This is a post-print (authors final draft) of an article in the journal

Musical Praxis (1998), 4, 1, pp. 61-77. [Original page numbers

between square brackets]. Due to technical problems at the time of
publishing most of the mathematical symbols have been converted
wrongly in the printed version of the article. These mistakes have
been corrected in this post-print version.

Musical Space: Mathematical Bases and Psychological Constraints

Mark Reybrouck
Abstract
Traditionally music analysis has been restricted to the description of
existing musical languages and styles. Music analysis that is both
panstylistic and cross-cultural must transcend these limitations. The
concept of musical space can be helpful here in providing the framework
that enables the individual music user to delimitate his musical universe.
This limited universe, as a psychological space, is highly constrained. The
mathematical space, as an ideal space, is not constrained.

[61] Traditionally music analysis has been understood as an attempt to

grasp the structure of music. Such an approach, however, is lacking in not
describing individual music users. To quote Laske (1977): "Goal state
analyses [score analysis] of music miss the crucial point that music is
above all a human experience, not merely a set of artifacts or
"structures" (p. 71) (See also: Polednak, 1985). Formal music analysis,
therefore, has to be broadened to integrate both the structural description
of the music and the process-like description of the listener's responses to
the music (Laske, 1977, Rosenthal, 1989).
This claim is ambitious as it tries to pass the limitations of traditional
conceptions of dealing with music. These are mostly one-sided and
restricted, in narrowing the subject matter to Western tonal music or other
strictly defined tone systems. They are mostly normative in leaning upon
stylistic constraints. And finally, they use static forms of description that
do not justice to the unfolding of time. A comprehensive model of music

analysis, therefore, must extend its scope from specifc musical languages
and styles to all possible kinds of music and structured sound. In order to
do this there is need of a conceptual framework and analytical tools, and
the concept of musical space can be helpful here. Spaces, indeed, are
networks within which points can be fxed by giving them some numbers,
called coordinates. And the allocation of points in musical space allows
the construction of confgurations that can be handled in different ways,
reflecting the listening strategies of the listener as well as the structure of
the music.
Towards a formal and operational approach
Scientific methodology is characterized by a continuous search for
definitions that contribute to understanding and reduction of ambiguity.
These demands are fulfilled mostly by using formal languages as tools
for articulating contents and making them intelligible. Science, therefore,
needs an appropriate nomenclature, a system of naming that assigns
unambiguously one meaning to each term. This implies a formal
approach of thinking and reasoning that restates the arguments in a
purified or regularized form, a form in which allessential parts are made
explicit and all nonessentials are eliminated (Pospesel, 1976). And the
way par excellence of doing this is using symbols. Formal languages, as
advocated by logic and neopositivism (Carnap, 1937, 1961) and semiotics
(Morris, 1975) are especially helpful here, since they provide a
systematic and economie way of thinking that combines purification,
simplification and systematization as essential tools of scientific
methodology (Morris, 1975).
Scientific methodology, however, also leans upon empirical verification.
To quote Wiener (1948): "The science of today is operational, that is, it
considers every statement as essentially concerned with possible
experiments or observable processes." (p.147). This entails measuring
devices that have both a qualitative and a quantitative moment. Music
[62] theory, therefore, must integrate a kind of metrics in its
methodology, and this at the level of the analysis of the musical structure
as well as at the level of processing by the listener. The latter can be
studied indirectly, by measuring his responses, and directly as evidenced

by modern neurophysiological research (Marin & Perry, 1998, Walin,

1991).
The starting point, however, of dealing with music, is the sounding music
and its numerical encoding, since it is not possible to measure the
reactions in a plausible manner, if the starting variable is not fixed.
Music, in that sense, can be reduced to its arithmetical substrate,
however, as a kind of sample space to be worked upon by the listener by
matching the sonic world against a limited number of categories that
represent his psychological space.
The sonic universe
Music can be defined as a sonorous articulation over time, combining
sounding phenomena with the unfolding of time. Time is the supporting
category, acting as a kind of independent variable. Sound, on the other
hand, is a function of time, and can be defined as the dependent variable.
This variable can be of any arbitrary length, but is mostly restricted to a
kind of temporal Gestalt that is decoded as a perceptual unit by the
listener. The latter, then, gives meaning to the sound that is encoded as a
sign, and that is essentially referring to itself. The process that is at work
here is a kind of symbolization that leans upon signification processes by
the listener (Reybrouck, 1995).
In order to do so, there is need of a domain that contains the elements to
build the sounding event that can be categorized as a sign. This domain,
we propose to call the sonic world or sonic universe (see also: Cogan
1984, Cogan and Escot, 1976). It represents the totality of sounds as a
virtual infinity of possible combinations of individual vibrational events.
In this sonic universe we can delimit subuniverses, that are demarcated
by perceptual and cultural constraints. The human audible range, e.g. has
an upper and a lower limit (from 16 to 20.000 Hz). Besides, there are
absolute and differential thresholds under which there is no perceptual
judgment. And finally there are cultural constraints that select certain
classes of the universe as meaningful elements, somewhat comparable to
the set of phonemes in linguistics. The study of musical cultures e.g.
shows a transition from a continuous universe to a discrete universe, with

