Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2
3
4
Dwight A. Bennett
695-725 Hwy 36 W
Susanville, CA 96130
530-260-1189
renegaderemount@yahoo.com
In Pro Per
5
6
7
9
10
11
12
NORMAN W. ALLEN,
Plaintiff,
13
14
15
16
17
18
vs.
SUMMIT FINANCIAL GROUP;
DANA CAPITOL CORP.; STEVE WEICH; ROD
HOSILYK; DWIGHT A. BENNETT; JUDITH A.
ST. JOHN; WILSHIRE CREDIT CORP.;
EVANS APPRAISAL SERVICES, INC.; and
DOES 1-10,
Defendants.
19
20
21
22
23
24
Cross-Complainants,
vs.
25
26
27
28
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
T.D. SERVICE COMPANY; WELLS FARGO)
BANK, N.A. as Trustee for the MLMI Trust )
)
Series 2005-HE3; and DOES 1-10,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
JUDITH A. ST. JOHN
)
Cross-Complainant,
)
)
[Declaratory Relief
)
Comparative Indemnity]
)
vs.
)
)
DWIGHT A. BENNETT
)
and DOES 11 through 25,
)
)
Cross-Defendants,
)
)
AND OTHER RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS
)
)
JUDITH A. ST. JOHN,
)
)
Cross-Complainant,
)
vs.
)
)
)
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., WELLS
)
FARGO BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR
)
MLMI TRUST SERIES 2005-HE3, BANK
)
OF AMERICA, N.A., AS SUCCESSOR
)
BY MERGER TO BAC HOME LOANS
)
)
SERVICING, LP, VICKI LOZANO,
)
VICKI LOZANO AS RECEIVER IN
)
CASE #45679, COUNTY OF LASSEN,
)
LARRY MILLAR, PETE HEIMBIGNER,
)
DONNA HAS TIES, JUDY WALESCH,
)
THE GRACE FOUNDATION OF
)
)
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, AND ROES
)
11 thru 50,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
NORMAN W. ALLEN
1
2
the matter may be heard, in Department 3 of the above-entitled Court, located at 2610
MOVING DEFENDANT), will and hereby does move to expunge Notice of Pendency of
Action (Lis Pendens) that was given in the above entitled action by Cross-Plaintiffs WELLS
FARGO BANK N. A. as Trustee etc., and NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, dated February 18,
2016, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit #1. The motion is made on
the grounds that the Notice of Pendency is without merit because the underlying c r o s s -
10
a c t i o n is not an action for possession of real property, the cross-action is based in equitable
11
remedies, for the Improvements, or alternatively, because claimant has not established by a
12
preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim. Further, the
13
Cross-Plaintiffs have avoided any equitable determinations at hearings for equitable matters that
14
were intended to establish equitable liabilities, setoffs, and equitable contributions. Instead banks
15
have submitted three different summary adjudication orders for a single hearing.
16
Further, all causes of action, that name this moving defendant in banks cross-action,
17
specifically request remedies for misplaced Improvements. The improvements are not
18
unique or irreplaceable real property, and the placement of the structures is insured under an
19
American Land Title Association creditors policy. Cross-complainants cross-action is not for
20
unique real property, it is for insured and replaceable Improvements that can be replaced with
21
money. Further because, it is undisputed that the Certificate of Compliance conducted in 2004 by
22
the acting Lassen County Surveyor James Eddie, central to this action, was flawed. All parties to
23
the numerous actions at law that have arisen from the flawed Certificate of Compliance,
24
acknowledge that this seminal event was a mutual mistake. That mutual mistake was necessarily
25
between St. John, Bennett, the surveyor, Lassen County, the appraiser Chris Talley, Evans
26
Appraisal Services, Summit Financial Group, Chicago Title, Option One, Merrill Lynch, Wells
27
Fargo, Wilshire Credit, and Norman Allen. Accordingly, the fifth cause of action alleged for an
28
equitable lien, is for a money judgment of unknown specifications, equities, and liabilities that
has not yet been adjudicated. The active complaints and cross-complainants do not allege that the
real property encumbered under the Allen to Option One Deed of Trust is less or different than
that real property offered for sale, and sold by movant. Allen purchased the correctly described
real property by contract with the correct legal description that is encumbered under the Option
One deed of trust. The cross-plaintiffs do not assert a cause of action for the recovery of unique
real property in their sixth cause of action for equitable mortgage. Their sixth cause of action is
for the right to establish a mortgage encumbering the Improvements based in equity. It is not a
real property claim; it seeks an equitable mortgage on the Improvements. The cross-
complainants cannot proceed to foreclosure on their sixth Cause of Action for equitable
10
mortgage, because the fundamental terms for redemption, and reconveyance, have not been
11
adjudicated, thus the requirements to establish and foreclose a mortgage under California law are
12
not met. Moreover, movant has raised and reasserts now the one action rule, the banks have
13
