SEC.

1, RULE 36
DELA PEA v. CA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 177828

February 13, 2009

ANNABELLE DELA PEA and ADRIAN VILLAREAL,

Petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and RURAL BANK OF
BOLINAO, INC., Respondents.

2. ORDERING, the [petitioners] to jointly and severally pay

the [respondent] the interest due as of October 17, 1995, in
the sum of P105,951.91;
3. ORDERING, the [petitioners] to jointly and severally pay
the [respondent] the penalty due as of October 17, 1995, in
the sum of P25,670.21;
4. ORDERING, the [petitioners] to jointly and severally pay
the [respondent] the litigation expenses, in the sum of
P4,500.00;
5. ORDERING, the [petitioners] to jointly and severally pay
attorneys fees in the sum of P7,722.27;
6. ORDERING, the [petitioners] to jointly and severally pay
the [respondent bank] the collection fees in the sum of
P50.00; and
7. To pay the cost of suit.

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners
Annabelle dela Pea and Adrian Villareal (petitioners) seeks
to nullify and set aside the October 31, 2006 Decision1 and
May 8, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 91338.
On October 20, 1983, respondent Rural Bank of Bolinao, Inc.
(respondent) extended a loan of Eighty-One Thousand
Pesos (P81,000.00) to petitioners. The loan was evidenced
by a promissory note,3 and was payable on or before
October 14, 1984.
Petitioners failed to pay their obligation in full when it
became due. Demands for payment4 were made by
respondent, but these were not heeded. Consequently,
respondent filed a collection case against the petitioners with
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bolinao, Pangasinan,
docketed as Civil Case No. 838.5
At the pre-trial conference set on October 17, 1995,
petitioners did not appear. Consequently, upon motion by
respondent, petitioners were declared as in default, and
respondent was allowed to present its evidence ex parte.
On November 2, 1995, the MTC rendered a Decision6
decreeing that:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor
of the [respondent] and against the [petitioners], to wit:
1. ORDERING, the [petitioners] to jointly and severally pay
the [respondent] the remaining principal loan in the sum of
P77,722.67 outstanding as of October 17, 1995, plus interest
of 12% per annum and penalty of 3% per annum, until full
payment of the principal loan thereof;

SO ORDERED.7
On appeal by petitioners, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
remanded the case to the MTC for further proceedings, viz.:
This Court finds Exhibit A, which is Annex A to the complaint,
as not material to the allegations in paragraph 2 of the
complaint since the Promissory Note was allegedly granted
on October 20, 1983 and the due date October 14, 1984. By
the allegations of paragraph 2 of the complaint stating that
the [petitioners] obtained a loan from the [respondent] on
October 20, 1993 for P81,000.00 which was to be paid on
October 20, 1984, hence, it is indeed a very great error to
state in the complaint the date of October 20, 1993 as the
date of the loan was obtained when the evidence shows that
it was granted on October 20, 1983.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this case is ordered
remanded back to the lower court for further proceedings in
order to determine what was the exact date when the loan
was taken from the [respondent] by the [petitioners] and the
due date of such Promissory Note and for other matters. The
declaration of the petitioners as in default is hereby set aside
for purposes of continuation of reception of parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
After the case was remanded, respondent moved for leave
to amend its complaint to conform to the promissory note. 9
The motion was granted by the MTC 10 and the amended
complaint11 was admitted. The case was then set for hearing
on November 16, 2000,12 but petitioners failed to appear,
thus, respondent introduced and offered the pieces of
evidence which it had earlier presented ex parte.
Subsequently, on November 28, 2000, the MTC promulgated
a Decision13 reiterating in full its November 2, 1995
judgment.
Petitioners again elevated this adverse decision to the RTC.
On June 14, 2001, the RTC set aside the MTC decision and
remanded the case for further proceedings. In so ruling, it

held that the MTC did not adhere to the RTC order to
conduct further proceedings. Despite its earlier ruling setting
aside the declaration of default against the petitioners, the
MTC did not require petitioners to file their answer. Likewise,
it did not set the case anew for pre-trial and presentation of
evidence of both parties. Petitioners failure to attend the
scheduled hearing can only be construed as waiver of their
right to cross-examine the witnesses, but not a waiver of
their right to present evidence. The RTC declared that
petitioners right to due process had been violated when they
were not given an opportunity to present countervailing
evidence.14 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

communicate with the court. Finally, they averred that they

have a meritorious defense. Accordingly, they prayed that
they be allowed to regain their standing in court.

