Ola v. People, G.R. No.

195547, Dec 2, 2015

A Brief for the Appellee,9 dated r-Aarch 1, 2010, was subsequently filed. On May
28, 2010, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court praying that she
be granted a period of twenty (20) days within which to file an appropriate ple
ading. On June 29, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Am
ended Appellant's Brief.10 In its first assailed Resolution promulgated on Septe
mber 9, 2010, the CA denied petitioner's motion for having been filed out of tim
e. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 11 but the CA denied it in its
second assailed Resolution dated December 14,.2010.
The CA has correctly ruled that under Section 4, paragraph 2, Rule 2, of the Rul
es of Court, petitioner had twenty (20) days from receipt of herein respondent's
brief to file a reply brief to discuss matters raised in respondent's brief whi
ch were not covered in her brief. However, as found by the CA, petitioner's mani
festation requesting an additional period to file an appropriate pleading as wel
l as her motion for leave of court to file an amended appellant's brief was file
d seventy-nine (79) days late and, as such, was deemed "not acceptable or too lo
ng to ignore.

The OSG did not file a motion for reconsideration on the ground of double jeopar
dy. Chua, on the other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration:J<) on August 8,
2007.a Resolution41 dated October 3, 2007, the CA denied Chua's motion for reco
nsideration and its supplement on the ground that acquittal is immediately final
and the re-examination of the record of the case would violate the guarantee ag
ainst double jeopardy. It also denied the motions lor reconsideration of both pa
rties on the civil aspect of the case. Hence
Lacks legal personality
In Villareal v. we upheld the doctrine that it is only the OSG, as representativ
e of the State, which may question the acquittal of the accused via a petition f
or certiorari under Rule 65, viz: .11 x x x The authority to represent the Sta
te in appeals of criminal cases hefon tlw Supreme Court and the CA is solely vest
ed in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35 (I), Chapter 12, Tit
le lJI, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumenta
lities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation
or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have specific powers and
functions to the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA, an
d all other courts or tribunals in all civil act.ions and special proceedings in
which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party
. The OSG is the law office of the Government. To he sure, in criminal cases, th
e acquittal of the accused or the dismiss:tl of the case against him can only be
appealed hy the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private c
omplainant or the offended pmiy may question such acquittal or dismissal only in
sofar as the civil liability or the accused is concerned. In a catena of cases,
this view has been time and again espoused and nrnintained by the Court. In Rodr
iguez v. Gadiane, it was categorically stated that if the criminal case is dismi
ssed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal
aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf' of the
State. The capability of the private complainant to question such dismissal or
acquiual is limited only to the civil aspect of the case. The same determination
was also arrived at by the Court in Metropolitan Bonk and Trust Company v. Veri
diano II. In the recent case of Jr. v. Bangayan, the Court again upheld this gui
ding principle. xxx Thus, the Court has delinitively ruled that in a criminal ca
se in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complai
nant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising the

refrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acq

uittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may he undertaken, legally feasible, on
ly by the State through the Solicitor General. As a rule, only the Solicitor Gen
eral may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended
party or G. R. No. I (i69'J5 complainant may not 1111dcrtakc such appeal. (Emph
asis supplied)
The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the party affected by
the dismissal of the criminal action is the State and not the private cornplain
ant.411 The interest of the private cornplainant or the private offended party i
s limited only to the civil liability.'15 In the prosecution of the offense, the
complainant's role is limited to that of a witness f<x the prosecution such tha
t when a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or i r there is an acquit
tal, an appea I therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the S
tate through the Solicitor General.4h The private offended party or complainant
may not take such appeal, but may only do so I . 1 l' I '17 as to tie c1v1 aspec
t o tic case. Although there are instances when we adopt a liberal view and give
due course to a petition filed by an offended party, we direct the OSG to file
its comment.118 When through its comment, the OSG takes a position similar to th
e private complainant's, we hold that the OSG ratifies and adopts the private co
mplainant's petition as its own.49 However, when the OSG in its comment neither
prays that the petition be granted nor expressly rziti fies and adopts the petit
ion as its own, we hesitate in disregarding, and uphold instead, the rule on per
sonality or legal standing.50 In this case, the OSG neither appealed the judgmen
t of acquittal of the CA nor gave its conformity to Chua's special civil action
for certiorari and mandamus
Recon will place Double Jeopardy
to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our rules on criminal proceedings r
equire that a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appella
te court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgatio
n.55 This is referred to as the "'finality-of-acquittal" rule. 'fhe rationale ro
r the rule was explained in People v. Velasco:-'" . 'i1
ighlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the
humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights or the citize
n, when brought in unequal contest with the State. x x x." Thus, Green expressed
the concern that "(t)hc underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at lea
st the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its re
sources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to expense and ordeal
and compelling him to live in a coniinuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as w
ell as enhancing the possibilify that even though innocent, he may he found guil
fy." It is axiomatic that on the basis or humanity, fairness and justice, an acq
uitted dclcndant is entitled to the right or repose as a direct consequence or t
he riuality or his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing t
he absolute nature or m.:quittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal
justice system attaches to the protection or the innocent against wrongful convi
ction." The interest in Che finality-of-acquittal rnlc, confined to vcnlicts of
not l!;Uilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know
ihc exact extent of one's liabilit)' With this right or repose, the criminal jus
tice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those wh
ose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a subseq
uent proceeding. Related to his right or repose is the defendant's interest in h
is right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. This interest enc
ompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in a single proceed
ing by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for society's awareness of the he
avy pcrsonnl strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defen
dant is rrnmi/Csted in the willingness lo limit Uovernmcnt lo a single criminal

proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of crin1i11al Jaw

s. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its
voice in the finality or the initial proceeding. J\s observed in /,ockharl v. Ne
lson, "(t)hc fundamental tenet animating the Douhk .Jeopardy Clause is that the
State should not he able Co oppress individuals through the abuse of the crimina
l process." Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final _
judgmcnf, the Constilution conclusively presumes that a second trial would he un
fair. (Citations omi11ed, emphasis supplied) There were cases,
next asserts that certain exceptions to the rule on double jeopardy are present
in this case. Particularly, she submits that: ( 1) the appellate court's proceed
ing is a sham or mock proceeding; (2) the People through the OSG, was deprived o
f the opportunity to be heard and its "day in court"; and (3) the result is a nu
ll and void judgment of acquittal. Errors of judgment or those involving misappr
eciation of evidence cannot be raised and be reviewd in a petition for certiorar
i under Rule 65. We arc also not convinced that the State was deprived of due pr
ocess in presenting its case. crl1c OSG, in foct, actively participated in prose
cuting the case before the CAAlthough we do not absolutely preclude the availmen
t of the remedy or certiorori to correct an erroneow; acquittal, the petitioner
must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the appellate court blatantly abu
sed its authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justicc.73 Chua failed to do so.
People v. Valdez
ollowing Temporada, for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru F
alsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,0
00.00, the "prescribed penalty" is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to r
eclusion perpetua. After trial, should the commission of such crime be proven by
the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the "imposable penalty" is reclusion p
erpetua in view of the RPC mandate that the prescribed penalty of reclusion temp
oral maximum to reclusion perpetua shall be applied in its maximum. 27 The falsi
fication, which is the means used to commit the crime of malversation, is in the
nature of a generic aggravating circumstance that effectively directs the impos
ition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. 28 The phrases "shall be
applied" and "shall impose, " found in Articles 63 and 64, respectively, of the
RPC, are of similar import as the phrase "shall be imposed" found in Article 48.
Both Articles 63 and 64 refer to the penalty to be imposed after considering th
e aggravating or mitigating circumstance/s. Finally, the "penalty actually impos
ed" is still reclusion perpetua, considering that the ISL finds no application a
s the penalty is indivisible.
To note, Article 48 of the RPC on complex crimes does not change the nature of t
he constituent offenses; it only requires the imposition of the maximum period o
f the penalty prescribed by law. When committed through falsification of officia
l/public documents, the RPC does not intend to classify malversation as a capita
l offense. Otherwise, the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Fal
sification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000
.00 should have been expressly included in Republic Act No. 7659.33 If truly a n
on-bailable offense, the law should have already considered it as a special comp
lex crime like robbery with rape, robbery with homicide, rape with homicide, and
kidnapping with murder or homicide, which have prescribed penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Just to stress, the inequity of denying bail as a matter of right to a
n accused charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Offici
al/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is palpable when
compared with an accused indicted for plunder, which is a heinous crime punisha
ble under R.A. No. 7080,34 as amended by R.A. No. 765935 and R.A. No. 9346.36 Ob
serve that bail is not a matter of right in plunder committed through malversati
on of public funds, but the aggregate amount or total value of ill-gotten wealth

amassed, accumulated or acquired must be at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,

000.00). In contrast, an accused who is alleged to have committed malversation o
f public funds thru falsification of official/public documents, which is not a c
apital offense, is no longer entitled to bail as a matter of right if the amount
exceeds P22,000.00, or as low as P22,000.0l. Such distinction is glaringly unfa
ir and could not have been contemplated by the law.

