ANSI-ANS 8.23-2007 Nuclear Criticality Accident Emergency Planning and Response

ANSI/ANS-8.
23-2007
ANSI/ANS-8.23-2007
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nuclear criticality accident

emergency planning and response
Copyright American Nuclear Society

Provided by IHS under license with ANS
No reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS
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Not for Resale, 01/02/2014 16:12:25 MST
ANSI/ANS-8.23-2007
American National Standard

Nuclear Criticality Accident
Emergency Planning and Response
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Secretariat
American Nuclear Society
Prepared by the
Standards Committee
Working Group ANS-8.23
Published by the
555 North Kensington Avenue
La Grange Park, Illinois 60526 USA
Approved March 23, 2007
by the
American National Standards Institute, Inc.


American
National
Standard
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American National Standard ANSI0ANS-8.23-2007 with permission of the publisher,
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Printed in the United States of America
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Foreword
~This Foreword is not a part of American National Standard Nuclear Criticality Accident
Emergency Planning and Response, ANSI0ANS-8.23-2007.!
This standard provides criteria for emergency planning and response to a nuclear criticality accident for facilities outside reactors that process, store, or
handle fissionable material. This standard assumes that an alarm system that
complies with American National Standard Criticality Accident Alarm System,
ANSI0ANS-8.3-1997 ~R2003!, is in place. This standard focuses on those elements of planning and response needed specifically in the event of a criticality
accident. It is not a general emergency planning and response standard.
This revision adds three appendices. The appendices are intended to assist
technical staff in fulfilling some of their responsibilities noted in this standard.
Few changes were made to the body of the standard. Section 4.1~9! was revised
because it was noted that a system to read dosimeters is needed to obtain useful
information from them. Section 5.1 was revised to emphasize that accident
characterization is done to support emergency response planning. Section 7 was
reformatted without sub-subsections because reentry, rescue, and stabilization
are interrelated topics.
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The working group would like to gratefully acknowledge the contributions by

Ichiro Nojiri, who died prior to the publication of this revision.
This standard was prepared by Working Group ANS-8.23, composed of the following members:
J. S. Baker ~Chair!, Los Alamos National Laboratory
D. E. Cabrilla, U.S. Department of Energy
R. W. Carson, Babcock & Wilcox Company
D. M. DAquila, U.S. Enrichment Corporation
C. M. Hopper, Oak Ridge National Laboratory
C. S. Lim, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River Laboratories
I. Nojiri, Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute
V. L. Putman, Bechtel BWXT Idaho, LLC
R. L. Reed, Washington Safety Management Solutions, LLC
R. W. Tayloe, Jr., Individual
H. W. Webb, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.
This revised standard was prepared under the guidance of ANS Subcommittee 8,
Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors, which had the following membership at
the time of its approval of this revision:
T. P. McLaughlin ~Chair!, Individual
J. A. Schlesser ~Secretary!, Washington Safety Management Solutions, LLC
F. M. Alcorn, Individual
H. D. Felsher, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
A. S. Garcia, U.S. Department of Energy
N. Harris, British Nuclear Fuels, PLC
B. O. Kidd, BWX Technologies, Inc.
R. A. Libby, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
D. A. Reed, Oak Ridge National Laboratory
T. A. Reilly, Individual
H. Toffer, Fluor Federal Services
G. E. Whitesides, Individual
Consensus Committee N16, Nuclear Criticality Safety, had the following membership at the time of its approval of this standard:
C. M. Hopper ~Chair!, Oak Ridge National Laboratory
R. A. Knief ~Vice Chair!, Sandia National Laboratories
G. H. Bidinger, Individual
R. D. Busch, University of New Mexico
i

R. S. Eby, American Institute of Chemical Engineers

M. A. Galloway, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
C. D. Manning, AREVA NP
S. P. Murray, Health Physics Society
R. E. Pevey, University of Tennessee
R. L. Reed, Washington Safety Management Solutions, LLC
B. M. Rothleder, U.S. Department of Energy
W. R. Shackelford, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.
R. G. Taylor, INM Nuclear Safety Services
R. M. Westfall, Oak Ridge National Laboratory
L. L. Wetzel, BWX Technologies, Inc.
R. E. Wilson, U.S. Department of Energy
ii
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Contents
Section
Page
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 Shall, should, and may . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3 Glossary of terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
1
1
1
4 Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1 Management responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 Technical staff responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
1
2
5 Emergency response planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.1 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2 Emergency response plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.3 Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
2
2
3
6 Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7 Reentry, rescue, and stabilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8 Classroom training, exercises, and evacuation drills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8.1 Classroom training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.2 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.3 Evacuation drills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
4
5
5
9 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bibliography
..........................................................
Selection and Use of Radiation Protection Instrumentation

for Emergency Response to a Nuclear Criticality
Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix B Criticality Specialist Emergency Response Resources . . . . .
Appendix C Nuclear Criticality Accident Emergency Response
Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
12
Appendices
Appendix A
iii
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13
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Nuclear Criticality Accident

Emergency Planning
and Response
1
Introduction
Criticality safety programs at facilities that use

fissionable material are primarily directed at
avoiding nuclear criticality accidents. However, the possibility of such accidents exists,
and the consequences can be life threatening.
Therefore, advance planning, practice in planned
emergency responses, and verification of readiness are considered necessary.
Scope
This standard provides criteria for minimizing

risks to personnel during emergency response
to a nuclear criticality accident outside reactors. This standard applies to those facilities
for which a criticality accident alarm system,
as specified in American National Standard
Criticality Accident Alarm System, ANSI0ANS8.3-1997 ~R2003! @1#,1! is in use. This standard
does not apply to nuclear power plant sites or
to licensed research reactor facilities, which are
addressed by other standards.
3
3.1
Definitions
Limitations
The definitions given below are of a restricted

nature for the purposes of this standard. Other
specialized terms are defined in Glossary of
Terms in Nuclear Science and Technology @2#.
3.2
Shall, should, and may
The word shall is used to denote a requirement; the word should is used to denote a
recommendation; and the word may is used
to denote permission, neither a requirement
nor a recommendation.
1! Numbers
3.3
Glossary of terms
drill: Supervised instruction intended to test,

develop, maintain, and practice the skills required in a particular emergency response activity. A drill may be a component of an exercise.
emergency coordinator: A person authorized to direct the overall emergency response.
emergency response: Actions taken from the
time of identification of a suspected, imminent,
or actual criticality accident to stabilization of
the event, including the assumption that an
accident has occurred, response to the emergency, and actions to begin subsequent recovery operations.
exercise: An activity that tests one or more portions of the integrated capability of emergency
response plans, equipment, and organizations.
facility: A defined area where fissionable material is located.
immediate evacuation zone: The area surrounding a potential criticality accident location that must be evacuated without hesitation
if a criticality accident alarm signal is activated.
site: A defined area containing one or more
facilities.
technical staff: Personnel with specific skills
and experience who can assist in the implementation of the requirements defined in this standard. Such personnel may include, but are not
limited to, criticality safety, health and safety,
and facility process support personnel.
Responsibilities
4.1
Management responsibilities
Management shall ensure the following:

