CASE

Introduction

DOCTRINE

City of Manila v Judge

Grecia-Cuerdo
Medical Plaza Makati
Condominium Corp v
Cullen
Editha
Padlan
v
Dinglasan

The authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be
implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by
the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.

Pinga v Heirs of Santiago

Quesada v DOJ
Magpale v CSC
Sandoval Caneba
Sun Insurance Office v
Asuncion
Vda De Murga v Chan

Zamora
Carmen

Heirs

of

1. Rule 1
Lumbuan v Ronquillo

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v

Melicor

Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the
property subject thereof. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has
jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.
The formalistic distinction between a complaint and a counterclaim does not detract from the fact that both of them embody causes of action that have in their end
the vindication of rights. Any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and NOT on the survival of the main complaint. Certainly, if the
counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws, which stand independent of the complaint, the TC is not precluded from dismissing it under
the amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified,
the amended rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim form peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint.
The SC is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial
tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened w the task of dealing w causes in the first instance. The hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for pets for the extraordinary writs.
Settled is the rule that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions acts without jurisdiction if no authority has been conferred by law to hear and decide
the case.
It is not the ordinary courts but the Natl Housing Authority (NHA) which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of (a) unsound real estate business
practices; (b) claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker
of salesman; and (c) cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in
no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Where the trial court acquired jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the pleading and
payment of prescribed filing fees but the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or specified the same has been left for the courts determination,
the additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
The pleadings of the parties and the annexes thereto clearly show that the jugular vein of the controversy hinges on the contract interpretation of clause 7 of the
contract of lease, a matter outside the jurisdiction of the municipal court. Inasmuch as the controversy hinges in the interpretation of clause 7 of the contract, that
is, whether or not said clause contemplated an automatic renewal of the lease, the action was not for unlawful detainer but one not capable of pecuniary
estimation and therefore beyond the competence of the municipal court.
The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 (the Katarungang Pambarangay Law), now included under R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code
of 1991), is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought about by the indiscriminate filing
of cases in the courts. To attain this objective, Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat as a precondition to filing a complaint in court.

The primordial objective of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules,14 is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of
justice which has been brought about by the indiscriminaA general function or purpose of a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in the case when
that cannot be accomplished without the aid of such a bill. It is not the office of a bill of particulars to supply material allegations necessary to the validity of a
pleading, or to change a cause of action or defense stated in the pleading, or to state a cause of action or defense other than the one stated.
te filing of cases in the courts. To attain this objective, Section 412(a) of Republic Act No. 716015 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the
Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a precondition to filing a complaint in court.
It must be underscored that supervening events have taken place before the lower courts where the parties have been adequately heard, and all the issues have
been ventilated. Since the records of those proceedings are with the Court of Appeals, it is in a better position to fully adjudicate the rights of the parties. To rely on
the records before this Court would prevent us from rendering a sound judgment in this case.
When petitioner vigorously participated in all stages of the case before the trial court and even invoked the trial courts authority in order to ask for affirmative relief,
he, considering that they merely stepped into the shoes of their predecessor, is effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial courts jurisdiction.
Although the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled that a party may be

People v Cawaling

Yu v Pacleb

Domagas v Jensen

Republic v CA
Tamano v Ortiz
La Tondena Distillers v
Ponferrada
Cabutihan v Landcenter
Construction
Citizen
Surety
Melencio-Herrera

Go v UCPB
Manchester Dev Corp v
CA

barred from raising it on ground of laches or estoppel.

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it
may not be ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of another tribunal. The
only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the case at bar, arise when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is
clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment.
(SAME AS JENSEN) We have held in an unbroken string of cases that an action for specific performance is an action in personam. In Cabutihan v. Landcenter
Construction and Development Corporation,[38] we ruled that an action for specific performance praying for the execution of a deed of sale in connection with an
undertaking in a contract, such as the contract to sell, in this instance, is an action in personam.
Being a judgment in personam, Civil Case No. 741-93 is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an opportunity to be
heard.Therefore, it cannot bind respondent since he was not a party therein. Neither can respondent be considered as privy thereto since his signature and that of
his late first wife, Angelita Chan, were forged in the deed of sale.
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is
determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the
person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him
to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court,
some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or
actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from
a judgment against the propriety (sic) to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations;
such action is brought against the person.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims
assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or
loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these
questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments
therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.
These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for,
except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations.
Personal actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
A complaint for "specific performance with damages" involving real property, was held to be a personal action, which may be filed in the proper court where the
party resides.
Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions), shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial
jurisdiction over the area where the real property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions, (personal actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper
courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides.
In an action strictly in personam, personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who
does not voluntary submit himself to the authority of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot consistently with the due process clause in the
Bill of Rights confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants.
In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as provided for in Section 1, Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to or possession of
real property, or interest therein. These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. The venue for real actions is the same
for regional trial courts and municipal trial courts the court which has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part thereof lies.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.

Sun Insurance Office v

Asuncion

It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject- matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court
may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

The ruling in Manchester (149 SCRA 562) cannot apply retroactively to this case for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was no such
Manchester ruling as yet.

Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing
fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.

Tacoy v RTC of Tagum

Determinative of the court's jurisdiction in this type of actions is the nature thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly arising from or connected
with the issue of title or possession, and regardless of the value of the property.

Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter alia over "all civil actions which involve
the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts." The rule applies regardless of the
value of the real property involved.

The amount of the docket fees to be paid should be computed on the basis of the amount of damages stated in the complaint.

Ayala Corp v Madayag

The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading should be specified. While it is true that
the determination of certain damages as exemplary or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such
damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket
fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages
that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.

Negros Oriental Planter

Assoc. v Hon Judge of
Negros

A complaint which fails to specify the amount of damages being claimed suffers from a material defect. Trial court may either order said claim to be
expunged from the record or order amendment of the complaint within a reasonable time.

Where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of
time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

Where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by
paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance and not the strict regulations set in Manchester will
apply.

2. Rule 2
Juana
Complex
Homeowners v Fil-Estate
Land

Del Rosario v FEBTC

CGR
Corporation
Treyes

Progressive Dev Corp v

CA

Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. A complaint states a cause of
action when it contains three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant,
and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its
averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action. To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are not
considered.
Section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court proscribes a party from dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two or
more actions based on it. Because the plaintiff cannot divide the grounds for recovery, he is mandated to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he
claims to exist and upon which he relies; he cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive actions to recover for the same wrong or injury.
Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the use and occupation of the
premises and attorney's fees. Hence, filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a result of their dispossession or those caused by
the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action.

Jurisprudence is unequivocal that when a single delict or wrong is committed like the unlawful taking or detention of the property of another there
is but one single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated, and all such rights should be alleged in a single complaint as

constituting one single cause of action.

Joseph v Bautista
Enriquez v Ramos
Flores v Mallare-Phillipps
3. Rule 3
Rayo v Metrobank
Vlason Enterprise v CA

Evangelista v Santiago

Domingo v Carague

Oposa v Factoran
Domingo v Scheer

It is likewise basic under Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single
cause of action. Under Sec. 4 of the same Rule, if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon
the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the other or others. "Cause of action" is defined by Sec. 2 of Rule 2 as the act of omission by
which a party violates a right of another.
Where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one
person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause arises.
Two causes of action being different, Section 4 Rule 2 does not apply
Application of Totality Rule and Interim Rules is subject to the requirements of for the permissive joinder of pares under Section 6 Rule 3. In case of permissive
joinder of parties, the total of all the claims shall be the first jurisdictional test.

A real party-in-interest is one with a present substantial interest which means such interest of a party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him, under
the substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand.

The inclusion of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint is a formal requirement under Section 3, Rule 7. However, the rules of pleadings
require courts to pierce the form and go into the substance, and not to be misled by a false or wrong name given to a pleading. The averments in the complaint,
not the title, are controlling.

Although the general rule requires the inclusion of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint, the non-inclusion of one or some of them is not
fatal to the cause of action of a plaintiff, provided there is a statement in the body of the petition indicating that a defendant was made a party to such action.

The term "lack of capacity to sue" refers to a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical
personality or any other general disqualifications of a party. "Lack of personality to sue refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest.

The first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for
a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact
that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
Judicial power is the power to hear and decide cases pending between parties who have the right to sue in courts of law and equity. Corollary to this dictum is the
principle of locus standi of a litigant. He who is directly affected and whose interest is immediate and substantial has the standing to sue. Thus, a party must show
a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision in order to warrant an invocation of the courts
jurisdiction and justify the exercise of judicial power on his behalf.
Petitioners personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned, since the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest to all citizens of the Philippines.

The joinder of indispensable parties under Sec 7, Rule 3 is mandatory. Without presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court
cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court.

The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. There is a lack of authority to act not only as to the
absent party but also as to those present.

Uy v CA

Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or
on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just.

An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case
can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal presence
as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity.

Laperal Dev Corp v CA

A proper party is one which ought to be a party if complete relief is to be accorded as between those already parties. A party is indispensable if no final
determination can be had of an action unless it is joined either as plaintiff or defendant.
A proper party is one which ought to be a party if complete relief is to be accorded as between those already parties. A party is indispensable if no final
determination can be had of an action unless it is joined either as plaintiff or defendant.

Real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Pacana v Rovila


On the other hand, an indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, in contrast to a necessary
party, which is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.

Senator
Pimentel
Senate Committee

Mathay v Consolidated
Bank
Newsweek v IAC

Sulo ng Bayan v Araneta

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v

Melicor
Dela Cruz v Joaquin

If a suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no
cause of action. However, the dismissal on this ground entails an examination of whether the parties presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of the
litigation, and not whether all persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded.
A person who is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it
will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his
presence would merely permit a complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is
not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation.
Requirements of a class suit:
1. That the subject matter of the controversy be one of common or general interest to many persons, and
2. That such persons be so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all to the court.

It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all (Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the
representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party (Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47
Phil. 348).

We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general
interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

In order that a class suit may prosper, the following requisites must be present:
1) that the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; and
2) that the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.

Under the first requisite, the person who sues must have an interest in the controversy, common with those for whom he sues, and there must be that
unity of interest between him and all such other persons which would entitle them to maintain the action if suit was brought by them jointly.
*repeated case
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS; WHEN A PARTY TO A PENDING ACTION DIES AND THE CLAIM IS NOT
EXTINGUISHED, SUBSTITUTION OF THE DECEASED IS REQUIRED; PURPOSE. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished,
the Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by Section 16 of Rule 3, . . . . The rule on the substitution of
parties was crafted to protect every party's right to due process. The estate of the deceased party will continue to be properly represented in the suit through the
duly appointed legal representative. Moreover, no adjudication can be made against the successor of the deceased if the fundamental right to a day in court is
denied.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A FORMAL SUBSTITUTION BY HEIRS IS NOT NECESSARY WHEN THEY THEMSELVES VOLUNTARILY APPEAR, PARTICIPATE IN THE
CASE, AND PRESENT EVIDENCE IN DEFENSE OF THE DECEASED. The Court has nullified not only trial proceedings conducted without the appearance of
the legal representatives of the deceased, but also the resulting judgments. In those instances, the courts acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal
representatives or the heirs upon whom no judgment was binding. This general rule notwithstanding, a formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they
themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased. These actions negate any claim that the right to due
process was violated.

Spouses Algura v City of

Naga

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE ON SUBSTITUTION BY HEIRS IS NOT A MATTER OF JURISDICTION BUT A REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS. Strictly
speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when
the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a
promulgated decision. Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial court's decision. The alleging party must prove
that there was an undeniable violation of due process.
Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may later still contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial
court, possibly based on newly discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court determines after hearing, that the party
declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk

of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment of prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to such
other sanctions as the court may impose.
The Court concedes that Rule 141, Section 19 provides specific standards while Rule 3, Section 21 does not clearly draw the limits of the entitlement to the
exemption. Knowing that the litigants may abuse the grant of authority, the trial court must use sound discretion and scrutinize evidence strictly in granting
exemptions, aware that the applicant has not hurdled the precise standards under Rule 141. The trial court must also guard against abuse and misuse of the
privilege to litigate as an indigent litigant to prevent the filing of exorbitant claims which would otherwise be regulated by a legal fee requirement.

White v City of Manila

Province
of
North
Cotobato v GRP Peace
Panel
on
Ancestral
Domain
4. Venue
Diaz vs. Adiong

Nocum vs Tan

Thus, the trial court should have applied Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of the Alguras after their affidavits and supporting documents showed that petitioners
did not satisfy the twin requirements on gross monthly income and ownership of real property under Rule 141. Instead of disqualifying the Alguras as indigent
litigants, the trial court should have called a hearing as required by Rule 3, Section 21 to enable the petitioners to adduce evidence to show that they didn't have
property and money sufficient and available for food, shelter, and basic necessities for them and their family. 27 In that hearing, the respondents would have had
the right to also present evidence to refute the allegations and evidence in support of the application of the petitioners to litigate as indigent litigants. Since this
Court is not a trier of facts, it will have to remand the case to the trial court to determine whether petitioners can be considered as indigent litigants using the
standards set in Rule 3, Section 21
the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court wrote that:
"We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered
an 'injury-in-fact', thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third
party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests". 33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the
petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the
enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties
Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit
Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments
will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or
the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; VENUE OF LIBEL CASE WHERE OFFENDED PARTY IS AN PUBLIC OFFICIAL. From the provision of Article 360, third
paragraph of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 4363, it is clear that an offended party who is at the same time a public official can only institute an
action arising from libel in two (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and the place where the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published.
2. ID.; ID.; IMPROPER VENUE; MUST BE RAISED IN A NOTION TO DISMISS PRIOR TO A RESPONSIVE PLEADING. Unless and until the defendant
objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss prior to a responsive pleading, the venue cannot truly be said to have been improperly laid since, for all practical
intents and purposes, the venue though technically wrong may yet be considered acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been
devised.

REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION; CONFERRED BY LAW BASED ON THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT. It is settled that
jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff's causes of action. In the case at bar, after examining the original complaint, we find that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was
filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondent's cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code provides that it is a Court of First Instance that is specifically designated to try a libel case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONERS ARE CONFUSING JURISDICTION WITH VENUE. Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. A former colleague, the Hon.
Florenz D. Regalado, differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the
case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and
the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by
the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties. In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article

UOBP vs. Rosemoore

Sps. Lantin vs. Lantion

Pacific vs Schonfeld

and the caricature were printed and first published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction. These additional allegations
would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent's failure to include the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction
over the case. Respondent's failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
venue was not properly laid.
The venue of the action for the nullification of the foreclosure sale is properly laid with the Malolos RTC although two of the properties together with the Bulacan
properties are situated in Nueva Ecija. Following the above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court, the venue of real actions affecting properties found in different
provinces is determined by the singularity or plurality of the transactions involving said parcels of land. Where said parcels are the object of one and the same
transaction, the venue is in the court of any of the provinces wherein a parcel of land is situated
the general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The
mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that
such stipulation is exclusive. 6 In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum,
not as limiting venue to the specified place
The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by this Court in the vintage case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, 31 is that while they are
considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in
the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and categorically
expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by them. 32
In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely," "exclusively in this court," "in no other court save ," "particularly," "nowhere else but/except ," or
words of equal import were stated in the contract. 33 It cannot be said that the court of arbitration in London is an exclusive venue to bring forth any complaint
arising out of the employment contract.
Petitioners contend that respondent should have filed his Complaint in his place of permanent residence, or where the PCIJ holds its principal office, at the place
where the contract of employment was signed, in London as stated in their contract. By enumerating possible venues where respondent could have filed his
complaint, however, petitioners themselves admitted that the provision on venue in the employment contract is indeed merely permissive.

