmosphere
Further, the warning will show the individual that
his interrogators are prepared to recognize his
privilege should he choose to exercise it . . .
The warning of the right to remain silent must be
accompanied by the explanation that anything
said can and WW be used against the individual

in court. This warning is needed in order to make

him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the
consequences of foregoing it . . .
An individual need not make a pre-interrogation
request for a lawyer. While such request
affirmatively secures his right to have one, his
failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a
waiver. No effective waiver of the right to counsel
during interrogation can be recognized unless
specifically made after the warnings we here
delineate have been given. The accused who
does not know his rights and therefore does not
make a request may be the person who most
needs Counsel
If an individual indicates that he wishes the
assistance of counsel before any interrogation
occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or
deny his request on the basis that the individual
does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney
...
In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of
the extent of his rights under this system then, it is
necessary to warn him not only that he has the
right to consult with an attorney, but also that ff. he
is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent
him . . .
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent
procedure is clear, If the individual indicates in
any manner, at any time prior to or during
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation impose cease. . . If the individual

cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he

wants one before speaking to policy, they must
respect his decision to remain silent . . .
If the interrogation continues without the presence
of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy
burden rests on the government to demonstrate
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his privilege against self-incriminate tion
and his right to retained or appointed counsel ... 12

behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition

either of the dead 16 trainee himself or by anyone
on his behalf. 16
We cast aside, for the same reason, the confessions of
September 25, 1975.
But the accused-appellants were denied their right to counsel not
once, but twice. We refer to the forced re-enactment of the crime
the three accused were made to perform shortly after their
apprehension.

xxx xxx xxx

Like the Decierdo confessions, the confessions in the case at bar

suffer from a Constitutional infirmity. In their supposed statements
dated September 9, 14, and 21, 1975, the accused-appellants
were not assisted by counsel when they "waived" their rights to
counsel. As we said in Decierdo, the lack of counsel "makes
[those] statement[s], in contemplation of law, 'involuntary,' even if
it were otherwise voluntary, technically." 13
With reset to the confessions of September 18, 197 5, while it is
stated therein that this Office had just requested the services of
Atty. NARVARO VELAR NAVARRO of the Citizens Legal
Assistance Office, Department of Justice, Dipolog District Office,
are you wining to accept the legal assistance of Atty. NAVARRO
to handle your case, 14 the same nonetheless call for a similar rejection. There is
nothing there that would show that Atty. Navarro was the accused-appellants' counsel of
choice (specifically, the appellant Romulo Villarojo who admitted therein having been the
bolo-wielder). On the contrary, it is clear therefrom that Atty. Navarro was summoned by the
NBI. He cannot therefore be said to have been acting on behalf of the accused-appellants
when he lent his presence at the confession proceedings. What we said in People v.
Galit, 15 applies with like force here:

No custodial investigation shall be conducted

unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged
by the person arrested, by any person on his

Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced

confessions come within the ban against self- incrimination. The
1973 Constitution, the Charter prevailing at the time of the
proceedings below, says:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself. 17
This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection
against testimonial compulsion, 18 but this has since been extended to any
evidence "communicative in nature" 19 acquired under circumstances of duress. Essentially,
the right is meant to "avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the
certainly inhuman procedure of competing a person, in a criminal or any other case, to

This was the lesson

learned from the ancient days of the inquisition in which accusation
was equivalent to guilt. 21 Thus, an act, whether testimonial or
passive, that would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is
covered by the inhibition of the Constitution.
furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction."

20

This should be distinguished, parenthetically, from mechanical

acts the accused is made to execute not meant to unearth
undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable
by simple observation. This includes requiring the accused to
submit to a test to extract virus from his body, 22 or compelling him

to expectorate morphine from his mouth 23 or making her submit to a

pregnancy test 24 or a footprinting test, 25 or requiring him to take part
in a police lineup in certain cases." In each case, the accused does
not speak his guilt. It is not a prerequisite therefore that he be
provided with the guiding hand of counsel.

