Intro Logic

Introduction to Mathematical Logic
Adrien Deloro
Spring 2009
Contents
0
Propositional Logic (Allegro)

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Syntax
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.1.1
The Language of Propositional Logic . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.1.2
Well-Formed Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.1.3
Unique Readability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.2.1
Truth Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.2.2
Satisfaction and Semantic Consequence
0.2.3
Simplifying the Language
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
Natural Deduction (in Classical Logic) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
0.3.1
Syntactic Consequences and Deductions . . . . . . . . . .
13
0.3.2
Our First Deductions
16
0.3.3
Simplifying the Language (and Presentation)
. . . . . . .
18
0.3.4
The Soundness Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
25
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Completeness Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26
0.4.1
Extending the Theory
27
0.4.2
Finding a Truth Assignment
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
29
0.5.1
Compactness
29
0.5.2
Applications to Decidability*
0.5.3
A Topological Proof* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
32
A Little Modal Logic* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
33
0.6.1
Semantics*
33
0.6.2
Proof Theory*
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
34
0.6.3
Completeness*
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
36
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
First-Order Logic (Largo)

1.1
1.2
28
The Compactness Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Syntax
30
39
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
39
1.1.1
First-order Languages
1.1.2
Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
40
41
1.1.3
Formulas
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
42
Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
44
1.2.1
Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
44
1.2.2
Parameters and Interpretations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
45
1.2.3
Satisfaction and Semantic Consequence
45
. . . . . . . . . .
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
Substitutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
46
1.3.1
Substitutability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
47
1.3.2
A Renaming Algorithm
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
48
1.3.3
Substitutions and Satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
49
Deductions and Soundness
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
51
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
51
1.4.1
Deductions
1.4.2
Simplifying the Language
1.4.3
Soundness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
56
Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
56
1.5.0
Strategy and Witnesses
57
1.5.1
Expanding the Language
1.5.2
Extending the Theory
1.5.3
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
53
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
58
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
60
Finding a Structure (and Assignment) . . . . . . . . . . .
62
Consequences and Compactness
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
64
1.6.1
Decidability*
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
64
1.6.2
Compactness
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
65
1.6.3
Non-Standard Analysis* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
66
An Alternate Proof of Compactness* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
68
1.7.1
Filters and Ultralters*
68
1.7.2
Ultraproducts (The o Structure)*
. . . . . . . . . . . .
70
1.7.3
Alternate Proof of Compactness* . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
72
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Second-Order Logic (Presto)
73
2.1
Compactness fails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
74
2.2
Peano Arithmetic
75
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1' Some Model Theory (Furioso)

1'.0 A Word on Model-Terrorists
77
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1'.1 Elementary Equivalence; Inclusion and Elementary Inclusion
. .
77
79
1'.1.1 Elementary Equivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
80
1'.1.2 Inclusion
81
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1'.1.3 Elementary Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
82
1'.2 Morphisms, Elementary Morphisms, Categoricity . . . . . . . . .
84
1'.2.1 Morphisms
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1'.2.2 Elementary Morphisms
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
84
86
1'.2.3 Categoricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
87
1'.3 Lwenheim-Skolem Theorems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
87
1'.3.1 The Substructure Generated by a Set
. . . . . . . . . . .
87
1'.3.2 Skolem Functions and the Descending Version . . . . . . .
89
1'.3.3 The General Version and the o-Vaught Criterion . . . .
90
1'.4 Back-and-Forth Methods
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1'.4.1 Dense Linear Orderings

1'.4.2
-isomorphisms
92
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
94
1'.4.3 Finitary Back-and-Forth*

1'.5 Quantier Elimination and
1'.5.1 Elimination Sets
91
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-Saturation .
96
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
99
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
99
1'.5.2
-Saturated
1'.5.3 Examples
Models
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Indices
111
Index of Notions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Index of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
List of Lectures
115
Chapter 0
Propositional Logic (Allegro)

Propositional logic, sometimes called Propositional Calculus, is interested in
compound propositions; it is the logic which underlies truth tables. In spite of
its little mathematical interest, it is a perfect eld for a rst encounter with
important notions.
We shall introduce a formalization of deduction in the setting of propositional
logic, and study (some of ) its properties. This will be a brief account of proof
theory.
We shall also introduce the objects of propositional logic, that is truth assignments.
These are on the side of meanings, called semantics.
They bring
their own notion of consequence; the main result of this chapter which serves
as a training area for more expressive logics, is that in propositional logic, both
notions coincide.
In this chapter:
Describe the language of propositional logic (0.1)
Describe the objects of propositional logic (0.2)
Formalize the notion of entailment (0.2.2)
Formalize the notion of deduction in propositional logic (0.3)
Show that entailment and deduction coincide (0.3.4 and 0.4)
Derive the compactness theorem and applications (0.5)
An incursion to modal logic* (0.6)
Lecture 1 (Language and Wff's; Unique Readability)
0.1 Syntax
We rst deal with the familiar syntax of propositional logic. The expressions are
(nite) sequences of well-known symbols (0.1.1), but not all such expressions
may be given a meaning.
(0.1.2).
This will lead us to the relevant notion of formula
A key, and fairly natural, property of the language is that there is
exactly one way to read a relevant formula (Theorem 0.1.9 of 0.1.3).
0.1.1 The Language of Propositional Logic

As we have said, propositional logic is interested in building coumpound propositions from elementary propositions.
Denition 0.1.1
(language of propositional logic)
The language of proposi-
tional logic consists of:
two punctuation symbols : the parentheses ( and )
ve connectives
a set
, , , ,
of sentence symbols
A1 , . . . , A n , . . . .
One should already have an intuition that
and
suce to encode the
other three connectives. This unformal idea will be given a precise meaning in
0.3.3.
Denition 0.1.2
(expression)
An expression is any (nite) sequence of sym-
bols from the alphabet. Its length is its length as a sequence.
Remark 0.1.3.
The set
of expressions of propositional logic is countable.
Technically, Denition 0.1.1 denes the alphabet of propositional logic. It is

never perfectly clear what language means: does one mean the alphabet, the
set of expressions, or the set of well-formed formulas (Denition 0.1.4 below)?
Very fortunately, the cardinals of the alphabet, the set of expressions, and the
set of well-formed formulas, are the same.
0.1.2 Well-Formed Formulas

As (
A1
is an expression, we must clarify the formation rules.
Denition 0.1.4
(well-formed formula)
The collection
WFF
of well-formed
formulas (w in short) is the smallest set such that:
each
if
An
and
is a w;
Remark 0.1.5.
are w, so are
(), ( ), ( ), ( ),
and
( ).
As this is the only relevant notion of formula anyway, we shall
soon omit well-formed, and say formula, for short.
Denition 0.1.6
(theory)
A theory is a set of w 's.
W 's are built from the sentence symbols with connectives.
As this is a
recursive denition, most of our proofs on formulas will proceed by induction

(notice that the length of a compound proposition is bigger than that of the
propositions which compose it).
Let us be more technical and check that Denition 0.1.4 makes sense.
Notation 0.1.7.
We dene the following functions.
C :
E
E

7
()
C :
E2
(, ) 7
E
( )
C :
E2
(, ) 7
C :
E2
(, ) 7
E
( )
C :
E2
E
(, ) 7 ( )
Notice that these functions actually take
Notation 0.1.8.
WFFn+1
WFF
(resp.
E
( )
WFF2 )
to
WFF.
WFF0 = A, and for n N,

[ [
[
[
= WFFn C (WFFn ) C (WFF2n ) C (WFF2n )
Let
It is clear that for all n N, WFFn is countable. It is also clear that WFF =
nN WFFn . This proves that WFF is a set, and even a countable set. More
generally, if A is innite (but perhaps uncountable), then Card WFF = Card A.
0.1.3 Unique Readability

There is still something which needs to be proved about our well-formed formulas: that no ambiguity arises when we read one.
Theorem 0.1.9 (unique readability).

C , C , C , C ,
and
Corollary 0.1.10.
position of
Let
The restrictions to
WFF of the functions
are injective and have disjoint images.
be a w of length
> 1.
Then there is a unique decom-
among the following possibilities:
(1 2 ),
(1 ),
(1 2 ),
(1 2 ),
(1 2 )
(This means that the connective and the composing propositions are unique.)
An initial segment of an expression

is an expression
E1
of
E2
with
E = E1 E2
is an expression
E1
such that there
(concatenation). A proper initial segment
is an initial segment such that
E1 6= E .
Notice that the empty (blank)
sequence is an expression but not a w.

The proof of Theorem 0.1.9 will rely on the following key observation.
Lemma 0.1.11
(balanced parenthesing)
(i). A w has as many left parentheses as right parentheses.

(ii). A non-empty proper initial segment of a w has strictly more left parentheses than right parentheses.
(iii). No proper initial segment of a w is a w.
Proof .
(i). We show the property by induction on (the length of )
scription of
If
WFF
WFF0 ,
using the de-
found above (Notation 0.1.8).
then
is a sentence symbol, and this is obvious. Assume
WFFn . Then an element of C (WFFn )

WFFn , so by induction has as many
left parentheses as right parentheses, and so does . The same holds for
2
2
2
2
elements of C (WFFn ), C (WFFn ), C (WFFn ), and C (WFFn ). So any
element of WFFn+1 has as many left parentheses as right parentheses.
the result is know for elements of
= ()
is of the form
with
By induction, the property is true on

(ii). Same method. If
WFF0 ,
then
WFF.
is a sentence symbol, so it has no
non-empty proper initial segments, and the claim is true!
WFFn .
Assume it holds for elements of
WFFn .
show that 1
Let
be of the form
Consider a non-empty proper initial segment

has more
('s
than
(),
of :
for
we
)'s.
If
is ( or (, we are done.
If
is (1 where
is a non-empty proper initial segment of
then we are done by induction.
If
There are no other cases, as
is ( then we are done as
This shows the property for
has as many
('s
as
)'s
by (i).
is a proper initial segment of
One copes with other four connectives in
a similar vein.
(iii). A consequence of (i) and (ii) (the empty expression is not a w anyway).
Proof of Theorem 0.1.9.
Assume that
C (1 , 1 ) = C (2 , 2 ),
(1 1 ) = (2
for well-formed formulas
1 , 1 , 2 , 2
2 )
and connectives
We may delete the rst (, getting
1 1 ) = 2
2 )
and
that is:
Then
1 or 2
1 is an
generality
the w
2 ,
must be an initial segment of the other; without loss of

initial segment of
2 .
If
is a proper initial segment of
then from balanced parenthesing (Lemma 0.1.11 (iii)),
can't be
a w, a contradiction.
So
1 = 2 ,
and deleting it we reach
1 ) =
At this point it is clear that
=
2 )
; deleting it, and the nal right parentheses,
we derive
1 = 2
Of course the case of
is even easier than that of binary connectives, so
everything is proved.
Such a quick proof of the Unique Readability Theorem is the reason why we
have introduced so many parentheses, in spite of the disgusting redundancies
they create. From now on we freely omit parentheses when there is no ambiguity,
i.e. we write
instead of
(() ).
End of Lecture 1.
Lecture 2 (The Semantics of Propositional Logic)
0.2 Semantics
We briey escape the claws of syntax, and give sense to our symbols.
So far
they bore no meaning; at no point yet did we agree on what they stand for.
0.2.1 Truth Assignments

Let us establish the connection between the language and the objects it is about.
Due to the relative poverty of propositional logic, not much can be said: everything is described once each sentence symbol of
will have been assigned a
truth value.
Denition 0.2.1
(truth values)
False (F , also denoted
There are two truth values: True (T ) and
).
Notice that everything from now on could be dened with more truth values;
for instance continuous logic investigates the case where the set of truth values
is
[0, 1].
But the important theorems we want might no longer hold.
Denition 0.2.2 (truth assignment).
A truth assignment is a function
v:A
{F, T }.
Once the sentence symbols have been given a truth value, the natural truth
value of every w is known.
Proposition 0.2.3.
Let v be a truth
v : WFF {F, T } such that:
tension
v(An ) = v(An )
v() = T
i
for each
assignment. Then there is a unique ex-
n N;
v() = F ;
v(1 2 ) = T
i
v(1 ) = T
and
v(1 2 ) = T
i
v(1 ) = T
or
v(2 ) = T ;
v(2 ) = T ;
v(1 2 ) = T
i
v(1 ) = F
v(1 2 ) = T
i
v(1 ) = v(2 ).
Proof .
This extension
or
v(2 ) = T ;
v is well-dened by Unique Readability (Theorem 0.1.9).
A quick induction shows that it is unique.
Example 0.2.4.
If v(A1 ) = v(A2 ) = T
v((A1 A2 ) (A3 A4 )) = T .
and
v(A3 ) = v(A4 ) = F ,
Only a little later (at the end of 0.2.3) shall we identify
then one has
to is extension
v.
0.2.2 Satisfaction and Semantic Consequence

Denition 0.2.5 (satisfaction).
v
satises
if for all
Let be a theory and v be a truth assignment.

, v() = T .
Example 0.2.6.
v(A1 ) = F , v(A2 ) = T
v(An ) = T
for all
Denition 0.2.7
satises
nN
(A1 A2 ).
satises
(satisability)
Let
{A1 , A1 A2 , . . . , A1 An , . . .}.
be a theory.
is satisable if there is
a truth assignment satisfying it.
Example 0.2.8.
{A1 , A1 A2 , A1 A3 } is satisable
assignment v(A1 ) = v(A2 ) = F , v(A3 ) = T ).
{A1 A1 }
(try for instance the truth
is not satisable.
{A1 , A2 , A1 A2 }
is not satisable.
A very natural question occurs: when is a theory satisable? it will have an

answer with the Compactness Theorem, Theorem 0.5.2 below.
The most important notion of logic is the following.
Denition 0.2.9
entails
denoted
(semantic consequence)
|= ,
Let
be a theory and
if every truth assignment satisfying
a w.
satises
tautologically implies . If |= , one may then say

is a tautology, or that is valid. We do not insist on classical terminology.
One also says that

that
Lemma 0.2.10. {}
Proof .
Suppose that
is satisable i
{}
6|= .
is satisable. Then there is a truth assignment
v does not satisfy .

.
Conversely suppose that 6|= . There is therefore a truth assignement v
satisfying , but not satisfying . It follows v() = T , so v actually satises
{}.
satisfying
and
This means that
by denition (Proposition 0.2.3),
does not entail
Theorem 0.2.11.
Let 0 be a nite theory and a w.

algorithm which decides whether entails or not.
Proof .
In
0 {},
Then there is an
only nitely many sentence symbols occur. List all (but
nitely many) truth tables involving them. If all truth tables satisfying
satisfy
also
the answer is yes; otherwise answer no at rst aw.
Question.
And what about an innite set?
This question will nd an answer when we can reduce the innite to the nite
(Compactness, Theorem 0.5.2). The answer is exactly half as good (Corollary
0.5.14). This is far from obvious, as
might now involve innitely many sen-
tence symbols, giving rise to continuum many truth tables.

single formula, so one has the feeling that some nite subset
suce to entail
in case
However
of
is a
would
does.
There is however no bound a priori on how many sentence symbols are

involved in 0 , as shows
An , An A1 }. This is
the example
= A1 , = {A2 , A2 , A3 , . . . , An1
actually the reason why the algorithm for innite
given in Corollary 0.5.14 cannot be implemented to answer no: if it hasn't

answered yes after a long waiting time, it could be
either because
|= ,
but we haven't waited long enough to be positive
about it;
or simply because
6|= ,
but we'll never know.
These questions will be made more precise in 0.5.2.
0.2.3 Simplifying the Language

Five connectives are too much:
extremely clumsy.
they made inductive denitions and proofs
Moreover we have a feeling that they are redundant.
We
shall cut down on symbols and rules.

In Proposition 0.2.3, we have treated
, ,
as if they were elementary
connectives, and not abbreviations. We show that considering them as abbreviations is harmless.
This involves rewriting the whole theory with only two
connectives, and checking that this new setting is equivalent to the previous
one.
10
Notation 0.2.12.
each
if
An
and
WFF0
is the smallest set such that:
is a w;
are w, so are
WFF0
The set
The collection
and
would require a version of the Unique Readability Theorem
(Theorem 0.1.9), which may be regarded as a special case of the previous one,
since
WFF0 WFF.
In any case, we keep working with few parentheses.
There is of course a natural way to translate a standard w

connectives) into a w '
Notation 0.2.13.
using only
An
is
()0
is
and
for each
and
(using ve
We inductively translate any w
uses only the two connectives
A0n
into a formula
which
n N;
(0 );
( )0
is
(0 0 );
( )0
is
(0 0 );
( )0
is
(0 0 );
( )0
is
((0 0 ) ( 0 0 )).
Hence for any formula
the translation
uses only two connectives, and
intuitively bears the same meaning.
Example 0.2.14.
0
(A3 A1 ) ),
Let
which is
be (A1 A2 )(A3 A1 ). Then 0 is ((A1 A2 )0

(((A1 A2 ) (A2 A1 )) (A3 A1 )).
The issue is that this new notion of formula gives rise to another extension
of truth assignment, and therefore to a new notion of entailment.
We must
check that these new notions do coincide with their original ve connectives
analogues.
Notation 0.2.15.
extension of
For a truth assignment
v : WFF {F, T },
v 0 () = T
i
for each
n N;
i
v(1 ) = F
or
v(2 ) = T .
Notice that this is a subset of the conditions dening

is dened only for
Lemma 0.2.16.
using only
be the
v() = F ;
v 0 (1 2 ) = T
v 0 ()
v0
dened by:
v 0 (An ) = v(An )
and that
let
Let
(Proposition 0.2.3),
WFF0 .
be a truth assignment,
0
0
and . Then v() = v ( ).
11
a w, and
its translation
Proof .
By induction on
If
Suppose that
is a sentence symbol, then by denition
is
Suppose that
i
v 0 (10 ) = F
v() = T is equivalent to v() = F , which is

v 0 ( 0 ) = F , which is equivalent to v 0 (0 ) = T .
Then
by induction equivalent to
v() = v() = v 0 (0 ).
1 2 . Then v() = T i v(1 ) = F or v(2 ) = T

v 0 (20 ) = T i v 0 (10 20 ) = T i v 0 (0 ) = T .
is
or
Suppose that is 1 2 . Then v() = T i v(1 ) = v(2 ) = T

v 0 (10 ) = v 0 (20 ) = T i v 0 ((10 20 )) = T i v 0 (0 ) = T .
We proceed similarly for the remaining two connectives
and
i
Any modication, even apparently harmless, of the notion of truth assignment, induces a modcation of the notion of semantic consequence (Denition
0.2.9).
Notation 0.2.17.
0
|=
be a consistent subset of WFF0

v satises , then v 0 () = T .
Let
if whenever
Corollary 0.2.18. |=
Proof .
and
WFF0 .
Write
i
0 |=0 0 .
|= . We show that 0 |=0 0 . Let v be a truth

0
0
assignement such that v satises . By Lemma 0.2.16, v satises . By
0
0
assumption, v satises . Using Lemma 0.2.16 again, v satises .
0
0 0
Now suppose that |= . We show that |= . Let v be a truth assign0
0
ment such that v satises . By Lemma 0.2.16, v satises . By assumption,
0
0
v satises . Using Lemma 0.2.16 again, v satises .
Suppose that
From now on, we know that the semantics induced by two connectives is the
same as that induced by ve. In particular we happily forget about
(We are not entirely done with
v0
and
|=0 .
however, since a similar verication will have
to be carried on the syntactic side, 0.3.3.)

We shall also identify any truth assignment
with its extension
v.
End of Lecture 2.
Lecture 3 (Natural Deduction in Classical Logic)
0.3 Natural Deduction (in Classical Logic)

In this section we formalize the notions of deduction and syntactic consequence;
this will be done in 0.3.1.
We shall work in the framework of Natural De-
duction (a certain notion of deduction), using Classical Logic (certain rules of

deduction).
Natural Deduction was invented by Gerhard Gentzen; there are other notions
of deduction (for instance, Hilbert's system, which relies on modus ponens), and
12
there are other logics (for instance, intuitionistic logic, which does not allow
contradiction proofs). They all yield dierent notions of deduction. We made
the choices which best reect a normal mathematician's thought.
After a couple of examples (0.3.2), we shall proceed in 0.3.3 to reducing
the language to two connectives.
There are indeed redundancies as we have
observed (Corollary 0.2.18). We shall show that one may restrict the language
and deduction rules to
and
without aecting the power of the notion of
deduction.
0.3.1 Syntactic Consequences and Deductions

What is a consequence, again? In terms of proofs,
if there is a way to deduce
Denition 0.3.1
(deduction)
follows from assumptions
using the w 's of the theory
A deduction is a nite sequence of basic steps
which are regarded as elementary deduction rules.

The deduction can be drawn as a tree showing the consecutive steps. This
will be more precise when we have given an example of a set of such rules, but
we can already formulate the following important denition.
Denition 0.3.2
a theorem of
says that
If
= ,
(syntactic consequence)
denoted
proves
Let
be a theory and
if there is a deduction of
under
a w. is
. One also
one writes
Example 0.3.3.
` ,
` ,
and says that
At the end of the day,
is a theorem (of our logic).
(( )) should be a theorem.
We now explain the basic steps of deduction. Bear in mind that we chose
the most natural setting (natural deduction), but there are many other possible
settings, and not all are equivalent. A characteristic feature of natural deduction
is that connectives may be introduced and eliminated. Describing the deduction
rules amounts to explaining how connectives are proved and used.
follows,
stands for a (possibly empty) theory, and
, ,
In what
etc. for w 's.
There is only one axiom (so far). In natural deduction for propositional
logic, the only way to start a proof is by assuming something.
Axiom:
{} `
Ax
Weakening allows us to add unused assumptions to an existing deduction.

Weakening:
`
{} `
13
Wk
The case of negation is very subtle. We have a way to introduce a negation provided we deduced an inconsistency (i ), but we also have a way
of removing double-negations (e ). This is a characteristic feature of classical logic, which is actually equivalent to admitting reductio ad absurdum. Keep in mind that this is only one among the possible treatments of
negation and contradiction, though it seems satisfactory to us as working

mathematicians.
The elimination rule
is necessary to show the excluded middle law
(Theorem 0.3.11 below); if we introduce a weaker rule, excluded middle

need not hold any more.
How hard it may be to believe at rst,
absurdum. Only
is not related to reduction to
is.
Introduction and elimination rules for
{} ` {} `
`
There are two elimination rules for
in classical logic :
`
`
as there are two possible ways to
use a conjunction.
` `
`
`
`
e1
`
`
e2
Dually, there are two introduction rules for
as there are two ways to
prove a disjunction. This is in general dicult, since when trying to show
one never knows a priori which is true; contradiction proofs will be
helpful (see the proof of Theorem 0.3.11 below).

On the other hand
e may look subtle at rst sight, but it merely describes
the process of a case-division.

`
`
i1
`
`
i2
and
` 1 2
{1 } `
`
{2 } `
may be regarded as convenient abbreviations (this will be made
formal in 0.3.3). But the connective
14
is essential.
{} `
`
The elimination rule

introduction rule
It is clear that
` `
`
is classically called modus ponens ; dually the
is called modus tollens .
should have the moral status of an abbreviation. Yet in
case it is admitted as a primitive connective, we need deduction rules.

