389 U.S.

191
88 S.Ct. 379
19 L.Ed.2d 407

WYANDOTTE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY et al.,

Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 31.
Argued Oct. 16 and 17, 1967.
Decided Dec. 4, 1967.

[Syllabus from pages 191-192 intentionally omitted]

Lucian Y. Ray, Cleveland, Ohio, for petitioners.
Alan S. Rosenthal, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
Mr. Justice FORTAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Two cases, consolidated by the trial court and raising related issues, are here
involved. In United States v. Cargill, Inc., the Government asked that parties
responsible for the allegedly negligent sinking of a vessel in an inland
waterway be declared responsible for removing the impediment to navigation
thus created. In United States v. Wyandotte Transportation Co. the United
States had itself removed a sunken vessel; claiming that the vessel had been
negligently sunk, it sought reimbursement for the costs of removal. The
question now before us for decision is whether the relief requested in these
cases is available to the United States.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana concluded
that such relief is not available. After the cases were consolidated, that court
granted summary judgment against the United States in each instance. The
court decided that the Government has no in personam rights against those
responsible for having negligently sunk a vessel. In its view, the United States
is limited to an in rem right against the cargo of the negligently sunk vessel and
against the vessel itself. United States v. Cargill, Inc., 1964 A.M.C. 1742.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. It held that under the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1151 et seq., as amended, 33 U.S.C.
401 et seq., the United States may assert in personam rightsto injunctive or
declaratory relief or damagesagainst those responsible for the negligent
sinking of a vessel. United States v. Cargill, Inc., 367 F.2d 971 (1966). Because
of a conflict among the circuits and because of the important question regarding
interpretation of a statute of the United States, we granted certiorari. 386 U.S.
906, 87 S.Ct. 854, 17 L.Ed.2d 781 (1967). We affirm the judgment below.

The crucial facts of both cases occurred in March 1961. The Cargill libel alleges
that, at that time, a supertanker bound up the Mississippi for Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, collided with two barges moored by a tug. The barges were owned
by petitioner Cargo Carriers, Inc., and petitioner Jeffersonville Boat and
Machine Co., respectively. The Government was notified immediately after the
accident that the two barges had sunk. A few days later, it was served with
notice that the barges were being abandoned. The United States refused,
however, to accept abandonment or to assume responsibility for removing the
wrecks. In Docember 1962, it brought suit against the owners, managers,
charterers, and insurers of the two barges, seeking a decree that the respondents
were responsible for removing the sunken vessels. The Government charged
that negligence in the equipping, manning, and mooring of the barges had
caused the sinking. To this date, the barges involved in this case remain in the
Mississippi.

The Wyandotte libel is founded on facts more dramatic. A barge loaded with
2,200,000 pounds of liquid chlorine sank while being pushed in the Mississippi
near Vidalia, Louisiana. Wyandotte, the owner of the barge, at first made some
attempts to locate and raise the wreck. But then, in November 1961, Wyandotte
informed the Army Corps of Engineers that it believed further efforts to raise
the barge would be unsuccessful. Wyandotte stated that it was abandoning the
vessel. The Government began a study of the danger posed by such a
substantial load of chlorine at the bottom of the Mississippi. It was feared that
if any chlorine escaped, it would be in the form of lethal chlorine gas, which
might cause a large number of casualties. The Government demanded that
Wyandotte remove the barge. Wyandotte refused to do this.'1

The United States then moved to avert a catastrophe by locating and raising the
barge and its deadly cargo. In October 1962, the President proclaimed the
presence of the barge to be a major disaster under the Disaster Relief Act, 64
Stat. 1109, 42 U.S.C. 18551855g. Safety precautions on a grand scale
were taken, and a team of experienced divers sought gingerly to raise
Wyandotte's barge. These operations, coating the United States some

$3,081,000, proved successful.