elements that are discontinuous and individually distinct. This is obvious

in the domain of pitch with tone systems ranging from only a pair of
tones over pentatonic, diatonic, chromatic and quarter tone systems. But
also in the domain of temporal relationships there is a reduction to a
limited number of tone durations, that mostly relate to each other in some
numerical ratio. And the repertory of instrumental timbres, finally, is also
restricted to existing musical instruments.
All this, however, is gradually changing, since technology has crossed the
thresholds of geographical and acoustical limits. Today it is possible to
construct every subuniverse by delimiting a repertory of sound from the
sonic universe. Music theory, therefore, has to be cross-cultural and
panstylistic (Serafne, 1988) in order to provide a genuine theory that
offers the analytical tools for describing every possible sonorous
articulation over time.
In order to do so one can start from an operational approach of delimiting
subuniverses and the conception of musical space can be very helprul
here. We take as a departure Leibniz' conception of space (Cassirer,
1962) as a method of knowledge. In this dynamic conception of space,
space is not enclosed in itself, but is a relative concept with three major
moments, nl. multiplicity, continuity and coexistence ("Pluralitas etiam
numero inest, continuitas etiam tempori et motui, coexistentia vero
accedit in solo extenso") (p. 270). This definition of space has been very
influential for the conception of geometrical space as a collection of
points. Especially the concept of continuous space can be formulated in
an elegant way in introducing sets of points.
[63] It is not difficult to apply this notion to musical space. Two levels
can be distinguished here: the level of pitch and the level of time. Both
can be defined as continua: the pitch continuum and the time continuuum.
We propose to use the term musical space-time for the combination of
both.
Musical space-time
The musical space ideally, should be a set of points, each of them
corresponding to a number. Musical figures can be delimited in this

space, and can be considered as configurations of points. These

configurations can present themselves once, but can undergo
transformations as well, moving from one configuration to another. The
geometric space that figures as a frarnework has to take account of this,
and must be chosen according to some criteria, nl. every possible point
must have an allocation in the space, and every transition from one
configuration to another must be possible.
In order to handle this in an operational way, there is the matching of the
geometrical space and the corresponding number space. We take as a
starting point the definition of time as a continuum.
The time continuum can be considered as a linear continuum, as can be
illustrated by a geometrc line-segment. To such a line-segment one can
apply the Cantor-Dedekind axiom that states that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the points of a line and all real numbersthat is,
the totality of decimals with an infinite number of places (Kramer, 1951,
p. 332).
One particular property of a continuous series or continuum is the
characteristic of being everywhere dense. This means that no two terms
are consecutive, but that between any two terms there are always other
members of the series. Another requirement for mathematical continuity
is that there be no gaps in the series. This property, however, can only be
applied when a collection is arranged in some order. The points of a line
from left to right and the movement of time from earlier to later are
examples of such an ordered arrangement.
The same can be applied to the collection of pitches, allowing a definition
of musical space-time as a continuum. Musical space, furthermore, can be
conceived as a collection of elements, that can be described in a formal
way as an algebraic structure, i.e. a non-empty set A together with a
collection of (at least one) operations on A and a collection of relations
on A. The system of real number e.g., with addition and multiplication
and the relation "less than", is an algebraic structure (Smith, Eggen &
St.Andre, 1986).