~1! Staff with relevant expertise is provided;
in brackets refer to corresponding numbers in Sec. 9, References.
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American National Standard ANSI0ANS-8.23-2007
~3! Immediate evacuation zones and evacuation routes are established;
4.2.2
During an emergency response the technical

staff shall
~1! be available to advise and assist the emergency coordinator in responding to the criticality accident;
~4! A personnel assembly station ~or stations! is established, and a method is provided for timely accounting of all personnel
who were within the immediate evacuation
zone at the time of the evacuation;
~5! Instrumentation and equipment needed to
respond to a criticality accident are provided;
Emergency response
~2! conduct a radiological dose assessment

appropriate for a criticality accident.
Emergency response planning
~6! The level of readiness ~including training! needed for response to a criticality accident is adequate;
5.1
~7! The capability to perform radiological dose

assessments for response to criticality accidents is provided;
Potential criticality accident locations and predicted accident characteristics shall be evaluated and documented in sufficient detail to assist
emergency planning. This evaluation may be
based on professional judgment or a more detailed analysis. The description should include
the estimated fission yield. The likelihood of
recurrence of criticality should be considered.
~8! A communication system for central coordination of all site emergency activities is
provided;
~9! A nuclear accident dosimetry system as
specified in American National Standard Dosimetry for Criticality Accidents, ANSI N13.31969 ~R1981! ~withdrawn! @3#, is provided;
~10! Equipment ~such as a criticality accident alarm system defined in ANSI0ANS-8.31997 ~R2003! @1# ! and procedures are in place
to activate the emergency response when
needed.
4.2
4.2.1
Technical staff responsibilities

Planning
The technical staff shall

~1! identify potential criticality accident
locations;
~2! evaluate and characterize potential criticality accidents, including radiological dose
prediction;
~3! determine the instrumentation and equipment requirements for emergency response
activities;
~4! define the immediate evacuation zone
around the potential criticality accident
locations;
~5! participate in the planning, conduct, and
evaluation of exercises and drills.
Evaluation
5.1.1
5.1.2
An immediate evacuation zone shall be established based on the documented evaluation.
Emergency response planning shall establish a
maximum acceptable value for the absorbed
dose at the immediate evacuation zone boundary. The basis for the maximum acceptable value
shall be documented. Shielding may be considered in establishing the immediate evacuation
zone. The localized effects of a criticality accident, and the fact that rapid evacuation is not
without risk, may result in an immediate evacuation zone that is significantly smaller than
an entire site.
5.2
Emergency response plan
5.2.1
An emergency response plan, consistent with
the documented accident evaluation required
in Sec. 5.1.1, shall be established and maintained. The emergency response plan may form
an integral part of, or be separate from, other
plans.
5.2.2
The emergency response plan shall include guidance to management, technical staff, and response personnel for response to a criticality
2

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~2! An emergency response plan is established, exercised, and maintained;
accident. The plan shall address recommended

protective actions, functions of response personnel, and equipment needed for criticality accident response.
5.2.3
The emergency response plan shall identify potential criticality accident locations and include appropriate facility descriptions.
5.2.4
The emergency response plan shall include provisions for
tory protection equipment, anticontamination

suits, both high-range and low-range gamma
radiation detection equipment, neutron detection equipment, communications equipment, and
personal monitoring devices ~such as selfreading pocket dosimeters!.
5.3.2
Appropriate monitoring equipment to determine if further evacuation is needed and to
identify exposed individuals shall be provided
for use at personnel assembly station~s!.
~1! an emergency coordinator;

~2! activating emergency response;
~3! responding to concurrent emergencies ~for
example, fire, personnel injury, or security
incidents!;
~4! identifying exposed personnel and determining their radiation dose;
~5! appropriate medical care for exposed
personnel;
~6! evaluating the consequences of the criticality accident, including those from radioactive and nonradioactive hazardous
materials that might be released as a result
of the accident;
~7! determining when the emergency condition no longer exists;
~8! coordinating with emergency organizations expected to provide emergency response assistance. These organizations may
be onsite or off-site;
~9! assembly and accountability of personnel.
5.2.5
The emergency response plan may be activated
on any indication that a criticality accident is
developing, is occurring, or has occurred.
5.3
Equipment
5.3.1
Appropriate protective clothing and equipment
shall be provided for response personnel. This
clothing and equipment can include respira-
Evacuation
6.1
When an evacuation is initiated, all personnel
within the immediate evacuation zone shall
evacuate without hesitation by planned evacuation routes to an established assembly station
~or stations!.
6.2
Radiation levels shall be monitored in occupied
areas adjacent to the immediate evacuation zone
after initiation of the emergency response.
6.3
Radiation levels shall be monitored periodically at the assembly station~s! after initiation
of the emergency response.
6.4
If the monitoring required by Secs. 6.2 and 6.3
indicates that the dose rate exceeds 1 mSv0h 2!
~100 mrem0h! in areas that continue to be occupied, nonemergency response personnel shall
be evacuated from those areas.
6.5
Sufficient exits from the immediate evacuation
zone shall be provided to enable rapid and unobstructed evacuation of personnel. Immediate
evacuation for personnel protection shall take
precedence over contamination control or security considerations.
2! The measurement 1 mSv0h derives from Table 22.1, on page 48, Recommendations on Limits for Exposure
to Ionizing Radiation, NCRP Report No. 91, June 1, 1987.
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6.6
7.7
Assembly stations shall be clearly identified or

posted.
If personnel need to be rescued, the rescue shall

be planned so as not to expose rescuers to lifethreatening radiation doses.
6.7
Evacuation routes should be planned to minimize the total risk considering all potential
hazards, for example, chemical, industrial, and
radiation.
7 Reentry, rescue, and

stabilization
7.1
All activities associated with reentry, rescue,
and stabilization shall be coordinated and authorized by the emergency coordinator. The
emergency coordinator may delegate authority
to other qualified individuals.
7.2
Reentry shall be planned to minimize risks to
personnel. The possibility of a continuing or
recurring criticality accident shall be considered.
7.3
Reentry during the emergency shall only be
made by personnel trained in emergency response and reentry.
7.4
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Personnel who reenter the immediate evacuation zone during the emergency shall be informed of the potential hazards and shall choose
to accept the associated risk. Reentry should
be performed by more than one person.
7.8
If the system remains critical and is possibly
causing excessive damage or significant releases of radioactive material, an early reentry
effort to disable the system may be permitted.
The method for disabling the system shall be
carefully planned and implemented to minimize risks to the reentry team.
7.9
The technical staff shall determine if the system
is subcritical and shall advise management of
methods to ensure stabilization of affected equipment and safe conditions for personnel. This
might include placing the fissile material in a
favorable geometry, diluting the fissile solution
below a critical concentration, or using neutron
absorbers to maintain subcriticality.
7.10
If use of neutron absorbers is planned to shut
down or stabilize a system, a sufficient quantity of absorbers shall be readily available. Prior
to being selected for use, the effect of the neutron absorbers under accident conditions shall
be evaluated. Consideration shall be given to
material compatibility and to cases under which
addition of the neutron absorber can increase
system neutron multiplication. Additional relevant information may be obtained from American National Standard Use of Fixed Neutron
Absorbers in Nuclear Facilities Outside Reactors, ANSI0ANS-8.21-1995 ~R2001! @4# and
Emergency Stock of Neutron Absorbers to Shut
Down Self-Sustained Chain Reaction in Solutions of Fissile Materials @5#.
7.5
Reentry should be made only if a preliminary
radiological survey indicates that the radiation
levels are acceptable for reentry. Existing instrumentation or temporary sensors with remote readout may be used.
7.6
All reentries shall be made with continuous
radiation monitoring. Both neutron and gamma
instruments should be used.
8 Classroom training, exercises,

and evacuation drills
8.1
Classroom training
A program of training for response to a criticality accident shall be developed and provided
annually in accordance with American National Standard Nuclear Criticality Safety
Training, ANSI0ANS-8.20-1991 ~R2005! @6#.
4