7

The United States demanded that the owners and operators of the barge
reimburse the Government for its expenses. This demand was rejected. In
January 1963, the Government brought suit, in rem against the barge and her
cargo, 2 and in personam against the owner of the barge, the owner of the boat
that had been pushing the barge when it sank, and the owner of the chlorine
cargo. 3 The libel charged these parties with negligence and fault in the design,
towing, manning, mooring, and equipping of the barge. The Government
sought a decree for the costs it incurred in removing the wreck.4

I.
8

Although the Government has advanced several discrete grounds for

affirmance, we do not pause to examine each of them.5 We agree that 15 of
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. 409, read in light of our
decision in United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 80 S.Ct. 884, 4
L.Ed.2d 903 (1960), controls the issues here presented. Section 15 reads in
relevant part as follows:

'It shall not be lawful * * * to voluntarily or carelessly sink, or permit or cause

to be sunk, vessels or other craft in navigable channels * * *. And whenever a
vessel, raft or other craft is wrecked and sunk in a navigable channel,
accidentally or otherwise, it shall be the duty of the owner of such sunken craft
to immediately mark it with a buoy or beacon during the day and a lighted
lantern at night, and to maintain such marks until the sunken craft is removed or
abandoned, and the neglect or failure of the said owner so to do shall be
unlawful; and it shall be the duty of the owner of such sunken craft to
commence the immediate removal of the same, and prosecute such removal
diligently, and failure to do so shall be considered as an abandonment of such
craft, and subject the same to removal by the United States as provided for in
sections 411416, 418, and 502 of this title.' 33 U.S.C. 409.

10

Petitioners do not dispute, as indeed they could not, that the negligent sinking
of a vessel falls within the prohibition of the first above-quoted clause of 15.6
They contend, however, that the Act contains specific remedies for such a
violation of 15, and that those remedies were meant by Congress to be
exclusive of all others. Petitioners point to the 15 duty of the owner to mark
and remove a sunken craft. They note that failure to remove 'shall be considered
as an abandonment of such craft, and subject the same to removal by the United
States.' And petitioners call our attention to 19 and 20 of the Act, 33 U.S.C.
414, 415, which set forth the procedure whereby the United States may

remove a sunken craft that 'shall be considered as' abandoned under 15.
Section 19 provides that whenever a sunken vessel exists as an obstruction to
any navigable waters of the United States for a period longer than 30 days, or
whenever the abandonment of such obstruction can be legally established in a
shorter time, the sunken vessel 'shall be subject to be broken up, removed, sold,
or otherwise disposed of by the Secretary of the Army at his discretion, without
liability for any damage to the owners of the same.' That section further
contemplates '(t)hat any money received from the sale of any such wreck * * *
shall be covered into the Treasury of the United States.' 33 U.S.C. 414.
Section 20, an emergency provision applicable only when a sunken vessel
obstructs a waterway 'in such manner as to stop, seriously interfere with, or
specially endanger navigation,' 33 U.S.C. 415, is similar in structure to 19.7
11

Finally, petitioners emphasize that 16 of the Act provides criminal penalties

for '(e)very person and every corporation that shall violate, or that shall
knowingly aid, abet, authorize, or instigate a violation of the provisions (of
15).' 33 U.S.C. 411.8 They point out that 12 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 406,
which provides penalties for violations of 10, 33 U.S.C. 403,9 expressly
authorizes the injunctive remedy. They argue that the lack of such an
authorization in 16 should be taken to mean that Congress did not intend the
United States to be able to obtain what is, in effect, injunctive relief as a remedy
for a violation of 15.10

12

The position of petitioners is, therefore, that in the case of a negligently sunk
vessel, the Government may require the owner to mark it; it may expect him to
remove it or forfeit his interest in the vessel; and if the Government proceeds to
remove the vessel, it possesses the right to sell vessel and cargo and retain the
proceeds of these sales.11 Moreover, the Government may proceed criminally,
under 16, against those responsible for the negligent sinking. But, petitioners
argue, the Government may do no more. Under their view, the very detail of
the Rivers and Harbors Act negates the possibility that Congress intended the
Government to be able to recover removal expenses exceeding the value of the
vessel and its cargo. Petitioners would apply the same analysis to a government
action for declaratory or injunctive relief. Indeed, petitioners believe that
authorization of the injunction remedy in another, analogous, section of the Act
indicates congressional intent to withhold declaratory or injunctive relief as a
means of enforcing 15.12