Defining music as an algebraic structure is a challenging and promising

enterprise, since it allows a formal analysis of the combination of musical
elements. Musical structure, then, can be described in combinatorial
terms, starting from the analysis of a whole in smaller parts, that can be
combined in a more or less coherent manner. This, in fact, is the central
issue of Leibniz' Ars Combinatoria: "omnia, quae sunt aut cogitari
possunt fere componentur ex partibus aut realibus aut saltum
conceptionibus." (Leibniz, 1974). Arithmetic and computation, therefore,
are at the very core of thinking and knowledge. Computational
techniques, however, take as a starting point a set of elements to operate
upon, and mathematical group theory as a part of algebraic structure
can be extremely helpful here. To quote Cohn: "An algebraic structure
on a set A is essentially a collection of finitary operations on A: the set
with this structure is also called an algebra." (1965, p. 41).
Algebraic structures are structured sets. In this sense they make use of
both set theoretical and algebraic methodology. The central problem,
however, is not methodology, but the definition of the elements. Musical
space and time have to be integrated in the definition, together with set
theoretical, geometrical and algebraic points of view. We take as a point
of departure the geometrical view that combines deductive reasoning and
empirical work. To quote Wiener (1976): "the view which 1 maintain ... is
that geometry, though a priori, deals with an [64] empirical subjectmatter." This is no absurdity, since "the study of an idealized or
schematized experience differs from that of a raw or crude experience in
that it has to take account of two distinct factors - the experience, and the
mode of schematization employed." (pp. 18-19). What matters here are
not the direct objects of experience, but the way of collecting and
arranging them: "space, which is made up of points, lines, etc, constitutes
a kind of tabulation of the experiences of our outer senses; yet geometry,
which has space as its ubject-matter, since it depends on the method of
tabulation alone ... is an "a priori", not an experimental science." And
further: "Geometry is the science of form into which we cast our spatial
experiences." (p. 20)
Musical space-time can be defined as a collection of points that constitute
the domain (the arguments) upon which predication processes can be

applied. The result of these processes are propositions that assign some
general term (predicate) to an individual (subject). Predication, however,
does not apply to points, that have no extension, but on units that are
recognizable as such. At a formal level these units are systems of isolated
points in one or more dimensions, somewhat comparable to the pointevents of physics. To quote Reichenbach (1958): "the point of the spacetime manifold is the point-event, i.e. an event determined by three space
coordinates and one time coordinate" (p.183). Each point of space has a
"world-line" that corresponds to the flow of time at a particular moment
or during an interval of time.
So it must be possible to construct a mathematical model for the
description of the physical domain (the sonorous universe) from which
the units can be recruited, and for giving a numerical description of them.
The space in which collections of points can be delimitated can be
conceived as a metrical space (S, d), i.e. a set S on which a metric or
distance function (d) is defined, that satisfies the following axioms:
(1) d (a, a) = 0 for every a S
d (a, b) > 0 for several a, b S

(2) d (a, b) = d (b, a) for every a, b S

(3) d (a, c) d (a, b) + d (b, c) for every a, b, c S
The real number d (a, b) is called the distance from a to b (Lipschutz,
1965). It allows an expansion from metrical to topological space, on the
condition that some topological properties are fulfilled. The technical
elaboration of this matter is not very easy. The main idea, however, is
quite evident. To quote Peterson (1992): "topology is concerned with
notations of continuity and relative position. Point-set topology regards
geometrical figures as collections of points, with the entire collection
often considered as spaces." And further: "topologists study properties of
spaces that remain unchanged, no matter how the spaces are bent,
stretched, shrunk, or twisted. Such transformations of ideally elastic
objects are subject only to the condition that nearby points in one space
correspond to nearby points in transformed versions of that space.

Because allowed deformation can be carried out by manipulating a

rubber sheet, topology is sometimes known as rubber-sheet geometry"
The idea is exemplified in figure 1 (von Krbek, 1949, p.107):

Figure 1. Manipulation of a rubber sheet as an illustration of rubber-sheet

geometry.

Musical space as topological space

[65] Applying this way of thinking to the domain of music provides an
operational description of musical space-time as a topological space,
allowing every discretization of the sonorous universe by selecting sets of
points, and every possible transformation of sets of points to other sets of
points. Musical configurations, indeed, can be defined as point-sets that
can be transformed into other configurations, and this in a gradual or
abrupt way. Figure 2 gives an illustration.

Figure 2. Example of a geometrical transformation.

In applying transformations to sets of points, the configurations mostly

are left invariant with respect to at least some properties. These are called
topological invariant. The sets, however, must be structured (structured