This training shall be reviewed annually, and

as needed, to ensure that appropriate changes
or modifications are incorporated into the training program. Other instructional formats, such
as computer-based training, may be used to
satisfy these requirements.
8.2.2
8.1.1
Exercises should be planned and controlled by

personnel who are not direct participants ~players! in the exercise.
Facility personnel who must respond to a criticality accident alarm shall be trained to recognize the alarm and to know the facility layout,
evacuation routes, personnel assembly station
locations, and personnel accountability and monitoring methods. Training should emphasize that
emergency actions, including evacuation, should
be performed in a manner to reduce risk of
injury.
8.1.2
Emergency response personnel shall be trained
on their specific duties and responsibilities to
respond to a criticality accident. This training
shall include procedures, facility layout, and
characteristics of a criticality accident.
8.1.3
Visitors shall be briefed on their responsibilities in responding to a criticality accident alarm
or criticality accident.
8.1.4
Training on reentry procedures and facility hazards shall be provided annually for reentry team
personnel.
8.2.3
8.2.4
Emergency response personnel should participate in nuclear criticality accident exercises to
update and reinforce their previous response
training.
8.3
Technical staff shall be trained in their duties

and responsibilities in the event of a criticality
accident.
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Exercises
A criticality accident response exercise should

be conducted annually to test the capabilities
of the emergency organizations and communication system and to reinforce emergency training. Exercises may include a drill.
References
The user is advised to review each of the following references to determine whether it, a
more recent version, or a replacement document is the most pertinent for each application. When alternate documents are used, the
user is advised to document this decision and
its basis.
@1#
ANSI0ANS-8.3-1997 ~R2003!, Criticality

Accident Alarm System; available from
American Nuclear Society, 555 North Kensington Avenue, La Grange Park, IL 60526.
@2#
Glossary of Terms in Nuclear Science and

Technology, American Nuclear Society
~1986!; available from American Nuclear
Society, 555 North Kensington Avenue, La
Grange Park, IL 60526.
8.2.1
Exercises should include a realistic scenario
involving a simulated criticality accident. Exercises shall have defined objectives that specify the aspects of emergency response selected
for testing or reinforcing.
Evacuation drills
Evacuation drills shall be conducted at least

annually. Drills should be scheduled to include
all personnel who routinely work within the
immediate evacuation zone. The drills shall be
preannounced ~for example, by written notice,
posted signs, or public address announcement!
to minimize the possibility that accident or injury could result. If the response tests the same
evacuation practices as used for a criticality
accident, an evacuation drill may involve a scenario other than a criticality accident. A response to a false alarm should not be substituted
for a drill, unless the required actions are observed or demonstrated.
8.1.5
8.2
Exercises should include a postexercise critique involving observers, controllers, and representative participants.
5

@3#
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ANSI N13.3-1969 ~R1981! ~withdrawn!,

Dosimetry for Criticality Accidents; available from American National Standards
Institute, Attention: Customer Services, 11
West 42nd Street, New York, NY 10036.
@4# ANSI0ANS-8.21-1995 ~R2001!, Use of Fixed

Neutron Absorbers in Nuclear Facilities
Outside Reactors; available from American Nuclear Society, 555 North Kensington Avenue, La Grange Park, IL 60526.
@5#
@6#
V. N. Gurin, B. G. Ryazanov, and V. I.

Sviridov, Emergency Stock of Neutron Absorbers to Shut Down Self-Sustained Chain
Reaction in Solutions of Fissile Materials, Proc. 6th Int. Conf. Nuclear Criticality Safety, pp. 13451353 ~1999!.
ANSI0ANS-8.20-1991 ~R2005!, Nuclear
Criticality Safety Training; available from
American Nuclear Society, 555 North Kensington Avenue, La Grange Park, IL 60526.
Bibliography
~This bibliography is not part of American National Standard Nuclear Criticality Accident
Emergency Planning and Response, ANSI0ANS8.23-2007, but is included for information only.!
The following documents contain recommended
related guidance for users of ANSI0ANS-8.232007:
ANSI0ANS-8.1-1998; R2007, Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors, American Nuclear
Society.
V. L. Putman, Bibliography for Nuclear Criticality Accident Experience, Alarm Systems, and
Emergency Management, INEL-9500513, Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory ~September
1995!.
6

Appendix A
~This appendix is not part of American National Standard Nuclear Criticality Accident Emergency Planning and Response,
ANSI0ANS-8.23-2007, but is included for information only.!
Selection and Use of Radiation Protection

Instrumentation for Emergency Response
to a Nuclear Criticality Accident
A.1
Introduction
Emergency response to a nuclear criticality accident requires radiation-monitoring instruments.

The guidance below is provided to assist in selecting appropriate instruments. These instruments
should help determine actions to protect personnel. Precise dose rates are not important in an
emergency response, but a clear understanding of the situation is important. While there are
instruments that are better suited than others, ease of use and familiarity with an instrument may
add to the fuller understanding of a situation, while an infrequently used instrument may add time
and uncertainty to a response. Emergency response personnel must also be aware of the normal
radiation fields and contamination levels for their site and facility.
This guidance does not supersede any applicable standards for radiation monitoring instrumentation or dosimetry nor does it apply to criticality accident alarm system ~CAAS! monitors, which are
addressed in American National Standard Criticality Accident Alarm System, ANSI0ANS-8.31997 ~2003!.
A.2
Radiation source from a nuclear criticality accident
General characteristics of the radiation source from a nuclear criticality accident can be inferred
from the accidents that have occurred and from critical experiments. Of the known process
criticality accidents, some had a single radiation pulse and promptly terminated. However, the
majority had ~or are suspected to have had! either a lengthy power excursion or multiple
excursions. These excursions varied from fractions of a second to hours in duration. The radiation
field from these excursions typically approaches a quasi-steady-state plateau if the excursion
continues long enough. The chain reaction is a strong source of neutron and gamma radiation.
Neutron production effectively ceases when the chain reaction ends. However, gamma radiation
continues to be emitted from fission product decay and from neutron activation of nearby
materials. The intensity of the radiation source from criticality accidents has varied by orders of
magnitude. This source term can only be predicted by specifying details of a hypothetical
accident and performing the appropriate calculations. Experience with metal and solution critical
assemblies shows that the expected postevent ~15 min later! source dose rates are approximately
several rads per hour ~tens of milligrays per hour! at 10 ft ~3 m!. Therefore, elevated dose rates
can be observed hundreds of meters from the source. Any criticality accident will result in large
amounts of gamma radiation ~both during and postevent! that is more conveniently detected than
neutron radiation. The presence of neutrons indicates that the reaction is still ongoing. However,
the absence of neutrons could mean that the accident has either been terminated or is in a very
low-power mode between excursions. The radiation field must be monitored for an extended
period to be certain that the accident is terminated, unless other information confirms that the
accident is over.
7
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A.3
Instrumentation considerations and recommendations
The following recommendations focus on characteristics of the instrumentation, rather than specifying a particular model. Recommendations for area monitoring ~Sec. A.3.1! address instruments
used to help evaluate whether an area may be safely occupied and the extent of any radionuclide
release. Personnel monitoring recommendations ~Sec. A.3.2! address instruments used to assess
personnel exposure or dose assessment and additional considerations for reentry and rescue.
Contamination monitoring considerations ~Sec. A.3.3! are also discussed. The expected energy
response of each instrument used should be well understood.
A.3.1
Area monitoring
If installed, remote reading monitors of a CAAS provide the first and safest information for
assessing local exposure rates. Elevated radiation levels indicate that an accident has occurred or
is ongoing. These data and a map of CAAS detector locations may also indicate the approximate
location of the accident. Unfortunately, some CAAS monitors have failed to function properly
when tested in high radiation fields from a critical assembly. Be aware that instruments,
electronics, and systems may not behave as designed during an actual event. Some facilities that
have had accidents did not install criticality alarm systems because the likelihood of a criticality
accident was judged to be incredible or because the facility operations included critical experiments. Other means of remotely sensing high-level fields ~e.g., robot-mounted probes! should be
used if available. If personnel decide to reenter areas that may have high-level fields, use of an
expandable-poletype detector can reduce exposure by providing a few meters of additional
distance between personnel and the source. This type of detector typically provides a dynamic
range up to 1000 rem0h ~10 Sv0h!.
Any instrument that responds to beta-gamma radiation fields can be used to evaluate conditions
after a criticality accident. A portable ionization chamberbased survey meter provides the most
accurate exposure rate measurement in low-level fields. It can be capable of measuring dose
equivalent rates up to 50 rem0h ~0.5 Sv0h!. An energy-compensated Geiger-Mueller ~G-M! instrument provides a uniform energy response above 70 keV and is an acceptable alternative to ionization chamberbased exposure rate meters.
A G-M pancake contamination probe can be used as indication of increased radiation levels.
Responses of approximately 3 to 5 cpm per mrem0h ~0.3 to 0.5 cpm per nSv0h! are common for this
type of probe.1! Because of its high sensitivity, this type of instrument may be difficult to use for
anything other than qualitative evaluations at far distances ~i.e., hundreds of meters from the
source!, but it can be used. These instruments may also be useful for measuring neutron activation,
assuming that this can be distinguished from photons ~primary or secondary! produced directly
from the accident.
Measurement of neutron dose equivalent in fields of unknown or uncertain spectra is facilitated by
the use of neutron rem meters. However, any instrument that is sensitive to neutrons from thermal
to 10 MeV can be used to determine whether the neutron population is above normal levels.
A.3.2
Personnel monitoring
If a criticality accident occurs, the first consideration is the direct physical injury to individuals
exposed to the accident. Unfortunately, the physical injury caused by radiation exposure ~below the
lethal or near-lethal range! cannot be observed directly. A technique is required to determine if an
individual is in need of immediate medical attention, needs medical attention but not immediately,
or does not require medical attention. Medical practitioners will treat radiation victims symptomatically, i.e., based on observable biological responses. Initially, biological effects might not give a
true indication of the radiation exposure level for a period of hours to days, so it is important to
1! cpm
counts per minute.
8

