Ethics Canon 7

ETHICS CASES: ATTY.
AYO CANON 7
[ADM. CASE No. 6595. April 15, 2005]

JOSEPH SAMALA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ANTONUITTI K. PALAA, respondent.
On July 14, 2001, complainant charged Paul Desiderio of Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 at the Prosecutors Office of Makati. On November 4, 2001, Judge Evelyn Arcaya-Chua of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Makati City, issued a warrant of arrest against Paul Desiderio.
RESOLUTION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a complaint filed by Joseph Samala against respondent Atty. Antonuitti K. Palaa for alleged
fraudulent activities that violate the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Sometime in February 2001, complainant was looking for a company where he could invest his dollar
savings. He met Raymond Taino, a trader-employee of First Imperial Resources, Inc. (FIRI), a company located
at Legaspi Village, Makati City. Taino introduced him to FIRI Manager Jun Agustin, Chief Trader Diosdado
Bernal, and Legal Officer Antonuitti K. Palaa, the respondent herein.
Complainant expressed his concern to the said three officers of FIRI about having been warned of
numerous fraudulent businesses in the Philippines. Respondent assured him that through FIRI he would be
directly putting his investment with Eastern Vanguard Forex Limited, a reputable company based in the Virgin
Islands which has been in the foreign exchange business for 13 years. The three officers presented to him their
company profile and documents purporting to establish their relationship with Eastern Vanguard Forex Limited.
Due to the personal representations and assurances of respondent, Agustin, and Bernal, complainant was
convinced and he invested his dollar savings with FIRI on March 9, 2001.
Subsequently, complainant decided to pull out his investment. On April 5, 2001, he sent FIRI a letter
requesting the withdrawal of his investment amounting to US$10,000 and giving FIRI 10 days to prepare the
money.
On March 5, 2002, complainant joined three police officers in serving the warrant of arrest against Paul
Desiderio at No. 10 Damascus St., Northeast Executive Village, B.F. Homes, Paraaque City. Complainant got the
said address of Paul Desiderio from the documents of FIRI. Although there was a street named Damascus in the
said village, there was no residence numbered 10. The police officers checked the existence of the said address
and resident at the office of the subdivision association. They were told that no such address existed and that no
resident named Paul Desiderio lived in the subdivision.
Complainant alleged that respondents act of representing himself to be the legal officer of FIRI and his
assurance that the check he personally delivered to him was signed in his presence by FIRI Officer Paul
Desiderio, when no such person appears to exist, is clearly fraudulent and violative of the Canons of
Professional Ethics.[1]
Complainant requested the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for a thorough investigation of respondent as
a member of the bar.
In an Order dated January 27, 2003, Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez required respondent
to submit his Answer to the Complaint within 15 days from receipt thereof. Despite receipt of said order as
evidenced by a registry return receipt dated February 3, 2003, respondent did not submit an Answer.
The case was referred to Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Commission on Bar Discipline for
investigation. Respondent failed to appear when the case was set for hearing on April 8, 2003, despite due
notice. Hence, respondent was declared in default and the case was heard ex parte.
Based on the evidence adduced, Commissioner Navarro reported, thus:

On April 15, 2001, complainant asked Agustin when his money would be returned. Agustin told him that
the request was sent to Thomas Yiu of Eastern Vanguard at Ortigas Center. Complainant went to see Thomas
Yiu at his office. Yiu was surprised when he saw the documents involving complainants investment. Yiu phoned
Agustin and demanded an explanation as to where the money was. Agustin said that he would return
complainants investment at FIRIs office in Makati. On the same day, in the presence of respondent, Agustin
delivered to complainant a check in the amount of P574,045.09, as the peso equivalent of complainants
investment with FIRI. On May 2, 2001, the said check was dishonored because it was drawn against insufficient
funds.
Complainant informed respondent of the dishonor of the check. Respondent assured him that the check
would be replaced. On June 1, 2001, respondent, as legal officer of FIRI, gave complainant P250,000 in cash
and a check in the amount of P329,045.09. Respondent told complainant that the check was signed by FIRI
President Paul Desiderio in his (respondents) presence and assured complainant that the check would be
funded. But on June 28, 2001, the check was dishonored because it was drawn against insufficient funds.
[R]espondent was instrumental in the issuance of the check signed by the alleged President of FIRI, Paul
Desiderio, whose whereabouts could not be located and whose identity was unknown[,] for respondent was the
one who handed personally to the herein complainant the check which was dishonored due to insufficient funds,
when it was the very respondent, Atty. Palaa, who allegedly assured that the check was funded. Respondent was
also one of those alleged officers of FIRI who assured complainant that his investment was directly placed in a
re[p]utable company.
Further investigation by the complainant with the assistance of NBI officers showed that respondent Palaa was
also linked with Belkins whose activity was the same as the FIRI and the SEC has on file the By-Laws of FIRI
wherein it was stated that[,] to wit: the primary purpose of which is to act as consultant in providing professional
expertise and reliable data analysis related to partnership and so on. And the corporation shall not engage in the
business as securities advisor, stockbroker or investment house[:] Q. x x x A. First Imperial is prohibited from
engaging in foreign exchange business. Q. x x x A. And despite [. . .] this prohibition, they went on and engaged
in activities which are prohibited specifically in their by-laws (TSN pages 16 and 17 of July 17, 2003, CBD Case
No. 02-1048).
ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7
It is evident from the foregoing that respondent and his cohorts violated the main purpose of the FIRI By-Laws
particularly investment or foreign exchange business which must have been the reason why Yiu was surprised
and got mad when complainant approached him about his dollar savings investment of USD10,000 received by
the respondent as Legal Officer and the two (2) other alleged officers Agustin and Bernal of the FIRI[,] a
transaction expressly prohibited by the FIRI By-laws.[2]
Respondent was found to have violated Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which states:
Hence, it is clear that the representations of respondent as legal officer of FIRI caused material damage to
complainant. In so doing, respondent failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
lessened the confidence of the public in the honesty and integrity of the same.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Antonuitti K. Palaa is found GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years
effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the records of respondent, and furnished to
all courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
Commissioner Navarro thus recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six
(6) months.
In its Resolution dated July 30, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with the modification that respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years.
This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession. [3] To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which
might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
profession.[4]
In this case, respondent assured complainant that by investing his dollar savings with FIRI, his investment
was in a stable company, even if, as it was later discovered, the by-laws of FIRI prohibited it from engaging in
investment or foreign exchange business and its primary purpose is to act as consultant in providing professional
expertise and reliable data analysis related to partnership and so on.
When complainant decided to withdraw his investment from FIRI, the first check given to him in the
amount of his total investment bounced. Thereafter, respondent, as legal officer of FIRI, gave
complainant P250,000 in cash and a check for P329,045.09. Respondent assured complainant that the second
check was a good check and that it was signed by Paul Desiderio, the alleged president of FIRI. However, the
said check bounced because it was drawn against insufficient funds, and the drawer of the check, Paul
Desiderio, could not be located when sought to be served a warrant of arrest since his identity was unknown and
his residential address was found to be non-existent.
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to
the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to
the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws
of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board
shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and
take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the
Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member
and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the
membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to
submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and
necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent,
however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court
Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of
par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP
By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10
of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12
of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court
Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to
be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose
names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status
as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as
a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP
By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that
inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice
of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal
profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court,
entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in
that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January
9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of
factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from
bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion
of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official
national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the
rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable
annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional
ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the
Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest
and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have
been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in
the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of
the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed
with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good,
to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts
explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of
the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did
so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the
integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the
Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No.
181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated
by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the
Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this
fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to
restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of
Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397),
and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the
power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the
Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice
of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise
of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body
politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for
the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit
himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an
interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become
a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional
for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is
to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of
which every lawyer is a ready a member.8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend
the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require
that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of
a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power the
respondent acknowledges from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as
such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding
such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners
in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar
Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does
not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court
appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an
arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an
unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the
facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the
Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud.
The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the
Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice
of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the
respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial
A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.
[B.M. No. 793. July 30, 2004]

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF
ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA
RESOLUTION
Thereafter, Maqueras case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from the IBPs receipt of
the case records.[8]
TINGA, J.:
May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of
law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney be meted the same
sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign
jurisdiction? There is a Rule of Court provision covering this cases central issue.Up to this
juncture, its reach and breadth have not undergone the test of an unsettled case.
In a Letter dated August 20, 1996,[1] the District Court of Guam informed this Court of the
suspension of Atty. Leon G. Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam for two (2) years
pursuant to the Decision rendered by the Superior Court of Guam on May 7, 1996 in Special
Proceedings Case No. SP0075-94,[2] a disciplinary case filed by the Guam Bar Ethics Committee
against Maquera.
The Court referred the matter of Maqueras suspension in Guam to the Bar Confidant for
comment in its Resolution dated November 19, 1996.[3] Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign
jurisdiction, where he has also been admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or
suspension in this realm, provided the foreign courts action is by reason of an act or omission
constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or a violation
of the lawyers oath.
In a Memorandum dated February 20, 1997, then Bar Confidant Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa
recommended that the Court obtain copies of the record of Maqueras case since the documents
transmitted by the Guam District Court do not contain the factual and legal bases for Maqueras
suspension and are thus insufficient to enable her to determine whether Maqueras acts or
omissions which resulted in his suspension in Guam are likewise violative of his oath as a member
of the Philippine Bar.[4]
The IBP sent Maquera a Notice of Hearing requiring him to appear before the IBPs
Commission on Bar Discipline on July 28, 1998.[9] However, the notice was returned unserved
because Maquera had already moved from his last known address in Agana, Guam and did not
leave any forwarding address.[10]
On October 9, 2003, the IBP submitted to the Court its Report and Recommendation and
its Resolution No. XVI-2003-110, indefinitely suspending Maquera from the practice of law within
the Philippines until and unless he updates and pays his IBP membership dues in full.[11]
The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February 28, 1958. On
October 18, 1974, he was admitted to the practice of law in the territory of Guam. He was
suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his clients property as
payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high
fee for handling his clients case.[12]
In its Decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that on August 6, 1987, Edward
Benavente, the creditor of a certain Castro, obtained a judgment against Castro in a civil
case.Maquera served as Castros counsel in said case. Castros property subject of the case, a
parcel of land, was to be sold at a public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to
Benavente. Castro, however, retained the right of redemption over the property for one year. The
right of redemption could be exercised by paying the amount of the judgment debt within the
aforesaid period.[13]
At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castros property for Five Hundred U.S. Dollars
(US$500.00), the amount which Castro was adjudged to pay him.[14]
Pursuant to this Courts directive in its Resolution dated March 18, 1997,[5] the Bar Confidant
sent a letter dated November 13, 1997 to the District Court of Guam requesting for certified copies
of the record of the disciplinary case against Maquera and of the rules violated by him.[6]
The Court received certified copies of the record of Maqueras case from the District Court of
Guam on December 8, 1997.[7]
On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of Maqueras legal services in the civil case
involving Benavente, entered into an oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his right of
redemption in favor of the latter.[15]
On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castros right of redemption by paying Benavente