13

We do not agree. Petitioners' interpretation of the Rivers and Harbors Act of

1899 would ascribe to Congress an intent at variance with the purpose of that
statute. Petitioners' proposal is, moreover, in disharmony with our own prior
construction of the Act, with our decisions on analogous issues of statutory

construction, and with a major maritime statute of the United States. If there
were no other reasonable interpretation of the statute, or if petitioners could
adduce some persuasive indication that their interpretation accords with the
congressional intent, we might be more disposed to accept that interpretation.
But our reading of the Act does not lead us to the conclusion that Congress
must have intended the statutory remedies and procedures to be exclusive of all
others. There is no indication anywhere elsein the legislative history of the
Act, in the predecessor statutes, or in nonstatutory lawthat Congress might
have intended that a party who negligently sinks a vessel should be shielded
from personal responsibility. We therefore hold that the remedies and
procedures specified by the Act for the enforcement of 15 were not intended
to be exclusive. Applying the principles of our decision in Republic Steel, we
conclude that other remedies, including those here sought, are available to the
Government.
II.
14

Article I, 8, of the Constitution grants to Congress the power to regulate

commerce. For the exercise of this power, the navigable waters of the United
States are to be deemed the 'public property of the nation, and subject to all the
requisite legislation by Congress.' Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713,
725, 18 L.Ed. 96 (1966). The Federal Government is charged with ensuring
that navigable waterways, like any other routes of commerce over which it has
assumed control, remain free of obstruction. Cf. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 586,
15 S.Ct. 900, 907, 39 L.Ed. 1092 (1895). The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,
an assertion of the sovereign power of the United States, Sanitary District of
Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 45 S.Ct. 176, 69 L.Ed. 352 (1925), was
obviously intended to prevent obstructions in the Nation's waterways. Despite
some difficulties with the wording of the Act, we have consistently found its
coverage to be broad. See, e.g., Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States,
supra; United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 80 S.Ct. 884, 4
L.Ed.2d 903 (1960).13 And we have found that a principal beneficiary of the
Act, if not the principal beneficiary, is the Government itself. United States v.
Republic Steel Corp., supra, at 492, 80 S.Ct. at 890.

15

Our decisions have established, too, the general rule that the United States may
sue to protect its interests. Cotton v. United States, 11 How. 229, 13 L.Ed. 675
(1851); United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 8 S.Ct. 850, 31
L.Ed. 747 (1888); Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States, supra. This rule
is not necessarily inapplicable when the particular governmental interest sought
to be protected is expressed in a statute carrying criminal penalties for its
violation. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., supra. Our decisions in cases

involving civil actions of private parties based on the violation of a penal statute
so indicate. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 482, 60
L.Ed. 874 (1916); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12
L.Ed.2d 423 (1964).14 In those cases we concluded that criminal liability was
inadequate to ensure the full effectiveness of the statute which Congress had
intended. Because the interest of the plaintiffs in those cases fell within the
class that the statute was intended to protect, and because the harm that had
occurred was of the type that the statute was intended to forestall, we held that
civil actions were proper. That conclusion was in accordance with a general rule
of the law of torts. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 286. We see no reason
to distinguish the Government, and to deprive the United States of the benefit
of that rule.
16

The inadequacy of the criminal penalties explicitly provided by 16 of the

Rivers and Harbors Act is beyond dispute. That section contains only meager
monetary penalties. In many cases, as here, the combination of these fines and
the Government's in rem rights would not serve to reimburse the United States
for removal expenses. It is true that 16 also provides for prison terms, but this
punishment is hardly a satisfactory remedy for the pecuniary injury which the
negligent shipowner may inflict upon the sovereign. Cf. United States v. Acme
Process Equipment Co., 385 U.S. 138, 87 S.Ct. 350, 17 L.Ed.2d 249 (1966).