estimate the radiation exposure level based on a field technique with immediate results. The most
favored technique is the use of an indium foil ~typically provided as part of the individual personnel
radiation dosimetry badges!. If indium foils are unavailable, an alternative technique is the detection of whole-body ~primarily 24 Na! activity observed by placing a survey instrument against the
abdomen. These techniques are described brief ly in the appendices of Ref. @A.1# and in Refs. @A.2#
and @A.3#.2! The indium foil has a high thermal neutron capture cross section with beta0gamma
emission that is readily detectable with a G-Mtype detector. Reference @A.2# documents experimentally derived relationships between the neutron dose and the count rate from a G-Mtype
detector ~calibrated to indicate a response of 3200 cpm in a 1 mrem0h radiation field from a gamma
source!. The best fit over the experimental dose range ~0 to 50 rads! is given by
D

C0
4231
1.099
where:
C0 is the G-M detector count rate, in cpm ~beta window open! at t 0;
The best fit in the dose range between 0 and 10 rads is given by
D
C0 150
.
4050
The measured count rate C~t ! must be adjusted to the count rate at the time of exposure ~t 0!.
Indium-116m beta decays with a half-life of 54.29 min. Therefore, C0 is given by
C0 C~t !e 0.0128t ,
where:
t is the elapsed time ~in minutes! between when the dose was received and when the measurement
was taken.
Reference @A.1# recommends the following relationship for estimating dose by measuring the blood
sodium ~ 24 Na! activity:
D 1.1 C0 0M ,
where:
D is the neutron dose in rads;
C0 is the count rate in cpm at t 0 from a G-M detector ~calibrated to indicate a response of 3200 cpm
in a 1 mrem0h radiation field from a gamma source!;
M is the body weight of an exposed person in kilograms.
Again, the measured count rate C~t ! must be adjusted to the count rate at the time of exposure
~t 0!. Sodium-24 decays with a half-life of 15 h. Therefore, C0 is given by
C0 C~t !e 0.0462t ,
2! Letters0numbers
in brackets refer to corresponding letters0numbers in Sec. A.4, References.
9

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D is the neutron absorbed dose in rads.
where
t is the elapsed time ~in hours! between when the dose was received and when the measurement was
taken.
Dose estimates from these methods have large uncertainties. These estimates are only intended to
be used to sort victims in descending order of exposure from most heavily irradiated to least. It is
desirable to separate victims into the following three groups 3! :
~1! those requiring immediate attention, i.e., doses generally above 50 rads ~0.5 Gy!;
~2! those requiring further dose analysis and possible medical evaluation, i.e., doses generally
between 10 and 50 rads ~0.1 and 0.5 Gy!;
~3! those who do not require medical attention, i.e., doses generally below 10 rads ~0.1 Gy!.
This information should be immediately communicated to the emergency coordinator and to the
medical staff responsible for emergency treatment of the victims. Processing of the personnel
nuclear accident dosimeters should be conducted in the order from highest to lowest expected dose.
An alarming personal dosimeter0detector is recommended as a f lexible means of managing dose to
the emergency response team members, including entries into very high radiation areas. Some of
these devices provide a selectable dose alarm setting up to 200 rads ~2 Gy!. Reference @A.4# provides
performance criteria for these dosimeters.
A.3.3
Contamination monitoring
Beta-gamma contamination may be present from fission products, activation of dirt, dust or debris,
or as fuel particles. Alpha contamination can be assumed to be from uranium or transuranic
isotopes.
Fixed continuous air monitors may not function properly after a criticality accident because of
residual radiation fields or radiation damage to electronics. Portable or fixed head air sampling
should be used to collect air filter media for radiometric counting in an appropriate counting
system.
Beta-gamma contamination monitoring may be difficult because of increased background levels
from the critical accident and from activation of the surrounding area. Monitoring for surface
contamination is best accomplished by using swipes. Beta-gamma contamination monitoring of
victims can be complicated by ~ 24 Na! activation of the victim. If only beta-gamma contamination
monitoring equipment is available to monitor victims for contamination, organic materials ~cloth,
plastics! are least likely to become activated; however, they may attract some noble gas fission
products. Fission product activity or activation of other materials ~away from the immediate
vicinity of the critical assembly! is not likely to pose a hazard to either victims or responders.
Alpha-only contamination probes can be used to show the presence of fuel particles.4! An alpha-only
~as opposed to a dual alpha-beta! probe should be used to conduct surveys to minimize beta-gamma
breakthrough ~spillover! and neutron response from the plastic scintillator. Photomultiplier tube
based ~scintillation! probes are sensitive to high ~tens of millirems per hour or hundreds of
microsieverts per hour! gamma radiation levels, but only at a few cpm per millirem ~10 mSv!. Air
proportional probes are generally insensitive to gamma radiation but exhibit a small response in
neutron fields because of recoil reactions. This response is on the order of a few cpm in fields of
several hundred millirems per hour ~a few microsieverts per hour!.
3!
The ranges given for quick-sort process action levels have been chosen to be very conservative because of the
large variation in response for these techniques with variation in neutron spectrum.
4! Here, it is assumed that the fuel particles are not heavily irradiated. If fuel particles are from nuclear fuel
that has significant burnup, the beta-gamma activity will dominate the alpha activity.
10
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A.4
References
@A.1#
F. A. Mettler, C. A. Kelsey, and R. C. Ricks, Medical Management of Radiation Accidents,

CRC Press, Boca Raton, Florida ~1990!.
@A.2#
M. T. Ryan et al., Calibration of the Indium Foil Used for Criticality Accident Dosimetry in
the UCC-ND Employee Identification Badge, ORNL0TM-8294, Oak Ridge National Laboratory ~1982!.
@A.3#
Dosimetry for Criticality Accidents, A Manual, Technical Reports Series No. 211, International Atomic Energy Agency ~1982!.
@A.4#
ANSI N42.20-2004, Performance Requirements for Pocket-Sized Alarm Dosimeters and