In view of the foregoing consideration, the Court renders

judgment declaring the proceedings of the MTC of Bolinao in
this case from after its admission of [respondents] amended
[complaint] as null and void; and setting aside the decision
dated November 28, 2000, and ordering the remand of this
case to the said Court for further proceedings by allowing the
[petitioners] to file their answer to the amended complaint
conducting the mandatory pre-trial conference of the parties
and hearing their respective evidences before rendering
decision thereon.

On March 12, 2004, the MTC issued an Order29 denying

petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. It
agreed with respondent that the motion is already moot and
academic, and further declared that granting the motion
would give rise to endless litigation.

SO ORDERED.15
Upon remand, respondent caused the re-service of
summons upon petitioners,16 who filed their Answer17 on July
7, 2003. Petitioners admitted obtaining a loan from
respondent bank, but alleged that they substantially paid
their obligation.
On July 28, 2003, the MTC issued a notice setting the case
for pre-trial on August 29, 2003.18 However, a day before the
scheduled pre-trial, petitioners moved for postponement;19
thus, the pre-trial was reset to September 26, 2003. 20 On
September 16, 2003, petitioners again moved for
postponement of pre-trial,21 which was also granted by the
MTC. The pre-trial was again reset to November 14, 2003.22
On November 14, 2003, respondent appeared, but no pretrial was held because petitioners, for the third time, moved
for its postponement in a motion filed on November 11,
2003.23 The MTC again granted the motion and rescheduled
the pre-trial to December 12, 2003,24 but again no pre-trial
was held as it was further moved to January 30, 2004. On
December 17, 2003, petitioners filed another motion for
postponement reiterating their request to conduct pre-trial on
January 30, 2004.25
On January 30, 2004, respondent appeared, while
petitioners did not. Consequently, the MTC, upon motion of
respondent, allowed the presentation of its evidence ex
parte. Thereafter, on February 9, 2004, respondent filed a
Motion to Render Judgment.26
Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with
Motion to Set Aside Order of Default).27 They averred that
they were not able to attend the pre-trial conference on
January 30, 2004 because petitioner Villareal suddenly felt
weak, and petitioner Dela Pea took care of him. They were
not able to inform the court that they could not make it to the
pre-trial because there was no way they could immediately

Respondent opposed the motion. Citing Section 5, Rule 18

of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, respondent
averred that the MTC was correct in allowing the
presentation of evidence ex parte in view of petitioners
failure to appear at the pre-trial conference. It also claimed
that the motion for reconsideration is already moot and
academic, considering that the case had already been
submitted for resolution.281avvphi1

On August 16, 2004, the MTC rendered a Decision30 ordering

petitioners to pay respondent bank their unpaid obligation of
P77,722.67 with interest at 3% per annum, from October 17,
1995 until its full payment. Petitioners were likewise held
liable for the payment of the interests and penalties due as of
October 17, 1995 amounting to P105,951.91 and
P25,670.21, respectively, litigation expenses of P4,500.00,
attorneys fees of P7,722.27, collection fees of P50.00 and
the cost of suit.
Petitioners appealed to the RTC. They objected to the form
and substance of the MTC decision on the ground that it did
not state the law on which its findings were based, in utter
disregard of Section 1, Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Petitioners further claimed denial of due process,
for they were not given an opportunity to present
countervailing evidence.31lawphil.net
On May 25, 2005, the RTC set aside the MTC decision and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 32 It declared that
the assailed MTC decision was a nullity for lack of legal
basis. According to the RTC, the MTC failed to clearly and
distinctly state the law which was made the basis of its
decision. The RTC also found that petitioners were not duly
notified of the scheduled pre-trial conference as the record is
bereft of proof that an order setting the case for pre-trial
conference on January 30, 2004 was issued. Neither was
there any order allowing the respondent to adduce evidence
ex parte in view of petitioners failure to appear on the said
date. The RTC concluded that the MTC decision was issued
without due process. Accordingly, the case was remanded
for pre-trial conference and for presentation of evidence.
Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, respondent appealed to
the CA. On October 31, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision. Reversing the RTC, the CA found that petitioners
had sufficient notice that the pre-trial conference will be held
on January 30, 2004 for this setting had been chosen and
confirmed twice by the petitioners. According to the CA,
petitioners should have appointed a representative, armed
with a special power of attorney, to appear on their behalf if
they could not make it to the scheduled pre-trial, especially in
this case where several postponements had already been
granted. It added that petitioners cannot repeatedly ask for

the postponement of a pre-trial on account of their insistence

to personally attend and participate in the same; otherwise,
the entire proceedings would be left at the mercy and whims
of a cunning litigant. Accordingly, the CA upheld the MTC in
allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence, and in
rendering judgment on the basis of the evidence presented.