` `
`
:
`
`
e1
`
`
e2
We shall start using quantiers in the next chapters and introduce adequate
rules; for the moment they won't appear, as we work in Propositional Logic.
Remark 0.3.4.
Notice that in our deductions we may have several assumptions,
but at each step we have only one conclusion. This is another typical feature of
Natural Deduction which supposedly reects the way we mathematicians work.
But there are other, more complex, deduction systems (for instance, Gentzen's
Sequent Calculus).
A formalization of deduction yields the following essential notion.
Denition 0.3.5
such that
(consistency)
and
A theory
is consistent if there is no w
` .
In other words, a theory is consistent if it is not possible to deduce a contradiction from it. There is a symbol for inconsistency (or contradiction), which
we shall not use.
Lemma 0.3.6.
Proof .
Hence
Suppose
is inconsistent i
for all w
inconsistent. Then there is
such that
`
`
Wk
{} `
{} `
`
e
`
The converse is obvious.
15
Wk
i
and
` .
0.3.2 Our First Deductions

We begin with an easy example.
Example 0.3.7.
For w 's
, ,
one has
` ( ) (( ) ( ))
Ax
Ax
Verication: On the one hand,
`
`
e
`
`
` ( ) ( )
i
` ( ) (( ) ( ))
e
i
On the other hand,
Ax
( ) ( ) ` (( ) ( ))
e
( ) ( ) `
(( ) ( )) `
` (( ) ( )) ( )
(1 )
where
and
and
(2 )
(1 )
(2 )
Ax
e
i
are the symmetric deductions obtained by exchanging
Combining both trees with
i ,
we nd
` ( ) (( ) ( ))
Theorem 0.3.8
(Contraposition)
Proof .
` .
Suppose
. `
i
` .
Then
Ax
{} `
`
Ax
Wk
Wk
{, } `
{, } `
{} `
e
{, } `
{, } `
{} `
i
`
Suppose
` .
What we just proved implies
` .
Therefore
Ax
Ax
{} `
{} `
Wk
Wk
{, } `
{, } `
i
{} `
`
Wk
{} `
{} `
{} `
e
{} `
i
`
16
Wk
i
WK
e
Parallel to the relationship between entailment and satisability (Lemma

0.2.10) runs the following.
Lemma 0.3.9
Proof .
(see Lemma 0.2.10)
Suppose
{}
is not inconsistent i
is not inconsistent and
(by axiom and weakening), and
{}
. {}
{} `
` .
Then
6` .
{} `
(by assumption). It follows that
6` .
6` , and {} is inconsistent. By inconsistency , there
is be such that {} ` and {} ` . Then by i , ` , against
the assumption. So {} is not inconsistent.
is inconsistent, against the assumption. So
Suppose that
Notice that the latter proof did not involve a semantic analog of the elimination of double negation (e ), but only
believe in
e ,
i ;
whence the odd statement. As you
you may say is consistent for is not inconsistent.
Theorem 0.3.10
(Reductio ad Absurdum)
If
{}
is inconsistent then
` .
Proof .
Suppose
{}
inconsistent. By Lemma 0.3.9,
` .
By
(e ),
` .
Still not impressed?
Theorem 0.3.11 (Excluded Middle holds in Classical Logic).
Excluded middle
is a theorem of Classical Logic.
, one has ` . Notice that one does not know

to prove, so there is little chance to nd a quick
deduction relying entirely on i . We shall work our way through a contradiction
proof involving e .
That is: for any w
a priori which of
Proof .
or
Due to pagesetting limitations, I must pause and resume.
Ax
{} `
Ax
Wk
{( ), } `
{( )} ` ( )
i
Wk
{( ), } `
{( ), } ` ( )
( ) `
i
( ) `
|
{z
}
()
()
( ) ` (()
( ) `
` ( )
e
`
17
Ax
i
The proof of Theorem 0.3.11 shows that contradiction deductions (typically

excluded middle) are always a little counter-intuitive to formalize. Notice that
in some weaker deduction systems, excluded middle cannot be deduced !
End of Lecture 3.
Lecture 4 (Reduction to Two Connectives (1/2))
0.3.3 Simplifying the Language (and Presentation)

We have introduced a battery of deduction rules, though we had concluded in
0.2.3 that two connectives were enough to convey all the desired meaning. We
now must check that working with only two connectives would preserve the
deductive strength, i.e.
check that all deductions can be imitated even when
(, )
one restricts connectives and rules to the

Recall what
ing
and proving
Lemma 0.3.12
Proof .
,
setting.
stands for (Notation 0.2.13). It is intuitively clear that prov-
should be the same.
(see Lemma 0.2.16)
By induction on
. {} ` 0
and
{0 } ` .
Provided the result has been proved for a formula
we shall freely write:
`
` 0
induction
though induction is of course not a deduction rule. This is actually short-hand

for the following:
.
.
. induction
.
{} ` 0
i
` 0
Wk
` ` 0
e
` 0
Of course
` 0
`
induction
is a similar shortcut, and is licit for a similar reason.
Suppose that
is a sentence symbol.
Then
0 = ,
obvious.
Suppose that
is
Then
0 = ( 0 ).
Now
{ 0 } ` 0
{} `
{, 0 } ` 0
Wk
{, 0 } `
{, 0 } `
{} ` 0
|{z}
Ax
=0
18
Ax
Wk
induction
i
and the claim is
and
Ax
{} `
0
{ } `
{0 , } `
Wk
{0 , } ` 0
{0 , } ` 0
{} `
|{z}
0 Ax
Wk
induction
i
=0
Suppose that
is
(1 2 ).
Then
{10 } ` 10
{, 10 } ` 10
{, 10 } ` 1
Ax
{} `
Wk
{, 10 } `
{, 10 } ` 2
{, 10 } ` 20
i
{} ` 0
Ax
Wk
induction
e
induction
On the other hand
Ax
{1 } ` 1
{0 , 1 } ` 1
{0 , 1 } ` 10
Ax
{0 } ` 0
Wk
{0 , 1 } ` 0
{0 , 1 } ` 20
{0 , 1 } ` 2
i
{0 } `
Of course the case of
Suppose that
and
= 1 2 ,
Wk
induction
e
induction
was trivial. The real proof starts here.
so that
0 = ((10 20 )).
One has
Ax
{} `
Wk
0
{, 1 20 } `
e
Ax
{, 10 20 } ` 1
{10 20 } ` 10 20
Wk
induction
{, 10 20 } ` 10
{, 10 20 } ` 10 20
e
{, 10 20 } ` 20
|
{z
}
()
Hence
Ax
{} `
Wk
{, 10 20 } `
{, 10 20 } ` 2
()
induction
{, 10 20 } ` 20 {, 10 20 } ` 20
{} ` (10 20 )
19
On the other hand
Ax
{10 } ` 10
0
{1 } ` 1
{ , 1 , 10 , 20 } ` 10
Wk
{0 , 1 , 10 , 20 } ` 1
{0 , 1 , 10 , 20 } ` 1
0
0
{ , 1 , 1 } ` 20
i
{0 , 1 } ` 10 20
|
{z
Ax
Wk
induction
i
()
Therefore
Ax
{0 } ` (10 20 )
()
{0 , 1 } ` 10 2 {0 , 1 } ` (10 20 )
{0 } ` 1
e
{0 } ` 1
Wk
i
Moreover
Ax
{20 } ` 20
Ax
Wk
0
{ , 10 , 20 } ` 20
{0 } ` 0
i
Wk
{0 , 20 } ` 10 20
{0 , 20 } ` 0
i
{0 } ` 20
e
{0 } ` 20
induction
{0 } ` 2
Combining both threes, we nd
Suppose that
= 1 2 ,
{1 , 10 }
0 = (10 20 ).
is clearly inconsistent by induction.
{1 , 10 } ` 20
and
On the other hand,

As
so that
{0 } ` .
{1 } ` 0 .
{2 , 10 } ` 20
By Lemma 0.3.6,
by induction, so
= 1 2 , combining both deduction

{} ` 0 . This was the easy part.
{2 } ` 0 .
trees and eliminating
we nd
For the converse we need an easy remark:
Ax
{10 } ` 10
induction
{10 } ` 1
Ax
Wk
{, 10 } ` 1
{} `
i
Wk
{, 10 } ` 1 2
{, 10 } `
i
{} ` 10
{z
}
|
(1 )
Of course one has similarly
{} ` 20 (2 ).
20
Therefore
(1 )
Ax
{} ` 10
{0 } ` 10 20
(2 )
0
0 Wk
0
0
0 Wk
{} ` 20
{ , } ` 1
{ , } ` 1 2
e
0
0
{ , } ` 2
{0 , } ` 20
{0 } `
e
{0 } `
The case of
Hence
is left as an exercise, but essentially easier than
and its translation
prove each other. Of course they do so only
is but a rst step as the notion of deduction
a deduction of
associated to
may involve ); Lemma

` itself has changed.
in the setting involving all connectives (since
Notation 0.3.13.
Wk
0.3.12
be a theory and a w. Write `0 if there is

using only axiom, weakening and the deduction rules
Let
from
and
Preservation of the notion of deduction under translation is therefore the

following result.
Corollary 0.3.14
`
i
Proof .
Let
For the moment we prove only that
` .
1 , . . . , n
pose
(see Corollary 0.2.18)
0 `0 0 .
be a theory and
0 `0 0
implies
a w. Then
` .
Sup-
By niteness of the notion of a deduction, there are formulas

such that
{10 , . . . , n0 } `0 0 .
Using
repeatedly, one nds
`0 10 (20 . . . (n0 0 ). . . )
As all the rules in
`0
are in
`,
one even has
` 10 (20 . . . (n0 0 ). . . )
Now one sees that
(1 (2 . . . (n ). . . ))
is
10 (20 . . . (n0 0 ). . . )
So by Lemma 0.3.12, it follows
` 1 (2 . . . (n ). . . )
In particular,
{1 , . . . , n } ` ,
and
` .
We shall prove the converse implication next time.

End of Lecture 4.
Lecture 5 (Reduction to Two Connectives (2/2); Soundness)
We nish the proof of Corollary 0.3.14.
21
Proof of Corollary 0.3.14, completed.

plies
0 `0 0
The remaining proof that
The cases of axiom and weakening are clear.
Suppose the last step is for instance
i :
{} ` {} `
`
By induction, one has
`,
it follows
And therefore
0 { 0 } `0 0
`0 ).
and
0 { 0 } `0 0 .
0 { 0 } `0 0 0 { 0 } `0 0
0 `0 0
As
is in
e , i , and e
are as trivial (since these rules
We now turn to the interesting congurations.
Suppose the last step is
i ,
that is
` 1 ` 2
` 1 2
We aim at proving
0 `0 (1 2 )0 ;
By induction, we know
0 `0 10
recall that
(1 2 )0
0 ` 20 .
Therefore
and
is
.
.
. induction
.
(10 20 ).
Ax
{10 20 } `0 10 20
0 `0 10
0 {10 20 } `0 10
0 {10 20 } `0 10 20
0
0
{1 20 } `0 20
{z
|
Wk
e
()
and
.
.
. induction
.
0 `0 20
()
0 {10 20 } `0 20 0 {10 20 } `0 20
0 `0 (10 20 )
0 `0 0 .
It is clear that the cases of

are in
` im-
is by induction on the length of the deduction.
Suppose the last step is
e1 :
` 1 2
` 1
22
e1
Wk
i
By induction,
0 `0 (10 20 ).
Clearly
0 {10 } `0 10 20 ().
Hence
.
.
. induction
.
0 `0 (10 20 )
()
0 {10 } `0 10 20 0 {10 } `0 (10 20 )
0 `0 10
e
0 `0 10
0 `0 (10 20 ).
By induction,
e2 :
Suppose on the other hand that the last step is
` 1 2
` 2
Wk
e2
Of course
0 {20 } `0 10 20 ().
Thus
.
.
. induction
.
0 `0 (10 20 )
()
0 {20 } `0 10 20 0 {20 } `0 (10 20 )
0 `0 20
e
0 `0 20
Suppose that the last step is
Wk
i
i1 :
` 1
` 1 2
i1
0 `0 10 . From Lemma 0.3.9 we know that 0

0
{1 } is inconsistent, so by Lemma 0.3.6 0 {10 } `0 20 . Introducing
, we nd 0 `0 10 20 , that is 0 `0 (1 2 )0 .
i2
is dealt with similarly.
Suppose the last step of the form:
` 1 2
By induction,
{1 } ` {2 } `
`
0 `0 10 20 , 0 {10 } `0 0 ,
and
23
0 {20 } `0 0 . By
`0 ), we easily nd:
and
contraposition (Theorem 0.3.8, which still holds for
0 {0 } `0 10 (1 )
0 {0 } `0 20 (2 )
Therefore
.
.
. induction
.
0 `0 10 20
(1 )
0
0
0
0
0
0
{ } ` 1 2
{0 } `0 10
(2 )
e
0
0
0 0
0 {0 } `0 20
{ } ` 2
0 `0 0
e
0 `0 0
The
rules are easy to deal with.
All is well that ends well and we may forget about
there are two connectives:
and
`0
and
0 .
From now on
The other three are abbreviations. Have I
said that before? It is very important to say it again, and above all, it is crucial
that a redundant connective should be regarded a an abbreviation of the same
expression in either setting (syntactic or semantic).

However we shall be extremely hypocritical about connectives. In our de-
nitions and inductive proofs, we need only to consider

necessary we shall feel free to use
, ,
and
and
but whenever
and the related rules. We know
that these are harmless shortcuts, which preserve the notions of truth and of
deduction.
We now aim at simplifying the presentation of deductions.
Notation 0.3.15.
(via
Whenever an assumption
Let us give an example. Suppose we want to show
` .
{} ` . . .
.
.
.
{} `
`
we now write:
.
.
.
and then
remains uncrossed, one has
.
.
.
As
, we
is eliminated
When we write a deduction under a set of assumptions
on top (deduction under ).

i or i ), we cross it out.
write
` .
Similarly,
{} ` {} `
`
24
Instead of
becomes:
which means
` .
Example 0.3.16.
6 6
then
Do not forget to cross out every relevant occurence of
As an example, we prove Excluded Middle (Theorem 0.3.11)
with this notation.
( )

( )
1.
( ) 6

i
( ) 6

i
i
3.
( 6 ) 6

i

i
( )
i
i
5.
i
2.
4.
( 6 ) 6

i

i
( )
e

i
i
6.
0.3.4 The Soundness Theorem

Recall that we have two notions of consequence: semantic (|=, Denition 0.2.9)
and syntactic (`, Denition 0.3.2).
Once we have proved the Soundness and
Completeness Theorems (Theorems 0.3.17 and 0.4.1), all will be well that ends
well: they do coincide. The easier part comes rst.
Theorem 0.3.17
be a w. If
Proof .
` ,
(soundness of propositional logic)
then
Let
If the deduction is just an axiom, it is of the form
{} `
Clearly
Induction on the length of the deduction. We use Corollaries 0.2.18 and
0.3.14, which enable us to treat only the rules associated to
be a theory and
|= .
Ax
{} |= .
The case of weakening is absolutely trivial.
25
and
Suppose that the last step is by

is inconsistent.
i ;
that is,
because
{}
By induction, there are no truth assignments satisfying
{}. So any truth assignment satisfying (if any) satises .

|= (notice that we did not claim satisability of ).
`
`
|= . Let v be a
v() = v() = T , we are done.
By induction, we know that

satisfying
Thus
Then
truth assignment
Suppose that the last step of the deduction is the modus ponens:
` `
`
` and ` hold; by induction, |= and |= .

v be a truth assignment satisfying . Then v( ) = v() = T , so
v() = T . This shows |= .
Hence
Let
Suppose that the last step of the deduction is the modus tollens:
{} `
`
|= . Let v be
then v satises
by denition. If v does satisfy then v satises {}; we then
know that v satises , and therefore v satises again. In any case
v satises . This implies that |= .
By induction,
{} |= ;
a truth assignment satisfying
we aim at showing
Even with ve connectives the case of
If
etc.
does not satisfy
wouldn't be very complicated.
Induction completes the proof.

End of Lecture 5.
Lecture 6 (Completeness of Propositional Logic)
0.4 The Completeness Theorem

Theorem 0.3.17 states that every syntactic consequence is a semantic consequence; roughly speaking, if you can prove it, it is true. Very remarkably (and
fortunately), the converse holds.
Theorem 0.4.1 (completeness of propositional logic).

be a w. If
|= ,
then
` .
26
Let
be a theory and
Lemma 0.4.2.
The Completeness Theorem is equivalent to:

every consistent theory is satisable.
Proof .
be a consistent theory.
such that 6` . By
completeness, this implies 6|= . It follows from Lemma 0.2.10 that {}
is satisable; let v be a truth assignment satisfying {}. In particular, v
satises !
Suppose that every consistent theory is satisable. Let 6` . Then {}
is consistent by Lemma 0.3.9. In particular, {} is satisable. So there is
a truth assignment v satisfying {}: v satises but does not satisfy ,
so 6|= .
As
Suppose the Completeness Theorem.
Let
is consistent (Denition 0.3.5), there is a w
0.4.1 Extending the Theory

We shall prove the Completeness Theorem. In view of Lemma 0.4.2, it suces
to show that every consistent theory is satisable. So, given a consistent set,
we must nd a truth assignment satisfying it.
As often in mathematics, choice is embarrassing. We shall force ourself to
have a unique suitable truth assignment.
This amounts to maximizing, in a
consistent way, the set of requirements.
Denition 0.4.3
,
either
or
(complete)
is in
A consistent theory
is complete if for any w
The following remark will be implicitely used in the proof.
Remark 0.4.4.
If
Verication: Suppose
and
` ,
is complete, then
` ,
but
.
6
i
By completeness,
against consistency.
So
We shall extend any consistent theory to a complete one. As we have said,

the problem of satisfying a complete consistent set is actually easier, as there is
no ambiguity on what truth assignment to chose.
Here is the inductive step.
Lemma 0.4.5.
{}
Proof .
w
If
is a consistent theory and
is a w, then
{}
or
is consistent.
= {} is not consistent. By assumption, there is a

` and ` . By i , one has ` . As is consistent,
have ` too, so 6` . So {} is consistent by Theorem
Assume that
such that
one cannot
0.3.10.
Lemma 0.4.6.
theory
Let
containing
be a consistent theory.
.
27
Then there is a complete consistent
Proof . Recall that WFF is countable (Remark 0.1.3, for instance); enumerate
WFF = {n : n N}. We shall extend recursively. Let 0 = . Assume n
has been constructed. By Lemma 0.4.5, n {n } or n {n } is consistent.
If n {n } is consistent, let n+1 be it; otherwise let n+1 = n {n }. So
th
the n
w n has been taken into account, and n+1 is still consistent.
= nN n . Clearly
is consistent, and for any w , = n for
Let
. (It is also clear by consistency
some n, so n or its negation is in n+1
that and are not both in .)
0.4.2 Finding a Truth Assignment

A complete consistent theory induces a unique truth assignment, as for any
sentence symbol
An ,
either
An
An
or
is in
The following lemma checks
that this happens in a consistent way.
Lemma 0.4.7 (truth lemma).
be a complete consistent theory.
.
the truth assignment v : A {F, T } such that v(An ) = T i An
any w , v() = T i .
Proof .
By induction. The result is clear if
pleteness of
Let
Assume
the case
v() = T .
Then for
is a sentence symbol! By com-
is immediate. Now suppose that
We show
Consider
is
1 2 .
. By completeness of
, 1
.
v(1 ) = F , then by induction 1 6
Hence {1 } is not consistent; it follows {1 } ` 2 , and therefore

` 1 2 . By completeness, (1 2 )
.
. Therefore
` 1 2 ; by
If v(2 ) = T , then by induction 2
completeness (1 2 ) .
If
Assume
We show
v() = T .
v(1 ) = T and v(2 ) = F . By induction (and completeness

and 2
. If
` 1 2 , then by modus
1
` 2 , which contradicts consistency. So
6` 1 2 . This
ponens,
.
implies 6
Otherwise,
of
),
this shows
Induction completes the proof. Notice however that proving the theorem with
ve connectives would be essentially as hard, though longer.
Proof of the Completeness Theorem (Theorem 0.4.1).
Due to Lemma
0.4.2, it suces to show that a consistent theory is satisable.

consistent theory. By Lemma 0.4.6, we can extend
set
We consider the truth assignment
satises
In particular
satises
Let
be a
to a complete consistent
induced by
By Lemma 0.4.7,
is satisable.
End of Lecture 6.
Lecture 7 (Compactness of Propositional Logic)
28
0.5 The Compactness Theorem

0.5.1 Compactness
Compactness is the general phenomenon of reduction of the innite to the nite.
Denition 0.5.1 (nite satisability).

if for all nite
0 , 0
Let
be a theory. is nitely satisable
is satisable.
Theorem 0.5.2 (compactness of propositional logic).
A theory is satisable i
it is nitely satisable.
Proof .
An implication is trivial: if
is satisable, then a truth assignment
satisfying it will also satisfy any nite subset.

Let
be a nitely satisable theory. Any nite fragment of
hence consistent by soundness (Theorem 0.3.17).
So
is satisable,
is nitely consistent.
But consistency and nite consistency coincide, as consistency is a nite notion

(our deductions all have nite length). So
is consistent, therefore satisable
by completeness (Theorem 0.4.1 and Lemma 0.4.2).
Corollary 0.5.3.
Proof .
If
|= ,
then there is a nite
such that
0 |= .
{} is not satisable; by compactness (Theorem

0 such that 0 {} is not satisable. With
means 0 |= .
By Lemma 0.2.10,
0.5.2) there is a nite subset

Lemma 0.2.10 again, this
We now give an example of application.
Denition 0.5.4.
of vertices to
A graph is
{1, . . . , k}
k -colorable
{x, y}
such that if
c from
c(x) 6= c(y).
if there is a function
is an edge, then
the set
Recall that a subgraph of a graph is a subset of the set of vertices equipped

with all possible edges.
Theorem 0.5.5
subgraphs are
Proof .
(Erds)
A countable graph is
k -colorable
i all of its nite
k -colorable.
V = {vn : n N} be an enumeration of the

Cv,i for v V and i {1, . . . , k} (their
c(v) = i, that is v bears the ith color).
Let
sentence symbols
vertices.
We add
meanings will be:
Consider the theory made of:
Cv,1 Cv,k
for each
i6=j 6= Cv,i Cv,j
vV
for each
ki=1 6= Cv,i Cv0 ,i
(meaning: each vertex has a color)
vV
(meaning: no vertex has two colors)
for adjacent vertices
v, v 0
(meaning: no two adjacent
vertices bear the same color)

By assumption, the theory is nitely satisable.
By compactness (Theorem
0.5.2), it is satisable: there exists a global coloring.

Still not impressed? Wait and see what we shall do with rst-order logic.
29
0.5.2 Applications to Decidability*

Compactness is very useful is the context of decidability, where one wants to
decide whether or not a given w is a consequence of a theory. We consider this
problem. For the question to make sense, we need of course to have the data in
a form readable by a machine. This is approached by the following denition.
Denition 0.5.6
(decidable)
A set is decidable if there is an algorithm which
can decide whether or not a given object belongs to it.
Example 0.5.7.
The set of w 's is decidable, as there is an algorithm which
determines whether a given formula is decidable or not.

Actually if one just wants to list all possible elements of the set, decidability
is a little too strong, and could be weakened as follow.
Denition 0.5.8
(semi-decidable)
A set is semi-decidable if there is an algo-
rithmic way to write a list such that sooner or later, every element of the set
will appear on the list.
One also says eectively enumerable for semi-decidable. This does not assert
that there is an algorithm deciding whether or not an object is in the set; all you
can get is an algorithm which will answer yes if the object lies in it. Otherwise,
the algorithm doesn't stop, as it scans through an innite list without nding
an answer.
Example 0.5.9.
Suppose that you are looking for Jorge Luis Borges in an
innite phone directory.
If the phone book is in alphabetical order, you start reading. If you reach
Byron without passing through Borges, then Jorge Luis Borges is not
in the phone book. If you reach Borges, Julio without passing through
Borges, Jorge, then Jorge Luis Borges is not in the phone book. Other-
wise you have reached Jorge Luis Borges. The phone book is decidable.
But now suppose that the phone book is not in alphabetical order. The
only way to nd out if Borges is in the phone book is to read through. If
you reach the name Borges, Jorge Luis, then he is in the phone book.
Otherwise, you cannot know whether he is not in the directory, or he is
but you haven't found his name yet. The phone book is semi-decidable.
Remark 0.5.10.
A set is decidable i both it and its complement are semi-
decidable.
We now are ready to explain what a readable theory is.
Denition 0.5.11
set
such that
Denition 0.5.12
(axiomatization)
0 |=
and
An axiomatization of a set of w 's
is a
|= 0 .
(nitely, decidably, semi-decidably axiomatizable theory)
If there exists a nite, decidable, or semi-decidable axiomatization, the theory

is said nitely, decidably, semi-decidably axiomatizable, accordingly.
30
A typical use of Compactness is the following result.
Proposition 0.5.13.
of
If
is nitely axiomatizable, then every axiomatization
contains a nite axiomatization.
Proof .
0 be a nite axiomatization of ; taking the conjunction, we may

0 = is a single formula.
0
0
Let be any axiomatization of . Then {} is not consistent, as
0
0
|= |= . So |= . By compactness, there is a nite subset of 0 , which
taking conjunction we may assume to be a formula , such that |= |= .
Let
assume that
We now state the results which interest us.
Corollary 0.5.14.
Let
be a semi-decidably axiomatisable theory and
Then there is an algorithm which will answer yes if
Proof .
If
|= ,
a w.
|= .
then by Compactness (Theorem 0.5.2, or rather Corollary
0 such that 0 |= . We therefore list all nite

0 of and apply the nite case algorithm of Theorem 0.2.11 to
|= , then we shall be answered yes in a nite time.
0.5.3), there is a nite

fragments
each. If
In other words, if
admits a semi-decidable axiomatization, then
itself,
as a set of w 's, is semi-decidable.
Remark 0.5.15.
The algorithm cannot be implemented to say no, even if
is decidably axiomatizable.
If after a very long time the algorithm hasn't
answered yes, it might be for two reasons:
you haven't waited long enough yet;
6|=
(in which case the algorithm will never stop).
Hence, in general, the set of semantic consequences of a semi-decidable
is
only semi-decidable (as opposed to the nite case, Theorem 0.2.11, where it is
decidable). However, if the theory is maximal in some sense, there is more.
Corollary 0.5.16.
Let
be a semi-decidable theory in a decidable language.
Assume that for any sentence
, either |=
|= or not.
or
|= .
Then there is an
algorithm which decides whether
Proof .
one for
Run two instances of the algorithm of Corollary 0.5.14: one for
and
One of them will sooner or later answer yes.
We do not insist further on decidability; our notion of algorithm is to remain

informal. Decidability and Computability are other branches of Mathematical
Logic, with very interesting results.
31
0.5.3 A Topological Proof*

Compactness phenomena rst arose in the context of topology.
Informally
speaking, a space is compact if whenever one can always nd an element meeting a nite number of requirements (lying in the intersection of nitely many
members), then there is an element meeting all requirements simultaneously.
And this is exactly what Theorem 0.5.2 says; it actually states the compactness of a certain topological space. We therefore give an alternate proof of the
compactness theorem.
Denition 0.5.17
(nite intersection property)
A family
has the nite
intersection property if the intersection of any nite number of sets in
is
nonempty.
Denition 0.5.18
(compactness)
family of closed sets
A topological space
is compact if for all
with the nite intersection property,
F 6= .
For instance, a nite space is always compact.
Theorem 0.5.19
(Tychono )
A product of compact spaces is compact for the
product topology.
Corollary 0.5.20. {0, 1}N
is compact for the product topology.
We now introduce a topology on the set of truth assignments.
Notation 0.5.21.
Let
S = {F, T }N
For every w
Let
be the set of truth assignments.

let
O = {v S : v() = T }.
be the topology generated by the
Proposition 0.5.22.
O 's.
is the product topology on
and totally disconnected. The
O 's
S. S
is Hausdor, compact,
are exactly the clopen sets of
S;
they form
a Boole algebra.
In particular, there is a correspondence between sets of w 's and closed sets:
7 C =
Remark 0.5.23.
This correspondence is not injective (as
{} and {} dene
the same closed set), but it is surjective since any closed set is an intersection
of clopen subsets.
Lemma 0.5.24.
i
satises
Let
be a theory and
32
be a truth assignment. Then
v C
Proof .
v C
i
i
i
Corollary 0.5.25.
, v O
, v() = T
v satises .
for all
for all
is satisable i
C 6= .
Proof of the Compactness Theorem, Theorem 0.5.2.
Let be a nitely
F = {O : }, a family of closed subsetes
of S . As is nitely satisable, F has the nite intersection property. By
compactness of S , F 6= . So C 6= and is satisable.
satisable set of w 's. Consider
Remark 0.5.26.
The only problem with this proof is that it is not eective,
as opposed to the one relying on the completeness theorem. But on the other
hand, it is free of references to a proof theory.
End of Lecture 7.
Lecture 8 (Modal Logic*)
0.6 A Little Modal Logic*

We say a word of modal logic. Modal logic is an extension of propositional logic
taking necessity into account. (One could also formalize belief, provability, etc.)
Syntactically speaking, this is done by adding adverbs, which will be unary
connectives.
Semantically this is a little more subtle.
We need to deal with
several worlds, which will describe the possibilities. In particular a statement

will be necessary if true in all possible worlds.
This notion of possibility requires a treatment of imaginability: some worlds
(not necessarily all) are conceivable from others. The notion of a Kripke model
will be detailed in Denition 0.6.2; for the moment we precise the language.
Denition 0.6.1 (language of modal logic).

connectives: and
close
WFF
.
To the language we add two unary
They denote necessity and possibility, respectively. We
under and
,
getting the set
WFFmod .
A2 ) is a w of modal logic, which reads It is necA1 implies the necessity of A2 . Similarly,
contingent; reads is impossible.
For instance (A1
essary that the possibility of

reads is
0.6.1 Semantics*
The semantics is of course a little more complex than before. As mentioned, we
need a whole collection of worlds, accessible by imagination from each other.
Denition 0.6.2
(Kripke model)
A Kripke model is a triple
33
(W, R, v)
where
W
R
v
is a non-empty collection of worlds;

is a binary relation on
AW
is a function from
Caution!
W ; w1 Rw2
to
means that
is conceivable in
w1 ;
{T, F }.
Truth values depend on the world.
Remark 0.6.3.
w2
v()
is now meaningless.
In Denition 0.6.2, we could require specic axioms on the
accessibility relation
in order to formalize a description of what our intuition
suggests that conceivability means.
Notation 0.6.4.
We extend
v(An , w) = v(An , w)
v(, w) = T
if
inductively to
for each
nN
WFFmod W :
and each world
v(, w) = F
v( , w) = T
if
v(, w) = F
w0
v(, w) = T
if for all world
v(, w) = T
if there is a world
v(, w) = T
or
such that
w0
wRw0 ,
such that
one has
wRw0
and
v(, w0 ) = T
v(, w0 ) = T .
The meaning is clear: ( is necessary) holds in the world

world accessible from
w,
holds. (An observer from
cannot ever fail.) On the other hand,
is a conceivable world
w0
in which
if for any
will then believe that
( is possible) holds in
holds: the observer of
if there
will think that
could hold somewhere.