5-6. Uniform Procedure in Trial Courts (Rule 5, Sections 1 & 2) and Kinds of Pleadings (Rule 6, Sections 1 to 13)
International
Container REMEDIAL LAW; FORUM-SHOPPING; WHEN PRESENT. For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, same essential facts
Terminal Services, Inc. and circumstances. Furthermore, the actions must also raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. Moreover, "[t]here is forum-shopping
vs. CA, G.R. No. 116910, whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another." Therefore, a party to a
October 18, 1995
case resorts to forum-shopping because "[b]y filing another petition involving the same essential facts and circumstances, . . . , respondents approached two
different fora in order to increase their chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action
Metals
Engineering 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM; ELEMENTS; PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR. Private respondent's
Resources Corp. vs. CA, counterclaim is compulsory in nature since (1) it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
G.R. No. 115088, June 20, opposing party's claim; 2) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and 3) the court has
1996
jurisdiction to entertain the claim.

Financial Bldg. Corp. vs.

Forbes Park, G.R. No.
133119, August 17, 2000

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE MADE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE ACTION. The rule is that a compulsory counterclaim not set up shall be barred if not
raised on time and the party in error is precluded from setting it up in a subsequent litigation on the ground of res judicata, the theory being that what are barred by
prior judgment are not only the matters actually raised and litigated upon, but also such matters as could have been raised but were not. In other words, a
compulsory counterclaim cannot be made the subject of a separate action but should be asserted in the same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence
giving rise to it. Where the counterclaim is made the subject of a separate suit, it may be abated upon a plea of auter action pendant or litis pendentia, and or
dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
IF THE DISMISSAL OF THE MAIN ACTION RESULTS IN THE DISMISSAL OF THE COUNTERCLAIM ALREADY FILED, THE FILING OF A MOTION TO
DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IS AN IMPLIED WAIVER OF THE COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM. A compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in
the original suit and derives its jurisdictional support therefrom. A counterclaim presupposes the existence of a claim against the party filing the counterclaim.
Hence, where there is no claim against the counterclaimant, the counterclaim is improper and it must be dismissed, more so where the complaint is dismissed at
the instance of the counterclaimant. In other words, if the dismissal of the main action results in the dismissal of the counterclaim already filed, it stands to reason
that the filing of a motion to dismiss the complaint is an implied waiver of the compulsory counterclaim because the grant of the motion ultimately results in the
dismissal of the counterclaim. Thus, the filing of a motion to dismiss and the setting up of a compulsory counterclaim are incompatible remedies. In the event that
a defending party has a ground for dismissal and a compulsory counterclaim at the same time, he must choose only one remedy. If he decides to file a motion to
dismiss, he will lose his compulsory counterclaim. But if he opts to set up his compulsory counterclaim, he may still plead his ground for dismissal as an affirmative

Mercader vs. DBP (Cebu

Branch), G.R. No. 130699,
May 12, 2000

defense in his answer. The latter option is obviously more favorable to the defendant although such fact was lost on Forbes Park. The ground for dismissal
invoked by Forbes Park in Civil Case No. 16540 was lack of cause of action. There was no need to plead such ground in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
since the same was not deemed waived if it was not pleaded. Nonetheless, Forbes Park still filed a motion to dismiss and thus exercised bad judgment in its
choice of remedies. Thus, it has no one to blame but itself for the consequent loss of its counterclaim as a result of such choice
As a supplemental pleading, it served to aver supervening facts which were then not ripe for judicial relief when the original pleading was filed. As such, it was
meant to supply deficiencies in aid of the original pleading, and not to dispense with the latter. Hence, it was patently erroneous for the Court of Appeals to
pronounce that the lease-purchase option was not raised in the pleadings. The DBP was even quite aware and knowledgeable of the supplemental pleading
because it filed an opposition thereto.|||

7. Parts of Pleadings (Rule 7, Sections 1 to 5)

Banco Filipino Savings G.R. No. 70054 "BF vs. Monetary Board, et al.," is an original special civil action for certiorari and mandamus filed in this Court by the old management of BF,
and Mortgage Bank vs. through their counsel, N.J. Quisumbing & Associates, using the name of the bank and praying for the annulment of MB Resolution No. 75 which ordered the
Court of Appeals, G.R. closure of BF and placed it under receivership. It is a "forum-shopping" case because it was filed here or February 28, 1985 three weeks after they had filed on
No. 70054, December 11, February 2, 1985 Civil Case No. 9675 "Banco Filipino vs. Monetary Board, et al." in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 143 (presided over by Judge Zoilo
1991
Aguinaldo) for the same purpose of securing a declaration of the nullity of MB Resolution No. 75 dated January 25, 1985
Republic vs. Kenrick A signed pleading is one that is signed either by the party himself or his counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must be
Development Corp., G.R. signed by the party or counsel representing him. Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from
No. 149576, August 8, one that is unsigned to one that is signed. Counsels authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any person.
2006
Argallon-Jocson
and The certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient.
Tusing vs. CA, G.R. No.
162836, July 30, 2009
Vicar
International A Board Rolution of a corporation is necessary for a secretary to sign a certificate non forum shopping
Construction vs. FEB
leasing and Finance, G.R.
No. 157195, April 22, 2005
Maranaw
Hotels
and Specific authorization could only come in the form of a board resolution issued by the Board of Directors that specifically authorizes the counsel to institute the
Resort Corp vs. CA, G.R. petition and execute the certification, to make his actions binding on his principal, i.e., the corporation.
No. 149660, January 20,
2009
Huibonhoa
vs. To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important question to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present or
Concepcion, G.R. No. whether a final judgment in one case will result to res judicata in another. Otherwise stated, to determine forum shopping, the test is to see whether in the two or
153785, August 3, 2006
more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought
San Miguel Corporation While the general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case and the signature of only one of them
vs. Aballa, G.R. No. is insufficient,[19] this Court has stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice,
149011, June 28, 2005
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective
This Court has allowed a liberal construction of the rule on the accomplishment of a certificate of non-forum shopping in the following cases: (1) where a rigid
application will result in manifest failure or miscarriage of justice; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of the motion
is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
National
Steel The powers of corporations organized under the Corporation Code shall be exercised by the board of directors; that the exercise of such powers may be done
Corporation vs. CA, G.R. indirectly through delegation; that pursuant to the exercise of its powers, the corporation through its Board of Directors, may employ such persons as it may need
No. 134468, August 29, to carry on the operations of the corporate business; that hence, with the express authorization by NSCs board of directors, Atty. Padilla was conferred with
2002
enough authority to sign the Verification cum Certification in the petition for review filed before the Court of Appeals
Vallacar Transit, Inc. vs. A partys failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different from the partys failure to sign personally the verification. The certificate of
Jocelyn Catubig, G.R. No. non-forum shopping must be signed by the party, and not by counsel. The certification of counsel renders the petition defective.
175512, May 30, 2011
On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal and not a jurisdictional requisite. It is intended simply to secure an assurance that
what are alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good

Vda. De Formoso vs.

PNB, G.R. No. 154704,
June 1, 2011

faith. The party need not sign the verification. A partys representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading
may sign the verification.
NON-COMPLIANCE with the requirement on or submission of DEFECTIVE VERIFICATION
Non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
The Court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule
may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. (Curable)
2. Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
NON-COMPLIANCE with the requirement on or submission of defective CERTIFIACATION against FORUM SHOPPING
Generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of substantial
compliance or presence of special circumstances or compelling reasons.
The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped
as parties to the case. UNLESS under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially
complies with the Rule.
The certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. UNLESS for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the
party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

8. Manner of Making Allegations in Pleadings (Rule 8, Sections 1 to 12)

Caete vs. Genuino Ice A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact, or
Co., G.R. No. 154080, conclusions of law. Ultimate facts means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action, or such facts as are so essential that they cannot be
January 22, 2008
stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate.
Imperial Textile Mills vs.
CA, G.R. No. 86568,
March 22, 1990
Guevarra vs. Eala, A.C.
No. 7136, August 1, 2007

an action based on a written instrument attached to the complaint, if the defendant fails to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument, the same is deemed admitted

Philippine American
General Insurance Co. et
al vs. Sweet Lines, G.R.
No. 87434, August 5,
1992

A denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It is in effect an admission of the
averment it is directed to. 25 Thus, while petitioners objected to the validity of such agreement for being contrary to public policy, the existence of the bills of lading
and said stipulations were nevertheless impliedly admitted by them.

a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a
denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of
the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted

9&11. Effect of Failure to Plead (Rule 9, Sections 1 to 3) and When to File Responsive Pleadings (Rule 11, Sections 1 to 11)
Ferrer vs. Ericta, G.R. No. Actions for damages arising from physical injuries because of a tort must be filed within four years. 8 The four-year period begins from the day the quasi-delict is
L-41767, August 13, 1978
committed or the date of the accident. It is true that the defense of prescription can only be considered if the same is invoked as such in the answer of the
defendant and that in this particular instance no such defense was invoked because the defendants had been declared in default, but such rule does riot obtain
when the evidence shows that the cause of action upon which plaintiff's complaint is based is already barred by the statute of limitations.
Ponciano vs. Parentela, A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out
G.R. No. 133284, May 9, of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiffs complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that if it is
2000
within the jurisdiction of the court, and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, it must be
set up therein, and will be barred in the future if not set up
Gojo vs. Goyala, G.R. No. A plaintiff who chooses not to answer a compulsory counterclaim must not be declared in default principally because the issues raised in the compulsory
L-26768, October 30, counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by the allegations in the complaint.
1970
Liam Law vs. Olympic Sec. 9 of the Usury law- The person shall file its answer in writing and under oath to any complaint brought or filed against the corporation before a competent

Sawmill Co. And Elino

Lee Chi, G.R. No. L30771, May 28, 1984

court. Lack of oath in the answer will result to admission of facts contained in the complaint.

Meliton vs. CA, G.R. No.

101883, December 11,
1992
Korea Technologies Co.
Ltd. Vs. Lerma, G.R. No.
143581, January 7, 2008

A dismissal of the complaint due to non payment of docket fees is without prejudice. Hence, a counterclaim can still be instituted.

Gajudo vs. Traders Royal

Bank, G.R. No. 151098,
March 21, 2006

If there is failure to answer, the court upon motion and proper declaration that the defending party is in default, court to then proceed to render judgement unless
required to submit evidence ex parte.

Laus vs. CA, G.R. No.

101256, March 8, 1993

A Motion to Dismiss is considered an incompatible remedy when such is not filed within the reglementary period.

De Guia vs. De Guia,

G.R. No. 135384, April 4,
2001
Lorbes vs. CA, G.R. No.
139884, February 15,
2001
Luna vs. Mirafuente,
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1610,
September 26, 2005

Notice of pre trial must be served both to counsel and the party. If served only upon the counsel, it must contain an express direction to inform his client of the
date, place, and time of the pre trial.

The remedy from an adverse judgment is appeal.

Answer filed not within the reglementary period a ground for the dismissal of the complaint
Sec. 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, answer must be made within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint. Failure to comply shall cause the complaint
to be dismissed upon motion or motu propio.

10. Amended and Supplemental Pleadings (Rule 10, Sections 1 to 8)

Bautista vs. Maya-Maya An amendment is a matter of right when no responsive pleading has yet to be filed.
Cottages, Inc., G.R. No.
148361, November 29,
2005
Alpine Lending Investors A Motion to Dismiss is not a responsive pleading. An amendment is still a matter of right.
vs. Corpuz, G.R. No.
157107, November 24,
2006
Philippine
Ports Substantial amendments are to made with leave of court. But the same may be disallowed if it is interposed for delay.
Authority vs. WG&A, G.R.
No. 158401, January 28,
2008
Azolla Farms vs. CA, G.R. Sec. 5 Rule Rule 10- Authority to conform or Authority to present evidence is in the sound discretion of the court
No. 138085, November
11, 2004
Swagman Hotels and The curing effect of Sec. 5 Rule 10 applies only if the cause of action exists at the time of the filing of the complaint.
Travel, Inc. vs. CA, G.R.
No. 161135, April 8, 2005

10

Young vs. Spouses Sy,

G.R. Nos. 157745 &
157955, September 26,
2006

Causes of action stated in the supplemental complaint is different from the causes of action in the original complaint, the court shall not admit the supplemental
pleading.

