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2010AMERICANBARASSOCIATIONSYDNEYCONFERENCE

MOOTCOURTCOMPETITION

CUTHBERTSTERLING
V.
LETTERM.DAVIDMAN

UNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURTFORTHESOUTHERNDISTRICTOFNEWYORK

BENCHMEMORANDUM

PREPAREDFOR:
THEHONORABLEANTONINSCALIA

BY:
DAVIDN.CINOTTI
EMILYJONES
ERNESTOSANCHEZ

AMERICANBARASSOCIATION,INTERNATIONALLAWSECTION
INTERNATIONALLITIGATIONCOMMITTEE

TABLEOFCONTENTS

PART1:GENERALINFORMATION ................................................................................................................................. 1
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................................. 1
STATEMENTOFFACTS.................................................................................................................................................... 1
PART2:LEGALANALYSIS .................................................................................................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION .......................................................................................................................................................................... 3
I.

LEGALBACKGROUND.................................................................................................................................... 3

A.

Motiontodismissforfailuretostateaclaimforwhichreliefcanbegranted . 3

B.

Summaryjudgment.................................................................................................................... 3

C.

Recognitionandenforcementofforeignmoneyjudgments .................................... 4

II.

SHOULDTHISCOURTREFUSERECOGNITIONONTHEBASISTHATTHENEWSOUTH
WALESCOURTLACKEDPERSONALJURISDICTIONOVERDAVIDMAN?................................. 6

A.

IsthetagjurisdictionobtainedthroughpersonalserviceonDavidmanat
theSydneyairportsufficientgroundsforrecognitionandenforcementofthe
AustralianjudgmentunderU.S.law? ................................................................................. 6

B.

WasDavidmantrickedintoattendingthemediationinAustralia,invokingan
exceptiontotagjurisdiction? ............................................................................................. 8

III.

SHOULDTHISCOURTREFUSERECOGNITIONBECAUSETHENEWSOUTHWALES
JUDGEMENTVIOLATESTHEFIRSTAMENDMENTANDTHUSNEWYORKPUBLIC
POLICY?................................................................................................................................................................ 9

A.

MandatoryprotectionsundertheFirstAmendment ............................................... 10

B.

AustraliancomponentoftheNewSouthWalesjudgment .................................... 13

C.

U.S.componentoftheNewSouthWalesjudgment .................................................. 16

IV.

SHOULDTHISCOURTREFUSERECOGNITIONBECAUSETHENEWSOUTHWALES
PROCEEDINGSWERESERIOUSLYINCONVENIENTFORDAVIDMAN? ..................................17

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................................................19
PART3:APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................................................ 1

TABLEOFCONTENTS

PART1:GENERALINFORMATION

INTRODUCTION

Thismemorandumdiscussesthefacts,law,andpartieslikelyargumentsinthecase
ofCuthbertSterlingv.LetterM.Davidman.PlaintiffCuthbertSterlingsuedandobtaineda
moneyjudgmentagainstDefendantLetterM.DavidmaninAustraliafordefamation.Now
SterlingseekstohavethisjudgmentrecognizedandenforcedintheUnitedStates.

STATEMENTOFFACTS

CuthbertSterlingisawellknown,NewYorkbasedmediabaronwithglobalmedia
interests. Sterling, who was born in Australia, renounced his Australian citizenship in
1986. He was naturalized as a U.S. citizen and currently maintains his domicile in
Connecticut.DavidmanisaU.S.citizenandisdomiciledinNewYork.Priortotheevents
leadinguptothisdispute,DavidmanhadneverlefttheislandofManhattan.

Davidman,aformerhighprofilepresenterontheSterlingnetwork,isnowthehost
of a current affairs program on a rival U.S. television network. Davidman has made no
secretofhisdislikeforSterlingfollowingDavidmansdismissalfromtheSterlingnetwork
and a subsequent expos in the Sterling press about Davidmans complex personal life.
DavidmansregularU.S.audienceexceeds10millionviewerspershow.Althoughhisshow
isnotbroadcastbyanynetworkinAustralia,hehasasmallfollowinginAustraliaamonga
group of fans who download podcasts from the Davidman website an average of 1,268
timesperepisode.

In 2007, Davidman presented a biographical portrait of Sterling on his program,


describing Sterling as obsessive, indifferent to the truth of media reports, focused
exclusivelyoncirculation,tendingtomegalomaniainbothhisbusinessandprivatelife,and
actively interfering in editorial policy for personal political purposes. On September 11,
2007,SterlingsuedDavidmanintheSupremeCourtofNewSouthWales,claimingdamages
fordefamationinbothAustraliaandtheUnitedStates.

Sterling served process on Davidman in the United States. Davidman retained


Australian counsel, who advised him that he could challenge the jurisdiction of the New
SouthWalescourtand/orseektostaytheproceedingswithoutenteringanappearanceor
submitting to jurisdiction. His attorneys also advised him, however, that the practice of
Judge Wisecrack, the New South Wales judge assigned to the case, was to insist that the
partiespersonallyattendamediationinSydneybeforetheretiredHon.RogerJ.Andrews,
QC, before any jurisdictional challenge would be heard. On the advice of his attorneys
and with great reluctance Davidman flew to Australia for the mediation, which ended
unsuccessfully in a shouting match between Davidman and Sterling. Davidman stormed
out,butwaspersonallyservedwithSterlingsStatementofClaimintheNewSouthWales
proceedingswhilewaitingtoboardaflightbacktotheUnitedStates.

BENCHMEMORANDUM

Davidman moved to dismiss the New South Wales action based on lack of subject
matterandpersonaljurisdiction.Inthealternative,hemovedtostaytheactionbecause
NewSouthWaleswasaninconvenientforumforthesuit.TherulesoftheSupremeCourt
ofNewSouthWalesauthorizeserviceofprocessonadefendantoutsideAustraliawhen:

(1) theproceedingsarefoundedonacauseofactionarisinginNewSouth
Wales;

(2) theproceedingsarefoundedonatortcommittedinNewSouthWales;
or

(3) the proceedings are wholly or partly founded on, or are for the
recovery of damages in respect of, damage suffered in New South
Walescausedbyatortiousactoromissionwhereveritoccurred.

DavidmansmotionwasremovedtotheHighCourtofAustralia,whichdeniedthemotion
afterargument.ThecasethenproceededtotrialbeforeJudgeWisecrack.

Davidmanfailedtoappearatthetrial,whichwasconductedinhisabsence.Judge
Wisecrack applied U.S. defamation law to Sterlings claim that he suffered harm to his
reputation in the United States (although the record is unclear whether Judge Wisecrack
applied the law of a particular State) and Australian defamation law to the claim that
SterlingsufferedharminAustralia.JudgeWisecrackreceivedevidenceofU.S.lawrelating
to defamation and concluded that Sterling was not required to show that Davidmans
statements about Sterling were motivated by malice. In any event, Judge Wisecrack
concludedthatDavidmanwasnotmotivatedbymalice,accordingtoanAustralianlawyers
understanding of that concept. He did not receive any evidence as to the definition of
maliceunderU.S.federalorstatelaw.ThetrialresultedinaverdictinfavorofSterlingfor
$5million,with$200,000ofthedamagesattributedtoharmthatSterlingsufferedinNew
South Wales. Despite his failure to appear at trial, Davidman had the right to appeal the
judgment,butdidnotdoso.