Pangasinan, which remanded back in its order dated August

29, 1996 x x x.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA

denied the same on May 8, 2007.

Accordingly, the amended complaint was granted by the

court during the hearing on September 18, 2000. With the
admission of the amended complaint of the respondent, the
case was set for hearing with due notices to [petitioners] and
counsel for further reception of evidence the [respondent]
may desire to adduce. On the said scheduled date of
hearing, the [petitioners] and counsel did not show up in
court. [Respondent], thru counsel, re-introduced in toto the
documentary evidences which they have previously
presented which they then re-offered in evidence and prayed
for their re-admission and thereafter rested their case. There
being no more supervening facts or new documentary
evidences introduced by the plaintiff in the instant case, the
court deemed no necessity in having a different decision
from the appealed decision of this court, except, of course
maybe its change of date, so it was already wise and
unmistakable to just re-write and adapt the decision of this
Court dated November 2, 1995 by the then Honorable
Antonio V. Tiong, Municipal Trial Judge.

Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REIN[S]TATING
THE DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF
BOLINAO WHICH IS NULL AND VOID FOR FAILURE TO
STATE THE LAW ON WHICH ITS FINDINGS OF FACTS
ARE BASED CONTRARY TO THE REQUIREMENT UNDER
SECTION 1, RULE 36 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
REINSTATED THE DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT OF BOLINAO EVEN WHEN THE LOWER COURT
OMITTED AND FAILED TO ISSUE AN ORDER AFTER THE
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMATION OF THE
DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF
BOLINAO AMOUNTS TO DENIAL OF THE PETITIONERS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW
ON MERE TECHNICALITY.33
Petitioners fault the CA for reversing the RTC, and for
reinstating and upholding the MTC decision. Reiterating their
arguments before the RTC, they assert that the MTC
decision is null and void for it does not conform to the
requirement of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and
of the Rules of Court.
Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution directs that:
SEC. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based.
Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court reflects the
foregoing mandate, thus:
SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A
judgment or final order determining the merits of the case
shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the
judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of
court.
The August 16, 2004 MTC decision reads in full:
This is an inherited case by the undersigned JudgeDesignate, filed way back in September 14, 1994.
Likewise, the instant case is an off-shoot of the appealed
decision of this court to the Regional Trial Court, Alaminos,

Proceedings were held whereby [respondent] moved with

leave of court to amend paragraph 2 of the complaint to
conform to evidence.

From the evidence adduced by the [respondent], it has

clearly been established that the [petitioners] obtained a loan
from [respondent] Rural Bank of Bolinao, Inc., with office
address at Poblacion, Bolinao, Pangasinan, in the sum of
EIGHTY-ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P81,000.00), on
October 20, 1983, as evidenced by a promissory note duly
signed and executed by the herein [petitioners] spouses
Annabelle dela Pea and Adrian Villareal at the place of
business of the [respondent] as a banking institution in the
presence of the witnesses of the [respondent], namely
Cederico C. Catabay and Maximo Tiangsing who are both
employees of the [respondent], that the [petitioners] have
paid a part of the principal loan with a remaining outstanding
balance of P77,772.67, but has from then defaulted in the
last payment of the loan which has and have matured on
October 14, 1984 (Exh. "A"). Accordingly, letters of demand
by Mateo G. Caasi, then General Manager of the respondent
Rural Bank of Bolinao, Inc., were sent by registered mail to
[petitioners] at their given address but turned deaf eared
(Exh. "C" & "D"); that, as a result of the utter disregard and
failures of the [petitioners] in payment of their long overdue
loan, the [respondent] was constrained to engage the legal
services of a lawyer in the filing of the instant case for
collection and has incurred litigation expenses and attorneys
fees; that, together with collection fees which [respondent] is
legally entitled to and the remaining unpaid balance up to the
present; that the grand total amount of money the
[petitioners] are obliged to pay [respondent] as of October
17, 1995, as reflected in the Statement of Account prepared
and submitted by Lito C. Altezo, Bookkeeper of the
[respondent] Rural Bank is Two Hundred Twenty-One
Thousand Six Hundred and Sixty-Seven Pesos and Six
Centavos (P221,667.06)- Exh. "B" 34
WHEREFORE, clearly viewed in the light of all the foregoing
considerations, the court hereby renders judgment in favor of
the [respondent] and against the petitioners, to wit:

1. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally the

[respondent] the remaining principal (obligation) loan in the
sum of P77.722.67 outstanding as of October 17, 1995, plus
interest of 3% per annum, until full payment of the principal
loan is made thereof;
2. Ordering [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally the
[respondent] the interest due as of October 17, 1995, in the
sum of P105, 951.91;
3. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally the
[respondent] the penalty due as of October 17, 1995, in the
sum of P25,670.21;
4. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally the
[respondent] the litigation expenses in the sum of
PP4,500.00
5. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally
attorneys fees in the sum of P7,722.27;
6. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally the
[respondent] the collection fees in the sum of P50.00; and
7. To pay the cost of the suit;
SO ORDERED.35
We agree with the petitioners that the above decision did not
conform to the requirements of the Constitution and of the
Rules of Court. The decision contained no reference to any
legal basis in reaching its conclusions. It did not cite any
legal authority or principle to support its conclusion that
petitioners are liable to pay respondent the amount claimed
including interests, penalties, attorneys fees and the costs of
suit.
In Yao v. Court of Appeals,36 we held:
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount
component of due process and fair play. It is likewise
demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution.
The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons
that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot
simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and
against Y and just leave it at that without any justification
whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know
why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if
permitted, should he believe that the decision should be
reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state
the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties
in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely
prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the
possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the
parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through
the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard
against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from
deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the
purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the
sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty

or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately

depend on the power of reason for sustained public
confidence in the justness of his decision.
Thus, the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower
courts and even of the Court of Appeals whose careless
disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their
sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial
responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to the
Constitution.
Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, a decision,
resolution or order which: contained no analysis of the
evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in
reaching its conclusions; contained nothing more than a
summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties;
convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any legal
authority or principle to support conclusions that the letter in
question was libelous; consisted merely of one (1) paragraph
with mostly sweeping generalizations and failed to support
its conclusion of parricide; consisted of five (5) pages, three
(3) pages of which were quotations from the labor arbiters
decision including the dispositive portion and barely a page
(two [2] short paragraphs of two [2] sentences each) of its
own discussion or reasonings; was merely based on the
findings of another court sans transcript of stenographic
notes; or failed to explain the factual and legal bases for the
award of moral damages.37
The CA, therefore, erred in upholding the validity of and in
reinstating the MTC decision.
However, we cannot grant petitioners plea to reinstate the
RTC decision remanding the case to the MTC for further
proceedings. Jurisprudence dictates that remand of a case
to a lower court does not follow if, in the interest of justice,
the Supreme Court itself can resolve the dispute based on
the records before it.
As a rule, remand is avoided in the following instances: (a)
where the ends of justice would not be subserved by a
remand; or (b) where public interest demands an early
disposition of the case; or (c) where the trial court had
already received all the evidence presented by both parties,
and the Supreme Court is in a position, based upon said
evidence, to decide the case on its merits. 38
Petitioners plead for a remand of their case to the MTC on
ground that they were denied due process. They claim that
they were not given an opportunity to present countervailing
evidence.
The argument does not persuade.
We perused the record of the case and we failed to see the
lack of due process claimed by the petitioners. On the
contrary, petitioners had been afforded more than what is
due them. This case was remanded to the MTC twice to give
petitioners an opportunity to be heard. Lest it be forgotten,
petitioners were first declared as in default on October 17,
1995 for their failure to appear at the pre-trial conference.
The MTC thereafter rendered judgment in favor of the

respondent. However, on appeal, the RTC set aside the

judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Upon remand, the MTC set the case for hearing, but again
petitioners failed to appear at the scheduled hearing.
Accordingly, respondent was allowed to present its evidence
ex parte, and a judgment in favor of the respondent was
issued. But again on appeal, the RTC set aside the MTC
decision and remanded the case, for the second time, to the
MTC, to give petitioners ample opportunity to present
countervailing evidence. Upon remand, respondent caused
the re-service of summons to petitioners, who filed their
answer to the complaint. When the case was set for pre-trial
conference, petitioners repeatedly moved for its
postponement; and despite several postponements,
petitioners still failed to appear at the pre-trial conference set
on January 30, 2004.