US$525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property
transferred in his name.[16]
On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for Three
Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$320,000.00).[17]
Castros property to him since he was able to sell the same to the Changs with more than
US$200,000.00 in profit, whereas his legal fees for services rendered to Castro amounted only to
US$45,000.00. The court also ordered him to take the MPRE upon his admission during the
hearings of his case that he was aware of the requirements of the Model Rules regarding business
transactions between an attorney and his client in a very general sort of way.[25]
On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that although
the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, there is no evidence to establish that
[Maquera] committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines. [26] However, the IBP still resolved to
suspend him indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977,
which failure is, in turn, a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll
of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court. [27]
On January 15, 1994, the Guam Bar Ethics Committee (Committee) conducted hearings
regarding Maqueras alleged misconduct.[18]
Subsequently, the Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of Guam praying that
Maquera be sanctioned for violations of Rules 1.5 [19] and 1.8(a)[20] of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in force in Guam. In its Petition, the Committee claimed that
Maquera obtained an unreasonably high fee for his services. The Committee further alleged that
Maquera himself admitted his failure to comply with the requirement in Rule 1.8 (a) of the Model
Rules that a lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire a
pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms governing the lawyers
acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fully disclosed to, and
understood by the client and reduced in writing.[21]
The Committee recommended that Maquera be: (1) suspended from the practice of law in
Guam for a period of two [2] years, however, with all but thirty (30) days of the period of
suspension deferred; (2) ordered to return to Castro the difference between the sale price of the
property to the Changs and the amount due him for legal services rendered to Castro; (3) required
to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings; and (4) publicly reprimanded. It also
recommended that other jurisdictions be informed that Maquera has been subject to disciplinary
action by the Superior Court of Guam.[22]
The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions committed in a
foreign jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by
Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992, which states:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or

other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an
attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes
any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis supplied).
Maquera did not deny that Castro executed a quitclaim deed to the property in his favor as
compensation for past legal services and that the transaction, except for the deed itself, was oral
and was not made pursuant to a prior written agreement. However, he contended that the
transaction was made three days following the alleged termination of the attorney-client
relationship between them, and that the property did not constitute an exorbitant fee for his legal
services to Castro.[23]
On May 7, 1996, the Superior Court of Guam rendered its Decision[24] suspending Maquera
from the practice of law in Guam for a period of two (2) years and ordering him to take the MultiState Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) within that period. The court found that the
attorney-client relationship between Maquera and Castro was not yet completely terminated when
they entered into the oral agreement to transfer Castros right of redemption to Maquera on
December 21, 1987. It also held that Maquera profited too much from the eventual transfer of
The Court must therefore determine whether Maqueras acts, namely: acquiring by
assignment Castros right of redemption over the property subject of the civil case where Maquera
appeared as counsel for him; exercising the right of redemption; and, subsequently selling the
property for a huge profit, violate Philippine law or the standards of ethical behavior for members of
the Philippine Bar and thus constitute grounds for his suspension or disbarment in this jurisdiction.
The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his clients property by exercising
the right of redemption previously assigned to him by the client in payment of his legal
services. Such transaction falls squarely under Article 1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5

[28]
of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 1491 prohibits the lawyers acquisition
by assignment of the clients property which is the subject of the litigation handled by the lawyer.
Under Article 1492,[29] the prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption.
The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and Article 1492 is founded on public
policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and
ignorance of his client[30] and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.
The case of In re: Ruste[31] illustrates the significance of the aforementioned prohibition. In
that case, the attorney acquired his clients property subject of a case where he was acting as
counsel pursuant to a deed of sale executed by his clients in his favor. He contended that the sale
was made at the instance of his clients because they had no money to pay him for his
services. The Court ruled that the lawyers acquisition of the property of his clients under the
circumstances obtaining therein rendered him liable for malpractice. The Court held:
Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the instance of the spouses driven by
financial necessity, as contended by the respondent, or at the latters behest, as contended by the
complainant, is of no moment. In either case an attorney occupies a vantage position to press
upon or dictate his terms to a harassed client, in breach of the rule so amply protective of the
confidential relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney and client, and of the rights of
both.[32]
The Superior Court of Guam also hinted that Maqueras acquisition of Castros right of
redemption, his subsequent exercise of said right, and his act of selling the redeemed property for
huge profits were tainted with deceit and bad faith when it concluded that Maquera charged Castro
an exorbitant fee for his legal services. The court held that since the assignment of the right of
redemption to Maquera was in payment for his legal services, and since the property redeemed by
him had a market value of US$248,220.00 as of December 21, 1987 (the date when the right of
redemption was assigned to him), he is liable for misconduct for accepting payment for his legal
services way beyond his actual fees which amounted only to US$45,000.00.
It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Courts judgment ordering Maqueras suspension
from the practice of law in Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in
the Philippines. Under Section 27,[34] Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to
his suspension in Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that
only if the basis of the foreign courts action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension in this jurisdiction.[35] Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only
constitutes prima facie evidence of Maqueras unethical acts as a lawyer.[36] More fundamentally,
due process demands that he be given the opportunity to defend himself and to present
testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in an investigation to be conducted in
accordance with Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a respondent
lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges against him. It is only after reasonable notice
and failure on the part of the respondent lawyer to appear during the scheduled investigation that
an investigation may be conducted ex parte.[37]
The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on his behalf
regarding the charges of unethical behavior in Guam against him, as it is not certain that he did
receive the Notice of Hearing earlier sent by the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is
a need to ascertain Maqueras current and correct address in Guam in order that another notice,
this time specifically informing him of the charges against him and requiring him to explain why he
should not be suspended or disbarred on those grounds (through this Resolution), may be sent to
him.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from the
practice of law for non-payment of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the present. [38] Under
Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of membership dues for six
(6) months shall warrant suspension of membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for
one year shall be ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.[39]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be suspended or disbarred for his acts which
gave rise to the disciplinary proceedings against him in the Superior Court of Guam and his
subsequent suspension in said jurisdiction.
The Bar Confidant is directed to locate the current and correct address of Atty. Maquera in
Guam and to serve upon him a copy of this Resolution.
Maqueras acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year suspension from the practice of
law in that jurisdiction are also valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law in the
Philippines. Such acts are violative of a lawyers sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his
clients. They are also violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17
which states that [a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust
and confidence reposed in him; and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to
maintain ones goods standing in the legal profession.[33]
In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
or until he shall have paid his membership dues, whichever comes later.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Maqueras personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992

EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent.
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant's
Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding and
communication gap and that she was refraining from pursuing her Complaint against Respondent.
Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed
Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.
PER CURIAM:
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good
moral character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78
instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for
Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983.
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for
Respondent's disbarment based on the following grounds:
a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage
with me assuming that our marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of our
marriage institution.
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at

Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed
under Article 76 of the Civil Code 1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).
b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already

married in his application to take the bar exam.
c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he
submitted to the Supreme Court;
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his
law studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a
stable future for them. Complainantadmits, though, that they had not lived together as husband
and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his
application, he declared that he was "single." He then passed the examinations but Complainant
blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming
that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy to take
the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also alleged that after
Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).
The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.
Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June 1982. Said
"Explanation" carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he admitted that he was
"legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet made
and declared public" so that he could proceed with his law studies and until after he could take the
Bar examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also admitted having indicated that he
was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I have still to
declare my status as single since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and
declared public." He further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her
conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.
d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing
of the affidavit ofdesistance and the conformity to his explanation and later on
the comment to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not
sincere, for he only befriended me to resume our marriage and introduced me
to his family, friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is he
wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court.
Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter
addressed to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he had already taken his Oath
stating, among others, that while he was grateful for Complainant's help, he "could not force
myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and considered her only a friend. Their marriage
contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code,
among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of the marriage, an
affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least twenty-one
(21) years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty years old at the time. He
advised Complainant not to do anything more so as not to put her family name "in shame." As for
him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can do
for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to any court."According to Complainant, although the
letter was unsigned, Respondent's initials appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail
envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").
Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant
who has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications.
In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had covenanted
not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and take the Bar first but
for the reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites of
Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the marriage and that said parties shall state the
same in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not have
abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and wife. When he
applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was
single.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General submitted his Report, with the
recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from the charges against him since Complainant
failed to attend the hearings and to substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for
making inconsistent and conflicting statements in the various pleadings he had filed before this
Court.
On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar Confidant for
evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter recommended the
indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of his marriage is settled.
Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find
Respondent's lack of good moral character sufficiently established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he
was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he
should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional
Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the
bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outrightfrom taking
the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.
Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not
only because of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also because that
marriage to the Complainant was void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely
wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume that his marriage to Complainant is void. The
presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character
under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official duty in connection
therewith has been regularly performed.
Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings

submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable.
The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an "Explanation," in
paragraph 1, page 1 of which he admits having been "legally married" to Complainant. Yet, during
the hearings before the Solicitor General, he denied under oath that he had submitted any such
pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending instead that it is only the second page where his signature
appears that he meant to admit and not the averments on the first page which were merely of
Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative Case,
he admits and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).
Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to Complainant (par.
1), in this case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage and, instead, harps on its being
void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage contract.
In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be made public
so as to allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he contends that
the reason it was kept a secret was because it was "not in order from the beginning."
Thirdly,
Respondent denies that he had sent the
unsigned
letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides with the reasons that
he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning, that is, for failure to
comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had reconciled
with Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable
him to take the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he had
done so and had become a "full-pledge (sic) lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage to
Complainant.
Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting
submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with
Complainant in order to serve his purpose. Inso doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196
SCRA 10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not
only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court.
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent toadmission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law(People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181
SCRA
692). As so aptly put by Mr.
Justice GeorgeA. Malcolm:
"As
good character is an
essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad
in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers ofan
attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall circulate the same to all
Courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
10
G.R. No. L-57351 January 16, 1982