On the basis of diversity of citizenship, Sterling now seeks to have the New South
Wales judgment recognized and enforced in this Court. Davidman has moved to dismiss
Sterlings complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted or,
alternatively,forsummaryjudgmentinregardtothejudgmentsenforceabilitypursuantto
Rules 12(b)(6) and 56(c) of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure respectively. In
response, Sterling has crossmoved for summary judgment in his own favor on the
enforceabilityissue,alsoonthebasisofRule56(c).

BENCHMEMORANDUM

PAGE2

PART2:LEGALANALYSIS

DISCUSSION

Davidmanwilllikelybasehismotionstodismissorforsummaryjudgmentonthe
grounds that: (1) the New South Wales court lacked personal jurisdiction over him; (2)
enforcing the judgment would violate the First Amendment and, therefore, New York
publicpolicy;and(3)theNewSouthWalesproceedingwasaseriouslyinconvenientforum
forhim.Sterling,ontheotherhand,shouldrespondthatthesedefectsdonotexistinthis
matter,therebyjustifyingentryofajudgmentagainstDavidmanbasedontheoutcomeof
theNewSouthWalesproceedings.1Thislegalanalysis,then,isdividedintofoursections.
The first section outlines the general law governing this action the standards for
reviewingDavidmansmotionsandwhetherU.S.courtscanrecognizeandenforceforeign
moneyjudgments.ThenextthreesectionswillrespectivelydiscusstheargumentsSterling
and Davidman should raise in regard to each of the substantive issues underlying the
motionsbeforetheCourt.

I.
LEGALBACKGROUND

A.
Motiontodismissforfailuretostateaclaimforwhichreliefcanbe
granted

On a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court
acceptsastrueallfactualallegationsinthecomplaintanddrawsallreasonableinferences
intheplaintiff'sfavor.2Thecomplaint'sallegations,however,mustbeenoughtoraisea
right of relief above the speculative level.3 Only a plausible claim for relief survives a
motion to dismiss.4 Thus courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation, and [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action,supportedbymereconclusorystatements,donotsuffice.5

B.
Summaryjudgment

Davidman alternatively seeks summary judgment holding that this Court can
enforcetheNewSouthWalesjudgment.Sterlingseekssummaryjudgmentholdingjustthe
opposite. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment should be
renderedifthepleadings,thediscoveryanddisclosurematerialsonfile,andanyaffidavits
showthatthereisnogenuineissueastoanymaterialfactandthatthemovantisentitledto
judgment as a matter of law.6 The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of
summaryjudgment...againstapartywhofailstomakeashowingsufficienttoestablish

1 The parties have agreed that the upcoming oral argument will only concern the issue of whether the
AustralianjudgmentisenforceableandnotthematterofhowmuchSterlingcouldcollectinU.S.currency.
2InreDDAVPDirectPurchaserAntitrustLitig.,585F.3d677,692(2dCir.2009).
3BellAtl.Corp.v.Twombly,550U.S.544(2007).
4LaFarov.N.Y.CardiothoracicGroup,PLLC,570F.3d471,476(2dCir.2009).
5Ashcroftv.Iqbal,129S.Ct.1937,194950(2009)(internalquotationmarksomitted).
6Fed.R.Civ.P.56(c).

BENCHMEMORANDUM

PAGE3

theexistenceofanelementessentialtothatparty'scase,andonwhichthatpartywillbear
the burden of proof at trial.7 A party moving for summary judgment may discharge its
burdenbyshowingthatis,pointingouttothedistrictcourtthatthereisanabsenceof
evidencetosupportthenonmovingparty'scase.8

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) requires that a party opposing summary
judgment may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its
responsemustbyaffidavitsorasotherwiseprovidedinthis rulesetoutspecificfacts
showingagenuineissuefortrial.9[S]peculationaloneisinsufficienttodefeatamotion
for summary judgment.10 The law is well established that conclusory statements,
conjecture,orspeculationareinadequatetodefeatamotionforsummaryjudgment.11

C.
Recognitionandenforcementofforeignmoneyjudgments

The underlying case law principle governing the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments is that of comity, first defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1895 as
neitheramatterofabsoluteobligationnorofmerecourtesyandgoodwill.12Comityis
therecognitionwhichonenationallowswithinitsterritorytothelegislative,executiveor
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, andto the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the
protectionofitslaws.13Ifaforeignforumprovidesafullandfairtrialbeforeacourtof
competentjurisdiction,underasystemofproceduralfairnessakintothoseofU.S.courts,
and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court or fraud in procuring the
judgment,themeritsofthecaseshouldnot,inanactionbroughtinthiscountryuponthe
judgment,betriedafresh...uponthemereassertionof[a] partythatthejudgmentwas
erroneousinlaworfact.14

Theseprincipleshavenotbeencodifiedinanyfederallaworreflectedinanytreaty
towhichtheUnitedStatesisaparty.Butmoststates,NewYorkincluded,haveaccordingly
adoptedsomeversionoftheUniformForeignCountryMoneyJudgmentsRecognitionAct
(Recognition Act) to govern the recognition and enforcement of foreign money
judgments.15Asthisisadiversityaction,NewYorksRecognitionActandsurroundingcase
lawareconsequentlythemainpointsofreferencehere.16

7CelotexCorp.v.Catrett,477U.S.317,321(1986).
8Id.at325.

9Fed.R.Civ.P.56(e).

10McPhersonv.N.Y.CityDep'tofEduc.,457F.3d211,215n.4(2dCir.2006).
11Woodmanv.WWORTV,Inc.,411F.3d69,85(2dCir.2005).
12Hiltonv.Guyot,159U.S.113,16364(1895).
13Id.at164.

14Id,at20203.

15N.Y.C.P.L.R.53015309(2007).AlthoughNewYorksubstantiallyamendedtheRecognitionActin2008,

the parties agree thatthe 2008 amendments do not apply tothiscase. All citations tothe Recognition Act
refertothe2007versionofthestatute.
16TherelevantstatutoryprovisionsaresetoutintheappendixtothisBenchMemorandum,andarequoted
asnecessary.
BENCHMEMORANDUM

PAGE4

The Recognition Act applies to any foreign country judgment which is final,
conclusive, and enforceable where rendered even though an appeal therefrom is
pending.17Defaultjudgmentsareconsideredconclusive.18TheRecognitionActprovides
onlytwoinstanceswhereaforeigncountryjudgmentisdeemednottobeconclusive,and
nonrecognitionismandatory.19Theseinstancesconsistofwhenajudgmentisrenderedin
a system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due
processoflaworwhenaforeigncourtlackspersonaljurisdictionoveradefendant.20The
partyassertingconclusivenessmustestablishprimafacie:(1)afinaljudgment,conclusive
andenforceablewhererendered; (2)subjectmatterjurisdiction;(3)jurisdictionoverthe
parties or the res; and (4) regular proceedings conducted under a system that provides
impartial tribunals and procedures compatible with due process.21 In other words, the
partyseekingtoenforceaforeignjudgment,namelySterling,bearstheburdenofproving
thatnomandatorybasisfornonrecognitionexists.22

New York case law has dictated that occasions reflecting procedural unfairness or
lackofdueprocessarerare,especiallywhentheforeignforumis,likeAustralia,asister
commonlawjurisdictionwithproceduresakintoourown.23Andmeredivergencefrom
Americanproceduredoesnotrenderaforeignjudgmentunenforceable.24Anyarguments
totheoppositeeffectonDavidmanspart,then,wouldbearlittlechanceofsuccess.