12. Motion for Bill of Particulars (Rule 12)

Virata
vs. A general function or purpose of a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in the case when that cannot be accomplished without the aid of such a bill.
Sandiganbayan,
221 It is not the office of a bill of particulars to supply material allegations necessary to the validity of a pleading, or to change a cause of action or defense stated in
SCRA 52 (1993)
the pleading, or to state a cause of action or defense other than the one stated.
Tan vs. Sandiganbayan, The Motion for Bill of Particulars primary objective is to apprise the adverse party of what the plaintiff wants to preclude the latter from springing a surprise attack
180 SCRA 34 (1989)
later. Any more particulars in that event would be evidentiary in character, which must be adduced at the trial proper.
Saw vs. CA, 195 SCRA An intervention has been regarded, as merely "collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal action and not an independent proceedings; and interlocutory
740 (1991)
proceeding dependent on and subsidiary to, the case between the original parties." With the final dismissal of the original action, the complaint in intervention can
no longer be acted upon. That right of the intervenor should merely be in aid of the right of the original party, like the plaintiffs in this case. As this right of the
plaintiffs had ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for. So the right of intervention has ceased to exist In the case at bar, there is no more principal action
to be resolved as a writ of execution had already been issued by the lower court and the claim of Equitable had already been satisfied. The decision of the lower
court had already become final and in fact had already been enforced. There is therefore no more principal proceeding in which the petitioners may intervene.
Metropolitan Bank & *There is no question that intervention is only collateral or ancillary to the main action. Hence, it was previously ruled that the final dismissal of the principal action
Trust Co. vs. Presiding results in the dismissal of said ancillary action. The main action having ceased to exist, there is no pending proceeding whereon the intervention may be based. In
Judge, 182 SCRA 820 the case at bar, however, there was no such final or complete dismissal but rather an approval of a compromise agreement which was embodied in what was
(1990)
specifically designated as a 'Partial Decision' affecting only the interests of herein petitioner and the defendant in said case but not those of her co-plaintiff
municipality and the intervenor. The clear intent of the court below in making the partial decision is to make a reservation to determine the rights of the intervenor
and, presumably, the plaintiff municipality. There may be nothing much left to be done with respect to the main case but as far as the proceedings in the trial court
are concerned, the controversy therein has not been fully settled and the disposition of the case is definitely incomplete.
*Granting of leave to file an amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and that discretion is broad, subject only
to the limitations that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case or that it was made to delay the action.
Once exercised, that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal, except in case of abuse thereof.
13. Filing and Service of Pleadings (Rule 13)
Aberca, et al vs. Ver, G.R. The only modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers allowed by the rules are personal service, service by mail and
No. 166216, March 14, substituted service if either personal service or service by mail cannot be made, as stated in Sections 6, 7 and 8 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. Nowhere under
2012
this rule is service of notice to file answer by publication is mentioned, much less recognized.
Service by publication only applies to service of summons stated under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court where the methods of service of summons in civil cases are:
(1) personal service;(2) substituted service; and (3) service by publication.
Romero vs. Court of As provided for by Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled on two grounds: (1) if the annotation was for
Appeals,
G.R.
No. the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. To
142406, May 16, 2005
put the property under the coverage of the rule on lis pendens, all a party has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property. It is not
necessary that ownership or interest over the property is proved.
De Los Santos vs. Service upon the parties' counsels of record is tantamount to service upon the parties themselves, but service upon the parties themselves is not considered
Elizalde, 514 SCRA 14
service upon their lawyers.
Marinduque Mining and Personal service of pleadings and other papers is the general rule while resort to the other modes of service and filing is the exception. When recourse is made to
Industrial
Corp.
vs. the other modes, a written explanation why service or filing was not done personally becomes indispensable. If no explanation is offered to justify resorting to the
NAPOCOR, 567 SCRA other modes, the discretionary power of the court to expunge the pleading comes into play.
483
United Pulp and Paper Sec.5 Rule 7 requires that the principal party or plaintiff certify under oath the complaint or other initiatory pleading he has commenced. Here, only counsel, who
co. Inc. vs. United Pulp was not authorized, signed.
and
Paper
Chapter- Sec. 11, Rule 13 requires written explanation to be attached in the petition why service or filing was not done personally. Where no explanation is offered to justify
Federation
of
Free service of pleadings by other modes, the discretionary power of court to expunge the pleading becomes mandatory. So, CA correctly expunged the petition due to
Workers, 426 SCRA 329, lack of written explanation. Rules of procedure exist for a purpose and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose.

11

G.R. No. 141117, March

25, 2004
14. Summons (Rule 14)
E.B. Villarosa & Partner
Co., Ltd. vs. Benito, 312
SCRA 65 (1999)

Northwest
Orient
Airlines, Inc. vs. CA, 241
SCRA 192 (1995)

Robinson vs. Miralles,

G.R.
No.
163584,
December 12, 2006)

Valmonte vs. CA,

SCRA 92 (1996)

252

Delos
Santos
vs.
Montesa, 221 SCRA 15
(1993)
Orion
Security
Corporation vs. Kalfam
Enterprises, Inc., G.R.
No. 163287, April 27, 2007
Santos
vs.
PNOC
Exploration Corporation,

Under the Old law, service of summons upon a manager is valid. But this rule no longer applies after the revision of the Rules in 97. The designation of persons
or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corp or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified under Section 11, Rule 14. The rule
now states general manager instead of only manager; corporate secretary instead of secretary; and treasurer instead of cashier. The phrase agent, or
any of its directors is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.
Strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over corp/ partnership.
Thus, service of summons upon branch manager of pet at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro instead upon the general manager at its principal office in Davao is
improper. Trial court has no jurisdiction. Thus all its orders and issuances is annulled and set aside.
In the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption may be invoked.
Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines,
service may be made: (1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if there is no such resident agent, on the government
official designated by law to that effect; or (3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive summons, the designation is exclusive, and service of summons is without force and gives the court
no jurisdiction unless made upon him.
Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the government official designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case
of a foreign insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission,
in the case of other foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Whenever service of process is so made, the government office or official
served shall transmit by mail a copy of the summons or other legal process to the corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such copy is a
necessary part of the service.
Under our procedural rules, personal service is generally preferred over substituted service, the latter mode of service being a method extraordinary in character.
For substituted service to be justified, the following circumstances must be clearly established: (a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was
impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the partys
residence or upon a competent person in charge of the partys office or place of business. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on
jurisdictional grounds.
We have ruled that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and any substituted service other than that
authorized by the Rules is considered ineffective. However, we frown upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of the
procedural rules, that governs.
In his Return, Sheriff Potente declared that he was refused entry by the security guard in Alabang Hills twice. The latter informed him that petitioner prohibits him
from allowing anybody to proceed to her residence whenever she is out. Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or substituted service of
summons upon petitioner. We note that she failed to controvert the sheriffs declaration. Nor did she deny having received the summons through the security
guard.
Considering her strict instruction to the security guard, she must bear its consequences. Thus, we agree with the trial court that summons has been properly
served upon petitioner and that it has acquired jurisdiction over her.
As petitioner Lourdes Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, 17. Such
service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places
and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address
of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner.
Defendant's voluntary appearance in the action equivalent to service of summons. Any mode of appearance in court by a defendant or his lawyer is equivalent to
service of summons, absent any indication that the appearance of counsel for petitioner was precisely to protest the jurisdiction of the court over the person of
defendant.
Jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and
their submission to its authority. Summons should be personally served on the defendant.
In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry,service may, by leave of court,be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such times as the court may order.

12

G.R.
No.
170943,
September 23, 2008
PCIB vs. Spouses Wilson
Dy Hong Pi et al, G.R. No.
171137, June 5, 2009

NM Rothschild & Sons

vs. Lepanto Consolidated
Mining Company, G.R.
No. 175799, November
28, 2011
15. Motions (Rule 15)
Lanto vs. Dimaporo, 16
SCRA 599 (1966)
Vlason Enterprises Corp.
vs. CA, 330 SCRA 26
(1999)

Vette Industrial Sales,

Co., Inc. vs. Cheng,
G.R.No. 170232-170301,
December 5, 2006
Boiser vs. Aguirre, Jr.,
458 SCRA 430

Sarmiento vs.
514 SCRA 246

Zaratan,

A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An appearance in whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. While the formal method of entering an appearance in a cause pending in the
courts is to deliver to the clerk a written direction ordering him to enter the appearance of the person who subscribes it, an appearance may be made by simply
filing a formal motion, or plea or answer. This formal method of appearance is not necessary. He may appear without such formal appearance and thus submit
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. He may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such appearance he specifically objects to the
jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
Extraterritorial Service of summons applies only when where the action is in rem or quasi in rem but not if an action is in personam. Seeking affirmative relief in a
court is tantamount to voluntary appearance therein.

Where the question of law raised in the motion to dismiss was fully discussed in said motion and the opposition thereto, oral arguments on the motion are reduced
to an unnecessary ceremony and should be overlooked. This is so, because the other intendment of the law in requiring hearing on a motion, i.e., "to avoid
surprises upon the opposite party and to give to the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion", has been sufficiently met. Courts do not exalt form
over substance.
A motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the clerk of
court has no right to receive and the trial court has no authority to act upon. Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice of the time and the place of hearing
of that motion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants to comply with these requirements renders their motions fatally defective. However, there
are exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These exceptions are as follows: ". . . Liberal construction of this rule has been allowed by this Court in cases
(1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice; especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the
questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be
served; (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse
party is not commensurate to the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed."
In De Rapisura v. Nicolas, the movant also failed to attach to his motion for reconsideration proof of service of a copy thereof to the other party. Nonetheless, this
Court held the failure not fatal as the adverse party had actually received a copy of the motion and was in fact present in court when the motion was heard. It was
held that the demands of substantial justice were satisfied by the actual receipt of said motion under those conditions.

A motion without notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It presents no question which the court could decide. The court has no reason to
consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The rationale behind the rule is plain: unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court will be
unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the rules themselves do not
fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition. The objective of the rule is to avoid a capricious change of mind in order to provide due process to
both parties and ensure impartiality in the trial.
Also, without proof of service to the adverse party, a motion is nothing but an empty formality deserving no judicial cognizance. The rule mandates that the same
shall not be acted upon by the court. Proof of service is mandatory.

As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand
that his right be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. The three-day notice required by law is intended not for the benefit of the movant but to avoid
surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a
party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard. The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study
the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. Considering the circumstances of the present case, we believe that
procedural due process was substantially complied with.

Further, it has been held that a "motion for extension of time . . . is not a litigated motion where notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the
latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex parte motion made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence and
usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties." As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by
the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. It has been said that "ex parte motions are

13

frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is
sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay might tend to defeat the objective of the motion."
16. Motion to Dismiss (Rule 16)
Boticano vs. Chu, 148

In fact, one of the circumstances considered by the Court as indicative of waiver by the defendant-appellant of any alleged defect of jurisdiction over his
SCRA 541 (1987)
person arising from defective or even want of process, is his failure to raise the question of jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance and at the first opportunity. It
has been held that upon general principles, defects in jurisdiction arising from irregularities in the commencement of the proceedings, defective process or even
absence of process may be waived by a failure to make seasonable objections.

Del Rosario vs Far East

Bank
and
Trust
Company,
G.R.
No.
150134, October 31, 2007
Halimao vs. Villanueva,
253 SCRA 1 (1996)

Tan vs. CA, 295 SCRA

247 (1998)

Asia Production Co., Inc.

vs. Pano, 205 SCRA 458
(1992)
Sunville
Timber
Products, Inc. vs. Abad,
206 SCRA 482 (1992)

Municipality of Binan vs.

Under Section 23, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service. Thus, under this
principle, it has been consistently held by the Supreme Court that the defect of summons is cured by the voluntary appearance of the defendant when he did not
only submit pleadings and motions, but he likewise appeared in person, thru counsel in the hearing and orally argued in open court on the pending incident.
"Bar by former judgment" makes the judgment rendered in the first case an absolute bar to the subsequent action since that judgment is conclusive not only as to
the matters offered and received to sustain it but also as to any other matter which might have been offered for that purpose and which could have been adjudged
therein. It is in this concept that the term res judicata is more commonly and generally used as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases.
The rule that a motion to dismiss is to be considered as a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the complaint applies more particularly to cases in which
the ground for dismissal is the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. When it appears on the face of the complaint that the plaintiff is not entitled to any
relief under the facts alleged, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint. By filing such a motion, the
defendant in effect says that even assuming the facts to be as alleged by the plaintiff, the latter has failed to prove that he has a right which the former has
violated. The rule does not unqualifiedly apply to a case where the defendant files a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction of the court or tribunal over the
person of the defendant or over the subject matter or over the nature of the action; or on improper venue; or on lack of capacity to sue of the plaintiff or on litis
pendentia, res judicata, prescription, unenforceability, or on the allegation that the suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made. In such cases, the hypothetical admission is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint which relate to and are necessary for the
resolution of these grounds as preliminary matters involving substantive or procedural laws, but not to the other facts of the case. On the other hand, when a
motion to dismiss is based on payment, waiver, abandonment, release, compromise, or other form of extinguishment, the motion to dismiss does not
hypothetically, but actually, admits the facts alleged in the complaint, i.e., the existence of the obligation or debt, only that the plaintiff claims that the obligation has
been satisfied. So that when a motion to dismiss on these grounds is denied, what is left to be proven in the trial is no longer the existence of the debt but the fact
vel non of payment by the defendant.
The flaw in the conclusion of the respondent court that the complaint stated a cause of action is that, while conveniently echoing the general rule that averments in
the complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted upon the filing of a motion to dismiss grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, it did not take into
account the equally established limitations to such rule, i.e., that a motion to dismiss does not admit the truth of mere epithets of fraud; nor allegations of legal
conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law. A more judicious resolution of a motion to dismiss, therefore, necessitates that the court be not restricted to the
consideration of the facts alleged in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Courts may consider other facts within the range of judicial notice as
well as relevant laws and jurisprudence which the courts are bound to take into account, and they are also fairly entitled to examine records/documents duly
incorporated into the complaint by the pleader himself in ruling on the demurrer to the complaint.
Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on the ground that the claim on
which the action is founded is enforceable under the provisions of the Statute of Frauds.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy
falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of
action, which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates
as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been observed.
One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters
coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to
resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a
chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner.
Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court is not mandatory even when the same is prayed for. It rests largely on the sound discretion of the trial court. The use of

14

CA, 219 SCRA 69 (1993)

NPC vs. CA, 185 SCRA
169 (1990)

Pacsports Phils., Inc. vs.

Niccolo Sports, G.R. No.
141602, November 22,
2001
Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. vs.
Chavez, G.R. No. 174160,
April 20, 2010

Fels Energy Inc. vs.

Province of Batangas,
G.R.
No.
168557,
February 19, 2007

the word "may" in said provision shows that such a hearing is not a matter of right demandable from the trial court. Where the provision reads "may," this word
shows that it is not mandatory but discretional. It is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission and possibility. Moreover, a preliminary hearing on
an affirmative defense for failure to state a cause of action is not necessary.
The ordinary procedure would have been to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal. But this general rule is subject to
certain exceptions, among which are, if the court in denying the motion to dismiss acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The
reason is, it would be unfair to require the defendant to undergo the ordeal and expense of trial under such circumstances as the remedy of appeal would not be
plain and adequate. More importantly, petitioner's motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, so that there is no need
for a full blown trial.
The firmly established rule is that one of two actions will be dismissed on ground of litis pendentia if the following requisites concur: (a) identity of parties, or at
least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
the identity in the two (2) cases should be such that judgment in one would amount to res judicata in the other. In view of those similarities in the two actions, a
final judgment on the merits in one would be a bar against the other on the ground of res judicata. This Court held in several cases that when the elements of litis
pendentia exist, the action filed later should be abated to avoid multiplicity of suits.
While conclusiveness of judgment does not have the same barring effect as that of a bar by former judgment that proscribes subsequent actions, the former
nonetheless estops the parties from raising in a later case the issues or points that were raised and controverted, and were determinative of the ruling in the
earlier case. In other words, the dictum laid down in the earlier final judgment or order becomes conclusive and continues to be binding between the same parties,
their privies and successors-in-interest, as long as the facts on which that judgment was predicated continue to be the facts of the case or incident before the court
in a later case; the binding effect and enforceability of that earlier dictum can no longer be re-litigated in a later case since the issue has already been resolved
and finally laid to rest in the earlier case.

Res judicata pervades every organized system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of common law, namely:
(1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation republicae ut sit litium; and (2) the hardship on
the individual of being vexed twice for the same cause nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A conflicting doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to
the will and dereliction of individuals and prefer the regalement of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and
happiness.

It must be stressed that an important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants
by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in two different fora. Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the administration
of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.

Yuvienco vs. Dacuycuy,

104 SCRA 668
Bank of America vs. CA,
400 SCRA 156

Associated Bank vs.