But a forced re-enactment is quite another thing. Here, the

accused is not merely required to exhibit some physical
characteristics; by and large, he is made to admit criminal
responsibility against his will. It is a police procedure just as
condemnable as an uncounselled confession.
Accordingly, we hold that all evidence based on such a reenactment to be in violation of the Constitution and hence,
incompetent evidence.
It should be furthermore observed that the three accusedappellants were in police custody when they took part in the reenactment in question. It is under such circumstances that the
Constitution holds a strict application. As for the accused
Dominador Sorela, we cannot accept the trial judge's finding that
he acted "with unexpected spontaneity" 27 when he allegedly
"spilled the beans 28 before the law enforcers on September 9, 1975.
What is to be borne in mind is that Sorela was himself under custody.
Any statement he might have made thereafter is therefore subject to
the Constitutional guaranty.
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way. 29
We indeed doubt whether Sorela's admissions, under the
circumstances, were truly his voluntary statementsChavez v.
Court of Appeals 30 tells us:

Compulsion as it is understood here does not

necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be
the product of unintentional statements. Pressure
which operates to overbear his will disable him
from making a free and rational choice, or impair
his capacity for rational judgment would in our
opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion
"tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips
of the defendant. 31
In such a case, he should have been provided with counsel.
Indeed, the three accused-appellants had languished in jail for
one year and two months before the information was filed, and
only after they had gone to court on an application for habeas
corpus. For if the authorities truly had a case in their hands, we
are puzzled why they, the accused, had to be made to suffer
preventive imprisonment for quite an enormous length of time.
What is more, there are striking aspects in the case that we find
distressing. For one, there was no trace of grief upon the faces of
the deceased's bereaved relatives, more so his widow and
children, upon witnessing his cadaver-wrapped in a sack and all
although it was supposedly the first time that they saw his
remains after two days of frantic search. 32 Exhibits "K", "L", "M",
"N", and "R", for another, depict the deceased's relatives in fixed
poses, while the deceased's corpse lay in the foreground. 33
Moreover, the victim was transferred to the municipal hand
building and then subsequently, to the parish church, again, for a
photographing session unusual procedure when the
perfunctory police procedure should have been to bring the
corpse to the health officer for autopsy.

It was in fact only on September 10, 1975 that Discredit Bagon's

remains were unwrapped, at the parish church at that, as if
pursuant to a script or as part of some eerie ceremony.
To the mind of, this Court, the disposition of the case was
characterized by unusual grandstanding, for reasons as yet
unclear to us. It leaves us with an uncomfortable impression that
each scene was an act in some contrived tragedy.
We likewise find the authorities' haste in securing the accused
Anacleto Olvis' acquittal, at the expense of the present three
accused, quite disconcerting. It should be noted that the three
appellants had initially implicated Olvis as the mastermind. Yet,
Olvis was never invited for the usual questioning.
To us, there is more to Exhibit "20," the request to transfer Olvis'
case to the jurisdiction of the National Bureau of Investigation for
reinvestigation, than meets the eye. As it happened, happily for
Olvis, the three accused-appellants while under NBI custody,
retracted their earlier statements indicting him as a coconspirator. Why the NBI should intervene in the case when the
Polanco police had apparently "solved" it, is, in the first place,
suspicious enough, but why the three appellants should, in an
instant, make a turn-about there leaves us even more disturbed.
While we do not challenge the verdict by acquittal rendered in
favor of Olvis, for it is not within our power to overturn
acquittals, 34 what is our concern is the apparent design to use three
ill-lettered peasants, 35 the three herein accused, as fall guys in an
evident network of political intrigue.
Still, we are not prepared to hand down a judgment of acquittal
upon all the three accused-appellants.