Alarm Ratemeters, American National Standards Institute.
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11
Appendix B
~This appendix is not part of American National Standard Nuclear Criticality Accident Emergency Planning and Response,
ANSI0ANS-8.23-2007, but is included for information only.!
Criticality Specialist Emergency Response Resources

A criticality specialist responding to a criticality accident emergency needs technical resources to
help provide information and guidance to the emergency response organization. The emergency
control center ~ECC! should be equipped with all the resources that a criticality specialist should
need during an emergency. However, an on-call criticality specialist might need to communicate
with the ECC or command post from his0her office or home. The specialist might also report to a
local incident command post that does not maintain such resources. Therefore, it would be prudent
for the on-call criticality specialist to maintain some technical resources on hand. A specially
equipped briefcase could be useful for this purpose. Alternatively, the information could be contained in a portable computer.
The technical resources should help the criticality specialist to
communicate with other subject matter experts;
understand details of the site0facility layout and the radiation detection equipment;
understand fissionable material locations and associated accident scenarios;
estimate radiation fields that might be encountered during emergency response activities.
As a minimum, the technical resources that should be immediately available to the responding
criticality specialist are the following:
contact lists ~e.g., phone and pager numbers! for
emergency responders and the ECC,
criticality experts and local fissile material process subject matter experts;
maps or diagrams of the layout of the site or facility ~as appropriate! and the available
radiation detector systems;
precalculated information pertinent to the facilities of concern, such as
relationships between radiation fields and the criticality accident source term as a function
of distance, shielding, and time elapsed after the accident ~Ref. @B.1# 1! contains this type of
information for some uranium systems!,
information about the quantity and location of neutron poison materials ~if any! that are
available for use during an emergency.
B.1
Reference
@B.1#
C. M. Hopper and B. L. Broadhead, An Updated Nuclear Criticality Slide Rule: Functional

Slide Rule, NUREG0CR-6504, Vol. 2, ORNL0TM-133220V2, Oak Ridge National Laboratory
~1998!.
1! Letter0number
in brackets refers to corresponding letter0number in Sec. B.1, Reference.
12

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tables of conversion factors, including those for units of radiation measurement and dose;

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Appendix C
~This appendix is not a part of American National Standard Nuclear Criticality Accident Emergency Planning and Response,
ANSI0ANS-8.23-2007, but it is included for information purposes only.!
Nuclear Criticality Accident Emergency Response Exercises

C.1
Introduction
This appendix provides guidance for developing a nuclear criticality accident emergency response
exercise. Exercise scenarios should be appropriate for the types of fissile material processes at a
site. The scenarios should be varied for different exercises at a site and should consider the
possibility of either a single pulse or an ongoing accident. It is important to use realistic scenarios
and radiation dose rates to avoid unnecessary or imprudent emergency response planning, training,
and actions. A hypothetical scenario is provided to illustrate estimations of the following:
a fission source term based on a credible accident scenario;
doses to nearby personnel;
doses to rescuers.
This discussion includes evacuation, rescue, dosimetry, and medical response issues. It also provides insights into the selection of immediate evacuation zone ~IEZ! boundaries and criticality
accident alarm detector placement considerations. The calculations are based upon simple analytical methods ~see Refs. @C.1# and @C.2# !.1! This hypothetical scenario is not intended to replace
accident descriptions in authorization basis, hazards assessment, or safety analysis documents nor
is the following discussion intended to replace corporate or regulatory policy regarding acceptable
radiation exposures for emergency response.
C.2
Background
Note: Some of this section was excerpted from Ref. [C.3].

Process criticality accidents have occurred almost exclusively in solution and other liquid media,
such as slurries, rather than in any dry material form @C.4#. Therefore, the following example is
based on a solution system. Past experimental studies, KEWB @C.5# and CRAC @C.6#, and ongoing
excursion studies, SILENE @C.7#, TRACY @C.8#, and SHEBA @C.9#, provide a wealth of information
directly applicable to estimating accident power histories ~i.e., source terms! and consequences
from site-specific liquid process operations. The data cover broad ranges of key parameters such as
solution volume, reactivity insertion rate, and solution concentration. Together these data provide
insights into physical phenomena that bound the practical upper limits of the specific fission yield
in the first spike.
Figure C.1 ~previously published in Ref. @C.3# ! shows the variation in the specific yield of the first
spike for prompt critical excursions in both CRAC and KEWB experiments. For all but very rapid
excursions, the specific fission yield is ;1.0 10 15 fissions0, even for relatively slow excursions.
Simple reactor theory indicates that the period varies inversely with the insertion ramp rate to the
one-half power ~see the discussion in Ref. @C.10# !. For high-reactivity insertion rates ~resulting in
1! Letters0numbers
in brackets refer to corresponding letters0numbers in Sec. C.9, References.
13

Figure C.1 Specific fissions in first spike as a function of reactor period
The first spike characteristics could also be affected by delayed initiation. For systems without an
inherent, strong neutron source ~such as is present in plutonium-bearing systems!, there might be
a short delay before the neutron chain reaction increases significantly. If more material is being
added, the reactivity insertion above delayed critical will be larger. The first spike fission yield will
be correspondingly larger. This delay is a stochastic effect that cannot be accurately predicted for
any single situation. The referenced experimental studies all used uranium in solution and almost
always without an external neutron source present. Delayed initiation could be a significant
component of the variation in the data shown in Fig. C.1. These data give a qualitative indication
that delayed initiation typically has a modest effect on solution systems. For the purposes of this
appendix, this effect is ignored.
The very short period excursions, shown in Fig. C.1, result from very fast insertion rates that
might be unattainable accidentally. The basis for stating that excursions so rapid that the specific
yield exceeds a nominal 1.0 10 15 might be unattainable accidentally is simply that upon
analyzing a postulated, process-specific accident sequence, the rate at which actual events happen
~e.g., gravity fall, movement of hands, and rate of f low of solution through pipes! will generally
result in neutronic periods in the nearly horizontal part of the curve in Fig. C.1 or even greater.
This estimate is supported by the available information on actual yields for the reported solution
criticality accidents. Therefore, if the postulated accident is assumed to have only a single spike,
the total fission yield can be estimated by multiplying the solution volume ~in liters! by 10 15
fissions0. If the postulated accident is assumed to be ongoing, then the fission source can be
estimated from the relationship documented in Ref. @C.11#. Representative data presented in
Ref. @C.11# show that the specific fission yields from CRAC and SILENE experiments tend to
converge despite wide variations in the experiment configurations and reactivity insertion rates.
The specific yields were approximately the same after ;2 min. Reference @C.11# presents an
empirical relationship developed to envelope these experimentally observed specific fission yields
14

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a period less than ;10 ms!, the specific fission yield could exceed the nominal value of 1.0 10 15
fissions0.
Figure C.2 Maximum specific fission yield resulting from criticality solution excursions in CRAC and SILENE
as a function of time. This relationship is shown in Fig. C.2, which was excerpted from Ref. @C.11#.2!
~Note that in this relationship, t in the equation has units of seconds.! It is a simple, pragmatic tool
to envelope the observed specific fission yields for solution systems as a function of time. It does not
include complex first spike characteristics that are system and insertion rate dependent.
C.3
Hypothetical accident scenario
The worker locations are denoted by A, B, C, and D in Fig. C.3. The facility is constructed of walls
that are the equivalent of 4-in. ~10.16-cm!-thick concrete. These walls are the only significant
intervening shielding materials. Personnel are assumed to evacuate at a rate of 5 ft0s ~1.5 m0s!.
The IEZ is the area inside the security fence. Note: As in this example, any IEZ should be
established based on a combination of factors such as the facility layout, site geography,
security boundaries, and doses to nearby personnel after an accident. Prompt dose from
the initial spike is received before alarm activation. Evacuation serves to mitigate any
additional dose and the corresponding acute health effects. The IEZ boundary should not
hinder prompt personnel accountability or other emergency response activities.
2! Reprinted
with permission, Trans. Am. Nucl. Soc., 55, 413 ~1987!.
15