sets), allowing the mapping of each element of set A onto set B, with
elements of A being the domain and elements of B being the co-domain
(the values or images of A).
Most interesting, however, are operation preserving mappings, that
actually preserve the structure of the algebraic system. Such mappings or
homomorphisms generate a transformed image of the original structure
(the domain) in the image set (the range) (Smith, Egge, St.Andre, 1986).
These homomorphic images are very useful tools for musical analysis in
providing a numerical basis for identification and transformation
algorithms. A special case of images, furthermore, are the images that are
generated 'within' the same topological space. They can be conceived as
functions (f: A B or f(x) = y).
[66] The problem, however, is the special status of music as temporal art:
the arguments of the function are themselves functions of time, and
transformations of musical figures are to be conceived as transformations
of functions. Musical space, then, is essentially a virtual space, becoming
a function space when sonorous articulation is going on. The unfolding of
music, therefore, can be described at two levels: the sonorous articulation
as a dependent variable (function) of the time as the independent variable,
with the points of the time continuum being the arguments and the points
of the spectral configuration being the images.
Sonic events, thus, can be defined as functions of time, and these
functions again can be considered as arguments of functions of a second
order, since images or morphisms can be defined on functions as well.
One has to consider, however, that each argument of a function has
exactly one image, but elements of the range (the co-domain or image
set) may have several arguments or none. The sonorous articulation,
however, is constrained by the unfolding of time (inexorable time), in the
sense that the original functions precede the image functions. Original
functions, yet, can be represented in memory and imagination, allowing a
quasi-simultaneous comparison of original functions and image
functions. The imagination, on the other hand, is not restricted, in the
sense that functions that exist only at a virtual level can function as a
reference for comparison as well. Two mechanisms are working here:

comparison of functions on the basis of memory and anticipation on the

basis of imagination.
There is one problem, however, in defining sonic events as functions of
time. Neither the sonorous articulation nor the succession of pitches are
continuous functions of time. Tone systems e.g. are discrete systems, and
most rhythmical-metrical groupings also can be reduced to a kind of
discretization of the time continuum. One has to distinguish therefore
between single sonic events and the concatenation of these events to more
encompassing temporal Gestalts. The latter, however, can be defined as
concatenations of continuous functions. Although things seem to get
more complicated, this is not really a problem, since morphisms are not
restricted to single functions, but are applicable to composites of
functions as well (Bosch, 1985). A morphism f is composable with
morphism g if the composite of the function g f exists, satisfying the
conditions of composition and associativity.
The concept of morphism, thus, is an important analytical tooi in
describing the structure of music, since morphisms map sets onto each
other, while preserving the structure of the set. Still more important,
however, is the concept of isomorphism (homomorphisms that are oneto-one or bijective). Here the morphism maps structured sets onto
themselves. Such a morphism is called an automorphism, and the set of
all automorphisms of a structured set is a group in mathematical sense.
The transformation group (Beth, 1850) is an example. The sets of all
movements of a plane in itself e.g. can be reduced to operations as
translation, rotation, mirror reversal and multiplication. Considering
musical figures as configurations of points in musical space-time, and
providing them with numerical coordinates, allows the isomorphic
mapping of points-sets onto themselves.
Discrete pitches versus pitch continuum
The objects of the sonorous universe can be defined as sets that can be
joined to greater sets. A pitch, e.g., can be conceived as a collection of
points in musical space-time, since every tone is not merely a focal pitch,
but a small spectral world with at least some minimal lapse of time. As
such it is not reducible to points without extension.

Tones, furthermore, mostly appear within a framework or grid of tones

that form a set of focal pitches. These are mostly restricted to the
culturally established pitches of existing tone scales, assigning pitches to
pitch classes. If one uses octave equivalence as a principle for assigning
octaves in the same perceptual category, then it is possible to use a
number system that allocates the notes in a periodic system (Caeyers &
Teugels, 1984). Such a cyclic system can be handled in a formal way,
using the mathematical concept of ring. For a chromatic scale this would
be the ring A = Z12 of whole numbers modulo 12 [two numbers are
congruent [67] modulo x if they remain the same after subtraction of x or
a number of x], where each element of A denotes an equivalence class of
pitches, i.e. the pitch of any note is identified with the equivalence class
or the "pitch class number" to which it belongs (Bazelow & Brickle,
1979).
This way of proceeding implies a reduction, in leaning upon the
periodicity of tone quality rather than on the linear character of pitch.
Octave equivalence, therefore, has to be considered as a kind of
categorical perception (Burns & Ward, 1978, Repp, 1984, Fricke, 1988,
Handel, 1989, Rakowski, 1990, Schneider, 1994), conceiving of pitches
as members of certain categories or classes rather than as elements of a
continuum.
The problem, however, of tone scales is rather complex (Schneider, 1994,
Dowling & Harwood, 1986). Mostly there is a selection of a limited store
of pitch classes (the tonal material) from the pitch continuum. The latter
is continuous, as can be illustrated by the gliding movement of one's
finger over a string. Nearly every possible length between two points can
be set in vibration. Most music cultures, however, do not operate with
continuous scales, but with discrete divisions of the scale. The rationale
for dividing is not always obvious. Admitting the octave equivalence as a
kind of universal principle (Dowling & Harwood, 1986), there is much
freedom in dividing the octave. Mersenne e.g, stated that the division of
the octave is more appropriate if it combines a limited number of steps
with more benefits (Ludwig, 1971). The well-tempered scale is a wellknown example of these claims. N-scales, however, are only possible