As we held in Sierra v. Court of Appeals, 44 and recently in

Henry dela Rama Co v. Admiral United Savings Bank:45

Clearly, petitioners abused the legal processes, effectively

defeating the justice which had long been denied the
respondent. We note that this case was filed on September
13, 1994, and petitioners, through legal maneuverings,
managed to delay its resolution. To date, this simple
collection suit has been pending for more than fourteen (14)
years. We will not countenance this patent flouting of the law
and the rules by petitioners and counsel. Accordingly, we will
now resolve the case based on the evidence before us.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Petitioners Annabelle

dela Pea and Adrian Villareal are ordered, jointly and
severally, to pay respondent Rural Bank of Bolinao, Inc.
P77,722.67, with interest at 12% per annum and penalty
charge of 3% per annum from October 14, 1984 until the
loan is fully paid. In addition, petitioners are adjudged liable
to pay respondent P40,000.00, as attorneys fees.

A promissory note is a solemn acknowledgment of a debt

and a formal commitment to repay it on the date and under
the conditions agreed upon by the borrower and the lender. A
person who signs such an instrument is bound to honor it as
a legitimate obligation duly assumed by him through the
signature he affixes thereto as a token of his good faith. If he
reneges on his promise without cause, he forfeits the
sympathy and assistance of this Court and deserves instead
its sharp repudiation.
Thus, petitioners cannot renege on their commitment to pay
their obligation, including interest and penalty, to the
respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners did not deny or question the authenticity and due

execution of the promissory note. They, however, offered the
defense that the loan obligation covered by the promissory
note had already been paid.
Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that in civil cases, the
party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Burden
of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence of the facts
in issue necessary to prove the truth of his claim or defense
by the amount of evidence required by law.39 Thus, a party
who pleads payment as a defense has the burden of proving
that such payment has, in fact, been made. When the
plaintiff alleges nonpayment, still, the general rule is that the
burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than
on the plaintiff to prove nonpayment.40
In Alonzo v. San Juan,41 we held that the receipts of
payment, although not exclusive, are deemed the best
evidence of the fact of payment. In this case, no receipt was
presented to substantiate the claim of payment as petitioners
did not take advantage of all the opportunities to present
their evidence in the proceedings a quo. Not even a
photocopy of the alleged proof of payment was appended to
their answer. Verily, petitioners failed to discharge the
burden. Accordingly, we reject their defense of payment.
By signing the promissory note, petitioners acknowledged
receipt of the loan amounting to P81,000.00, and undertook
to pay the same, plus interest and penalty, on or before
October 14, 1984.
Records show that as of October 17, 1995, petitioners
unpaid obligation under the note is P77,722.67,42 excluding
interest of 12% per annum, penalty charge of 3% per annum,
and attorneys fees, which they bound themselves to pay
under the note.43

SEC. 14, RULE 39

KATIHAN v. JUDGE MACEREN
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1680
August 17, 2007
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-1876-MTJ)
KATIPUNAN NG TINIG SA ADHIKAIN, INC. (KATIHAN) by
GODOFREDO S. BONGON, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LUIS ZENON O. MACEREN, SHERIFF ANTOLIN
ORTEGA CUIZON, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 39,
Quezon City, Respondents.

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint against Presiding Judge
Luis Zenon O. Maceren (Judge Maceren) and Sheriff Antolin
Ortega Cuizon (Sheriff Cuizon) of the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Branch 39, Quezon City, for violation of Article
III, Section 1 of the Constitution and Rule 39, Section 10(d)
of the Rules of Court.

The facts of the case are undisputed as follows:

A case for ejectment and damages was filed in the MeTC,
Branch 39, Quezon City on September 14, 2005, docketed
as Civil Case No. 35076, entitled "Efrain Limsui, represented
by his Attorney-in-fact, Apolonio Magno v. Damayang
Magkakapitbahay ng 81 Linaw Street, Inc. and B.I.G.K.I.S.
Neighborhood Association, and their members and all
persons claiming rights under them."
The plaintiff is the new owner of the eight (8) parcels of land
formerly owned by Dr. Carmen Lopez (Lopez), covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. RT-38111 (38772), RT38112 (387710), RT-38113 (38770) and RT-38006 (38773),
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in 1957 in
the name of Lopez. To oversee the vacant lands, Lopez
appointed caretakers who brought along with them their
families to live therein, but they assured Lopez that they will
leave the property when so ordered. After some time, the
caretakers allowed their friends to stay in the property.
Before long, Lot Nos. 65 and 81 were filled with squatters.1
Because the property was occupied by squatters,
prospective buyers shied away. Efrain Limsui bought the
parcels of land from Lopez at a lower price, assuming the
risks of dealing with the squatters. Limsui learned that the
squatters in Lot No. 81 grouped together and incorporated
as
"Damayang
Magkakapitbahay
(Damayang
Magkakapitbahay) ng 81 Linaw St., Inc.," while the other
squatters in the land formed "Buklurang Idoloheya sa Gawa
at Kaunlaran ng Isip at Salita, Inc. (BIGKIS)."2
Representatives of Limsui talked to the different leaders of
the defendant-associations and the barangay officials in the
area in February 2005, offering financial and other material
assistance in exchange for vacating the premises. The
members of the defendant-associations accepted. However,
some did not comply with the undertaking, adamantly
refusing to leave the property. Thus, Limsui filed the said
ejectment case.3
Summonses were duly served on the defendant-associations
on September 19, 2005. No answer was filed by the
defendants. However, a Compromise Agreement was
executed and presented to the trial court on September 26,
2005. On November 2, 2005, the MeTC rendered a Decision
based on the compromise agreement submitted by the
parties.
In the compromise agreement, the parties agreed that the
defendants would voluntarily vacate the property and remove
the structures they have erected on the land. Defendants
acknowledged the ownership of Lopez over the land and
admitted that they occupied the same through the mere
tolerance of Lopez. They also recognized the right of Lopez
to sell the land to Limsui. In exchange for the peaceful
surrender of the property by the members of the defendantassociations, the parties agreed on the amount of financial
assistance that plaintiff would give to the defendants.
On October 21, 2005, Katipunan ng Tinig sa Adhikain, Inc.
(KATIHAN) and Pagsasama sa Iisang Adhikain (PIA) filed a
Verified Manifestation and Motion with the trial court where

the action for ejectment was pending, stating that they are
also residents of the land subject of the ejectment suit, and
that they are in danger of being evicted without due process
of law. They claimed that they did not receive any summons,
and not being parties to Civil Case No. 35076, they should
not be affected by the Decision based on the compromise.
Thus, any writ of execution that may be issued by the MeTC
should only be enforced against the signatories of the
compromise agreement. They also informed the trial court
through the Verified Manifestation and Motion that on
October 14, 2005, several men carrying guns, crowbars and
sledgehammers, arrived at the subject premises, and
destroyed their houses without any court order.
Judge Maceren noted the Verified Manifestation and Motion
of KATIHAN and PIA.
On November 23, 2005, the MeTC issued an Order granting
the issuance of a writ of execution for the enforcement of the
Decision dated November 2, 2005. On November 30, 2005,
a Writ of Execution was issued by the MeTC, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
WHEREAS, you are hereby commanded to cause the
following DEFENDANTS and the other/all persons claiming
interest under them to VACATE the place designated on the
Decision, and restore the possession thereof to the Plaintiff.
On the same day, Antolin Ortega Cuizon, Sheriff III, MeTC,
Quezon City, issued a Notice to Vacate to the defendants,
and on June 28, 2006, he issued a Final Notice of
Demolition, viz.:
That the undersigned Sheriff III hereby gives you until the
whole day of July 3, 2006 (Monday) from receipt thereof
within which to vacate the subject premises.
In this connection, and in order to avoid inconvenience and
discomfort on your part regarding the service of such Writ of
Demolition, formal demand is hereby made upon you to
vacate and demolish all structures and improvements in the
premises in question.1avvphi1
Failure on your part to comply herewith shall leave the
undersigned no other alternative but to employ necessary
means or force to satisfy [the] said Writ.
On July 7, 2006, Cuizon submitted a Sheriffs Report to the
MeTC, which reads:
That, on [the] 10th day of January 2006 and June 28[,] 2006,
the undersigned served a copy of Notice to Vacate and Final
Notice of Demolition and Writ of Execution and copy of the
Decision based on Compromise Agreement, attached
thereon, respectively, upon Defendants DAMAYANG
MAGKAKAPITBAHAY NG 81 LINAW STREET, INC. and
B.I.G.K.I.S. NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, and their
members and all persons claiming rights under them, at the
premises in question, thru ULYSIS MANLANGIT, President,
LITA MAGPANTAY, Chairman of the Board, and RODRIGO
PELAYO, President, thru Carmelita Perez, association
Officer, who signed to acknowledged (sic) receipt thereof;