One can of course reduce the language to use the sole modal connective ;
clearly
stands for
;
we implicitely do so and forget about
.
Denition 0.6.5 (satisfaction in modal logic). |= if for all models (W, R, v)

such that
is satised in all worlds of
Example 0.6.6.
One has
W,
is also satised in all worlds of
W.
{} |= .
This is somehow problematic, as one should not allow anything similar on

the proof-theoretic side. So we shall have to restrict the completeness theorem
(Theorem 0.6.10 below).
The safest is to consider that Example 0.6.6 is not meaningful.
agree never to use
|= ,
but to focus on the case
|= .
0.6.2 Proof Theory*

The proof theory is very much alike. We add two rules.
Kripke's Rule:
` ( )
`
34
We then
Necessitation Rule:
Caution!
`
`
N,
There are no assumptions in rule
Otherwise one nds
{} `
{} `
i
`
i.e.
must be the empty set.
in other words, everything which holds is necessary, a clear insanity.

Recall however that
{} |= ; in particular, we shall not have full com |= will be stronger than ` . Completeness
pleteness, in the sense that

will hold only for
Remark 0.6.7.
= .
Notice that if we have made specic requirements on the ac-
cessibility relation
(see Remark 0.6.3), we might need to add a couple of
extra rules.
Example 0.6.8.
In Denition 0.6.2, we impose on the accessibility relation to
be reexive. Then
|= () .
As there is no way to prove it, we admit it as
an axiom, or equivalently we add the following rule:
`
`
Theorem 0.6.9
Proof .
(soundness of modal logic)
` ,
If
then
|= .
A quick induction.
The case of the rules of Propositional Logic is essentially as in Theorem

0.3.17. For
{} `
`
you might need to introduce
{w
in
W : v(, w) = F },
W1 = {w
in
W : v(, w) = T }
and
W2 =
and prove the claim piecewise.
`
`
(Recall that the Necessitation rule has no assumptions ).

Let
(W, R, v) be any Kripke

v(, w) = T .
model. We show that for any world
of
W,
we have
|= , so our Kripke model

W , one has v(, w0 ) = T . In particular,
0
has v(, w ) = T . Hence v(, w) = T .
By induction,
As
satises
for any
:
w0
w0
that is, for any

such that
wRw
in
, one
is arbitrary, the Kripke model satises . Since we have taken any
Kripke model, we deduce that
|= .
35
Now suppose that the last step is
` ( )
`
We show
|= .
(W, R, v)
.
So let
we show that it satises
be a Kripke model satisfying
w. We want to show that v( , w) = T . We may

v(, w) = T (as otherwise we are done). By denition, for all w0
0
0
such that wRw , one has v(, w ) = T . We aim at showing v(, w) = T ,
0
0
0
that is v(, w ) = T for any world w accessible from w . Let w be such
0
that wRw .
Fiw a world
suppose
` ( ). In particular, for any world w0

v( , w0 ) = T . As v(, w0 ) = T , it follows
this is true for all w ' accessible from w , one has
wRw , one has

v(, w0 ) = T . Since
v(, w) = T .
with
One concludes that
|= .
0.6.3 Completeness*
Theorem 0.6.10
(completeness of modal logic)
Counter-example 0.6.11.
tions, as
{} |= ,
but
Let
Write
Let
Wun
Claim
|= ,
` .
The proof will rely on the construction of a uni-
(Wun , Run , vun ).
be the collection of all maximal consistent modal theories.
wRun w0
i
{ : w} w0 .
be such that
vun (An , w) = T
i
w An .
Wun is not empty by Lemma 0.4.6, or something similar in WFFmod .
(truth lemma; see Lemma 0.4.7)
mal consistent modal theory
For any
w, vun (, w) = T
i
WFFmod
w.
Verication: By induction. The only non-trivial case is
then
This is not true with a non-empty set of assump-
vun : A Wun {T, F }
Notice that
If
{} 6` .

versal Kripke model
and any maxi-
= .
w0 be any world such that wRun w0 . We assumed

w, so by denition of Run , one has w0 . By induction, vun (, w0 ) = T .
0
This being true for any w ' with wRun w , we deduce vun (, w) = T , that
is vun (, w) = T .
Suppose
w.
Let
36
vun (, w) = T ;
We now suppose
{ : w}.
If
w. Consider Nw =
= Nw {}.
we show that
We form the modal theory
is consistent, then it can be extended to a maximal consistent modal
theory
w0 .
Nw w0 and by denition of the relation, wRun w0 .

vun (, w) = T , so vun (, w0 ) = T , against w0 .
Hence
assumption,
is not consistent. It follows Nw ` .

Nw such that {1 , . . . , n } ` . We nd
So
There are therefore
By
1 , . . . , n
{1 , . . . , n } `
i
` 1 (2 (. . . (n )...)
N
` (1 (2 (. . . (n )...))
K
` 1 (2 (. . . (n )...)
w and w is maximal consistent, we see w.
As 1 , . . . , n are in
We now prove completeness of modal logic.

maximal consistent modal theory
T;
the universal model
Wun
containing
does not satisfy
Suppose
6` .
So there is a
vun (, w) =
In particular,
Hence
6|= .
Remark 0.6.12.
Of course if we have made restrictions the accessibility relations (and cleverly added the corresponding deduction rules), we need to prove completeness accordingly, that is we must show that the accessibility relation
on the universal model
Wun
6|=
(see
The proof fails for the following reason.
We
Notice further that we cannot show that if

Counter-example 0.6.11).
6` ,
naturally restrict our universal model to the set
extensions of
of course
Run
has the desired properties.
W Wun ,
then
of maximal consistent
and we take the induced accessibil-
ity relation and truth assignment. When trying to prove the truth lemma
for
W ,
we shall form
= Nw {};
it is not consistent; we think
we are very clever.

Hence we nd {1 , . . . , n } ` . But now even if we detach a formula
such that {, 1 , . . . , n } ` , we will end up with (1
. . . (n )...), and there is no reason for to be in !
This discussion reveals that the universal model
only if
W satises the truth lemma
is closed under . This yields the following generalization of Theorem
0.6.10.
Theorem 0.6.13
(completeness of modal logic revisited)
theory which is closed under . If
|= ,
then
Let
be a modal
` .
In particular, by a method similar to that of Lemma 0.4.2, we nd the dual

statement.
37
Theorem 0.6.14
(completeness of modal logic revisited)
theory which is closed under . If
is consistent, then
Let
be a modal
is satisable.
Notice that the resulting compactness phenomenon does not require closure
under .
Corollary 0.6.15 (compactness of modal logic).
Let
be a modal theory.
Then
is satisable i it is nitely satisable.
Proof .
Suppose
is nitely satisable; we prove that it is satisable (the other
implication being trivial).
0 is the smallest subset of WFFmod

0
which contains and such that = . As for any WFFmod ,
0
{} ` , it is clear that is nitely satisable.
0
By soundness of modal logic (Theorem 0.6.9), is consistent. By complete0
0
ness (Theorem 0.6.14), is satisable. As , so is .
Let
be the closure of
under :
However interesting epistemologically, one sees on the technical side that

modal logic is but an easy extension of propositional logic. We shall return to
more mathematical views.
End of Lecture 8.
Lecture 9 (ME1)
End of Lecture 9.
38
Chapter 1
First-Order Logic (Largo)

First-order Logic, also called Predicate Logic, is more expressive than Propositional Logic: it can mention elements. This requires extending the language;
in particular we shall need quantiers. Up to an abbreviation, we use only one.
But this quantier deeply aects the notion of deduction; we need new rules.
On the other hand, the meaning of rst-order languages is also richer. We shall
introduce structures, which provide their semantic notion of entailment.
If soundness remains easy to show, completeness of rst-order logic will be
a major and non-trivial result. Hence, though quite expressive, rst-order logic
enjoys excellent properties.
In this chapter:
Dene rst-order languages (1.1)
Introduce the structures associated to rst-order languages (1.2)
An unpleasant journey to the theory of substitutions (1.3)
Extend the notion of deduction to rst-order logic (1.4)
Prove a soundness theorem for rst-order logic (1.4.3)
Prove Gdel's completeness theorem for rst-order logic (1.5)
Derive compactness (1.6.2) and nd applications (1.6.2)
Lecture 10 (First-Order Languages; Terms and Formulas)
1.1 Syntax
First-order is essentially more expressive than Propositional Logic:
tually introduce elements.
we even-
So one will need quantication, but also specic
39
elements (constants), properties of elements (relations), and a way to build on

elements (functions).
1.1.1 First-order Languages

We shall from the start cut down on the number of connectives used; this will
make inductive denitions and proofs way shorter, and is legitimate in view of
the results of 0.2.3 and 0.3.3.
Denition 1.1.1
(rst-order language)
A rst-order language
consists of
the following symbols:
Logical symbols, which are common to all languages:
( and )
the connectives and
a set V of variables v1 , v2 , . . . , vn , . . .
the quantiers and
the symbol =, which is a binary relation symbol
Specic symbols, which depend on the language (these form what is called
the signature of the language):

a set
of constant symbols
for each
n 1,
a set
of
n-ary
relation symbols
for each
n 1,
a set
of
n-ary
function symbols
Of course one denes the set of expressions of
Remark 1.1.2.
L.
When giving a rst-order language, one does not specify logical
symbols. In particular, even if it is not mentioned, the symbol = is always

part of the language.
Remark 1.1.3.
signature:
It is technically possible to have only relation symbols in the
one replaces constant symbols by unary relation symbols (which
stand for singletons), and
n-ary
function symbols by
n + 1-ary
relations (the
graphs of the functions). It is more convenient to allow constant and function

symbols, but bear in mind that we would be able to work with purely relational
languages throughout.
Notation 1.1.4.
One immediately allows the following abbreviations (E1 ,
denote arbitrary expressions):
E1 E2
stands for
(E1 E2 );
E1 E2
stands for
(E1 ) E2 ;
E1 E2
stands for
((E1 E2 ) (E2 E1 ));

40
E2
E1 6= E2
stands for
(= (E1 , E2 )).
This should save us precious amounts of time later, though one could introduce ve connectives (as we clumsily did for Propositional Logic before the
verications of 0.2.3 and 0.3.3).
Remark 1.1.5.
On the other hand, we have two quantiers.
By arguments
ressembling those of 0.2.3 and 0.3.3 (see Corollaries 0.2.18 and 0.3.14), we will
get rid of
showing that it may be considered as a mere abbreviation. This
will be done in 1.4.2 (Corollaries 1.4.8 and 1.4.11).
Example 1.1.6.
The empty language, or language of pure sets, contains the equality as its
only relation symbol.
The language of orderings is

(we omit to mention
The language of groups is
Lord = {<}, with < a binary relation symbol
=).
Lgrps = {1, ,1 }
is a binary function symbol,
The language of rings is

symbols,
+, ,
where
is a constant symbol,
is a unary function symbol.
Lrings = {0, 1, +, , } where 0 and 1 are constant
are binary function symbols.
1.1.2 Terms
We have dened expressions, but only well-formed formulas are of interest. Yet
before we can dene them, we need to explain which combinations of elements
are meaningful.
Denition 1.1.7
(term)
The collection of
L-terms
is the smallest set such
that:
every variable is a term;
every constant symbol is a term;
if
t1 , . . . , tn
are terms and
is a
n-ary
function symbol, then
f (t1 , . . . , tn )
is a term.
Notation 1.1.8
set
Var(t)
(variables occuring in a term)
of variables occuring in
if
is a constant symbol
if
is a variable
if
is
x,
then
c,
For an
L-term t,
we dene the
t:
then
Var(t) = ;
Var(t) = {x};
f (t1 , . . . , tn ), where t1 , . . . , tn are terms and f

Var(t) = Var(t1 ) . . . . . . Var(tn ).
symbol, then
41
is a
n-ary
function
It is quite clear that a variable
occurs in a term
i the symbol
appears
t.
in the expression
Example 1.1.9.
(1, (v1 , 1)) is a term of Lgrps , which is more conveniently written 1(v1 1).
Only v1 occurs in it.
2 v12 3 v2
Lrings , as we have implicitely made the following

2 stands for +(1, 1), 3 for +(1, +(1, 1)), and v12 for (v1 , v1 ).
v1 and v2 occur in the term.
is a term of
abbreviations:
The variables
No meaning (and not much interest) so far! We start building on elements

to create well-formed formulas.
1.1.3 Formulas
Denition 1.1.10
of the form
are
(atomic formula). An atomic formula of L is an expression

R(t1 , . . . , tn ), where R is an n-ary relation symbol of L and t1 , . . . , tn
L-terms.
Example 1.1.11.
v1 = v2
is an atomic formula of any rst-order language (as equality is
always part of the language).
x2 + 1 = 0
Lrings .
is an atomic formula of
Denition 1.1.12 (well-formed formula).

formulas of
The collection
WFFL
of well-formed
is the smallest set such that:
every atomic formula is a w;
if
and
if
is a w and
are w 's, so are
and
is a variable, then
and
are w 's.
From now on, formula will implicitely mean well-formed formula.
Example 1.1.13.
v1 v2 (v1 v2 = 1 v2 v1 = 1)
v1 1 = 0
is a w of
v1 v1 v1 = v1
Theorem 1.1.14
Proof .
is (short-hand for) a w of
Lgrps .
Lrings .
is a w of any rst-order language.
(unique readability)
There is only one way to read a w.
Proceed exactly like for propositional logic, Theorem 0.1.9.
quires a version of the balanced parenthesing lemma, Lemma 0.1.11.
42
This re-
Notation 1.1.15
the set
Var()
(variables occuring in a formula)
if
if
is
if
is
1 2 ,
if
is
is an
Var(tn );
atomic formula
then
or
L-w ,
For an
we dene
of variables occuring in
R(t1 , . . . , tn ),
then
Var() = Var(t1 )
Var() = Var();
then
x ,
Var() = Var(1 ) Var(2 );

with
x V,
Again, it is clear that a variable

appears in the expression
Var() = Var() {x}
then
occurs in a formula
i the symbol
It is clear from Example 1.1.13 that when working syntactically we will have
to be extremely cautious with variables. This will give rise to several painful
technicalities, such as the notion of substitutability, to which the entire 1.3 is
unfortunately devoted.
Notice however that no one is stupid enough to make such mistakes at the
semantic level.
So once we are done with the syntactic study of rst-order
language, we shall happily forget the technical details.
Denition 1.1.16
If
(free or bound variable)
Let
be a w and
if
is atomic, then
if
is
occurs free in
if it occurs free in
if
is
1 2 , x
occurs free in
if it occurs free in
if
is
occurs in
then
or
occurs free in
y , x
occurs free in
if it occurs in
if
a variable.
or in
occurs free in
but is not free, it is said to occur bound in
and
x 6= y .
Example 1.1.17.
In
v1 v1 = v2 , v1
The same holds of
In
is bound and
v2
v1 v1 v1 = v2
is free.
(which is unfortunately a w ).
(v1 v2 = v3 ) (v1 = v2 ), v1 , v2
and
v3
occur free.
Hence free means: we're still missing something to know what it is about.
Notation 1.1.18.
variables in
For a formula
we let
FreeVar()
denote the set of free
Denition 1.1.19
Remark 1.1.20.
(sentence)
A sentence is a w with no free variable.
In a sense, in propositional logic all (well-formed) formulas
are sentences, as there are no variables.
Denition 1.1.21
(theory)
A theory is a set of sentences.
43
This denition is the most natural one (we do not want unexplained variables), but we shall need to be very careful.
Some subtleties around the notion of consistency will arise in 1.4.
We shall dene
|=
and
for sets of formulas, not of sentences, as
this will be useful later.
Example 1.1.22.
Lsets )
The theory of innite sets (in
is
{v1 . . . vn i6=j vi 6= vj : n N}
The theory of orderings (in
Lord )
is
v1 (v1 < v1 ), v1 v2 (v1 < v2 v1 = v2 v2 < v1 ),

v1 v2 v3 (v1 < v2 v2 < v3 v1 < v3 )
The theory of groups (in
Lgrps )
is given by the sentences:
v1 v2 v3 v1 (v2 v3 ) = (v1 v2 ) v3
v1 (v1 1 = v1 1 v1 = 1)
v1 (v1 v11 = 1 v11 v1 = 1)
The theory of rings is the
Lrings -theory
given by the expected axioms.

End of Lecture 10.
Lecture 11 (The Semantics of First-Order Logic)
1.2 Semantics
Let us turn our attention to the meaning a rst-order formula should convey.
This is a matter of interpreting the non-logical symbols (the signature of the
language), but also if necessary the free variables. This section is less clumsy
but more important than 1.1.
1.2.1 Structures
Denition 1.2.1 (L-structure).
a non-empty base set
for each constant symbol
for each
n-ary
we require that
An
consists of:
(called the base set or underlying set);
of
L,
relation symbol
=M
L-structure M
a specic element
of
L,
a subset
must be the equality on
44
cM
RM
of
of
M;
M n;
for each
n-ary
One also refers to
relation function
of
L,
a function
fM
from
Mn
to
M.
as the universe of the structure.
We have thus given a meaning to all symbols of
L.
All?
No!
We have
forgotten the meaning of the variables, which prevent the terms from having a
meaning, which prevent the formulas from having a meaning! So one must also
specify the value of the variables.
1.2.2 Parameters and Interpretations

Denition 1.2.2
(assignment of the variables)
Let
be an
L-structure. An
s from V to
assignment of the variables, or assignment for short, is a function
M.
An assignment is merely a choice of parameters (it species what the variables stand for).
Denition 1.2.3
L-structure
interpretation
s(c) = cM
s(x)
if
(interpretation of a term with parameters)
s : V M be
in M of a term t
and
for a constant symbol
f (t1 , . . . , tn ),
Lemma 1.2.4
then
be an
s,
denoted
s(t).
c;
x;
s(t) = f M (s(t1 ), . . . , s(tn )).
(univocity of interpretation)
s, s0 : V M
s(t) = s (t).
term and
0
Proof .
with parameters
already makes sense for a variable
is
Let
an assignment of the variables. We dene the
Let
L-structure, t
s| Var(t) = s0| Var(t) .
be an
be two assignments such that
an
L-
Then
Clear by induction.
1.2.3 Satisfaction and Semantic Consequence

Denition 1.2.5
(satisfaction)
Let
an assignment. We dene satisfaction in

written
M |= [s].
is atomic,
if
say
R(t1 , . . . , tn ),
(Recall that the symbol
if
is
if
is
if
then
M |= [s]
then
be an
then
and
s:V M
if
be
with parameters
s,
M |= [s] if (s(t1 ), . . . , s(tn )) RM
is always interpreted as the equality on
M ).
M 6|= [s].
M |= [s]
if
M 6|= [s]
x , then M |= [s] if there

s agree on V \ {x} and M |= [s0 ].
L-structure
of a formula
is
45
or
M |= [s].
is an assignment
s0
such that
and
if
x , then M |= [s] if it is the case that

0
0
that s and s agree on V \ {x}, M |= [s ].
is
such
The idea is clear. The
clause means that there is a value for
holds, the other variables being xed as in
freezes all variables

holds in
y 6= x
for any assignment
to
s(y)
but
s.
The
s0
such that
clause means that if one
m M,
assumes all possible values
M.
Lemma 1.2.6
(univocity of satisfaction). Let M be an L-structure, an Ls, s0 : V M two assignments such that s| FreeVar = s0| FreeVar .
0
Then M |= [s] i M |= [s ].
In particular, if is a sentence, then M |= [s] does not depend on s.
formula, and
Proof .
A clear induction.
We naturally write
M |= [s].
If is a
M |= [s]
set of sentences, then
one says that
is a model of
if
is a set of w 's such that for all
M |= [s]
does not depend on
s;
in this case
We do not insist on this terminology now, as
we shall be working mostly with sets of formulas instead of theories.
Denition 1.2.7
there is an
(satisability)
L-structure M
Let
L-w 's. is satisable if

s : V M such that M |= [s].
be a set of
and an assignment
Pay attention to the following. We want our notion of consequence to deal

not only with sentences (which have no free variables), but also with formulas
with free variables. For instance we want to say that
y + 1,
even though we have no idea of what
and
x = y does imply x + 1 =
y are. So we do need to
operate on all w 's.
Denition 1.2.8
(semantic consequence)
|= if for any L-structure M

M |= [s] then M |= [s].
formula.
Let
s : V M,
be a set of formulas,
and any assignment
a
if
Example 1.2.9.
Let
Tgrp
n N,
n m, one
For
the sentence v1 v1 v1 = 1,
v1 v2 v1 v2 = v2 v1 . Then Tgrp {} |= .
be the theory of groups,
the sentence
let
has
n be the sentence v1 . . . vn i6=j (vi = vj ).

n |= m .
and
For each
End of Lecture 11.

Lecture 12 (Substitutions)
1.3 Substitutions
We shall soon give deduction rules extending those of propositional logic. Before
that, we need more notions about the interplay of terms and formulas.
46
1.3.1 Substitutability
Given a formula
term
t.
deduce
x Var ,
and a variable
we may want to replace
by a
This will typically be the case in our proof theory, when we want to
(t)
from
x (x).
But one must be extremely careful as the following
examples show.
Example 1.3.1.
f (v1 ) = 1,
v1 = 1
Consider the formula
and the term
f (v1 ).
Replacing, one nds
and the replacement procedure stops after one iteration.
Consider the formula
v1 v1 = v2 .
v1 by a
1 = v1 )
If we replace
a variable, the result no longer is a w ! ( 1
term which is not
We shall therefore substitute only free occurences. The problem is that

we cannot naively susbtitute all free occurences.
If in
v1 v1 = v2
we replace
v2
by
v1 ,
v1 v1 = v1 ,
we nd
which clearly
should mean something else.
Similarly, if in
v1 v1 = v2
we replace
v2
v1 ,
by any term involving
we
alter the meaning.

These examples suggest that we may replace only certain free variables, but
not all. A problem arises when the replacement bounds a variable of

free in
that was
before.
Denition 1.3.2
for a variable
(term substitutable for a variable)
in a formula
if no variable of
one replaces every free occurence of
by
Var t
A term
is substitutable
becomes bound in
when
t.
Example 1.3.3.
Let
be
v1 = v 2
and
be any term. Then
it is also substitutable for
Let
be
v1 v1 = v1 .
Then
are no free occurences of
Let
be
v2 ,
v1 .
For instance, if
the structure of
is substitutable for
f (v1 )
v1
in
1 ;
v3 .
It is also substitutable for
v1 v1 = v2 . Then any
t is substitutable
the other hand,
and substitutable for
v1 in 2 ,
v2 , etc.
as there
t is substitutable for v1 in 3 . On
v2 in 3 i v1 does not occur in t.
term
for
t = f (c, v1 ), then writing v1 v1 = t would deeply alter

3 . If t = f (c, v2 ), or t = f (c, v3 ), then replacing v2 by t
is perfectly licit.
Let
(v1 v1 = v2 ) (v2 = v1 ) and t be a term. Then t is substiv1 in 4 . On the other hand, t is substitutable for v2 in 4 i
not occur in t.
be
tutable for
v1
does
Notation 1.3.4.
If
expression where every free occurence of
47
in
one writes
is replaced by
t.
[t/x]
for the
( / is read for).
We refrain from writing
Example 1.3.5.
1 [t/v1 ]
is
[t/x]
if
is not substitutable for
in
Consider Example 1.3.3 again.
t = v2 ,
2 [f (v1 )/v1 ]
is
whereas
1 [t/v3 ]
v1 v1 = v1 .
So is
v1 = v2 .
is of course
2 [f (v1 )/v2 ].
3 [f (c, v1 )/v1 ]
is
v1 v1 = v2 .
3 [f (c, v3 )/v2 ]
is
v1 v1 = f (c, v3 ).
3 [f (c, v1 )/v2 ] is of course not allowed (not substitutable), as the

from
v1
would become bound.
4 [f (c, v1 )/v1 ]
is
(v1 v1 = v2 ) (v2 = f (c, v1 )).
4 [f (c, v3 )/v2 ]
is
(v1 v1 = f (c, v3 )) (f (c, v3 ) = v1 ).
4 [f (c, v1 )/v2 ] is not allowed.