BP 22
ourt herein dismissed the instant case on the ground that the MeTC Jacked jurisd
iction over the offense charged, it did not decide the same on the merits, let a
lone resolve the issue of respondent's guilt or innocence based on the evidence
proffered by the prosecution.34 The appellate court merely dismissed the case on
the erroneous reasoning that none of the elements of BP 22 was committed withi
n the lower comi's jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidenc
e failed to show respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, therefore,
such dismissal did not operate as an acquittal, which, as previously discussed,
may be repudiated only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court showing a grave abuse of discretion. Thus, petitioner's resort to Rule
45 of the Rules of Court cannot be struck down as improper. In a petition for re
view on certiorari under Rule 45, the parties raise only questions of law becaus
e the Court, in its exercise of its power of review, is not a trier of facts. Th
ere is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of the pro
bative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants.35 In De
In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments
of the complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time o
f the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law fo
r the crime charged at the time of its commission.38 Thus, when a case involves
a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to the juris
diction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a quest
ion of Jaw that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.39 More impo
rtantly, moreover, since the dismissal of the instant case cannot be considered
as an acquittal of respondent herein, he cannot likewise claim that his constitu
tional right to protection against double jeopardy will be violated.

November 207041 People v. Arrojado

A murder case was dismissed by the trial courton the ground that the investigati
ng prosecutor who filed the said Infformation failed to indicate therein the num
ber and date of issue of her Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certififacaete
of Compliance , as required by Bar Matter No. 1922.
Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines pleadings as the wr
itten statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted
to the court for appropriate judgment. Among the pleadings enumerated under Sect
ion 2 thereof are the complaint and the answer in a civil suit. On the other han
d, under Section 4, Rule 110 of the same Rules, an information is defined as an
accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prose
cutor and filed with the court. In accordance with the above definitions, it is
clear that an information is a pleading since the allegations therein, which cha
rge a person with an offense, is basically the same as a complaint in a civil ac
tion which alleges a plaintiffs cause or cause of action. In this respect, the C
omi quotes with approval the ruling of the CA on the matter, to wit:
[A]n information is, for all intents and purposes, considered an initiatory plea
ding because it is a written statement that contains the cause of action of a pa

rty, which in criminal cases is the State as represented by the prosecutor, agai
nst the accused. Like a pleading, the Information is also filed in court for app
ropriate judgment. Undoubtedly then, an Information falls squarely within the am
bit of Bar Matter No. 1922, in relation to Bar Matter 850.
In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought abo
ut by a counsel's failure to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and dat
e of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance, this Court issued an En
Banc Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealin
g the phrase "Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismi
ssal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records" and repla
cing it with "Failure to disclose the required information would subject the cou
nsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action." Thus, under the amendatory
Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the num
ber and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longe
r result in the dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings from the r
ecords. Nonetheless, such failure will subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine
and/or disciplinary action.
199087 People v. Punzala, Nov 11, 2015
In assailing the validity of the search warrant, accused-appellants claim that t
he PDEA agents who applied for a search warrant failed to comply with the requir
ements for the procurement of a search warrant particularly the approval of the
PDEA Director General. Accused-appellants also contended that the court which is
sued the search warrant, the RTC of Manila, Branch 17 had no authority to issue
the search--warrant since the place where the search is supposed to be conducted
is outside its territorial jurisdiction. We are not persuaded. A.M. No. 03-8-02
-SC, entitled "Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges
and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties" as approved by the Court in
its Resolution of January 27, 2004, as amended, provides: SEC. 12. Issuance of s
earch warrants in special criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts of Manila
and Quezon City. -The Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official leave
of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judg
es of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applicat
ions filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine Nationa
l Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involv
ing heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunit
ions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff a
nd Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enact
ed by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court. The applications shall
be endorsed by the heads of such agencies or their respective dulv authorized o
fficials and shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/o
r the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The E
xecutive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if
justified, which may be served outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said
co mis. In the instant case, aside from their bare allegation, accused-appellan
ts failed to show that the application for search warrant of the subject premise
s was not approved by the PDEA Regional Director or his authorized representativ
e. On the contrary, the search warrant issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 17 sa
tisfactorily complies with the requirements for the issuance thereof as determin
ed by the issuing court, thus: Pursuant to Section 2, Article 3 of the 1987 Cons
titution, Sections 2 to 5, Rule 126 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, mod
ified by Section 12 of Supreme Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 03-08-02-SC
dated January 27, 2004, and Certification dated October 28, 2009, it appearing t
o the satisfaction of the undersigned after personally examining under oath Agen
t Liwanag B. Sandaan and Agent Derween Reed both of Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency Metro Manila Regional Office, that there is probable cause, there are goo
d and sufficient reasons, to believe that undetermined quantity of assorted dang