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This example uses a hypothetical uranium processing facility. A criticality accident is caused by the
inadvertent routing and accumulation of 80 gal of 93.2 wt% 235 U-enriched uranyl nitrate solution
at 30 g U0. The solution is added at 5 gal0min into an unref lected, empty, thin-walled steel,
1000-gal-capacity vertical cylindrical process-vacuum receiver tank that is 4 ft ~1.2 m! in diameter.
Figure C.3 provides the building layout, evacuation routes, assembly station location, and the
locations of personnel at the time of the first pulse.
--```,,`,`,,``,````,`````````,,-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---
Figure C.3 Hypothetical facility, accident location, and evacuation routes
C.4
Source term development
Reference @C.11# provides the following empirical relationship for power history:
Nf ~t !
t
fissions0 ,
@3.55 1015 ~6.38 1017 !{t #
where:
t is time ~in seconds! for which the system remains critical.
This relationship was derived to bound the experimentally observed power histories for solution
systems for the first 10 min. It does not model any complex power history features that might occur.
Neglecting evaporation of water, one could estimate the total number of fissions generated in the
16

initial critical volume by multiplying the foregoing equation by that volume, in liters, and evaluating it as a function of time. That is,
Nf ~t !
ct
fissions
@3.55 1015 ~6.38 1017 !{t #
ct
fissions
a bt
where:
a 3.55 1015 ;
b 6.38 1017 ;
c initial critical volume, in liters, at t 0.
Conditions for the first pulse can be estimated using the lower left-hand graph ~HEU Solution and
Vertical Cylinders! of slide 6 from Ref. @C.2#. For an addition rate of 5 gal0min of solution with 30 g
U0 and a cylinder diameter of 48 in. ~122 cm!, the first pulse is estimated as 7.53 10 17 fissions.
The graph also shows that the initial pulse will occur with ;60 gal ~227 ! of solution. The initial
critical height is ;7.7 in. ~19.6 cm!. The remaining 20 gal ~76 ! of solution is added over the next
4 min.
To evaluate the time-dependent total fissions for a uniform solution addition rate following the
onset of criticality at a volume c, multiply the empirical relationship by the solution addition rate
r and then integrate it over the total time in seconds T, for which solution is added, i.e.,
Nf ~t !
~T t !
r{dt ,
a b~T t!
--```,,`,`,,``,````,`````````,,-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---
where:
r 0.315 0s.
Then,
Nf ~t !
Nf ~T !
rT rt
dt rT
@a bT bt #
dt
r
@~a bT ! bt #
t{dt
@~a bT ! bt #
t
~a bT !
rT
ln~a bT bt !
ln~a bT bt !60T r
b
b
b2
a
rT
ar
2 ln
b
b
a bT
T
0
The general form for the fission yield of an assumed nuclear criticality accident resulting from
continuous solution addition past an initial volume for criticality ~neglecting solution evaporation!
is therefore
Nf ~T !
a
rT
ar
2 ln
b
b
a bT
cT
fissions .
a bT
This equation can be evaluated as a function of time using a spreadsheet. Doing this and matching
the results to the initial pulse yield give the source term described in Figs. C.4 and C.5. Data are
shown for the first 10 min ~600 s! after the first pulse. The calculations may be extended to any
17

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Figure C.4 Fission rate versus time
desired length of time. Note: Exercising some emergency response activities could require
an accident scenario that is well over 1 h.
Figure C.5 is very similar to Fig. 2 from Ref. @C.11# ~Fig. C.2 in this appendix! except that the curve
is shifted up, with the first spike yield being ;3.3 10 15 fissions0. This is because the assumed
solution addition rate, combined with the system shape, gives a large reactivity insertion beyond
Figure C.5 Integrated specific fission yield versus time

18

prompt critical. The relationships given in Ref. @C.2# conservatively account for this effect and
therefore predict this relatively high-specific fission yield. The initial period for this scenario is
estimated to be ,10 ms based on Fig. C.1. Note: The solution addition rate for this example
was deliberately chosen to provide a relatively large source term. In contrast, scenarios
for real facilities should be based upon realistic plant parameters. Although the first
spike fission yield should be estimated, a detailed analysis of the first spike characteristics is not important for emergency planning purposes.
C.5
Dose estimates
Doses to personnel can be estimated from the source term and their distance from the accident.
Figure C.3 shows the position of four workers relative to the accident at the time of the alarm and
their evacuation paths. The grid overlay on Fig. C.3 is composed of squares that are 5 ft ~1.5 m! on a
side. It is assumed that workers begin to evacuate 2 s after the initial pulse and that they move at a
rate of 5 ft0s ~1.5 m0s!. Prompt dose values can be estimated from the fission rate versus time data
shown in Fig. C.4 and in the lower left graph on slide 1 ~uranyl nitrate! of Ref. @C.2#. For simplicity,
the distances between the workers and the accident are calculated from the center of the tank ~i.e.,
assuming a point source!. For example, in the time interval from 2 to 3 s, there are ;4 10 16 fissions,
and the worker at location A moves such that his0her average distance is ;9 ft ~2.7 m! from the
source. Since there is no intervening shielding, the estimated total ~gamma plus neutron! prompt
dose for this interval is 160 rads ~note that 100 rads 1 Gy!. The average distance and intervening
shielding, based on the persons position, are estimated for each time interval along the evacuation
route. The dose for that interval is estimated from Ref. @C.2#. One can then sum up the incremental
doses to estimate the total dose received during the evacuation. Reference @C.2# includes factors to
allow for various shielding configurations. These are assumed to be adequate for this example; however, facility-specific shielding conditions could have a large effect and should be considered. For this
exercise the workers will reach the assembly station after ;45 to 60 s. The total ~gamma plus neutron! dose estimates for the first pulse and for the first minute of the accident are given in Table C.1.
Part of the total dose received is from fission product decay. This contribution can be estimated using
the upper right graph on slide 1 ~uranyl nitrate! of Ref. @C.2#. It is based on the source term during
a time interval, the distance to the worker, intervening shielding, and the elapsed time since those
fissions occurred. For example, in the time interval from 2 to 3 s, the worker located at A is at an
average distance of ;9 ft ~2.7 m! from the source with no intervening shielding. The fission product
decay from the first pulse of 7.53 10 17 fissions gives a 1-min dose of ;400 rads ~4 Gy! at this position
beginning 1 s later. Dividing this 1-min dose by 60 s gives an incremental dose of only 7 rads0s ~70
mGy0s!. This is much smaller than the prompt first-pulse dose of 3800 rads ~38 Gy!. For an ongoing
accident, the fission product dose is a small or insignificant fraction of the total dose to any worker.
Thus, for this type of scenario, the dose from fission product decay may be neglected.
--```,,`,`,,``,````,`````````,,-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---
Table C.1 Dose estimates to personnel (rad or cGy)

Worker
location
Dose from
first pulse
Total dose in
first minute
3800
4300
130
270
44
74
19
19