All other grounds for nonrecognition are discretionary.25 They are: (1) a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on the foreign courts part; (2) foreign proceedings where a
defendantdidnotreceivenoticeoftheproceedingsintimetoprepareasufficientdefense;
(3) procurement of a judgment through fraud; (4) where a cause of action underlying a
judgment is repugnant to New York public policy; (5) a judgment that conflicts with
anotherfinalandconclusivejudgment;(6)foreignproceedings contrarytoanagreement
between the parties to settle a given dispute in another manner; and (7) forum non
conveniens.26 As further explained below, this case only appears to raise the matter of
public policy, on account of the First Amendment implications in any action related to a
defamation claim, and forum non conveniens. New York courts have held that a party
opposing a judgments recognition and enforcement bears the burden of proving that a

17C.P.L.R.5302.

18 See Watary Servs. v. Law Kin Wah, 668 N.Y.S.2d 458 (App. Div. 1st Dept 1998) (holding that a default

judgmentshouldberecognizedunlessoneoftheexceptionsintheRecognitionActapplies).
19C.P.L.R.5304(a)(2007);seealsoid.5303.
20Id.
21Ackermannv.Levine,788F.2d830,842n.12(2dCir.1986).
22SeeWattsv.SwissBankCorp.,27N.Y.2d270,275(1970).
23 Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 630 (2d Cir. 1976) (addressing the enforceability of a Canadian
judgment);seealsoCIBCMellonTrustCo.v.MoraHotelCorp.N.V.,100N.Y.2d215,22122(2003)(notingthat
the overall fairness of the English legal system is beyond dispute); Blacklink Transport Consultants Pty.
Ltd. v. Von Summer, No. 105638/07, 2008 WL 89958, at *23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9, 2008) (recognizing an
Australianjudgment,specificallyonefromtheSupremeCourtofNewSouthWales).
24SeeAckermann,788F.2dat842.
25 C.P.L.R. 5304(b) (stating that a foreign country judgment need not be recognized on the specified
grounds).
26Seeid.
BENCHMEMORANDUM

PAGE5

discretionary basis for nonrecognition applies.27 The high standards described here,
however, are not insurmountable for the party opposing recognition and enforcement,
especially if the judgment was sufficiently offensive (i.e., more than just a variance with
localpublicpolicyandevenifthejudgmentwasrenderedinacommonlawjurisdiction).28

II.
SHOULD THIS COURT REFUSE RECOGNITION ON THE BASIS THAT THE NEW
SOUTHWALESCOURTLACKEDPERSONALJURISDICTIONOVERDAVIDMAN?

Becauseaforeigncourtslackofpersonaljurisdictionisoneofthegrounds(andthe
only applicable one here) upon which the foreign money judgment is not conclusive
between the parties29, it presents the strongest defense, if proven, for Davidman against
enforcementoftheAustraliancourtsjudgment.

Although personal jurisdiction for purposes of recognition and enforcement of


foreignmoneyjudgmentsintheUnitedStateshasbeenaddressedbyU.S.courts,30thefacts
of this moot problem are different from those cases in that both parties here are U.S.
citizens. Thus, no question exists as to whether a U.S. court has jurisdiction over one or
bothpartiesforpurposesofrecognizingandenforcingthejudgmentintheUnitedStates.31
In that regard, no minimum contacts analysis is required. A sophisticated argument
likely will not discuss the personal jurisdiction over the parties in the recognition
proceeding,otherthantoidentifyitasanonissueortobrieflydistinguishthefactsofthis
case from those cases. The real issue here is whether the Australia court had personal
jurisdictionoverDavidmansufficienttorenderajudgmentagainsthim.

A.
IsthetagjurisdictionobtainedthroughpersonalserviceonDavidman
at the Sydney airport sufficient grounds for recognition and
enforcementoftheAustralianjudgmentunderU.S.law?

Althoughlackofpersonaljurisdictionisadefensetorecognitionofaforeignmoney
judgment,theRecognitionActspecificallyprovidesthataforeigncountryjudgmentshall
notberefusedrecognitionforlackofpersonaljurisdictionifthedefendantwaspersonally

27SeeDresdnerBankAGv.Haque,161F.Supp.2d259,26263(S.D.N.Y.2001).NewYorkfederalcourtshave

not been as definitive as New York state courts as to whether the burden of proving a judgment can be
enforced. Compare Watts, 25 N.Y.2d at 275 with Dresdner, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 263 (Although the [Second
Circuithasnotspecified]howtheseburdensapplywithrespecttoArticle53oftheCPLR,itwouldappear
thattheplaintiffseekingenforcementoftheforeignjudgmentbearstheburdenofprovingthatnomandatory
basisfornonrecognitionpursuanttoCPLR5304(a)exists,andthatthedefendantopposingenforcement
has the burden of proving that a discretionary basis for nonrecognition pursuant to CPLR 5304(b)
applies.)(citationsomitted).
28 See Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F.Supp.1, 36 (D.D.C. 1995) (refusing to enforce a British libel judgment
thatwasfoundtodepriveonesFirstAmendmentrights);Abdullahv.SheridanSquarePress,Inc.,No.93Civ
2515,1994WL419847,at*1(S.D.N.Y.May4,1994).
29C.P.L.R.5304(a).
30See,e.g.Yahoo!Inc.v.LaLigueContreleRacisme,433F.3d1199(9thCir.2006)(enbanc);Ehrenfeldv.Bin
Mahfouz,518F.3d102(2dCir.2008).
31ButseeYahoo!,433F.3d1199;Ehrenfeld.518F.3d102.
BENCHMEMORANDUM

PAGE6

servedintheforeignstate.32UnderNewYorklaw,Sterlinglikelybearstheinitialburdenof
establishing a prima facie case that the New South Wales court had personal jurisdiction
over Davidman.33 Once Sterling meets that burden, Davidman then bears the burden of
rebuttingthatshowing.34

Sterling should argue that the plain language of the statute suggests that the
AustraliacourthadjurisdictionoverDavidmanthroughthepersonalserviceonhimatthe
Sydney airport. Sterling may also cite federal case law to support his position.35 This
discussion should point out that not only has the U.S. Supreme Court held that personal
service alone confers personal jurisdiction, where service is made within the territorial
boundaries, but also that personal service upon an individual physically present within
those boundaries alone comports with due process.36 Therefore, Sterling should argue,
personalserviceonDavidmanattheSydneyairportwasconsistentwiththerequirements
of due process under the Constitution of the United States, as well as the State of New
York.37 Counsel should note that this is also consistent with proposed federal legislation
regardingtherecognitionofforeignjudgments,mandatingthatpersonaljurisdictionover
thedefendantcomportwiththedueprocessrequirementsimposedondomesticcourtsby
theConstitutionoftheUnitedStates.38

Sterlingshouldalsodiscusstherecentconsolidatedcasesopinionhandeddownby
the U.S. District Court for the District of ABA.39 The Court acknowledged the plaintiffs
argument that no basis existed for attacking the foreign courts jurisdiction over the
defendant because, although the defendant did not appear in the foreign court for the
proceedings, she was personally served within the foreign country, thus meeting the
jurisdictional requirements ofanABA statute identicalto the RecognitionAct.40 Without
analysis, the Court held: there is no question that the [foreign] court had personal
jurisdictionoverthedefendant.41

Because of the plain language of the statute, Davidmans best argument is that an
exceptiontothisruleexiststhatissufficienttochallengetheAustraliancourtsjurisdiction
over him under C.P.L.R. 5304(a)(2). Davidman may also raise the assertion that, even
though he was physically present in Australia and personally served there, such service
does not comport with U.S. notions of due process because there was not a sufficient

32C.P.L.R.5305(a)(1).

33SeeCIBCMellonTrustCo.v.MoraHotelCorp.,296A.D.2d81(App.Div.1stDept2002).
34Id.