violated the one action rule, and the security first rule, sanctions are required that have not yet
14
been adjudicated. The banks sixth cause of action does not state a claim for possession or title to
15
real property. The banks first, third, and fourth causes of action for Declaratory Judgment,
16
Equitable Subrogation, and Reformation respectively, each address the Improvements or the
17
14-acres exclusively, and do not state real property claims. Given the failure to complete
18
hearings in equity, damages created by illegal seizure, damages for conversion of unencumbered
19
property, assumption of St. John liabilities and equities by settlement, and required sanctions for
20
the security first rule they have not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the
21
claims will afford any change of possession or title in real property. Cross-plaintiffs Cross-
22
action does not state a real property claim. The July 1, 2013 Cross-complaint alleged by banks
23
does not name movant in any cause of action and no jurisdiction over movant was acquired by it.
24
This motion will be made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 405.30, 405.31, and
25
405.32 et seq. The motion is based upon this notice, the accompanying memorandum of points
26
and authorities, Movants Request for Judicial Notice in support, all pleadings and papers on file
27
in the above-captioned actions, and other evidence that may be presented by MOVING
28
DEFENDANT prior to or at the hearing on this motion to strike the notice of pendency.
1
2
DATED: __3/14/16______
_________________________________
5
6
The Court should GRANT the motion for the following reasons.
8
1. Factual Background
9
10
1)
11
late 2003, between Defendant Judith A. St. John (hereinafter ST. JOHN) and Defendant
12
Steve Wei ch (hereinafter WEICH), who was a mortgage broker licensed in the State of
13
Nevada to package loans for Nevada First Financial Corp. Weich in the process of seeding
14
15
broker Cal S.T.R.S. financing in Lassen County, (California State Teachers Retirement
16
Services). That claim was also false. St. John and moving defendant Dwight Bennett
17
(hereinafter BENNETT), had begun living as a couple in February 1996 and acting as business
18
partners in registered Missouri Fox Trotting horses, and the purchase and rehabilitation of
19
foreclosure properties then sold or put on line as income producing rentals with tax advantages.
20
St. John had very good credit, a steady but modest income as an elementary school teacher and
21
approximately $10,000.00 in savings from her career. Bennett had an established real estate
22
services company conducting trash-outs, rehabilitation, and repairs for local realtors and property
23
owners. St. John maintained her regular work hours and kept the business books, Bennett
24
continued in his profession while using family contacts with Coldwell Banker he found
25
investment properties, negotiated the purchase, provided materials, and completed the
26
rehabilitation needed to convert the foreclosures into income producing properties. By 2004
27
Bennett and St. John owned three rentals and had purchased Whispering Pines Stables removing
28
it from bankruptcy and foreclosure. During early 2004 the couple had occasion to examine their
assets and debts. They determined that they each earned outside incomes and all properties were
operating at a profit with a loan to value ratio approximately $1.3 Mil. in Assets and $410,000.00
in mortgage debts. St. John was a meticulous record keeper and their partnership transactions
were reduced to writing. (See Declaration of Norman W. Allen, Exhibit #2 and Declaration of
Dwight A. Bennett). Steve Weich and Summit began acting as St. Johns financial advisors when
she undertook her first efforts at managing the asset mortgages while refinancing their rental
properties. 2004 represented the first year without exceptional tax advantages as the properties
required no investments for major improvements, only preparation for sale and Bennett was
remodeling 1 rental in preparation of selling it on the open market. When St. John explained a
10
tax scheme to Bennett proposed by Weich; Bennett and St. John experienced their first deep
11
divide over financial matters. There was ample cash on hand but Weich had suggested a money
12
laundering/tax avoidance scheme using the rentals and ranch with their nine (9) bank accounts
13
that would give the false impression of losses by each of the businesses, each business loaning
14
the other businesses operating funds. Bennett adamantly refused and scheduled a conference
15
with their tax preparer for explanation to St. John, for the penalties of tax fraud on a small
16
business and individuals, and to determine the approximate amount of capital gains taxes
17
required on the upcoming sale. Subsequently, on Weichs advice, St. John concealed partnership
18
funds, stripped the ranch bank account, then removed their partnership accounts, bank records,
19
and contracts from the premises. She reduced their vehicles and horses to her name only.