erous drugs, particularly shabu, including the proceeds or fruits and those used
or intended to be used by the respondents as a means of committing the offense,
you are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day or
night of the premises above described and forthwith seize and take possession of
the undetermined quantity of assorted dangerous drugs including the proceeds vi
fruits and bring said property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law d
irects. 19 Moreover, we find no merit in accused-appellants' claim that the RTC
of Manila, Branch 17, had no authority to issue the assailed search warrant sinc
e the place to be searched is outside its territorial jurisdiction. As aforecite
d, Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC clearly authorizes the Executive
Judges and the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTC of Manila and Quezon City to is
sue search warrants to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdictio
n in special criminal cases such as those involving heinous crimes, illegal gamb
ling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of th
e Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as in this case, for as long as the
parameters under the said section have been complied with.
People v. Posada 196502 2 September 2015
The search warrant was valid.
The Office of the Solicitor General correctly argued that any question
as to the validity of the search warrant was closed by the September 21,
2006 Resolution of the RTC, which the accused-appellants opted not to
question further. As mentioned by the CA, the judicial finding of probable
cause in issuing a search warrant should not be doubted when the judge
personally examines the applicant and/or witnesses and there is no basis to
doubt his reliability and competence in evaluating the evidence before him.4
With regard to the designation of the place to be searched, the RTC
sufficiently justified that the search warrant particularly described the place
to be searched: a sketch showing the location of the house to be searched
was attached to the application and the search warrant pointed to only one
house in the area.5
A long-standing rule is that a description of the place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertai
n
and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points
out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers
unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.6
Taking from
American Jurisprudence, [t]he determining factor as to whether a search
warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity is
not whether the description is sufficient to enable the officer to locate and
identify the premises with reasonable effort. 7

Homar v. People G.R. 182534

2 September 2015
The prosecution failed to prove that a lawful warrantless arrest preceded the se
arch conducted on the petitioner s body.
The Constitution guarantees the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation o
f these rights shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While th
e power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, the
exercise of this power and the implementation of the law should not violate the