Bear in mind that we replace only free occurences!
1.3.2 A Renaming Algorithm

As we have said, one must be extraordinarily stupid (or wicked) to construct
misleading formulas; intuitively, we always avoid these dangers. Here is why.
Theorem 1.3.6
there is
that
Let be a w, t a term, and x a variable. Then

only in the names of bound variables, and such
x in , and {} ` and {}
` .
(renaming)
which diers from
We do not wish to dene the notion
` right now (this will be done in 1.4.1),
but it will be clear in due time that the renaming procedure described below
makes
and
mutually provable.
Caution! depends on , on x,
Proof .
We construct a suitable
If
If
is
Again,
If
Suppose that
If
is
1 2 ,
in
x = y,
is
that is if
can be
Clearly
is
we take
free occurences of
If
inductively.
, we apply the algorithm

t is substitutable for x in .
is atomic, then there is nothing to do:
substitutable for
and on t.
y ,
to be
with
to smaller
1 2 .
and take
to be
meets the requirements.
y V.
is x , we may take to be itself. There are

x in , so t was trivially substitutable for x in .
no
x 6= y and y 6 Var(t), then no problem will occur from the quantication

y . We let be y ; clearly t is substitutable for x in .
on
48
x 6= y
If
y Var(t),
but
then something must be done. We let
(or better: the rst!) variable not in
z
in
y in
z [z/y]
.
is then substitutable for
makes sense. Let
be
Var(t) {x}.
Var()
We claim that
[z/y]
x
occur in t.
and
does not
y .
We use the same method to deal with
be any
(as it doesn't appear in it); so
this is clearly the case, as it is true in
Notice that if
Notice that
has been eectively enumerated, then taking the rst vari-
able not occuring in
Var(t) {x}
Var()
makes
well-dened, and we have
an eective algorithm.
Example 1.3.7.
The easiest is to take

variable in
Example 1.3.3 again.
Similarly,
for
1 .
One can substitute any term for any
1 .
can be
2 ,
as any term is substitutable for any variable in
2 .
t
If
v1 6 Var(t),
then
v1 Var(t)
v1
in
3 ,
so with respect to
v2
in
v1 , 3
3 ; 3
could be
3 .
can still be
3 .
t for v1 in 3 , something
t is f (v1 ), then v3 v3 = v2 will do as
3 . (In this case, 3 [t/v1 ] is v3 v3 = f (v1 ).) On the other hand if t is
g(v1 , v2 , v3 ), then the 3 given by our algorithm will be v4 v4 = v2 (and
3 [t/v1 ] will now be v4 v4 = g(v1 , v2 , v3 )).
Now if
must be done.
Notice that
and we want to susbtitute
If for instance
does depend on
t!
v2 in 4 ; a problem occurs only if

z be a variable not occuring in t, nor
Then (z z = v2 ) (v2 = v1 ) will do as
4 . (Of course
ts a certain desired substitution, as z depends on t.)
We want to be able to substitute
v1 Var(t),
equal to v2 .
this
4 only
and
for
which we assume. Let
If we were not interested in the proof theory of rst-order logic, we would

work permanently up to renaming. Unfortunately we will have to be a little
careful.
1.3.3 Substitutions and Satisfaction

What happens if we substitute a term to a variable, and then wonder about
satisfaction?
Fortunately, everything goes as expected.
shall consider an assignement

variable
x.
Lemma 1.3.8.
s
on
and a term
In what follows, we
which we shall substitute to a
This merely has the eect of changing the value of
the new value at
with
being the interpretation of
Let
V \ {x},
t,
be
at variable
t.
L-terms, s an assignment, x a variable. Let s agree

s(x) = s(t). Then s( ) = s( [t/x]).
and such that
49
Proof .
Induction on
For clarity, let
denote
[t/x].
We want to prove that
s( ) = s(
).
This is clear if
If
If
is
x,
then
is a constant, or a variable not equal to
t,
is
and
x.
s( ) = s(x) = s(t) = s(
).
f (1 , . . . , n ), then s( ) = s(f (1 , . . . , n )) = f M (
s(1 ), . . . , s(n )) =
(s(
1 ), . . . , s(
n )) = s(f (
1 , . . . , n )) = s(
).
is
Proposition 1.3.9.
be a formula and t a term substitutable for a variable

L-structure and s : V M an assignment. Let s be
the assignement which agrees with s on V \ {x} but on s
(x) = s(t). Then
M |= ([t/x])[s] i M |= [
s].
x
in
Proof .
prove
Let
Let
be an
. For clarity
M |= [
s].
Induction on
M |= [s]
i
we let
denote
[t/x].
Hence we want to
is atomic, say R(1 , . . . , n ). Then is the

R(1 [t/x], . . . , n [t/x]), which we naturally denote R(
1 , . . . , n ).
Suppose that
formula
Now us-
ing Lemma 1.3.8,
M |= [s]
i
i
i
The case where
We suppose
First, if
y = x,
(s(
1 ), . . . , s(
n )) RM
(
s(1 ), . . . , s(n )) RM
M |= [
s]
is obtained via connectives is trivial.
of the form
then
y .
is exactly
(as
does not occur free in
).
Then
using Lemma 1.2.6,
M |= [s]
i
i
So the real case is when

is is substitutable for
in
M |= [s]
M |= [
s]
y 6= x, which we now suppose. By assumption, t

, and this implies y 6 Var(t). Furthermore, t
and is y .
in
M |= [s]
; we show that M |= [
s], that is M |=
s0 be any assignment agreeing with s except on y . We
need to show that M |= [
s0 ].
. Let s0 agree
By assumption, M |= [s]
, which means M |= (y )[s]
0
0
with s except on y , and such that s (y) = s
(y). By assumption,
0 ].
M |= [s
0
We note that s and s
0 agree but on x, and s(t) = s(x) = s0 (x). Now
y does not appear in t, and s and s0 agree except on y , so by Lemma
0
0 ], it follows by induction,
1.3.8 s (t) = s(t) = s
0 (x). As M |= [s
0
0
M |= [
s ]. As s is arbitrary on y but coincides with s everywhere
else, this means M |= (y )[
s], that is M |= [
s].
Suppose that
(y )[
s].
Let
50
Now suppose M |= [
s]. We want to show that M |= [s]
, that is
. So let s0 be any assignement agreeing with s except
M |= (y )[s]
on y . Let s
0 agree with s except on y , and such that s0 (y) = s0 (y).
Notice that s
0 (x) = s(x) = s(t) = s0 (t), as y 6 Var(t), and s and s0
agree except on y .
We know M |= [
s], so M |= (y )[
s]. In particular, M |= [
s0 ].
0
0
0
0
But s
and s agree everywhere but on x, and s (x) = s (t). So
0 ]. As s0 was arbitrarily obtained from s
by induction, M |= [s
, and therefore
by changing its value on y , we nd M |= (y )[s]
M |= [s]
.
The case of
is similar.
Counter-example 1.3.10.
for
x in .
substitutable for
v1
in
t substitutable
t is v2 . Clearly t is not
sentence v2 v2 = v2 , resulting
It is extremely important to have
is v2 v1 = v2
Consider the case where

We let
denote the
and
from an illegitimate replacement.
L-structure M and assignment s : V M one will

M |= [
s]. Reasoning
as in the proof of Proposition 1.3.9, one does have s
0 (x) = s(x) = s(t), but now
y occurs in t, and there is no reason why s(t) = s(y) and s0 (y) should agree!
It is the case that for any
have
M |= [s]
.
But it will not be the case in general that
End of Lecture 12.

Lecture 13 (Deductions; Simplifying the Language)
1.4 Deductions and Soundness

1.4.1 Deductions
We already know reasonable deduction rules for
and
In order to extend
natural deduction to rst-order logic, we must explain the roles of
=, ,
and
Equality requires new axioms, as we want the following intuitively obvious

properties to be deducible.
t=t
t1 = t2 (t[t1 /x] = t[t2 /x])

t1 = t2 ([t1 /x] [t2 /x])
where
is a variable,
stitutable for
in
is a w,
t, t1 , t2
are terms with
t1
and
t2
sub-
(This class of axioms could be made considerably
smaller, but it is not our goal.)
adds deduction rules.
One may infer
x from if x does not appear in
th assumption. On the other hand, using a universal quantier amounts

to substituting to a special case.
51
`
` x
if
` x
` [t/x]
adds dual deduction rules.
if
in
One shows an existential by providing an
example, and uses one by introducing a witness.

` [t/x]
` x
if
` x
in
if
{} `
`
is not free in
{}
Of course we shall prove that these rules may be regarded as short-cuts,

provided
is considered as an abbreviation for
(this will be done in
1.4.2).
One could now nish the proof of the renaming algorithm (Theorem 1.3.6)
by showing that
Remark 1.4.1.
Consider
{} `
and
{}
` .
We must slightly update the denition of consistency. Why?
{(x = x)}.
If no reference to equality is made, then this set of
formulas is consistent, but yields inconsistency as soon as one adds the equality
axioms (which we won't renounce anyway).
So we redene consistency as consistency when one adds the axioms of equal-
ity (in practice no ambiguity arises).
Proposition 1.4.2.
` x y (x = y y = x)
` x y z (x = y y = z x = z)
Proof .
Let
Notice that
be the formula z = x, in which we

[x/z] is x = x, but [y/z] is y = x.
shall replace
We nd the deduction
x=y
x = y [x/z] [y/z]
x=xy=x
y=x
x=x
Introducing the implication and quantifying, we do get
` x y (x = y y = x)
Transitivity is an exercise.
52
by
x,
or
y.
1.4.2 Simplifying the Language

We now explain briey why two quantiers are obviously redundant (as far as
the semantics is concerned). This runs parallel to 0.2.3 and 0.3.3.
Notation 1.4.3
not use
(see Notation 0.2.12)
WFF0
be the set of w 's that do
Notation 1.4.4
a formula
Let
of
, 0
for atomic
()0
is
is
We inductively translate any w
into
(0 );
( )0
(x )0
WFF0 :
(0 0 );
is
is(x
0 )
(x )0 = (x 0 )
Of course
and
bear the same meaning; we check that viewing
as an
abbreviation doesn't alter our notions of consequence.
Notation 1.4.5
truth assignment, and
M be an L-structure, s : V M
M |=0 [s] inductively.
Let
a w. We dene
M |= [s] if (s(t1 ), . . . , s(tn )) RM
if
is atomic,
if
is
if
is
1 2 ,
if
is
x , then M |= [s] if it is the case that

s and s0 agree on V \ {x}, M |= [s0 ].
say
R(t1 , . . . , tn ),
M |= [s]
then
then
if
then
M 6|= [s].
M |= [s]
if
M 6|= 1 [s]
or
M |= 2 [s].
for any assignment
s0
such that
Notice that this is a subdenition of Denition 1.2.5, but that

only on formulas of
Notation 1.4.6.
Let
|=0 if for any L-structure M

M |=0 [s], one has M |=0 [s].
Lemma 1.4.7 (see Lemma 0.2.16).
an
Proof .
L-formula.
Then
By induction on
WFF0 and WFF0 . We

assignment s : V M such that
Let
M |= [s]
and
M be an L-structure, s
M |=0 0 [s].
Proof .
an assignment,
i
the only non-immediate case being when
But this case is very easy.
Corollary 1.4.8
is dened
be a consistent subset of
write
and
|=0
WFF0 .
. |=
Obvious from Lemma 1.4.7.
53
i
0 |=0 0 .
is x .
The syntactic side is hardly more subtle.
Lemma 1.4.9
Proof .
x ,
(see Lemma 0.3.12)
. {} ` 0
and
{0 } ` .
Induction again. It clearly boils down to treating the case where
so that
Notice that
is
in
0 .
Using induction, one nds
Ax,Wk
{x , , x 0 } `
.
.
. induction
.
Ax,Wk
{x , , x 0 } ` x 0
e
0
0
{x , , x } `
{x , , x 0 } ` 0
i
{x , } ` x 0
|
{z
()
so
x 0 .
is
{x } ` x
{} ` 0
()
We need Reductio ad Absurdum (Theorem 0.3.10) for the converse. We

show that
{0 , }
is inconsistent.
{x , 0 } ` 0
Ax,Wk
.
.
. induction
.
{x , 0 } `
i
{x , 0 } ` x
{x , 0 } ` x
{x } ` 0
{z
|
Ax,Wk
i
()
Now as
does not appear free in the assumptions,
{x } ` 0
{x } ` x 0
It follows that
{, 0 }
is inconsistent, whence
{0 } ` .
Of course the real problem is to show that one may drop the
rules without
aecting the deductive strength.
Notation 1.4.10
which does not use the
Corollary 1.4.11
`
i
Write
Let
`0
if there is a deduction
rules.
0 `0 0 .
54
be a theory and
a w. Then
Proof .
The implication
0 `0 0 `
is very comparable to the proof of
Corollary 0.2.18, thanks to Lemma 1.4.9.

We now show that
implies
0 `0 0
by induction on the deduction.
The only interesting cases are when the last step is a
-rule.
There are two
possibilities.
Suppose that the last step is:
` [t/x]
` x
where
in
Then
.
.
. induction
.
Ax
{x 0 } `0 x 0
Wk
0 `0 0 [t/x]
0 {x 0 } `0 x 0
e
Wk
0 {x 0 } `0 0 [t/x]
0 {x 0 } `0 0 [t/x]
i
0 `0 x 0
| {z }
=0
so
0 `0 0 .
Now suppose that the last step is:
` x {} `
`
where
{}. By induction, 0 { 0 } `0 0 ;
0 {0 } `0 0 .
contraposing (Theorem 0.3.8),

Now
0 {0 } `0 0
{0 } `0 x 0
0
since
By induction again,
0 `0 0
0 {0 }.
0 `0 x 0 .
So
0 {0 }
is inconsistent, and
by Reductio ad Absurdum (Theorem 0.3.10).
Hence for us, an existential statement may be proved by showing that a

universal statement does not hold. Intuitively, this is disputable: one has never
given an example! For instance, in intuitionistic logic where one does not allow
as a deduction rule,
is not equivalent to
.
End of Lecture 13.
Lecture 14 (Soundness; Completeness (1/2))
55
1.4.3 Soundness
Theorem 1.4.12
Proof .
If
(soundness of rst-order logic)
` ,
then
|= .
By induction on the deduction. Notice that we are extending propo-
sitional logic, so weakening, negation, and implication have been dealt with
in the proof of the propositional logic version (Theorem 0.3.17).
Axioms of
equality are easily dealt with. It remains to consider the case of quantication.
By Corollaries 1.4.8 and 1.4.11, only
need be examined:
is now a mere
abbreviation.
Suppose that the last step of the deduction was:
`
` x
where
does not occur free (Denition 1.1.16) in
induction,
Let
[s]
|= .
We show
s : V M an
M |= (x )[s].
be a structure and
and aim at showing
Then
and by
|= x .
assignment. We assume
M |=
s0 be any other assignment agreeing with s on V \ {x}. We must show

M |= [s0 ]. As x does not occur free in , M |= [s0 ] (Lemma 1.2.6).
0
0
As |= , this implies M |= [s ]. So M |= [s ] regardless of the value
0
assigned to x by s . So M |= (x )[s]. As a conclusion, |= x .
Let
Now suppose that the last step was:
` x
` [t/x]
t is substitutable (Denition 1.3.2)

[t/x]. For clarity, let denote [t/x].
where
Let M be
M |= [s].
an
L-structure, s : V M
M |= [s]
.
for
in
We shall show
|=
any assignment, and suppose
We have to prove
` x , and by induction |= x . As M |= [s], it follows

M |= (x )[s]. So for any s0 which agrees with s on V \ {x}, we have
M |= [s0 ]. Let s map x to s(t) (and coincide with s elsewhere); again
M |= [
s]. By Proposition 1.3.9, M |= [s]
. Hence for any s such that
M |= [s], we have M |= [s]
; we are done.
We know
Of course even allowing
as a basic quantier, the proof wouldn't be any
harder.
1.5 Completeness
Soundness (Theorem 1.4.12) was the easy part.
We now show the analog of
Theorem 0.4.1 for rst-order logic; informally speaking, it expresses that if it
56
is true, then there is a deduction of it" (in rst-order classical logic for natural
deduction).
This theorem is due to Kurt Gdel (in his PhD).
Theorem 1.5.1
(completeness of rst-order logic)
If
|= ,
then
` .
We adopt the same strategy as for the case of propositional logic (Theorem
0.4.1). It suces to show the following:
Theorem 1.5.2
,
then
(completeness of rst-order logic, equivalent version)
If
|=
` .
Theorems 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 are equivalent (see Lemma 0.4.2).
Remark 1.5.3.
Throughout we shall be working with sets of formulas instead
of theories (which are sets of sentences: Denition 1.1.21).
Even if you have
a feeling that it would suce to show Theorem 1.5.2 for theories, there will
be a point in the proof (the fairly technical Lemma 1.5.28 below) in which all
formulas must be taken into account.

Such a subtlety was impossible to imagine in propositional logic, where in a
sense all formulas are sentences!
Remark 1.5.4.
The consistent set we start with may be assumed to contain
the axioms of equality. This remark is essential; see Remark 1.4.1.
1.5.0 Strategy and Witnesses

Starting with a consistent set of rst-order w 's, we shall nd an
L-structure
and an assignment of the variables satisfying it. As in the case of propositional

logic, this will rst require extending to a maximal set of formulas (Lemma
1.5.18 of 1.5.2), and then nding an
L-structure
(Lemma 1.5.28 of 1.5.3).
It is not unrealistic to think that the collection of terms will provide the
base set. (Actually we shall need to factor out an equivalence relation, that is
work with a set of equivalence classes; pay no attention now to this slight detail
which will be explained in 1.5.3.) We shall then dene an ad hoc structure on
the base set, ensuring that relations and functions behave as required.
c and a unary
f , we shall have terms c, f (c), f (f (c)), etc., and we know how
to interpret c and f . But the issue is that we also have quantiers; for example,
the sentence v1 f (v1 ) = c, which expresses that f (v1 ) = c has a solution, might
For instance, if in the language there are a constant symbol
function symbol
be in the theory. The brilliant idea is to add a pointer to such a solution.

First we should simplify the language, following Corollaries 1.4.8 and 1.4.11
of s:rstorderreducinglanguage. We systematically replace
For each formula
a new constant
cx,
x ,
if
by
fails, we shall name the aw, i.e. introduce
such that
(x ) [cx, /x]
57
Such a formula means: If
is not always true, it is because of
cx,
precisely.
But this will require extending the language with new constants (1.5.1),
and extending the collection of formulas to force this phenomenon (1.5.2).
This strategy of adding witnesses is due to Leon Henkin.
Remark 1.5.5.
We shall only treat the countable case, but some remarks will
indicate how to generalize to uncountable languages.

Let
be a consistent set of
L-formulas containing the axioms of equality.

in a language which provides witnesses.
The goal is to nd a nice extension of
1.5.1 Expanding the Language

We want to introduce witnesses for formulas of the form
x .
This raises
two (minor) issues.
When we add new constants, we expand the language, so we also create

new formulas, and we need even more witnesses!
When we add new constants, we expand the class of terms, so we also

expand the equality axioms and the
rules. Will
still be consistent?
We deal with the rst issue. The intuitive idea is that for any formula of
the form
x ,
we add a new constant symbol
the language, we add new formulas!
cx, .
Of course when we expand
It thus looks like we need to repeat the
construction; fortunately the cardinal remains the same.
Lemma 1.5.6.
0
0
There is a countable extension L of L by a set C of new
0
constant symbols cx, , such that C is in bijection with the set of pairs (x, )
0
where x V and is a L -formula.
Proof .
WFF0 = WFF(L0 ). For each pair (x, ) V WFF0 ,

cx, , getting the language L1 .
We repeat the construction with formulas of WFF1 = WFF(L1 ), and intro0
0
duce new constant symbols, which yields L2 . Let L = nN Ln . Clearly L has
Let
L0 = L
and
we add a new constant symbol
the desired property.

Notice that at each step
Card Ln
remains countable, so
Card L0 = Card L.
remain consistent in
one can deduce a contradiction in L0 ,
then the deduction has used new constant symbols; L says nothing about these,
We now deal with the second possible issue - why does
L0 ?
The intuitive reason is clear: if from
so they behave like free variables. This is expressed by the following theorem.
[z/c] denotes brute replacement of all occurences of

c by the variable z (this creates no confusion, as there was certainly
quantication over the constant c).
In the statement below,
the constant
no
Theorem 1.5.7 (generalized generalisation).

,
variable z
ing in
and suppose
not occuring
Let c be a constant symbol occur ` where c does not occur in . Then there is a
in such that ` z [z/c].
58
Example 1.5.8.
If
`c=0
and
does not mention
We write
D:`
c,
then
to say that
(our usual deductive tree). Notice that there is a nite subset
D : 0 ` .
Let z be
` x x = 0.
D is a deduction
0 such that
D nor 0 (which are nite, but we have

c by z in each node of D, forming a tree
D[z/c] : 0 ` [z/c].
a variable not occuring in
countably many variables!) We replace
D[z/c].
We show that
If we use an axiom of equality, then substituting
for
remains an axiom
of equality!
If the step is for instance of the form:
0 `
then by induction
[z/c] [z/c].
0 `
`
0 ` [z/c]
and
0 ` ( )[z/c]
0 ` [z/c]
0 ` ( )[z/c]
0 ` [z/c]
which completes the step. The
which is
0 `
Hence
i , e , i
rules are as easy.
Suppose that the last step was of the form:
0 `
0 ` x
x does not
x ([z/c]). It
where
occur free in
is
follows
0 .
Notice that by choice of
z , (x )[z/c]
.
.
. induction
.
0 ` [z/c]
0 ` (x )[z/c]
Suppose that the last step was of the form:
0 ` x
0 ` [t/x]
t is substitutable for x in .
([t/x])[z/c] is ([z/c])[t/x].
where
By choice of
and
It follows
z , (x )[z/c] is x ([z/c])
.
.
. induction
.
0 ` x [z/c]
0 ` ([t/x])[z/c]
59
0 ` [z/c].
` z [z/c] too.
Hence
As
0 ,
one has
0 ` z [z/c].
So
Remark 1.5.9. 0 appears just to make sure that we can provide a new variable
z:
perhaps
did mention all variable names... but we used only nitely many
in the deduction anyway.
Corollary 1.5.10.
Proof .
with the new equality axioms remains consistent in
We shall prove a little more:
deduction rules associated to

claim that if
L,
and
write
`0
L0 .
if there is a proof using
if the deduction is carried in
do not use new constant symbols, then
`0
implies
L. We
` .
L0 -consistency of .
So we suppose ` , and we assume nite. Working inductively, for
0
every new constant symbol ci C which appears in the deduction, there is
by Theorem 1.5.7 a variable xi such that ` xi [xi /ci ]; in particular `
[xi /ci ]. As the ci 's don't appear in , we thus have ` .
This will clearly establish
Yes! We have found a reasonable language to work in: it has enough witnesses, and
remains consistent.
Remark 1.5.11.
L0
The construction of
immediately generalizes to uncount-
L (the construction remains indexed

Card L). Corollary 1.5.10 is still true.
able
by
N;
at each stage,
Card Ln =
End of Lecture 14.

Lecture 15 (Completeness (2/2))
1.5.2 Extending the Theory

From now on we consider
the
L -axioms
as a consistent set of
L0 -formulas
which contains
of equality.
C 0 . Let {(xn , n : n
x V is a variable and
We shall next prescribe the role of the set of witnesses
N} be an enumeration
is an L0 -formula.
Notation 1.5.12
of the set of pairs
(Henkin axioms)
Let
(x, ),
n
where
be the formula:
(xn n ) n [cxn ,n /xn ]

cxn ,n is the
{0 , . . . , n1 }. For
where
rst element of
C0
which does not occur in
simplicity, we write
cn
instead of
cxn ,n
{0 , . . . , n }
(there is no risk of
confusion with the original constants).
means: if
is not true for all
xn 's,
it is because of... and points to a
specic constant symbol, which has never been mentioned before.
Notation 1.5.13.
Let
0 = {n : n N}.
60
We have expanded our consistent set. Is it still consistent?
Lemma 1.5.14. 0 is a consistent set of L0 -formulas.

Proof . Let n = {k : k n}. We know that 0 =
is consistent.
n is; we show that n+1 is consistent again.

Otherwise, n ` n+1 . Recall that n+1 stands for
Suppose that
(xn+1 n+1 ) n+1 [cn+1 /xn+1 ]

n ` xn+1 n+1 and n ` n+1 [cn+1 /xn+1 ]. But
cn+1 does not occur in n . So generalizing
on the constant (Theorem 1.5.7), we may replace cn+1 by xn+1 and quantify.
We nd n ` xn+1 n+1 , which is a contradiction to its consistency.
Minimal work shows
by construction (Notation 1.5.12),
is the basis of our inductive process; it is a consistent set of
L0 -formulas.
We now maximize the set of requirements (see 0.4.1). Unfortunately, as observed at the beginning of the proof of completeness (see Remark 1.5.3), we
cannot limit ourselves to sentences, but must take all possible formulas into
account.
Denition 1.5.15 (V -complete; see Denition 0.4.3).

order formulas
Caution!
(for:
is
V -complete
if for any formula
A consistent set of rst-
either
or
This is way stronger than what complete ought to be. A
is in
V -complete
variable-complete) set of formulas even prescribes the behaviour of the
variables (v1
= v2
is in it, or
v1 6= v2
is in it). The good notion, when working
with theories, is that of completeness (Denition 1.6.2 below), which is only

about sentences.
Remark 1.5.16 (see Remark 0.4.4).

has
i
If
is V -complete, then for any w one
We now make our way to a
V -complete set of formulas containing the Henkin
axioms.
Lemma 1.5.17
(see Lemma 0.4.5)
{}
{}
or
Proof .
Very much like Lemma 0.4.5.
Lemma 1.5.18
there is a
Proof .
(see Lemma 0.4.6)
V -complete
If
is consistent and
is a w, then
is consistent.
set
Let
containing
be a consistent set of w 's. Then
and the Henkin axioms.
Like Lemma 0.4.6.
Remark 1.5.19.
If
L0
is not countable, one has to do a little bit of ordinal
induction. If you know about ordinals, you should see that taking unions at
limit stages preserves consistency. The construction is exactly the same.
L0 -formulas which contains all axioms and

also describes the relations between
describes the role of witnesses (notice that
We have reached a maximal set of
variables, as in Denition 1.5.15 we took all formulas, not only sentences). It is

time to construct a structure.
61
1.5.3 Finding a Structure (and Assignment)

Recall that from a set
we built a maximal, consistent set of
which contains all axioms of
L,
for some expansion
of
L0 -formulas
by new con-
stant symbols, and the Henkin axioms (Notation 1.5.12), which explain their
behaviours.
We are very close to satisfying
Notation 1.5.20.
Let
T0
be the set of terms of
L0 .
This looks like a very clever base set, but here is a minor complication. If
in the language there are a constant symbol
then
c, f (c),
and a unary function symbol
f,
in
etc. are terms. But perhaps the formula
which case the terms
f (f (c))
and
f (f (c)) = c
is in
are required to code the same element.
To force this, we identify pairs of terms which are believed to be equal by

the set of conditions.
Notation 1.5.21.
Let
be the relation on
t t0
Lemma 1.5.22.
Notation 1.5.23.
brackets
[.]
T 0:
` t = t0
if
is an equivalence relation.
Let
M = T 0/
be the quotient set of
modulo
We use
to denote equivalence classes.
will be our universe. We have to interpret symbols of
Notation 1.5.24.
We turn
into an
L0 -structure M
L0 .
with the following in-
terpretation:
c L0 ,
For
For an
let
n-ary
cM = [c].
relation symbol
of
L0 ,
let
` R(t1 , . . . , tn )}
RM = {([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) M n :
For an
n-ary
relation symbol
of
L0 ,
let
f M ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) = [f (t1 ), . . . , f (tn )]
Lemma 1.5.25.
Proof .
This is well-dened.
There is no ambiguity for the constants. We do the case of a relation
symbol (a function symbol is handled similarly).
` R(t1 , . . . , tn ); we show that

`
t1 t01 , . . . , tn t0n and
0
0
. As
R(t1 , . . . , tn ). By denition, the formulas t1 = t01 , . . . , tn = t0n are in
` R(t1 , . . . , tn ) R(t0 , . . . , t0n ).
it contains the axioms of equality, we have
1
` R(t1 , . . . , tn ). Detaching, we nd
` R(t0 , . . . , t0 ).
By assumption,
n
1
Suppose
62
We have an
L-structure,
and now need an assignment of the variables; but
as they are terms, they already have been taken care of.
Notation 1.5.26.
Lemma 1.5.27.
Proof .
M |= [s]
Proof .
map
to
i
Suppose
i
(truth lemma; see Lemma 0.4.7)
.
` !
is
Bear in mind that by
t1 = t2 .
i
i
i
Suppose
is
R(t1 , . . . , tn ).
M |= [s]
i
i
Suppose
is
i
i
is
i
i
i
(We used consistency and
for any
s(t1 ) = s(t2 )
[t1 ] = [t2 ]
` t1 = t2
M 6|= [s]
M 6|= [s] or M |= [s]

or
( )
V -completeness
of
.)
is x . The witnesses play their role

(xn , n ), and therefore is the formula xn n .
that cn denotes the associated witness.
Suppose
Then
M |= [s]
of
Then
i
Suppose
V -completeness
one
(s(t1 ), . . . , s(tn )) RM
([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) RM
` R(t1 , . . . , tn )
M |= [s]
L0 -formula ,
Then
i
For any
Then
M |= [s]
[x].
L0 -term t T 0 , s(t) = [t].
For any
Induction on
formula,
s:VM
Clear for a constant and a variable; clear by induction.
Lemma 1.5.28
has
Let
here.
(x, )
is some pair
Recall (Notation 1.5.12)
. By assumption, M |=
M |= [s]; we show that
0
(xn n )[s]; let s agree with s except on xn and such that s0 (xn ) =
cn . By denition of satisfaction, M |= n [s0 ]. Proposition 1.3.9 then
. As n
says M |= (n [cn /xn ])[s]. By induction, n [cn /xn ]
and is consistent, one has ` xn n . So .