Spouses Montano, 604

Thus, there is forum shopping when there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered
in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
Under existing jurisprudence relative to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, the movant-defendant is deemed to
admit the factual allegations of the complaint. While such is the rule, those allegations do not detract from the fact that under Article 1319 of the Civil Code there
was not an absolute acceptance, hence the complaint states no cause of action.

The order denying the motion to dismiss cannot be the subject of petition for certiorari. Petitioners should have filed an answer to the complaint, proceed
to trial and await judgment before making an appeal. As repeatedly held by this Court: "An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the
subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or mandamus. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer and to interpose as defenses the objections
raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. . . . Under certain
situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, i.e., (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where
there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not
promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiff's baseless action and compelling the defendant
needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case."

A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest. Lack of personality to sue can be used as
a ground for a Motion to Dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
It is inconsequential that petitioner had already filed an answer to the complaint prior to its filing of a motion to dismiss. The option of whether to set the case for
preliminary hearing after the filing of an answer which raises affirmative defenses, or to file a motion to dismiss raising any of the grounds set forth in Section 1,

15

SCRA 134
Lu Ym vs. Gertrudes
Nabua, 452 SCRA 298

Rule 16 of the Rules are procedural options which are not mutually exclusive of each other.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion or
order the amendment of the pleading.The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason

17. Dismissal of Actions (Rule 17)

O.B.
Jovenir The trial court has no discretion or option to deny the motion, since dismissal by the plaintiff under Section 1, Rule 17 is guaranteed as a matter of right to the
Construction
and plaintiffs. Even if the motion cites the most ridiculous of grounds for dismissal, the trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as dismissed, since the
Development Corp. vs. plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of ground.
Macamir Realty and CA,
G.R. No. 135803, March
26, 2006
Cruz. vs. CA, G.R. No. The doctrine of res judicata is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims
164797, February 13, of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation - republicae ut sit
2006
litium, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause - nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would
subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the
preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.
Ko vs. PNB, 479 SCRA

Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff, proper remedy is ordinary appeal with the Court of Appeals.
298, January 28, 2006

Duty of plaintiff to prosecute his action with diligence, neglect thereof warrants dismissal of case.
Gajudo vs. Traders The mere fact that a defendant in default does not automatically result in the grant of the prayers of the plaintiff.
Royal Bank, G.R. N o. To win, the latter must still present the same quantum of evidence that would required if the defendant were still present.
151098, March 21, 2006
Martinez vs. Republic,

Party declared in default retains the right to appeal from judgment by default on the ground that plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the
G.R. No. 160895, October complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without need of prior filing of motion to set aside the order of default.
30, 2006

A party declared in default has the right to appeal from the judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is different
in kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law.
18. Pre Trial (Rule 18)
LCK Industries Inc. vs.
Planters
Development
Bank, G.R. No. 170606,
November 23, 2007
Calalang vs. CA, 217
SCRA 462 (1993)
Paredes vs. Verano, 504
SCRA 264
19. Intervention (Rule 19)
Mactan
Cebu
International vs. Heirs of
Minoza, February 2, 2011
Bon-Mar Realty vs. de
Guzman,
G.R.
No.
182136, August 29, 2008
Executive Secretary vs.
Northeast Freight, 581
SCRA 76

Purpose of entering into a stipulation of facts is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the court as well of the costs of proving facts which will not
be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.

Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Pre-trial is a device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues between the
parties.
A pre trial cannot validly be held until the last pleading has been filed which last pleading may be the plaintiffs reply, except where the period to file the last
pleading has lapsed.
A judgment of default against a defendant nwo failed to attend pre-trial, or even any defendant who failed to file an answer, implies waiver only of their right to be
heard and to present evidence to support their allegations but not all their other rights.

The interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant. It must be of such
direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.

It is not proper where there are certain facts giving the intervenors case an aspect peculiar to himself and differentiating it clearly from that of the
original parties; the proper course is for the would-be intervenor to litigate his claim in a separate suit.
To warrant intervention, two requisites must concur:
a). Movant has a legal interest in the matter of litigation; and
b). intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of the parties nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly
decided in a separate proceeding.
The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The permissive term of the rules shows the intention to
give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing intervention.

16

20-22. Calendar of Cases/Subpoena/ Computation of Time (Rules 20, 21 and 22)

People vs. Montejo, 21 Excusing a witness from appearance before a court judge, or other officer of the province in which he resides if the distance exceeds 50 kilometers from his place
SCRA 722
of residence to the place of trial by the usual course of travel, applies solely to civil cases and not to criminal cases.
Commissioner of Internal The rule is that the 2 year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted return. A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a
Revenue vs. Primetown regular year of a leap year.
Property, 531 SCRA 436
23-24. Rules 23 and 24 (Depositions)
Fortune Corporation vs.

Rules providing for pre-trial discovery of testimony, inspection of documentary evidence and other tangible things and the examination of property and
CA, G.R. No. 108119, person were an important innovation in the rules of procedure.
January 19, 1994

The rule clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good cause shown that the court may order that the deposition shall not be taken.
Republic
vs.

The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing, to narrow and clarify the basic issues
Sandiganbayan,
between the parties, and as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues.
November 21, 1991

Leave of court not necessy:

a). depositions (whether oral examination or written interrogatories);
b). interrogatories to parties;
c). request for admission, may be availed of without leave of court, and generally, w/o court intervention.
Caguiat vs. Torres, 30 2. ID.; DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY; RIGHT TO TAKE DEPOSITION, NOT ABSOLUTE; DEPOSITION FOR PROTECTION OF PARTIES AND WITNESSES.
SCRA 106
The right of a party to take depositions as a means of discovery is not exactly absolute under Sections 16 and 18 of Rule 24 of the Rules of Court for these
rules are precisely designed to protect the parties and their witnesses. The Court can either prevent the taking of a deposition, or stop one that is already being
taken whenever, in its opinion, the move to take their depositions is actually intended to only annoy, embarrass or oppress them.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEPOSITIONS, WHEN UNNECESSARY. Where, aside from having practically disclosed all his evidence at the pre-trial defendant expressed
willingness to enter into a stipulation of facts, which offer plaintiffs rejected, and, where the parties herein filed a joint motion for hearing on the merits, it is
inevitable to conclude that there was indeed no further need for the deposition desired by appellants. It would not serve any useful purpose, for there was show
any real concrete reason for such deposition
Dasmarinas
Garments Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to
Inc. vs. Reyes, 225 SCRA the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial. Indeed, the law authorizes the taking of depositions of witnesses
622
before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court "to perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in the said
court" (Rule 134, Rules of Court), and even during the process of execution of a final and executory judgment
Deposition-taking in the case at bar is a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor
could be observed by the trial judge;" but the procedure is not on that account rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken, inadmissible. It precisely falls
within one of the exceptions where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of a deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony of the deponent in
open court and without being "subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge." This is allowed provided the deposition is taken in accordance with
the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court and the existence of any of the exceptions for its admissibility e.g., "that the witness is out of the province and at
a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the
party offering the deposition; or . . . that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment, etc." (Sec. 4, Rule 24, supra,
italics
supplied)

is
first
satisfactorily
established
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be
opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay; the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his
testimony is offered. It matters not that that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for
cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing.
Cariaga vs. CA, 358 Court emphasized that "the preconditions set forth in Section 47, Rule 130 for the admission of testimony given by a witness out of court must be strictly complied
SCRA 583
with and that there is more reason to adopt such a strict rule in the case of Section 1(f) of Rule 115, for apart from being a rule of evidence with additional specific
requisites to those prescribed by Section 47, more importantly, said provision is an implementing translation of the constitutional right of an accused person "to
meet the witnesses (against him) face to face." In Tan vs. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that "'unable to testify' or for that matter 'unavailability', does not cover the
case of witnesses who were subpoenaed but did not appear. It may refer to inability proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when the
witness is old and has lost the power of speech. It does not refer to tampering of witnesses."

17

Rule 25 (Interrogatories to Parties)

Rule 26 (Admission By Adverse Party)
Rule 27 (Production or Inspection of Documents or Things)
Rule 28 (Physical and Mental Examination of Persons)
Rule 29 Refusal to Comply with Modes of Discovery - 1 to 6
Marcelo
vs. 1. REMEDIAL LAW; PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE; MODES OF DISCOVERY; THE RULES OF COURT PRESCRIBES THE PROCEDURES AND DEFINES ALL
Sandiganbayan,
531 THE CONSEQUENCES FOR REFUSING TO COMPLY WITH THE DIFFERENT MODES OF DISCOVERY The Republic cannot plausibly evade the
SCRA 385
consequences of its failure to answer written interrogatories and requests for admission. If the plaintiff fails or refuses to answer the interrogatories, it may be a
good basis for the dismissal of his complaint for non-suit unless he can justify such failure or refusal.To be sure, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedures and
defines all the consequence/s for refusing to comply with the different modes of discovery. The case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan, a case for recovery of illgotten wealth where the defendants served upon the PCGG written interrogatories but the latter refused to make a discovery, is relevant.

Arellano vs. CFI of

Sorsogon, 65 SCRA 46
Uy Chao vs. De La Rama
Steamship, 6 SCRA 69

DBP vs. CA, 470 SCRA

317
Nestle Philippines, Inc.
vs. CA, 375 SCRA 543

PNB vs. Gancayco, 15

SCRA 91

Air Philippines Corp. vs

2. SAME; SAME; THE RULES OF COURT REQUIRES EVERY PLEADING TO CONTAIN IN A METHODICAL AND LOGICAL FORM, A PLAIN, CONCISE AND
DIRECT STATEMENT OF THE ULTIMATE FACTS ON WHICH THE PARTY PLEADING RELIES FOR HIS CLAIM OR DEFENSE To stress, the Rules of Court
require every pleading to "contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for
his claim or defense". A transgression of this rule is fatal. In view of the absence of specific averments in the Republic's complaint, the same is defective for it
presents no basis upon which the court should act, or for the defendant to meet it with an intelligent answer. The complaint, to stress, did not present the very
documents claimed to be the source of the Marcelo-Marcos vinculum: it did not attach the alleged boat supply contract which is the main cause of action against
the petitioners; the unpaid loan document from which another claimed cause of action arose; and other relevant documents and information. The Republic tags, at
every turn, the PN-MFC contract to be a "favored contract", without, however, so much as stating with sufficient particularity the circumstances that led it to arrive
at such conclusion.
7. DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERIES; PURPOSE. The purpose of discovery procedure is to provide means by which both parties in an action may acquire,
without waiting for the trial, knowledge of material facts and evidence which otherwise would be peculiarly within the knowledge only of the other. In that way,
surprises and deceptions are avoided and the litigants must have to depend no longer on the techniques and tactics of trial lawyers but must win or lose on the
basis of the bare facts constituting their causes.
1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION OF FACTS AND GENUINENESS OF DOCUMENTS; WHEN THEY MUST BE MADE.
Requests for admission of facts and genuineness of document must be made after the pleadings are closed. The reason for this requirement is that the questions
of fact involved in a case are inquired into only when it reaches the stage of proof. Where this stage, as to any particular relevant fact, is accelerated by a motion
to dismiss which cannot be fairly resolved without evidence thereon being received, the purpose of the rule comes into play. In so far as that fact is concerned the
issue is already joined and the pleadings may be deemed to be closed within the meaning of Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.
2. ID.; DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINANT; INDUBITABILITY OF GROUND OF MOTION TO DISMISS. The fact that in dismissing the complaint the court did not
make a definite finding as to whether or not appellee was a war sufferer and had filed a war damage claim, leaving the question unresolved, shows that the
ground of the motion to dismiss does not appear to be indubitably, for which reason the court would have been justified in allowing an amendment of the complaint
so as to include therein the necessary allegation on that question of fact, or in deferring the determination of the motion until the trial.
The rule on admission as a mode of discovery is intended "to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and
the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry."
A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue, nor should he be required to
make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the
allegations of the requesting partys pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the request,
whose purpose is to establish said partys cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, pointless,
useless, and a mere redundancy
The disclosure would not be contrary to the policy making bank deposits confidential for while Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 declares bank deposits to be
"absolutely confidential" it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following instances: (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of
impeachment; (3) upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; (4) in cases where the money deposited is the
subject matter of the litigation. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of
cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential
Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because they derive economic value from being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable

18

Pennswell, 540 SCRA 215

Zepeda
vs.
China
Banking Corp., 504 SCRA
126

by the public
It should be noted that respondent bank filed a motion to expunge the complaint based on Section 3(c) of Rule 29 which states:
SEC. 3. Other consequences. If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order made under section 1 12 of this Rule requiring
him to answer designated questions, or an order under Rule 27 to produce any document or other thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to
be done, or to permit entry upon land or other property, or an order made under Rule 28 requiring him to submit to a physical or mental examination, the court may
make such orders in regard to the refusal as are just, and among others the following:
(c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party; and
As we have explained in Arellano v. Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, 14 the consequences enumerated in Section 3(c) of Rule 29 would only apply where the
party upon whom the written interrogatories is served, refuses to answer a particular question in the set of written interrogatories and despite an order compelling
him to answer the particular question, still refuses to obey the order.
In the instant case, petitioners refused to answer the whole set of written interrogatories, not just a particular question. Clearly then, respondent bank should have
filed a motion based on Section 5 and not Section 3(c) of Rule 29. Section 5 of Rule 29 reads:
SEC. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers. If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party willfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take
his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25 after proper service of such
interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof,
or enter a judgment by default against that party, and in its discretion, order him to pay reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including attorney's fees.
DIcSHE
Due to respondent bank's filing of an erroneous motion, the trial court cannot be faulted for ruling that the motion to expunge was premature for lack of a prior
application to compel compliance based on Section 3.

Rule30 (Trial)
Rule 31 (Consolidation)
Rule 32 (Trial by Commissioner)
Rule 33 (Demurrer to Evidence)
Republic
vs.
ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; SUMMARY JUDGMENT: PROPER IN THE ABSENCE OF GENUINE ISSUE. In the early case of Auman vs. Estenzo, summary
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. judgment was described as a judgment which a court may render before trial but after both parties have pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon application by one
152154, November 18, party, supported by affidavits, depositions or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may in turn file an opposition supported also by affidavits,
2003
depositions or other documents. This is after the court summarily hears both parties with their respective proofs and finds that there is no genuine issue between
them. Summary judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: SECTION 1. Summary judgment for
claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer
thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. Summary
judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. The theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may
on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or
fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner Republic. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls
for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to
constitute a genuine issue for trial. Respondents' defenses of "lack of knowledge for lack of privity" or "(inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago" or,
on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that "the funds were lawfully acquired" are fully insufficient to tender genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses' defenses were a sham
and evidently calibrated to compound and confuse the issues.|||
Sarmiento vs. Juan, 120 While the court may declare the plaintiff non- suited for non-appearance at the pre-trial or dismiss the case for his non- appearance at the trial without motion on
SCRA 403
the part of the defendant, the latter may not be declared in default without such motion on the part of the plaintiff. Since no motion on the part of the plaintiff was
made, defendant should not have been declared in default.
People vs. Mazo, G.R. NON-PRESENTATION OF AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO THE PRESUMPTION THAT SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE WOULD BE ADVERSE
No. 136869, October 17, IF PRODUCED; CASE AT BAR. The failure of the prosecution to offer in evidence the affidavit allegedly executed by Yap after the killing does not give rise to
2001
the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. Such presumption is not applicable when the omitted evidence is at the disposal
of both parties, because it would have the same weight against the one as against the other party. In People vs. Padiernos, the Court rejected similar claim by the
accused, thus: . . . Nor do we find merit in the contention that the non-presentation of the written statement of this witness to the police which she allegedly did not
sign, gave rise to the presumption that it "contained declarations disastrous to the prosecution case." The presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable

19

Superlines Trans. Co. vs.