MACARIO FESTIN, BENJAMIN FAMILARA, CARLITO FETALCURIN, GALICANA FORMADERO, SEGUNDO
FABABAIR, ROLLO FAINSAN, DAVID FETALVERO, FRANCISCO FORFIEDA, JOSE PAZ and CARLITO
FONTE, petitioners,
vs.
JORY F. FADERANGA, NORBERTA RIOS, ANTOLIN FRUELDA, FILEMON MARTINQUILLA, AVELINO
FABONAN, ERNESTO FERRANCULLO, ELMER FABAYOS, PEDRO FADEROGAO, REYNALDO
FETALVERO, RADIGONDES FAMINI, respondents.
11
There was, in such opinion, a reference to Venezuela v. Commission on Elections, 4 Villegas v. Commission on
Elections, 5 and Potencion v. Commission on Elections, 6 where this Court saw to it that an attempt to prolong a
pre-proclamation controversy should not prosper. The opinion in Faderanga then went on to state: "This Court
applied the doctrine, earlier noted, that such a stage having been reached, the proper remedy would be an
election contest or a quo warranto petition as the case may be. In the language of Aguinaldo v. Commission on
Elections: "Since Venezuela v. Commission on Elections, this Court has invariably adhered to the principle that
after the holding of the January 30, 1980 election, and a proclamation thereafter made, a petition to disqualify a
candidate based on a change of political party affiliation within six months immediately preceding or following an
election, filed with this Court after January 30, 1980, arising from a pre-proclamation controversy, should be
discussed without prejudice to such ground being passed upon in a proper election protest or quo warranto
proceeding. Where, however, such constitutional provision had been seasonably invoked prior to that date with
the Commission on Elections having acted on it and the matter then elevated to this Court before such election,
the issue thus presented should be resolved.' " 7
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The congenital infirmity from which this quo warran to suit suffers is quite obvious considering that on the facts of
the case and the applicable law, this Court had rendered a decision as far back as June 26, 1981 in Faderanga
v. Commission on Elections. 1 As expressly admitted by petitioners, "a decision in favor of the respondents was
promulgated on June 26, 1981, and received by herein petitioners at 5:25 p.m. of the same day, hence this
petition for quo warranto." 2What was not stated in the petition is that the entry of judgment was made as far back
as July 13, 1981. This is a settled matter then, the parties being conclusively bound by the ruling of this Court.
There can be no other judgment except that of dismissal.
The filing of this suit for quo warranto, an ingenious device resorted to by counsel, is equally indicative of a lack
of respect for a final decision of this Court and a reflection of his grasp of the law. For the principal petitioners in
this proceeding, Macario Festin and Carlito Fetalcurin were the respondents along with the Commission on
Elections in the above-cited decision. Respondents, on the other hand, were the then petitioners. Their claim to
continue in their respective municipal offices was sustained, having been duly proclaimed and occupying their
positions, subject to an election protest or a quo warranto proceeding. A pre-proclamation controversy was thus
put to an end in accordance with authoritative rulings. This petition on its face is thus a transparent attempt at
evasion which is not to be tolerated. An extended opinion then would be quite appropriate.
The facts as set forth in that decision, reiterated in the present petition, follow: "The case arose from a petition
filed on January 18, 1980 by private respondents with respondent Commission on Elections seeking the
disqualification of petitioners from being candidates respectively for mayor, vice mayor and members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Banton, Romblon. It was alleged that they changed their party affiliation from KBL to NP
within six (6) months before the local election. On the date of the election, such petition was still undecided.
Petitioners won and on January 31, 1980 were proclaimed duly elected respectively as mayor, vice mayor and
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Banton, Romblon. Petitioners were informed that respondent
Commission on Elections sent a telegram to the Registrar of Banton, Romblon to suspend the proclamation of
the petitioners. It was, however, received only late in the same day of January 31, 1980 after the proclamation. It
was not until February 28, 1980 that such petition for disqualification was resolved. It was denied for lack of
sufficient evidence. Accordingly, on March 3, 1980, the Registrar of Banton, Romblon, advised petitioners that all
winning candidates would be proclaimed anew on the afternoon of that day. Thus, for the second time, on March
3, 1980, petitioners were proclaimed. Only then did petitioners take their oaths of office. There was a motion for
reconsideration by private respondents with respondent Commission on March 19, 1980. An opposition was filed
by petitioners on April 17, 1980. It was their contention that no new issues, grounds or facts were raised therein.
For them, the proclamation having attained the stage of finality, to reopen the proceedings would be tantamount
to annulling it contrary to the 1978 Election Code. The motion for reconsideration was heard and submitted for
resolution on September 29, 1980. Then, three mouths to the day, on December 29, 1980, as noted at the
outset, respondent Commission reversed itself. Hence this certiorari and mandamus petition filed on January 19,
1981. A temporary restraining order was issued on January 20, 1981." 3
This excerpt from the opinion is equally relevant: "As a matter of fact, in Arcenas v. Commission on Elections,
when petitioner, the defeated mayoralty candidate for Hermosa, Bataan instituted a certiorari proceeding alleging
a grave abuse of discretion as respondent Commission motu proprio discussed an action for disqualification of
private respondent, the victor in such election, this Court found nothing objectionable in what was done. The
Commission was sustained. That decision of this Court, rendered a month before the assailed resolution, ought
to have furnished guidance. Respondent Commission should have denied the motion considering that as far
back as March 3, 1980, petitioners were proclaimed and thereafter held and continue to hold the offices in
question. That is not merely to abide by the authoritative pronouncements of this Court. It would be likewise in
consonance with what the realities of the situation dictate. Even disregarding the first pronouncement, the
Commission, apparently after considerable thought, had affirmed that as the victors in the election, petitioners
had earned the right to be proclaimed. To upset the existing conditions in Banton, Romblon under the
circumstances would not be conducive to stability. On the other hand, to follow the authoritative pronouncement
of this Court and thus put an end to the pre-proclamation controversy, reserving the right to private respondents
to pursue the matter in the appropriate election protest or quo warranto petition as the case may be, would be
more in keeping with the orderly ways of the law. This is not to impugn the good faith of respondent Commission.
It is merely to stress that in a choice of alternatives, what should guide its final disposition of a pre-proclamation
controversy after the lapse of a considerable period is to accord respect to a proclamation made after due
deliberation but, as noted above, without prejudice to a protest or quo warranto action to be filed, if the losing
party chooses to pursue such remedy." 8
To repeat, the petition must fail.

1. The finality of the above decision based on authoritative rulings notwithstanding, petitioners, who have no
choice except to yield obedience, remain adamant The dispositive portion in Faderanga cannot be any clearer:
"[Wherefore], the petition is granted. The order of December 29, 1980 is nullified and set aside, amounting as it
does to a grave abuse of discretion. The right of petitioners as duly elected officials in the various positions in
question to continue as such is affirmed, subject, however, to private respondents, if so reminded, instituting an
election protest or a quo warranto proceeding, as the case may be. For that purpose, they are given a period of
fifteen (15) days after receipt of this decision. The restraining order of January 20, 1981 is hereby made
permanent. This decision is immediately executory. No costs." 9 Principal respondents then, now petitioners,
were not left without remedy. At their option, they could file "an election protest or a quo warranto proceeding, as
the case may be. For that purpose, they are given a period of fifteen (15) days after receipt of this decision." 10 It
was promulgated on June 26, 1981. They admitted having received a copy on the same day. They chose not to
avail themselves of the remedy afforded them. Instead, undoubtedly upon advice of counsel, they instituted this
quo warranto proceeding, alleging that there was a culpable violation of the Constitution construed in relation to
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 and Presidential Decree No. 1661 as amended. How flimsy and insubstantial is such a
contention. That certainly is no way to escape from the binding force of a final decision. It calls to mind an
observation by Cardozo that while orthodoxy is not always desirable, heterodoxy may be another name for
ignorance - if not of something worse.
2. The law as to this particular controversy has thus been enunciated. To repeat, the parties, now petitioners and
now respondents, who litigated the same matter in Faderanga, must abide by such judgment. As categorically
stated in Kabigting v. Acting Director of Prisons: 11 "It need not be stated that the Supreme Court, being the court
of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any given
case constitutes the law of that particular case." 12 This Court has likewise noted the amplitude of its coverage.
What is express as well as what is implied in a decision is included, to be implemented faithfully, no
circumvention or evasion being allowed. 13 Recently, in Bueno Industrial and Development Corporation v. R. C.
Aquino Timber and Plywood Co., Inc., 14 it was noted how steadfast this Court has been in relying on such
concept. 15
3. Nor is this all. Notwithstanding the decision of this Court in Faderanga, now final, based on authoritative
doctrines, counsel for petitioner, a certain Gilbert M. Fabella, had the temerity to state the following in his petition:
"Respondents if allowed to continue holding the position as Mayor, Vice-Mayor and members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Banton, Romblon, in wanton violation of the constitutional prohibition in effect we would
be creating an elective officers of a Municipality who are above the law by judicial flat (emphasis ours). " 16 This
highly-gratuitous statement is offensive not so much because of the lack of the proper respect owing this Court,
imputing to it a judgment based solely on "judicial fiat," but even more so, because of its lack of appreciation of
the controlling jural norms. Such a display of arrogance could, of course, be traceable to his inexperience as a
legal practitioner having been admitted to the bar only on April 20, 1978. Evidently, he could have profited more
from an intensive study in political law subjects as a student and thereafter during this brief period of his
professional career. Obviously, he failed to do so. In addition to the previously-cited cases of Venezuela, Villegas
and Potencion, the Aguinaldo decision, relied upon in Faderanga, likewise made mention of Arcenas v.
Commission on Elections 17 and Singco v. Commission on Elections. 18 It provided the opportunity, therefore, for
this Court to reiterate the principle with greater precision. Thereafter, Laguda v. Commission on
Elections 19 applied the Aguinaldo doctrine. A reminder is, therefore, not out of place. Justice Laurel spoke of a
"becoming modesty" 20 being a desirable trait in lower court judges. It applies as well to practitioners, especially
so when the litigations entrusted to them may tax their ability to the utmost. While the circumstance of counsel for
petitioner Gilbert M. Fabella being new in the profession may be mitigating, it cannot entirely exculpate him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Attorney Gilbert M. Fabella is hereby admonished to be
more careful in his choice of language and to devote greater time, attention, and effort in the preparation of
pleadings for submission to this Court. Let a copy of this admonition be spread on his record.
12
A.C. No. 4497
September 26, 2001
MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G. SABURNIDO, complainants, vs.

ATTY. FLORANTE E. MADROO, Respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is the administrative complaint 2 for disbarment of respondent, Atty. Florante E.
Madroo filed by spouses Venustiano and Rosalia Saburdino. Complainants allege that respondent has
been harassing them by filing numerous complaints against them, in addition to committing acts of
dishonesty.
13
2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758, for falsification, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido and two
others. Respondent averred that Venustiano, with the help of his co-respondents in the case, inserted an
entry in the police blotter regarding the loss of Venustiano's firearm.
3. Crim. Case No. 93-67,7 for evasion through negligence under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code,
filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent alleged that Venustiano Saburnido,
without permission from his superior, took into custody a prisoner by final Judgment who thereafter
escaped.
4. Adm. Case No. 95 33, 8 filed by respondent against Rosalia Saburnido for violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. Respondent alleged that Rosalia Saburnido served as chairperson of the Board of
Election Inspectors during the 1995 elections despite being related to a candidate for barangay councilor.
At the time the present complaint was filed, the three actions filed against Venustiano Saburnido had
been dismissed while the case against Rosalia Saburnido was still pending.
Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the Philippine National Police stationed at

Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, while his wife Rosalia is a public school teacher. Respondent is a former
judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Balingasag-Lagonglong, Misamis Oriental.
Previous to this administrative case, complainants also filed three separate administrative cases against
respondent.
In A. M. No. MTJ-90-383,3 complainant Venustiano Saburnido filed charges of grave threats and acts
unbecoming a member of the judiciary against respondent. Respondent was therein found guilty of
pointing a high-powered firearm at complainant, who was unarmed at the time, during a heated
altercation. Respondent was accordingly dismissed from the service with prejudice to reemployment in
government but without forfeiture of retirement benefits.
Respondent was again administratively charged in the consolidated cases of Sealana-Abbu v. Judge
Madroo, A.M. No. 92-1-084-RTC and Sps. Saburnido v. Judge Madroo, A.M. No. MTJ-90-486.4 In the
first case, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Florencia Sealana-Abbu charged that respondent granted and
reduced bail in a criminal case without prior notice to the prosecution. In the second case, the spouses
Saburnido charged that respondent, in whose court certain confiscated smuggled goods were deposited,
allowed other persons to take the goods but did not issue the corresponding memorandum receipts.
Some of the goods were lost while others were substituted with damaged goods. Respondent was found
guilty of both charges and his retirement benefits were forfeited.
Complainants allege that respondent filed those cases against them in retaliation, since they had earlier
filed administrative cases against him that resulted in his dismissal from the judiciary. Complainants
assert that due to the complaints filed against them, they suffered much moral, mental, physical, and
financial damage. They claim that their children had to stop going to school since the family funds were
used up in attending to their cases.
For his part, respondent contends that the grounds mentioned in the administrative cases in which he
was dismissed and his benefits forfeited did not constitute moral turpitude. Hence, he could not be
disbarred therefor. He then argues that none of the complaints he filed against complainants was
manufactured. He adds that he "was so unlucky that Saburnido was not convicted." 9 He claims that the
complaint for serious irregularity against Venustiano Saburnido was dismissed only because the latter
was able to antedate an entry in the police blotter stating that his service firearm was lost. He also points
out that Venustiano was suspended when a prisoner escaped during his watch. As for his complaint
against Rosalia Saburnido, respondent contends that by mentioning this case in the present complaint,
Rosalia wants to deprive him of his right to call the attention of the proper authorities to a violation of the
Election Code.
In their reply, complainants reiterate their charge that the cases against them were meant only to harass
them. In addition, Rosalia Saburnido stressed that she served in the BEI in 1995 only because the
supposed chairperson was indisposed. She stated that she told the other BEI members and the
pollwatchers that she was related to one candidate and that she would desist from serving if anyone
objected. Since nobody objected, she proceeded to dispense her duties as BEI chairperson. She added
that her relative lost in that election while respondent's son won.
In the present case, the spouses Saburnido allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing
numerous complaints against them, namely:
1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755,5 for serious irregularity, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido.
Respondent claimed that Venustiano lent his service firearm to an acquaintance who thereafter extorted
money from public jeepney drivers while posing as a member of the then Constabulary Highway Patrol
Group.
In a resolution dated May 22, 1996, 10 we referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In its report submitted to this Court on October 16, 2000, the IBP noted that respondent and his counsel
failed to appear and present evidence in the hearing of the case set for January 26, 2000, despite notice.
Thus, respondent was considered to have waived his right to present evidence in his behalf during said
hearing. Neither did respondent submit his memorandum as directed by the IBP.
After evaluating the evidence before it, the IBP concluded that complainants submitted convincing proof
that respondent indeed committed acts constituting gross misconduct that warrant the imposition of
administrative sanction. The IBP recommends that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one year.
14
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroo is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year with a WARNING that a repetition the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent's suspension is effective upon his receipt of notice of
this decision. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondent's record as an attorney in this Court, and
notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP.
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit
to continue to be an officer of the court. 11 Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands
all lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, in Rule 7.03,
the Code provides:
RULE 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall be whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
Clearly, respondent's act of filing multiple complaints against herein complainants reflects on his fitness to
be a member of the legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait whether
in a lawyer or another individual, as complainants were instrumental in respondent's dismissal from the
judiciary. We see in respondent's tenacity in pursuing several cases against complainants not the
persistence of one who has been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact
revenge.
Respondent's action erodes rather than enhances public perception of the legal profession. It constitutes
gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.x x x
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. However, we find that suspension from the practice of
law is sufficient to discipline respondent.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect
the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. 12 While we will not hesitate to remove
an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also
not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. 13 In this case, we find
suspension to be a sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not primarily
intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession. 14
A.C. No. 6396
October 25, 2005
ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of Court. Members of
the bar decorum must at all times comfort themselves in a manner befitting their noble profession.
Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she filed with the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a Complaint-Affidavit[1] with
supporting documents[2] against respondent Atty. Virgil R. Castro for Unprofessional Conduct,
specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[3] The charge in the complaint is summed up as follows:
Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya
Chapter. On 5 May 2003, respondent went to complainants office to inquire whether the complete
records of Civil Case No. 784, entitled Sps. Crispino Castillano v. Sps. Federico S. Castillano and
Felicidad Aberin, had already been remanded to the court of origin, MCTC Dupax del Norte,
Alfonso Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record
of either party in Civil Case No. 784.
Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted since a
certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals should first be presented to serve as
basis for the transmittal of the records to the court of origin. To this respondent retorted scornfully,
Who will certify the Court of Appeals Decision, the Court of Appeals? You mean to say, I would still
have to go to Manila to get a certified true copy? Surprised at this outburst, complainant replied,
Sir, its in the Rules but you could show us the copy sent to the party you claim to be representing.
Respondent then replied, Then you should have notified me of the said requirement. That was two
weeks ago and I have been frequenting your office since then, but you never bothered to notify
me. Complainant replied, It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said requirement.
Respondent then answered, You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the record of
the case? Complainant responded, No, Sir, I mean, its not our duty to notify you that you have to
submit a copy of the Court of Appeals decision. Respondent angrily declared in Ilocano,Kayat mo
nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay? (You mean to say you dont care anymore? Is that the
way it is?) He then turned and left the office, banging the door on his way out to show his anger.
The banging of the door was so loud it was heard by the people at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30
where a hearing was taking place.[4]
After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his finger at
complainant and shouted, Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo nga ibales kaniak
ah! (Vulva of your mother! If you are harboring ill feelings against my client, dont turn your ire on
me!) Complainant was shocked at respondents words but still managed to reply, I dont even know
your client, Sir. Respondent left the office and as he passed by complainants window, he again
shouted, Ukinnam nga babai! (Vulva of your mother, you woman!)[5]
Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her office of which
she was, and still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her credibility had been
tarnished and diminished, eliciting doubt on her ability to command full respect from her staff. [6]
[7]
The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident, was supported by an Affidavit signed
by employees of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the incident.
The Affidavit narrated the same incident as witnessed by the said employees. A Motion to File
Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was filed by complainant on 25 September 2003.[8]
On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order[9] requiring respondent to submit his answer to the
complaint. Respondent submitted hisCompliance[10] dated 18 June 2003. Respondent explained
that he was counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 847, entitled Sps. Federico Castillano, et al.
v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et al., filed with the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30. He learned of the
finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 64962 with respect to Civil Case No.
847 before the lower court. Prior to the incident, he went to the office of the complainant to request
for the transmittal of the records of the case to the MCTC and the complainant reassured him of
the same.
Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the records on
5 May 2003. However, he has no explanation as to what transpired on that day. Instead, he
narrates that on 25 May 2003, twelve days after the incident, the records had not yet been
transmitted, and he subsequently learned that these records were returned to the court of origin.
The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25 September
2003 by the Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. However, on said date, only
complainant appeared. The latter also moved that the case be submitted for resolution.
[11]
Respondent later on filed a Manifestation stating that the reason for his non-appearance was
because he was still recuperating from physical injuries and that he was not mentally fit to prepare
the required pleadings as his vehicle was rained with bullets on 19 August 2003. He also
expressed his public apology to the complainant in the same Manifestation.[12]
Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the next
hearing date in view of respondents public apology, adding that respondent personally and humbly
asked for forgiveness which she accepted.[13]
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded and
warned that any other complaint for breach of his professional duties shall be dealt with more
[14]
severely. The IBP submitted to this Court a Notice of Resolution adopting and approving the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.[15]
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil
Case No. 784. Had he been counsel of record, it would have been easy for him to present the
required certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He need not have gone to
Manila to procure a certified true copy of the decision since the Court of Appeals furnishes the
parties and their counsel of record a duplicate original or certified true copy of its decision.
His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were
already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and there being
no authorization from either the parties to represent them, respondent had no right to impose his
will on the clerk of court.
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
15
Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No.
784, respondent deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of record of that
case. It does not matter whether he did so in good faith.
Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784,
respondent acted rudely towards an officer of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk of court
and uttered at her the most vulgar of invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered but also unbecoming
considering that he did all these to a woman and in front of her subordinates.
As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,[16] respondent ought to have realized that this sort
of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode
public respect for it.[17] These acts violate Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to wit:
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflect on his fitness to practice law, now shall he, whether in public or private
life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that lawyers
conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are
duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and
candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times.[18]
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not
categorically deny the charges in the complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of the
prefatory facts of the case as well as of the incident on 5 May 2003.
Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavit that respondents uncharacteristic
behavior was not an isolated incident. He has supposedly done the same to Attys. Abraham
Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy Lambino, the latter having filed a case against respondent
pending before this Court.[19] We, however, cannot acknowledge such allegation absent any
evidence showing the veracity of such claim. No affidavits to that effect were submitted by either
Atty. Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.
Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that
respondent had apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This is not to say,
however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the
consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards. The fact remains that
things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be taken back. Hence, he should bear
the consequences of his actions.
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their brethren.
This esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is
born of sharp contexts and thrives despite conflicting interest. It emanates solely from integrity,
character, brains and skills in the honorable performance of professional duty.[20]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with be dealt with
more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate
annotation in the record of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6408. August 31, 2004]
ISIDRA BARRIENTOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELERIZZA A. LIBIRAN-METEORO respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro for
deceit and non-payment of debts.
A letter-complaint dated May 21, 2001 was filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
under the names of Isidra Barrientos and Olivia C. Mercado, which was signed, however, by Isidra only. It
states that: sometime in September of 2000, respondent issued several Equitable PCIBank Checks in
favor of both Isidra and Olivia, amounting to P67,000.00, and in favor of Olivia, totaling P234,000.00, for
the payment of a pre-existing debt; the checks bounced due to insufficient funds thus charges for
violation of B.P. 22 were filed by Isidra and Olivia with the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan; respondent
sent text messages to complainants asking for the deferment of the criminal charges with the promise
that she will pay her debt; respondent however failed to fulfill said promise; on May 16, 2001, respondent,
through her sister-in-law, tried to give complainants a title for a parcel of land in exchange for the
bounced checks which were in the possession of complainants; the title covered an area of 5,000 square
meters located at Bantug, La Torre, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, registered in the name of Victoria Villamar
which was allegedly paid to respondent by a client; complainants checked the property and discovered
that the land belonged to a certain Dra. Helen Garcia, the sole heir of Victoria Villamar, who merely
entrusted said title to respondent pursuant to a transaction with the Quedancor; complainants tried to get
in touch with respondent over the phone but the latter was always unavailable, thus the present
complaint.[1]
On July 13, 2001, in compliance with the Order [2] of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
respondent filed her Answer alleging that: she issued several Equitable PCIBank checks amounting
to P234,000.00 in favor of Olivia but not to Isidra; said checks were issued in payment of a pre-existing
obligation but said amount had already been paid and replaced with new checks; Isidra signed a
document attesting to the fact that the subject of her letter-complaint no longer exists; [3] she also issued in
favor of Olivia several Equitable PCIBank checks amounting to P67,000.00 for the payment of a preexisting obligation; the checks which were the subject of the complaint filed at the City Prosecutors Office
in Cabanatuan City are already in the possession of respondent and the criminal case filed by
complainants before the Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City Branch 3 was already dismissed; the
Informations for Violation of B.P. 22 under I.S. Nos. 01-14090-03 [4] were never filed in court; Olivia
already signed an affidavit of desistance; respondent did not send text messages to Isidra and Olivia
asking for deferment of the criminal complaints neither did she present any title in exchange for her
bounced checks; she never transacted with Isidra since all dealings were made with Olivia; and the
present complaint was initiated by Isidra only because she had a misunderstanding with Olivia and she
wants to extract money from respondent.[5]
Attached to said Answer is an affidavit signed by Olivia C. Mercado which states as follows:
1. That I am one of the complainants for the Disbarment of Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines National Office in Pasig City, Philippines docketed as CBD case no. 01840;
2. That the filing of the said complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines was brought about by
some misunderstanding and error in the accounting of the records of the account of Atty. Elerizza L.
Meteoro;
3. That I was the one who transacted with Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro and not my co-complainant Isidra
Barrientos;
4. That all the pieces of jewelry were taken from me by Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro and the corresponding
checks were given to Isidra Barrientos through me;
5. That my name was indicated as co-complainant in a letter-complaint filed by Ms. Isidra Barrientos
against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro but I am not interested in pursuing the complaint against Atty. Elerizza L.
Meteoro since the complaint was brought about by a case of some mistakes in the records;
6. That I, together with Isidra Barrientos had already signed an affidavit of desistance and submitted the
same before the Municipal Trial Court Branch III of Cabanatuan City w(h)ere Criminal Case Nos. 77851
to 56 for violation of BP 22 were filed against Atty. Meteoro;
7. That with respect to I.S. nos. 03-01-1356 to 1361 the case was not filed in court and I have also
executed an affidavit of desistance for said complaint;
8. That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of all the foregoing and to prove that I have no
cause of action against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro. [6]
16
On August 9, 2001, the IBP-CBD issued a Notice of Hearing requiring both parties to appear
before it on September 6, 2001. On said date, both parties appeared and agreed to settle their
misunderstanding.[7]
On November 27, 2001, the parties agreed that the balance of P134,000.00 which respondent
acknowledged as her indebtedness to complainant will be settled on a staggered basis. Another hearing
was then set for February 5, 2002. Respondent failed to appear in said hearing despite due notice. It was
then reset to February 28, 2002 with the order that should respondent fail to appear, the case shall
already be submitted for resolution.[8]
Respondent appeared in the next two hearings. However, this time, it was complainant who was
unavailable. In the hearing of July 31, 2002, respondent was absent and was warned again that should
she fail to appear in the next hearing, the Commissioner shall resolve the case. On said date, respondent
did not appear despite due notice.[9]
On August 1, 2002, respondent filed with the Commission a motion for reconsideration of the July
31 order stating that: she got sick a few days before the scheduled hearing; she had already paid
complainant the amount of P64,000.00; in March of 2002, respondents father was admitted to the
Intensive Care Unit of the University of Santo Tomas Hospital thus she was not able to settle her
remaining balance as planned; and because of said emergency, respondent was not able to fully settle
the balance of her debt up to this date. Respondent prayed that she be given another 60 days from
August 1,2002 to finally settle her debt with complainant. [10]
On April 30, 2003, the IBP-CBD issued an order granting respondents motion and setting aside the
order dated July 31, 2002. It noted that while respondent claims that she already paid
complainant P64,000.00, the photocopies of the receipts she submitted evidencing payment amount only
to P45,000.00.[11] A hearing was then set for May 28, 2003 at which time respondent was directed to
present proof of her payments to the complainant. The hearing was however reset several times until
August 20, 2003 at which time, only complainant appeared. Respondent sent somebody to ask for a
postponement which the commission denied. The commission gave respondent a last opportunity to
settle her accounts with complainant. The hearing was set for October 7, 2003 which the commission
said was intransferrable.[12]
On October 7, 2003, only complainant appeared. The commission noted that respondent was duly
notified and even personally received the notice for that days hearing. The case was thereafter submitted
for resolution.[13]
On October 24, 2003, the Investigating IBP Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan submitted his
report pertinent portions of which read as follows:
The issue to be resolved is whether or not Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro has committed a violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Office holds that she has. More particularly, the respondent,
by initially and vehemently denying her indebtedness to herein complainant and then subsequently
admitting liability by proposing a staggered settlement has displayed a glaring flaw in her integrity. She
has shown herself to possess poor moral characters. In her motion for reconsideration, seeking the
reopening of this case, the respondent made a false assertion that she had settled up to P64,000.00 of
her indebtedness but the receipts she submitted total only P50,000.00. What is more disconcerting is that
while she is aware and duly notified of the settings of this Office respondent has seemingly ignored the
same deliberately. Finally, the respondent has not offered any satisfactory explanation for, nor has she
controverted the complainants charge that she (respondent) had tried to negotiate a transfer certificate of
title (TCT) which had been entrusted by a certain Dra. Helen Garcia to her relative to a transaction which
the former had with the Quedancor where respondent was formerly employed. Based on all the foregoing
findings and the deliberate failure of the respondent to come forward and settle her accountabilities,
inspite of several warnings given her by the undersigned, and her failure to attend the scheduled
hearings despite due notice, this Office is convinced that Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro has committed a
glaring violation not only of her oath as a lawyer but also the dictates of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 which
mandates that a worthy member of the Bar must constantly be of good moral character and unsullied
honesty.[14]
He then recommended that Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro be suspended from the practice of law
for two years and meted a fine of twenty thousand pesos. [15]
On October 29, 2003, respondent filed another motion for reconsideration stating that: she was not
able to receive the notice for the October 7 hearing because she was in Bicol attending to pressing
personal problems; she only arrived from the province on October 25, 2003 and it was only then that she
got hold of the Order dated October 7; from the very beginning, respondent never intended to ignore the
Commissions hearings; as much as she wanted to pay complainant in full, the financial crisis which hit
her family since 2001 has gravely affected her ability to pay; until that day, the expenses incurred by
respondent due to the hospitalization of her father has not been paid in full by her family; the family home
of respondent in Cabanatuan has already been foreclosed by the bank; respondents husband has been
confined recently due to thyroid problems and respondent herself had sought medical help on several
occasions due to her inability to conceive despite being married for more than five years; if not for said
reasons, respondent could have already paid the complainant despite respondents knowledge that the
amount complainant wanted to collect from her is merely the interest of her debt since she already
returned most of the pieces of jewelry she purchased and she already paid for those that she was not
able to return. Respondent prays that the resolution of the case be deferred and that she be given
another 90 days from said date or until January 19, 2003 to settle whatever balance remains after proper
accounting and presentation of receipts.[16]
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-67
CBD Case No. 01-840
Isidra Barrientos vs.
Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering respondents glaring violation not only
of her oath as a lawyer but of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
and Restitution of P84,000.00 to complainant.[17]
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP except as to the alleged matter of
respondent offering a transfer certificate of title to complainants in exchange for the bounced checks that
were in their possession.
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of
law.[18] Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They
are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity
and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. [19]They must at
all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include
prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflect the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
[20]
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states that:
CANON 1 -- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 -- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In this case, respondent in her answer initially tried to deny having any obligation towards Isidra
Barrientos. Upon appearing before the IBP-CBD, however, respondent eventually acknowledged her
indebtedness to Isidra in the amount of P134,000.00, promising only to pay in a staggered basis. Her