That, on the 3rd day of July 2006, Counsel for the Plaintiff,
Atty. Lauron, informed the undersigned Sheriff that they had
a meeting with the Defendants/Occupants of subject
premises and both parties agreed, that the latter will
voluntarily vacate and demolish their shanties on July 4,
2006;
That, on the 4th day of July 2006, the undersigned went
back to the premises in question to verify the veracity of both
parties['] verbal compromise agreement;
That, upon arrival thereat, the undersigned found out that
Defendants and all occupants of the premises in question
have already voluntarily and peacefully vacated the premises
in question and the Plaintiffs demolition workers peacefully
and freely extracted all the usable materials of the
shanties/structures and consequently turned-over the same
to the Defendants/Occupants;
That, the undersigned turned-over the subject premises to
the Plaintiff thru the Counsel for the Plaintiff, copy of which
are (sic) attached hereto, and the Plaintiff is now in the actual
physical control and possession of the premises in question;
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully return
the copy of the Writ of Execution SERVED and DULY
COMPLIED/SATISFIED for the information and guidance of
the Honorable Court, and for whatever action as it may deem
proper under the premises.
The enforcement of the writ of execution is the reason for
KATIHANs administrative complaint against Judge Maceren
and Sheriff Cuizon. KATIHAN contends that its members
were in peaceful possession of a portion of the property
subject of Civil Case No. 35076, and because of the Writ of
Execution issued by Judge Maceren and the Writ of
Demolition issued by Sheriff Cuizon, they were ejected from
the land in violation of their right to due process of law and
contrary to the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.
KATIHAN stresses the fact that it was not impleaded as a
defendant in Civil Case No. 35076, and therefore, it is not,
nor are its members, bound by the Decision in the said
case.4
Furthermore, the implementation of the Final Notice of
Demolition by Sheriff Cuizon on July 4, 2006, according to
KATIHAN, was a violation of the Rules of Court because he
should have secured an order from the MeTC before he
destroyed, demolished or removed the improvements on the
subject lots.5 Judge Maceren allegedly participated in the
malfeasance committed by Sheriff Cuizon, since he
(Maceren) personally assured KATIHAN on July 3, 2006 that
it was not involved in the case, that the issue had already
been resolved, and that it was now up to the Sheriff who
would implement the Writ of Demolition. KATIHAN is of the
view that Judge Maceren should have prevented Sheriff
Cuizon from implementing the Writ of Demolition because no
hearing was set for the purpose and the trial court did not
issue a special order of demolition.6
In his Comment dated November 16, 2006, Judge Maceren
stated that during the hearing on the Compromise
Agreement on October 17, 2005, lawyers were present

claiming to represent certain individuals who were

supposedly occupants of the subject lots, and they
expressed their objections to the Compromise Agreement.
They alleged that they are not members of the defendantassociations in Civil Case No. 35076. However, no formal
intervention was filed by the said counsels. Judge Maceren
also explained that he merely noted the Verified
Manifestation and Motion filed by PIA and KATIHAN because
both are not parties to the case and the trial court had no
jurisdiction to consider and/or act on their claims. As to the
allegation that he personally talked to the officials and
members of PIA and KATIHAN, and told them "HINDI KAYO
KASAMA AT TAPOS NA ANG USAPIN, NASA SHERIFF NA
LAMANG KUNG IPATUTUPAD PA ANG DEMOLITION,"
Judge Maceren manifested that he cannot remember having
talked to them, and that he doubts its truth since he is not in
the habit of talking to persons who have interests in pending
cases that are heard before his sala.
For his part, Sheriff Cuizon submitted an undated Comment
to this Court, the pertinent portions of the said Comment
reads:
1. I am the designated Sheriff assigned to (sic) the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 39, Quezon City;
2. I have been tasked to implement the Decision dated
November 02, 2005 of the said court by virtue of a Writ of
Execution dated November 30, 2005 in connection with the
case "Efrain Limsui, etc. vs. Damayang Magkakapitbahay Ng
81 Linaw Street, Inc. and B.I.G.K.I.S. Neighborhood
Association," docketed as Civil Case No. 35076. Among the
undertakings, under the Writ of Execution, is the demolition
of the structures of the defendants. A copy of the Writ of
Execution is attached hereto as Annex "1";
3. Accordingly, I prepared and sent a Notice to Vacate to the
defendants in the said case on January 10, 2006. However,
this was not implemented immediately as I was made to
understand by the plaintiff that the defendants are being
convinced to vacate voluntarily. A copy of the Notice to
Vacate is attached hereto as Annex "2";
4. On June 28, 2006, upon the prodding of the plaintiff, I sent
a Final Notice of Demolition to the defendants informing
them of the implementation on July 04, 2006. A copy of the
notice is attached as Annex "3";
xxxx
7. (sic) The complainants claim that there was no special
order of demolition, and thus I could not undertake the same.
This is not true, my Notice to Vacate and Final Notice for
Demolition were based on a Decision and a Writ of
Execution that incorporates an undertaking to demolish
structures of the defendants, as earlier mentioned. Under the
circumstances, therefore, there was no need for me to ask
for an Order of Demolition.
The sole issue in this case is whether Judge Maceren and
Sheriff Cuizon can be held administratively liable for the
demolition of the structures of complainants ostensibly
without due process of law, and for violation of the rules of