Assume
63
Assume
M 6|= [s];
we want to show that
there is an assignment
s0
which agrees with
. By assumption,
6
s except on xn and such
M |= (n )[s0 ].
0
By construction of M , s (xn ) is some class [t] for a term t. We would
like to use Proposition 1.3.9 and say that M |= (n [t/xn ])[s]; the
issue is that perhaps t is not sustitutable for xn in n , so the above
that
does not make sense. We need to rename a bit.

Let
n be a formula in which t is substitutable for xn and such that
{n } ` n and {n } ` n (Theorem 1.3.6). Then M |= (n )[s0 ],
s0 (xn ) = [t] = s(t) (Lemma 1.5.27), and t is substitutable for xn
in
n . The use of Proposition 1.3.9 is now legitimate, and we nd
M |= (n [t/xn ])[s].
. By consistency (and as t is substituable
By induction,
n [t/xn ] 6
for xn in
n ), xn n 6 either. We are done with substitutions;
. So 6
.
as
n and n prove each other, we nd xn n 6
The reader should have another look at remark 1.5.3; it is now clear that we
had to work with all formulas, and not only sentences.
Proof of Gdel's Completeness Theorem for First-Order Logic.

rst-order language
and a consistent set of
structure and an assignment satisfying
We rst expand
We then extend
to a language
to a
V -complete
L0
L-formulas .
Fix a
We nd an
L-
.
having many witnesses (Lemma 1.5.6).
set of
,
L0 -formulas
which describes the
behavior of the witnesses (Lemma 1.5.18).

We construct an
L0 -structure M
M |= [s]:
as in Notation 1.5.24 and an assignment
M |= [s] for all 0 .
as in Notation 1.5.26. By Lemma 1.5.28,
In particular,
is satisable.
End of Lecture 15.
Lecture 16 (Consequences; Compactness; Non-Standard Analysis)
1.6 Consequences and Compactness

1.6.1 Decidability*
The denitions of 0.5.2 immediately generalize to the case of rst-order logic.
Corollary 1.6.1
sented in an eective way),
Let
be a rst-order language (pre-
a set of w 's (presented in an eective way) and
a w. Then there is an algorithm which will answer yes if
Proof .
|= .
The set of axioms of equality is decidable; so we may assume that
contains all the axioms. There is an algorithm which produces all theorems of
(try all deductions of length
n,
then all of length
an algorithm which answers yes if

this is equivalent to
` .
|= .
64
n + 1,
etc.). So far we have
But by soundness and completeness,
We want to generalize Corollary 0.5.16 to rst-order logic; this requires dening some maximality condition for a theory.
V -completeness
(Denition 1.5.15,
an ad hoc notion for the proof of the completeness theorem) is obviously too
strong, as one should care only for sentences. The good notion is the following.
Denition 1.6.2
sentence
either
Notice that
(complete)
or
A rst-order theory
is complete if for any
` .
is complete i maximal as a consistent theory. This is more
understandable if one closes
under consequence, in which case this denition
is the same as the one we gave when proving completeness of propositional logic,
Denition 0.4.3.
Caution!
Let us insist that as opposed to
V -completeness, only sentences are

V -completeness, but is
taken into account. Completeness is much weaker than

the only relevant notion when working with theories.
Corollary 1.6.3
a decidable language. Assume that

which decides whether
|=
Let
be a semi-decidable theory in
is complete. Then there is an algorithm
or not.
Hence, semi-decidable and complete is decidable.
1.6.2 Compactness
Theorem 1.6.4
formulas. Then
Proof .
If
(compactness of rst-order logic)
is satisable i
Let
be a set of rst-order
is nitely satisable.
is nitely satisable, it is consistent.
As it is consistent, it is
satisable by the equivalent form of completeness.
Caution!
Even if you have a clear idea where to satisfy nite fragments of
you may be surprised by a structure satisfying
Example 1.6.5.
Consider an innite set A, and let the language contain conca (a A). The set of formulas = {v1 6= ca : a A} is clearly nitely
satisable in A, as it suces to take an assignment with s(v1 ) not one of the
nitely many mentioned a's. But of course no assignment to A will satisfy all
of simultaneously.
stants
Corollary 1.6.6.
Proof .
If
|= ,
there is a nite subset
such that
0 |= .
Like Corollary 0.5.3.
One may want to have another look at the notion of nite axiomatizability
(Denition 0.5.12).
Example 1.6.7.
The theory of an innite set is not nitely axiomatisable.
65
Verication: Suppose it is. Then by Proposition 0.5.13 the natural axiomati-
{x1 . . . xn i6=j xi 6= xj : n N} too contains a nite axiomatisation,

{x1 . . . xn i6=j xi 6= xj }. The latter is
satised by any possibly nite set with at least n elements, a contradiction.
zation
which reduces to a single sentence
Before moving to an application, let us comment on a historical misunderstanding.
Ce malheureux Thorme de Compacit est entr par la petite

porte, et on dirait que cette modestie originelle lui cause encore du
tort dans les manuels de Logique. C'est mon avis un rsultat beaucoup plus essentiel, primordial (et donc aussi moins sophistiqu),
que le Thorme de Compltude de Gdel, qui arme qu'on peut formaliser la dduction d'une certaine faon en Arithmtique, et c'est
une erreur de mthode que de l'en dduire.
The poor Compactness Theorem got in through the back door, and
it seems that this initial modesty still mars it in Logic textbooks.
It is
in my opinion a result way more essential, primordial (and thus also less
sophisticated) than Gdel's Completeness Theorem, which states that one
can formalize deduction in a certain way in Number Theory, and it is a
methodological error to deduce the former from the latter.
Bruno Poizat, Cours de Thorie des Modles

The truth is that the compactness theorem is a purely semantic property,
and has nothing to do with the notion of deduction. It rst appeared in days
where deductions were a logician's main preoccupation; this explains its initial
modesty.
There is an alternate proof of compactness in 1.7.
1.6.3 Non-Standard Analysis*

The genesis of calculus is a complicated story. However the notion of innitesimals was one of the ways to start a scientic quarrel (and perhaps have a duel)
in the xviii
th
century. In short, are there numbers which are smaller than all
positive reals? (Of course such numbers could not be real numbers themselves.)
Can one introduce such convenient ctions, and work with them? Is what we
show about real numbers using innitesimals true or do we create inconcisten-
th
cies? We provide a xx
Our goal is to extend

interests us; that is,
century answer to the controversy.
by innitesimals. First, we agree that
as a eld
as a ring-structure (as it is customary to treat elds as
< and the absolute value |.|

R, but we may put them in the language
ring-structures). We even equip it with the ordering

(these are actually denable in the ring
freely). This is the language we are interested in.

But we want a little more. First, we should introduce a new constant for
an innitesimal. Second, we're not interested in nding an abstract structure;
we want one which behaves like
R,
or even better, which contains
66
in a nice
manner.
We shall form an ad hoc theory, which will force the structure to
behave.
L = {0, 1, <, +, , , |.|} and the ordered eld R. We

{cr : r R} (which will stand for elements of R), nding the
0
language LR , and one more new constant ; let L = LR {} be the resulting
rst-order language. Let be the set containing the following:
Consider the language
add new constants
all
LR -sentences
the formulas
which hold true in
R;
{0 < < cr : r R>0 }
(One cannot formally quantify over
in the latter: the
cr 's
are elements
of the language, but their collection is not expressible in the language!)

The theory
thus states that the
cr 's
have the same relations as the real
numbers they stand for (in particular, some sentences express that we are talking
about an ordered eld); the extra formulas say that
is a positive element
smaller than any positive real number.
Lemma 1.6.8.
Proof .
is satisable.
mentions only nitely many cr 's, which we inter < cr are

mentioned, and we interpret as a positive real number smaller than the cr 's
in question. This discussion shows that is nitely satisable; actually that
any nite fragment of is satisable in R.
By compactness, is satisable (but of course, not in R, because R has no
pret in
A nite fragment of
as the reals they stand for; only nitely many conditions
innitesimals; same phenomenon as in Example 1.6.5).
Notation 1.6.9
R
(non-standard reals)
contains an interpretation of
pretation of the
cr 's,
Lemma 1.6.10. R
Proof .
Map
to
Let
be an
L0 -structure
satisfying
which is an innitesimal, and an inter-
which behave like the real numbers they stand for.
R .
injects canonically into
cR
r
cr in R ). This is natural enough,

|= cr 6= cs ; hence R |= cr 6= cs .
(the interpretation of
and injective alright: if
r 6= s R,
then
It goes without saying that the mapping is actually a ring homomorphism.

We now freely identify
with its image in
inclusion is of course proper, as

We now work on retrieving
the non-standard line
also longer than
R .
Notation 1.6.11
of
R.
6 R:
R ,
and consider that
The
it is an innitesimal!
We have added innitesimals, so in a sense
is thicker; we have also added their inverses, so it is
(bounded elements and innitesimals)
R :
b = {x R :
R R .
there is
r R>0 : |x| < r};
67
Consider the subsets
o = {x R :
b
r R>0 : |x| < r}.
for all
is the set of bounded elements (not innitely large);
nitesimals (innitely close to
a better picture of
o,
R . b
and
the non-standard line
0).
Of course
o R = {0}.
is the set of in-
If you want to have
you may consider that the real line
embeds into
is the portion of the non-standard line which is not
incommensurably longer than
R. o
is the thickness around
It goes without saying that though nicely dened, these subsets of
are
not (rst-order)-denable: the denitions are not expressible in our language
L0 .
Lemma 1.6.12. b
Proof .
is a ring, and
is an ideal of
b.
Easy computations.
We shall now dene an isomorphism

interesting.
b/o ' R.
The construction is fairly
Following the same mental picture as before, when one consider
only the commensurable part and factors out the thickness, one retrieves the
standard line
R.
Denition 1.6.13
(standard part)
least upper bound of
For any non-negative
{r R : r < x}.
(We dene
st x
x b,
let
st x be the
x b by
for negative
st x = st(x)).
R is Dedekind-complete. Let x b be non-negative;
A = {r R : r < x} of R is non-empty and bounded above
A has a least upper bound in R; st is well-dened. A little more
This makes sense, as

then the subset
since
x b.
So
basic algebra reveals:
Lemma 1.6.14. st
Now as
st
is a ring-homomorphism with kernel
is clearly onto
R (it
b/o ' R.
induces an isomorphism
is the identity on
o.
R),
we deduce that
In particular, any element
written in a unique way as the sum of a real number

and an innitesimal
o.
st x
x b
st
can be
(its standard part),
(This is of course not true for elements of
R \ b,
which are innitely big.)

One can then start doing analysis in a very elegant fashion, whith arguments
such as:
is continuous at real
aR
i for any innitesimal
, f (a + ) f (a)
is innitesimal.
End of Lecture 16.
Lecture 17 (Proof of Compactness by Ultraproducts*)
1.7 An Alternate Proof of Compactness*

1.7.1 Filters and Ultralters*
Denition 1.7.1
(lter)
Let
X 6=
be a set.
68
F P (X)
is a lter on
if:
6 F ;
if
AF
if
A, B F ,
and
Example 1.7.2.
A B,
then
then
B F;
A B F.
In a topological space, the collection of neighborhoods of a
given point forms a lter.
Remark 1.7.3.
Let
be a family of subsets of
property (Denition 0.5.17). Then there is a lter
having the nite intersection
such that
B F.
F = {Y X : there exist B1 , . . . , Bn in B such that B1

F is the smallest family of sets containing every nite
intersection of members of B . This clearly meets the conditions dening a lter.
Notice that 6 F by the nite intersection property.
Verication: Let
Bn Y } ,
Recall that
i.e.
conite in
Example 1.7.4.
Y
means that
X \Y
is nite.
is innite. The Frchet lter is
F r
e = {Y X :
X}.
is conite in
Remark 1.7.5.
IF
Assume
Let
X . Consider IF = {X \ Y : Y F}. Then

(P (X), , X, M, ). Dually, every ideal of P (X) gives
bijection between lters on X and ideals of P (X).
be a lter on
is an ideal of the ring
rise to a lter: there is a
The collection of lters on
may be (partially) ordered by inclusion. The
bijection of Remark 1.7.5 is order-preserving.
Denition 1.7.6
Lemma 1.7.7.
P (X), A U
Proof .
Let
(ultralter)
U be a lter
X \ A U.
Let
or
A maximal lter on
on
X.
Then
be a lter, and bear in mind that
is called an ultralter.
is an ultralter i for all
in
is closed under nite inter-
sections.
U is an ultralter, and let A P (X). There are three cases.

Y U , A Y 6= , then U {A} is a family as in Remark 1.7.3, so it is
contained in a lter. By maximality of U as a lter, it follows A U . If for all
Y U , (X \ A) Y 6= , then X \ A U similarly. So it remains the case where
there are Y1 , Y2 U such that A Y1 = (X \ A) Y2 = . But then Y1 Y2 = ,
Suppose that
If for all
a contradiction.
A P (X), A U or X \ A U . Let U
. Let Y U. If Y U we are done.
extending U : we show U = U
X \ Y U U , so = Y (X \ Y ) U, a contradiction.
Suppose that for all
be a lter
Otherwise
Ultralters trivially exist.
Denition 1.7.8
on
is
(principal ultralter)
Pa = {Y X : a Y }.
69
Let
a X.
The principal ultralter
Remark 1.7.9.
If
is nite, then every ultralter on
is principal.
In the interesting case (X innite), do non-principal ultralters exist? Assuming AC (or Zorn's Lemma), they do; AC is actually slightly stronger than
necessary to show this.
In fact, there is an Ultralter Axiom which is inde-
pendent of ZF (and weaker than AC) saying that every lter is included in an
ultralter.
Applying this to the Frchet lter on
(Example 1.7.4), we nd
non-principal ultralters. This is however highly non-constructive.
Lemma 1.7.10
(AC, or Ultralter Axiom)
Every lter is included in an
ultralter.
Remark 1.7.11. F
IF
is an ultralter i
is a maximal ideal.
In particular,
Lemma 1.7.10 is equivalent to Krull's Theorem in Ring Theory.
Verication: Clear, as the bijection of Remark 1.7.5 is inclusion-preserving.
Remark 1.7.12.
on
Alternately, an ultralter can be viewed as a
(where a set has measure
if it is in the ultralter,
{0, 1}
measure
otherwise). This
-additive since for instance if we look at the Frchet

N each singleton has measure 0 but their union (equal to N) has measure
measure is however not

lter on
1.
Lemma 1.7.13
ultralter
Proof .
As
. If B
B U.
(AC)
such that
has the nite intersection property, there is an
has the nite intersection property, it is contained in a lter
Remark 1.7.3. Then Lemma 1.7.10 gives an ultralter
Remark 1.7.14.
There are
Card X
22
ultralters on
X.
extending
by
F.
(This theorem, due to
Hausdor, is non-trivial.)
1.7.2 Ultraproducts (The o Structure)*

Denition 1.7.15
and for each
Mi 's
M .
iI
(with respect
The base of
. Let I 6= be a set, U be an ultralter on I ,

Mi be an L-structure.
We dene the ultraproduct of the
Q
to U ), denoted
I Mi /U . For simplicity, we refer to it as
(ultraproduct)
let
Mi
modulo the equivalence relation
(mi ) (ni )
if
{i I : mi = ni } U
by:
is the set
We interpret constants in

cM = (cMi )iI
We interpret relations by:
RM

(m1i ) , . . . , (mki )
if
70

i I : RMi (m1i , . . . , mki ) U
Similarly for functions:
fM

(m1i ) , . . . , (mki ) = (mk+1
)
i
if
iI:f
Mi
m1i , . . . , mki

= mk+1
U
i
Checking that these are well-dened is very similar to showing the transitivity of the equivalence relation: if we have two equivalent sequences, then they
must agree on a set in
U , which means that the functions or relations must agree

U , hence lying in U .
on a set containing a set in
Theorem 1.7.16
be a w. Let s : V M be an assignment,

say s (x) = [(mi,x )iI ], and let si (x) = mi,x ; each si is an assignment V Mi .
Then M |= [s ] i {i I : Mi |= [si ]} U .
(o)
Proof .
By induction on
If
Now suppose that
Let
is atomic then it is clear from our denition of
M .
. If M |= [s ], then M 6|= [s ]. By
that {i I : Mi |= [si ]} 6 U , and since U is an
is
induction, this means
ultralter (so it always contains a set or its complement), this means that
{i I : Mi 6|= [si ]} U , i.e.

M |= [s ]. All of these steps
Next assume that
i
i
i
i
is
{i I : Mi |= [si ]} U .
Hence
Then:
M |= ( )[s ]
M |= [s ] and M |= [s ]
{i I : Mi |= [si ]}, {i I : Mi |= [si ]} U
{i I : Mi |= [si ]} {i I : Mi |= [si ]} U
{i I : Mi |= ( )[si ]} U
(We heavily used that
that
are reversible, so the i holds.
Finally, assume that
U
is
If
Now suppose that
is an ultralter here.)
x .
M |= (x )[s ], there is an assignment (s )0 which agrees with s
0
0
except on x, and such that M |= [(s ) ]. Say (s ) (x) = [(ni )] for
0
a family (ni ) i Mi , and for each i I let si agree with si except
0
0
on x, where si (x) = ni . By induction {i I : Mi |= [si ]} U ,
which implies {i I : Mi |= (x )[si ]} U .
J = {i I : Mi |= (x )[si ]} is in U . For
ni Mi and s0i agree with si on V \ {x} where s0i (x) = ni
0
0
be such that Mi |= [si ]. For i I \ J , let si = si . We nd a
0
resulting assignment (s ) : V M which diers from s only on

0
x. As J {i I : Mi |= [si ]} is in U , we nd by induction that
M |= [(s0 ) ]. Hence M |= [s ].
i J,
let
71
1.7.3 Alternate Proof of Compactness*

Proof of compactness of rst-order logic, Theorem 1.6.4.
satisable rst-order theory
For each
i I,
I be the collection
Mi satisfying i by
Let
there is a structure
Fix a nitely
of nite subsets of
the denition of nite
satisability.
For each
let
A = {i I : Mi |= }.
family corresponds to
A1 n ,
to
{A :
M =
Mi /U
(i.e.
is nitely
{A : }.
which must be nonempty since
satisable. By Lemma 1.7.13, there is an ultralter

We let
Then the family
has the nite intersection property, since the intersection of a nite

extending
is the ultraproduct of the
Mi 's
with respect
U ).
Let
We have (using o' Theorem and our denitions):
M |=
{i I : Mi |= } U
and the latter is true by construction, so
Remark 1.7.17.
A U,
M |= .
This modern and elegant proof of rst-order compactness
has one drawback: it is highly non-constructive, as it relies on the existence of

ultralters (Lemma 1.7.13). On the other hand, it is purely semantic and does
not rely on a hidden completeness argument!
Ultraproducts are very important in model theory, if one is not interested
in eectiveness. They appear in important constructions and deep results. For
instance, one could have realized the non-standard reals as an ultrapower of
R:
x a non-principal ultralter
Theorem,
on
N,
and let
R =
Q
N
R/U .
By o'
is an ordered eld. If you want to feel an innitesimal, consider
the equivalence class, modulo
U,
of the sequence
( n1 )nN :
it is positive, and
ultimately smaller than any xed positive real number!

End of Lecture 17.
72
Chapter 2
Second-Order Logic (Presto)

In this short chapter we briey describe second-order logic, in which one may
quantify on collections of elements. This requires new symbols
and
2 .
The
logic is amzazingly expressive, too expressive to have interesting results.
In this chapter:
Explain what second-order means.
Show that it is essentially more expressive than rst-order.
Show that it is essentially too expressive for logic.
Lecture 18 (Second-Order Logic)
Denition 2.0.1 (second-order language).
We now expand our existing collec-
tion of symbols by the following:
for each
k 1,
the quantiers
a set of
and
k -ary
predicate variables
X1k , X2k , . . . , Xnk , . . .
2 now quanties over collections/relations/functions (a relation is a set

1
of n-uples; a function is a certain relation). For instance, X (a) means that
2
the element a is in the predicate X . Or, the formula Y (a, b) means that the
elements a and b are in relation according to the binary predicate Y . In a word,
one may now quantify over predicates.
Caution!
The superscript of a variable denotes its arity, that is the Cartesian
power of the base set in which it lives. But the superscript in
2 and 2 indicates
the order of the logic.

One should dene terms and w 's, but we do not wish to repeat these
discussions, as we shall not try to describe a proof theory. There are two reasons.
73
First, we would have to determine suitable axioms for the relationship

between predicates and elements, as we determined reasonable axioms
for equality in the case of rst-order logic. This amounts to agreeing on
axioms for membership, that is agreeing on a theory of sets, which is not
the spirit of this course.
Second, and worse, this appears a little pointless to us, as compactness

will fail anyhow: hence so would completeness.
We therefore entirely forget about proof theory.
2.1 Compactness fails

Proposition 2.1.1.
There is a second-order formula expressing that a set is
innite.
Proof .
A set is innite i it injects into a proper subset. There is a formula
saying that
Y1
X 1:
is a subset of
subset(Y
, X 1) :
There is a formula saying that
Y1
propersubset(Y 1 , X 1 ) :
functional(2 ) :
x Y 1 (x) X 1 (x)
is a proper subset of
subset(X
ab1 b2 2 (a, b1 ) 2 (a, b2 ) b1 = b2

2
is injective:
a1 a2 b 2 (a1 , b) 2 (a2 , b) a1 = a2
function(2 , X 1 , Y 1 ) :
, Y 1 ) (x X 1 (x) Y 1 (x))
is the graph of a functional relation:
There is a formula saying that the relation
injective(2 ) :
denes a function from
X1
to
Y 1:
functional(2 ) x y X 1 (x) (Y 1 (y) 2 (x, y))
injection(2 , X 1 , Y 1 ) :
X1
injects(X 1 , Y 1 ) :
denes an injective function from
X1
injective(2 ) function(2 , X 1 , Y 1 )
injects into
Y:
2 2 injection(2 , X 1 , Y 1 )
And eventually, the following formula expresses that
infinite(X 1 ) :
X 1:
X1
is innite:
2 Y 1 propersubset(Y 1 , X 1 ) injects(X 1 , Y 1 )
74
to
Y 1:
One should compare this to rst-order logic, in which innite is not a single
formula, but an innite theory not nitely axiomatizable (Example 1.6.7).
Corollary 2.1.2.
Proof .
For
No compactness theorem.
n N,
let
be the (rst-order) sentence:
which expresses that the underlying set has at least
v1 . . . vn i6=j vi 6= vj ,
elements. Let be the
formula constructed in Proposition 2.1.1 and consider the following second-order

theory:
T = {: n N} {2 X 1 (X 1 )}
Then
is clearly not satisable, but is nitely satisable!
In particular, regardless of what our proof theory would have been, completeness would have failed.
2.2 Peano Arithmetic

We now deal with a remarkable property of the integers.
Denition 2.2.1
(Peano Arithmetic)
unary function symbol.
{0, s}
Let
PA
Let
be a constant symbol and
be the second-order theory in the language
with the following axioms:
is an injective function
every element not
there are no cycles, i.e. for each
is in the image of
the axiom:
x |s {z
s}(x)x
n
Every subset which contains
2 Y 1
and is closed under
is the entire base set:

Y 1 (0) (y Y 1 (y) Y 1 (s(y)) x Y 1 (x)
Theorem 2.2.2 (absolute categoricity of PA).

are like
All models of Peano Arithmetic
N (with the natural interpretations of 0 and s as the successor function).
Like stands for isomorphic, which we do not wish to dene now (this will
be done in model theory, Denition 1'.2.6).
It just means that the bijection
preserves the language; that up to names, the objects are exactly the same.
This result will be referred to as absolute categoricity of
PA,
a terminology
which will become clearer after the denition of categoricity in model theory
(Denition 1'.2.14).
75
Proof . Let M |= PA. We nd a bijection between N and M which maps 0 to

0M and which is compatible with succession. For the sake of clarity, we write
n + 1 for sN (n) (succession in N happens to coincide with adding 1, though
addition is not part of the language).
f (0) = 0M . Inductively, we now dene f (n + 1) = sM (f (n)). This does

dene a function N M , which is by denition compatible with s. Clearly f
is injective (induction in N; s has no cycles in M).
It remains to show that f is surjective. Consider im f M . This subset
M
M
contains 0
and is closed under s ; as M satises the axioms of PA, one has
im f = M . So f is surjective; it is a successor-preserving bijection.
Let
Caution!
PA.
The temptation is strong to wonder whether or not
is a model of
But the integers existed before we started doing logic, and the fact that we
have found a nice description of their behaviour does not change it!
There is no reason to stop. One may quantify over collections of collections
of elements and introduce
and so on. Goes without saying that
nth -order
logic remains sound, but does not enjoy compactness.

