Professional Documents
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CASE STUDY
for the
establishment of a
CRUDE OIL
REFINERY
In Equatorial
Guinea
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2. Publicly available from directories, publications and websites,
as mentioned in the body and the footnotes where possible
or appropriate. In some cases, non-publicly available
information was used, including independent research,
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While the information set forth herein is deemed by the
author(s) to be accurate, the author(s) shall not be held
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summarized case study or for any other written or oral
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party in the course of its evaluation
3. The information contained in this summarized case study
will require careful scrutiny, verification and due diligence
efforts from the Recipients [of the summarized case
study]. Any person or entity seeking to make an investment
in the business(es) so-proposed should not rely on the
information set forth in this summarized case study as
complete. In addition, the analyses contained herein do not
claim to be appraisals of the assets, or the valuation(s) of
any entity. The author(s) makes no guarantees regarding any
benefits [to be] received from investment, nor the legal, tax
or accounting effects of any transaction; and this
summarized case study does not constitute an offer to
sell, or a solicitation of an offer to buy [any kind of business
Background Information
THE BASIS
This business case has resulted from the keen interest expressed
by some Arab investors in investing sizeable funds [billions
possibly, denominated in US dollars] in viable ventures inside of
appropriate industries in any country of the continent of Africa.
One key requirement of this group of Arab investors is that they
get political protection for their investment[s]; a requirement
that explicitly implies that a sovereign government of the
sovereign nation in which the investments will be domiciled,
guarantees; by way of signed agreements, treaties, waivers
and/or sovereign irrevocable bank guarantees; the funds being
placed.
This business case proposes EQUATORIAL GUINEA as the
destination-nation for the proposed investment for two key
reasons
i. Key stakeholders in this project have access to and have
guaranteed the Arab investors same to the highest political
leadership of Equatorial Guinea none other than the
President of Equatorial Guinea Teodoro Obiang Nguema
Mbasogo
ii.
i.
ii.
iii.
In the last four (4) years 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014;
20,000 new shale wells have come on stream in the
United States; boosting US crude production to 9 million
barrels per day! If natural gas liquids are included, that
comes up to 12.5 million barrels per day!
Another key indicator US share of the global supply of
tight oil [shale oil or light tight oil] has risen from 0.5%
to 3.7%
One last key indicator cost of producing crude oil in
the United States presently averages between $10 and
$20
[DEMAND]
The majority of oil majors predicated their business models
on demand for crude oil and gas plus derivatives out of four
key centers the United States, [West] Europe, China and
Japan. The current supply-side dynamics in the markets is
breaking this up. According to the International Energy
Agency, [global] demand for [crude] oil and gas plus
derivatives will grow only by 0.9 million barrels per day in
2015. That point being made, a look at each of these four
key centers would be appropriate; in order to paint a
picture of what the future bodes for demand from each of
these centers
1. United States [crude] oil and gas imports are dropping and
will continue to drop for reasons well-enunciated above;
2. [West] Europes demand for [and hence import of] [crude]
oil and gas is reducing and will continue to; for some time in
the nearest future. The key reason here is her shrinking
economy. [West] European demand for [crude] oil and gas
plus derivatives is forecasted to rise to a peak of 14 million
barrels per day through to 2040.
3. China has remained [and still remains] a [crude] oil and
gas plus derivatives demand center. In December 2014,
China hit 7 million barrels per day of [crude] oil and gas plus
derivatives imports up 13% from the previous year. This
demand is projected to rise up to as much as 18 million
barrels per day by 2040. The key driver here is the
[continuing] growth of the Chinese economy 7.7% in 2013
and 7.4% in 2014 substantial growth rates in a $9 to $10
trillion economy. It is worthy to note that the Chinese
government, in the recent past, had been willing to pay top
dollar rates for [crude] oil and gas plus derivatives imports;
but with the supply glut in the markets now, that willingness
will increasingly fade.
4. Japan, the worlds third largest consumer of [crude] oil and
gas plus derivatives as at 2014, has seen its demand drop by
22% since 2000 due to such structural factors as an
iii.
iv.
3. OPEC
OPEC has the short end of the stick in the emergence of
these trade patterns. Seemingly, OPEC is being shut out of
key markets [China, India, North America]. An interim
mitigation strategy would be for it to expand its share of
[West] Europes market, while saying a prayer for West
Europes economic turnaround; even as it [that is, West
Europe] pursues a strategy of diversifying its supplies of
energy from its primary supplier [Russia]. If this [West
Europes] economic turnaround does not happen soon, OPEC
would be in the doldrums.
China and India are other bright lights on the horizon for
OPEC, if the bloc can successfully fend off overtures for
these markets from Russia. [In 2013, approximately 71% of
Chinas and Indias crude oil and gas as well as petroleum
imports were fulfilled by OPEC countries]
Key Recommendations
1. Equatorial Guinea has [proven] abundant resource
reserves [for example, crude oil, gold, diamonds,
coltan, bauxite]; all available in commercial quantities
2. Present Equatoguinean government policies as centered
around the countrys extractive industries presently provide
support to entrepreneurs and prospective investors
interested in the countrys natural resources. Current
Equatoguinean government policies as centered on
the countrys extractive industries also tilt towards a
Public-Private Sector partnership framework for the
development of the countrys various resource bases.
One big advantage any investor can leverage on is a
connection to the current political leadership in the
country [Equatorial Guinea]. This kind of connection
will protect investors resources in terms of capital,
machinery and equipment; and ensure that at vital
cross-roads as the project unfolds, there is some
political leverage available to get things done
3. Prospective investors in Equatorial Guinea would have to
source required human resources from outside of the
Equatoguinean economy. Literacy rate(s) in Equatorial
Guinea presently is low and the country has practically no
technical-base upon which such complex projects as those
proposed can be executed
4. Due diligence and a proper business case of the
opportunities outlined within the context of these projects
being based in Equatorial Guinea has to be carried out [or
commissioned] by the proposed investors into the projects.
This summary case should not be construed to be
self-sufficient by itself in describing the opportunities
and risks involved in the proposed projects
5. The proposed projects requires that ample financing be
available; in order to wait out [possible or real] price
slumps in the commodities market