Arts.

25-45: Penalties
Reclusion Perpetua
People v. Novio (G.R. No. 139332)
Facts:
On September 23, 1994, 13-year-old Maricel B. Talisay, together with her minor brothers Jun
and Joey slept side-by-side at their store. Their parents werecaretakers of a beach house and
needed to sleep there at that time. At 3:00 inthe morning, a ticklish sensation and stabs of pain
in her vagina awakenedMaricel. When she woke up, she saw the accused, Noli Novio, naked on
top of her. Her duster was rolled up to her neck and her panty has already beenremoved by the
accused. Noel Novio was able to penetrate his penis insideMaricel's Vagina.Meanwhile,
Maricel's parents were awakened by their neighbor andreported to them that a man was inside
their store. Nenita, Maricel's mother immediately got hold of her bolo and flashlight and
proceeded to their store.Nenita saw a man's sandals at the doorstep. Nenita knocked and
called out toMaricel and ordered her to open the door. Despite repeated demands to openthe
door, Maricel was not able to do so. Nenita was able to forcibly open thedoor and beamed the
flashlight to Maricel and saw Noel Novio on top of her. Theaccused was holding the hands of
Maricel with his left hand and covered her mouth with his right hand. Nenita mounted to hack
Novio with her bolo but theaccused immediately took his jogging pants and ran away leaving
his shirt,wallet, underwear and sandals. Nenita immediately reported the incident to
thebarangay and went to the police for investigation. Maricel submitted herself tomedical
examination right after the incident.Noli Novio denied the allegations and argued that Maricel
and him aresweethearts. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubtfor
the crime of rape and sentenced him to 30 years of reclusion perpetua and toindemnify the
victim the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos withoutsubsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the cost of theseproceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court was correct in imposing the proper penaltyfor the crime of rape?
Decision:
No, the Supreme Court held that the penalty imposed by the trial court isvoid. Under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act7659, the prescribed penalty for
simple rape is reclusion perpetua. However, the trial court sentenced the appellant to thirty
years of reclusion perpetua. Thepenalty imposed by the trial court is void. Although under
Article 27 of the RevisedPenal Code as amended by Republic 7659, reclusion perpetua has a
range of twenty years and one day to forty years, by nature, the penalty remains a singleand
indivisible penalty. It cannot be divided into periods or equal portions. If thelaw prescribes
reclusion perpetua as a single and indivisible penalty for a felony,the trial court is mandated to
impose said penalty, absent any privileged mitigating circumstances conformably with Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code.The trial court is not authorized to vary the penalty provided for
by law either inthe character or the extent of punishment inflicted.There was no need for the

trial court to specify the duration of thirty years of reclusion perpetua whenever it is imposed
as a penalty in any proper case.The Court is not impervious to Article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code whichpertinently provides that, in applying the so-called three-fold rule, i.e., that(w)hen
the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, . . . the maximum durationof the convict's
sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of timecorresponding to the most severe
of the penalties imposed upon him theduration of perpetual penalties (penal perpetua)
shall be computed at thirty years. The imputation of a thirty-year duration to reclusion
perpetua in Article 70 is, as this Court recently held, only to serve as the basis for determining
theconvict's eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule in the service of
multiple penalties.

People of the Philippines vs. De los Santos

FACTS: Glenn Delos Santos and his 3 friends went to Bukidnon on his Isuzu Elf truck. On their
way, they decided to pass by a restaurant where Glenn had 3 bottles of beer. On their way to
Cagayan de Oro City from Bukidnon, Glenns truck, hit, bumped, seriously wounded and
claimed the lives of several members of the PNP who were undergoing an endurance run on a
highway wearing black shirts and shorts and green combat shoes. Twelve trainees were killed
on the spot, 12 were seriously wounded, 1 of whom eventually died and 10 sustained minor
injuries. At the time of the occurrence, the place of the incident was very dark as there was no
moon. Neither were there lampposts that illuminated the highway. The trial court convicted
Glenn of the complex crime of multiple murders, multiple frustrated murders and multiple
attempted murders, with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying circumstance.

HELD: Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the
result of a single act of reckless driving, Glenn should be held guilty of the complex crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicides with serious physical injuries and less
serious physical injuries.
The slight physical injuries caused by Glenn to the ten other victims through reckless
imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light
felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should be treated and punished as separate
offenses. Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed.