constitutional rights of the citizens.20

To determine the admissibilit
y of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or n
ot the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.21 There must be a
valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless a
rrest, which must precede the search. For this purpose, the law requires that t
here be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made
the process cannot be
reversed.22
Section 5, Rule 11323 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Proce
dure provides the only occasions when a person may be lawfully arrested without
a warrant. In the present case, the respondent alleged that the petitioner s warr
antless arrest was due to his commission of jaywalking in flagrante delicto and
in the presence of Tan and Tangcoy.
To constitute a valid in flagrante
delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committi
ng, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the pr
esence of or within the view of the arresting officer.24
The prosecutio
n has the burden to prove the legality of the warrantless arrest from which the
corpus delicti of the crime - shabu- was obtained. For, without a valid warrant
less arrest, the alleged confiscation of the shaburesulting from a warrantless s
earch on the petitioner s body is surely a violation of his constitutional right a
gainst unlawful search and seizure. As a consequence, the alleged shabu shall be
inadmissible as evidence against him.
On this point, we find that asi
de from the bare testimony of Tan as quoted by the CA in its decision, the prose
cution did not proffer any other proof to establish that the requirements for a
valid in flagrante delicto arrest were complied with. Particularly, the prosecu
tion failed to prove that the petitioner was committing a crime.
The res
pondent failed to specifically identify the area where the petitioner allegedly
crossed. Thus, Tan merely stated that the petitioner crossed the street of Roxas
Boulevard, in a place not designated for crossing. Aside from this conclusion,
the respondent failed to prove that the portion of Roxas Boulevard where the pet
itioner crossed was indeed a no jaywalking area. The petitioner was also not char
ged of jaywalking. These are pieces of evidence that could have supported the c
onclusion that indeed the petitioner was committing a crime of jaywalking and th
erefore, the subsequent arrest and search on his person was valid. Unfortunatel
y, the prosecution failed to prove this in the present case.
We clar
ify, however, that the filing of a criminal charge is not a condition precedent
to prove a valid warrantless arrest. Even if there is a criminal charge against
an accused, the prosecution is not relieved from its burden to prove that there
was indeed a valid warrantless arrest preceding the warrantless search that pro
duced the corpus delicti of the crime.
Neither can the presumption of r
egularity in the performance of official duty save the prosecution s lack of evide
nce to prove the warrantless arrest and search. This presumption cannot overcom
e the presumption of innocence or constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable do
ubt. Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial
yet often disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This elementary princip
le accords every accused the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt; and the burden of proving the guilt of the accu
sed rests upon the prosecution.25It may not be amiss to point out also the contr
ary observation of the Court as regards the findings of the RTC when it held, ra
ther hastily, that in the process of accosting the petitioner for jaywalking, Ta
ngcoy recovered from his possession a knife and a small plastic sachet containin
g shabu.26The testimony of Tan, as quoted in the CA decision, and the findings o
f the RTC, cast doubt on whether Tan and Tangcoy intended to arrest the petition
er for jaywalking. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that
he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effect
ed by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person s volunta
ry submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the applicati
on of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a fo
rmal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention
on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an int
ent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that sub

mission is necessary.2
Clearly, no arrest preceded the search on the person of the petitioner. When Ta
n and Tangcoy allegedly saw the petitioner jaywalking, they did not arrest him b
ut accosted him and pointed to him the right place for crossing. In fact, accor
ding to the RTC, Tan and Tangcoy immediately accosted him and told him to cross [
at] the designated area. 29Tan and Tangcoy did not intend to bring the petitioner
under custody or to restrain his liberty. This lack of intent to arrest him was
bolstered by the fact that there was no criminal charge that was filed against
the petitioner for crossing a no jaywalking area.
The indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest was emphasized in Luz vs. People of the Philippines.
30 The Court held that the shabu confiscated from the accused in that case was i
nadmissible as evidence when the police officer who flagged him for traffic viol
ation had no intent to arrest him. According to the Court, due to the lack of in
tent to arrest, the subsequent search was unlawful. This is notwithstanding the
fact that the accused, being caught inflagrante delicto for violating an ordina
nce, could have been therefore lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending
officers. In the light of the discussion above, the respondent s argument that the
re was a lawful search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest for jaywalking ap
pears to be an afterthought in order to justify a warrantless search conducted o
n the person of the petitioner. In fact, the illegality of the search for the s
habu is further highlighted when it was not recovered immediately after the alle
ged lawful arrest, if there was any, but only after the initial search resulted
in the recovery of the knife. Thereafter, according to Tan, Tangcoy conducted a
nother search on the person of the petitioner resulting in the alleged confiscat
ion of the shabu. Clearly, the petitioner's right to be secure in his person was
callously brushed aside twice by the arresting police officers.

188794 Ogayon v. People 2 September 2015

The rulings in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,53People v. Court of Appeals,54 and
People v. Correa55 are without significance to the present case. As mentioned,
Malaloan v. Court of Appeals involved the question of where motions to quash sea
rch warrants should be filed, and the guidelines set therein was applied in Peop
le v. Court of Appeals. People v. Correa, on the other hand, involved a warrantl
ess search of a moving vehicle. We reiterate that the requirement to raise obje
ctions against search warrants during trial is a procedural rule established by
jurisprudence. Compliance or noncompliance with this requirement cannot in any
way diminish the constitutional guarantee that a search warrant should be issued
upon a finding of probable cause. Ogayon s failure to make a timely objection c
annot serve to cure the inherent defect of the warrant. To uphold the validity
of the void warrant would be to disregard one of the most fundamental rights gua
ranteed in our Constitution.
People v. Samson g.R. no. 214883
Let it be underscored that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open f
or review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreci
ate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.
People v. Villariez G.R. 211160
n the present case, the Information charged Villariez, together withhis brothers
, of inflicting upon Enrique a fatal gunshot wound in the bodycausing the latter s
instantaneous death. The commission of the specific acts charged against
Villariezconstitutes the offense charged in the Information. The prosecution s f
ailureto establish conspiracy due to the death of a co-conspirator and the dismi
ssalof the case against another co-conspirator does not defeat the conviction of