Victor, 124 SCRA 939

Aljems Corp vs. CA,

G.R. No. 122216, March
28, 2001

Northwest Airlines, Inc.

vs. CA, 284 SCRA 408

does not apply where the evidence was at the disposal of both the defense and the prosecution. In the case at bar, the alleged statement of prosecution witness
Letty Basa was in the possession of the police authorities. Hence, the defense could have requested the lower court below to issue a subpoena requiring the
police to produce such statement, but as the defense failed to do that, they cannot now argue that said statement if produced would have been adverse to the
prosecution.
EMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JUDICIAL ECONOMY AND ADMINISTRATION AS WELL AS CONVENIENCE OF THE PARTIES; CONSIDERATIONS FOR
CONSOLIDATION OF CASES IN THE CASE AT BAR. There is, however, a more pragmatic solution to the cotroversy at bar; and that is to consolidate the
Gumaca case with the Cavite case. Considerations of judicial economy and administration, as well as the convenience of the parties for which the rules on
procedure and venue were formulated, dictate that it is the Cavite court, rather than the Gumaca court, which serves as the more suitable forum for the
determination of the rights and obligations of the parties concerned. As observed by both the trial and appellate courts, to require private respondents who are all
residents of Kawit, Cavite, to litigate their claims in the Quezon Court would unnecessarily expose them to considerable expenses. On the other hand, no like
prejudice would befall the defendants transportation companies if they were required to plead their causes in Cavite, for such change of venue would not expose
them to expenses which are not already liable to incur in connection with the Gumaca case.
2. ID.; PURPOSE AND OBJECT OF PROCEDURE. The whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court fully and completely
available for justice. The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of
the court within the limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the count to transmute
themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter, but to give it effective facility in righteous action. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of
justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not
constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a
means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes on that
of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism."(Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General,
20 Phil. 523)
Rule 32, 3 and 5 of the present Code of Civil Procedure. The underscored portions of 3 and 5 indicate quite clearly the necessity for a formal hearing and the
swearing of witnesses; otherwise, the commissioner cannot determine factual questions which arise in the course of his examination of the accounts. For this
purpose, the witnesses must necessarily be sworn in and offered for cross-examination by the parties so that the truth of any question may be determined. This
would not be possible were the commissioner merely to interview the parties. Where controversial questions are involved, such as whether certain items must be
allowed or disallowed, an adversary proceeding is particularly indicated. That is why the last sentence of 3 says that The trial or hearing before him shall proceed
in all respects as it would be held before the court. For the fact is that the commissioner substitutes for the judge, and whatever the judge can or cannot do, the
commissioner also can or cannot do. Consequently, if a judge cannot decide a question without hearing the parties on oath or affirmation, neither can the
commissioner.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; DENIAL OF DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS
WITHOUT RECEPTION OF PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. NORTHWEST's Motion to Dismiss (By Way of
Demurrer to Evidence) with Motion for Summary Judgment involved two distinct and separate processes, viz: (1) demurrer to evidence, which was then governed
by Rule 35, now by Rule 33; and (2) motion for summary judgment, which was then governed by Rule 34, now Rule 35, of the Rules of Court. The subject of the
demurrer were the claims for moral, exemplary, and temperate damages and attorney's fees, while the target of the motion for summary judgment was the claim
for actual damages. We agree with the Court of Appeals in its holding that the trial court erred in deciding the entire case on its merits. Indeed, as to the demurrer
to evidence, the trial court should have been solely guided by the procedure laid down in the rule on demurrer to evidence. It had no choice other than to grant or
to deny the demurrer. It could not, without committing grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, deny the motion and then forthwith grant
TORRES' claims on a finding that TORRES has established a preponderance of evidence in support of such claims. In the instant case, the trial court did just that
insofar as moral damages, attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation were concerned. What it should have done was to merely deny the demurrer and set a date
for the reception of NORTHWEST's evidence in chief. CTHDcS
2. ID.; ACTIONS; SUMMARY JUDGMENT; ALLOWED WHERE THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT AND THE MOVING PARTY IS
ENTITLED THERETO. As to the motion for summary judgment, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were in error. Summary judgments were formerly
governed by Rule 34 of the Rules of Court. The rule is now Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the amendments allowing the parties to submit not
only affidavits but also depositions or admissions in support of their respective contentions. Motions for summary judgment may be filed by the claimant or by the
defending party. Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the old Rule 34 the governing law in this case. NORTHWEST, the defending party, moved for summary judgment on the
claim for actual damages after TORRES had presented his evidence in chief. This was allowed by Section 2 where the motion may be filed "at any time," as
distinguished from Section 1 where the claimant, like TORRES, may file the motion at any time after the answer is filed. Summary judgment is allowed if, except
as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

20

Radiowealth Finance
Corp. vs. Del Rosario,
G.R. No. 138739

David et al vs. Rivera,

G.R. Nos. 139913 &
140159, January 16, 2004

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In thus submitting for summary judgment the matter of its liability only to the maximum allowed in Section 22(2) of the Warsaw
Convention, NORTHWEST was deemed to have hypothetically admitted arguendo that the firearms were lost. It did not waive the presentation of evidence that it
was not in fact liable for the alleged loss of firearms. And even if it were so liable, NORTHWEST could still prove at the appropriate time that it was not liable
beyond the maximum provided in said Section 22(2). Notably, TORRES prayed for actual damages in the amounts of (1) $9,009.32 representing the value of the
lost firearms; and (2) P39,065 representing the cost of his plane tickets. Concretely then, there remained a genuine issue on the fact and amount of actual
damages. The motion for summary judgment was not therefore in order. NORTHWEST must have resorted to it, in like manner as it did in filing the demurrer, to
delay the progress of the trial of the case. Verily it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court to grant such motion and award TORRES actual
damages commensurate to the value of the firearms and based on his evidence alone.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE; CONSEQUENCE OF REVERSAL ON APPEAL. Explaining the consequence of a
demurrer to evidence, the Court in Villanueva Transit v. Javellana pronounced: "The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical. The defendant is
permitted, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for a dismissal (i.e., demur to the plaintiff's evidence) on
the ground that upon the facts as thus established and the applicable law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the trial court denies the dismissal motion, i.e.,
finds that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient for an award of judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the case still remains before the trial court which should
then proceed to hear and receive the defendant's evidence so that all the facts and evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed before it for
adjudication as well as before the appellate courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is lost. The doctrine is but in line with the established procedural precepts in the
conduct of trials that the trial court liberally receive all proffered evidence at the trial to enable it to render its decision with all possibly relevant proofs in the record,
thus assuring that the appellate courts upon appeal have all the material before them necessary to make a correct judgment, and avoiding the need of remanding
the case for retrial or reception of improperly excluded evidence, with the possibility thereafter of still another appeal, with all the concomitant delays. The rule,
however, imposes the condition by the same token that if his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant
loses his right to present evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiff's case and evidence. In
such event, the appellate court which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiff's evidence." In other
words, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence retain the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial
court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present
their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage
prolonged litigations.
2. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; INTENT OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES CAN BE DETERMINED BY THEIR CONTEMPORANEOUS AND SUBSEQUENT
ACTS; CASE AT BAR. The contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties manifest their intention and knowledge that the monthly installments would be
due and demandable each month. In this case, the conclusion that the installments had already became due and demandable is bolstered by the fact that
respondents started paying installments on the Promissory Note, even if the checks were dishonored by their drawee bank. We are convinced neither by their
avowals that the obligation had not yet matured nor by their claim that a period for payment should be fixed by a court. Convincingly, petitioner has established not
only a cause of action against the respondents, but also a due and demandable obligation. The obligation of the respondents had matured and they clearly
defaulted when their checks bounced. Per the acceleration clause, the whole debt became due one month (April 2, 1991) after the date of the Note because the
check representing their first installment bounced.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; A PARTY WHO DID NOT APPEAL CANNOT OBTAIN AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF OTHER THAN THAT
GRANTED IN THE APPEALED DECISION. As for the disputed documents submitted by the petitioner, the CA ruling in favor of their admissibility, which was
not challenged by the respondents, stands. A party who did not appeal cannot obtain affirmative relief other than that granted in the appealed decision.
While appeal is the recognized remedy to question the judgment of an inferior court, this does not detract from the authority of a higher court to issue a writ of
prohibition to restrain the inferior court, among other instances, from proceeding further on the ground that it heard and decided the case without jurisdiction. [38]
Since the right to prohibition is defeated not by the existence, but by the adequacy, of a remedy by appeal, it may accordingly be granted where the remedy by
appeal is not plain, speedy or adequate
The very issue determinative of the question of jurisdiction is the real relationship existing between the parties. It is necessary that evidence thereon be first
presented by the parties before the question of jurisdiction may be passed upon by the court.
A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one party to the adequacy of the evidence of his adversary to make out a case. Otherwise stated, the party demurring
challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict

Rules 34 and 35 (Judgment on the Pleadings/Summary Judgment)

21

Meneses vs. Sec. of

Agrarian Reform, G.R.
No. 156304, October 23,
2006...

Diman vs. Alumbres, 299

SCRA 459 (1998)
Ontimare vs. Elep, G.R.
No. 159224, January 20,
2006
Asian Construction and
Development Corp. vs.
PCIB, G.R. No. 153827,
April 25, 2006
Bitanga vs. Pyramid
Construction, 565 SCRA
544
Pineda vs. Heirs of
Guevara, 515 SCRA 627
Bungcayao vs. Fort
Ilocandia,
G.R.
No.
170483, April 19, 2010
Calubaquib vs. Republic,
G.R. No. 170658, June 22,
2011

GN: A motion for reconsideration must be filed witin the reglementary period
EXP:
(a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property,
(b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances,
(c) the merits of the case,
(d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules,
(e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and
(f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby
No party has a right to an extension of time to comply with an obligation within the period set therefor by law; motions for extension are not granted as a matter of
course; their concession lies in the sound discretion of the Court exercised in accordance with the attendant circumstances
A Trial Court has no discretion to determine what the consequences of a party's refusal to allow or make discovery should be; it is the law which makes that
determination; and it is grave abuse of discretion for the Court to refuse to recognize and observe the effects of that refusal as mandated by law
For summary judgment to be proper, two (2) requisites must concur, to wit: (1) there must be no genuine issue on any material fact, except for the amount of
damages; and (2) the moving party must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
In the instant case, the summary judgment was rendered after the presentation of evidence by both parties in a full blown trial.The trial courts decision
was merely denominated as summary judgment. But in essence, it is actually equivalent to a judgment on the merits, making the rule on summary
judgment inapplicable in this case
A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts
as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for. The party
who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is
patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when
there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment
cannot take the place of trial.
To forestall summary judgment, it is essential for the non-moving party to confirm the existence of genuine issues, as to which he has substantial, plausible and
fairly arguable defense, i.e., 29 issues of fact calling for the presentation of evidence upon which reasonable findings of fact could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, although a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment will be insufficient to preclude entry thereof.
Laches is not concerned with the mere lapse of time, rather, the party must have been afforded an opportunity to pursue his claim in order that the delay may
sufficiently constitute laches.[11] Without prejudging the instant case, an apparent delay in the enforcement of ones claim does not automatically constitute laches.
The party charged with negligence or omission in invoking his right must be afforded the opportunity to raise his defenses, which can be accommodated only in a
contentious proceeding.
Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that there
are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute,
the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary
judgment is not proper. A genuine issue is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false
claim.
In determining the genuineness of the issues, and hence the propriety of rendering a summary judgment, the court is obliged to carefully study and appraise, not
the tenor or contents of the pleadings, but the facts alleged under oath by the parties and/or their witnesses in the affidavits that they submitted with the motion
and the corresponding opposition. Thus, it is held that, even if the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, a summary judgment is proper so long as the
affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.[40]
The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the motion are therefore important because these enable the court to determine if the parties pleadings,
affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against, the motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and adequately justify the finding that, as a matter of
law, the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no defense to the action.[41] The non-observance of the procedural requirements of filing a motion and conducting
a hearing on the said motion warrants the setting aside of the summary judgment

36.Rule 36 (Judgments, Final Orders and Entry)

BA Finance Corp. vs. CA, The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings
229 SCRA 566 (1994)
of fact being conclusive. It is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing
errors of law that might have been committed, unless there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are

22

Ting vs. Velez-Ting, G.R.

No. 166562, March 31,
2009
San Pedro vs. Binaloy,
August 25, 2005

Lacurom vs. Tienzo, 535

SCRA 253
dela Merced vs. GSIS,
G.R.
No
167140,
November 22, 2011
Pea vs. GSIS, Sept. 19,
2006

so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.|||

Test whether to follow the stare decisis rule. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2)
consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and,
(4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.
By force of res judicata, a final judgment is conclusive not only on the issues actually determined by the decision but on all issues that could have been raised or
litigated in the anterior suit. In fine, when material facts or questions which were in issue in a former action and were there admitted or judicially determined are
conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between
the same parties or their privies, regardless of the form of the latter. This is, as it should be, for a judgment is an adjudication on all matters which are essential to
support it and that every proposition assumed or decided by the court leading up to the final conclusion and upon which such conclusion is reached is as
effectually passed upon as the ultimate question which is finally solved.
A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court.

the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, except where it is granted by statute in which case it should be exercised in the manner and
in accordance with the provisions of law.20 In other words, appeal is a right of statutory and not of constitutional origin. 21 The perfection of an appealin the manner
and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional 22 and the failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render
the judgment final and executory and, hence, unappealable, 23 for it is more important that a case be settled than it be settled right. 24 Furthermore, it is axiomatic
that final and executory judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land. 25 Just
as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of the case.