20
Simultaneously, Weich presented a refinancing scheme to Bennett that were designed to reduce
21
the deed of Whispering Pines to St. John name only. Presenting what he had discovered through
22
historical Escrow Documents, alleging that Whispering Pines would benefit through a division
23
by certificate of compliance, (hereinafter C of C). A division that Weich alleged would assure
24
excellent interest rates and ease of financing by returning the consolidated parcels to a 40-acre
25
bare parcel and a 14.03 Improved parcel. After the C of C was underway Weich suggested that
26
following the C of C, St. John should quit claim off of the 14-acre parcel, wait 6 months to a year
27
and then purchase the Ranch from Bennett, and upon their marriage, they would be reunited
28
2)
Unknown to Bennett, St. John continued refinancing the rental properties in her
name only, while Bennett prepared them for sale with labor intensive remodeling at the height of
the real estate market. In January of 2005 St. John left the ranch during a heavy snow but
returned numerous times until November 2005, to clean out their partnership and banking
records. Shortly after her departure Bennett learned that St. John had indeed quit claimed off of
the ranch deed and had stopped making the ranch mortgage payments from its missing proceeds,
she was borrowing ranch payments from Allen without Bennetts knowledge, she asked Allen
not to tell Bennett, after borrowing money from Allen but she did not use it to make the
mortgage payments. When the checkbook was returned to Bennett there was a balance of
10
approximately $10,000, all funds borrowed from Allen. The ranch payment was in arrears
11
approximately $12,000. Weich suddenly reentered with the ranch file, under his new broker,
12
Summit Financial Group, Inc., and with a loan package all ready to go in time to avoid the
13
imminent foreclosure scheduled in slightly over 100 days. Weich explained that he had advised
14
St. John to not waste any more money by making the ranch payments until he had refinanced
15
it. He also told Bennett that the lender wanted unique high value properties with substantial
16
equity, that were difficult to finance. He suggested that these successful creditors were interested
17
in helping borrowers, suggesting the creditors personal attention meant latitude in underwriting
18
hence no pest inspections or other traditional reports were required. Bennett had three angry
19
encounters with Weich as he reemerged. St. John and Weich pressured Allen into saving the
20
ranch against Bennetts wishes. For the fiscal year of 2004 St. John filed federal income taxes
21
claiming a $50,000 loss on Whispering Pines. Later an audit of the books showed the ranch
22
earned $45,000 in net profits and she received a $29,000 federal income tax return perpetrating a
23
$124,000 + or - tax fraud for 2004. St. John withdrew the partnership real property from the
24
market, cancelling a sale for Exhibit #2. Then she changed the utilities into her name for six (6)
25
months before selling the subject of Exhibit #2 for $175,000.00, unlawfully avoiding all capital
26
gains taxes and avoiding the partnership split of the resulting taxable proceeds. By fraudulently
27
avoiding capital gains taxes on the partnership property St. John absconded with $100,000 + or
28
in tax free proceeds, rather than of the $85,000.00 projected after payment of capital gains
taxes with the partnership split. Bennett and McNeal shared these realities during negotiations in
2009 with St. Johns counsel of record, now the Honorable Judge Michele Verderosa, and a
wave of terror and death followed, engulfing the ranch and devastating the business, while
Verderosa withdrew as St. Johns Counsel. Each of these above matters are based on direct
personal knowledge, evidence, eye witness accounts and the records of Lassen 45679, 46190,
and DV49327.