In his counter-affidavit, 36 marked as Exhibit "44-A" for the defense,

the accused Romulo Villarojo admitted hacking the victim to death
with a bolo. He stressed, however, that he did so in self- defense. He
pulled out a hunting knife in order to stab me and in order also to
defend my body, I hack[ed] him." 37 He completely absolved his coaccused Dominador Sorela and Leonardo Cademas from any
liability.
Villarojo's admission inflicting the fatal wounds upon the
deceased is binding on him. 38 But it is still our business to see
whether his defense can stand scrutiny.
The records will disclose that the deceased suffered twelve
assorted wounds caused by a sharp instrument. The assault
severed his right hand and left his head almost separated from
his body. This indicates a serious intent to kill, rather than selfdefense. 39
In finding that Villarojo did take the life of the victim, we cannot,
however, appreciate superior strength or nocturnity. These
qualifying circumstances were considered by the court a quo on
the basis of the extrajudicial statements executed by the accused,
statements we reject for the reasons earlier discussed. In the
absence of any other proof, the severity and number of wounds
sustained by the deceased are not, by themselves, sufficient
proof to warrant the appreciation of the generic aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Hence, Villarojo
should be liable for plain homicide.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the
Decision dated November 30, 1984. The accused-appellants
Leonardo Cademas and Dominador Sorela are ACQUITTED on
the ground of reasonable doubt. The accused-appellant Romulo
Villarojo is found guilty of homicide, and is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision
mayor as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months, and one day

of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is furthermore ordered to

indemnify the heirs of Discredit Bagon in the sum of P30,000.00.
No special pronouncement as to costs.

SECTION 13
COMMENDOR V DE VILLA
CRUZ, J.:p

These four cases have been consolidated because they involve

practically the same parties and related issues arising from the
same incident.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private
respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their
alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on
December 1 to 9, 1989.
The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67
(Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a
Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, they are questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial
Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the charges
against them and the creation of the General Court Martial GCM
convened to try them.
In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the
legality of GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against its ruling denying
them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of
Com. Act No. 408.
In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are assailed oncertiorari on
the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no
authority either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private
respondents.

In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of

the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a petition for habeas
corpus directing the release of the private respondents.
Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.
I
Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial
Investigation PTI Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office
Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel issued
a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually
addressed to the petitioners, to wit:
You are hereby directed to appear in person
before the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating
Officers on12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall,
Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there to
submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of
your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial investigation
of the charge/charges against you for violence of
AWs _______________. DO NOT SUBMIT A
MOTION TO DISMISS.
Failure to submit the aforementioned counteraffidavits on the date above specified shall be
deemed a waiver of your right to submit
controverting evidence.
On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy
of the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death
and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the
proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to

grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing

This was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated
February 21, 1990.
In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the
motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their
respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for
reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the PTI Panel gave
them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This
was done on March 14,1990.
The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation
of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71, which provides:
Art. 71. Charges Action upon. Charges and
specifications must be signed by a person subject
to military law, and under the oath either that he
has personal knowledge of, or has investigated,
the matters set forth therein and that the same are
true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and
belief.
No charge will be referred to a general courtmartial for trial until after a thorough and impartial
investigation thereof shall have been made. This
investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of
the matter set forth in said charges, form of
charges, and what disposition of the case should
be made in the interest of justice and discipline.
At such investigation full opportunity shall be
given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses
against him if they are available and to present
anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in

defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer

shall examine available witnesses requested by
the accused. If the charges are forwarded after
such investigation, they shall be accompanied by
a statement of the substance of the testimony
taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)
They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted
merely of a roll call and that no prosecution witnesses were
presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for
summary dismissal was denied, the motion for reconsideration
remains unresolved to date and they have not been able to
submit their counter-affidavits.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948
manifested that they were exercising their right to raise
peremptory challenges against the president and members of
GCM No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this
purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges
had been discontinued under P.D. No. 39.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5,
1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He
thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional
liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. After considering the
petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and
members of GCM No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued
an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot.
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce
the order for his release and to declare in contempt the
commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said
order. He later also complained that Generals De Villa and

Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final resolution of the

appeal to be taken" to this Court.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional
liberty of Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner,
Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of
additional intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.

On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454

filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpuson the ground
that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges.
The petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, where it was raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano.
Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed
against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest,
the trial court ordered their release.