35Burnhamv.SuperiorCt.,495U.S.604(1990).
36 Id. at 619 (using due process standard of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice and
recognizingthatsuchastandardwasdevelopedbyanalogytophysicalpresence,anditwouldbeperverse
tosayitcouldnowbeturnedagainstthattouchstoneofjurisdiction).
37SeeHilton,159U.S.at16364.
38H.R.2765,111thCongress,1stSess.,June9,2009.
39InreConsol.Actions,DocketNo.09CV0001(2010).
40Id.at4.
41Id.at7.

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PAGE7

connectionbetweenthedefendantandtheforumstateastomakeitfairtorequiredefense
oftheactionintheforum.42

The parties will likely address the hypothetical issue of whether, if personal
jurisdiction was not obtained by personal service, other bases of jurisdiction43 existed.
SterlingshouldcontendthattheNewSouthWalescourtsexerciseofpersonaljurisdiction
overDavidmanwasproperifanybasisforjurisdictionunderNewYorklawwouldapply.44
The parties may also discuss whether Davidman had sufficient minimum contacts with
Australiatoconferjurisdiction.45SterlingshouldfocusonthefactthatDavidmansshows
wereavailablebypodcastinAustraliathroughDavidmanswebsite.EachDavidmanshow
is downloaded by Australian fans in Australia an average of 1,268 times per episode.
Davidman should focus on the fact that his show is not broadcast by any network in
Australia, and Davidman had never traveled to Australia prior to the mediation of the
dispute.ThefactsaresilentastowhetherDavidmansshowwaspromotedoradvertised
inAustralia,whetherDavidmanownedanyassetsinAustralia,orwhetheranyotherbasis
sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts test exists. Both parties should discuss
whether Davidmans contacts with Australia were purposeful and whether he availed
himselfoftheprivilegeofconductingbusinessthere.46

B.
Was Davidman tricked into attending the mediation in Australia,
invokinganexceptiontotagjurisdiction?

The question for Davidman then becomes whether any exceptions to tag
jurisdictionservetobarrecognitionandenforcementofthejudgmentunderthepersonal
jurisdiction exception to recognition. The perceived harshness of the transitory
jurisdictionrulehasbeenmitigatedsomewhatbyjudiciallyfashionedexceptions.47One
such exception is when the defendants presence was procured by the plaintiffs fraud or
force.48Itisgenerallyrecognizedthatwhereadefendantisenticedintothejurisdictionof
the court through fraud or trickery on the part of the plaintiff or someone acting in his
behalf,inorderthatpersonalserviceofprocessuponthedefendantmaybeobtained,the
servicewillbesetasideuponproperapplication.49

Davidman will likely argue that he was tricked into attending the mediation in
AustraliasothatSterlingcouldpersonallyservehimthere.HeshoulddiscussU.S.federal
caselawwhichrecognizesanexceptiontopersonaljurisdictionforpersonswhoenterthe

42Kulkov.SuperiorCt.,436U.S.84,9192(1978).
43C.P.L.R5305(b).
44Id.

45IntlShoeCo.v.Washington,326U.S.310(1945).
46Seeid.

47GaryB.Born,InternationalCivilLitigationinUnitedStatesCourts123(3ded.1996).
48SeeAnnotation,AttackonPersonalServiceasHavingBeenObtainedbyFraudorTrickery,98A.L.R.2d551

(1964).
49Id.

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forumforthepurposeofnegotiatingasettlement.50Davidmanwilllikelyarguethatthis
exceptionshouldapplytohimbecausehehadneverlefttheislandofManhattanpriorto
themediation,andwouldnothavetraveledtoAustraliabutforthemediation.Moreover,
hereceivednoassurancesfromSterlingthathewouldnotsubjecthimselftotheNewSouth
Walescourtspersonaljurisdictionoverhim.51Furthermore,Davidmanmayarguethathe
lefthishomeandcountryinordertomakeagoodfaitheffort atsettlingthedispute,and
solely for that purpose, and therefore should not have been subjected to the personal
jurisdictionoftheNewSouthWalescourt.

SterlingshouldarguethatthisexceptiondoesnotapplybecauseDavidmanwasnot
enticed to Australia by Sterling or anyone acting on Sterlings behalf. Davidman had
retained Australian counsel and was independently represented. The mediation was
requiredbeforeJudgeWisecrackwouldconsiderDavidmansjurisdictionalchallenge,and
therefore Sterling did not lure Davidman to Australia under the auspices of a settlement
discussion.52Rather,[o]ntheadviceofhisattorneysandwithgreatreluctance,Davidman
broke the habit of a lifetime, flew to Australia and attended the mediation.53 Sterling
should point out that although the Henkel court recognized an exception to personal
jurisdictionforpurposesofsettlement,thefactsofHenkelaredistinguishablebecausethe
plaintiff in Henkel induced the defendant to attend the settlement conference for the
purposeofpersonalservice.54Here,themediationwascourtorderedandnotsuggested
bySterling.

III.
SHOULD THIS COURT REFUSE RECOGNITION BECAUSE THE NEW SOUTH
WALESJUDGEMENTVIOLATESTHEFIRSTAMENDMENTANDTHUSNEWYORK
PUBLICPOLICY?

DavidmanwilllikelyarguethattheCourtshoulddenyrecognitionandenforcement
of the New South Wales judgment because recognizing the judgment would violate the
FirstAmendmenttotheU.S.Constitution.55Althoughthe2007versionoftheRecognition
Actdoesnotexplicitlycontain adefensetorecognitionofaforeigndefamationjudgment
basedontheFirstAmendment,itdoesprovidethatacourtneednotrecognizeaforeign

50HenkelCorp.v.Degremont,SA,136F.R.D.88(E.D.Pa.1991);seealsoFid.&DepositCo.v.Bussa,22So.2d562

(La.1945);W.StatesRefiningCo.vBerry,313P.2d480(Utah1957).

5198A.L.R.551.

52ButseeHenkel,136F.R.D.88.
53StatementofMootProblem3(emphasisadded).
54Henkel,136F.R.D.88.

55 For purposes of this moot problem, Davidman does not intend to challenge recognition of the judgment

pursuanttotheNewYorkStateConstitution,whichaffordsmoreprotectiontocertaintypesofspeechthan
the First Amendment. See Immuno AG v. MoorJankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1278 (N.Y. 1991) ([T]he
protectionaffordedbytheguaranteesoffreepressandspeechintheNewYorkConstitutionisoftenbroader
thantheminimumrequiredbytheFederalConstitution.(internalquotationmarksomitted)).Therefore,we
donotdiscussthatissueinthisBenchMemorandum.

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PAGE9

judgmentifthecauseofactiononwhichthejudgmentisbasedisrepugnanttothepublic
policyofthisstate.56

TheNewYorkCourtofAppealshasnotconsideredwhethertheFirstAmendment
provides a defense to enforcement of a foreign defamation judgment under this public
policydefense.ButtheSecondCircuithasconsideredtheissueandhasheldthat[f]oreign
judgments that impinge on First Amendment rights will be found to be repugnant to
publicpolicy.57TheSecondCircuithasalsoexplainedthatadistrictcourtmustfollowa
twostep process in deciding whether a foreign defamation judgment violates New York
public policy.58 First, the court must identify[] the protections deemed constitutionally
mandatory[undertheFirstAmendment]forthedefamatoryspeechatissue.59Second,the
court must determin[e] whether the foreign [defamation] laws provide comparable
protection.60

Thus, for the First Amendment to prevent recognition of the New South Wales
judgment, Davidman would need to show that the defamation law applied by the New
South Wales court provided less protection than the First Amendment to Davidmans
criticism of Sterling on his currentaffairs program. Based on the Second Circuits
framework for analysis, we discuss below: (1) the mandatory protections that the First
Amendment would likely require for Sterling to recover damages against Davidman; (2)
whether the New South Wales courts award of damages for violation of Australian
defamation law violated First Amendment standards; and (3) whether the New South
WalesjudgmentcompliedwiththeFirstAmendmenttotheextent thatitappliedU.S.law
and,ifitdidnot,whethermisapplicationofU.S.lawissufficienttorefuserecognitionofthe
judgment.