attempt to evade her financial obligation runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, above quoted, and violates the lawyers oath which imposes upon every member of the
bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. [21]
After respondent acknowledged her debt to complainant, she committed herself to the payment
thereof. Yet she failed many times to fulfill said promise. She did not appear in most of the hearings and
merely submitted a motion for reconsideration on August 1, 2002 after the IBP-CBD Commissioner had
already submitted the case for resolution. She claimed that she got sick days before the hearing and
asked for sixty days to finally settle her account. Again, she failed to fulfill her promise and did not appear
before the Commission in the succeeding hearings despite due notice. After the case was submitted
anew for resolution on October 6, 2003, respondent filed another motion for reconsideration, this time
saying that she was in the province attending to personal matters. Again she asked for another ninety
days to settle her entire debt. This repeated failure on her part to fulfill her promise puts in question her
integrity and moral character. Her failure to attend most of the hearings called by the commission and her
belated pleas for reconsideration also manifest her propensity to delay the resolution of the case and to
make full use of the mechanisms of administrative proceedings to her benefit.
She also could not deny that she issued several checks without sufficient funds, which prompted
Isidra and Olivia to file complaints before the prosecutors office in Cabanatuan City. Her only excuse is
that she was able to replace said checks and make arrangements for the payment of her debt, which led
to the dismissal of the criminal complaints against her.
We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It
shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public
confidence.[22] The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of
respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order. [23] It
also manifests a lawyers low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her
peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem. [24]
17
Mere issuance of worthless checks by a lawyer, regardless of whether or not the same were
issued in his professional capacity to a client, calls for appropriate disciplinary measures. As we
explained in Co vs. Bernardino:[25]
The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily
assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity. Where,
however, the misconduct outside of the lawyers professional dealings is so gross a character as to show
him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him,
the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the office of attorney.
The evidence on record clearly shows respondents propensity to issue bad checks. This gross
misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar, puts his
moral character in serious doubt[26] (Citations omitted).
She also claims that her father was hospitalized in March 2002 and that she and her husband also
had to seek medical help which greatly affected her ability to pay. She however did not present any proof
to substantiate such claims. She also did not appear personally before the complainant and the
commission, in spite of the many opportunities given her, to make arrangements for the payment of her
debt considering the circumstances that befell her family. Instead, she waited until the case was
submitted for resolution to allege such facts, without presenting any proof therefor.
We cannot uphold the IBP in finding that since respondent has not offered any explanation for, nor
has she controverted the complainants charge that she tried to negotiate with them a transfer certificate
of title that had been entrusted to her by a client, she should be held liable therefor. Basic is the principle
that if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving her cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which she bases her claim, the respondent is under no obligation to
prove her exception or defense.[27] Simply put, the burden is not on the respondent to prove her
innocence but on the complainants to prove her guilt. In this case, complainants submitted a photocopy
of a TCT in the name of Victoria Villamar together with their letter-complaint, which according to
complainants was the title respondent tried, through her sister-in-law, to negotiate with them in exchange
for the bounced checks in their possession. [28] No other evidence or sworn statement was submitted in
support of such allegation. Respondent in her answer, meanwhile, denied having any knowledge
regarding such matter and no further discussion was made on the matter, not even in the hearings before
the commission.[29] For this reason, we hold that respondent should not be held liable for the alleged
negotiation of a TCT to complainants for lack of sufficient evidence, but only for the non-payment of debts
and the issuance of worthless checks which were sufficiently proved and which respondent herself
admitted.
We reiterate that membership in the legal profession is a privilege and demands a high degree of
good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing
requirement for the practice of law.[30]
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondents misconduct. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months. In Lao
vs. Medel,[31] which also involved non-payment of debt and issuance of worthless checks, the Court held
that suspension from the practice of law for one year was appropriate. Unlike in the Lao case however,
respondent is this case paid a portion of her debt, as evidenced by receipts amounting to P50,000.00.
Thus we deem that six months suspension from the practice of law and the restitution of P84,000.00 to
complainant Isidra Barrientos would be sufficient in this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby
SUSPENDED for six months from the practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this Decision, and is
ordered to pay complainant Isidra Barrientos the amount of P84,000.00, as balance of her debt to the
latter, plus 6% interest from date of finality of herein decision.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP as well
as the court administrator who shall circulate herein Resolution to all courts for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5151. October 19, 2004]
PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M. LUMALANG, SR., MELITON D.
EVANGELISTA, SR., and NELSON B. MELGAR, complainants, vs. ATTY.
NORBERTO M. MENDOZA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino, Romeo M. Laygo, Solomon M.
Lumalang, Sr., Meliton D. Evangelista, Sr., and Nelson B. Melgar against Atty. Norberto M.
Mendoza for Grossly Immoral Conduct and Gross Misconduct.
Complainants allege in their Affidavit-Complaint that respondent, a former Municipal Trial
Court Judge, abandoned his legal wife, Felicitas V. Valderia in favor of his paramour, Marilyn dela
Fuente, who is, in turn, married to one Ramon G. Marcos; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente
have been cohabiting openly and publicly as husband and wife in Brgy. Estrella, Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro; respondent had fathered two children by his paramour Marilyn dela Fuente; respondent
and Marilyn dela Fuente declared in the birth certificates of their two daughters that they were
married on May 12, 1986, making it appear that their two children are legitimate, while in
respondents Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC during the 1995 elections,
respondent declared that his wife is Felicitas V. Valderia; in respondents certificate of candidacy for
the 1998 elections, he declared his civil status as separated; such declarations in the birth
certificates of his children and in his certificate of candidacy are acts constituting falsification of
public documents; and respondents acts betray his lack of good moral character and constitute
grounds for his removal as a member of the bar.
Respondent filed his Comment wherein he states that complainants, who are his political
opponents in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, are merely filing this case to exact revenge on him for his
filing of criminal charges against them; complainants illegally procured copies of the birth
certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela
Fuente Mendoza, in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, thus, such
documents are inadmissible in evidence; respondent did not participate in the preparation and
submission with the local civil registry of subject birth certificates; respondent never declared that
he had two wives, as he has always declared that he is separated in fact from his wife, Felicitas V.
Valderia; and complainants have used this issue against him during elections and yet, the people
of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro still elected him as Mayor, hence, respondent has not offended the
publics sense of morality.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter
IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the IBP conducted hearings.
Witnesses for complainants, Nelson B. Melgar and Romeo M. Laygo, submitted their
affidavits as their direct testimony and were subjected to cross-examination by respondents
counsel.
Witness Nelson B. Melgar declares in his affidavit as follows: He knows respondent for they
both reside in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. Respondent is known as a practicing lawyer and a former
Municipal Trial Court Judge. Respondent has been cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn
dela Fuente, representing themselves to be husband and wife, and from their cohabitation, they
produced two children, namely, Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna
Normina dela Fuente Mendoza. Sometime in 1995, he (witness Melgar) received a letter from a
concerned citizen, informing him that respondent was married to Felicitas Valderia of San Rafael,
Bulacan, on January 16, 1980, but respondent abandoned his wife to cohabit with Marilyn dela
Fuente. Attached to the letter was a photocopy of a Certification issued by the Civil Register
attesting to the marriage between respondent and Felicitas Valderia. He also received information
from concerned citizens that Marilyn dela Fuente is also legally married to one Ramon G. Marcos,
as evidenced by a Certification from the Office of the Civil Register. Respondent stated in his
Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1995 that he is still legally married to Felicitas
Valderia. In respondents Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1998, he declared his
civil status as separated. Respondent has represented to all that he is married to Marilyn dela
Fuente. In the Naujanews, a local newspaper where respondent holds the position of Chairman of
18
the Board of the Editorial Staff, respondent was reported by said newspaper as husband to Marilyn
dela Fuente and the father of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.
On cross-examination, witness Melgar testified as follows: He was the former mayor of
Naujan and he and respondent belong to warring political parties. It was not respondent who told
him about the alleged immoral conduct subject of the present case. Although he received the letter
of a concerned citizen regarding the immoral conduct of respondent as far back as 1995, he did
not immediately file a case for disbarment against respondent. It was only after respondent filed a
criminal case for falsification against him that he decided to file an administrative case against
respondent.[1]
On re-direct examination, witness Melgar testified that there were people who were against
the open relationship between respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente as respondent had been
publicly introducing the latter as his wife despite the fact that they are both still legally married to
other persons, and so someone unknown to him just handed to their maid copies of the birth
certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.[2]
The affidavit of Mr. Romeo M. Laygo, which was adopted as his direct testimony, is
practically identical to that of witness Melgar. On cross-examination, witness Laygo testified that he
was not the one who procured the certified true copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna
Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, as somebody
just gave said documents to Nelson Melgar. He was a municipal councilor in 1995 when the letter
of a concerned citizen regarding respondents immorality was sent to Melgar, but he did not take
any action against respondent at that time.[3]
Complainants then formally offered documentary evidence consisting of photocopies which
were admitted by respondents counsel to be faithful reproductions of the originals or certified true
copies thereof, to wit: a letter of one Luis Bermudez informing Nelson Melgar of respondents
immoral acts,[4] the Certification of the Local Civil Registrar of San Rafael, Bulacan, attesting to the
celebration of the marriage between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia, [5] the Birth Certificate
of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza, [6] the Birth Certificate of Myrra Khrisna Normina
dela Fuente Mendoza,[7] the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated March 9, 1995, [8] the
Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated March 25, 1998, [9] Certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro dated October 27, 1998, attesting to the marriage celebrated
between Marilyn dela Fuente and Ramon Marcos, [10] and the editorial page of
the Naujanews (February-March 1999 issue),[11] wherein it was stated that respondent has two
daughters with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.
Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to present any evidence and merely submitted a
memorandum expounding on his arguments that the testimonies of complainants witnesses are
mere hearsay, thus, said testimonies and their documentary evidence have no probative weight.
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVI-2004123, reading as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondents violation of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is
hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof
that he is no longer cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife and has abandoned such immoral
course of conduct.
Portions of the report and recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, upon
which the above-quoted Resolution was based, read as follows:
FINDINGS:
The evidence of complainants to support their charge of immorality consists in a) the testimonies
of Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo given by way of affidavits executed under oath and affirmed
before the Commission and b) their documentary evidence consisting of their Exhibits A to H.
Respondent filed his comment through counsel and did not formally present or offer any evidence.
Respondent opted not to present his evidence anymore because according to him there is none to
rebut vis--vis the evidence presented by the private complainants. Respondent instead submitted a
memorandum through counsel to argue his position. As can be seen from the comment and
memorandum submitted, respondents counsel argues that the complaint is politically motivated
since complainants are political rivals of respondent and that the birth certificates Exhibits D and
D-1 which were offered to show that respondent sired the children namely Mara Khrisna Charmina
dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza out of his cohabitation
with Marilyn dela Fuente are inadmissible because they were allegedly secured in violation of
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993. The rest of the exhibits are either hearsay or selfserving according to respondent.
The witnesses who are also two of the complainants herein, on the other hand, categorically state
in their affidavits [Exhibits A and B] particularly in paragraph 2 that Respondent has been
cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn de la Fuente, representing themselves to be husband
and wife. In paragraph 10 of said affidavits the witnesses also categorically state that respondent
has even represented to all and sundry that Marilyn de la Fuente is his wife. These categorical
statements made under oath by complainants are not hearsay and remain un-rebutted.
Respondent chose not to rebut them.
Exhibit E, the Certificate of Candidacy executed by respondent shows that respondent is married
to one, Felicitas V. Valderia. As shown by Exhibit H, a marriage certificate, Marilyn de la Fuente is
married to one, Ramon G. Marcos. Duly certified true copies of said exhibits have been presented
by complainants.
With respect to Exhibits D and D-1, we believe that they are competent and relevant evidence and
admissible in this proceedings. The exclusionary rule which bars admission of illegally obtained
evidence applies more appropriately to evidence obtained as a result of illegal searches and
seizures. The instant case cannot be analogous to an illegal search or seizure. A person who
violates Rule 24 of Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1993 as cited by respondent risks the
penalty of imprisonment or payment of a fine but it does not make the document so issued
inadmissible as evidence specially in proceedings like the present case. Exhibits D and D-1 which
are duly certified birth certificates are therefore competent evidence to show paternity of said
children by respondent in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.
By and large the evidence of complainants consisting of the testimonies of witnesses Nelson
Melgar and Romeo Laygo, and corroborated by the documentary exhibits will show that indeed
respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a certain Marilyn de la Fuente who is not his wife and
that out of said cohabitation respondent sired two children. These facts we repeat have not been
denied by respondent under oath since he chose to just argue on the basis of the improper
motivations and the inadmissibility, hearsay and self-serving nature of the documents presented.
Complainants have presented evidence sufficient enough to convince us that indeed respondent
has been cohabiting publicly with a person who is not his wife. The evidence taken together will
support the fact that respondent is not of good moral character. That respondent chose not to deny
under oath the grave and serious allegations made against him is to our mind his undoing and his
silence has not helped his position before the Commission. As between the documents and
positive statements of complainants, made under oath and the arguments and comments of
respondent submitted through his lawyers, which were not verified under oath by respondent
himself, we are inclined and so give weight to the evidence of complainants. The direct and
forthright testimonies and statements of Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo that respondent was
openly cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente is not hearsay. The witnesses may have admitted that
respondent Mendoza did not tell them that a certain Marilyn de la Fuente was his paramour (for
why would respondent admit that to complainants) but the witnesses did state clearly in their
affidavits under oath that respondent was cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente who is not
respondents wife. Again their categorical statements taken together with the other documents, are
enough to convince us and conclude that respondent is not of good moral character.
Members of the Bar have been repeatedly reminded that possession of good moral character is a
continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of
good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law [ Mortel vs.
Aspiras 100 Phil. 586 (1956); Cordova vs. Cordova 179 SCRA 680 (1989);People vs. Tuanda 181
SCRA 682 (1990)]. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage [Mijares vs. Villaluz 274 SCRA 1 (1997)].
In the instant case respondent has disregarded and made a mockery of the fundamental institution
of marriage. Respondent in fact even so stated in Exhibit F that he is separated from his wife. This
fact and statement without any further explanation from respondent only contributes to the blot in
his moral character which good moral character we repeat is a continuing condition for a member
to remain in good standing. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
19
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent has violated this
rule against engaging in immoral conduct.
We agree, as cited by the respondent, with the pronouncement made in Santos vs. Dischoso, 84
SCRA 622 (1978) that courts should not be used by private persons particularly disgruntled
opponents to vent their rancor on members of the Bar through unjust and unfounded accusations.
However, in the instant case the charges can hardly be considered as unfounded or unjust based
on the evidence presented. The evidence presented shows that respondent no longer possess
(sic) that good moral character necessary as a condition for him to remain a member of the Bar in
good standing. He is therefore not entitled to continue to engage in the practice of law.
We find such report and recommendation of the IBP to be fully supported by the pleadings
and evidence on record, and, hence, approve and adopt the same.
The evidence presented by complainants reach that quantum of evidence required in
administrative proceedings which is only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conviction.[12]
Witness Melgars testimony that respondent had been publicly introducing Marilyn dela
Fuente as his wife is corroborated by the contents of an article in theNaujanews, introducing
respondent as one of Naujans public servants, and stating therein that respondent has been
blessed with two beautiful children with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente. [13] It should be noted that said
publication is under the control of respondent, he being the Chairman of the Board thereof. Thus, it
could be reasonably concluded that if he contested the truth of the contents of subject article in
the Naujanews, or if he did not wish to publicly present Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife, he could
have easily ordered that the damning portions of said article to be edited out.
With regard to respondents argument that the credibility of witnesses for the complainants is
tainted by the fact that they are motivated by revenge for respondents filing of criminal cases
against them, we opine that even if witnesses Melgar and Laygo are so motivated, the credibility of
their testimonies cannot be discounted as they are fully supported and corroborated by
documentary evidence which speak for themselves. The birth certificates of Mara Khrisna
Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June
16, 1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente; and
the Certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bulacan attesting to the existence in
its records of an entry of a marriage between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia celebrated on
January 16, 1980, are public documents and are prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein, as provided for under Article 410[14] of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Respondent mistakenly argues that the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela
Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and
May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente, are inadmissible in
evidence for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1993, which provides as follows:
Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records.
(1) The records of a persons birth shall be kept strictly confidential and no information
relating thereto shall be issued except on the request of any of the following:
a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by him;
b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely necessary in administrative,
judicial or other official proceedings to determine the identity of the childs parents
or other circumstances surrounding his birth; and
c. in case of the persons death, the nearest of kin.
(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of at
least two months or a fine in an amount not exceeding five hundred pesos, or both
in the discretion of the court. (Article 7, P.D. 603)
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that evidence is admissible
when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. There could be no
dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore, is
whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for
having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions
against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that
procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render said records inadmissible in
evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of
evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized,
however, that said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a
person from interference by the government or the state. [15] In People vs. Hipol,[16] we explained
that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the
individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers governmental power and
protects the individual against any aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of
government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this
case. The alleged warrantless search made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the
treasurers office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted
searches and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject
birth records as evidence against respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on
Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said
public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly taken into consideration in the
resolution of this administrative case against respondent.
Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente
Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza and respondents Certificate of
Candidacy dated March 9, 1995 wherein respondent himself declared he was married to Felicitas
Valderia, were never denied nor rebutted by respondent. Hence, said public documents sufficiently
prove that he fathered two children by Marilyn dela Fuente despite the fact that he was still legally
married to Felicitas Valderia at that time.
In Bar Matter No. 1154,[17] good moral character was defined thus:
. . . good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from
the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place
where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such
conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law.
In Zaguirre vs. Castillo,[18] we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, to wit:
. . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of
good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
20
immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
In the above-quoted case, we pointed out that a member of the Bar and officer of the court is
not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must
also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting
those moral standards and, thus, ruled that siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a
conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer.[19]
We must rule in the same wise in this case before us. The fact that respondent continues to
publicly and openly cohabit with a woman who is not his legal wife, thus, siring children by her,
shows his lack of good moral character. Respondent should keep in mind that the requirement of
good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is
also a continuing requirement to maintain ones good standing in the legal profession.
[20]
In Aldovino vs. Pujalte, Jr.,[21] we emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of
the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal
profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of
the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court,
which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to
withdraw the privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby found GUILTY of
immorality, in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED
INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof that he has abandoned
his immoral course of conduct.
Let a copy of this resolution be served personally on respondent at his last known address
and entered in his record as attorney. Let the IBP, the Bar Confidant, and the Court Administrator
be furnished also a copy of this resolution for their information and guidance as well as for
circularization to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
EN BANC
Rebecca B. Arnobit, in her affidavit-complaint [1] dated May 11, 1975, prays that the Court exercise
its disciplinary power over her husband, respondent Atty. Ponciano Arnobit, on the grounds of
Immorality and Abandonment.
REBECCA B. ARNOBIT, A.C. No. 1481

Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
In her complaint, Rebecca alleged that she and respondent were married on August 20, 1942.
Twelve children were born out of this union. Rebecca further alleged seeing respondent through
law school, continuously supporting him until he passed the bar examinations and became a
member of the Philippine bar. Several years after, however, or in 1968, respondent left the
conjugal home and started cohabiting with one Benita Buenafe Navarro who later bore him four
more children. Respondents infidelity, according to Rebecca, impelled her to file a complaint for
legal separation and support. A criminal case for adultery against Benita and respondent later
followed.
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
ATTY. PONCIANO P. ARNOBIT, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
Respondent. BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 17, 2008
In his Answer[2] dated July 31, 1975, respondent admitted that Rebecca is his wedded wife and the
mother of their 12 children. He denied, however, having cohabited with Benita. And he pointed to
his complaining wife as the cause of their separation, stating the observation that she was always
traveling all over the country, ostensibly for business purposes, without his knowledge and
consent, x x x thereby neglecting her obligations toward her family.[3]
Issues having been joined, hearings were conducted before the Office of the Solicitor General and,
subsequently, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline
(Commission). At the hearings, Rebecca presented both oral and documentary evidence to
support her allegations of abandonment and immorality.
Aside from her testimony, Rebecca presented two other witnesses, viz: Venancia M. Barrientos,
her sister, who identified a letter dated August 28, 1970 written by respondent to her, addressing
her as Vending (Exhibit B-1), therein asking for forgiveness for the unhappiness he caused his
family; and Melecio Navarro, husband of Benita, who testified about how respondent took his wife
Benita as a mistress, knowing fully well of their lawful marriage.
Rebecca also presented the affidavits of National Bureau of Investigation agents Eladio C. Velasco
and Jose C. Vicente (Exhibits H-1 and H-2) to show the existence of a prima facie case for
adultery. The pictures and baptismal and birth certificates of Mary Ann, Ma. Luisa, Caridad, and
Ponciano Jr., all surnamed Arnobit, were submitted to prove the fact that respondent sired four
illegitimate children out of his illicit cohabitation with Benita.[4]
According to the investigating commissioner, respondent, despite due notice, repeatedly absented
himself when it was his turn to present evidence, adding that scheduled hearings had to be
postponed just to afford respondent ample opportunity to present his side of the controversy. The
investigating commissioner also stated that, in most cases, respondent would seek postponement,
pleading illness, on the very date of the hearing. And according to the Commission, its several
directives for respondent to send by mail his affidavits and documentary exhibits in lieu of personal
appearance so that the commission could finish with the investigation proved futile.
In its Report dated June 21, 1995, the Commission found respondent liable for
abandonment and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. The
recommendation portion of the report reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended to the Board of Governors that
the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
months as a lesson for him to change his ways. An indefinite suspension is
not recommended because it has been gathered from complainant herself that
respondent supports himself through the practice of law which would be cruel
for us to curtail at this time when he is already advanced in age the penalty of
three (3) months suspension and recording of such penalty in his record being
sufficient to berate him as to his lack of responsibility as evidenced by his
abandonment of the children. [Report and Recommendation rendered by
Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas]
On January 27, 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XII-96-43 adopting and
approving the Commission report aforementioned.
While the Court concurs with the inculpatory findings of the IBP on the charge of abandonment, it
cannot bring itself to agree that respondent is liable only for that offense. As it were, the charge for
gross immoral conduct has sufficiently been proven. Following established jurisprudence,
respondent deserves to be disbarred.
21
profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive
and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such
character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do
the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because vast interests are committed to his care;
he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation,
his life, his all.[5]
Immoral conduct has been described as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as
to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the
basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it
must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.[6]
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community.[7] A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required
to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as
to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral
standards.
A review of the records readily reveals that despite the protracted delay in the hearings mainly
caused by respondents failure to appear, complainant relentlessly pursued this administrative case
against her husband. She was, to be sure, able to establish by clear, convincing, and preponderant
evidence his commission of marital infidelity and abandonment of his family.
Although respondent in his answer denied abandoning complainant and their children and offered
an explanation as to the cause of his and his wifes separation, he opted not to take the witness
stand and be cross- examined on his sworn answer. Neither did he bother to call and present his
alleged paramour, Benita, who could have had disproved an existing adulterous relationship
between them, or, at least, confirm his protestation about the paternity of her four children.
Significantly, Benitas husband, no less, risked personal ridicule by testifying on the illicit liaison
between his wife and respondent.
The fact that respondents philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his profession
would not save the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct
which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges with which his license and the law invest him. [8] To borrow
from Orbe v. Adaza, [t]he grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, [9] of the Rules of Court are
not limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct x x x of a lawyer in his professional or
private capacity.[10] To reiterate, possession of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
While the onus rests on the complainant proffering the charges to prove the same, respondent
owes himself and the Court the duty to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar.
Mere denial of wrongdoing would not suffice in the face of clear evidence demonstrating unfitness.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct:
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
As this Court often reminds members of the bar, the requirement of good moral character is of
much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal
When ones moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished
profession is imperiled, it behooves the individual concerned to meet the charges squarely and
present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit
to keep his name in the Roll of Attorneys. [11] Respondent has not discharged the burden in this
regard. Although duly notified, he never attended the hearings to rebut the serious charges brought
against him, irresistibly suggesting that the charges are true.
Undoubtedly, respondents act of leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit and have children with
another woman constitutes grossly immoral conduct. And to add insult to injury, there seems to be
little attempt on the part of respondent to be discreet about his liaison with the other woman.
As we have already ruled, disbarment is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife
to maintain an illicit relationship with another woman who had borne him a child. [12] In the instant
case, respondents grossly immoral conduct compels the Court to wield its power to disbar. The
penalty is most appropriate under the premises.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Ponciano P. Arnobit is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered into the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished the IBP and
circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
22
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5454. November 23, 2004]
CARMELINA Y. RANGWANI, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAMON S. DIO, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed against Atty. Ramon S. Dio by Carmelina Y.
Rangwani before this Court. In her complaint, Rangwani alleged that sometime in the years 1995
to 1996, Atty. Dio befriended her. Owing to his status in the community as a good lawyer and
businessman, respondent was able to convince the complainant to part with her title to a parcel of
land located in Dasmarias, Cavite, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2791-97, Entry
5320-102. After the lapse of five months, complainant demanded the return of her title from
respondent who promised to return the same but failed to do so. After ten months, respondent was
nowhere to be found. Complainant, with the help of an informer, was able to locate respondent
who turned out to have transferred his residence to Makati City. Upon confrontation, respondent
retorted that he could not give back the title to the land. Instead, he offered to buy the property.
Thus, he issued the following checks[1] to complainant:
Check No. Date Amount
0062631 May 15, 1999 P50,000.00
0062632 June 15, 1999 50,000.00
0062633 July 15, 1999 50,000.00
0062634 July 30, 1999 52,570.00
When deposited, all the checks bounced for the reason closed account.
In the year 1999, complainant filed Criminal Cases No. 55666, No. 57029, No. 276070, and
No. 279784 for violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against the respondent. Warrants for
the arrest of respondent in relation to these cases were issued.[2]
On 29 August 2001, this Court, acting on the Complaint, issued a resolution requiring the
respondent to comment thereon on the complaint. [3] On 22 November 2001, respondent filed an
Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Comment and for a Formal Hearing. In this motion, he
bared that the Courts resolution requiring him to comment was sent to his parents residence. He
claimed he has been living for the past two years in a rented house at Signal Village, Taguig, Metro
Manila, and has been in the province for the last three weeks attending to business concerns. He
said he was not aware that a disbarment complaint has been filed against him. While he admitted
that there were cases previously filed by complainant against him, said cases had already been
withdrawn and the corresponding desistance, waiver and quitclaim had been signed by her and
that complainant had in fact received (already) the monetary claims or their equivalent involving
said cases.[4] Respondent was, therefore, under the belief that all those cases had been dismissed.
Hence, he said, he was unaware that warrants for his arrest were issued. He had been a lawyer
for the past twenty-three years and this is the first and only case filed against him before the Court
and in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). He was a working student who took various jobs
at the early age of seventeen. He took the 1977 bar exams and landed No. 13 with an average of
88.88%. He said his title as a lawyer and his license to practice are the only legacies he can leave
to his children; hence, he prays that he be given the chance to be heard formally to be able to air
his side.
On 16 January 2002, complainant filed her counter-affidavit[5] disputing her alleged
withdrawal of this complaint and the denial by the respondent of the standing warrants of arrest
against him arising out of the incident in question. The same was referred to the IBP.
In a resolution dated 28 January 2002,[6] this Court resolved to grant respondents Omnibus
Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Comment on the administrative complaint and for a Formal
Hearing, and noted the comment therein. The case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report
and recommendation within ninety days from notice.
On 02 May 2002, complainant submitted a letter [7] to the IBP withdrawing the complaint she
filed against respondent, stating that after much reflection and recall of the antecedent facts that
led to the filing of the complaint, I have finally decided to withdraw the same as it arose purely out
of misunderstanding and miscommunication and definitely not warranting any disciplinary action
much less disbarment and apologize for whatever inconvenience the complaint had cause[d] the
office.
In an Order dated 19 June 2002, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala of the IBP,
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), to whom the case was assigned for investigation, report and
recommendation, notified the parties to appear for a hearing at said office on 03 July 2002.
Per order dated 03 July 2002 of Commissioner Maala, it appears that when the case was
called for hearing, neither complainant nor respondent appeared. It was not shown, however,
whether they received notices of the scheduled hearing, hence, the same was ordered cancelled
and reset to 17 July 2002.
In a resolution dated 05 August 2002, this Court acting on the letter of complainant dated 02
May 2002, resolved to note the same and referred it to the IBP.
On 07 October 2002, complainant submitted to the IBP a motion to hold and to quash
withdrawal of the administrative case expressing a desire to actively pursue her complaint.
According to complainant, respondent begged her to dismiss the administrative complaint
she filed and promised to settle his obligations with her. It was only for this reason that she agreed
to sign a written withdrawal of her complaint. This was, however, a mere promise which remained
unfulfilled.[8]
Not very long after, on 25 October 2002, complainant again filed before the IBP a Motion to
Dismiss Complaint. As is usual in desistance, complainant manifested her interest to have the
complaint dismissed after what she said was a mature reflection, realizing that respondent had
served her faithfully, honorably and well in the various cases that he had handled for her at a time
when she needed it most. She articulated that the cases she had filed against the respondent have
long been settled between them and should have been dismissed by the Court, but she was not
aware that respondents presence is necessary for the dismissal of those cases, and she could not
locate respondent. She only discovered later on that he was actually taken very ill due to
hypertension and gastro-intestinal problems. On the other hand, respondent, in an effort to
exculpate himself, averred he was under the impression that complainant would take care and see
to the dismissal of the said cases against him. To convince the IBP that the case should be
dismissed, complainant likewise claimed that respondent had no more obligation to her because
the same had been offset by legal services rendered by the latter after an accounting was taken.[9]
In an Order dated 05 November 2002, issued by IBP Commissioner Rebecca VillanuevaMaala, the parties were notified to attend a hearing on the case which was set on 04 December
2002.[10] This scheduled hearing was, however, reset to 12 December 2002 for failure of the
complainant to appear on the earlier date. [11] At the hearing set on 12 December 2002, both parties
appeared but complainant moved to reset on 29 January 2003 without objection from the
respondent.[12]
On 31 January 2003, the IBP, in Compliance [13] with this Courts resolution dated 20
November 2002[14] directing it to submit a status report on the case every first day of the month
until termination of the investigation, stated that because of complainants failure to appear and
affirm her Affidavit of Desistance despite several hearings set by the Commission, it now
considered the cases submitted for report and recommendation and to be decided on the merits
thereof.
Per report of Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, respondent Atty. Ramon S. Dio was
found to have committed gross misconduct, and he was, thus, recommended to be suspended for
a period of one year from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and member of the bar. This
23
was reduced to six months by the IBP Board of Governors in a resolution dated 21 June 2003,
which reads:
RESOLUTION NO. XV-2003-343

