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Assembly and political rights, and asked all the factories to send
delegates. Workers immediately understood the principles of such
representation on the basis of workplaces. There were the
experiences of sending factory representatives to the Shidlovski
Commission (which was studying factory conditions) and the strike
committees of the past nine months upon which to draw. Anweiler
writes:
When the strike wave spread from Moscow to St. Petersburg, and
when, on October 11th, the first factories stopped work the workers
themselves felt the need to meet together in order to decide in
common what path to follow. It was for this purpose that delegates
were elected in several factories--the Putilov and Obukhov works,
among others--of these delegates, more than one had been a
member of the strike committee or a former representative to the
Shidlovski Commission.[4]
More and more factories elected delegates. Within three days, there
were 226 delegates representing 96 factories and workshops (the
principle was usually one delegate for every 100 workers in a factory).
It was decided to admit representatives of the socialist parties
(Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and Social-Revolutionaries). On October
17th, this group decided on the name "Soviet of Workers' Deputies"
and elected a provisional executive committee of 22 members (two
for each of the seven areas of the city, two for each of the four most
important unions) and decided to publish its own newspaper, "News
from the Soviet of Workers' Deputies." The Soviet, at first performing
no other task than organising and leading the strike, changed itself
over the course of several days into an organ of the general and
political representation of workers, in the centre of the revolutionary
movement of the working class in the capital. It quickly became a
"workers' parliament," which it attempted to remain even after the
strike ended at the end of October. According to Anweiler, "this
change was neither deliberated or consciously expressed. After
having at its peak engendered the Soviet, the revolutionary
movement surged on, with greater impetuosity than ever, and the
organ that it had created accompanied it on its path."[5] The Soviet
had been formed out of necessity--that of organising and maintaining
the general strike. No one needed to convince the workers that such
organisation was crucial.
Similar organisations appeared amidst strikes in all the urban areas of
European Russia (and in some larger villages as well), Between 40
and 50 came into existence in October. Although most only functioned
for a short period their importance should not be underestimated.
This was the first experience of direct democracy for most of those
involved. The Soviets were created from below, by the workers,
peasants, and soldiers, and reflected their desires--which were
expressed in non-sectarian resolutions. No political party dominated
the Soviets, and many workers were opposed to allowing
increased, the base of the Soviet lost more and more of its power.
Meetings became less frequent and soon the Soviet itself became
nothing but an open forum, where workers and soldiers could come
together, air their views, meet others like themselves, and keep their
constituencies informed about what was going on. It did offer people
who had never had the chance to speak out to do so. But it did not
represent the power of the working class. If anything, it represented
its powerlessness.
This Soviet seems quite characteristic of the Soviets throughout
Russia--both in the urban areas and in the countryside. Often, workers
or peasants came into conflict with their Soviet. Neither this organ nor
the Provisional Government can be considered as instruments of
working-class power. However, the workers were able to create such
an instrument--the factory committee.
Whereas the Soviets were primarily concerned with political issues,
e.g., the structure of the government, the continuation of the war, the
factory committees dealt solely with the problems of continuing
production within their factories. Many sprang up in the face of lockouts or attempted sabotage by the factory owners. It was through
these committees that workers hoped to solve their initial problems-how to get production going again, how to provide for themselves and
their families in the midst of economic chaos. Many workers were
faced with the choice of taking over production themselves or
starving. Other workers who were relatively assured of employment
were influenced both by the burst of activity which characterised the
revolution and the worsening economic situation. If they were to
remain secure, they had to have a greater say in the management of
their factories. They realised that they needed organisations on the
shop level to protect their interests and improve their situations.
The trade unions could be of no help in these matters. Until the turn
of the century, trade unions were illegal. The tradition of guilds, which
had been an important precursor of trade-unionism in Western
Europe, was lacking, due to the fact that industry was still rather
young in Russia. Only the most politically-minded workers could be
expected to be interested in trade-unionism under the repressive
conditions and such workers were usually more apt to join the already
existing radical political organisations. In 1905 the existing trade
unions played an insignificant role in the upheaval. Many of them
were crushed in the repression of the next few years. A select few
were allowed to continue to function, but only under police
supervision. By the time of the February 1917 uprising, several trade
unions existed as national organisations, but few had any influence
within the factories. Most of the trade union leaders were Mensheviks,
who rejected the notion that workers should have any say about the
internal affairs of a factory. During the first few months of 1917, trade
unions membership increased from a few scores of thousands to 1.5
million. Most of this increased membership was purely formal, i.e., it