17

It was a similar process of reasoning that underlay our decision in United States
v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 80 S.Ct. 884, 4 L.Ed.2d 903 (1960).
That case concerned the deposit of industrial solids which, we believed, created
an 'obstruction * * * to the navigable capacity' of a waterway of the United
States, within the meaning of 10 of the Act. We decided that the Government
might seek injunctive relief to compel removal of such an obstruction, even
though such relief was nowhere specifically authorized in the Act. We
concluded that the authorization of injunctive relief in 12, which is applicable
only to a limited category of 10 obstructions (structures), should not be read
to exclude injunctions to compel removal of other types of 10 obstructions. In
referring to the Act, we noted that 'Congress has legislated and made its
purpose clear; it has provided enough federal law in 10 from which
appropriate remedies may be fashioned even though they rest on inferences.
Otherwise we impute to Congress a futility inconsistent with the great design of
this legislation.' 362 U.S., at 492, 80 S.Ct., at 890.

18

Although we do not approach the instant cases in the context of 10, we

believe the principles of Republic Steel apply, by analogy, to the issues now
before us.15 The Government may, in our view, seek an order that a negligent
party is responsible for rectifying the wrong done to maritime commerce by a

15 violation. Denial of such a remedy to the United States would permit the
result, extraordinary in our jurisprudence, of a wrongdoer shifting responsibility
for the consequences of his negligence onto his victim. It might in some cases
permit the negligent party to benefit from commission of a criminal act. We do
not believe that Congress intended to withhold from the Government a remedy
that ensures the full effectiveness of the Act. We think we correctly divine the
congressional intent in inferring the availability of that remedy from the
prohibition of 15.
19

It is but a small step from declaratory relief to a civil action for the
Government's expenses incurred in removing a negligently sunk vessel. See
United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754 (C.A.2d Cir. 1964). Having
properly chosen to remove such a vessel, the United States should not lose the
right to place responsibility for removal upon those who negligently sank the
vessel. See Restatement of Restitution 115; United States v. Moran Towing &
Transportation Co., 374 F.2d 656, 667 (C.A.4th Cir. 1967). No issue regarding
the propriety of the Government's removal of Wyandotte's barge is now raised.
Indeed, the facts surrounding that sinking constitute a classic case in which
rapid removal by someone was essential. Wyandotte was unwilling to
effectuate removal itself. It would be surprising if Congress intended that, in
such a situation, the Government's commendable performance of Wyandotte's
duty must be at Government expense. Indeed, in any case in which the Act
provides a right of removal in the United States, the exercise of that right
should not relieve negligent parties of the responsibility for removal.
Otherwise, the Government would be subject to a financial penalty for the
correct performance of its duty to prevent impediments in inland waterways.16
See United States v. Perma Paving Co., supra, 332 F.2d at 758.

20

We note, moreover, that under the Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act of

1851, 9 Stat. 635, as amended, 46 U.S.C. 181 et seq., the liability of a
shipowner 'for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter,
or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture' may be limited to 'the interest of such
owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending'; but this limitation is
available only if the act or damage occurred 'without the privity or knowledge
of such owner.' 46 U.S.C. 183. 'For his own fault, neglect and contracts the
owner remains liable.' American Car & Foundry Co. v. Brassert, 289 U.S. 261,
264, 53 S.Ct. 618, 619, 77 L.Ed. 1162 (1933). The reading that petitioners
would place on the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 would create an additional
right of limitation, applicable in the special case of a sinking even though the
owner is himself negligent. Yet Congress gave no indication, in passing the
Rivers and Harbors Act, that it intended to alter or qualify the 1851 Act.17 In
the congressional failure to connect these two statutes, we find at least some

evidence that petitioners' discovery of a limitation of liability in the Rivers and