End of Lecture 18.
Lecture 19 (ME2)
End of Lecture 19.
76
Chapter 1'
Some Model Theory (Furioso)

After the failure of compactness in higher logic, we move back to rst-order
logic, which is obviously the only logic worth considering. Model theory is the
mathematical study of rst-order theories; syntactical considerations disappear,
if not entirely, at least in spirit. One will still argue by induction on the length
of formulas, which is a syntactic notion, but there also exists a purely semantic
approach to model-theory, which emphasizes on back-and-forth methods. For
these reasons, model theory has been called the semantics of predicate calculus.
In this chapter: a rst account of model theory
Elementary equivalence, elementary inclusion (1'.1)
Elementary morphisms (1'.2)
Lwenheim-Skolem theorems (1'.3)
Back-and-forth methods (1'.4)
Quantier elimination (1'.5.1)
-saturated
models and applications (1'.5.2 and 1'.5.3)
Lecture 20 (Models and Theories; Elementary Equivalence)
1'.0 A Word on Model-Terrorists

We are through with syntax, and will start doing some mathematics.
Our
treatment of terms and formulas has been remarkably accurate as long as we

have been interested in proof theory; model theory is on the semantic side, so we
shall make notations more convenient, and disregard the risk of an ambiguity.
77
1'.0.1 Formulas and Parameters

Notation 1'.0.1
(tuple notation)
more conveniently written
a (n
(a1 , . . . , an )
a).
A nite sequence of objects
is then the length of the tuple
is
We shall often abuse notation of Cartesian powers in order to avoid mentioning lengths. For instance, if
instead of
a1 , . . . , an M ,
we shall feel free to write
aM
a M n.
From now on we assume that every formula we consider has been suitably
constructed or renamed (for instance by the algorithm of Theorem 1.3.6); that
(v1 v1 = v2 ) (v1 = v2 ) will play us tricks.

x, y, z , etc. but also x1 , x2 , etc. to be variables themfor general variables). In particular x = x1 , . . . , xn is a
is, we take for granted that no

Furthermore, we take
selves (and not names
tuple of variables.
Notation 1'.0.2
(formula with free variables)
the only free variables of the formula

Hence
(x)
means
variables of the tuple
We write
(x)
to indicate that
are among the tuple of variables
FreeVar x;
x are not used.
but we may write

In any case,
(x)
(with no
x.
even if some
x)
denotes a
sentence. We now get rid of assignments of the variables.
Notation 1'.0.3
variables among
same length as
. Let (x) be a formula with free

L-structure. Let m = (m1 , . . . , mn ) M n have
M |= (m) if M |= [s] with s : xi 7 mi .
(formula with parameters)
x,
x.
and
an
We write
It is customary to expand the language via constants.
Notation 1'.0.4 (expansion by constants; LA ).

and
a set.
symbols
ca
LA
for elements
of
i
L be a rst-order language,
L new constant
A.
In this case, we shall always interpret
(a)
Let
denotes the language obtained by adding to
ca
by
a.
Under this convention,
M |=
M |= (ca1 , . . . , can ).
1'.0.2 Quantications
We rehabilitate poor
Denition 1'.0.5
and make it a quantier again.
(quantier-free formula)
A formula is quantier-free if it
has no quantiers.
Denition 1'.0.6 (universal formula).

v1 . . . vn 0 ,
where
Denition 1'.0.7
form
(existential formula)
v1 . . . vn 0 ,
where
Be very careful that
Denition 1'.0.8
a formula
A formula is universal if it is of the form
is quantier-free.
A formula is existential if it is of the
is quantier-free.
v1 v2 . . .
is neither universal nor existential.
(quantication rank)
.
78
We dene the quantication rank of
if
is atomic, then
if
is
if
is
1 2 ,
if
is
x ,
then
qrk = qrk + 1.
if
is
x ,
then
qrk = qrk + 1.
then
qrk = 0;
qrk = qrk ;
then
qrk = max(qrk 1 , qrk 2 );
We do not capture the alternation of
's and 's, though a recursion theorist
would feel at some point interested.
1'.0.3 Models and Theories

We shall work only with theories (sets of sentences) instead of arbitrary sets of
cx for each variable x, and let

L0 = L {cx : x a variable}. To every (possibly open) L-formula we associate
0
0
an L -sentence by replacing every free occurence of every free variable by the
formulas. Indeed, let us introduce a new constant
corresponding constant; notice that subsitutability is not an issue. And a set

of
L-formulas
is satisable i the
The advantage being that since
L0 -structure:
L0 -theory 0 = {0 : }
assignments of the variables are now useless.
As we shall never use truth values again,
Denition 1'.0.9 (model).

M |= T
is satisable.
is a set of sentences, it suces to provide an
one says that
Let
denotes a rst-order theory.
M be an L-structure and T
T.
be an
L-theory.
If
is a model of
Model-theorists often abuse terminology and say that
is consistent for
satisable; by Gdel's Completeness Theorem (Theorem 1.5.1) this is harmless

anyway. But one should not think that model-theorists are interested in syntax;
all they care about is structures.
We even abuse further, by sometimes im-
plicitely dening a theory to be consistent. This leads to questions like: is this
theory a theory?
(which means: is this theory consistent?). No ambiguity
arises in practice.
Also, we freely identify any theory with the set of its consequences (since
there is no ambiguity on the notion of consequence).
This bridges the gap
between two dierent denitions of completeness (Denitions 0.4.3 and 1.6.2),

which now perfectly agree.
1'.1 Elementary Equivalence; Inclusion and Elementary Inclusion

Remark 1'.1.1.
Elementary is the standard adjective used in model theory;
one must be careful with the denitions (elementary equivalence, Denition

1'.1.5, and elementary inclusion, Denition 1'.1.13), as the role of parameters
is not necessarily obvious.
Terminology tends to be confusing; elementary
captures a way of thought, not a notion.
79
1'.1.1 Elementary Equivalence

Denition 1'.1.2 (theory of a structure).
order
L-theory
of
M,
or the theory of
This amounts to taking only
Let
M be an L-structure. The rstTh M = { : M |= }.
for short, is
L-sentences
of
by new constant symbols for elements of
Denition 1'.1.3
structure and
The quantier-free theory of
over
is
Remark 1'.1.4.
If
Let
be an
L-
over
is
Th0 (M, A) = {(a) LA :
is quantier-free}.
In particular, Th M = Th(M, ).
Th(M, A) { LA : qrk() = 0}.
complete
(Notation 1'.0.4).
Th(M, A) = {(a) LA : M |= (a)}.
The theory of
and
if one wants
is the expansion
a set of parameters.
M |= (a)
LA
(theory of a structure, with parameters)
AM
M;
which are true in
to allow parameters, we must generalize a little. Recall that
is an
One may also notice that
L-structure
and
A M,
then
Th0 (M, A) =
Th(M, A)
is a
LA -theory.
Verication: In
M, (a)
is either true or false!
Model theory is interested in the theories of structures.
As far as rst-
order properties are concerned, being the same amounts to satisfying the same
sentences. This is captured by the following, central notion.
Denition 1'.1.5
and
. Let M, N be L-structures. M
M N , if Th M = Th N .
(elementary equivalence)
are elementarily equivalent, denoted
This behaves very much like an equivalence relation (reexive, symmetric,

transitive), except that the class of all
L-structures
is not, set-theoretically
speaking, a set.
Lemma 1'.1.6.
A theory
is complete i for all models
M, N
of
T,
one has
M N.
Proof .
Recall that we have identied
with the set of its consequences, and
that a theory is complete i it is maximal as a consistent set of sentences.
T complete. If M |= T , then T Th M. As T is complete, one

T = Th M; since T = Th N similarly, it follows M N .
Suppose that any two models of T are elementarily equivalent. Let be a
sentence such that neither not is in T . Then there are models M |= T {}
and N |= T {}. In particular, M N , and this is a contradiction. So
either or is in T .
Suppose
has
So the running question: is this theory complete? Has a partial answer: can
one show that any two of its models are elementarily equivalent?
80
1'.1.2 Inclusion
We now turn our attention to substructures; the naive notion (Denition 1'.1.7)
is not very useful, the interesting form will be elementary inclusion (Denition
1'.1.13). As noted in Remark 1'.1.1, terminology might be a bit confusing, as
elementary will not exactly mean the same thing as in elementary equivalence
(Denition 1'.1.5).
But let us begin with the naive, not-so-useful, notion of inclusion.
Denition 1'.1.7
substructure of
(substructure)
N,
written
Let
M N,
M, N
be
L-structures.
Then
is a
if the following hold:
M N;
cM = cN
for all constant symbols
RM = RN M n
for all
f M = f N M n+1
(f
of
In a word,
of
for all
relation symbols
n-ary
R L;
function symbols
R L.

N |M
may also be written f
, the restriction and corestriction
|M n
n+1
to
n-ary
c L;
M)
M
to the base
bears the
M.
same language, with
L-structure
induced by restriction of the structure
M and N in the
M N as L-structures,
(In general, if you found two structures
M N
but it is not the case that
then presumably there is something wrong.)
Example 1'.1.8.
A subgroup of a group is a substructure as a group structure.
A subring of a ring is a subbstructure as a ring structure.
Remark 1'.1.9.
Then
Let
be an
L-structure and M N
L-structure M N
can be equipped with an
for each constant symbol
c, cN M
for each function symbol
f, M
The structure
is closed under
be a non-empty subset.
i the following hold:
fN .
is then uniquely determined.
When studying Lwenheim-Skolem theorems we shall say a little more about
generating substructures (1'.3.2).

The following is a very healthy exercise.
Remark 1'.1.10.
Let
L-substructures,
an L-structure M
of
(Mi )iI be an increasing chain

i j Mi Mj . Then iI Mi naturally bears
that for all i I , Mi M .
be a non-empty set and
that is
such
Lemma 1'.1.11 ('s go up, 's go down).

(m)
be a formula with parameters in
M.
81
Let
MN
be an
L-structure.
Let
(i). If
is quantier-free, then
(ii). If
is existential, then
(iii). If
is universal, then
M |= (m) N |= (m).
M |= (m) N |= (m).
N |= (m) M |= (m).
Proof .
(i). The case of an atomic formula is by denition. Then a quick induction on
the complexity.
(ii). Induction again. If there are no quantiers, then this is known. Suppose
x (x, m); is existential again. If M |= x (x, m), then

M such that M |= (, m). By induction, N |= (, m); so
N |= (m).
that
is
there is
(iii). Might be obtained via (ii), or by similar methods.

In general, existential witnesses need not go down (dually, universal properties need not go up).
Counter-example 1'.1.12.
ZQ
as ring-structures, but
Q |= x x + x = 1
QR
R |= x x2 = 1 + 1
RC
C |= x x2 = 1
though
though
though
doesn't.
doesn't.
doesn't.
One sees that this notion of inclusion is therefore not very interesting to us.
Elementary inclusions (Denition 1'.1.13) will be more relevant.
End of Lecture 20.
Lecture 21 (Elementary Inclusion; Morphisms)
1'.1.3 Elementary Inclusion

We now introduce a better-behaved notion of inclusion (and substructure). The
intuitive idea is that both structures should agree on as many properties as
possible, allowing parameters.
Of course in order for the question to make
sense, only elements of the small structure can be taken into account.
Denition 1'.1.13
(elementary substructure)
L-structures. M is an
Th(M, M ) = Th(N , M ).
of
Let
M N be an inclusion
N , written M N , if
elementary substructure of
Example 1'.1.14.
(N, <) 6 (Z, <), as N |= x x 0
0 as a parameter.)
but
82
Z |= x x < 0.
(This formula uses
(Q, <) (R, <)

M N
(not necessarily obvious yet).
Let
We have observed in Counter-example 1'.1.12 that none of the inclusions

of rings
M N.
be innite sets, regarded as pure sets. Then
ZQRC
QC
is elementary.
As rings,
When we constructed non-standard reals in 1.6.3, we considered a theory extending
(not necessarily obvious).
Th(R, R),
in order to force the inclusion
R R
to be
elementary.
In other words, M N i M and N have the same LM -theory, i N |=
Th(M, M ). This is also equivalent to: for any LM formula (m) with parameters in M , M |= (m) i N |= (n).
In particular M N implies M N , but the converse need not hold.
Consider
N = (Z, <)
and
M = (2Z, <) N .
As
they are clearly isomorphic (Denition 1'.2.6 below), it is clear that they are
M N (this will be more convincing later).

M |= x (x 0 x 2), and N |= x (0 < x < 2). Hence M and N can
distinguished by the tuple (0, 2).
essentially the same object, and

Yet
be
Lemma 1'.1.16.
ementary chain of
iI Mi .
Proof .
Then for
I be a non-empty
L-substructures, that
all i I , Mi M.
Let
(Mi )iI be an increasing eli j Mi Mj . Let M =
set and
is
A very healthy exercise.
The following gives a criterion for elementarity of inclusions; it should be

used mostly in order to go down, that is, when one already has perfectly under-
N , and tries to see if M N
stood the notion of satisfaction in
is an elementary
substructure. (This will typically be the case in 1'.3.2). The statement is more
subtle than it rst seems.
Theorem 1'.1.17
Then
MN
if
Proof .
(Tarksi's test)
i for all formula
N |= x (x, m)
Suppose
Suppose that
m M.
atomic. Clearly,
Suppose that
s.t.
L-structures.
M,
N |= (, m)
by induction. Let (m)

M |= (m) N |= (m).
We show
We show
M |= (m)
i
be a
N |= (m).
is built from shorter formulas using connectives. There is
not much to prove.
be an inclusion of
with parameters in
then there is
is clear by denition.
formula with parameters
MN
Let
(m)
is
x .
83
Assume that M |= x (x, m). Then there is M such that

M |= (, m). By induction, N |= (, m), so N |= (m). Notice
that we did not use the assumption yet.
N |= x (x, m). By assumption, there is M

N |= (, m). By induction, M |= (, m), and therefore
M |= (m).
Now assume that
such that
In short, the inclusion is elementary i all
's
go down; yet it is not a good
idea to try to put Tarski's test in a nutshell, as there are some subtleties.
Remark 1'.1.18.
Elementary equivalence is a notion involving satisfaction in two structures

(M and
N ).
isfaction:
in
N.
in
However, Tarski's Test reduces to only one notion of sat-
N.
Notice indeed that the condition is only about truth
This will make Tarski's test especially valuable when constructing
elementary substructures (1'.3.2).
One should be very careful that in Tarski's test (Theorem 1'.1.17), one
considers all formulas of the form
x ,
where
too might have quanti-
ers, and not only existential formulas (read Counter-example below).
Consider
(N, <)
and
(N {}, <),
notes an extra element greater than all natural numbers.
deN {}
where
Then
has a greatest element (this is a rst-order sentence), but
N doesn't: clearly
N 6 N {}. But for a purely existential formula , one has N |= (n) i
N {} |= (n). (This need not be entirely clear yet, as a proof would rely on
back-and-forth methods.)
1'.2 Morphisms, Elementary Morphisms, Categoricity

We now have the objects of model-theory; we want to nd the suitable notion
of morphisms between them.
1'.2.1 Morphisms
Notation 1'.2.1.
we write
(m)
If
m = (m1 , . . . , mn ) is a tuple and : M N

((m1 ), . . . , (mn )).
Denition 1'.2.2 (L-morphism).

be a function.
is an
(cM ) = cN
m RM
is a function,
for the tuple
i
L-morphism
Let
M, N
for any constant symbol
(m) RN
(f M (m)) = f N ((m))
be
L-structures
if:
c;
for any relation symbol
R;
for any function symbol
f.
84
and
:M N
In short, an
tions of
in
L-morphism
M and N .
is a function which is compatible with the interpreta-
LL-embedding.
In particular, as equality is always among the relations, one sees that an
morphism is always injective. This is the reason why one also says
Remark 1'.2.3.
morphism;
IdM
The composition of two
is always an
L-morphisms
is of course an
L-
L-morphism.
Example 1'.2.4.
Let
and
be orderings. Then
:M N
is an
{<}-morphism
i it
is an order-preserving (injective) function.
An injective group homomorphism is an
Lgrp -morphism.
Any ring morphism between elds is an
Lrng -morphism.
Remark 1'.2.5.
If
M N,
More precisely, let
then the inclusion map
lying sets).
Then
M N
is an
L-morphism.
M, N be two structures with M N (the underM N as L-structures i the inclusion map is an
L-morphism.
M, N
Let
be
L-structures.
Then there is an
can be turned into a model of

ers, parameters in
Th0 (M, M )
L-embedding M N i N
M with no quanti-
(theory of
M ).
One may rush to the denition of an isomorphism.
Denition 1'.2.6 (L-isomorphism).
L-morphism
is an
L-isomorphism
if it is surjective.
N are L-isomorphic, written M ' N (L

L-isomorphism between them.
and
is an
(Recall that an
Remark 1'.2.7.
ping of an
L-morphism
is always injective!)
L-isomorphisms,
L-isomorphisms.
The composition of two
L-isomorphism,
are
being implicit) If there
the reciprocal map-
Example 1'.2.8. (Z, <) and (2Z, <) are clearly isomorphic.
Remark 1'.2.5 however suggested that we did not take the good denition in
the rst place: morphisms reduce to inclusions, which in general have but little
interest. So we look for something more reminiscent of the notion of elementary
inclusion.
85
1'.2.2 Elementary Morphisms

Denition 1'.2.9
(elementary morphism)
elementary if for all formulas
(m)
M |= (m)
An
L-morphism : M N
M:
is
with parameters in
N |= ((m))
i
Stronger than ordinary morphisms which only preserve interpretation, one

could say that elementary morphisms preserve satisfaction.
Remark 1'.2.10.
IdM
The composition of elementary morphisms is elementary;
is always elementary.
The following must be compared with Remark 1'.2.5.
Remark 1'.2.11.
If
M N,
Let
then the inclusion map
MN
be two
L-structures.
M N
Then
is elementary.
MN
i the inclusion map is
elementary.
More generally, there is an elementary embedding
M0 N such
Th(M, M ).
As for
that
L-isomorphisms,
Proposition 1'.2.12.
Proof .
Let
mentary.
An
: M N
M ' M0
i
M N
i there is
can be turned into a model of
we had already reached a very nice notion.
L-isomorphism
be a bijective
By induction on a formula
M |= (m) i N |= ((m)).
If is atomic, this is clear
is elementary.
L-morphism.
We show that
we show that for any tuple
is elem M,
by denition of a morphism. The case of connec-
tives is not hard to deal with.
M |= (m), then there is M such that M |=

N |= ((), (m)); therefore N |= ((m)). Conversely, if N |= ((m)), then there is N such that N |= (, (m)). Since
is surjective, there is M such that () = . Hence N |= ((), (m));
by induction, M |= (, m), so M |= (m).
Suppose
(, m).
= x .
If
By induction,
Corollary 1'.2.13.
If
M ' N,
then
M N.
Proof . Th(M) is the set of properties of the empty tuple in M.

an isomorphism
one has that for any sentence,
86
M |=
i
As there is
N |= .
1'.2.3 Categoricity
Denition 1'.2.14
models and
nality
(categoricity)
and any two models of
Caution!
T be a rst-order theory with innite

-categorical if it has a model of cardicardinal are isomorphic.
Let
an innite cardinal.
of
is
This should be opposed to absolute categoricity of second-order
Peano arithmetic (Theorem 2.2.2), which is about any two models of
PA.
First-
order theories cannot capture cardinalities as second-order logic does (this will
become clear with the Lwenheim-Skolem theorems, in 1'.3); absolute categoricity is impossible for a rst-order theory with innite models. One therefore
compares only models of the same cardinality.
Example 1'.2.15.
Here are some categorical theories (we do not prove these
facts):
0 -categorical
1 (harder).
The theory of dense linear orderings is

below), but not
-categorical
for any
(Theorem 1'.4.4
The theory of vector spaces over a nite eld is categorical in any cardinal.
The theory of vector spaces over

categorical for any
Q is not 0 -categorical, but it is 1 (generalize this statement to bigger base elds!).
The theory of algebraically closed elds of a given characteristic is not
0 -categorical,
but it is
-categorical
for any
(hint: transcendence
bases).
Categoricity will provide a criterion for completeness of a theory (Corollary
1'.3.14). But let us briey leave the syllabus.
Theorem 1'.2.16
some
(Morley's categoricity theorem)
is categorical in any
A theory categorical in
L.
Micahel Morley actually proved the countable language case in 1965; Saharon
Shelah extended it to any language in 1974.
End of Lecture 21.
Lecture 22 (Lwenheim-Skolem Theorems)
1'.3 Lwenheim-Skolem Theorems

1'.3.1 The Substructure Generated by a Set
Notation 1'.3.1.
If
is nite, we write
87
Card L = 0
anyway.
Card L 1 . You may think that

Card WFFL .
Let us start with an L-structure M and a subset A of M . One can easily
nd the smallest substructure of M containing A: it suces to close A (union
Notice that there is no risk of confusion if
in any case,
Card L
actually denotes
the constants) under the functions of the language; the resulting substructure
has cardinality at most
Card A + Card L.
Example 1'.3.2.
Let G be a group and S . Then there is a smallest subgroup

G containing S ; it is precisely the closure of S under the group multiplication
and inversion. If S is countable, then so is hSi.
of
Lemma 1'.3.3.
be a rst-order structure,
smallest
of
Let M
L-structure hAi
containing
A.
A M . Then there is a
CardhAi Card A +
Moreover,
Card L.
Proof .
L
A0 = A {cM : c
We rst deal with the constants by considering
a constant symbol}.
We now write the set of function symbols of the language
where
Fn
is the set of function symbols of arity exactly
A1 = A0
[ [
n.
F =
nN
Fn ,
Let
f M (An0 )
nN f Fn
(The idea is clear.
L.
functions of
One wishes to add the images of elements of
Unfortunately
f (A0 )
A0
through
does not necessarily make sense, as the
arity of the function may vary. The union indexed over
N deals with this minor,
strictly notational, issue.)
A1 we
hAi = nN
From
set
build
A2
contains
in a similar fashion, and keep going. Eventually the
A,
all (interpretations of ) constants, is closed under
(the interpretations of ) all functions in the language.

symbols on
an
hAi
L-structure
M ), getting
M.
most Card A + Card L; at each stage, we
are 0 Card L stages, and this proves
which is a substructure of
A0 has cardinality at
Card L elements; there
CardhAi Card A + Card L.
Notice that
add at most
Example 1'.3.4.
Consider the case of a subset
S0 = S {1}, S1 = S0 S01 S0 S0 ,
AM
Let
be any set. The substructure generated by
substructure of
containing
A.
It coincides with
G again. Then
hSi = nN Sn .
of a group
etc. One does nd
Denition 1'.3.5 (substructure generated by a set).

and
We interpret relation
by the induced interpretation (i.e., as a subset of
hAi
M be an L-structure
in M is the smallest
from Lemma 1'.3.3.
One can prove that an arbitrary intersection of substructures of

substructure of
again; we have just been generalizing to
which is well-known for groups.

substructures of
containing
A.
It follows that
hAi
88
is a
a construction
is the intersection of all
Notice in any case that
that we could construct it explicitely.
hAi
is canonical, and
hAi
All this is very nice, but in general

substructure of
has no reason to be an elementary
(Denition 1'.1.13), and this is precisely what we would be
interested in. So Lemma 1'.3.3 and Denition 1'.3.5 are not that useful.
1'.3.2 Skolem Functions and the Descending Version

If we want to nd an elementary substructure containing
A,
then by Tarski's
Test (Theorem 1'.1.17) we ought to add existential witnesses for all formulas.
Recall how existential witnesses played an essential role in the proof of the
completeness of rst-order logic. We now deal with them in a more semantic
fashion, adding to the language functions which choose them (this construction
is of course not canonical, and heavily relies on the axiom of choice).
Caution!
The substructure we shall construct in Theorem 1'.3.9 will not be
canonical.
Denition 1'.3.6 (Skolem functions).

formula
f ,
(x, y), where y
the Skolem function

We let
LSk = L {f : (x, y)
Denition 1'.3.7
of
is the
Let L be a rst-order language. For any

n-uple of variables, we add a new function symbol
associated to .
is an
an
L-formula}.
L-theory.
T and the

y x (x, y) (f (y), y)
(Skolemization)
LSk -theory TSk
Let
be an
which is the union of
The Skolemization
axioms
The meaning is clear: our new axioms say that witnesses are explicitely given
by our new function symbols.
Lemma 1'.3.8.
Let
be a model of
Skolem functions making
T . Then
TSk .
there is an interpretation of the
a model of
Proof .
We must give a meaning to the Skolem function symbols f . Let (x, y)

L-formula, and m M have same length as y . If M |= x (x, m), then
M
there is M such that M |= (, m); we choose such a and set f (m) = .
If there is no suitable , we map m to any element in M .
be an
With heavy use of the axiom of choice (we perform innitely many choices),
we thus dene functions
fM ,
which are the interpretations of the Skolem func-
tion symbols. By construction,
M |= y x (x, y) (f (y), y)
Let us return to our problem. If we now close a subset
AM
under all
functions including the Skolem functions, we are in good position to nd an

elementary inclusion, as all necessary witnesses have been plugged in.
Theorem 1'.3.9
. Let M be an inCard A + Card L

A M0 and Card M0 = .
(descending Lwenheim-Skolem theorem)
L-structure and A M . Let be

Card M . Then there is M0 M such
nite
a cardinal with
that
89
Proof .
Card A = . We turn M into an LSk -structure

TSk . In the language LSk , we now consider the substructure of
M generated by A (Lemma 1'.3.3). Forgetting the interpretation of the Skolem
functions, this is a fortiori an L-structure M0 . Moreover Card M0 = .
We may assume that
which satises
It remains to prove that the inclusion is elementary. We use Tarski's Test
(m0 ) be a formula with parameters in M0 ; assume

M |= TSk , one has M |= (fM (m0 ), m0 ). But by
M
element f (m0 ) lies in M0 . This is what we need in order to
(Theorem 1'.1.17).
Let
M |= x (x, m0 ).
construction, the
As
apply Tarski's criterion.
Remark 1'.3.10.
M0 M
as
L-structures,
not necessarily as
because when we expand the language to

we did want to ensure
M0 M
as
LSk ,
LSk -structures.
LSk -structures,
new Skolem functions for the new formulas, getting
L-structures
However an inclusion of
guage
LSk
This is
we create new formulas. If

we would need to add
LSk,Sk ,
etc.
is what we want; the expanded lan-
is a technical device we can forget about.
The construction is highly non-canonical (it relies on the axiom of choice).

In general, there is no smallest elementary substructure containing
A:
everything depends on the way we interpreted the Skolem functions, which

is arbitrary. One should not use the notation
hAi
for Skolem hulls.
As a nal interesting word, we prove inconsistency of set theory.
Corollary 1'.3.11
(Skolem's paradox)
(If set theory is satisable) there is a
countable model of set theory.
Proof .
Write down ZFC as a rst-order theory in the language
{}.
Start with
a model and apply Theorem 1'.3.9.