Rules 37 and 38 (New Trial or Reconsideration/Relief from Judgments, Orders, or Other Proceedings)
Neypes vs. CA, 469 To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
SCRA 633
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions
for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
Cansino vs. CA, 409
SCRA 403

Uy vs. First Metro

Integrated
Steel,
September 27, 2006

Purcon, Jr. vs. MRM

Under Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party may file a motion for reconsideration on the ground, among others, that x x x, the evidence is insufficient to
justify the decision or final order, or the decision or final order is contrary to law. It requires the motion to point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the
judgment or final order which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making specific reference to the testimonial or documentary
evidence presented or to the provisions of law alleged to be violated.
It is implicitly clear from Rule 37 that a motion for reconsideration cannot be used as a vehicle to introduce new evidence. Petitioners correctly contend that if
respondents wanted to present further evidence, they should have filed a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. However, for newly discovered
evidence to warrant a new trial, (a) it must have been discovered after trial, (b) it could not have been discovered or produced at the trial despite reasonable
diligence, (c) it must be material and not merely collateral, cumulative, corroborative or purely for impeaching a witness, merely important evidence being not
enough, and (d) if presented, would probably alter the result of the action.
The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due
to his own negligence, or mistaken mode of procedure for that matter; otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has
already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of procedure by counsel. In exceptional cases, when the mistake of counsel is so
palpable that it amounts to gross negligence, this Court affords a party a second opportunity to vindicate his right. But this opportunity is unavailing in the instant
case, especially since petitioner has squandered the various opportunities available to him at the different stages of this case. Public interest demands an end to
every litigation and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the administration of justice.
When a judgment or final order is entered and Fraud/Accident/ Mistake/ Excusable negligence is present, a party may file for a petition for relief of judgment.

23

Philippines, Inc et al, G.R.

No. 182718, September
26, 2008
Yusuke Fukuzumi vs.
Sanritsu
Great
International Corp et al,
G.R. No. 140630, August
12, 2004

Sec. 2 Rule 38 applies to party and not counsel. The failure to file an appeal because of the illness of a counsel is far from being excusable.

Rule 39 (Execution)
Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Corpuz,
412 SCRA 1 (2003)
Balajonda
vs.
COMELEC,
G.R.
No.
166032, February 28,
2005
Jalandoni vs. PNB, 108
SCRA 102 (1981)
Fiestan vs. CA, 185
SCRA 751 (1990)

-Issuance of a writ of execution even before the adverse party receives a copy of the decision is considered gross incompetency of the law.

Dagooc vs. Erlina, A.M.

No. P-04-1857 (formerly
OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1429-P),
March 16, 2005
Campillo vs. CA, 129
SCRA 513 (1984)
Manila Remnant Co., Inc.
vs.
CA,
231
SCRA
281(1994)
Malonzo vs. Mariano,
170 SCRA 667 (1989)
Del Rosario vs Far East
Bank
and
Trust
Company,
G.R.
No.
150134, October 31, 2007
Napocor vs. Maruhom,
609 SCRA 198

-An officer shall enforce an execution of judgment for money by demanding the judgment obligor the immediate payment, pay in cash, bank check payable and
other form of payment acceptable to the obligee. Nowhere in the rules does it say that a promissory note is acceptable unless the obligee consents to it.

MMDA vs. Concerned

Residents of Manila Bay,
574 SCRA 661

Writ of Mandamus lies to require the execution of ministerial duty. Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not
to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.
Doctrine of continuing mandamus - Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be
set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

Not only courts can issue a writ of execution , COMELEC can. It is regardless whether it is in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.

A judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from date of its entry or from the date it became final and executory.
- The formalities of a levy, as an essential requisite of a valid execution sale under Section 15 of Rule 39 and a valid attachment lien under Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court, are not basic requirements before an extrajudicially foreclosed property can be sold at public auction.

A sale of a real estate whether made as a result of a private transaction or of a foreclosure sale, only becomes legally effective upon the date of its registration.
The subsequent sale of a piece of land is not valid when a previous sale has been effected and the seller had knowledge of such sale. The legal impediment of
the subsequent sale does not bar to the registration of the deed of absolute sale.
The right to redemption is one (1) year. Failure to redeem the property within the period shall bar future action with regard to the property
Res judicata applies. Conclusiveness of judgment.

Writs of Execution; it is a fundamental legal axiom that a writ of execution must conform strictly to the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed.
Otherwise, it is null and void.
The term grave abuse of discretion, in its juridical sense, connotes capricious, despotic, oppressive, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.

24

City of Naga vs.

Asuncion, 557 SCRA 528

The judgment of the RTC against the defendant in an ejectment case is immediately executory. Appellate court may stay the said writ should circumstances so
require.

Iligan Bay Manufacturing

Corp. vs. Dy, 524 SCRA
55

: Redemption has been defined as the right of a debtor, and sometimes of a debtors other creditors, to repurchase from a buyer at a forced sale, property of the
debtor that was seized and sold in satisfaction of a judgment or other claim against the debtor, which right is usually limited to forced [sale] of real property.
The law protects the original owner. It is the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat the owners right. Therefore, redemption should be looked upon with favor
and where no injury will follow, a liberal construction will be given to our redemption laws, specifically on the exercise of the right to redeem.

Premiere Development
Bank vs. Flores, 574
SCRA 66
Silverio et al vs. Filpino
Business
Consultants
Inc, G.R. No. 143312,
August 12, 2005

: A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. The prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, and issuance thereof is a ministerial duty of
the court.
The court may be stay immediate execution of judgment when supervening events, occurring subsequent to the judgment, bring about material change in the
situation of parties; To justify the stay of immediate execution, the supervening events must have a direct effect on the matter already litigated and settled.

40. Rule 40 (MTC to RTC)...

Provost vs. CA, G.R. No. Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not proper where the case involves an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. The court may
160406, June 26, 2006
nevertheless treat it as one proper for review under Rule 45
The regional trial courts have jurisdiction over complaints for recovery of ownership or accion reivindicatoria. Section 8, Rule 40 10 of the Rules on Civil Procedure
nonetheless allows the RTC to decide the case brought on appeal from the MTC which, even without jurisdiction over the subject matter, may decide the case on
the merits.
Encarnacion vs. Amigo,
G.R.
No.
169793,
September 15, 2006

What defines a piece of land is the boundaries therein laid down in the description, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.
3 kinds of recovery of possession
Accion interdictal - an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action
for recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court
Accion publiciana - or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession, which should be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when the
dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and
Accion reinvidicatoria or accion de reinvidicacion - which is an action for the recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court.
The material element that determines the proper action for the recovery of the possession of the property is the length of time of dispossession
forcible entry and unlawful detainer the remedies of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are granted to a person deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or
assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person.
Disposession not more than 1 year ejectment proceeding is proper and the inferior court has jurisdiction
Dispoession lasted for more than 1 year proper action is accion publiciana and the RTC has jurisdiction. Accion publiciana is a suit for recovery of the right to
possess but also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty.

25

Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matteris determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted.
41. Rule 41 (RTC to CA)
Manila Memorial Park vs.
CA, 344 SCRA 769 (2001)

Neypes vs. CA,

SCRA 633 (2005)

469

Ordinary appeal from final judgment or order of the MTC to the RTC and the RTC to the CA or proceedings originally filed in the RTC, the 15 day period for appeal
is interrupted or suspended by a MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL or MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. If the Motion for new trial or reconsideration is denied, the
moving party has only the remaining period from notice of denial within which to file a notice of appeal fundamental precept is that the reglementary periods
under the Rules are to be strictly observed for being considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and an orderly discharge of judicial business.
The legality of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the appellate court, and the latter is not precluded from dismissing the petition on the
ground of its being out of time.
Right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law.
Appeal should be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,
leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. The order denying the Motion for reconsideration constitutes the final order which finally disposed of the
issues involved in a case.
Delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused under exceptional circumstances, one of this is if it is based on substantial justice.
FRESH PERIOD RULE The SC deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal counted from the order dismissing
the MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. The fresh period applies to Rule 40 (MTC RTC), Rule 42 (Petitioner for Review RTC
CA), Rule 43 (Quasi- judicial CA), Rule 45 (Appeals by Certiorari to the SC).

Trans International vs.

CA, 285 SCRA 49 (1998)

The fresh period may only be availed only if either motion is filed MR or Motion of New Trial, otherwise the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of
the original appeal period.
The general rule holds that the appellate jurisdiction of the courts is conferred by law, and must be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
thereof and such jurisdiction is acquired by the appellate court over the subject matter and parties by the perfection of the appeal. Failing to do so, the right to
appeal is lost.
Relaxed appeal requirement only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction.

Rule 42 (RTC to CA)

Ross Rica Sales Center,
Inc. vs. Ong, G.R. No.
132197, August 16, 2005

Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee's brief. Applying this rule
contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal. Perforce, the period of
appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and started to run again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. A Motion for
Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals
Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC is a notice of appeal and an appeal is deemed
perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal.
Allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient without necessarily employing the terminology of law
ACCION FOR REVINDICATORIA recovery of ownership of real property
ACCION PUBLICIANA issue is the better right of possession or possession de jure
ACCION INTERDICTAL the issue is material possession or possession de facto
UNLAWFUL DETAINER question of possession is primordial while the issue of ownership is generally unessential.
Filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to
try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale being that, while there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case

26

Macawiwili Gold Mining

and Devt. Co, Inc. vs. CA,
297 SCRA 602 (1998)

Ditching vs. CA,

SCRA 343 (1996)

263

and the suit for annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for are not the same.
Writ of certiorari lies only when petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration, as a
general rule, must be filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ of certiorari is sought. Exceptions when the questions raised before this
Court are the same as those which have been squarely raised in and passed upon by the court below, the filing of a motion for reconsideration in said court before
certiorari can be instituted in this Court, is no longer prerequisite. This rule is subject however, to exceptions among which are the following, namely: 1) where the
issue raised is one purely of law; 2) where public interest is involved; 3) in case of urgency; and (4) when the questions raised before this Court are the same as
those which have been squarely raised in and passed upon by, the court below.
WRIT OF CERTIORARI lies when a court, in denying a motion to dismiss, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. By "grave
abuse of discretion" is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law.
Court explicitly ruled that a motion for extension must be filed within the reglementary period of appeal. A motion for extension of time to file a petition should be
filed prior to the expiration or lapse of the period fixed by law.
Perfection of an appeal within the statutory period is a jurisdictional requirement. If an appeal be not taken within the reglementary period, the judgment becomes
final and the court loses all jurisdiction over the case, and it has no alternative but to order the execution of the final judgment.
Miscomputation by counsel of the appeal period will not arrest the course of the same nor prevent the finality of the judgment. Otherwise, the definitive and
executory character of the judgment would be left to the whim of the losing party, when it is to the interest of everyone that the date when judgments become final
should remain fixed and ascertainable.

Rule 43 (Quasi-Judicial Agencies to CA)

Fabian vs. Desierto, 295 Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under
SCRA 440 (1998)
the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial
agencies.
Administrative liability of public official falls under the jurisdiction of both the civil service commission and the office of the ombudsman adjudications of the CSC
is appealable to the CA, while adjudications of the Office of the Ombudsman is appealable to the SC. This court held, for the systematic and efficient case
management would dictate the consolidation of the case under the CA, both for expdiency and to avoid possible conflicting decisions.
If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine
whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute. Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular
and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be
raised at any time or on the court's own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is
developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.
whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals,
as specific provision to that effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No such provision on
appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what are referred to and already provided for in Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution. Revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45

Santos vs. Go, 473 SCRA

The Supreme Court can rule on the matter sua sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No
countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which was intended to give this Court a measure of
control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the Court.
APPEALS; RULE 43 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CLEARLY SHOWSTHAT IT GOVERNS APPEALS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FROM

27

350 (2005)

DECISIONS AND FINAL ORDERS OR RESOLUTIONS OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS OR QUASI- JUDICIAL AGENCIES IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR
QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IS NOT AMONG THE ANGENCIES ENUMERATED IN SECTION 1 OF RULE 43 - Inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius.
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IS NOT A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY AND IT IS NOT ONE OF THOSE AGENCIES WHOSE DECISIONS, ORDERS, OR
RESOLUTIONS ARE APPEALABLE TO THE CA UNDER RULE 43, THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE TO
INDICT PETITIONERS FOR ESTAFA IS, THEREFORE, NOT APPEALABLE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS VIA PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 43

Fortich vs. Corona, 289

SCRA 624 (1998)

THE DECISION WHETHER TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT OR NOT, IS DEPENDENT UPON THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE PROSECUTING FISCAL AND,
ULTIMATELY, THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE. FINDINGS OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ARE NOT SUBJECT TO REVIEW UNLESS MADE
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal.
error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
real party in interest is a party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. Undoubtedly, movants' interest over
the land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.
appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No 18. Section 7 thereof provides: "SEC. 7.
Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period. Only one motion for reconsideration by any
one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases." It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a
suppletory character whenever practicable."

Lapid vs. CA, 334 SCRA

738 (2000)

When the Office of the President declaring the Decision final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office
had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision
The provisions of Section 27 of R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman that the
punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e., suspension without pay for one year, is not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory.
such the legal maxim "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius" finds application. Other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not
enumerated in the said Section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed will stay the immediate implementation of the
decision.
The only provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the proper forum and of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as the proper
mode of appeal. All other matters included in said Section 27, including the finality or non-finality of decisions, are not affected and still stand (appealable to the
SC).
A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month's salary shall be final and unappealable. In all other
cases, the respondent therein has the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending
appeal.

45.Rule 45
Nunez vs. GSIS Family
Bank, 475 SCRA 305
(2005)

THE REMEDIES OF APPEAL AND CERTIORARI ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE AND NOT ALTERNATIVE NOR SUCCESSIVE -errors of jurisdiction are best
reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 while errors of judgment can only be corrected by appeal in a petition for review under Rule 45.
This SC, however, in accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice may treat a petition for certiorari as having
filed under Rule 45, more so if the same was filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review.

28

The requirement of notice under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 in connection with Section 2, Rule 37 (Motion for Reconsideration) of the Rules of Court is
mandatory. Absence of the mandatory requirement renders the motion a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the
court has no authority to act upon.