Harbors Act is unwarranted.18
III.
21

Petitioners contend that, despite our prior decisions and the silence of the
Rivers and Harbors Act on this point, that statute authorizes them simply to
abandon their negligently sunk vessels, without further responsibility for those
vessels. We find in the Act no support for such an absolute right of
abandonment. The provision upon which petitioners place most reliance, the
final clause of 15, creates a 'duty of the owner of (a) sunken craft to
commence the immediate removal of the same, and prosecute such removal
diligently.' Because 'failure to do so shall be considered as an abandonment of
such craft, and subject the same to removal by the United States as provided for
in sections (19 and 20),' petitioners contend that such failure in no case has
other consequences. But the duty imposed by and the remedy provided in the
final clause of 15 and 19 and 20 are not prescribed only for owners of
negligently sunk vessels. Those provisions apply 'whenever a vessel * * * is
wrecked and sunk in a navigable channel, accidentally or otherwise * * *.'
Unlike a negligent sinking, a non-negligent sinking is not declared by the Act
to be unlawful. It seems highly unlikely that Congress, having specified that
only a negligent or intentional sinking is a crime, would then employ such
indirect language to grant the culpable owner a personal civil immunity from
the consequences of that crime.

22

We believe the sections noted by petitioners are intended to protect the United
States against liability for removing a sunken vessel if it chooses to do so. See
Zubik v. United States, 190 F.2d 278 (C.A.3d Cir. 1951); Gulf Coast Transp.
Co. v. Ruddock-Orleans Cypress Co., 17 F.2d 858 (D.C.E.D.La.1927). Section
19 speaks explicitly of the discretion of the Secretary of the Army to break up,
remove, sell, or otherwise dispose of a sunken vessel that has obstructed a
waterway 'without liability for any damage to the owners of the same.' These
sections do not negate the rights of the United States to obtain declaratory relief
or to recover removal expenses. It is true that a proviso to 19 states '(t)hat any
money received from the sale of any such wreck * * * shall be covered into the
Treasury of the United States.' But that proviso does not indicate that the
United States, having chosen to remove a sunken vessel, shall receive no other
monies. At most, the proviso establishes the proposition that, if the United
States chooses to sell a wreck, the owner of the vessel has no right to any
monies received.19 Section 20, the emergency section, closely parallels 19. It
adds nothing to petitioners' argument.20

23

Petitioners also claim that a substantial body of nonstatutory law establishes the
rule that a shipowner who has negligently sunk a vessel may abandon it and be
insulated from all but in rem liability.21 They argue that Congress must have
intended to codify this rule in the Rivers and Harbors Act. We do not accept
petitioners' claim. Although several modern courts have assumed the existence
of such a common-law rule, see, e.g., United States v. Moran Towing &
Transportation Co., 374 F.2d 656, 667 (C.A.4th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 319 F.2d 512, 518519 (C.A.9th Cir. 1963), the rule
evaporates upon close analysis.22 We do not believe Congress intended the
Rivers and Harbors Act to embody this illusory nonstatutory law.

IV.
24

These cases were decided in the District Court on petitioners' motions for
summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further
proceedings. As we have noted, the Government's libels were based on a theory
of negligence, and the award of the Court of Appeals called for a determination
whether the acts of the various petitioners constituted negligence. We agree
with that disposition.

25

Affirmed.

26

Mr. Justice MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this

case.

27

Mr. Justice HARLAN, concurring.

28

I concur in the Court's holding that under 15 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899, 33 U.S.C. 409, the United States may recover the costs of removing a
vessel negligently sunk in navigable waters from those responsible for the
sinking. I further agree with the holding that the United States is entitled to the
declaratory relief sought in the Cargill action. In affording this latter relief it is
my understanding that the Court does not purport to decide whether the United
States may also obtain an injunction compelling removal, but has left that
question to be answered in light of a full development of the facts, and in
accordance with normal standards of equity.

29

In reaching these conclusions, I have not been unmindful of the view stated by
me in dictum in my dissenting opinion in United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,
362 U.S. 482, 493, 80 S.Ct. 884, 891, 4 L.Ed.2d 903, to the effect that the
courts are precluded from supplying relief not expressly found in the Rivers and

Harbors Act. Insofar as that dictum might be taken to encompass the present
case, where, contrary to my view in Republic Steel, I do believe that the relief
afforded by this Court is fairly to be implied from the statute, candor would
compel me to say that the dictum was ill-founded.
30

On these premises I join the opinion of the Court.