However in this model
U0
of set theory we may construct
and
P (N),
which is notoriously uncountable, and yet a subset of the countable underlying

universe. . .
[Catch: countable does not bear the same meaning in the rst model, say
U , and the countable one U0 .
All that we have proved is that
it does not see (i.e., perceive as a set) a bijection between
U0 is so small that
P (N) and N.]
1'.3.3 The General Version and the o-Vaught Criterion

We now try to go up; that is, provide very large elementary extensions of
existing models.
Theorem 1'.3.12
nite
that
(ascending Lwenheim-Skolem theorem)
L-structure and Card M

Card M .
90
M be an inM M such
Let
be a cardinal. Then there is
Proof .
C 0 = {ci : i < } be new constants, and consider the language

C 0 . Form the L0 -theory T 0 = Th(M, M ) {ci 6= cj : i 6= j}. This
Let
L = LM
theory is consistent: a nite fragment mentions a nite number of properties
(m), which are

ci 6= cj , meaning
in M again.
trivially satisable in
that there are at least
M, and a nite number of formulas

n distinct elements: this is satisable
T 0 is satisable in M; by compactness, there is a
a model M of T (notice that M is not likely to be M). As M |= Th(M, M ),
one has M M ; on the other hand, the constants of C say that M has at
least elements.
Hence any nite fragment of
Combining Theorems 1'.3.9 and 1'.3.12, one derives a sharper version.
Theorem 1'.3.13 (Lwenheim-Skolem theorem).

A M . Let be a cardinal
0
0
that A M , Card M = ,
Proof .
L.
Proof .
and
Let M be an L-structure and

Card A + Card L . Then there is M0 such
M0 M or M0 M.
Go up (Theorem 1'.3.12), then down (Theorem 1'.3.9).
Corollary 1'.3.14
guage
with
If there is
Let
(o-Vaught test)
Card L
M, N |= T .
Let
is
such that
be a rst-order theory in a lan-
-categorical,
then
is complete.
M N.
We aim at showing
M0 and N 0
N and N 0 . But
By the Lwenheim-Skolem theorem (Theorem 1'.3.13), there are
such that M M or M M , and similarly for

M M0 and N N 0 . In particular, M0 , N 0 |= T .
0
0
As M and N are models of T of cardinal , they are isomorphic
0
0
0
0
goricity; it follows M N . As a conclusion, M M N N .
of cardinal
in any case
Example 1'.3.15.
by cate-
We shall prove later (Theorem 1'.4.4) that DLO is
0 -
categorical. In particular it will be complete!

End of Lecture 22.
Lecture 23 (Back-and-Forth Methods)
1'.4 Back-and-Forth Methods

It is not very common in practice to have an isomorphism; a very good reason is that two structures may have the same theory without having the same
cardinality! So one should aim at weaker correspondences.
And precisely, we shall work with very partial functions, functions which are
dened only on a nite set. But these turn out to be enough (as our formulas are
nite too!) Model theory has a wide variety of so-called back-and-forth methods
which enable to inductively extend partial functions. One should bear in mind
the image of a bootstrap.
Disclaimer: back-and-forth methods are easier to work out in the case of
relational languages. With unary functions they are still manageable; if there
91
is a binary function around, it is not very likely that one will understand any
kind of back-and-forth.
1'.4.1 Dense Linear Orderings

We start with a key example.
Denition 1'.4.1
(DLO)
A dense linear ordering (with no endpoints be-
ing always implicit) is a model of the following theory in the language
{<}
of
orderings:
x (x < x)
xy (x < y x = y y < x)
xyz (x < y y < z x < z)
xyz x < y (x < z z < x)
xyz y < x x < z
DLO denotes either this theory, or a model of the theory (this is harmless as
the theory will turn out to be complete).
Remark 1'.4.2.
The rst three axioms express that
<
is a linear ordering; the
fourth (density) says that between any two points there is another point; the
fth (no endpoints) states that there is no least, nor largest element). In spite
of the name, one should never forget the last one!
Example 1'.4.3.
Recall that given two orderings
the extension of the orderings such that any element of

of
( B is pasted after
A).
(Q, <) is a countable DLO.

`
`
`
(Q < Q, <) and (Q < {} < Q, <)
(R, <)
B, A
< B denotes
A lies below any element
and
are other countable DLO's.
is a DLO of cardinality continuum.
A close inspection will reveal that
<
and
are actually isomorphic.
Back-and-forth methods start here.
Theorem 1'.4.4
Proof .
Let
(Cantor)
M, N
Any two countable DLO's are isomorphic.
be countable DLO's. We shall inductively construct an iso-
morphism. To this extent, we enumerate the underlying sets

and
N = {nk : k N}.
M = {mk : k N}
We want to construct an isomorphism; it suces to
construct an order-preserving function
dened on all of
M , and which is onto.
This will be done inductively by considering two kinds of steps:
at odd stages, we shall make sure that
92
is dened everywhere on
M;
at even stages, we shall make sure that
reaches every element of
N.
We thus want to nd an increasing sequence of partial maps which preserve
0 (m0 ) = n0 .
n0 .
the ordering. Let us start by dening

can say is
m0 = m0 ,
So far, so good, as all we
which certainly holds of
2k is a partial map with nite support, and

a = dom 2k M and b = im 2k N satisfy the same relations.
(You may think that 2k preserves the conguration of the tuple, that
it is a partial L-morphism in the sense of Denition 1'.2.2.) We want to
extend 2k to an order-preserving map 2k+1 with mk+1 dom 2k+1 .
(stage 2k+1) Suppose that
such that
mk+1
mk+1
is in a certain conguration with respect to the nite tuple

lies above any element of
there is certainly
hand,
mk+1
a,
which lies above any element of
lies between two elements of the tuple
the same pattern can be reproduced in

that the extended tuples
We let
2k+1
(stage
2k + 2)
extend
2k
a, mk+1
by
Suppose that
a.
then as there are no endpoints in
and
N.
b,
a,
b.
If
N,
If on the other
then as
In any case there is
N is dense,
N such
still satisfy the same relations.
2k+1 (mk+1 ) = .
2k+1
has been constructed as a nite partial
a0 = dom 2k+1 and b0 = im 2k+1 .

way that nk+1 will be in the image.
map which preserves relation between

We aim at extending
2k+1
in such a
And we argue exactly like above, getting in any case an element

such that
We let
behaves with respect to
a0
exactly the way
M
b0 .
does for
2k+2 () = nk+1 .
At the limit, we let
= kN k .
This is still an order-preserving bijection.
Because of our construction at odd stages, every element of
dom = M . Because of our construction

that : M N is an isomorphism.
domain, so
It follows
nk+1
will appear in the
at even stages,
im = N .
Bearing in mind Denition 1'.2.14, one sees that Theorem 1'.4.4 says that
DLO is
0 -categorical.
As a consequence, one can deduce from Corollary 1'.3.14
that DLO is complete.
Remark 1'.4.5.
This superb proof relies on two essential ideas.
If you can always extend a partial function, then at the limit something
nice will happen. Proposition 1'.4.14 below will generalize this idea.
It is however dicult to understand at rst in what measure exactly countability is needed. Many constructions in model theory rely on induction
beyond
But here we know how to deal only with nite congurations,
and this is why the limiting process can't go further than the rst innite. For instance, there are two non-isomorphic DLO's of cardinality
(Counter-example 1'.4.15 below).
Above all, the proof relies on this bootstrap construction, arguing that
any nite conguration on one hand can be reected on the other hand.
This is worth a general denition (Denition 1'.4.10 hereafter).
93
1'.4.2 -isomorphisms
Denition 1'.4.6
(local isomorphism,
A local isomorphism, or
function
M N
0-isomorphism).
0-isomorphism, : M N
tions, and relations. Hence
is a local isomorphism i
satisfy the same atomic formulas (in
Two tuples
aM
and
bN
Two structures
M, N
are locally, or
if there is a local isomorphism
is an injective partial
with nite domain which preserves the constants, func-
mapping
0-isomorphic,
to b.
N are locally, or 0-isomorphic,

7 is a 0-isomorphism.
and
if the empty function
dom
and
im
respectively).
written
written
a '0 b,
M '0 N ,
Local is of course, opposed to global: we consider only functions with

nite support.
So a local isomorphism is a small fragment of a morphism.
When one wants to insist on the poor quality of
, one calls it a 0-isomorphism:

0. This is very far from being
it preserves only formulas of quantication rank

elementary!
Remark 1'.4.7.
is always
A beginner's mistake is to think that the empty tuple of
0-isomorphic
to the empty tuple from
N.
there might be constants in the language. For instance, the ring
1 + 1 = 0,
but the ring
Z/3Z
doesn't.
This is not the case, as
Z/2Z
saties
So even the empty function is not
compatible with the interpretation!

A little thinking will reveal that
M '0 N
i
Th0 (M) = Th0 (N ) (quantier-
free theories, no parameters: this boils down to atomic formulas using terms
built from constants).
Example 1'.4.8.
`
(Z, <) and`(Z < Z, <); we denote by 0 the 0 of
Z; there are two copies of 0 in Z < Z, which we denote respectively by
01 and 02 . Clearly '0 . Clearly too, 0 '0 01 . Also, (0, 2) '0 (01 , 02 )
(as 0 < 2 and 01 < 02 ).
`
Consider the successor function and the structures (Z, s) and (Z Z, s).
Clearly '0 and 0 '0 01 . But it is no longer the case that (0, 2) '0
(01 , 02 ). Indeed, M |= 2 = s(s(0)), whereas N |= 02 6= s(s(01 )).
Consider the orderings
Example 1'.4.9.
A moment's thought and one realizes that in the language of
orderings, local isomorphisms are exactly order-preserving bijections with nite

support.
We can now give the key denition. Bear in mind the image of a bootstrap.
Denition 1'.4.10 (-isomorphism,
two
L-structures. M
and
is a
non-empty family
Karp family). Let M and N be

-isomorphic, written M ' N , if there
isomorphisms M N such that:
are
of local
94
forth:
for all
and
M , there is F
back:
for all
and
M,
there is
extending
such that dom
extending
is called a Karp family, and its elements are called
such that
im
-isomorphisms.
Remark 1'.4.11.
If there is a Karp family, there is a largest one (take the union of all).
M'N
implies
M ' N
(take all restrictions of a global isomorphism),
but the converse need not hold in general: perhaps
and
don't even
have the same cardinality (Counter-example 1'.4.13 below).
Any two DLO's are
-isomorphic.
More specically,
the family of local isomorphisms is a Karp family.
Proof .
Local isomorphisms between orderings are just order-preserving, nite
support bijections (which do exist: the family is not empty!). The back-andforth property is the core of the proof of Theorem 1'.4.4.
We emphasize that
-isomorphic
-isomorphic,
are
is much weaker than isomorphic.
Consider the orderings
but of course
(Q, <)
and
(R, <).
They
Q 6' R.
There is however a partial correction.
Proof .
If
M ' N
and both are countable, then
M ' N.
This is an abstract version of the bootstrap construction used in The-
orem 1'.4.4.
Propositions 1'.4.12 and 1'.4.14 together yield the proof of Theorem 1'.4.4.
The notions of
-isomorphism
and of a Karp
family (Denition 1'.4.10) are about arbitrarily large nite congurations; one
should therefore not expect to generalize Proposition 1'.4.14 past
and
Consider an ordered sum

and
0 ,
even if
have the same cardinality. Here is a counter-example.
N =
1 (Q {}) (Q
M=
(copies of
copied after each other),
followed by a point). Both are dense linear order-
ings without endpoints, of cardinality
1 .
They are
-isomorphic
(Proposition
1'.4.12), and yet they are not isomorphic. The latter is a non-trivial exercise.
Back-and forth arguments are especially powerful in
(dened below, Denition 1'.5.12).
algebraically closed elds are
-saturated
models
For instance, it is not true that any two
-isomorphic,
but any two
-saturated
models
(dened below, 1'.5.2) are. These are algebraically closed elds of innite transcendence degree; you may already try to establish a back-and-forth between
them. This will be done in 1'.5.3.
95
1'.4.3 Finitary Back-and-Forth*

We build on local isomorphisms to nd weaker versions of back-and-forth.
Denition 1'.4.16 (n + 1-isomorphism).
A local isomorphism
:ab
(n + 1)-isomorphism
is an
if:
for all
there is
and an
n-isomorphism : a 'n b
extending
for all
there is
and an
n-isomorphism : a 'n b
extending
a and b are (n + 1)-isomorphic, written a 'n+1 b, if there exists an (n + 1)isomorphism between them.
Two structures
the empty function
Remark 1'.4.17.
N
7
and
(n + 1)-isomorphic, written M 'n+1 N ,

(n + 1)-isomorphism.
if
Notice that this is an inductive denition, as opposed to
-isomorphism
the notion of
are
is an
(Denition 1'.4.10), which is dened for a class,
simultaneously.
Here begin the funny games: given two structures, how isomorphic are they?
Remark 1'.4.18.
Back-and-forth may be viewed as a game opposing two play-
ers, having two dierent boards
and
N.
A round consists of the following
two steps:
player
puts a pawn on either board;
player
puts a pawn on the other board, in order to keep both congura-
tions similar.
M and N
are
n-isomorphic if (a clever) player 2 is sure to last at least n rounds.
Example 1'.4.19.
Consider
Consider Example 1'.4.8 again.
M = (Z, s)
and
N = (Z
Z, s). They are 0-isomorphic (as the

1-isomorphic, as picking an element
language has no constants!). They are
in one structure can certainly be reected on the other one.
2-isomorphic. Consider the element 01 N ; it will

M by some element which we may assume to be 0; 0 '0 01 .
But now player 1 chooses 02 , which cannot be reected in M, as there is
only one orbit of s in M, and 01 and 02 lie in distinct orbits of N .
They are however not

be reected in
Interestingly, these structures turn out to be elementary equivalent (this

might be a little unclear yet but 1'.5.2 and 1'.5.3 will shed some light).
< Z, <). Let k N; I say that Z and Z

< Z are
k -isomorphic. For clarity, let us call Z the Z which comes alones; and let
Consider
Z1
and
(Z, <) and (Z
Z2
be the left and right
Z's
96
of the pasted structure.
Player
player
player
picks a
Player
2
2
2
will identify
Z1 : whenever player 1 makes a move in Z,

Z1 ; whenever player 1 makes a move in Z1 ,
does the same in Z. Now, when player 1 plays in Z2 , player 1
k
similar conguration in very big elements of Z, of size around 2 .
will win, but it will take him at least
with
does the same in
rounds!
There is a name for the second phenomenon of Example 1'.4.19.
Denition 1'.4.20 ( -isomorphism).

:ab
is an
-isomorphic
et
are
-isomorphism
Two structures are
if for all
if there is an
-isomorphic
if
it is an
n-isomorphism.
-isomorphism
is an
between them.
-isomorphism.
Remark 1'.4.21.
A beginner's mistake:
denotes the rst innite ordinal, which is very
-isomorphism is way weaker than

-isomorphism;
here is why. In Example 1'.4.19 we have seen that (Z, <)
`
and (Z
< Z, <) are -isomorphic. However they are not -isomorphic,
small for set theory.
In particular,
as otherwise, being countable, they would be isomorphic by Proposition

1'.4.14, which is clearly not the case.
-isomorphisms
are a little subtle. They mean that player
strategy that will keep him playing for at least
the strategy might depend on
always has a
rounds, but the choice of
(typically Example 1'.4.19). If there were
a uniform strategy, which does not depend on how long player

keep playing, one would have
-isomorphisms
guage.
-isomorphism
tries to
(Denition 1'.4.10 above).
are especially interesting because of our notion of a lan-
Going down through the recursive denition of satisfaction, one sees
that our formulas are always about nite tuples, of arbitrary length.
If
M ' N ,
then
M N.
In order to prove this proposition, let us introduce useful terminology.
Denition 1'.4.23
(type of a tuple)
Let
tpM (a) = {(x) : M |= (a)}.

the superscript
L-structure
and
The type of
be an
be a tuple (abusing, as usual, Cartesian powers).
a M
M is
in
When there is no risk of confusion, one drops
Bearing in mind the denition of the quantication rank of a formula (Denition 1'.0.8), one can even dene
Lemma 1'.4.24.
M, N
Let
respectively. If
tpM
n (a) = {(x) : qrk() n
M, N be L-structures and a, b
a 'n b, then tpn (a) = tpn (b).
97
and
M |= (a)}.
be tuples extracted from
Proof .
b,
then
By induction. First notice that by denition (Denition 1'.4.6), if
and
a '0
satisfy the same relations, hence the same atomic formulas; the
claim is proved.
n; we show it for n + 1. So let

n + 1-isomorphic tuples. We show tpn+1 (a) = tpn+1 (b). Let
be a formula of tpn+1 (a). We show that N |= (b).
A quick induction on the structure of reveals that the only interesting case
is that of (a) being x (a, x), for a formula now of quantication rank n.
We have assumed M |= (a): so there exists M such that M |= (a, ).
In particular, tpn (a, ). As a and b are n + 1-isomorphic, there is by
denition (Denition 1'.4.16) N such that a, 'n b, . By induction,
tpn (b, ); that is, N |= (b, ). It follows that N |= (b): we are done.
Suppose that the property is known for
a 'n+1 b
be two
Remark 1'.4.25.
We insist that if
there is a Karp family of extensions of

and
and b are locally isomorphic, and that

a '0 b (one may then write a ' b), a
satisfy the same formulas with quantiers.
Proof of Proposition 1'.4.22.
Suppose M ' N ; we show M N . Our

n, M 'n N . By Lemma 1'.4.24, tpM
n () =
M
()
=
Th
(M)
(the
theory
of
M
restricted
to
formulas
of
()
.
But
tp
tpN
n
n
n
qrk n). As this is true for any n, one gets Th(M) = Th(N ); so M N .
assumption means that for each
Proposition 1'.4.22 does not have a converse, because when
n > 0,
Lemma
1'.4.24 doesn't.
Then
and
they are not
01 clearly satisfy
1-isomorphic.
Remark 1'.4.27.
`
(Z, s) and (Z Z, s) again.
of qrk 1, but as observed,
Consider the case of

the same formulas
The choice of Counter-example 1'.4.26 is typical. Actually, in
a language consisting of nitely many relations, the converse to Lemma 1'.4.24

does hold, and in particular
M ' N
i
M N!
We sum up the isomorphism strength as follows (n
'
'
'
< m)
'm
'n
(R, <) ' (Q, <) but they are not isomorphic (Counter-example 1'.4.13)
`
(Z, <) ' (Z < Z, <) but they are not -isomorphic (Remark 1'.4.21).
`
(Z, s) (Z Z, s) but they are not -isomorphic (Example 1'.4.19).
`
(Z, s) '1 (Z Z, s) but they are not 2-isomorphic (Example 1'.4.19).
In special cases, converses do hold:
98
If
M ' N
There always is an ordinal such that
In a nite, purely relational language,
are countable, then
M'N
(Proposition 1'.4.14).
M ' N
MN
implies
M ' N .
does imply
N ' N .
End of Lecture 23.

Lecture 24 (Elimination Theorem)
1'.5 Quantier Elimination and -Saturation

Sometimes, every formula (with free variables!) boils down to a formula with
no quantiers.
that
This was typically the case when in high school, you realized
x ax2 + bx + c = 0
i
b2 4ac 0
(over
Th(R)
as an ordered ring). We
give a name to this general phenomenon.
Denition 1'.5.1
(quantier elimination)
quantiers (has QE) if for any formula
(x)
A rst-order theory
eliminates
there is a quantier-free formula
T |= x (x) (x).
such that
(x) and (x) are

L {x}, T {(x)} |= (x)
(One says that

having, in
(x)
T ; this
T {(x)} |= (x).)
equivalent modulo
and
amounts to
Example 1'.5.2.
R as an ordered ring, the formula x ax2 + bx + c = 0 is equivalent to

(b 4ac 0) (a = 0 (b 6= 0 c = 0)). Actually the theory RCF of R
In
as an ordered ring eliminates quantiers.
C as a ring, the formula x an xn + + a1 x + a0 is equivalent to

(ni=1 ai = 0 a0 6= 0) (this is the D'Alembert-Gau theorem). Actually
the theory ACF0 of C as a ring eliminates quantiers.
In
We shall give a semantic criterion for a theory to admit QE (Corollary 1'.5.6

below). As it can be stated in a more general form, we extend the denition to
arbitrary elimination.
1'.5.1 Elimination Sets

Denition 1'.5.3
formulas.
modulo
formulas. Then
and all tuples

if
Let
and
(elimination theorem)
Let E be a set of
of L is equivalent
E.
be a theory.
if every formula
to some Boolean combination of formulas from
Theorem 1'.5.4
of
(elimination set)
is an elimination set modulo
Let
be a theory and
E a set of
M and N
is an elimination set if and only if, for all models
and
extracted from
and
satisfy the same formulas from
same formulas.
99
E,
respectively,
then they satisfy the
Proof .
E
that
One implication is trivial. For the other one, we may clearly assume
is closed under Boolean operations.
tradiction.) Let
(x)
be an
L-formula.
E.
(modulo
T)
Step 1.
There is a nite subset
to a formula of
} {(c) (d)}
and
such that the theory
E contains a con(x) is equivalent
T {(c) (d) :
is inconsistent.
c, d be tuples
L = L {c, d}. Let
Verication: Let
0
x)
(In particular,
We shall prove that
of new constant symbols (of the same length as
T 0 = T {(c) (d)} {(c) (d) : E}

The
L0 -theory T
is not consistent; supppose it is. Then there is a model
with interpretations
same formulas from
m = c and n = d
E , but disagree on :
Notice that
and
M |= T 0
satisfy the
against the assumption. So
T0
is not
consistent. By compactness, there is a nite, inconsistent fragment.
Step 2.
For every
M |= T ,
there is a formula
M (x) E
equivalent to
(x).
M |= T , and X = {m M : M |= (m)} (the subset of

). If X is empty, then bearing in mind that E contains a
contradiction, we are done. So we may suppose that X 6= .
For each m X , let m = { : M |= (m)} and m = \ m . Let
V

m = m
m (hence m describes exactly which formulas of a
tuple m X satises).
Notice that each m is in E , and that only nitely many m 's are possible
by niteness of (even though X might be innite). Let M = X m : this
should be another denition of X ! Notice that M E . We now claim that
M |= x ((x) M (x)).
Let n M . If M |= (n), then by denition n X ; hence M |= n (n)
and M |= M (n). On the other hand, assume M |= M (n). By construction
of M , there is m X such that M |= m (n); by construction of m , one has
M |= m (m). It follows that m and n satisfy exactly the same formulas from
. By Step 1, m and n must agree on too. As m X , one has M |= (m);
it follows M |= (n).
Verication: Let
n
dened by
The issue is that, so far, the formula

theory
is equivalent to
only in M (if the
were complete we would however be done). We solve this problem.
Step 3.
Let M |= T . There is a
T {M } |= x ((x) M (x)).
Verication: Let
sentence
M = { E : M |= }
M E
(this is
true in
E Th(M))
and such that
and
T 0 = { : M } { : 6 M } {x ((x) M (x))}
If
T0
N of T 0 . The empty tuple

E as M ; in particular, by
were consistent, we would have a model
satises exactly the same formulas from
100
satises the
M |= x ((x) M (x)),
M and N , that is M N . Yet

T 0 is not consistent.
By compactness, there is a nite fragment of M , which we can take to be
single sentence M , such that T {M } |= x ((x) M (x)).
assumption,
Step 4.
Finitely many
same formulas in
a contradiction. So
M 's
suce for all models of
T 0 = T {M : M |= T }
Verication: Let
T.
(this makes sense: the collection
M 's is a set alright, as

L-sentences). If T 0 were consistent, we would have
none of the M 's holds, which is impossible!
of models is a proper class, but the collection of
subcollection of the set of
model
N |= T
in which
By compactness,
nite set
Step 5.
There is
of
M 's
Verication: Let
T0
is nitely inconsistent, and this means that there is a
such that
(x) E
T |= M .
such that
T |= x (x) (x).
= {M : M |= T }; we may assume that is nite.

_
(x) =
(M M (x))
Consider
E . Now let M |= T , and m M : we show M |= (m) (m).