A.
MandatoryprotectionsundertheFirstAmendment

Statesmayregulatedefamatoryspeech,61buttheU.S.SupremeCourthasheldthat
theFirstAmendmentlimitsStatespowertoawarddamagesagainstmediadefendantsfor
defamation.62Theextentoftheseconstitutionallimitsdependsonwhether thespeechat
issueisofpublicorprivateconcernandtheplaintiffisapublicfigureorprivateperson.63

56

C.P.L.R. 5304(b)(4). As explained above, denial of recognition under the publicpolicy exception is
discretionaryratherthanmandatory;however,someNewYorkStateSupremeCourtjusticeshaveheldthat
the statute required them to deny recognition to foreign judgments that would violate the defamation
defendantsconstitutionalrightsifenforced.See,e.g.,Bachchanv.IndiaAbroadPubs.Inc.,585N.Y.S.2d661,
662(Sup.Ct.1992).
57S.A.R.L.LouisFeraudIntl.v.Viewfinder,Inc.,489F.3d474,480(2dCir.2007).
58Id.at481.
59Id.
60Id.
61SeeR.A.V.v.St.Paul,505U.S.377,383384(1992).
62N.Y.TimesCo.v.Sullivan,376U.S.254(1964);seealsoPhila.Newspapers,Inc.v.Hepps,475U.S.767,775
(1986).
63Hepps,475U.S.at775.
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PAGE10

Inadefamationactionagainstanewspaperorbroadcaster,apublicofficialorpublic
figurebearstheburdenofshowingthatstatementspertainingtoamatterofpublicconcern
weremadewithactualmalice.AstheSupremeCourthasexplained,[w]henthespeech
is of public concern and the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, the Constitution
clearlyrequirestheplaintifftosurmountamuchhigherbarrierbeforerecoveringdamages
from a media defendant than is raised by the common law.64 A public figure cannot
recover unless he proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published
thedefamatorystatementwithactualmalice.65Despitetheusualdenotationoftheterm,
malice in this context does not require evil motive or ill will.66 Instead, actual malice is
definedasknowledgethatthestatementwasfalse,orreckless disregardastowhetherit
wasfalse.67Astatementwasrecklesslymadeifthereissufficientevidencetopermitthe
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication.68

AlthoughtheSupremeCourtdoesnotappeartohaveexpresslyconsideredwhether
apublicfiguredefamedonapurelyprivatemattermustprovemalice,theSecondCircuitin
Weldyv.PiedmontAirlines,Inc.69readtheSupremeCourtcasestorequireapublicfigureto
proveactualmalicebyclearandconvincingevidence,whetherornotthespeechatissue
concernedamatterofpublicconcern.70Becausetheissuewasnotsquarelypresentedin
Weldy,thisCourtmightviewtheSecondCircuitsstatementinWeldyasdictum.However,
ifitisdictum,itappearstobeapersuasiveinterpretationofSupremeCourtcaselaw.

In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,71 the Supreme Court held that the Reverend Jerry
Falwell, a public figure, needed to prove actual malice before he could recover for
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Hustler Magazine for publishing a
parodythatdepictedFalwellashavingengagedinadrunkenincestuousrendezvouswith
his mother in an outhouse.72 The Supreme Court explained that the First Amendment
protects even vulgar and tasteless criticism of public figures, provided that the speech is
not false and made with malice.73 This holding suggests that public figures must always
showactualmalice,whetherornotthetopicofthespeechmeetsthedefinitionofamatter
ofpublicconcern.74

64Id.

65Massonv.NewYorkerMagazine,Inc.,501U.S.496,510(1991).
66Id.
67Id.

68ChurchofScientologyIntl.v.Behar,238F.3d168,174(2dCir.2001)(quotingSt.Amantv.Thompson,390
U.S.727,731(1968)).
69985F.2d57(2dCir.1993).
70Id.at64.
71485U.S.46(1988).
72Id.at48,56.
73Seeid.at5053.
74SeeDworkinv.HustlerMagazine,Inc.,867F.2d1188,1197(9thCir.1989)(holdingthatFalwellforecloses
theargumentthatapublicfigureneednotproveactualmalicefordefamationconcerningamatterofpurely
privateconcern).

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PAGE11

Ifthedefendantisaprivatepersonwhowasallegedlydefamedonamatterofpublic
concern, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a
publisher or broadcaster of defamatoryfalsehood, provided that the standard does not
impose liability without a showing of fault.75 The Supreme Court drew the distinction
between public and private figures because public figures usually enjoy significantly
greater access to channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic
opportunitytocounteractfalsestatementsthanprivateindividualsnormallyenjoy.76In
addition, public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury
fromdefamatoryfalsehoodconcerningthem.77

In addition to proving malice, public figures and private persons alike are
constitutionally required to prove that the defamatory statements were actually false in
casesagainstmediadefendantsregardingmattersofpublicconcern.78Thus,thecommon
law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks
damagesagainstamediadefendantforspeechofpublicconcern.79Itisnotclearwhether
thisruleappliesiftheplaintiffsuesbasedonspeechoutsidethepublicconcern.

Whether a plaintiff is a public figure is an issue of law for the court to decide.80
Those who have voluntarily sought and attained influence or prominence in matters of
social concern are generally considered public figures.81 As noted above, public figures
alsohavegreateraccesstomeansofmasscommunication.82Applyingthistest,theSecond
CircuitheldinCellethatawellknownradiocommentatorandtheownerandoperatorof
aprominentmediaoutletintheFilipinoAmericancommunitywerepublicfigures.83

Whether the allegedly defamatory statements pertained to a matter of public


concernisalsoanissueoflawforthecourt.84Thecourtmustexaminethecontent,form,
andcontextofthespeech.85Amatterofpublicconcernisanymatterofpolitical,social,or
otherconcerntothecommunity.86TheSupremeCourthasalsodefinedamatterofpublic
concernasthesubjectoflegitimatenewsinterest;thatis,asubjectofgeneralinterestand
ofvalueandconcerntothepublicatthetimeofpublication.87[A]speakersmotiveisnot
dispositive in determining whether his or her speech addresses a matter of public
concern.88

75Gertzv.RobertWelch,Inc.,418U.S.323,332(1974).
76Id.at334.
77Id.at335.

78Hepps,475U.S.at776.
79Id.at777.

80Cellev.FilipinoReporterEnters.,209F.3d163,176(2dCir.2000).
81Id.

82Gertz,418U.S.at344.

83Celle,209F.3dat177.
84SeeSousav.Roque,578F.3d164,171(2dCir.2009)(notingthatquestionwhetheremployeewasspeaking
onmatterofpublicconcernforFirstAmendmentpurposesisissueoflaw).
85Connickv.Myers,461U.S.138,147(1983).
86Id.at146.
87CityofSanDiegov.Roe,543U.S.77,8384(2004)(percuriam).
88Sousa,578F.3dat173.