the accused for the offense charged and proven during the trial.
In US v. Vitug,9 the Information charged that the accused committedthe specific
acts therein attributed to him, and that he committed those actsin conspiracy
with his co-accused. We ruled that the commission of thespecific acts c
harged against the accused constituted the offense charged,and the failure t
o establish the conspiracy in no way prevented conviction ofthe accused for the
offense charged and proven
PDIC v. Hon. Casimiro, et al. 2 Sept 2015 G.R. No. 206866
In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigati
on proceedings
whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor
is geared only
to determine whether or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent
for trial for the supposed crime that he committed. In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr
.,22 the Court defined probable cause and the parameters in finding the existenc
e thereof in the following manner: Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a c
riminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engende
r a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is p
robably guilty thereof. The term does not mean actual or positive cause nor does i
t import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief
. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient ev
idence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable c
ause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In dete
rmining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without r
esorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technic
al knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been commit
ted, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for tria
l. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction.23 (Emphases and underscoring supplied) Verily, preliminary
investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not ther
e is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the pe
rson charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion an
d belief, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether
there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.24 [A preliminary investigati
on] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of [the prosecution s]
evidence. The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary i
n nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown t
rial on the merits. 25 Hence, the validity and merits of a party s defense or accusat
ion, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventil
ated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. 26Guided by
the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman gravely abused
its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint against private respondents
for lack of probable cause, as will be explained hereunder
In view of such grave accusations against them, Cu and Zate resorted to mere den
ials, while Apelo ignored the complaint by not filing a counter-affidavit despit
e due notice, thus, miserably failing to debunk the charges hurled against them.
Indubitably, the foregoing establishes probable cause to believe that private r
espondents may have indeed committed such acts constituting the crimes charged a
gainst them. As such, they must defend themselves in a full-blown trial on the m
erits.
Finally, it was error on the part of the Ombudsman to simply discredit Gomez s aff
idavit as inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay. It is noteworthy to point
out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the techn
ical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings.32

In the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman,33the Court declared that hearsay ev

idence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations
because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudica
te rights and obligations of parties. Citing a case decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States, it was held that probable cause can be established with h
earsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay
,
n this case, assuming arguendo that Gomez s statements, as written in her affidavi
t are indeed hearsay, there is nevertheless substantial basis to credit the same
, considering that she was a former Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of B
DBI a high-ranking officer that may be privy to delicate transactions such as th
e purported under-the-table deal involving private respondents. In this regard, it
must be emphasized that in determining the elements of the crime charged for pu
rposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to supp
ort a prima facie case against the respondents are required, not absolute certai
nty. Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on
more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction.
35 To reiterate, the validity of the merits of a party s defense or accusations as
well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidences are better ventilated du
ring the trial stage than in the preliminary stage. 36 In sum, the Court is conv
inced that there is probable cause to indict private respondents of the crimes c
harged against them. Hence, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion a
mounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ordered the dismissal of the
criminal complaint against private respondents.
People v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 160619 9 Sept 2015
nformation is to afford an accused his right to be informed of the nature and ca
use of the accusation against him. It is in pursuit of this purpose that the Rul
es of Court require that the Information allege the ultimate facts constituting
the elements of the crime charged. Details that do not go into the core of the c
rime need not be included in the Information, but may be presented during trial.
The rule that evidence must be presented to establish the ex.istence of the ele
ments of a crime to the point of moral certainty is only for purposes of convict
ion. It finds no application in the determination of whether or not an Informati
on is sufficient to warrant the trial of an accused. Designated as additional Me
mbers
The main purpose of an Information is to ensure that an accused is formally info
rmed of the facts and the acts constituting the offense charged. 16 Where insuff
icient, an accused in a criminal case can file a motion to have the Information
against him quashed and/or dismissed before he enters his plea. 17 A motion to q
uash challenges the efficacy of an Information 18 and compels the court to deter
mine whether the Information suffices to require an accused to endure the rigors
of a trial. Where the Information is insufficient and thus cannot be the basis
of any valid conviction, the court must drop the case immediately and save an ac
cused from the anxiety and convenience of a useless trial.
A motion to quash an Information on the ground that the facts charged do not con
stitute an offense should be resolved on the basis of the allegations in the Inf
ormation whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. 20 The question t
hat must be answered is whether such allegations are sufficient to establish the
elements of the crime charged without considering matters aliunde.21 In proceed
ing to resolve this issue, courts must look into three matters: (1) what must be
alleged in a valid Information; (2) what the elements of the crime charged are;
and (3) whether these elements are sufficiently stated in the Information.
A motion to quash an Information on the ground that the facts charged do not con
stitute an offense should be resolved on the basis of the allegations in the Inf