ARGUMENT
7
8
9
3)
Wells Fargo Bank, Bank of America, Judith St. John and their counsels of record
10
undertaken in 2003-4. Each above mentioned party acknowledges that the sale with misplaced
11
improvements was a mutual mistake, and no one knew that the improvements were situated,
12
on parcel no.: 099-260-69, not parcel no.: 099-260-70 as believed. The simple truth is that a state
13
licensed surveyor conducted the certificate of compliance. Yet, these same parties allege that
14
Bennett, St. John and Allen or variously Bennett, and Allen knew the C of C was errant at the
15
time of the sale, and for unknown reasons, launched headfirst and fraudulently into the
16
17
fraudulent conduct. There was no fraudulent conveyance and, a constructive trust isnt justified.
18
It is not real property claim, the missing elements are only improvements resolved by money
19
damages, if any. Wells Fargos conduct and unethical actions have manipulated the Courts,
20
starting with the Ryan Firm, and continuing through Bryan Cave L.L.P. Wells Fargo Bank has so
21
far claimed three (3) lis pendens (See Exhibit #3 and #4), to create and impose undue economic
22
hardship and imply grounds for extreme acts, as in illegal seizure through their receiver.
23
Nonetheless, as is clearly stated in Wells Fargo Bank N.A. as Trustee Etc., and BACs (B.of A.),
24
cross-complaint at each cause of action, this instant case concerns only misplaced improvements,
25
while the real property conveyed is exactly the same property promised. Although the Banks
26
have never conducted a survey to ascertain how much more land they would receive, from aerial
27
photographs it appears to be 15-20 more acres, if the Improvements and the land they sit on were
28
to be given over to Wells Fargo as Trustee. It is moot because the banks want even more, and
seek to control and foreclose all 54.03-acres. There was no precedent for Wells Fargo Bank to
seize the 54.03-acres in 2011, and no precedent for their efforts to foreclose 40-acres more than
is encumbered under the Option One Deed of Trust. (There is no WFB Deed of Trust as claimed
in the banks cross-action, motion for summary adjudication, and application for ex parte
receiver).
(i) A lis pendens is a document recorded with the county recorder's office
that gives constructive notice that a "real property claim" has been filed
that may "affect . . . title to, or the right to possession of, specific real
property . . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., 405.4.) (Campbell v. Superior Court
(La Barrie) (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 904 [34 Cal.Rptr.3d 68]).
7
8
9
10
4)
While a mutual mistake occurred beyond the knowledge or control of the parties
11
to the transaction, here the same is alleged as fraudulent conduct by parties litigant. Examination
12
of conduct during the transaction, to identify the frauds alleged was needed, all parties
13
acknowledge the mutual mistake, and the allegations being unfounded, were set forth to gain
14
tactical advantage at litigation. Fraud was practiced by some of the parties prior to the transaction
15
or subsequent to the transaction, in litigation, and on the court by its officers and parties litigant.
16
Without seeking to identify where the fraud arises the Court abrogates equity and will reinforce
17
misconduct and injustice should that determination forgo the examination of historical conduct
18
by the parties with unclean hands. Wells Fargo has attacked Bennett and others relentlessly
19
20
partition efforts and more. The ex parte receiver was appointed in part based on allegations of
21
fraudulent conveyance and the recovery of fraudulently transferred or stolen real and private
22
property that did not exist. The banks completely misrepresented the truth of matters to achieve
23
their litigation goals. It is the core requirement of matters in equity that the litigants enter with
24
clean hands at the source event and at litigation before the court to resolve equitable issues. As to
25
the actual duties and motivations during the transaction, and the behavior and integrity during
26
27
28
b. "the term `good faith,' as used in this subdivision and subdivision (d)
2
[of Civ. Code 3439.08] means that the transferee did not collude
with the debtor or otherwise actively participate in (any) [f]raudulent
scheme." (See legis. committee com., 12 West's Ann. Civ. Code
(1994 pocket supp.) 3439.03, p. 161.)