There are typically large uncertainties associated with dose estimates. Even for this simple hypothetical scenario, the uncertainties could be 50% or greater. The overall uncertainty is a combination of several uncertainties, including those for the following:
distance and orientation to the accident;
intervening shielding ~typically having complex three-dimensional geometry!;
neutron and gamma leakage spectra ~source terms!;
neutron and gamma energy spectra at personnel locations and associated kerma factors.
Quantifying each of these uncertainties is difficult and labor intensive. The effort to quantify the
uncertainties is not justified because such estimates are not likely to be important to human
health. An actual accident scenario would probably be much different from any scenario used for
planning or exercises. Furthermore, there are also significant uncertainties ~e.g., 10 to 20%!
associated with measured dose values obtained from typical dosimetry techniques ~Ref. @C.12# !.
C.6
Emergency response exercise considerations
This type of hypothetical scenario can be used to exercise many elements of emergency response.
Evacuation and accountability are the most important elements. These and other general aspects
of emergency response ~e.g., establishing incident command! should be exercised regularly but are
beyond the scope of this discussion. For response to a criticality accident, a few special activities
should be practiced in conjunction with an exercise, such as the following:
assessing the need for further evacuation to a more distant location;

preparing for rescue ~if needed!;
making rapid dose assessments;
arranging for medical treatment ~if needed!.
C.6.1
Radiation surveys and evacuation considerations
Exercise controllers should be prepared to inject realistic data during the course of the exercise.
This would include simulated radiation fields at occupied locations and corresponding dose estimates for workers who were near the accident location. Detector count rate data could be substituted for worker doses if the exercise objectives include practicing worker dose estimation. Such
count rate data are dependent on the specific detectors and dosimetry techniques used. Since this
is site specific, details are not included here. Accident experience shows that radiological contamination, if any, would be very localized to the accident site.
For the example above, radiation field data could be estimated using Ref. @C.2#. The security portal
could continue to be occupied by guards at least until a more distant security perimeter is
established. The portal and the assembly station should have radiation monitoring equipment
readily available. In this example, the minimum distances from the accident location to the portal
and the assembly station are ;93 ft ~28 m! and 160 ft ~49 m!, respectively. The total dose from the
first pulse at these locations is ;5 and 2 rads ~50 and 20 mGy!, respectively. It is reasonable to
assume that radiation measurements could be made within a few minutes after the accident. It is
expected that gamma detectors would be available; therefore, gamma dose rates were estimated
from the lower-left graph of slide 1 in Ref. @C.2#. ~Note that gamma rays contribute about half of the
total dose.! Figure C.6 shows the estimated gamma radiation fields at these locations for the first
10 min after the initial pulse.
20

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taking radiation surveys outside the IEZ;
Figure C.6 Gamma dose rate at the security portal and assembly station versus
time after first pulse
A person who is standing near the security portal at the time of the accident and then evacuates to
the assembly station and remains there for the next 10 min would receive a total dose of ;15 rads
~0.15 Gy!; about two-thirds of that dose occurs after the first spike. This is about the highest
expected dose to personnel outside the IEZ at the time of the accident. Fifteen rads ~0.15 Gy! is
below the threshold for significant acute biological effects to personnel. Most individuals will not
exhibit any physical symptoms from doses below 15 rads. Therefore, the IEZ for this example is
a reasonable choice. Note: The potential doses would be much lower if the scenario did
not include an ongoing accident. Assuming the accident in this example terminated after
the first spike, the gamma dose at the assembly station 5 min after the spike would be
;1.8 rads/h.
The radiation field at the assembly station is high enough to present a concern because the system
is still critical during this time period. It is significantly higher than the 100 mrem0h ~1 mSv0h!
criterion given in Sec. 6.4. Therefore, further evacuation to a more remote location is appropriate.
If workers stayed at the assembly station for a total of 10 min, they would receive an additional
total dose of another ;10 rads.
C.6.2
Rescue considerations
Some workers who received large prompt doses from past criticality accidents experienced a
temporary loss of consciousness ~Ref. @C.4# !. Therefore, if a criticality accident is judged credible, it
is also prudent to prepare for personnel rescue. However, before a rescue is attempted, it should be
determined that rescuers will not be subjected to life-threatening doses. Reference @C.2# can be used
to help make this determination. The following example illustrates this.
Radiation surveys or process information from workers might be able to establish the accident
location or at least a close approximation. The radiation field at a given distance and time after an
accident can establish a reference point to estimate the radiation field at other locations. An
exponential radiation die-away would be observed for a single-pulse accident. An accident that does
not promptly self-terminate will typically have multiple pulses and an oscillating radiation field
during the first few minutes that eventually approaches a quasi-steady-state level.
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21
Continuing with the preceding scenario, assume that during the evacuation worker A collapses just
outside the door to the facility. After reaching the assembly station, worker B tells others that the
tank near worker A was being filled just before the alarm, indicating the probable accident location.
Radiation surveys at the assembly station show that the radiation field is fairly constant or slowly
diminishing ~see Fig. C.5! but is high enough to clearly indicate that the accident is ongoing. Assume that at 5 min after the first pulse, the incident commander considers a rescue attempt and
asks the technical staff to assess the radiation level near worker A. The gamma radiation field at the
assembly station at that time is ;40 rads0h ~0.4 Gy0h!. The technical staff estimates that the distance
between the accident location and the assembly location is ;160 ft ~49 m!. The lower right-hand
figure on slide 1 from Ref. @C.2# can be set so that 160 ft ~49 m! corresponds to 40 rads0h ~0.4 Gy0h!
on the vertical axis. Worker A is judged to be ;45 ft ~14 m! from the accident location. There is about
the same intervening shielding at the assembly location and at worker As location. Moving up
the vertical axis to the point corresponding to 45 ft ~14 m!, the gamma dose rate is ;600 rads0h
~10 rads0min or 6 Gy0h!. Assuming that the gamma dose is about half of the total dose, the total dose
rate is ;20 rads0min ~0.2 Gy0min!. In general, the dose to rescuers should be estimated by integrating the incremental dose over time as a function of their position and intervening shielding. However,
in a situation where prompt rescue is judged appropriate, simple estimates are necessary and sufficient. For example, assume that fire department responders estimate they will need ,15 s at worker
As location to load him onto a stretcher. Then, one might estimate a rescuers total dose as the dose
rate at worker As location ~20 rads0min or 0.2 Gy0min! for a period of twice that time, or 30 s. This
would be 10 rads ~0.1 Gy!. Given that there are no other significant hazards, the incident commander
would probably authorize the rescue because this is well below a life-threatening dose.
C.6.3
Dosimetry and medical response
As part of preaccident planning, local hospitals and appropriate medical personnel should be
informed of the potential need to treat heavily irradiated victims. Medical personnel should participate in drills or exercises that include simulated irradiated victims. Special circumstances that
could be expected with such victims ~e.g., external contamination! should be considered and simulated in the exercises as appropriate. Reference @C.13# also recommends procedures for the
transport and handling of radiation exposure victims and discusses the radiation sickness symptoms that can be expected at different dose levels.
Doses to significantly exposed personnel should be estimated from the individuals dosimeters or
the other quick techniques discussed in Appendix B. Such estimates need to be provided promptly
to medical personnel if they are to be of any value for treating a victim. This capability should be
exercised to ensure it might be done in a timely manner. These dosimetry methods involve significant uncertainties that should be communicated to medical personnel along with the dose estimates.
Any worker close enough to an accident to receive a potentially life-threatening dose will probably
have a very nonuniform dose, corresponding to his0her orientation to the initial radiation pulse.
There might be very large differences in dose from one part of the body to another. For this reason,
dosimetry based on hair activation is recommended to supplement other forms of dosimetry. Hair
samples from different parts of the body can help quantify this nonuniformity. Such information is
of greater value for treating a victim than a whole-body average dose. Note: For simplicity, the
example exercise presented here assumes that the dose estimates are uniform wholebody doses. Clearly, this is not realistic for workers within a couple of meters of the
accident.
C.7
Termination
Exercises should typically address termination in one of two ways. It could assume self-termination
by some plausible means such as dilution, evaporation, or leaks. Alternatively, it could lead the
technical staff to develop an intervention strategy. In either case, the technical staff should practice
planning for facility recovery.
22
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--```,,`,`,,``,````,`````````,,-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---
Continuing with the preceding example, the solution volume must be reduced by ;20 gal ~76 ! to
be subcritical. Reference @C.2# notes that ;10 17 fissions are required to evaporate 1 of water that
is originally at room temperature. Assuming that water and the fissile solution have similar values
of specific heat and latent heat of vaporization, ;7.6 10 18 fissions would be required to reduce the
volume by 20 gal and terminate the accident. Of course, this is a major simplification of the
complex heat transfer phenomena that are occurring, including heat losses to the vessel and other
surroundings. It also ignores any reactivity effect from concentrating the fissile solution. Accepting
this simplification and extending the fission source term estimate ~illustrated in Fig. C.4! show
that it takes ;17 min to produce this many fissions. Note: Experience indicates that it is very
unlikely that this mechanism alone will terminate the accident so promptly. Alternatively,
the technical staff might find a way to remotely add water or nitric acid to the tank to dilute
the system. Adding another 80 gal of liquid will dilute the system from 30 to 15 g U0, which is
approximately the minimum critical concentration for a 160-gal, uranyl nitrate system. Further
dilution will certainly terminate the chain reaction.
C.8
Conclusion
An emergency exercise for a criticality accident scenario should include a realistic source term and
radiation field data. The method illustrated above is one recommended approach. However, this is
not meant to exclude other approaches. Further suggested reading is provided in the references.
C.9
References
@C.1#
B. L. Broadhead, C. M. Hopper, R. L. Childs, and J. S. Tang, An Updated Nuclear