On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:
II
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution granting the right to bail to all persons
with the defined exception is applicable and
covers all military men facing court-martial
proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of
General Court- Martial No. 14 denying bail to
petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken
assumption that bail does not apply to military
men facing court-martial proceedings on the
ground that there is no precedent, are hereby set
aside and declared null and void. Respondent
General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to
conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of
the petitioner, intervenors and which may as well
include other persons facing charges before
General Court-Martial No. 14.
Pending the proceedings on the applications for
bail before General Court-Martial No. 14, this
Court reiterates its orders of release on the
provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as
well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio
Tecson.

The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as
follows.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948
were given several opportunities to present their side at the pretrial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12,
1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February
21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit
their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal
motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit
in writing. This they did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in
effect denied when the PTI Panel resolved to recommend that the
charges be referred to the General Court Martial for trial.
The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due
process because the investigation was resolved against them
owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits. They
had been expressly warned In the subpoena sent them that
"failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the
date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to
submit controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the
warning. As their motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel
was justified in referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without
waiting for the petitioners to submit their defense.

Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an

opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived
or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.

language is clearly such that a

defendant could object to trial in
the absence of the required
investigation. In that event the
court-martial could itself postpone
trial pending the investigation. And
the military reviewing authorities
could consider the same
contention, reversing a courtmartial conviction where failure to
comply with Article 70 has
substantially injured an accused.
But we are not persuaded that
Congress intended to make
otherwise valid court-martial
judgments wholly void because
pre-trial investigations fall short of
the standards prescribed by Article
70. That Congress has not
required analogous pre-trial
procedure for Navy court-martial is
an indication that the investigatory
plan was not intended to be
exalted to the jurisdictional level.

There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War

71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now settled that "even a
failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a
general court- martial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v.
Espino, 1 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial
investigation does not deprive a general courtmartial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial
investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory,
and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a courtmartial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L
ed 986 (1949), the Court said:
We do not think that the pre-trial
investigation procedure by Article
70 (The Philippine counter-part is
article of war 71, Commonwealth
Act 408) can properly be
construed as an indispensable
pre-requisite to the exercise of the
Army General court martial
jurisdiction.. The Article does
serve important functions in the
administration of court-martial
procedures and does provide
safeguards to an accused. Its

xxx xxx xxx

Shortly after enactment of Article
70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate
General of the Army did hold that
where there had been no pre-trial
investigation, court-martial
proceedings were void ab initio.
But this holding has been
expressly repudiated in later

holdings of the Judge Advocate

General. This later interpretation
has been that the pre-trial
requirements of Article 70 are
directory, not mandatory, and in no
way effect the jurisdiction of a
court-martial. The War
Department's interpretation was
pointedly called to the attention of
Congress in 1947 after which
Congress amended Article 70 but
left unchanged the language here
under consideration. compensable
pre-requisite to the exercise of
Army general court-martial
jurisdiction
A trial before a general court-martial convened
without any pretrial investigation under article of
war 71 would of course be altogether irregular but
the court-martial might nevertheless have
jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the
one obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil
courts to the effect that absence of preliminary
investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of
the court but merely to the regularity of the
proceedings.
As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary
investigation, that issue was resolved more than two years ago
in Kapunan v. De Villa, 2 where we declared:
The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of
petitioners, there was substantial compliance with
the requirements of law as provided in the Articles

of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No.

911. The amended charge sheets, charging
petitioners and their co-respondents with mutiny
and conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed
by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military
law, after he had investigated the matter through
an evaluation of the pertinent records, including
the reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers,
and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies
on record. The charge sheets were sworn to by
Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance with and
in the manner provided under Art. 71 of the
Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as
amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of suppletory
application, the fact that the charge sheets were
not certified in the manner provided under said
decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the
oath has personally examined the affiant and that
he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood its affidavit, does not invalidate said
charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial
investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj.
Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No. 77, as
amended by P.D. No. 911, petitioners were
subpoenaed and required to file their counteraffidavit. However, instead of doing so, they filed
an untitled pleading seeking the dismissal of the
charges against them. That petitioners were not
able to confront the witnesses against them was
their own doing, for they never even asked Maj.
Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses so that
they may be made to answer clarificatory
questions in accordance with P. D, No. 77, as
amended by P.D. No. 911.