M |= (m). By construction, M |= M . In particular, M |=
x ((x) M (x)), whence M |= (m) M (m), and M |= M (m),
whence M |= (m).
Suppose now M |= (m). Then there is a model N such that M |= N
N (m). As T {N } |= (c) N (c), we see that M |= (m).
Notice that
Suppose
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1'.5.4.
Remark 1'.5.5.
This proof is a little long and clumsy.
We have just been
covering a normal, compact space; a topological argument is possible, short,

and elegant, but it requires introducing spaces of types, which is a little beyond
the scope of a rst introduction.
Corollary 1'.5.6.
els
and
if
of
and
A theory
eliminates quantiers if and only if, for all mod-
and all tuples
and
extracted from
and
respectively,
satisfy the same atomic formulas, then they satisfy the
same formulas.
The question is now: how do we prove that two tuples do satisfy the same
formulas? In practice, this often results from a back-and-forth construction.
Corollary 1'.5.7.
Let T be a rst-order theory such that

M, N |= T , local isomorphisms between M and N form a
T eliminates quantiers.
101
for any two models

Karp family. Then
Proof .
We use Corollary 1'.5.6.
Let
m, n
be drawn from
M, N
respectively
and satisfy the same quantier-free formulas; we show that they satisfy the
same formulas. As
and
satisfy the same quantier-free formulas, they are
locally isomorphic. By assumption, they are
tpM (m) = tpN (n) (see Remark

formulas; T eliminates quantiers.
it follows
same
-isomorphic.
m
1'.4.25). Hence
So
m ' n, and
n satisfy the
and
We shall later generalize Corollary 1'.5.7 to a weaker assumption (Theorem

1'.5.19 below).
Remark 1'.5.8.
T,
QE is strongly language-dependent; actually for any
there is a language
L L0
and an
L0 -theory T T 0
such that
T0
L-theory
eliminates
quantiers.
Verication: We rst get rid of
y (x, y) we introduce a new

x (y (x, y)) R (x).
's,
replacing them by
relation symbol
Of course the resulting theory
T1
R (x)
in the resulting language
eliminate quantiers, as we have created new formulas.

construction.
T = n Tn
After
For any formula
and we add to the theory
L0 = n Ln
steps, any formula of
to a quantier-free formula of
L1
need not
But we repeat the

is equivalent modulo
L.
One can actually prove compactness that way, reducing to compactness of

propositional logic.
End of Lecture 24.
Lecture 25 ( -Saturated Models)
1'.5.2 -Saturated Models

Theorem 1'.5.4 suggests a method to prove quantier elimination: just show that
two locally isomorphic tuples satisfy the same formulas. This can be done by
establishing
-back-and-forth ( -back-and-forth
more subtle:
hope for the strongest.)
is weaker and sucient but
So let us go back to back-and-forth
constructions.
For instance, if one tries to show that
should start with algebraically closed elds
isomorphic tuples
Th(C) eliminates quantiers, one

K, L; one would take two locally
a '0 b, and try to check that we can always extend. This

K has an element which is transcendental over a, but L is
fails if, for instance,

algebraic over
b.
The conclusion of this algebraic discussion is that some models are richer
than others, and that presumably back-and-forth is easier to manage in rich
models.
A formal notion of wealth is
-saturation
(Denition 1'.5.12 below).
This requires the following denition, which generalizes the notion of a system
n variables.
x = (x1 , . . . , xn ) of
of equations in
To understand it, x an integer
variables
length
n.
102
and a tuple of
Denition 1'.5.9 (type). Let L be a rst-order language, M an L-structure,

A M a set of parameters. An n-type over A is a collection p(x) of LA -formulas
(x, a) (a A) which is consistent with Th(M, A).
Treating the variables as constants, one sees that an
theory in
LA (x)
extending
n-type
is merely a
Th(M, A).
This generalizes the case of the type of a tuple (Denition 1'.4.23), which is
called realized. But any type is the type of a tuple which hasn't appeared yet:
every type is realized somewhere.
Remark 1'.5.10.
n N such
of M.)
that
If
p(x)
realizes
is a type over
p.
(Of course
A M , then
N will tend to
there is
N M
and
be a proper extension
Types are amazingly important and interesting (they come with nice topological methods), and students should refrain the teacher from going to deep
into this matter.
Example 1'.5.11.
If
A M and b M ,
n-type over A.
then
tp(b/A) = {(x, a) : LA : M |= (b, a)}
is
an
Consider
(N, <).
is not realized in
Then
N,
{x > n : n N}
1-type
over
N.
Notice that it
When we constructed the non-standard reals in 1.6.3, we simply constructed a
1-type
over
R,
namely
went to an elementary extension
is a
but in some elementary extension.
Consider
p(x) = {0 < x < r : r R>0 },

R R satisfying it.
as a ring, and study maximal
1-types
over
Z.
and then
There are two
kinds:
algebraic types, types which contain a formula

nomial
with coecients in
P (x) = 0
for a poly-
Z.
the transcendental type, which contains
{P (x) 6= 0 : P Z[X]}.
We build on the previous example to (2-)types of pairs of complex numbers
p(x, y)
over
Z.
There are four kinds:
both x and y are algebraic over Z: the type boils

0, P2 (y) = 0} for some polynomials P1 and P2 .
down to
{P1 (x) =
x
is algebraic over Z, but y is transcendental: the type reduces to

{P1 (x) = 0} {P (y) 6= 0 : P Z[X]} for a certain polynomial P1 .
x is transcendental, y is algebraic: p(x, y) = {P (x) 6= 0 : P Z[X]}

{P2 (y) = 0}
x
P2 .
(x, y) is algebraically de{P (x) 6= 0 : P Z[X]} {P (y) 6= 0 : P

Z[X]} {Q1 (x, y) = 0} for some Q1 Z[X, Y ].
and
for some
are transcendental but the family
pendent: the type contains
103
The family (x, y) is algebraically independent:

{Q(x, y) 6= 0 : Q Z[X, Y }. This is the type of
dence degree 2.
the type is
p(x, y) =
any pair of transcen-
One measures richness of a structure by the amount of types it realizes.
Denition 1'.5.12 ( -saturated).
An
L-structure M
M.
is
-saturated
if any
1-
type over nitely many parameters is realized in
Example 1'.5.13.
A nite structure is always
Any DLO is
-saturated,
but this is a trivial example!
-saturated.
(N, s) is not -saturated. Let n (x) be the formula x 6= sn (0). Then the
1-type p(x) = {n (x) : n N} uses 0 as its only parameter, and is not
realized in N.
(N, <) is not -saturated. Let n (x) be the formula x1 . . . xn x1 <
< xn < x. Then the 1-type {n (x) : n N} uses no parameters and is
not realized in N.
Q is not -saturated. Indeed, any element of Z can be written as

1's. So the transcendental type p = {P (x) 6= 0 : P (X) Z[X]}
parameters. It is however not realized in Q.
The ring
a sum of
uses no
Theorem 1'.5.14.
tary extension
Proof .
Let M be an innite L-structure.

M M which is -saturated.
Then there is an elemen-
This proof relies on ordinal induction, and may be omitted freely; the
result may not.
M , and all 1-types over a,

perhaps bigger than ) of all 1types over all nite tuples of M : {pi (x) : i < }. The reader not familiar with
ordinals ought to suppose = for simplicity; in this case the construction is
We enumerate all nite tuples
of elements of
nding an enumeration (by some ordinal
very understandable.
pi (x) is a 1-type over Mi , so it is realized in some

i
elementary extension M
of M (a quick look at Remark 1'.5.10 if necessary).
Take unions at limit ordinals (this is required only if > ). Let M1 = M .

Let
M0 = M.
For each i,
i+1
As we have taken the increasing union of an elementary chain, Lemma 1'.1.16
M M1 . By construction,
M1 .
M1 need not be -saturated, as we
says that
all
1-types
over nite tuples of
are
realized in
have added new elements, so we might
have created new types. But we resume the construction, getting

countably many steps, the union
sion of
is
-saturated,
by Lemma 1'.1.16 again.
104
M2 .
After
and an elementary exten-
Remark 1'.5.15.
mentary extension
One has no control on the cardinality of an
M ,
-saturated eleM. Indeed,
even starting with a countable base model
at each step the number of types might be huge.

For instance, if one consider
Z as a ring, then there are continuum many

1-types: for each subset I of the primes, consider pI = {x 6= 0}
{y x = p.y : p I} {y x 6= p.y : p 6 I} which expresses that the only primes
dividing x are the elements of I .
So there is no countable, -saturated elementary extension of the ring Z.
dierent
Dealing with
1-types
or
n-types
is the same, as a quick induction reveals.
Lemma 1'.5.16. M is -saturated i any n-type over nitely many parameters

is realized in
Proof .
M.
n-type with nitely many parameters is realp(x, y) be an n + 1-type with nitely many parameters a (x
th
still stands for (x1 , . . . , xn ); the n+1
variable is y ).
Let q(x) = {y (x, y, a) : (x, y, a) p}. This is clearly an n-type over a;
by induction, it is realized by an n-uple b M .
We now let r(y) = {(b, y, a) : (x, y, a) p}. This is clearly a 1-type over
b, a, which is again a nite tuple. So r is realized in M: there is c M realizing
it. It is clear that b, c realizes p.
ized in
Induction. Suppose any
M,
and let
Remark 1'.5.17.
Indeed, even though

Again, why are
p,
s(y) = {x (x, y, a) : (x, y, a) p}.
of s, (a, c) has no reason to realize p!
Observe that one couldn't have taken both projections of
constructing and realizing rst
q,
then
is a realization
-saturated models so important?
Because when one tries to
check completeness of a theory, one may focus on them, which are presumably
nicer than the general models.
Here is a generalization of Lemma 1'.1.6 to
weaker assumptions.
Lemma 1'.5.18. T
is complete i any two
-saturated
models are elementary
equivalent.
Proof .
Let
M, N
be models of
T;
we show that they are elementarily equiva-
M M, N N which are -saturated.
As M M and N N , M and N are models of T . By assumption, they
are elementary equivalent. It follows M M N N ; we are done.

lent. By Theorem 1'.5.14, there are
Here is our generalization of Corollary 1'.5.7.
Theorem 1'.5.19.
models
Then
Proof .
let
M, N |= T ,
Let
be a rst-order theory such that for any
local isomorphisms between
and
-saturated
form a Karp family.
eliminates quantiers.
We use the elimination theorem, Theorem 1'.5.4. Let
m M, n N
M, N |= T ;
we
satisfy same quantier-free formulas; we want to show that
they satisfy the same formulas.
105
-saturated. By Theorem 1'.5.14,

M M and N N . As m
satises the same formulas in M and M , it actually suces to work in M
and N , that is we may assume M and N are -saturated.

As m and n satisfy the same quantier-free formulas, they are locally isomorphic, so by assumption they are -isomorphic. They must therefore satisfy
First, we may assume that
there are
-saturated
and
are
elementary extensions
the same formulas.

The conclusion of this abstract discussion is that
-saturated
elementary
extensions always exist, and form a good ground on which to study a theory
(the details are not too important).
End of Lecture 25.
Lecture 26 (Examples)
1'.5.3 Examples
We eventually shed light on all notions by studying examples.
DLO's
The theory of dense linear ordering has already been dened and studied in
1'.4.1. We put the existing pieces together.
Proposition 1'.5.20
(DLO's)
quantiers. The theory is

model is
Proof .
-saturated
DLO is complete and decidable; it eliminates
0 -categorical
but not
and local isomorphisms are
1 -categorical. Moreover,
-isomorphisms.
any
We know everything, but here is how a study could go. Past the two
rst, many steps are permutable.

(i). The rst step is to realize that any DLO is indeed
(ii). Then, prove that any local isomorphism is an
-saturated.
-isomorphism.
is a local isomorphism.
-isomorphic.
(iii). Moreover, as there are no constants,

from (ii) that any two models are
It follows
(iv). As a consequence of (iii) and with Proposition 1'.4.14, any two countable
models are isomorphic; the theory is
0 -categorical.
(v). One may uses the o-Vaught criterion (Corollary 1'.3.14 to argue that
the theory is complete.
(vi). It would be as simple to say that any two models are elementary equivalent
by (iii); so the theory is complete, again.
(vii). As the theory is clearly eectively presented (nitely many axioms!), and
complete, it is decidable (Corollary 1.6.3).
106
(viii). Turning back to categoricity questions, one would see that the theory is
not
1 -categorical
(Counter-example 1'.4.15).
It follows from Morley's
-categorical
theorem (Theorem 1'.2.16) that it is not
in any
1 .
(ix). It follows from (ii) that DLO eliminates quantiers (Theorem 1'.5.19).
The Successor Function

Proposition 1'.5.21 (N, 0, s).
Let
have the following axioms:
xx0 s(x) = s(x0 ) x = x0 ;

x s(x) 6= 0;
xy x 6= 0 s(y) = x;
x sn (x) 6= x
for each
n N.
It is not 0 embeds elementarily
The theory is complete and decidable; it eliminates quantiers.

categorical but is
-categorical
1 .
in any
Moreover
into every model.
Proof .
This is a new study. We must understand the
-saturated
models. In
order to do this we must develop some understanding of the general model.

(i). A model is a set equipped with a function
s which is onto except on 0, and
which has no cycles. There are therefore two kinds of orbits: the orbit of
0,
which starts and never ends, and other orbits, which have no starting
nor ending point: they are like
(Z, s).
We see that the general model of
has the form
is any set. There is no way to order
Z-like
Mi = N
``
Z,
where
orbits.
(ii). Local isomorphisms are easily understood; one would however fail to establish back-and-forth between any two models.
are not
-isomorphic
It is clear that
and
(being countable they would be isomorphic
by Proposition 1'.4.14).
(iii). In particular, the theory is not
0 -categorical.
On the other hand since
isomorphism classes are determined by the sole set

structure,
is obviously
-categorical
I,
which bears no
in any uncountable
(iv). One may apply the o-Vaught criterion to derive completeness of
(and
its decidability, as it is eectively axiomatized).

However we insist that the sooner one understands the
-saturated models,
the better.
1-type p(x) = {sn (0) 6= x : n N} (no parameters!

` N appears as
indexing set!) is clearly not realized in N, but it is in N
Z. On the other
n
hand, if we x a Z, then the 1-type q(x) = {s (a) 6= x : n N} over a is
(v). The
107
not realized in
Z.
If we want to realize it, we must go to
` ` 0
Z Z.
And so on.
We then understand that a model is
for an innite set
-saturated
i of the form
``
I.
-saturated models do
-saturated
want to nd such that
(vi). One then sees that local isomorphisms between

form a Karp family:
models, and let
a '0 b
side as a.
suppose that
be on the same
are drawn from

We
a, '0 b, .
lies in
= sn (bi ).
If
the orbit of some

As
a '0 b,
If on the other hand
too: this is possible, as
ai ,
say
= sn (ai )
n N,
for
lies in a new orbit, we pick
in a new orbit
is innite!
0 is
-saturated
(vii). Any two models are clearly locally isomorphic (the orbit of
in either model).
are
-isomorphic.
we let
this creates no confusion!
It follows from (vi) that any two
similar
models
It follows that the theory is complete and eliminates
quantiers.
(viii). In particular, any inclusion of structures is elementary. As
embeds into
any model, it embeds elementarily into any model.
The Ordering
Proposition 1'.5.22 (N, 0, <).
Let
be the theory:
x (x < x)
xy (x < y x = y y < x)
xyz x < y y < z x < z
(y 0 y) (xy x y x = 0)
xyz y > x (x < z y z)
(There is an element lying immediately above
x)
xyz x 6= 0 (y < x (z < x z y))

(If
is not
0,
then there is an element lying immediately below
The theory is complete and
embeds elementarily into any model. It does not
admit QE, but it does eliminate quantiers in the language

where
dn
(0, <, {dn : n N}),
is a new binary predicate symbol standing for
dn (x, y) :
x1 . . . xn1 x < x1 < < xn1 < y
(the algebraic distance from
x).
to
is at least
108
n)
Proof .
Things are a little more subtle here.
(N, 0, s): one can dene (by

s
. In particular, any model
` `
MI = N < (I,<) Z, where I is now an ordered set.
(i). A key observation is that this theory interprets

a rst-order formula) the successor function
of
has the form
(ii). One must be very careful that local isomorphisms do not form a Karp
family between
-saturated
models.
Indeed, pairs
(x, x+ )
and
(x, x++ )
are locally isomorphic, but back-and-forth between them is not possible!

We already have a feeling that distance comes into play. But we reserve
language-related issues for the end.
(iii). If one has studied
are
-isomorphic,
-isomorphisms
(1'.4.3), one sees that any two models
so the theory is complete. There is another proof in (v)
but this one is recommended, being simple and elegant.
-saturated, I must be innite. This is however

a in some copy of Z, and consider the 1-type p(x) =
{x1 . . . xn1 a < x1 < xn1 < x : n N} over a. It means that x
is innitely bigger than a, that x lies in a copy of Z lying above that in
which a lives.
(iv). For a model to be

not enough.
Fix
In particular, we understand that for the model to be
-saturated, I
must
have no largest element. And similarly, it must have no least element: it

has no endpoints. This is still not enough.
a < b in I , and consider the 1-type q(x) = {x1 . . . xn1 a < x1 <
xn1 < x : n N} {x1 . . . xn1 x < x1 < xn1 < b : n N} over
(a, b): it expresses that the orbit of x contains neither a nor b, that x lives
in a copy of Z which lies between that of a and that of b. This is density
of the ordering I !
Fix
And we now see that
MI
is
-saturated
i
is a DLO.
(v). One could reprove completeness: the theory is of course not

(neither is it
1 -categorical,
0 -categorical
-
since DLO isn't), but any two countable,
saturated models are isomorphic.

Indeed, let
MI
and
MJ
whence isomorphic.
identifying copies of
be such models.
and
are countable DLO's,
MI ' MJ
by
Z.
In particular, any two countable and

equivalent.
We then construct an isomorphism
-saturated
Let N
This is however not enough.
models are elementary

be any model; by the
Lwenheim-Skolem theorem (Theorem 1'.3.13), it contains a countable
N0 = MI , where I is countable. Now I embeds

I 0 , so N0 embeds elementarily into N1 = MI 0 . It
elementary substructure
into a countable DLO
follows that
N ' N1 ,
and completeness is proved.
This method is however not recommended, as it relies on the existence of

countable,
-saturated
models; one should prefer the proof of (iii).
109
L = {0, <} and L0 = L {dn : n N} be the expanded language.

0
Notice that WFF(L) = WFF(L ); we don't change the expressive strength
(vi). We let
of the language, but merely force certain quantied formulas to now be

quanter-free.
In particular, a model of
description of
-saturation
(vii). One now sees that
L0 -local
is
-saturated
in
i
-saturated
in
L0 :
our
does not change.

isomorphisms between
-saturated
models are
L --isomorphisms.
L0 is immediate.
nds N MI .
From there, quantier elimination in
L -structures,
an inclusion of
one
As
N MI
is also
Algebraically Closed Fields*

Denition 1'.5.23
(ACF)
An algebraically closed eld is a model of the fol-
lowing theory in the language
the structure is a eld;
for each
n N,
{0, 1, +, , }
the axiom
of rings:
an . . . a0 x an 6= 0 an xn + + a0 = 0.
ACF denotes either this theory, or a model of the theory.
We let
denote the set of prime numbers.
Denition 1'.5.24
For
(ACFq )
p P , an algebraically closed
ACF {1 + + 1 = 0}
| {z }
eld of characteristic
is a model of
the theory
p times
An algebraically closed eld of characteristic
is a model of the theory
ACF {1 + + 1 6= 0 : p P}.
Proposition 1'.5.25. ACF

{0}, ACFq
uncountable
qP
kappa-categorical in any
eliminates quantiers. Moreover, for any
is complete. It is not
0 -categorical,
but is
Proof .
We begin with simple remarks: given algebraically closed elds
one has
K '0 L
-saturated
i they have the same characteristic.
i it has innite transcendence degree over its prime eld.
It is then very easy to see that if
K, L
are
-saturated
ACF's of the same
characteristic, then local isomorphisms form a Karp family. In particular,
L. ACFq
K, L,
Moreover, an ACF is
is complete! Now the characteristic is in the quantier-free type of
any tuple, so
ACF
eliminates quantiers.
As for categoricity,
and
Q(X)
are clearly non-isomorphic; but playing
with transcendence bases, one easily nds that

uncountable
110
ACFq
is
-categorical
in any
Corollary 1'.5.26
(Hilbert's Nullstellensatz). Let K be an algebraically closed

X = (X1 , . . . , Xn ) a tuple of indeterminates, and I C K[X] an ideal of
K[X]. Then I has a solution in Kn .
eld,
Proof .
ity,
We may assume that
is a maximal ideal
m; notice that by Noetherian-
is nitely generated. In particular, existence of a solution is a rst-order
formula with parameters in

We let
both are models of
K L.
K.
be the algebraic closure of the eld
ACF
K[X]/m;
clearly
K L.
As
and the theory eliminates quantiers, one actually has
Now there is a solution to
m in Ln
(the class modulo
since this is rst-order, there is a solution in
Kn
m of the tuple X );
too.
More interesting results hold, but one unfortunately has to stop some day.
End of Lecture 26.
111
Index of Notions
Inclusion . . . . . . . . . see Inclusion
*: may freely be omitted
Morphism . . . . . . see Morphism
Substructure . see Substructure
Algebraically Closed Field* . . . . 110
Elimination Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
ACFq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Equality Axioms . . . . . . . . see Axiom
Assignment
Truth Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . 8
of the Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Filter* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Atomic Formula . . . . . . . see Formula
Finite Intersection Property* . . . 32
Axiom
Formula
Axioms of Equality . . . . . . . . . 51
Atomic Formula . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Deduction Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Existential Formula . . . . . . . . 78
Axiomatization of a Theory . . . . . 30
Quantier-Free Formula . . . . 78
Universal Formula . . . . . . . . . . 78
Turning one into a Sentence 79
Back-and-Forth
Finitary* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
of Height
* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Innite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Elementary Inclusion . . . . . . . 82
Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Isomorphism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Categoricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
0-Isomorphism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Absolute Categoricity . . . . . . 75
n-Isomorphism* . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Compactness
-Isomorphism* . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
-Isomorphism . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
in Topology* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Complete Theory . . . . . . . . . . . 27, 65
V -Complete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Consequence
Karp Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Semantic Consequence . . . 9, 46
Kripke Model* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Syntactic Consequence . . 13, 51
Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 52
Language
of Propositional Logic . . . . . . . 5
Decidable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
of Modal Logic* . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Semi-Decidable . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
First-Order Language . . . . . . 40
Deduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 51
Second-Order Language . . . . 73
Local Isomorphism . . . . . . . see Isom.
D. Rules
for Connectives . . . . . . . . . . 13
for
and
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46, 79
Dense Linear Ordering . . . . . . . . . . 92
in Modal Logic* . . . see Kripke
Modus Ponens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Elementary
Modus Tollens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Equivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Morphism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
112
Elementary Morphism . . . . . . 86
Weakening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Well-Formed Formula
Non-Standard Reals* . . . . . . . . . . . 67
in Propositional Logic . . . . . . . 5
in First-Order Logic . . . . . . . . 42
Witness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Peano Arithmetic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Q
Quantication Rank . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Quantier Elimination . . . . . . . . . . 99
S
Satisfaction
in Modal Logic* . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Satisability
-Saturation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Sentence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Skolem Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Standard Part* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Substitutable Term . . . . . . see Term
Substructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Elementary Substructure . . . 82
T
Term . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Substitutable Term . . . . . . . . . 47
Theory
of a First-Order Structure . . 80
Truth Assignment . see Assignment
Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
of a Tuple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
U
Ultralter* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Ultraproduct* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
V
Variable, Free or Bound . . . . . . . . . 43
113
Index of Results
O
*: may freely be omitted
-Saturated
Models Do Exist . . 104
Categoricity
Absolute C. of
PA . . . . . . . . . . 75
QE
Morley's C. Theorem* . . . . . . 87
Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101, 105
1 -C.
0 -C.
1 -C.
of
of
of
of
ACF* . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
DLO . . . . . . . . . 92, 106
Th(N, 0, s) . . . . . . . 107
of
of
Compactness
of
DLO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Th(N, 0, <) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Th(N, 0, s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
ACF* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
of Propositional Logic . . . . . . 29
of Modal Logic* . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Renaming Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
of First-Order Logic . . . . . . . . 65
fails in Higher Logic . . . . . . . 75
Completeness
Skolem's Paradox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Soundness
of Modal Logic* . . . . . . . . 3638
of Modal Logic* . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Completeness of a Theory
Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . 80, 91, 105

of
DLO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93, 106

N . . . . . . 108
of the Ordering on
Tarski's Test for
of the Successor Function . 107

of
ACFq * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
U
Unique Readability . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 42
D
Decidability*
Semi-D. of a Theory . . . . 31, 64
of a Complete Theory . . 31, 65
E
Elimination Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Excluded Middle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
G
Generalisation Theorem . . . . . . . . . 58
L
o' Theorem* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
o-Vaught Completeness Test . . 91
Lwenheim-Skolem Theorem
Descending Version . . . . . . . . . 89
Ascending Version . . . . . . . . . . 90
Final Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
114
List of Lectures
Lecture 1 (Language and W 's; Unique Readability) . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lecture 2 (The Semantics of Propositional Logic) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lecture 3 (Natural Deduction in Classical Logic) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
Lecture 4 (Reduction to Two Connectives (1/2))
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18
Lecture 5 (Reduction to Two Connectives (2/2); Soundness) . . . . . . . .
21
Lecture 6 (Completeness of Propositional Logic)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26
Lecture 7 (Compactness of Propositional Logic) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
28
Lecture 8 (Modal Logic*)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
33
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
38
Lecture 9 (ME1)
Lecture 10 (First-Order Languages; Terms and Formulas)
. . . . . . . . .
39
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
44
Lecture 12 (Substitutions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
46
Lecture 13 (Deductions; Simplifying the Language) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
51
Lecture 14 (Soundness; Completeness (1/2)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
55
Lecture 15 (Completeness (2/2))
60
Lecture 11 (The Semantics of First-Order Logic)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lecture 16 (Consequences; Compactness; Non-Standard Analysis)
. . . .
64
. . . . . . . . . . .
68
Lecture 18 (Second-Order Logic) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
73
Lecture 19 (ME2)
76
Lecture 17 (Proof of Compactness by Ultraproducts*)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lecture 20 (Models and Theories; Elementary Equivalence)
. . . . . . . .
77
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
82
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
87
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
91
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
99
Lecture 21 (Elementary Inclusion; Morphisms)

Lecture 22 (Lwenheim-Skolem Theorems)
Lecture 23 (Back-and-Forth Methods)
Lecture 24 (Elimination Theorem)
Lecture 25 ( -Saturated Models) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

Lecture 26 (Examples) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
115

Intro Logic

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Intro Logic

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Introduction to Mathematical Logic

Propositional Logic (Allegro)

The Language of Propositional Logic . . . . . . . . . . . .

Satisfaction and Semantic Consequence

Simplifying the Language

Natural Deduction (in Classical Logic) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Syntactic Consequences and Deductions . . . . . . . . . .

Our First Deductions

Simplifying the Language (and Presentation)

The Soundness Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Completeness Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Extending the Theory

Finding a Truth Assignment

A Little Modal Logic* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

First-Order Logic (Largo)

The Compactness Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Parameters and Interpretations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Satisfaction and Semantic Consequence

Substitutions and Satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Deductions and Soundness

Simplifying the Language

Strategy and Witnesses

Expanding the Language

Extending the Theory

Finding a Structure (and Assignment) . . . . . . . . . . .

Consequences and Compactness

An Alternate Proof of Compactness* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Filters and Ultralters*

Ultraproducts (The o Structure)*

Alternate Proof of Compactness* . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Second-Order Logic (Presto)

1' Some Model Theory (Furioso)

1'.1 Elementary Equivalence; Inclusion and Elementary Inclusion

1'.1.1 Elementary Equivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1'.1.3 Elementary Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1'.2 Morphisms, Elementary Morphisms, Categoricity . . . . . . . . .

1'.2.2 Elementary Morphisms

1'.3 Lwenheim-Skolem Theorems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1'.3.1 The Substructure Generated by a Set

1'.3.2 Skolem Functions and the Descending Version . . . . . . .

1'.3.3 The General Version and the o-Vaught Criterion . . . .

1'.4 Back-and-Forth Methods

1'.4.1 Dense Linear Orderings

1'.4.3 Finitary Back-and-Forth*

Index of Notions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Propositional Logic (Allegro)

These are on the side of meanings, called semantics.

Describe the language of propositional logic (0.1)

Describe the objects of propositional logic (0.2)

Formalize the notion of entailment (0.2.2)

Formalize the notion of deduction in propositional logic (0.3)

Show that entailment and deduction coincide (0.3.4 and 0.4)

Derive the compactness theorem and applications (0.5)

An incursion to modal logic* (0.6)

Lecture 1 (Language and Wff's; Unique Readability)

This will lead us to the relevant notion of formula

A key, and fairly natural, property of the language is that there is

exactly one way to read a relevant formula (Theorem 0.1.9 of 0.1.3).

0.1.1 The Language of Propositional Logic

(language of propositional logic)

The language of proposi-

tional logic consists of:

two punctuation symbols : the parentheses  ( and  )

Filters and Ultralters*

two punctuation symbols : the parentheses ( and )

suce to encode the

An expression is any (nite) sequence of sym-

Technically, Denition 0.1.1 denes the alphabet of propositional logic. It is

formulas (w in short) is the smallest set such that:

are w, so are

soon omit well-formed, and say formula, for short.

A theory is a set of w 's.

W 's are built from the sentence symbols with connectives.

recursive denition, most of our proofs on formulas will proceed by induction

We dene the following functions.

sequence is an expression but not a w.

(i). A w has as many left parentheses as right parentheses.

is ( or (, we are done.

is ( then we are done as

We may delete the rst (, getting

; deleting it, and the nal right parentheses,

Denition 0.2.2 (truth assignment).

v is well-dened by Unique Readability (Theorem 0.1.9).