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PAGE12


Based on these precedents, Davidman will likely argue that: (1) he made the
statementsasamemberofthemediaonanewsprogram,(2) his statementsweremade
about a matter of public concern(his personal motivesnotwithstanding)the credibility
of information published by Sterlings global media outlets, and (3) Sterling is a public
figurebecausehehassoughtandattainedworldwideinfluenceinthemediaandhaseasy
access to means of communication to respond to Davidmans statements. Accordingly,
Davidman will likely argue that the First Amendment required Sterling to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that Davidman knew the statements were false or had serious
doubtsaboutthetruthofthestatements,andthatthestatementswereinfactfalse.

Sterling might respond that Davidmans speech was not on a matter of public
concern because: (1) Davidson was motivated by his own dislike of Sterling; and (2) the
televisionbiographyfocusedinlargepartonSterlingspersonallife,whichisnotasubject
of general interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of publication.89
Thus, Sterling might contend that this Court should not require him to show malice, as
neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has expressly held that the malice
standard applies when a public figure sues for defamation regarding a purely private
matter, and private matters such as Sterlings alleged egotism are no impediment to the
unfetteredinterchangeofideasforthebringingaboutofpoliticalandsocialchangesthat
the First Amendment protects.90 Sterling might seek to distinguish Falwell because it
concernedacartoonparody,atraditionalmeansofpoliticalandsocialcommentarywell
knowntotheFramers.91

Once the Court resolves the applicable First Amendment standard, it will need to
addresswhethertheNewSouthWalescourtsapplicationofAustralianandU.S.defamation
lawviolatesthestandard.92TheCourtneednotrecognizetheentirejudgment:Wherea
foreign judgment contains discrete components, the enforcing court should endeavor to
discern the appropriate extent of recognition, with reference to applicable public policy
concerns.93 We refer below to the portion of the judgment issued under Australian
defamation as the Australian component of the judgment, and to the portion of the
judgmentissuedunderU.S.defamationlawastheU.S.component.

B.
AustraliancomponentoftheNewSouthWalesjudgment

Davidman will likely argue that the New South Wales courts application of
Australian defamation law did not comply with the mandatory First Amendment
protections discussed above and that this Court should not recognize the Australian
component of the judgment. To resolve this issue, the Court would need to evaluate
whether Australian defamation law provides protections comparable to those required

89CityofSanDiego,543U.S.at8384.

90SeeN.Y.Times,376U.S.at269(internalquotationmarksomitted).
91SeeFalwell,485U.S.46at5355.

92SeeS.A.R.L.LouisFeraudIntl.,489F.3dat481.
93Ackermann,788F.2dat844(internalquotationmarksandcitationomitted).

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PAGE13

under the First Amendment.94 The record is barren as to the content of Australian
defamationlaw.Despitethisdeficiencyintherecord,theCourtcanconsultanymaterialit
choosestodecidethecontentofAustralianlaw.95

Australia has a federal system, but the common law is uniform throughout all
Australianstates,unlessdisplacedbystatestatute.96ThecommonlawofAustralialargely
follows English common law, and includes the traditional commonlaw defense to
defamation of qualified privilege, which provided thata defendant mayavoid liability for
defamationbyprovingthathereasonablypublishedfalsestatementsandthatheandthe
recipient had either a reciprocal duty and interest in the making of the statement or a
commoninterestinthemakingofthestatement.97

Because of this reciprocity requirement, the commonlaw qualified privilege


provide[d] no defence for the mistaken publication of defamatory matter concerning
governmentandpoliticalmatterstoawideaudience.98ButtheAustralianHighCourthas
heldthattheAustraliancommonlawmustprovidesuchadefensetobeconsistentwiththe
implicit guarantee in the Australian Commonwealth Constitution of freedom of
communication concerning political and governmental matters.99 The Lange court
thereforeestablishedacommonlawprivilegethatallowsadefamationdefendanttoshow
that he acted reasonably in widely disseminating defamatory statements concerning
political matters.100 This privilege is limited, however, by the freedom it is meant to
protect.[T]hefreedomwhichthe[Australian]Constitutionprotects...islimitedtowhat
is necessary for the effective operation of that system of representative and responsible
government provided for by the Constitution.101 A defendant does not act reasonably
unlesshehadreasonablegroundsforbelievingthattheimputationwastrue,tookproper
steps,sofarastheywerereasonablyopen,toverifytheaccuracyofthematerialanddid
not believe the imputation to be untrue.102 The defendant must also have sought a
response from the person defamed and published the response made (if any) except in
cases where the seeking or publication of a response was not practicable or it was
unnecessarytogivetheplaintiffanopportunitytorespond.103

In addition to the qualified privilege, a defendant may prove justification as a


defensetodefamationunderNewSouthWaleslawbydemonstratingthathisstatements

94Seeid.

95SeeFed.R.Civ.P.44.1(Indeterminingforeignlaw,thecourtmayconsideranyrelevantmaterialorsource,

includingtestimony,whetherornotsubmittedbyapartyoradmissibleundertheFederalRulesofEvidence.
(emphasisadded)).
96SusannaFrederickFischer,RethinkingSullivan:NewApproachesinAustralia,NewZealand,andEngland,34
Geo.Wash.IntlL.Rev.101,120(2002).
97Id.at116.
98Langev.AustralianBroad.Corp.(1997)189C.L.R.520,556.
99Seeid.at566,570.
100Seeid.at571573.
101Id.at561.
102Id.at574.
103Id.
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PAGE14

were true.104 The defendant bears the burden to establish the truth of the defamatory
statementsbecause[t]helawpresumesthatthedefamatorywordscomplainedofarefalse
andtheplaintiffdoesnothavetoprovethatthedefamatorywordswereuntrue.105

Accordingly,whileapublicfigureintheUnitedStatesbearstheburdenofproving
thatamemberofthemediaknowinglyorrecklesslypublishedfalsestatementsabouthim,
thedefendantinAustraliamustshowthatheactedreasonablyunderthecircumstancesin
publishing false material to the public about political or governmental affairs, or that the
material was substantially true. Thus, Davidman will likely argue that recognition of the
Australian component of the New South Wales judgment would violate the First
Amendment and New York public policy because: (1) he bore the burden of proving
reasonablenessandtruth;(2)hemaybeheldliableifheactedunreasonablyinpublishing
thematerialevenifhedidnotknowinglyorrecklesslymakefalsestatements;and(3)the
Langeprivilegeislimitedtomattersofpoliticalorgovernmentalimportance,whileU.S.law
protectscriticismofpublicfiguressuchasSterlingonanymatterinthepublicinterestand
probablyalsoprotectscriticismofpublicfiguresonpersonalmatters.106

Sterling might respond that the New York statute does not require foreign
defamation law to be equivalent to U.S. law, but only requires that foreign law provide
protections roughly comparable to the First Amendment. Justice Cardozo long ago
establishedthatNewYorkisnotsoprovincialastosaythateverysolutionofaproblemis
wrongbecausewedealwithitotherwiseathome. 107Sterlingmightalsorelyon Yahoo!
Inc.v.LaLigueContreLeRacisme,inwhichtheNinthCircuitheldthat[i]nconsistencywith
American law is not necessarily enough to prevent recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment in the United States. The foreign judgment must be, in addition,
repugnanttopublicpolicy.108Repugnantmeanscontradictoryoroffensive,109which
is a high standard that is infrequently met.110 Sterling will need to acknowledge the
SecondCircuitsholdingthat[f]oreignjudgmentsthatimpingeonFirstAmendmentrights
will be found to be repugnant to public policy,111 but he could argue that this holding
must be read in light of the legal standards discussed above, and that Australian
defamationlawisnotsodifferentfromU.S.standardstobecontradictoryoroffensiveto
NewYorkpublicpolicy.