procedure concerning the execution of judgments under

Rule 39.
The Court finds that Judge Maceren acted within the bounds
of his authority when he merely noted the Verified
Manifestation and Motion filed by PIA and KATIHAN in Civil
Case No. 35076, as the movants were not parties to the
ejectment case. They did not file any formal motion for
intervention in the said case despite the opportunity to do so.
As to the demolition of complainants structures and
improvements on the subject lots, as correctly observed by
the Office of the Court Administrator, there is no concrete
evidence that Judge Maceren acquiesced to or participated
in Sheriff Cuizons act of directing the demolition of the
structures without proper authority from the court. However,
Judge Maceren should have exercised considerable care
and caution before approving the compromise agreement,
knowing that a formal manifestation and motion was filed by
persons who claimed that they would be adversely affected
by the decision based on the compromise agreement. He
should have directed all parties in interest to intervene in the
case. Be that as it may, the lapse of judgment of Judge
Maceren is not ample basis to hold him administratively
liable, since his action of merely noting the Verified
Manifestation and Motion is well within his judicial discretion.
Conversely, Sheriff Cuizon is administratively liable for
ordering the demolition of the structures on the subject
property and for his issuance of the Final Notice of
Demolition without authority from the court. Sheriff Cuizon
exceeded his authority in issuing the Final Notice of
Demolition. He issued the same without a special order of
demolition from the court having jurisdiction over the
ejectment case.
It must be stressed that the preparation of writs is not among
the duties of sheriffs as the authority to issue the same
resides in judges.7 The Rules of Court is very clear and
categorical in saying that when the property subject of the
execution contains improvements constructed or planted by
the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not
destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon
special order of the court, issued upon motion of the
judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has
failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by
the court.8
Sheriff Cuizons compliance with the Rules of Court,
especially in the implementation of judgments, is not merely

directory but mandatory. Sheriff Cuizon is expected to know

the rules of procedure, particularly when it pertains to his
function as an officer of the court. Furthermore, in the Final
Notice
of
Demolition,
Sheriff
Cuizon
committed
misrepresentation when he stated that a writ of demolition
was issued by the trial court.1avvphi1
Sheriff Cuizon is likewise administratively liable for his failure
to make periodic reports as mandated by Section 14, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 14. Return of writ of execution. The writ of execution
shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after
the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the
judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days
after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court
and state the reason therefore. Such writ shall continue in
effect during the period within which the judgment may be
enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the
court every (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until
the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The
returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the
proceedings taken, and shall be filled with the court and
copies thereof promptly furnished the parties.
It is mandatory for a sheriff to make a return of the writ of
execution to the clerk or judge issuing it within thirty (30)
days upon his receipt of the writ.9 The Writ of Execution was
issued by Judge Maceren on November 30, 2005. On the
same date, Sheriff Cuizon issued a Notice to Vacate.
Correspondingly, Sheriff Cuizon should have submitted to
the MeTC a return of writ on December 30, 2005 and a
report every thirty (30) days thereafter until the judgment is
fully satisfied. The reason behind this mandatory requirement
is to update the court on the status of the execution and to
take necessary steps to ensure the speedy execution of
decisions. 10
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the administrative
complaint against Judge Luis Zenon O. Maceren is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Sheriff Antolin Ortega Cuizon is
SUSPENDED for a period of three (3) months without pay,
with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.