divisions of the pitch continuum. A genuine theory of music that is both

panstylistic and cross-cultural, therefore, has to broaden its scope, in
allowing every possible allocation of points on the pitch continuum. We
are inclined, therefore, to take as a starting point the pitch continuum and
not a grid of points (the pitch system), allowing the delimitation of any
number of fixed pitches, in accordance with perceptual and cultural
constraints. Pitches, then, can be defined as variables that can be filled in
with any possible value from the pitch continuum.
Musical space-time: an operational approach
The definition of pitches as variables allows a gentle transition from a
mere discrete description to a more continuous description of the
idiosyncrasies of the sonorous articulation. Every natural tone has an
evolutionary course that can be plotted against a two-dimensional
Cartesian coordinate system to picture the relationship between pitch and
time (figure 3). Equating the x-axis with the unfolding of time allows us
to define the sonorous articulation [reducing it for the moment to the
aspect of focal pitch] as a function of time.

Figure 3. Two-dimensional representation of the relationship between

pitch (y) and time (x).

[68] The perception of pitch can be visualized as a continuous path of a

curve that passes along some defined area of the pitch continuum. Such a
continuous function of time can apply to a singular sonic event or to a
succession of them. The delimitation of these temporal units, however, is
dependent upon processing strategies by the listener, leaning highly upon
Gestalt perception (Leman, 1997, Reybrouck, 1997), and this at two

levels: as a continuous function of time, reflecting the idiosyncrasies of

the sonorous articulation in a rather analog way, and in a discrete way,
reducing the whole function to a single symbolic representation.
The mathematical substructure, therefore, must provide the basis for
allowing a transition from a continuous to a discrete conception of space.
The starting point is the numerical base, that assigns to every point in
musical space-time a number, and this in an unambiguous way.
Furthermore, we propose to combine a kind of graphic representation
with a kind of measurableness, in stating that the length of any arbitrary
length can be defined by the number of times that a unit length can be
contained in it. One has, however, to make a distinction between the time
continuum and the pitch continuum, in the sense that the flow of time is
irreversible (inexorable character of time), while the pitch continuum has
both a linear and a periodic aspect. We therefore propose a kind of
visualization for the sonorous articulation by using a plane, that is winded
up as a logarithmic spiral around the time axis (figure 4).

Figure 4. Visual representation of musical space-time (left) and the pitch

continuum as a cross-section of the unfolding of time (right).

This way of proceeding combines a simpie representation with

operational advantages, as it is possible to define pitch as the linear
distance (s) from an arbitrary point on the spiral to another point, or as
the angle formed by the ray that intersects the origin and the point on the
spiral and the horizontal axis ().

Using a logarithmic spiral has several advantages over a mere linear

continuum, since it combines an arithmetical series (the succession of
equal angles) with a geometrical series (the succession of pitches on the
spiral). This means that the spiral can be read as a clock, where moving
the hand over an angle of 30 equals a half step in the pitch series.
Furthermore, every angle intersects the spiral at several places, thus
defining an equivalence class of octaves. Pitch thus can move in a
continuous way along the spiral, but can jump from turn to turn in a
discontinuous way, maintaining the angle (octave) or changing it. Some
analogy with the atomic model is obvious here, with the electrons
rotating in stable orbits around the nucleus.
[69] Tone systerns mostly behave as the atomic model, with a fixed
numbers of orbits that are arranged as a system of concentric circles. In
this sense, pitch can also be defined as a distance from a point on the
circle to the central point or origin. The transition, however, from a
discrete tone space to a pitch continuum implies the abandonment of
concentric circles in favor of a spiral. Every point in the pitch continuum
is then defined unequivocally through the distance of a point on the
circumference of the circle to the center. Furthermore, the point can be
considered as the intersection of a concentric circle with the spiral. The
geometric description of the points, therefore, can be handled more
adequately in polar coordinate form. In this system, each point in the
plane is assigned coordinates (r, ) with respect to a fixed line in the
plane called the polar axis and a point on that line called the pole (figure
5).

Figure 5. Description of a point in polar coordinate form.

This approach is of great importance as it enables us to name numerical

quantities more easily. The system expresses the coordinates in terms of
the distance "r" from a point P to the pole and the measure of the angle
"" between the axis and a line joining the origin to the point. The latter
is the horizontal ray that starts from the pole and that is usually drawn to
the right with a unit length.
This system for naming and plotting points in a plane as a combination of
the distance r, which is the length of OP, and the measure of allows us
to use ordered pairs of numbers and to name the quantities as vectors that
are oriented in space. OP, then, can be expressed in terms of r and
rather than in terms of the present values m and n of its coordinates. By
defining the sine and cosine of the angle it is possible to rename OP
from (m, n) to (r cos , r sin ).