There is some dispute as to whether the United States ever agreed to remove
the owner's barge. The Court of Appeals was cognizant of this issue but
concluded that its resolution of the cases made a decision on this point
unnecessary. We agree. We therefore do not pass on the question whether the
United States asserted the right to remove Wyandotte's barge or whether the
Government, once it has asserted such a right, is precluded from seeking
declaratory relief.

Upon motion of the United States, the District Court ordered that the chlorine
and its containers be sold and that the proceeds be paid into court pending final
disposition of the litigation. The proceeds of this sale were $85,000. Petitioners
do not dispute the right of the United States to this sum. See n. 12, infra.

On petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment
entered in favor of Union Carbide Co., the owner of the chlorine, on the ground
that there was no allegation or proof of negligence on its part. That decision is
not now before us.

Of the expenses incurred by the United States, approximately $1,565,000 was

for engineering costs; the remainder, some $1,516,000, was for public health
and safety measures, including allegedly necessary precautions against a
possible rupture of the chlorine containers during salvage operations. We do
not, of course, pass on the questions whether all of these expenses were
necessary to remove the barge or whether the Government may recover all of
them.

Thus, we intimate no view as to whether a negligently sunk vessel may be an

'obstruction * * * to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United
States,' prohibited by 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
403. This was the ground upon which the Court of Appeals rested its decision.
We do not assess any of the Court of Appeals' conclusions, nor do we decide
whether petitioners may be subject to the criminal and other remedies of 12 of
the Act, 33 U.S.C. 406, which applies to violations of 10.
Nor, finally, do we decide whether nonstatutory public nuisance law may form

a basis for the relief here sought by the Government. See, e.g., Mayor, etc. of
Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91, 97, 9 L.Ed. 1012 (1838);
United States v. Hall, 63 F. 472, 474 (C.A.1st Cir. 1894); The Ella, (1915) P.
111 (1914); Comment, Substantive and Remedial Problems in Preventing
Interferences with Navigation: The Republic Steel Case, 59 Col.L.Rev. 1065,
1067 (1959); Wisdom, Obstructions in Rivers, 119 Just. P. 846 (1955). We
therefore do not pass either on the question whether such a nonstatutory right of
the sovereign has ever existed in the United States, cf. Willamette Iron Bridge
Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 8, 8 S.Ct. 811, 814, 31 L.Ed. 629 (1888); United
States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 486, 80 S.Ct. 884, 887, 4 L.Ed.2d
903 (1960); or on whether such a right, if it ever did exist, survived the series of
enactments beginning with the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 426,
454, in which Congress asserted the general interest of the United States in the
removal of sunken vessels obstructing navigable waters. Cf. In re Debs, 158
U.S. 564, 15 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed. 1092 (1895).
6

It bears emphasis that we are here concerned with the careless or negligent
sinking of a vessel, which is specifically declared not to be lawful by the first
above-quoted clause of 15. Negligence is the sole theory of recovery in the
Government's libels. Questions involving a non-negligent sinking, which is not
forbidden by 15, are not before us and we do not mean to indicate what relief,
if any, may be available to the Government in that situation.

The determination of the applicability of 20 is left by that section to 'the

opinion of the Secretary of the Army, or any agent of the United States to
whom the Secretary may delegate proper authority.' Once the determination is
made, the Secretary or his agent may 'take immediate possession' of a sunken
vessel 'so far as to remove or to destroy it and to clear immediately' the
obstructed waterway. See n. 20, infra.

Violation is a misdemeanor, punishable by 'a fine not exceeding $2,500 nor less
than $500, or by imprisonment (in the case of a natural person) for not less than
thirty days nor more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in
the discretion of the court * * *.'

See n. 5, supra.

10

As noted, the United States sought declaratory relief in the Cargill action.