3
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
5)
12
conduct of a Certificate of Compliance under the California Subdivision Map Act. Those
13
procedures entail the use of a licensed land surveyor, whether a private surveyor or by
14
compensating the county for the work performed by the county surveyor. Bennett had no way of
15
knowing that the temporary county surveyor James Eddy, would not conduct the required site
16
inspections to determine the placement of improvements. Bennett and Allen had no way of
17
knowing that the appraiser hired by Summit Financial was the son-in-law of that surveyor and
18
that he would only confirm the details of the certificate of compliance privately, through his
19
family member and not by the use of county agencies and records. Moreover, Bennett and Allen
20
did not know until after the errors had been discovered, that St. John had provided Summit and
21
Weich, (who were all 3 pushing to expedite the procedure in 2003-4), with surveyor James
22
Eddys contact information. Bennett and Allen still do not know what conversation transpired
23
that induced Eddy to forego his professional responsibilities. It is a matter of sworn deposition
24
testimony that Bennett was completely forthcoming with the defendant appraiser, informing him
25
of the completed C of C, and that St. John, on Weichs advise had deeded off of the subject
26
property and then withdrew, while both induced Allen to stand in her position. St. John would
27
have been a straw buyer. Allen was a buyer in good faith. Moreover, Bennett and Allen ordered
28
title reports, purchased extended and exceptional title insurance C.L.T.A. and A.L.T.A. to insure
the transaction, themselves, and the creditor. James Eddy, the acting Lassen County Surveyor,
fouled the procedure designed to avoid just that possibility, submitted incorrectly drawn
elevation maps of the parcels in the approval process and to the state offices in Sacramento. Thus
at the time of the transaction the parcels incorrectly rendered, had aged over a year in the Big
Book, the errors were not discovered at the time of the sale and the title insurers policies were
obligated to indemnify the true Creditor for the title errors. Both Bennett and Allen were
transparent during the transaction and made exactly the kind of good faith efforts and reasonable
inquiries the Legislature envisioned a reasonably prudent person would do, there was no
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
i)
But that is nevertheless what the trial court concluded, rejecting the Legislature's
clear mandate in the name of "common sense": "[C]ommon sense suggests that the
test cannot be a purely subjective one which allows the transferee to preserve good
faith by hiding his head in the sand and making no reasonable inquiry. The extensive
case authorities cited at pages 5-6 of Folksam's reply brief confirm that `good faith'
includes doing the sort of reasonable inquiry that a reasonably prudent person would
do under the circumstances." The problem with this reasoning, aside from the fact
that the cited authorities do not support it, is that in the very next breath the trial court
concluded that the Lewises did make what the court itself believed was a
"reasonable inquiry"! The court said: "reasonable inquiry includes getting a title
report and title insurance.... The Lewises themselves by their conduct evidence this
to be so: they obtained title reports and title insurance." (Original italics.)
Unfortunately, the Lewises' reasonable inquiry still left them in ignorance, because
the federal lis pendens was not disclosed in the preliminary reports and title policies.
ii) Since the Lewises had made precisely the inquiry that the trial court thought they
should have made and still knew nothing about the claims against Shipley, the trial
court erred in holding that they "colluded" or "actively participated" in the claimed
fraudulent conveyance. Instead, the court stripped the Lewises of their good faith
status by imputing to them knowledge supposedly (but not actually) held by their title
insurer (Lewis v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th
1850, See at Pg. 1860 [37 Cal. Rptr.2d 63])
5)
In Lewis v. Superior Court, the offending title event was an unindexed Lis
25
Pendens misfiled in the federal court. The good faith effort was the same as here; reasonable
26
inquiry, title reports, and title insurance. In La Paglia v. The Superior Court of San Diego County, the
27
Court of Appeals followed the legislatures consistent narrowing of the lis pendens statutes, the 4th
28
District Court refused to allow a lis pendens by creditors, as a tool to bludgeon litigants into unfair
a) In California, a notice of lis pendens gives constructive notice that an action has
been filed affecting title or right to possession of the real property described in
the notice. ( 409.) Any taker of a subsequently created interest in that property
takes his interest subject to the outcome of that litigation. (Urez
Corp. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal. App.3d 1141, 1144 [235 Cal. Rptr.
837].)
3
4
5
6
b) While the lis pendens statute was designed to give notice to third parties and
not to aid plaintiffs in pursuing claims, the practical effect of a recorded lis
pendens is to render a defendant's property unmarketable and unsuitable as
security for a loan. The financial pressure exerted on the property owner may
be considerable, forcing him to settle not due to the merits of the suit but to rid
himself of the cloud upon his title. The potential for abuse is obvious.
(See Nash v. Superior Court (1978) 86 Cal. App.3d 690, 700 [150 Cal. Rptr.