The pitch continuum as a logarithmic spiral

The most common representation of the pitch continuum seems to be the
linear continuum. Another possibility, however, is the graphic
representation as a logarithmic spiral.(1) This spiral takes the simple form
r = a or = logarithm r, where r is the radius and a the logarithmic base.
This means that the ever-growing length of r is an exponential function of
itself, gradually increasing with each unit of angle. Naming the angles in
unit measures gives an arithmetical series of units, while the
corresponding measures of the distance r constitute a geometrie series, as
can be concluded from the following numbers:

... -3,
... l/a3

-2,
l 2
/a

-1,
l
/a

0,
1

1,
a

2,
a2

3 ...
a3 ...

[70] For the definition of the base 'a' we suggest to lean upon the ratios of
vibration frequencies. Two octave tones are in the ratio of 2/1, so that the
frequency of two successive notes (within the well-tempered system) are
directly proportionate to each other, with a ratio of 122 = 1,059 = a.
Every interval between two notes can be defined through intrapolation
between 1 and 2 according to the formula 122 i ( i = 1, 2, ..., 11).

Figure 6. The logaritmic spiral as the exponential function r = a.

This way of thinking goes back to Simon Stevin (Dijksterhuis, 1970) who
argued for a uniform division of the octave in 12 equal parts, with
irrational ratios for all intervals with the exception of the octave.
Irrational numbers, however, are not handy to operate upon. We are

inclined, therefore, to use the logarithm of r for the basis 122 as

measuring unit. Starting from the equivalence of x = ay and y = logax, we
can state:
r = a <=> = logar.
Or to quote Hofstadter (1986): "here are some phenomena for which
there are two (or more) scales with which we are equally comfortable,
depending on the circumstances. Take pitch-music. If you look at a piano
keyboard, you will see a linear scale along which pitch can be measured.
It is an additive, or linear scale. By this I mean that if you assigned
successive whole numbers to successive notes, then the distance from any
note to any other would be given by the difference between their numbers.
Only addition and subtraction are involved." And further: "... if you are
going to think of things acoustically rather than auditorily, physically
rather than perceptually, each pitch is better described in terms of its ...
frequency than in terms of its positions on a keyboard... The point is that
the natural operations for comparing frequencies [71] are multiplication
and division, whereas the natural operations for note numbers on a
keyboard are addition and subtraction. What this means is that the note
numbers are logarithms of the frequencies." (p. 126).
The advantage of this procedure is that it combines the elegance of the
well-tempered system (= 0, 1, 2, ..., 11) with every possible extension
of to other numbers. therefore must not be restricted to whole
numbers, but can be expanded to all numbers, allowing a numerical
representation of other tone systems and experimental kinds of music on
the logarithmic spiral.
One further feature of the logarithmic spiral, is its pole being an
asymptotic point. This means that the curvilinear figure approaches this
point in an ever-increasing way without ever reaching it totally. It is
therefore possible to give a zero-value to any arbitrary point of the spiral
with the curve expanding itself (positive expansion) beyond this point,
and shrinking itself (negative expansion) beneath it. Furthermore, one can
equate the zero-value with the keynote of the tone system. Rather than
speaking of a tonic, however, we propose to use the term polar axis, as a

reference axis for defining the distance to the pole (the origin of the polar
axis). This polar axis can be fixed (established tonality) or can change its
place (modulation, roving harmony and enharmonic change). The axis,
however, acts as a reference axis that allows a kind of organization of the
movement of pitches as music unfolds over time. It is up to the listener,
however, to define the base of reference.
The logarithmic spiral thus has several advantages. It acts as a system for
identifying elements in a set of points by labeling them with numbers,
and this both in a continuous and a discrete manner.
The sonorous universe as a four-dimensional continuum
The sonorous universe can be defined as a pitch continuum that is
extended with a time continuum and a loudness continuum. For the
purpose of visualization it can be helpful to let the system collapse to two
or three dimensions, as has been done by describing musical space-time
as the unfolding of the spectral configuration in time. This reduction,
however, is a risky task, since it entails ontological considerations as to
the nature of musical sound. The crucial problem here is the old question
of substance and accidents. Is it possible to speak of substance in music,
and what are the accidents? Descartes has discussed a related question as
regards the notion of time. He stressed the importance of substance and
the independence of time moments. Hume, on the other hand, was critical
of the notion of substance, but, exactly as Descartes, he stressed the
notion of change: "Now as time is composed of parts that are not
coexistent, an unchangeable object, since it produces none but coexistent
impressions, produces none that can give us the idea of time and,
consequently, that idea must be derived from a succession of changeable
objects, and time in its first appearance can never be severed from a
succession" (quoted in Whitehead, 1978, p. 136). The notion of
succession and of duration seems to be very important here. The term
substance, therefore, is a rather ambiguous term with regard to music,
since musical objects are dependent on the articulation over time. Musical
substance has a dynamic character that leans upon secondary attributes
that shape the unfolding of time. We are inclined, however, to consider
time as the primary moment of musical articulation. To quote Serafine
(1988): "The temporality of music is its defining feature, and the role of