China Road and Bridge

Corp. vs. CA, 348 SCRA
401 (2000)

Failure to timely perfect an appeal cannot simply be dismissed as a mere technicality, for it is jurisdictional. Nor can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of
technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial justice. The requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure, but
an essential requirement without which the decision appealed from would become final and executory. The same can be said about the late filing of a notice of
appeal.
WHEN QUESTION OF LAW EXISTS. when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when
the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts, or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and probabilities of the
situation.
Findings of the CA in question of law or both questions of law and fact is best left to the appellate court.
In a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, there cannot be any question of fact or "doubt or difference as to the truth or falsehood of
facts," simply because there are no findings of fact in the first place. What the trial court merely does is to apply the law to the facts as alleged in the complaint,
assuming such allegations to be true. It follows then that any appeal therefrom could only raise questions of law or "doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts." Therefore, a decision dismissing a complaint based on failure to state a cause of action necessarily precludes a review of the same decision
on questions of fact.
The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate
court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
APPEAL BY PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45, ONLY ISSUE IS PURE QUESTION OF LAW.
Improper mode of appeal to the CA should be dismissed outright

65. Rule 65
Day
vs.
RTC
Zamboanga City,
SCRA 610 (1999)

of
191

Applying Sec. 22 of B.P. 129 (governing law in the matter of appeals from the inferior courts to the Regional Trial Courts), decisions of inferior courts may be
elevated to the Regional Trial Court only by ordinary appeal, that is, by filing a Notice of Appeal with the inferior court. The said proviso does not admit of any other
mode of elevating decisions of inferior courts to the Regional Trial Court presumably to carry out the purpose of B.P. 129 which is to simplify judicial procedure to
effect a speedy administration of justice.
B.P. 129 provides: "provided the main action is within its jurisdiction, an inferior court can appoint a receiver and it has jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction in either forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases."
The RTC has no jurisdiction in a Certiorari case to entertain procedural questions or questions of facts or substance already passed upon by the lower
court . Further, in an original action for certiorari, questions of fact cannot be raised much less passed upon by the RTC. Thus, it has been ruled that: "Questions
of fact cannot be raised in an original action for certiorari. Only established or admitted facts can be considered."
The only grounds which may serve as the basis for the respondent court to raise the writ of certiorari are lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion by
the inferior court or that the said inferior court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in its appreciation of the barangay certification as constituting
sufficient compliance with P.D. 1508. The Writ of Certiorari has been reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any
other purpose.
Errors in the application of the law and the appreciation of evidence committed by a court after it has acquired jurisdiction over a case, are correctible only by
appeal

29

Romys Freight Service

vs. Castro, 490 SCRA 165
(2006)

Banco Filipino Savings

and Mortgage Bank vs.
CA, 334 SCRA 305 (2000)

As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is needed before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 can be resorted to.
WRIT OF CERTIORARI The sole object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The phrase grave abuse of discretion has a
precise meaning in law, denoting abuse of discretion "too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility." It does
not encompass an error of law. Nor does it include a mistake in the appreciation of the contending parties respective evidence or the evaluation of their relative
weight.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in
contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility.
DIFFERENCE CERTIORARI vs REVIEW
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction.
PETITION FOR REVIEW seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court. Errors of judgment include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's
findings
The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lapsed or lost remedy of appeal.
It is true that this Court may treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45 to serve the higher interest of justice, but not when the petition is filed
well beyond the reglamentary period for filing a petition for review and without offering any reason therefor.

Fajardo vs. Bautista, 232

SCRA 292 (1994)

Allowing appeals, although filed late, in some rare cases will be allowed but is must be under be exceptional circumstances to justify the relaxation of the rules.
Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order, and hence a proper subject of appeal, not certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari
are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Accordingly, although the special civil action of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is
available, it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects
of the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual. Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal,
where such loss is occasioned by the petitioner's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.

Rule 46 Original Cases

Rule 47 Annulment of
Judgment or Final Orders
and Resolutions
Rule 48 -- Preliminary
Conference
Rule 49 Oral Argument
Rule 50 Dismissal of
Appeal
Rule 51 Judgment
Rule 52 Motion for
Reconsideration
Rule 53 New Trial
Rule
54

Internal
Business (CA)

30

Rule 55 Publication of Judgments and Final Resolution (CA)

Rule 56 Original and Appealed Cases (SC)
1. Guy vs. CA, 539 SCRA A party is guilty of forum shopping when he repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
584
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantiall the same issues either pending in or already
resolved adversely by some other court to avoid conflicting decisions being rendered by the different courts
Forum shopping may only exist where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.
The element of litis pendentia are:
Identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions
Identity of rights asserted and the relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts
Identity of the 2 cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other
Injuctive writ show that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the injunction is directed are violative of this right.
Rule 46 the CA acquires jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents by the service upon them of its order or resolution indicating its initial action on the
petitioners or by their voluntary submission to such jurisdiction, the reason for this being that, aside from the fact that no summons or other coercive process is
served on respondents, their responde to the petitioners will depend on the initial action of the court thereon.
When a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings byt failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process for by such
failure, he is deemed to have waived or forfeited his right to be hear without violating the constitutional guarantee
Section 5(g) Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of court court has inherent power to amend its judgment as to make it conformable to the law applicable, provided
that said judgment has not yet acquired finality.
Petition under Rule 45 only questions or errors of law may be raised, there is a question of law or jurisprudence when the doubt or controversy concerns the
correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented

2. Molina vs. CA, January

13, 2003

Question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when there is a need
to calibrate the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as
their relation to each other and to the while, and the probability of the situation.
Litigation is a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and
indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities, asks that justice be done on the merits. Hence, Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court mandates that rules
of procedure shall be liberally interpreted.
Lapses in literal observation of procedural rule will be overlooked when they do not involve public policy, when they arose from honest mistake or unforeseen
accident, when they have not prejudiced the adverse party, nor deprived the court of its authority

3. NYK International vs.

NLRC, February 17, 2003

It is not required under Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court that the trial judge himself be impleaded in a petition for certiorari. The rule clearly states that a
petition for certiorari may be filed against the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Section 1 of Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that the petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject
thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto. Failure to do so shall result in the rejection of such annexes and the
dismissal of the case. Subsequent compliance shall not warrant any reconsideration unless the court is fully satisfied that the non-compliance was not in any way
attributable to the party, despite due diligence on his part, and that there are highly justifiable and compelling reasons for the court to make such other disposition
as it may deem just and equitable.
Findings of facts of the NLRC, particularly in a case where the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are in agreement, are deemed binding and conclusive upon this Court.
As long as their decisions are devoid of any unfairness or arbitrariness in the process of their deduction from the evidence proffered by the parties, all that is left is
for the Court to stamp its affirmation and declare its finality.

31

4. Shipside, Inc. vs. CA,

February 20, 2001

Verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, noncompliance with which does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct
and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if
verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.
The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. The Court has allowed the belated
filing of the certification when there were special circumstances or compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification
on non-forum shopping.
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD: Article 1144(3) provides that an action upon a judgment "must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues." On
the other hand, Section 6, Rule 39 provides that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry,
but that after the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. Taking these two provisions into
consideration, it is plain that an action for revival of judgment must be brought within ten years from the time said judgment becomes final.

5. Vanguard Assurance
Corporation vs. CA, 64
SCRA 148

The rule that prescription does not run against the State does not apply to corporations or artificial bodies created by the State for special purposes, its grantees,
although artificial bodies of its own creation, are in the same category as ordinary persons Defense of imprescriptibility may be raised by the government only in
cases where it is a real party in interest.
A surety in a counterbond is not to be considered as a special intervenor in the principal case, joining issue with the principal defendants; hence, its rights and
liabilities need not be ascertained, fixed or adjudicated at the same time with those of the principal defendant before the final judgment, or in a supplemental
pleading for that purpose.
The procedure laid down in Section 20 of Rule 57 need not be followed in a case where the plaintiff seeks from the surety in a counterbond filed by the defendant
to lift an order of attachment previously issued. Said section refers to recovery of damages by a party against whom attachment was issued and the remedy
provided therein is available only to the defendant, not the plaintiff.
Automatic liability of surety on counterbond attaches when execution of judgment against defendant is returned unsatisfied. Suretys liability is not removed even if
he did not have the opportunity to ascertain correctness of judgment.

6.
Roman
Catholic
Archbishop vs. CA, June
19, 1991

Findings of fact of trial and appellate courts will not be disturbed by SC. Generally, an appeal should not be dismissed on a ground which goes to the merits of the
case or the right of plaintiff or defendant to recover, except when the appellate court finds the appeal to be manifestly and palpably frivolous.
When the contents thereof provide for automatic reversion of property donated in case of violation of conditions set forth therein, judicial action for rescission is no
longer necessary. It was held therein that said stipulation is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of
breach, without need of going to court, and that, upon the happening of the resolutory condition or non-compliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation
is automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect. Judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration
rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine
whether or not the rescission was proper.
The SC has authority to review matters even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal. This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they
are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. Thus, we have held that an
unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question properly assigned is dependent, will be considered
by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error.

7. People vs. Jabinal, 55

SCRA 607

The remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the
records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and for the expeditious administration of justice has resolved actions on the merits instead
of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice, would not be subserved by the remand of the case.
Decisions of the SC, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law means, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New
Civil Code judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form a part of the legal system.xxx
The interpretation upon a law by this court constitutes in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed. Legis intepretado legis vim obtinet

32

 the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.

8. Navarro vs. Executive

Secretary,
G.R.
No.
180050, April12, 2011

A person cannot be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not possible. New doctrines should be applied prospectively, and should not apply
to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise
moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
The Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of judgment in light of attendant extraordinary circumstances. The power to suspend or even
disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared final.

9. League of Cities vs.

Comelec,
G.R.
Nos.
176951, 177499, 178056,
April 12, 2011

Locus Standi one must allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that: "No
second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained." Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15
days from receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court therefore allows the filing of the second
motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.

10. Heirs of Maura So vs.

Obliosca, 542 SCRA 406

The court has frequently disencumbered itself under extraordinary circumstances from the shackles of technicality in order to render just and equitable relief.
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. (1)
Petition for annulment of judgment is no longer available where, remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedy and lost, (2) he has
failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or negligence.
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment precludes the re-litigation of a particular fact or issue already passed upon by a court of competent jurisdiction in a
former judgment, in another action between the same parties based on a different claim or cause of action.
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The only exception to the
general rule under the doctrine of finality of judgments are the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable.
The court has the inherent power and discretion to amend, modify or reconsider a final judgment when it is necessary to accomplish the ends of justice.

11. Ramos vs. Pepsi

Cola, G.R. No. L-22533,
February 9, 1967

REDIBILITY OF WITNESS NOT FOR THE SUPREME COURT TO RE- EXAMINE

MATTERS NOT RAISED AND ARGUED IN THE LOWER COURT CANNOT BE VENTILATED IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE FIRST TIME

Rule 57 (Preliminary Attachment)

Davao Light & Power Co., An action or proceeding is commenced by the filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading. By that act, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter or
Inc. vs. CA, 204 SCRA nature of the action or proceeding is invoked or called into activity; and it is thus that the court acquires jurisdiction over said subject matter or nature of the action.
343 (1991)
And it is by that self-same act of the plaintiff (or petitioner) of filing the complaint (or other appropriate pleading) by which he signifies his submission to the
court's power and authority that jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
obtained, as above stated, by the service of summons or other coercive process upon him or by his voluntary submission to the authority of the court.
A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as the provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other proper party may, at the
commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of

33

any judgment that may be recovered. It is a remedy which is purely statutory in respect of which the law requires a strict construction of the provisions granting it.
Withal no principle, statutory or jurisprudential, prohibits its issuance by any court before acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Rule 57 The phrase, "at the commencement of the action," obviously refers to the date of the filing of the complaint
WRIT MAY BE ISSUED EX-PARTE. What the rule is saying quite clearly is that after an action is properly commenced by the filing of the complaint and the
payment of all requisite docket and other fees the plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the pertinent requisites
laid down by law, and that he may do so at any time, either before or after service of summons on the defendant.
HEARING ON APPLICATION THEREON, GENERALLY NOT NECESSARY. a hearing on a motion or application for preliminary attachment is not generally
necessary unless otherwise directed by the Trial Court in its discretion.
The only pre-requisite is that the Court be satisfied, upon consideration of "the affidavit of the applicant or of some other person who personally knows the facts,
that a sufficient cause of action exists, that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 . . . (Rule 57), that there is no other sufficient security for the claim
sought to be enforced by the action, and that the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to recover, is as
much as the sum for which the order (of attachment) is granted above all legal counterclaims."
HOW DISCHARGED. There are two (2) ways of discharging an attachment: first, by the posting of a counterbond; and second, by a showing of its improper or
irregular issuance. The defendant need not wait until his property is seized before seeking the discharge of the attachment by a counterbond.
The filing of a counterbond is a speedier way of discharging the attachment writ maliciously sought out by the attaching creditor instead of the other way, which, in
most instances . . . would require presentation of evidence in a fullblown trial on the merits, and cannot easily be settled in a pending incident of the case.
NOT BE DISSOLVED BY A SHOWING OF ITS IRREGULAR OR IMPROPER ISSUANCE. the defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the
attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiff's application and affidavits on which the writ was
based and consequently that the writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued the reason being that the hearing on such a motion for
dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the action. In other words, the merits of the action would be ventilated at a mere hearing of a
motion, instead of at the regular trial. Therefore, when the writ of attachment is of this nature, the only way it can be dissolved is by a counterbond
Olib vs. Pastoral, 188
SCRA 692 (1990)

DISSOLUTION OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT DOES NOT DISCHARGE SURETIES ON BOND; REASON.

1Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or
at any time thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party. Attachment is an auxiliary
remedy and cannot have an independent existence apart from the main suit or claim instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant. Being merely ancillary to a
principal proceeding, the attachment must fail if the suit itself cannot be maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer be justified.
Where the main action is appealed, the attachment which may have been issued as an incident of that action, is also considered appealed and so also removed
from the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate case independent of the principal action because the attachment
was only an incident of such action.
The rule is that the bond is not deemed extinguished by reason alone of such non-payment.

Valmonte vs. CA,

SCRA 92 (1994)

252

Rule 57, Section 19, of the Rules of Court hold that the order of attachment is considered discharged only where the judgment has already become final and
executory and not when it is still on appeal. The obvious reason is that, except in a few specified cases, execution pending appeal is not allowed.
Action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot be personally served, substituted service, as provided in Rule 14, 7-8
is essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. If
defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of
court, be made by publication.
3ACTION IN REM; NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANT MAY BE SERVED WITH SUMMONS EXTERRITORIALLY. On the other hand, if the action is in rem or
quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If

34

the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons may be served exterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, 17. In such cases, what
gives the court jurisdiction in an action in rem or quasi in rem is that it has jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the personal status of the plaintiff who is domiciled in the
Philippines or the property litigated or attached.

Traders Royal Bank vs.

IAC, 133 SCRA 141 (1984)

Service of summons in the manner provided in 17 is not for the purpose of vesting it with jurisdiction but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due
process, so that he will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he
has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; ATTACHMENT; INDEPENDENT VINDICATORY ACTION MAY BE FILED BY THIRD PARTY WHOSE PROPERTY HAS BEEN
WRONGFULLY LEVIED UPON BY ATTACHMENT. Section 14, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly sets forth the remedy that may be availed of by a person
who claims to be the owner of property levied upon by attachment, viz: to lodge a third-party claim with the sheriff and if the attaching creditor posts an indemnity
bond in favor of the sheriff, to file a separate and independent action to vindicate his claim (Abiera vs. Court of Appeals, 45 SCRA 314).
INJUNCTION; COURTS MAY NOT INTERFERE WITH JUDGMENT OF ANOTHER COURT OF COORDINATE AND CONCURRENT JURISDICTION BY
INJUNCTION; RULE IS APPLICABLE ONLY WHERE NO THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANT IS INVOLVED; PURPOSE OF THAT RULE. The purpose of the rule is to
avoid conflict of power between different courts of coordinate jurisdiction and to bring about a harmonious and smooth functioning of their proceedings.