394] [disapproved on other grounds in Malcolm v. Superior Court (1981) 29
Cal.3d 518, 528 (174 Cal. Rptr. 694, 629 P.2d 495)]; Comment, The Use of Lis
Pendens in Actions Alleging Constructive Trusts or Equitable Liens: Due
Process Considerations (1984) 24 Santa Clara L.Rev. 137, 140.) In light of its
history as a device designed to protect third parties rather than provide
plaintiffs with an unfair advantage in litigation, courts have (La Paglia at Pg.
1327) restricted rather than broadened application of this potentially
devastating pretrial remedy. (See, e.g., Urez Corp. v. Superior Court,
supra, 190 Cal. App.3d at p. 1145; Moseley v. Superior Court (1986) 177 Cal.
App.3d 672, 678 [223 Cal. Rptr. 116].) (La Paglia v. The Superior Court of San
Diego County, (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 1322 [264 Cal. Rptr. 63]).
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
6)
Wells Fargo Bank N.A. as Trustee through the current lis pendens is continuing
18
its practice of law in the manner of true Lassen County good ol boys, free of ethical restraints,
19
unshackled from legal requirements for factual pleadings, and with complete disregard for
20
judicial oversight. Why would they expect to be protected by litigation immunity while
21
perpetrating fraud after fraud upon the courts? Is it because a court that has no integrity sacrifices
22
nothing in the abuses of process that defile the significance of meaningful due process? Integrity
23
and ethics are required for the flames of indignity to rise up at the abolition of equal justice under
24
the law. The practice that has been applied by the Banks and others is for attorneys to cast
25
aspersions with hearsay, alleging fraudulent and/or improper schemes and partitions, while
26
alleging a mutual mistake by all parties. To attack and blame the victims least able to defend
27
themselves with vindictive but empty hearsay allegations that will not be adjudicated works
28
because it foments prejudices that replace fact finding procedures. In this instant case there is a
historical pattern of unethical deferral of inquiry into routinely false allegations in the banks
pleadings at the expense of meaningful due process, statutory requirements, equities, and
established doctrines of law. Notably, judicial estoppel, equitable estoppel, and the preclusion of
inconsistent positions should have drawn serious sanctions long ago, and prevented the banks
and counsel for banks from continuing the use of such tactics. By this current notice of lis
pendens the banks are attempting to diminish and obscure a fraud practiced upon the United
States Bankruptcy Court. The banks falsely claimed on September 2, 2011 and October 17, 2011
that they had already recorded and filed a lis pendens on Bennetts real property, after the lien
had been fully litigated in Lassen. Further misleading the federal court by allegations that
10
Lassen 46190 is Wells Fargos complaint for mortgage fraud against Bennett consolidated
11
with Lassen 45679 in 2011. The banks through their counsel were able to completely mystify
12
and defraud the bankruptcy court by falsely misrepresenting events in the Lassen Superior Court.
13
14
1) CREDITORS WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. AND BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING,
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
7)
Much like this Lassen Court, the United States Bankruptcy Court accepted the
12
complete fabrications of Bank Attorneys Beardsley and Ryan over the vehement and absolutely
13
truthful objections of debtor in pro se. Obviously, the bankruptcy Judge didnt bother to read the
14
misrepresented lis pendens and falsified submission by banks counsel, merely assuming that his
15
fellow attorneys must be honest and ethical in the court. Astonishingly, the Hon. Judge
16
McManus then incorporated Wells Fargos fraudulent misrepresentations into his ruling and
17
alleged that Bennetts bankruptcy petition must have been filed in bad faith, in part because
18
Bennett alleged that the banks had no lis pendens recorded in Lassen case no.: 45679. After 4
19
years of abusive fraud in the courts, the banks casually file a lis pendens, (See Exhibits 1 & 4).
20
Now, for the first time openly alleging that their equitable remedies are actually real property
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
a) The Supreme Court outlined the law governing the statutory scheme pertaining to the
recording of a lis pendens and the procedure applicable to expunging an improperly
recorded notice in Kirkeby v. Superior Court of Orange County (2004) 33 Cal.4th 642,
647, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 805, 93 P.3d 395 (Kirkeby):
(i) A lis pendens may be filed by any party in an action who asserts a "real property
claim." (Code Civ. Proc., 405.20.) [1] Section 405.4 defines a "`Real property
claim'" as "the cause or causes of action in a pleading which would, if
meritorious, affect (a) title to, or the right to possession of, specific real
property...." "If the pleading filed by the claimant does not properly plead a real
property claim, the lis pendens must be expunged upon motion under CCP
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS - 14
405.31." (Code com., 14A West's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (2004) foll. 405.4, p.