specific pitch duration, loudness, and timbral characteristics of sound

events is of only secondary importance. Sound is the medium through
which interesting temporal events are organized, but however necessary
sound is as the carrier of music, it is by itself an insufficint condition of
the artform. The principle character of music is movement in time - the
exploration of simultaneous and successive events that embody points of
arrival and stasis, points of departure and continuation, and a train of
event-to-event similarities and transformation." (p. 69) Time, therefore, is
the leading category of the sonorous articulation (Klugman, 1961,
Dahlhaus, 1967). It is a non-material and formal category, that precedes
the sonorous articulation as a material category. The [72] sonorous
articulation, therefore, provides the sensuous dressing up of movement in
time, and this in several dimensions. The pioneenng work of Schaeffer
(1952, 1956) is still important here. Every note, he states, has a
beginning, a transitory state and an ending, and it is the fluctuation of
intensity that gives the notes their form. Every note - in reducing for the
moment musical sounds to notes - has three dimensions: loudness,
duration and pitch. These can be represented graphically as a sonogram,
i.e. a system of coordinates that combines the spectral, dynamic and
melodie features of the sound, and that allows an operational description
of musical sound.

Figure 7. Three-dimensional representation of sound (sonogram)

Schaeffer has made an extensive study of musical objects. He formulated

33 criteria of sonorous characterization with 19 of them referring to the
dynamic aspect, 9 referring to timbre and only 5 referring to pitch. The
articulation of sound, therefore, cannot be reduced to spectral and
durational aspects, but has to be supplied with a dynamic description. The
sonorous universe, thus, has to be extended from a three- to a fourdimensional continuum, that cannot be represented in a graphic way.
There is, however, an elegant way of dealing with this continuum, if one
uses a four-dimensional vector space. The points of musical space-time,
therefore, are to be regarded as multiples of points.
The psychological space
Psychological space is not directly related to physical-mathematical space
as the potential continuum of physical stimuli is not paralleled by a
psychological continuum (Schneider, 1994). Continuity is a property of
nature (most natural processes proceed in an continuous manner), but the
mind is operating in a rather discrete marnier, assigning stimuli to a set of
ordered categories. An infinite repertory of signs does not allow
processes of categorization that lean upon a finite or limited lexicon. In
order to handle the sonorous universe, one has to make selections out of
this virtual infinity of elements. Psychological space, therefore, tends to
be a subspace of a more encompassing mathematical space. The basic
question, however, relates to the criteria of delimitation.
A possibility may be offered here by defning the perceptual units with
which the listener can operate deliberately and consciously as continuous
functions of time and composites of them. The objective qualities of
sound and time can be taken as a starting point, with the spectral
configuration as a cross-section of the unfolding of time. Every
recognizable and identifiable sound however has an evolutionary course
and a minimal lapse of time, and this course is a continuous function of
time, at least in the way Dirichlet (quoted in Colerus, 1937, p. 330)
defined a function: the function of a real variable x [in this case: the time]
in a domain or [73] interval from a to b is every quantity y, which, for
every value of x has only one value, that is given by the value of x, or that
can be found or constructed in one way or another.

The problem with this approach is the almost infinite number of possible
functions. Some restrictions therefore must be taken into account, and
this both at the productive and receptive level of dealing with music.
There are first the restrictions of a rather physiological and psychological
nature. Certain functions may be constructed that do not match perceptual
reality. Second, there are restrictions of a rather technical and acoustical
kind. The construction of instruments e.g. does not always allow the full
utilization of the whole pitch continuum. Each instrument has its range
and many instruments have fixed pitches, that do not allow sliding
movements within the pitch continuum. Thirdly, there are cultural
conventions that mostly refer to discretization of the pitch continuum.
Most cultures have scales and typical instruments that define all possible
pitches to be generated. Existing tone systems, therefore, are reductions
that use only a partition of the sonic universe with preferential places in
the pitch continuum. The criteria for allocating their place (mathematical
elegance, ratio of whole numbers...), however, are normative and the
expression of cultural constraints. Some broader point of view therefore
is desirable, and this can possibly be filled in by semiotic methodology.
The claims of semiotics
Dealing with music leans upon experience and conceptualization. Music
theory therefore must provide the tools for describing this process and
this in an operational and formal way. Semiotic methodology can be
helpful here, since semiotics as the science of signs allows an
exhaustive description of the relations between the sonorous material,
their reference and meaning, and the listener. The structural description
of music therefore has to be supplemented by a procedural description of
the subjective experience of the listener. In this process the listener uses
signs, which may have both a subjective and an intersubjective base, and
that can be formalized at three levels. To quote Morris (1975):" One may
study the relations of signs to the objects to which the signs are
applicable. This relation will be called the semantic dimension of
semiosis ..., the study of this dimension will be called semantics.
Or the subject of study may be the relations of signs to interpreters. This
relation will be called the pragmatic dimension of semiosis..., and the
study of this dimension will be named pragmatics ...; and since all signs