Adm. Case No. 5454
Carmelina Y. Rangwani vs.
Atty. Ramon S. Dio
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification as to penalty to
conform to the evidence, and considering that respondents issuance of checks in violation of the
provisions of B.P. 22 constitutes serious misconduct and in addition respondent committed gross
misconduct when he failed to comply his promise to complainant to settle the case, Atty. Ramon S.
Dio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.
We agree with the IBPs finding of guilt as the same is fully anchored on the evidence on
record and on applicable laws, rules and jurisprudence.
Quite conspicuously, despite the opportunities accorded to respondent to refute the charges
against him, he failed to do so or even offer a valid explanation. The record is bereft of any
evidence to show that respondent has presented any countervailing evidence to meet the charges
against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter lack of respect
towards the public officers who were assigned to investigate the cases. [15] On the contrary,
respondents comments only markedly admitted complainants accusations. [16] When the integrity of
a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He
must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. [17] These, the
respondent miserably failed to do.
Respondent relies, quite heavily, on the complainants move to dismiss the complaint, to
secure exoneration. His reliance is misplaced. Firstly, because the same has not been confirmed
and substantiated by the complainant at all as she failed to appear in the hearings scheduled for
the purpose despite due notice. Secondly, and most importantly, we have consistently looked with
disfavor upon such desistance of complainants because of legal and jurisprudential injunction.
Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Service or dismissal. . . . .
...
No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same.
In Bais v. Tugaoen,[18] the Court frowned upon the complainants affidavit of desistance,
hence, in spite of it, proceeded with the complaint against the erring judge.
In Reyes-Domingo v. Morales,[19] we expostulated that:
The withdrawal of a complaint for lack of interest of a complainant does not necessarily warrant the
dismissal of an administrative complaint (Dagsa-an v. Conag, 290 SCRA 12 [1998]). The Court
cannot be bound by the unilateral decision of a complainant to desist from prosecuting a case
involving the discipline of parties subject to its administrative supervision (Zamora v. Jumamoy,
238 SCRA 587 [1994]). The need to maintain the faith and confidence of our people in the
government and its agencies and instrumentalities demands that proceedings in administrative
cases against public officers and employees should not be made to depend on the whims and
caprices of complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses (Sy v. Academia, 198 SCRA 705
[1991]).
The later case of Executive Judge Pacifico S. Bulado v. Domingo Tiu, Jr. (A.M. No. P-96-1211, 31
March 2000, pp. 4-5, 329 SCRA 308), more pointedly stated that
While complainant in this case may have forgiven respondent, this Court, charged as it is with
enforcing discipline in the judiciary, cannot simply close its eyes to respondents acts of extreme
intransigence. Withdrawal of the complaint will not free respondent from his administrative liability
(Estreller v. Manatad, Jr., 268 SCRA 608 [1997]), particularly because administrative proceedings
are imbued with public interest, public office being a public trust (Gacho v. Fuentes, Jr., 291 SCRA
474 [1998]).
The need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government, its agencies and its
instrumentalities requires that proceedings in administrative cases should not be made to depend
on the whims and caprices of the complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein
(Estreller v. Manatad, supra; Gacho v. Fuentes, supra). The court cannot be bound by the
unilateral act of a complainant in a matter that involves its disciplinary authority over all employees
of the judiciary; otherwise, our disciplinary power may be put to naught ( Sandoval v. Manalo, 260
SCRA 611 [1996]).
Finally, in Bolivar v. Simbol,[20] the Court, citing In re Davies,[21] ruled that the discipline of
lawyers cannot be cut short by a compromise or withdrawal of charges:
It is contended on the part of the plaintiff in error that this settlement operated as an absolution and
remission of his offense. This view of the case ignores the fact that the exercise of the power is not
for the purpose of enforcing civil remedies between parties, but to protect the court and the public
against an attorney guilty of unworthy practices in his profession. He had acted in clear disregard
of his duty as an attorney at the bar, and without good fidelity to his client. The public had rights
which Mrs. Curtis could not thus settle or destroy. The unworthy act had been fully consummated.
Respondents act of having borrowed the title to the land of complainant, his presumed use
of the said title for his personal gain, his failure to return the same despite repeated demands and
worse, his issuance of three checks in exchange for the said land title which bounced, constitute
gross misconduct for which he must be disciplined. In this connection Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is unequivocal. It states:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to
a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal
matter he is handling for the client.[22]
[23]
In the case of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles v. Atty. Thomas Uy, Jr., this Court held:
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of
fidelity and good faith. It is designed to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything of
that kind from being done for the protection of the client (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1992 ed., p. 188).
Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust
all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Furthermore, Rule
16.01 of the Code also states that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client. The Canons of Professional Ethics is even more explicit:
24
this end, all members of the bar are strictly required to at all times maintain the highest degree of
public confidence in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their profession.
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer should observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.[25]
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that
renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Every lawyer should act and comport
himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.[26]
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers at all times to
uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession.[27]
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The question now arises as to the proper penalty to be imposed.
As to the propriety of imposing the supreme penalty of disbarment, the rule is that
disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. [28] While we will not hesitate to remove an erring
attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not
disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. [29] In this case, we find
suspension to be a sufficient sanction against respondent - suspension being primarily intended
not as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession. [30]
The following cases rendered by this Court and the penalties imposed thereto where Rule 16
of the Code of Professional Responsibility finds application are enlightening.
In the earlier case of Aya v. Bigornia,[31] the Court ruled that money collected by a lawyer in
favor of his clients must be immediately turned over to them and failure to do so merits a penalty of
suspension for six months. In Daroy v. Legaspi,[32] the Court held that lawyers are bound to
promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do
constitutes professional misconduct warranting disbarment. Subsequently, in the case of Obia v.
Catimbang,[33]respondent Atty. Basilio M. Catimbang was ordered indefinitely suspended for failure
to return the amount of P11,000 entrusted to him. Still later, in Dumadag v. Lumaya,[34] the Court
likewise ordered the indefinite suspension of Atty. Ernesto L. Lumaya for his receipt of and failure
to deliver the amount of P4,344 to his client, complainant in the case.
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or
takes advantages of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
In the case of Burbe v. Magulta,[35] this Court imposed upon Atty. Magulta the penalty of
suspension for one (1) year for his conversion into legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his
client.
Money of the client collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the
lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be
commingled with his own or be used by him.
In the case of Nuez v. Ricafort,[36] this Court ordered the indefinite suspension of Atty.
Romulo Ricafort for his act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of an alias writ of execution for
money judgment rendered against him.
This Court, in several cases,[24] has time and again ruled that the fiduciary duty of a lawyer
and advocate is what places the law profession in a unique position of trust and confidence, and
distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this trust and confidence is betrayed, the faith of the
people not only in the individual lawyer but also in the legal profession as a whole is eroded. To
Therein, the Court held:

There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent
gravely abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed dishonesty when
he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he
compelled the complainant to go to court for the recovery of the proceeds of the sale and, in the
process, to spend money, time and energy therefore. Then, despite his deliberate failure to answer
the complaint resulting in his having been declared in default, he appealed from the judgment to
the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay the docket fee
despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of the
complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he
had already unjustly and unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the
alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in continued pursuit of
a clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been validly and lawfully adjudged by
the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks were drawn. There
was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his obligation as proved by the
fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay the obligation.
While the case of Nuez v. Ricafort[37] holds some similarity to the present case, it is material
to note that this is the first time that a complaint of this nature has been filed against the
respondent. Likewise, unlike the Nuez case, the criminal cases filed by the complainant have not
been finally disposed of, hence, no conviction against respondent was ever obtained. On all fours
to this case is the case of Lao v. Medel.[38] Respondent Atty. Robert W. Medel, who issued four
checks which were subsequently dishonored totaling twenty-two thousand pesos (P22,000) in
payment of his outstanding obligation, was ordered suspended for one year by this Court in line
with the cases of Co. v. Bernardino,[39] Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon, Jr.,[40] and Saburnido v. Madroo.[41]
Finally, in the most recent case of Isidra Barrientos, et al. v. Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro,
this Court imposed upon respondent Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro the penalty of suspension for
six (6) months for having issued several checks to the complainants in payment of a pre-existing
debt without sufficient funds We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her.
It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public
confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of
respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order.
25
It also manifests a lawyers low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she
joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold
in high esteem.
This Court justified the imposition of a lighter penalty of six months upon Atty. LibiranMeteoro instead of one year as was imposed in the case of Lao v. Medel[43] on the ground of Atty.
Libiran-Meteoros payment of a portion of her debt to the complainant.
In the same manner, we find that the lesser penalty of six months cannot be imposed upon
herein respondent Atty. Dio on the ground that, just like the case of Lao v. Medel, there is no
showing of any restitution whatsoever in this case on the part of the respondent. Likewise, the
fraudulent manner by which he was able to entice complainant to entrust to him the title to her land
should also be taken into account.
As was so aptly stated in Cuizon v. Macalino:[44]
Such conduct indicates the respondents unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him,
shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of
public confidence and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon S. Dio is found guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT
and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondents suspension is effective upon his
receipt of notice of this Decision.
[42]
Let notice of this Decision be spread on respondents record as an attorney in this Court, and
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
concerned.
SO ORDERED.

Ethics Canon 7

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Ethics Canon 7

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

ETHICS CASES: ATTY.

[ADM. CASE No. 6595. April 15, 2005]

Based on the evidence adduced, Commissioner Navarro reported, thus:

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors.

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

[B.M. No. 793. July 30, 2004]

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castros right of redemption by paying Benavente

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992

It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at

b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

G.R. No. L-57351 January 16, 1982

To repeat, the petition must fail.

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

A.C. No. 4497

September 26, 2001

MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G. SABURNIDO, complainants, vs.

Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the Philippine National Police stationed at

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

A.C. No. 6396

October 25, 2005

ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, Complainant,

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

REBECCA B. ARNOBIT, A.C. No. 1481

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

RESOLUTION NO. XV-2003-343

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

Therein, the Court held:

ETHICS CASES: ATTY. AYO CANON 7

You might also like