The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been
constitute in accordance with Article 8 of the Articles of War
because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the
body, was not signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.
Article of War No. 8 reads:
Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. The President of
the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of
Constabulary and, when empowered by the
President, the commanding officer of a major
command or task force, the commanding officer of
a division, the commanding officer of a military
area, the superintendent of the Military Academy,
the commanding officer of a separate brigade or
body of troops may appoint general courtsmartial; but when any such commander is the
accuser or the prosecutor of the person or
persons to be tried, the court shall be appointed
by superior competent authority. ...
While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by
Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt that he authorized it because the
order itself said it was issued "By Command of General De Villa"
and it has not been shown to be spurious. As observed by the
Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition Form showed that
Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM
No. 14 and appointed its president and members. It is significant
that General De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any
way disowned the said order, as he would certainly have done if
his authority had been improperly invoked. On the contrary, as
the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he sustained General
Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the other
respondents by the Solicitor General.

Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that

this was originally provided for under Article 18 of Com. Act No.
408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June
12, 1948, to wit:
Art. 18. Challenges. Members of general or
special courts-martial may be challenged by the
accused or the trial judge advocate for cause
stated to the court. The court shall determine the
relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not
receive a challenge to more than one member at
a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate
shall ordinarily be presented and decided before
those by the accused are offered. Each side shall
be entitled to the peremptory challenge, but the
law member of the court shall not be challenged
except for cause.
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v.
Alejandro, 3 thus:
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine
Army, after the passage in 1935 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as
the National Defense Act), except for a handful of
Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the
United States military and naval academies who
were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a
complete dearth of officers learned in military law,
its aside from the fact that the officer corps of the
developing army was numerically made equate
for the demands of the strictly military aspects of
the national defense program. Because of these
considerations it was then felt that peremptory
challenges should not in the meanwhile be

permitted and that only challenges for cause, in

any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of
the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408),
as worded on September 14, 1938, the date of
the approval of the Act, made no mention or
reference to any peremptory challenge by either
the trial judge advocate of a court- martial or by
the accused. After December 17,1958, when the
Manual for Courts-Martial of the Philippine Army
became effective, the Judge Advocate General's
Service of the Philippine Army conducted a
continuing and intensive program of training and
education in military law, encompassing the length
and breadth of the Philippines. This program was
pursued until the outbreak of World War 11 in the
Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the formal
surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer
corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had
expanded to a very large number, and a great
many of the officers had been indoctrinated in
military law. It was in these environmental
circumstances that Article of War 18 was
amended on June 12,1948 to entitle "each side"
to one peremptory challenge, with the sole
proviso that "the law member of court shall not be
challenged except for cause.
On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order
No. 8, empowering the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to
create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military
personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them.

On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing

the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other
matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the
peremptory challenge, thus:
No peremptory challenge shall be allowed.
Challenges for cause may be entertained to
insure impartiality and good faith. Challenges
shall immediately be heard and determined by a
majority of the members excluding the challenged
member. A tie vote does not disqualify the
challenged member. A successfully challenged
member shall be immediately replaced.
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498,
or the National Security Code, which was a compilation and
codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended
"to meet the continuing threats to the existence, security and
stability of the State." The modified rule on challenges under P.D.
No. 39 was embodied in this decree.
On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045
proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law throughout
the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8
and declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created
pursuant thereto upon final determination of the cases pending
therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and
the other general orders mentioned therein. With the termination
of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created
thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased
automatically.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason

of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis,
cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the
maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to
peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when
the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of
Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now
again allows the right to peremptory challenge.
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the
right to peremptory challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No.
39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when
martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so
withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative, having
been cast out under the new dispensation as, in the words of the
Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the
previous regime.
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments
of martial law. It is curious that the present government should
invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action
against the accused officers.