are potentially if not actually related to other signs, it is well to make a

third dimension of semiosis co-ordinate with the other two which have
been mentioned. This third dimension will be called the syntactical
dimension of semiosis, ... ; and the study of this dimension will be named
syntactics." (pp. 6-7).
Music analysis cannot be reduced to a structural description of the
syntactical dimension of musical 'signs', but has to take account of the
listener and his intentions. Musical signs, indeed, are not standardized
units, that are members of a finite lexicon of existing categories, but have
to be defined 'ad hoc'. The strategies of assigning semantic weight to
perceptual units are quite complex, and lean upon predication processes
by the listener (Reybrouck, 1995). It is beyond the scope of this paper to
go into details here. We only want to stress the importance of
'signification processes' in defining the syntactical units. An operational
approach of dealing with music, therefore, has to start from variable units
can be given a fixed meaning at every moment. These units can be
represented in a propositional way. Defining musical signs as continuous
functions of time, however, is leaning upon a kind of analog
representation as well, as is advocated by modern representation theories.
To quote Desain & Honing (1992): "We expect further progress from the
elaboration of continuous knowledge representation, the most eye
catching feature of connectionism in comparison to the symbolic
paradigm that uses discrete concepts." And fiuther: "In general it
appears that representations ofa continuous nature can improve the
flexibility of representational systems considerably. They sometimes yield
a level of performance that is not obtained by their discrete counterparts.
Continuity has been underrated for too long now, both from a [74]
technical viewpoint - in many cases considering a discrete representation
a harmless simplification -, and from musicological and psychological
perspectives which, more or less, overstressed the importance of discrete
categories." (pp. 15-16).
Musical space must provide the framework to select the variables and this
without restrictions of any kind. The mathematical space, therefore,
should be an ideal space, that is not constrained. Psychological space, on

the other hand, is highly constrained in reducing this ideal space to a

limited store of categories.
Conclusion
Music analysis has a long tradition of structural descnption. Music,
moreover, is a sounding phenomenon that unfolds itself in time. Musical
units, therefore, have a temporal course with their length being dependent
upon decoding mechanisms by the listener. One of the basic assumptions
of music analysis, then, is the assessment that there is no lexicon of
standardized and normalized units. There is no a priori-repertory of signs
but only a repertory that has to be constructed in an ad hoc-fashion at
every articulation of sound. The existing sign systems that are operating
at a syntactical level and that present themselves as a kind of lexicon are
not panstylistic and cross-cultural. They lean upon acculturation,
conditioning and learning processes and are idiolectic and idiosyncratic in
essence. They are not fixed and can change. Every musical repertory
therefore is at least transitional and provisional.
The basic question thus reduces to the delimitation of the elements.
Starting from the sonorous experience of the listener one can study the
acquisition of the code. This leans upon learning processes, both
inductive and heuristic, that result in a kind of symbolization. Symbolic
processes, however, use signs. The musical sign, therefore, is waiting for
conceptual and empirical support. We have proposed to define the
musical sign as a function of time, allowing a kind of representation that
combines a discrete and analog way of encoding, with the unfolding of
time referring to the latter and the act of categorization referring to the
former. In order to do this, there is need of a musical space that provides
a continuous framework wherein discrete subspaces can be delimitated.
Musical space, therefore is the necessary framework for the definition of
the signs
Note
(1) Somewhat later than the publishing date of this article I found an
older contribution of M.R. Jones in which she has developed the idea of
the logarithmic spiral in a way that is very close to the proposal in this
paper. Intellectual honesty forces me to mention the full reference of her

article as well: M.R.Jones (1981). Music as a stimulus for psychological

motion. Part I. Some determinants of expectancies. Psychomusicology, 1,
2, 34-51.

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