104 See Defamation Act 2005, 25 (N.S.W.) (It is a defence to the publication of defamatory matter if the

defendantprovesthatthedefamatoryimputationscarriedbythematterofwhichtheplaintiffcomplainsare
substantiallytrue.).
105Herald&WeeklyTimesLtdv.Popovic,[2003]V.S.C.A.161,274(V.Ct.App.)(opinionofGilliard,J.).
106See,e.g.,Matusevitchv.Telnikoff,877F.Supp.1,10(D.D.C.1995)(refusingtoenforceBritishlibeljudgment
because, under U.K. law, the defendant bears the burden of proving allegedly defamatory statements true
andtheplaintiffisnotrequiredtoprovemaliceonthepartofthelibeldefendant);Bachchan,585N.Y.S.2dat
664(same).
107Loucksv.StandardOilCo.,120N.E.198,201(N.Y.1918).
108Yahoo!,433F.3dat1215.
109WebstersNewWorldDictionary548(2003).
110Ackermann,788F.2dat842.
111S.A.R.L.LouisFeraudIntl,489F.3dat480.
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PAGE15

C.

U.S.componentoftheNewSouthWalesjudgment

TheNewSouthWalescourtappliedU.S.defamationlawtotheclaimsthatSterling
sufferedharmtohisreputationintheUnitedStates.Thecourtconcludedthatnomalice
was required to prove defamation against Davidman but that, even assuming malice was
required,DavidmandidnotactwithmaliceasthattermisunderstoodinAustralianlaw.
UnderAustralianlaw,likeEnglishcommonlaw,malicemeansillwill,spite,orsomeother
impropermotive.112

Davidman will likely again argue that the U.S. component of the New South Wales
judgment violates public policy because the New South Wales court issued the judgment
without finding that he knowingly or recklessly made false statements about Sterling.
Indeed,DavidmanmightpointoutthattheNewSouthWalescourtfoundthathedidnotact
withmalice.

Sterling might also repeat the same arguments he would make regarding the
Australian component of the judgment. He could argue as well that the Recognition Act
does not permit nonrecognition of judgments issued by foreign courts applying U.S.
substantivelawbecausetheRecognitionActonlypermitsnonrecognitionifthecauseof
action on which the judgment is based violates public policy.113 Sterling could contend
thatthecauseofactiononwhichtheU.S.componentofthejudgmentwasbasedwasU.S.
defamationlaw,theapplicationofwhichcouldnotviolateNewYorkpublicpolicy.114The
merefactthattheNewSouthWalescourtmayhavemisappliedU.S.lawdoesnotrender
theU.S.causeofactionitconsideredrepugnanttopublicpolicy.115

Finally,Sterlingcouldarguethat,becausetheCourtretainsdiscretiontorecognizea
foreignjudgmentevenifitviolatespublicpolicy,116itshouldexercisethatdiscretionhere
infurtheranceofinternationalcomitybecausetheNewSouthWalescourtmerelymadea
mistake of law. Because the main purpose of the Recognition Act is to promote the
efficientenforcementofNewYorkjudgmentsabroadbyassuringforeignjurisdictionsthat
their judgments would receive streamlined enforcement here,117 the New York Court of
Appeals would expect lower courts in the State to overlook legal errors in foreign
judgments,lestmereerrorsoflawbyNewYorkcourtssubjecttheirdecisionstorejection
abroad. Moreover, Davidman had the opportunity to seek to correct any legal errors by
appealing the New South Wales judgment, but he declined to do so. Davidman might

112Fischer,supranote96,at117.
113C.P.L.R.5304(b)(4).

114 See Socy of Lloyds v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 332 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that the plain language of the
publicpolicyexceptionrequiresthatthecauseofaction,notthejudgmentitself,violateTexaspublicpolicy);
seealsoC.P.L.R.5308(providingthat[t]hisarticleshallbesoconstruedastoeffectuateitsgeneralpurpose
tomakeuniformthelawofthosestateswhichenacttheseprovisions,makingreferencetothedecisionsof
otherstatecourtsinterpretingtheRecognitionActappropriate).
115Cf.EuropcarItaliaS.p.A.v.MaiellanoTours,Inc.,156F.3d310,316(2dCir.1998)(holdingthatcourtcould
notrefuserecognitionofforeignarbitralawardforviolationofU.S.publicpolicybecauseoflegalerror).
116SeeC.P.L.R.5304(b).
117CIBCMellonTrustCo.,100N.Y.2dat221.

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PAGE16

respond that the publicpolicy defense is not meant to encourage foreign courts to apply
U.S. law, but to protect defendants in New York courts from violation of their most
fundamentalrights,suchastherighttofreespeech,andtoensurethatNewYorkcourtsare
notcomplicitintheviolationofthoserights.

IV.
SHOULD THIS COURT REFUSE RECOGNITION BECAUSE THE NEW SOUTH
WALESPROCEEDINGSWERESERIOUSLYINCONVENIENTFORDAVIDMAN?

Another discretionaryground for the Court to refuse recognition of the Australian


courts judgment is that, where jurisdiction was based solely on personal service, the
foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for determination of the action.118
Obviously, a threshold requirement here is that the Australian court exercised personal
jurisdiction based on personal service alone, and not on Davidmans contacts with
Australia. Davidman should be prepared to discuss this aspect of the defense. Sterling
should assert that personal jurisdiction was based on both personal service and
Davidmans contacts, and thus this defense does not apply to bar recognition of the
Australianjudgment.

The last ground for nonrecognition under subsection (b) authorizes a court to
refuse recognition and enforcement of a judgment rendered in a foreign country on the
basis only of personal service when it believes the original action should have been
dismissed by the court in the foreign country on grounds of forum non conveniens.119
Forumnonconveniensisacommonlawdoctrinethatpermitsfederalcourtstodismissa
case over which they have jurisdiction but dismissal would nonetheless best serve the
convenienceofthepartiesandtheendsofjustice.120Thedoctrinepresupposesatleast
twoforumsinwhichthedefendantisamenabletoprocessthechosenfederalcourton
theonehandandeitheranalternativestatecourtorcourtofaforeigncountryontheother
andfurnishesthecriteriaforchoicebetweenthem.121

Generally,thepartiesshoulddiscussthelevelofdeferencetobegiventoSterlingin
choosingtheAustralianforum.Whilethereisordinarilyastrongpresumptioninfavorof
the plaintiff's choice of forum,122 a court should give greater deference to a plaintiff's
forumchoicetotheextentthatitwasmotivatedbylegitimatereasons123likeconvenience,
and less deference to a plaintiffs forum choice to the extent it was motivated by tactical
advantage,suchasforumshopping.

Specifically, the parties should discuss the factors set forth by the U.S. Supreme
Court for courts to weigh in determining whether dismissal based on forum non

118C.P.L.R5304(b)(7).

119Unif.ForeignMoneyJudgmentsRecognitionAct4comment,13U.L.A.26869(1986).

120Murrayv.BritishBroad.Corp.,81F.3d287,290(2dCir.1996)(quotingKosterv.Am.LumbermensMut.Cas.
Co.330U.S.518,527(1947)).
121GulfOilCorp.v.Gilbert,330U.S.501(1947).
122PiperAircraftCo.v.Reyno,454U.S.235,255(1981).
123Iragorriv.UnitedTechs.Corp.,274F.3d65,73(2dCir.2001).