Criticality Slide Rule: Technical Basis, NUREG0CR-6504, Vol. 1, ORNL0TM-133220V1,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory ~1997!.
@C.2#
C. M. Hopper and B. L. Broadhead, An Updated Nuclear Criticality Slide Rule: Functional

Slide Rule, NUREG0CR-6504, Vol. 2, ORNL0TM-133220V2, Oak Ridge National Laboratory ~1998!.
@C.3#
T. P. McLaughlin, Process Criticality Accident Likelihoods, Magnitudes and Emergency

PlanningA Focus on Solution Accidents, Proc. 7th Int. Conf. Nuclear Criticality Safety
(ICNC 2003), Tokaimura, Ibaraki, Japan, October 2024, 2003, JAERI-Conf 2003-019,
Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute ~2003!.
@C.4#
T. P. McLaughlin, S. P. Monahan, N. L. Pruvost, V. V. Frolov, B. G. Ryazanov, and V. I.

Sviridov, A Review of Criticality Accidents ~2000 Revision!, LA-13638, Los Alamos National Laboratory ~2000!.
@C.5#
M. E. Remley, J. W. Flora, D. L. Hetrick, D. R. Muller, E. L. Gardner, R. E. Wimmer, R. K.

Stitt, and D. P. Gamble, Experimental Studies on the Kinetic Behavior of Water Boiler
Type Reactors, Proc. 2nd U.N. Int. Conf. Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Geneva, Switzerland, September 113, 1958, Vol. 11, p. 1079 ~1958!.
@C.6#
P. Lecorche and R. L. Seale, A Review of the Experiments Performed to Determine the

Radiological Consequences of a Criticality Accident, Y-CDC-12, Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant
~1973!.
@C.7#
F. Barbry, SILENE Reactor Results of Selected Typical Experiment, SRSC No. 223,
Commissariat lEnergie Atomique Institut de Protection et de Sret Nuclaire ~1994!.
@C.8#
K. Nakajima, Y. Yamane, K. Ogawa, E. Aizawa, H. Yanagisawa, and Y. Miyoshi, Tracy

Transient Experiment Databook 1! Pulse Withdrawal Experiment, JAERI-Data0Code 2002005, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute ~2002!.
23

@C.9#
C. C. Cappiello, K. B. Butterfield, R. G. Sanchez, J. A. Bounds, R. H. Kimpland, R. P.

Damjanovich, and P. J. Jaegers, Solution High-Energy Burst Assembly ~SHEBA! Results
from Subprompt Critical Experiments with Uranyl Fluoride Fuel, LA-13373-MS, Los
Alamos National Laboratory ~1997!.
@C.10#
W. E. Nyer, Mathematical Models of Fast Transients, The Technology of Nuclear Reactor

Safety, Vol. 1, T. J. Thompson and J. G. Beckerley, Eds., The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts ~1964!.
@C.11#
F. Barbry, Model to Estimate the Maximum Fission Yield in Accidental Solution Excursions, Trans. Am. Nucl. Soc., 55, 412 ~1987!.
@C.12#
R. T. Greene, C. C. Sims, and R. E. Swaja, Nineteenth Nuclear Accident Dosimetry

Intercomparison Study, ORNL0TM-8698, Oak Ridge National Laboratory ~1983!.
@C.13#
F. A. Mettler, C. A. Kelsey, and R. C. Ricks, Medical Management of Radiation Accidents,

CRC Press, Boca Raton, Florida ~1990!.
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24


ANSI-ANS 8.23-2007 Nuclear Criticality Accident Emergency Planning and Response

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ANSI-ANS 8.23-2007 Nuclear Criticality Accident Emergency Planning and Response

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ANSI/ANS-8.

nuclear criticality accident

Copyright American Nuclear Society

Licensee=Los Alamos National Labs/5926584100

American National Standard

Copyright American Nuclear Society

Licensee=Los Alamos National Labs/5926584100

Designation of this document as an American National Standard attests that

American Nuclear Society

Copyright 2007 by American Nuclear Society. All rights reserved.

Printed in the United States of America

Copyright American Nuclear Society

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The working group would like to gratefully acknowledge the contributions by

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R. S. Eby, American Institute of Chemical Engineers

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5 Emergency response planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7 Reentry, rescue, and stabilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8 Classroom training, exercises, and evacuation drills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Selection and Use of Radiation Protection Instrumentation

Copyright American Nuclear Society

Licensee=Los Alamos National Labs/5926584100

Copyright American Nuclear Society

Licensee=Los Alamos National Labs/5926584100

Nuclear Criticality Accident

Criticality safety programs at facilities that use

This standard provides criteria for minimizing

The definitions given below are of a restricted

Shall, should, and may

drill: Supervised instruction intended to test,

Management shall ensure the following:

in brackets refer to corresponding numbers in Sec. 9, References.

Copyright American Nuclear Society

Licensee=Los Alamos National Labs/5926584100

American National Standard ANSI0ANS-8.23-2007

~3! Immediate evacuation zones and evacuation routes are established;

During an emergency response the technical

~2! conduct a radiological dose assessment

Emergency response planning

~7! The capability to perform radiological dose

Technical staff responsibilities

The technical staff shall

Emergency response plan

Licensee=Los Alamos National Labs/5926584100

~2! An emergency response plan is established, exercised, and maintained;

American National Standard ANSI0ANS-8.23-2007

accident. The plan shall address recommended

tory protection equipment, anticontamination

~1! an emergency coordinator;

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Licensee=Los Alamos National Labs/5926584100

American National Standard ANSI0ANS-8.23-2007

Assembly stations shall be clearly identified or

If personnel need to be rescued, the rescue shall

7 Reentry, rescue, and

8 Classroom training, exercises,

Licensee=Los Alamos National Labs/5926584100

American National Standard ANSI0ANS-8.23-2007

This training shall be reviewed annually, and

Exercises should be planned and controlled by

Technical staff shall be trained in their duties

A criticality accident response exercise should