11

The Government notes, in regard to petitioners' contention that these remedies

are exclusive, that they apply only to the owner of a vessel. The Government
argues that the position of those allegedly negligent petitioners who are not
owners is substantially weaker. But see United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
319 F.2d 512, 521 (C.A.9th Cir. 1963). We note that the prohibition of 15

against the negligent sinking of a vessel and the criminal penalties of 16 are
not limited to owners. Our disposition of these cases makes it unnecessary for
us to pass on the Government's contention.
12

Petitioners concede the in rem right of the United States against a negligently
sunk vessel and its cargo, see Brief for Petitioners, p. 12, despite the fact that
the right of the Government to proceed against cargo is by no means clearly
granted by the statute. See 19, 33 U.S.C. 414; United States v. Cargo
Salvage Corp., 228 F.Supp. 145 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1964). See also 16, 33 U.S.C.
412.

13

In this conclusion we have been supported by similarly broad readings of

similar statutes predating this one. See, e.g., United States v. Rio Grande Dam
& Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 19 S.Ct. 770, 43 L.Ed. 1136 (1899).

14

See North Bloomfield Gravel Min. Co. v. United States, 88 F. 664, 678679
(C.A.9th Cir. 1898). See also Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201,
208209 (C.A.6th Cir. 1961); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694
(C.A.2d Cir. 1947).

15

Petitioners would distinguish Republic Steel on the ground that, in that case, 'if
* * * injunctive relief * * * was not available, the free navigability of the
channel would be seriously impaired and Republic Steel Corp., by repeatedly
paying the fine imposed (by 12), would, in effect, be operating under a
license.' See Brief for Petitioners, p. 29; United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 319 F.2d 512, 518 (C.A.9th Cir. 1963). This ground of distinction will
not do, for at least three reasons. First, the criminal provisions of 12 include
not only a fine but a prison term. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
319 F.2d 512, 523 (C.A.9th Cir. 1963) (dissenting opinion). Second, if fines
were in practice the only deterrent in 12 and 16, it might well be worthwhile
to risk fines rather than take necessary safety measure for tows. Third, the
proposed ground of distinction concentrates upon the injunction in Republic
Steel against future violations of the Act; it does not explain the mandatory
injunction in that case to compel removal of the obstruction that had already
been created at the time of the Government's suit.
Indeed, the argument for exclusivity was stronger in Republic Steel than it is
here. In that case, we decided that injunctive relief was a proper enforcement
measure against a violation of the very section to which 12 (but not the
statutory provision of injunctive process) applies.

16

Wyandotte, noting that Government funds spent in removal operations were

provided under the Disaster Relief Act, 42 U.S.C. 18551855g, argues that
nothing in that Act authorizes the United States to recover disaster relief

expenditures from private parties. We agree, but the argument misses the point.
We believe the United States may recover its expenses under the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899. We see nothing in the Disaster Relief Act to the contrary.
17

We do not, of course, pass on the applicability of the Limitation Act, before or

after passage of the Rivers and Harbors Act, to the facts of the case now before
us. We only note that the principle for which petitioners are contending is very
much like the principle of limitation of liability, known to the statutory
maritime law of the United States almost 50 years prior to passage of the
Rivers and Harbors Act.

18

Petitioners' theory is, moreover, in conflict with the administrative

interpretation of the statute. A regulation promulgated by the Department of the
Army provides that 'a person who * * * negligently permits a vessel to sink in
navigable waters of the United States * * * may * * * be compelled to remove
the wreck as a public nuisance or to pay for its removal.' 33 CFR 209.410.
The origins of this regulation go back to 1901. Letter from William Cary
Sanger, Acting Secretary of War, to William L. Hughes, July 31, 1901. See
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 490, n. 5, 80 S.Ct. 884,
889, 4 L.Ed.2d 903 (1960).

19

This rule is not unfair. See 41 Tulane L.Rev. 459, 464, n. 29 (1967). The
shipowner should know the value of his vessel and cargo. If he believes that
value is greater than the cost of removal, he may, within 30 days after the
obstruction is created, raise the vessel himself. See 19, 33 U.S.C. 414.