ormation whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. 20 The question t
hat must be answered is whether such allegations are sufficient to establish the
elements of the crime charged without considering matters aliunde.21 In proceed
ing to resolve this issue, courts must look into three matters: (1) what must be
alleged in a valid Information; (2) what the elements of the crime charged are;
and (3) whether these elements are sufficiently stated in the Information.
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information
is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offen
se given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission
of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. When an offense
is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the compl
aint or information. xxx Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. -The acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating ci
rcumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily
in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person o
f common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qual
ifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
This Court, in Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan, 22 explained the two important purposes
underlying the rule. First, it enables the accused to suitably prepare his defe
nse.23 Second, it allows the accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction i
n a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.24 Thus, this Court held that th
e true test in ascertaining the validity and sufficiency of an Information is "w
hether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as t
o apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged."
For as long as the ultimate facts constituting the offense have been alleged, an
Information charging a violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 need not state,
to the point of specificity, the exact amount of unwarranted benefit granted no
r specify, quantify or prove, to the point of moral certainty, the undue injury
caused. We have consistently and repeatedly held in a number of cases that an In
formation need only state the ultimate facts constituting the offense and not th
e finer details of why and how the crime .
d 29 was comm1tte . As alleged in
the Information, the unwarranted benefit was the privilege granted by Castillo t
o the Arciagas to operate the dumpsite without the need to comply with the appli
cable laws, rules, and regulations; the undue injury being residents and student
s were made to endure the ill-effects of the illegal operation. The details requ
ired by the Sandiganbayan (such as the specific peso amount actually received by
the Arciagas as a consequence of the illegal operation of the subject dumpsite
or the specific extent of damage caused to the residents and students) are matte
rs of evidence best raised during the trial; they need not be stated in the Info
rmation. For purposes of informing the accused of the crime charged, the allegat
ion on the existence of unwarranted benefits and undue injury under the Informat
ion suffices. Moreover, the rationale for the ultimate facts requirement becomes
clearer when one considers the period when a motion to quash is filed, that is,
before the accused's arraignment and the parties' presentation of their evidenc
e. It would be illogical, if not procedurally infirm, to require specific peso a
mount allegations of the unwarranted benefit and proof of undue injury -to the p
oint of moral certainty, no less -at this stage of the criminal proceedings.
Indeed, this Court held in Llorente that the "undue injury must be specified, qu
antified and proven to the point of moral certainty."30 The validity and suffici
ency of the Information, however, was not an issue in Llorente. The import of th
e ruling therein is that proof of undue injury must be established by the prosec
ution during the trial and not when the Information is filed. Nowhere in Llorent
e did we require that undue injury be specified, quantified and proved to the po
int of moral certainty at the time of the filing of the Information. Such an int
erpretation would effectively require the prosecution to include all the relevan
t evidence in the Information and to present such evidence of undue injury even