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PAGE17

conveniensisproper.TheCourtconsidersbothpublicandprivatefactors.124Theprivate
interestfactorsrelatetotheconvenienceofthelitigantsthemselvesandinclude:

(1) therelativeeaseofaccesstoproof;

(2) availabilityofcompulsoryprocessforattendanceofunwillingwitness
andthecostofobtainingtheattendanceofwillingwitnesses;

(3) possibilityofviewofpremises;

(4) enforceabilityofajudgmentifoneisobtained;and

(5) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditiousandinexpensive.125

Thepublicinterestfactorsinclude:

(1) preventingcongestionofthecourt'sdocket;

(2) thelocalinterestinhavinglocalizedcontroversiesdecidedathome;

(3) the appropriateness of trying a case in a forum that is at home with


thestatelawthatmustgovernthecase;

(4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws; or in the


applicationofforumlaw;and

(5) the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury


duty.126

The factors must be balanced, and no one factor is determinative in either granting or
denyingdismissalbasedonforumnonconveniens.127However,thedefendantsburdenis
usually greater than the plaintiffs [u]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant,theplaintiff'schoiceofforumshouldrarelybedisturbed.128

The parties should discuss these factors in their respective arguments. Sterling
shouldfocusontheburdenofproofandrelativeeaseofaccesstoproofaspects,aswellas
thegeneralpolicyaffordingdeferencetotheplaintiffschoiceofforum.Davidmanshould

124Gilbert,330U.S.501.

125 Banco de Seguros des Estado v. J.P. Morgan Chase &Co., 500 F. Supp. 2d 251, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing

Gilbert,330U.S.at508).

126Id.at259260.

127Piper,454U.S.at249250(quotingGilbert).
128 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508; see also Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 7475 (noting that even when a plaintiff's forum

choiceisentitledtoalesserdegreeofdeference,theactionshouldbedismissedonlyifthechosenforumis
showntobegenuinelyinconvenientandtheselectedforumsignificantlypreferable).
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PAGE18

focusonAustraliasrelativelackofinterestinthedisputecomparedtotheUnitedStates,
thefactthatbothpartiesareU.S.citizensandresidents(whichmakestravelbackandforth
to Australia expensive and inconvenient), the fact that Davidman had a lifelong habit of
neverleavingManhattan,thefactthatthegreaterportionofthedamagessuffered,inany
event, occurred in the United States, as well as Sterlings apparent attempt at forum
shopping in Australia, where the protection afforded to speech is not as great as in the
UnitedStates.

AlthoughthefactorsheremayweighinfavorofDavidman,thedistrictcourtstillhas
thediscretionwhethertodenyrecognitionoftheAustralianforeignjudgmentbecausethe
forum was seriously inconvenient.129 The forum non conveniens defense is not a
mandatory bar to recognition and enforcement like the lack of personal jurisdiction
defense. However, Davidman likely has a better argument with regard to the forum non
conveniens defense than the lack of personal jurisdiction defense, based on the current
stateofU.S.law.

CONCLUSION

Thelawsgeneraldirectioninfavorofenforcingforeignmoneyjudgmentsstandsin
marked contrast to the more absolutist view of First Amendment rights evident in some
decisions. That conflict forms the basic framework from which to view this case. The
arguments presented should highlight the tension between the policies behind these
issues, but also present a logical balancing of those policies in favor of the respective
partysposition.

129C.P.L.R.5304(b)(7).

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PAGE19

PART3:APPENDIX

NEWYORKUNIFORMFOREIGNCOUNTRYMONEYJUDGMENTSRECOGNITIONACT
N.Y.CivilPracticeLawandRulesArticle53(2007)

5301.Definitions

Asusedinthisarticlethefollowingdefinitionsshallbeapplicable.

(a)Foreignstate.Foreignstateinthisarticlemeansanygovernmentalunitotherthanthe
UnitedStates,oranystate,district,commonwealth,territory,insularpossessionthereof,or
thePanamaCanalZone[fig1]ortheTrustTerritoryofthePacificIslands[fig2].

(b)Foreign country judgment. Foreign country judgment in this article means any
judgmentofaforeignstategrantingordenyingrecoveryofasumofmoney,otherthana
judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a judgment for support in matrimonial or
familymatters.

5302.Applicability

This article applies to any foreign country judgment which is final, conclusive and
enforceablewhererenderedeventhoughanappealtherefromispendingoritissubjectto
appeal.

5303.Recognitionandenforcement

Exceptasprovidedinsection5304,aforeigncountryjudgmentmeetingtherequirements
of section 5302 is conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or denies
recovery of a sum of money. Such a foreign judgment is enforceable by an action on the
judgment,amotionforsummaryjudgmentinlieuofcomplaint,orinapendingactionby
counterclaim,crossclaimoraffirmativedefense.

5304.Groundsfornonrecognition

(a)Norecognition.Aforeigncountryjudgmentisnotconclusiveif:
1. the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide impartial
tribunalsorprocedurescompatiblewiththerequirementsofdueprocessoflaw;
2. theforeigncourtdidnothavepersonaljurisdictionoverthedefendant.

(b)Othergroundsfornonrecognition.Aforeigncountryjudgmentneednotberecognized
if:
1. theforeigncourtdidnothavejurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter;
2. the defendantintheproceedings intheforeign courtdid not receive noticeof the
proceedingsinsufficienttimetoenablehimtodefend;
3. thejudgmentwasobtainedbyfraud;

APPENDIX

4. thecauseofactiononwhichthejudgmentisbasedisrepugnanttothepublicpolicy
ofthisstate;
5. thejudgmentconflictswithanotherfinalandconclusivejudgment;
6. the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the
parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by
proceedingsinthatcourt;or
7. in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court was a
seriouslyinconvenientforumforthetrialoftheaction.

5305.Personaljurisdiction

(a)Basesofjurisdiction.Theforeigncountryjudgmentshallnotberefusedrecognitionfor
lackofpersonaljurisdictionif:
1. thedefendantwasservedpersonallyintheforeignstate;
2. thedefendantvoluntarilyappearedintheproceedings,otherthanforthepurposeof
protecting property seized or threatened with seizure in the proceedings or of
contestingthejurisdictionofthecourtoverhim;
3. thedefendantpriortothecommencementoftheproceedingshadagreedtosubmit
tothejurisdictionoftheforeigncourtwithrespecttothesubjectmatterinvolved;
4. the defendant was domiciled in the foreign state when the proceedings were
instituted, or, being a body corporate had its principal place of business, was
incorporated,orhadotherwiseacquiredcorporatestatus,intheforeignstate;
5. thedefendanthadabusiness officeintheforeignstateandtheproceedingsinthe
foreign court involved a cause of action arising out of business done by the
defendantthroughthatofficeintheforeignstate;or
6. the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign state and the
proceedingsinvolvedacauseofactionarisingoutofsuchoperation.

(b) Other bases of jurisdiction. The courts of this state may recognize other bases of
jurisdiction.

5306.Stayincaseofappeal

Ifthedefendantsatisfiesthecourteitherthatanappealispendingorthatheisentitledand
intendstoappealfromtheforeigncountryjudgment,thecourt maystaytheproceedings
untiltheappealhasbeendeterminedoruntiltheexpirationofaperiodoftimesufficientto
enablethedefendanttoprosecutetheappeal.

5307.Recognitioninothersituations

This article does not prevent the recognition of a foreign country judgment in situations
notcoveredbythisarticle.

APPENDIX

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5308.Uniformityofinterpretation

Thisarticleshallbesoconstruedastoeffectuateitsgeneralpurposetomakeuniformthe
lawofthosestateswhichenacttheseprovisions.

5309.Citation

This article may be cited as the Uniform Foreign Country MoneyJudgmentsRecognition


Act.

APPENDIX

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