The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory

challenge may be exploited by a respondent in a court-martial
trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment.
It is hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will not be
so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the
light of present circumstances, is a matter addressed to the lawmakers and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret and
apply the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their
adverse effects. This is a problem only the political departments
can resolve.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the
propriety of the petition for certiorari and mandamus and the
petition for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents with
the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since
the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused
of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no
authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the
court-martial proceedings.
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29,
the Court of Appeals is vested with "exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders,
or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the
petitioners also cite the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals 4 where
this Court held that "appeals from the Professional Regulation
Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals.
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited
refer to ordinary appeals and not to the remedies employed by
the accused officers before the respondent courts.
In Martelino, we observed as follows:

It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no

supervision or correcting power over the
proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere
errors in their proceedings are not open to
consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is
jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the
exercise of their undoubted discretion, courtsmartial may commit such an abuse of discretion
what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to
as "grave abuse of discretion" as to give rise to
a defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the
point at issue in this action suggested by its
nature as one for certiorari and prohibition ... .
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and
other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpusand quo
warranto. 5 In the absence of a law providing that the decisions,
orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of Staff
can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise
similar jurisdiction.
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in
G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not
available in the military, as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula,
where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more
emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
The justification for this exception was well explained by the
Solicitor General as follows:

The unique structure of the military should be

enough reason to exempt military men from the
constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note
that mutinous soldiers operate within the
framework of democratic system, are allowed the
fiduciary use of firearms by the government for
the discharge of their duties and responsibilities
and are paid out of revenues collected from the
people. All other insurgent elements carry out
their activities outside of and against the existing
political system.
xxx xxx xxx
National security considerations should also
impress upon this Honorable Court that release
on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging
precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000
putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis
on bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order were
sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer number
alone is already discomforting. But, the truly
disquieting thought is that they could freely
resume their heinous activity which could very
well result in the overthrow of duly constituted
authorities, including this Honorable Court, and
replace the same with a system consonant with
their own concept of government and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail
would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This
guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things
similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the

treatment is substantially different from others. The accused

officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members
of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been
discriminated against because they are not allowed the same
right that is extended to civilians.
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454
that they had not been charged after more than one year from
their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance
with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy
trial.
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on
February 18, 1991, and was referred to the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on
February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the petitioners
submitted the charge memorandum and specifications against
the private respondents dated January 30, 1991. On February 12,
1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was
created and initial investigation was scheduled on March 12,
1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the private respondents
received the copies of the charges, charge sheets and
specifications and were required to submit their counter-affidavits
on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of more
than one year in the investigation and preparation of the charges
against the private respondents. However, this was explained by
the Solicitor General thus:
... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was
able to complete it pre-charge investigation only
after one (1) year because hundreds of officers
and thousands of enlisted men were involved in
the failed coup. All of them, as well as other
witnesses, had to be interviewed or investigated,
and these inevitably took months to finish. The

pre-charge investigation was rendered doubly

difficult by the fact that those involved were
dispersed and scattered throughout the
Philippines. In some cases, command units, such
as the Scout Rangers, have already been
disbanded. After the charges were completed, the
same still had to pass review and approval by the
AFP Chief of Staff.
While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must
reiterate the following admonition:
This Court as protector of the rights of the people,
must stress the point that if the participation of
petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is
confined on orders of Adjutant General Jorge
Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges
can be filed against him or the existence of
a prima facie case warranting trial before a
military commission is wanting, it behooves
respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon
(now General) to release petitioner. Respondents
must also be reminded that even if a military
officer is arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then
Articles of War, indefinite confinement is not
sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that
immediate steps must be taken to try the person
accused or to dissmiss the charge and release
him. Any officer who is responsible for
unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying the
case to a final conclusion may even be punished
as a court martial may direct. 6
It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by
Judge Solano on February 26, 1991, the government filed a

notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration,

the latter was ultimately denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991.
The 48- hour period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the
Rules of Court did not run until after notice of such denial was
received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the
private respondents' contention, therefore, the decision had not
yet become final and executory when the special civil action in
G.R. No. 97454 was filed with this Court on March 12, 1991.

ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED

for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED,
and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to
exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the
Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are
also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for the
release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. No costs.

III

SO ORDERED.

Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate

the following observations of the Court in Arula:
The referral of charges to a court-martial involves
the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW 71).
A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must
be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as
long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any
error committed by him or it in the exercise
thereof will amount to nothing more than an error
of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected
only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not
sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ
of certiorari.
As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177
have not acted with grave abuse of discretion or without or in
excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and
the reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such
action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find
that the right to peremptory challenge should not have been
denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private
respondents should not have been ordered released.

GOVT OF HONGKONG V OLALIA

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to
nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8,

Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.)

issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order
dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private
respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002
denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20,
2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department
of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders
were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision
in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the
then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement
for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took
effect on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples
Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong
Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an
advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He
also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to
defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August
23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued
against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to
fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong
Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of

private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the
RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest
of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an
Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the
NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ
of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for
review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that
the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting
the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of
Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and
executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila
a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by
Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent
filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed
by petitioner.

After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued

an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from
further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to
Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This
was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December
20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further
erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted subject to
the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition
that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and
answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at
all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes
of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused
fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in
favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this
Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice
and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure
order before this Court even in extradition proceeding;
and

4. Accused is required to report to the government

prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the
nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if
they further desire, manifest before this Court to require
that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed
with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the
accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be
forfeited in favor of the government and that the
corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein
accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to
vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in
his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a
potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited
solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained
that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to
a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to
bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,

or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The

right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court
has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective
extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark
B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking
through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief
Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not
apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal
proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section
4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal
laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should
not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17,
1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where
the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings.
It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second
sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely
emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the
right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private
respondents case. However, this Court cannot ignore the
following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of
the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th
century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher
value now being given to human rights in the international sphere;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal
human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty
of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the
other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy
placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity
of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual
person may properly be a subject of international law is now
taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of
international law are limited only to states was dramatically
eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the
unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts

characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against

peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the
Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former
Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual
person is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both
international organizations and states gave recognition and
importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and
all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed.
While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said
Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon
the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff
v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a
prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,3the
principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the
land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the
Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights
enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and
due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of
nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution
which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay

on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified.

In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to
make available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court
in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties
giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the
right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling
in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to
deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily
limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in
administrative proceedings, such as deportation and
quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to
close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to
bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted
to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this
jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of
administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the
obligation of the Philippines under international
conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a
Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary
certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal.
After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no
crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as
a person who has committed the most serious crime known to
law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding,

some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law."

Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation
proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of
Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom
no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on
bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously
stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of
Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification
why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise,
considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be
invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative
proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained
is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in
this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties,
the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the
Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every
individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal
of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him
at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting
state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting
state or government."

Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign

power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one
accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction,
and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the
demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the
potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not
by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even
though such punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui
generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between
different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or
innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown
civil action, but one that is merely administrative in
character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person
accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the
state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is
characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty
on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means
employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the
machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D.
No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the
"immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if
such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that
Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask
for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of
the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional
arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused
if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a
prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary

detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition,

but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on
September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December
20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In
other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years
without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard,
such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of
his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged
deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant
him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to
an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or
her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be
the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the
standard of due process is premised on the presumption of
innocence of the accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it is
from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of
admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest
warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of
the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that
such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing,
the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of
showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted
bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that
the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it
entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign

relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does
not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations,
the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to
life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international
conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not,
therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail,
provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof
required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of
proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While
administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence
used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the
object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective
extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion
in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear
and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be
lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove
by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and
will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition
court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent
presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the
basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case

is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of
his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter,
conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.