20

Thus, 20 concludes with the proviso '(t)hat the expense of removing any such
obstruction as aforesaid shall be a charge against such craft and cargo; and if
the owners thereof fail or refuse to reimburse the United States for such
expense within thirty days after notification, then the officer or agent aforesaid
may sell the craft or cargo, or any part thereof that may not have been destroyed
in removal, and the proceeds of such sale shall be covered into the Treasury of
the United States.' Petitioners rely heavily on the phrase 'shall be a charge
against such craft and cargo.' But that phrase does not lead to the conclusion
that the Government possesses no other right to recover. The phrase merely
describes the lien interest of the United States. See United States v. Moran
Towing & Transportation Co., 374 F.2d 656, 671 (C.A.4th Cir. 1967)
(dissenting opinion). Such a provision is necessary in a 20 case because,
under the terms of that section, the owner is not given a statutory period in
which to decide whether the value of his vessel and cargo exceeds the cost of
removal and to effectuate removal himself.

21

Petitioners do not appear to claim that the legislative history of the Rivers and

Harbors Act of 1899 clearly indicates the intent of Congress to create or codify
this rule. To the extent that any intent appears in the legislative history of the
1899 Act, it is the intent not to alter pre-existing statutory law. Thus, the House
conferees said of the statute that it was a 'codification of existing laws
pertaining to rivers and harbors, though containing no essential changes in the
existing law.' 32 Cong.Rec. 2923 (1899); see United States v. Republic Steel
Corp., 362 U.S., at 486, 80 S.Ct., at 887. The legislative history of prior statutes
in scant. And the prior Acts themselves lend no support to petitioners. See
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1880, 21 Stat. 180; Rivers and Harbors Act of 1882,
22 Stat. 191; Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 426.
22

The American decisions speaking of a nonstatutory right of abandonment all

trace back to a dictum in Winpenny & Chedester v. City of Philadelphia, 65 Pa.
135 (1870). See, e.g., The Manhattan, 10 F.Supp. 45 (D.C.E.D.Pa.1935); Gulf
Coast Transp. Co. v. Ruddock-Orleans Cypress Co., 17 F.2d 858
(D.C.E.D.La.1927). In Winpenny the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in
dictum that the 'owner (of a sunken vessel) is absolutely not liable to raise or
remove the hulk.' 65 Pa., at 138. For this proposition, the Pennsylvania court
cited three treatises and five English cases. The cases are not good authority.
The only one close to the point, King v. Watts, 2 Esp. 675, 170 Eng.Rep. 493
(1798), held that an indictment for having sunk a vessel in the Thames could
not be maintained because the owner had not been negligent and 'it would be
adding to the calamity to subject the party to an indictment * * * against which
he could not guard, or which he could not prevent.' Of the two treatises cited,
one, Shearman & Redfield on Negligence 3d ed. 1869), states at 583 that '(i)t
is well settled that the owner of a vessel which has been sunk in navigable
waters, and abandoned by him, is under no obligation to remove the vessel * *
*.' But the only case cited for this 'well-settled' rule is King v. Watts.
Moreover, it seems clear that the Winpenny court was not speaking of the 'rule'
that petitioners propose. That court, after the above quoted passage, went on as
follows:
'There seem to be good reasons for this rule. When a vessel is lost by the act of
God, or by accident, the owner suffers oftentimes great damage, and when she
becomes a total loss, it seems to be a great hardship to add to his misfortune the
duty of removing the wreck. It would discourage commerce to hold him to so
severe a duty; for who would engage in trade, if, when he has lost his vessel, he
might be forced to incur an expense of more than her original cost in removing
the wreck from some difficult position? If compelled by the accident to
abandon his property, the duty of removal should rather fall on the public, who
are interested in the navigation, than on him.'

Cases cited for petitioners that do not rely on Winpenny either do not support
petitioners' claim of a nonstatutory rule, see, e.g., In re Highland Nav. Corp., 24
F.2d 582 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1957), affirmed, 29 F.2d 37 (C.A.2d Cir. 1928); Zubik
v. United States, 190 F.2d 278 (C.A.3d Cir. 1951); United States v. Bridgeport
Towing Line, Inc., 15 F.2d 240 D.C.D.Conn.1926), or support it only with
unsupported dicta of their own, see, e.g., Barraclough v. Brown, (1897) A.C.
615 (construing the Aire and Calder Navigation Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict., c.
32).