prior to arraignment. Moreover, under the Sandiganbayan 's interpretation of Llo

rente, the accused would be required to face (and even rebut) the evidence as so
on as the Information is filed and even before he pleads. This runs counter to t
he function of a motion to quash as a remedy afforded an accused before he proce
eds to trial.
Outright quashal of the Information not proper Even assuming for the sake of arg
ument that the Information was defective on the ground that the facts charged th
erein do not constitute an offense, outright quashal of the Information is not t
he proper course of action. Section 4, Rule 11 7 of the Rules of Court gives cle
ar guidance on this matter. It provides -30 Sec. 4. Amendment of complaint or in
formation. -If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complain
t or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an
amendment be made. If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not co
nstitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity
to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecuti
on fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers fr
om the same defect despite the amendment. (Emphasis supplied.) When a motion to
quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and
the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and o
rder the prosecution to file an amended Information. 31 Generally, a defect pert
aining to the failure of an Information to charge facts constituting an offense
is one that may be corrected by an amendment. 32 In such instances, courts are m
andated not to automatically quash the Information; rather, it should grant the
prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an amendment. 33 This rul
e allows a case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cur
ed by simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which o
nly result to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided. More than this practical
consideration, however, is the due process underpinnings of this rule. As explai
ned by this Court in People v. Andrade,34 the State, just like any other litigan
t, is entitled to its day in court. Thus, a court's refusal to grant the prosecu
tion the opportunity to amend an Information, where such right is expressly gran
ted under the Rules of Court and affirmed time and again in a string of Supreme
Court decisions, effectively curtails the State's right to due process. Hence, e
ven assuming that the Information was defective, the Sandiganbayan should have f
irst ordered its amendment and not its quashal. Doing so would have saved the pa
rties from resorting to an appeal to this Court and this case from remaining in
the docket of the Sandiganbayan for a long period.
People v. Buca G.R. No 209587, 23 September 2015
Accused-appellant argues that the statement in the Information17 that the rape o
ccurred sometime before December 24, 2002 despite the fact that the prosecution
established that the crime was committed on December 24, 2002 violates Section 1
1,18 Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, on the req
uirement of stating the date of the commission of the offense and the right of t
he accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
We do not agree. The Court has already addressed this issue in People v. Lizada,
19 to wit:
The Court does not agree with accused-appellant. It bears
stressing that the precise date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an
essential element of the crime. Failure to specify the exact date when the ra
pe was committed does not render the Information defective. The reason for thi
s is that the gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of the private c
omplainant under any of th circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Rev
ised Penal Code, as amended. x x x Moreover, in People vs. Salalima,20 this Cou
rt held that:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the ra
pes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. T
he reason is obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was raped is not
an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal kn

owledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revis
ed Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any
time as near to the actual date when the offense was committed an information is
sufficient.
In previous cases, we ruled that allegations that rapes were com
mitted before and until October 15, 1994,
sometime in the year 1991 and the days th
ereafter, sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent the
reto and on or about and sometime in the year 1988 constitute sufficient compliance
with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. (Emphasis
supplied) Notably, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Proced
ure, as amended, states that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or in
formation the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a materia
l ingredient of the offense. Such requirement is not applicable to the crime of
rape where the date of the commission of the offense is not an essential elemen
t. Also, said Section 11 expressly permits that a crime may be alleged to have
been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commissio
n. The information charging accused-appellant of rape sometime before December
24, 2002 when the crime was committed exactly on December 24, 2002 is sufficient
ly compliant with said Section 11. In addition, as correctly pointed out by th
e CA, the Information is valid as under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, an information is deemed sufficient if it states th
e name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the off
ended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the plac
e where the offense was committed.21The Court has also discussed the essence of
the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation ag
ainst him in Andaya v. People,22 to wit:It is fundamental that every element con
stituting the offense must be alleged in the information. The main purpose of re
quiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to e
nable the accused to suitably prepare his defense because he is resumed to have
no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. x x x (Emphas
is supplied) It is evident in this case that accused-appellant was able to testi
fy about the incident on December 24, 200223 because the date alleged was not va
gue or covering an unreasonable period as to deprive him the opportunity to prep
are his defense which is the essence of the right allegedly violated. It is wo
rthy to note that the records are bereft of any objection by the accused-appella
nt about the date of the commission of the crime at the time of arraignment,24 d
uring the formal offer of exhibits25 and at the time the prosecution put AAA on
the witness stand26 to establish the rape committed on December 24, 2002. In P
eople v. Gianan,27the Court held that an accused-appellant s failure to raise a ti
mely objection that the time difference alleged in the information covered a bro
ad period constitutes a waiver of his right to object. We further observe that
accused-appellant did not even disavow knowledge of the incident on that date bu
t, in fact, admitted that he spoke with AAA at their house on December 24, 20022
8 and even entered AAA s house.29 The testimony of accused-appellant leads us to
conclude that the allegation was sufficient to inform him of the date the crime
charged occurred which enabled him to prepare his defense. Thus, we find the al
legations in the Information and the subsequent conviction of accused-appellant
by the lower courts valid and lawful under the circumstances.