Pacis vs. Comelec, 29

SCRA 24 (1969)

ATTACHMENT; INTERVENTION IN AN ATTACHMENT PROCEEDING; CUMULATIVE AND SUPPLETORY TO THE RIGHT TO BRING AN INDEPENDENT SUIT.
Intervention as a means of protecting the third-party claimant's right in an attachment proceeding is not exclusive but cumulative and suppletory to the right to
bring an independent suit. The denial or dismissal of a third-party claim to property levied upon cannot operate to bar a subsequent independent action by the
claimant to establish his right to the property even if he failed to appeal from the order denying his original third-party claim.
INJUNCTION; INJUNCTION BOND; CLAIM FOR DAMAGES ON ACCOUNT OF ILLEGAL ATTACHMENT AGAINST INJUNCTION BOND; PERIOD OF FILING
THEREFOR. The reglementary period within which to file the motion for assessment and award of damages as a result of the preliminary injunction issued
against the party-movant, upon depositor bond is before the main judgment becomes final and executory.
DAMAGES BY REASON OF RESTRAINING ORDER; RESTRAINED PREVAILING PARTY MAY RECOVER.
RECOVERY AGAINST INJUNCTION BOND. Damages sustained as a result of a wrongfully obtained injunction may be recovered upon the injunction bond
required to be filed with the court.
INJUNCTION BOND. The filing of a bond before the issuance of an injunction has been made a reglementary requisite under the same rule which permits the
issuance of an injunction.
GOOD FAITH, NOT A DEFENSE IN RECOVERY OF DAMAGES AGAINST BOND. Too, it is axiomatic that probable cause is necessary before an injunction
may be ordered, and if good faith were tenable as a defense, it would rule out practically all relief from actual damages sustained as a result of an injunction.
DISSOLUTION OF INJUNCTION A CAUSE FOR AN ACTIONABLE WRONG. --The dissolution of the injunction because of the failure of petitioner's main cause
of action, therefore, is an "actionable wrong," so to speak, for the purpose of recovery upon the bond.
RECOVERY OF DAMAGES IS LIMITED TO THE AMOUNT OF BOND. The bond, under the rule, is the only protection conceded to the party restrained.
Recovery cannot be made beyond what the law permits.

Rule
58
(Preliminary
Injunction)
Hernandez vs. National
Power Corporation, G.R.
No. 145328, March 23,
2006

INJUNCTIONS: Temporary Restraining Orders PD 1818 was issued prohibiting judges form issuing restraining orders against government infrastructure
projects he prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or retraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise
of discretion in technical cases on issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this court declared that courts could not be prevented
from exercising their power to retrain or prohibit administrative acts
For a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION the rules do not require that the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the applicant, what the rules

35

Sabalones vs. CA, 239

SCRA 79 (1994)

required is that the act complained of be PROBABLY in violation of the rights of the applicant Probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional
remedy, which is different from injunction as a main action where on needs to establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction.
The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties
and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or
continue doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus make ineffectual the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the
plaintiff.
As observed by Francisco, "Injunction is primarily a preventive remedy. Its province is to afford relief against future acts which are against equity and good
conscience and to keep and preserve the thing in the status quo, rather than to remedy what is past or to punish for wrongful acts already committed. It may issue
to prevent future wrongs although no right has yet been violated."

Ulang vs. CA, 225 SCRA

637 (1993)

Verzosa vs. CA,

SCRA 100 (1998)

299

Federation
of
Land
Reform Farmers of the
Phils. vs. CA, 246 SCRA
175 (1995)

The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation.
Injunction, whether preliminary or final, is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which
may never arise, or to restrain act which does not give rise to a cause of action. The complainants right or title, moreover, must be clear and unquestioned, for
equity, as a rule, will not take cognizance of suits to establish title, and will not lend its preventive aid by injunction where the complainants title or right is doubtful
or disputed. The possibility of irreparable damage, without proof of violation of an actual existing right, is no ground for an injunction, being mere damnum absque
injuria
A mandatory injunction will not lie to defeat execution of final judgment so as to take property out of successful partys possession.
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; INJUNCTION; REQUISITES THEREOF An injunctive writ may be issued when the following requisites are established: 1. The
invasion of the right is material and substantial; 2. The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; 3. There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage.
Complaint was amended to include a new or different cause of action or demand; hence, it was as if a new complaint was filed. In the said case, a complaint for
injunction was amended to include a larger tract of land which had not been included in the original suit. The Court held that " the suit will be deemed to have been
commenced upon the date of amendment, in determining whether the defendant had acquired title by adverse possession to the portion of the tract of land not
included in the original complaint. It has been held that "an amendment which merely supplements and amplifies the facts originally alleged relates back to the
date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations, the period of which expires after service of the original complaint but before
service of amendment." It is the actual filing in court that controls and not the date of the formal admission of the amended pleading.
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; "20-DAY RULE", DEFINED. The "20 day Rule" is found in Section 5, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which provides: "Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; issuance of restraining order. No preliminary injunction shall be granted without
notice to the defendant. If it shall appear from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified complaint that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant
before the matter can be heard on notice, the judge to whom the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a restraining order to be effective only
for a period of twenty days from date of its issuance. Within the said twenty-day period, the judge must cause an order to be served on the defendant, requiring
him to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, and determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary
injunction shall be granted, and shall accordingly issue the corresponding order. In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the restraining
order is deemed automatically vacated. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair, affect or modify in any way any rights granted by, or rules pertaining
to injunctions contained in existing agrarian, labor or social legislation."
EXCEPTION: Ordinarily, the efficacy of a temporary restraining order is non-extendible and the courts have no discretion to extend the same considering the
mandatory tenor of the Rule. However, there is no reason to prevent a court from extending the 20-day period when the parties themselves ask for such extension
or for the maintenance of the status quo.

59.
Rule
59
(Receivership)
Normandy vs. Duque, 29
SCRA 385 (1969)

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; RECEIVERSHIP; NATURE; RECEIVERSHIP COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE REASONABLENESS OF
EXPENDITURE. A receiver is a representative of the Court appointed for the purpose of preserving and conserving the property in litigation and prevent its
possible destruction or dissipation, if it were left in the possession of any of the parties. The receiver is not the representative of any of the parties but of all of them
to the end that their interests may be equally protected with the least possible inconvenience and expense. It is inherent in the office of a receiver not only that he
should act at all times with the diligence and prudence of a good father of a family but should also not incur any obligation or expenditure without leave of court to

36

supervise the receiver and see to it that he adheres to the above standard of his trust and limits the expense of the receivership to the minimum. It is generally the
receivership court that is in a better position to determine whether a particular expenditure is reasonable and justified or not and its ruling therein may not be
disturbed by this Court.
CLERICAL SERVICES EMPLOYED BY RECEIVER MUST BE WITH LEAVE OF COURT FOR REIMBURSEMENT TO BE PROPER.
60. Rule 60 (Replevin)
BA Finance Corp. vs. CA,
258 SCRA 102 (1996)

Chiao Liong Tan vs. CA,

228 SCRA 75 (1993)

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; REPLEVIN, CONSTRUED. Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional relief. It may
refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional
remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and hold it pendente lite. The action is primarily possessory in nature and
generally determines nothing more than the right of possession. Replevin is so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in personam
in rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is concerned, and in personam as regards to damages involved. As an "action in rem," the gist of the replevin
action is the right of the plaintiff to obtain possession of specific personal property by reason of his being the owner or of his having a special interest therein.
Consequently, the person in possession of the property sought to be replevied is ordinarily the proper and only necessary party defendant, and the plaintiff is not
required to so join as defendants other persons claiming a right on the property but not in possession thereof. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court allows an application
for the immediate possession of the property but the plaintiff must show that he has a good legal basis, i.e., a clear title thereto, for seeking such interim
possession.
EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL. The considerable weight given to the findings
of the trial court is not without any reason. It had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses which is usually not reflected in the transcript of records.
The profundity of the conclusions thus reached is just the result of such observance. When the Court of Appeals affirmed said findings, it goes to show that no
misapprehension of facts was committed as said Court has the power to scrutinize said factual findings under existing rules of procedures.
REPLEVIN; MAY RESOLVE ISSUE ON OWNERSHIP; REASON. It is true that the judgment in a replevin suit must only resolve in whom is the right of
possession. Primarily, the action of replevin is possessory in character and determines nothing more than the right of possession. However, when the title to the
property is distinctly put in issue by the defendant's plea and by reason of the policy to settle in one action all the conflicting claims of the parties to the possession
of the property in controversy, the question of ownership may be resolved in the same proceeding.

Northern Motors, Inc. vs.

Herrera, 49 SCRA 392
(1973)

FLEXIBLE TO AUTHORIZE SETTLEMENT OF ALL EQUITIES BETWEEN THE PARTIES. Although a "replevin" action is primarily one for possession of
personalty, yet it is sufficiently flexible to authorize a settlement of all equities between the parties, arising from or growing out of the main controversy. Thus, in an
action for replevin where the defendant is adjudged entitled to possession, he need not go to another forum to procure relief for the return of the replevined
property or secure a judgment for the value of the property in case the adjudged return thereof could not be had. Appropriately, the trial court rendered an
alternative judgment.
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; ACTION FOR REPLEVIN; CHATTEL MORTGAGEE MAY MAINTAIN SUCH ACTION. There can be no question that persons
having a special right of property in the goods the recovery of which is sought, such as a chattel mortgagee, may maintain an action for replevin therefor. Where
the mortgage authorizes the mortgagee to take possession of the property on default, he may maintain an action to recover possession of the mortgaged chattels
from the mortgagor or from any person in whose hands he may find them. This is irrespective of whether the mortgage contemplates a summary sale of property
or foreclosure by court action.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF MORTGAGEE TO MORTGAGED CHATTEL. when the debtor defaults, and the creditor desires to foreclose the mortgaged chattel,
he must necessarily take the mortgaged property in his hands, but when the debtor refuses to yield the possession of the property, the creditor must institute an
action, either to effect a judicial foreclosure directly, or to secure possession as a preliminary to the sale contemplated under Section 14 of Act No. 1508. The right
of the mortgagee to have possession of the mortgaged chattel after the condition of the mortgage is breached must be therefore deemed to be well settled.
AFFIDAVITS; REQUIREMENTS. All that is required by the affidavit contemplated in Section 2 of Rule 60 is that upon applying for an order for replevin, the
plaintiff must show that he is "the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof"; that the property is wrongfully
detained by the defendant with an allegation on the cause of detention; that the same has not been taken for any tax assessment or fine levied pursuant to law nor
seized under any execution, or an attachment against the property of such plaintiff or if so seized that it is exempt from seizure. The affidavit must also state the
actual value of the property.
TEST FOR SUFFICIENCY THEREOF. In determining the sufficiency of the application for a writ of replevin, the allegations thereof and the recitals of the

37

documents appended thereto and made part thereof should be considered.

FORECLOSURE BY SHERIFF NOT REQUIRED BEFORE FILING AN ACTION FOR REPLEVIN.
61. Rule 61 (Support
Pendente Lite)
Reyes vs. Ines-Luciano
G.R.
No.
L-48219,
February 28, 1979
Lam vs. Chua G.R. No.
131286, March 18, 2004

ADULTERY AS A DEFENSE IN ACTION FOR SUPPORT MUST BE ESTABLISHED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE. It is enough that the facts be established by
affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. Such evidence must be sufficient to enable the court to justly resolve the application of support
pendent lite.
Judgment of support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a
needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the
giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination
For declaration of nullity of marriage or annulment of marriage there can be no default pursuant to Sec 6 Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Art
48 of the Family Code
Where a court enters a judgment or awards relief beyond the prayer for the complaint or the scope of its allegations the excessive relief is not merely irregular but
is void for want of jurisdiction and is open to collateral attack.

Calderon vs. Roxas, G.R.

No. 185595, January 9,
2013

Award of support must be based on evidence presented before it. The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to
support their children under the Family code and the monthly expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation of the child
The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite which may be availed of at the commencement of the proper action or proceeding,
or at any time prior to the judgment or final order.
Rule on Provisional Orders which shall govern the issuance of provisional orders during the pendency of cases for the declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment
of voidable marriage and legal separation. These include orders for spousal support, child support, child custody, visitation rights, hold departure, protection and
administration of common property.
Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain
rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional because they constitute
temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action, and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of
the main action. The subject orders on the matter of support pendente lite are but an incident to the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

62. Rule 62 (Interpleader)

Ocampo vs. Tirona G.R.
No. 147812, April 6, 2005

Wack Wack Golf and

Country Club vs. Lee E.
Won, G.R. No. L-23851,
30 SCRA 165

The elements to be proved and resolved in unlawful detainer cases are the fact of lease and expiration or violation of its terms
An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property. The action of
interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without
claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who
claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to
determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a
double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former
are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIOn: The actions of interpleader under Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a remedy whereby a person who has personal
property in his posession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the
said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves in order to
determine finally who is entitled to one or other thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect
of one liability.

38

PROCEDURE UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND NEW RULES OF COURT DISTINGUISHED, they have the same procedure but
SECTION 1 RULE 63 of the ROC the remedy of interpleader is available regardless of the nature of the subject-matter of the controversy, whereas under the
SECTION 120 of the CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE an interpleader suit is proper only if the subject-matter of the controversy is personal property or relates to
the performance of an obligation.
ACTION TO BE FILED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AFTER A DISPUTE ARISES, need not wait for an independent suit against him before filing a bill of
interpleader or else he may be barred by laches or undue delay.
PARTY WHO HAS SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED A RIGHT CANNOT BE LATTER IMPLEADED or asked to prove anew against other adverse claimants.
Rule
63
(Declaratory
Relief)
DBM vs. Manilas Finest
Retirees
Association,
G.R. No. 169446, May 9,
2007

Martelino vs. NHMF Corp.

G.R. No. 160208, June 30,
2008

there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or
contract subject of the complaint. A special civil action is after all not essentially different from an ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56
of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes necessary some special regulation. But the identity between their
fundamental nature is such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve
to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.
Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may be converted into an ordinary action and the parties allowed to file such pleadings as may be
necessary or proper, if before the final termination of the case "a breach or violation of an ordinance, should take place."
Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court expressly states that "[n]o preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person
sought to be enjoined."
Declaratory relief under Section 1 of Rule 63 a person must file a petitioner for declaratory relief before breach or violation of a deed, will, contract, other written
instrument, statute, executive order, regulation, ordinance or any other government regulation The purpose of the action [for declaratory relief] is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc. for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not
to settle issues arising from its alleged breach. It may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers. Where
the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action.
Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to explain or
clarify short of a judgment or final order.
If the petitioner erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for prohibition if it has far-reaching implications and it raises question that should be
resolved it may be treated as one for prohibition
Prohibition is a remedy against proceedings that are without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain,
speedy adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
If the petition for declaratory relief and prohibition was vague, dismissal is not proper because the respondents may ask for more particulars

39