Caram v. Segui, et al GR. No.

193652 August 5, 2014

Facts: Ma. Christina Caram became pregnant with the child of Gicano Constantino III
without the benefit of marriage. Christina mislead Gicano into believing that she
had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy.
When she gave birth to Baby Julian, she voluntarily surrendered the baby by way of
Deed of Voluntary Commitment to DSWD. During the wake of Gicano, Christina
confessed to Gicanos family that she had a son and gave him up for adoption due
to financial distress and initial embarrassment. When they decided to recover the
baby, the DSWD, through respondents, refused, arguing that Christina had already
terminated her parental authority over Baby Julian by virtue of the Deed of
Voluntary Committment and that he is already declared legally available for
adoption. Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo before the
Quezon RTC, seeking to obtain the custody of Baby Julian from respondents. The
RTC rendered judgement in favor of respondents. Christina then elevated the case
to the SC. She alleged that her enforced separation from Baby Julian amounted to
an enforced disappearance within the context of the Amparo rule.
Issue: whether or not a writ of Amparo is the proper remedy in this case.
Ruling: NO. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful actor omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof. T]he Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of
"extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present
form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings"
are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended
by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct
or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the
fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law. The
elements constituting enforced disappearances are the following:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State ora political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to

acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the Amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her
"enforced separation" from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an
"enforced disappearance" within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her
position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's
whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010
Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina
Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in
her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers presented
Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5,
2010. There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the
Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.
Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her
child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the
necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she
is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child
and contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that
what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over
a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the
State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of Amparo is a remedy available to victims of
extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature,
regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public
official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and
guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and
threats that vitiate the quality of life.

De Lima, et al. v. Gatdula Gr. No. 204528 February 19, 2013

Facts: On 27 February 2012, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.2 This case
was docketed as In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo of Atty.
Magtanggol B. Gatdula, SP No. 12-127405. It was raffled to the sala of Judge Silvino
T. Pampilo, Jr. on the same day. The Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice
Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director
Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation Gatdula wanted De
Lima, et al. to cease and desist from framing up Gatdula for the fake ambush
incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Gatdula in relation to
the alleged ambush incident. Instead of deciding on whether to issue the writ, the
judge issued summons and ordered petitioners to file an answer. De Lima, et al.
manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases. Judge
Pampilo insisted that since no writ has been issued, return is not the required
pleading but answer. The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in
Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and
thus required an Answer. The RTC rendered a Decision granting the issuance of
the Writ of Amparo. Petitioners elevated the case to the SC, assailing the RTC
decision through a petition for review on Certiorari via Rule 45.
Issue: whether or not the filing of answer was appropriate.
Ruling: No. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for
the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to
the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life,
liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard
of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and
requiring an Answer. The respondents are required to file a Return after the
issuance of the writ through the clerk of court. The Return serves as the responsive
pleading to the petition.24 Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside
from identifying the issues in the case. Respondents are also required to detail the
actions they had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to state
the actions they had taken to: (i) verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii)
recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person
identified in the petition; (iii) identify witnesses and obtain statements concerning
the death or disappearance; (iv) determine the cause, manner, location, and time of
death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought
about the death or disappearance; and (vi) bring the suspected offenders before a
competent court.25 Clearly these matters are important to the judge so that s/he
can calibrate the means and methods that will be required to further the
protections, if any, that will be due to the petitioner.