Jason Ivler vs Hon San Pedro & Evangeline Ponce

HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71,
Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
The petition seeks the review of the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming
sub-silencio a lower courts ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a
second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property.
This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight

Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.
Facts:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and
damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information
for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of
reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition
for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case,
including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because
of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Issues:
(1) Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when
the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and
(2) Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the
death of respondent Ponces husband.
Ruling:
On Petition for Certiorari
The RTC dismissed Ivlers petition for certiorari, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners
forfeiture of standing to maintain said petition arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner
for his non-appearance at the arraignment in the second offense. Thus, without reaching the
merits of the said petition, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but this proved unavailing.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting
petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce
calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical
injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less
grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the
homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, the Court granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion
not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party
and private respondent is represented by counsel.
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the
terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in relation
to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the
Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if
the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a
suit to review judgments of convictions.
On Double Jeopardy
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense
of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not."
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasioffenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and
penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and
not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasioffense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under
the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for
quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to
quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be
imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave
or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the
lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of
culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2
May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in
Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

People of the Philippines vs. Gonzales, Jr.

FACTS:
On October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m., the families of Noel Andres and herein accusedappellant were both on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. At theintersection
point, the cars they were driving almost collided. Later on, when Andresfound an opportunity,
he cut Gonzalez off, disembarked from his car and went over toGonzales. Altercation then
ensued. Meanwhile, Dino Gonzalez, son of Inocencio,entered the scene in defense of his father.
Fearing that his son was in danger, Gonzaleztook out the gun which was already in his car
compartment. Upon seeing his father,Gonzalezs daughter, Trisha, hugged her father and in the
process held his hand holdingthe gun. The appellant tried to free his hand and with Trishas
substantial body weight pushing against him the appellant lost his balance and the gun
accidentally fired. Feliber Andres, Noels wife, was shot to death while their son, Kenneth and
nephew Kevin werewounded.The trial court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of
murder and two countsof frustrated murder and accordingly sentenced him to death. Accused
were also orderedto pay for civil liabilities to the heirs of Mrs. Andres, and the parents of Kevin
Valdez.Hence, an automatic review or this case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it found treachery was
present in the commission of the crime.
2. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to
appreciatevoluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong be considered as mitigating circumstances.
RULINGS:

1. It has been consistently held by this court that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes
committed at the spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated altercationsare
generally not attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused todeliberately
employ a treacherous mode of attack. Thus, the sudden attack made by theaccused due to his
infuriation by reason of the victims provocation was held to bewithout treachery. Sudden
attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and insults bythe victim or acts taunting the
accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive behavior of the victim were held to be
without treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarnedof reprisal. For the rules on
treachery to apply the sudden attack must have been preconceived by the accused,
unexpected by the victim and without provocation on the part of the latter. We affirm the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General that theshooting was not attended by treachery and
accordingly the crime committed for thedeath of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder.
2. The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation,incomplete
defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense,
were not convincingly proved and none can be considered in theimposition of penalties. The
testimony of prosecution witness contradicts the appellants pretense of voluntary surrender.
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining.Provocation must
be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong committed andthat the provocation must
be commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies according to
the circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres towards the appellant
and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it isnot sufficient provocation to shoot at the
complainants vehicle.
The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of arelative
is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and shouting at theappellant and his
son do not amount to an unlawful aggression against them, DinoGonzalez.
Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent tocommit
so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This mitigating circumstance isobtaining when
there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accusedto commit a wrong
and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at thetime of the commission
of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and the injury
sustained by the victim. The appellants use of a gun,although not deliberately sought nor
employed in the shooting, should have reasonably placed the appellant on guard of the
possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun issufficient to produce the resulting crimes
committed.

ARTICLE 39
Article 39. Subsidiary penalty. - If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine
mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary
personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following rules:

1.
If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and fine, he shall
remain under confinement until his fine referred in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his
subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case
shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted
against the prisoner.

2.
When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not
exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony,
and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light felony.

3.
When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional no subsidiary
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.

4.
If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal
institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time
established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same deprivation as those of
which the principal penalty consists.

5.
The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his
insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine in case his financial circumstances should
improve. (As amended by Republic Act No. 5465, April 21, 1969.)

[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10159]

AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLE 39 OF ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED PENAL CODE
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Article 39 of Act No. 3815, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
Art. 39. Subsidiary Penalty. If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine
mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary
personal liability at the rate of one day for each amount equivalent to the highest minimum
wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by
the trial court, subject to the following rules:
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correctional or arresto and fine, he shall remain
under confinement until his fine referred in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his

subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case
shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted
against the prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not
exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony,
and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a fight felony.
3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correctional, no subsidiary
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal institution,
but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time established in the
preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same deprivations as those of which the principal
penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his
insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine in case his financial circumstances should
improve. (As amended by Republic Act No. 5465, which lapsed into law on April 21, 1969.)
SEC. 2. Separability Clause. If any provision or part hereof is held invalid or unconstitutional,
the remainder of the law or the provision not otherwise affected shall remain valid and
subsisting.
SEC. 3. Repealing Clause. All laws, presidential decrees or issuances, executive orders, letters
of instruction, administrative orders or rules and regulations which may be inconsistent with
this Act shall be deemed repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
SEC. 4. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: April 10, 2012.