239.)
(ii) Section 405.30 allows the property owner to remove an improperly recorded lis
pendens by bringing a motion to expunge. There are several statutory bases for
expungement of a lis pendens, including the claim at issue here: claimant's
pleadings, on which the lis pendens is based, do not contain a real property
claim. (See 405.31.) [2] Unlike most other motions, when a motion to expunge
is brought, the burden is on the party opposing the motion to show the existence
of a real property claim. (See 405.30.) (Campbell v. Superior Court, (2005)
132 Cal.App.4th 904 [34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 68].)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
b) (Accord BGJ Associates, LLC v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 952, 957, 89
Cal.Rptr.2d 693 (BGJ Associates) [applying "demurrer-like review pursuant to section
405.31 of whether the pleading states a `real property claim'"].)
i)
A request for the imposition of an equitable lien does not support the recording of a
lis pendens
a. Existing case law
(i) "An equitable lien is a right to subject property not in the possession of
the lienor to the payment of a debt as a charge against that property.
[Citation.] It may arise from a contract [34 Cal. Rptr. 3d at Pg.78] which
reveals an intent to charge particular property with a debt or out of
general considerations of right and justice as applied to the relations of
the parties and the circumstances of their dealings.' [Citation.]
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
8)
25
convenience of the Court), The causes of action involving Bennett are 1, 3, 4, 5, & 6. The first
26
27
28
a) 23. If the allegations of the Complaint are true, there exists a real
controversy between Cross-Complainants and Cross-Defendants, namely
the intent of all parties to convey the Improvements, concerning their
respective rights and duties under the WFB Deed of Trust and Contract,
1
2
3
9)
a) 31. Wells Fargo and BAC are informed and believe, and based thereon allege,
that Bennett intended to convey the Improvements to Allen when they entered
into the Contract for the sale of the 14 acres. (Cross-complaint 3rd cause of
action Pg. 6:16-18). (Emphasis added).
5
6
7
10)
9
10
11
11)
The Fifth cause of action for equitable lien, states in pertinent part:
12
a) 49. Therefore, Wells Fargo and BAC are entitled to the imposition of an
equitable lien on the improvements. Imposition of an equitable lien will put all
parties in their intended positions, and will afford all parties the benefits sought
by entering into these transactions. (Cross-complaint 5th cause of action Pg.
8:13-16). (Emphasis added).
13
14
15
16
12)
The Sixth cause of action for equitable mortgage, states in pertinent part:
a) 57. Therefore, Wells Fargo and BAC are entitled to imposition of an equitable
mortgage on the Improvements.
17
18
b) 58. This mortgage will be enforceable against any party adjudged to hold
title to the Improvements because the mortgage was intended by all parties
to encumber the improvements, and the loan proceeds were used to pay off
the existing loan on the Improvements. (Cross-complaint 6th cause of action
Pg. 9: 9-14). (Emphasis added). (From aerial photographs it appears that the
banks would reap the profit of 15 - 20 more acres than are encumbered if the
banks were to be gifted the land situated under the improvements).
19
20
21
22
13)
It could not be clearer; each cause of action seeks redress for the missing
23
improvements. Moreover, the banks cross-action speaks to the 14.03-acres encumbered without
24
complaint, nor does the cross-action mention any further land sought, only equitable remedies
25
for the Improvements. Establishing that the 14.03-acres in real property encumbered by the
26
Option One Deed of Trust was the amount bargained for and received. The cross-action of Wells
27
Fargo Bank N.A. and BAC does not state a claim for real property and Wells Fargo Bank erred
28
in seizing and controlling the 40-acre parcel vested in Bennetts name, the act for which Bennett
has a reasonable belief Wells Fargo will soon find themselves exposed to liabilities that far
exceed the value of Bennetts vested lands. Mr. Greenes theory that Bennett sold Allen the
wrong parcel carries as much weight at law as his announcement to the Bankruptcy Court that
Lassen Superior Court already ruled, placing a lien in excess of $640,000.00 against the
Whispering Pines Ranch property. (Generally speaking, the U.S.B.C.E.D.C. hearing transcript
14)
litigation rights would seem to be the underlying cause or complaint for which they now seek
10
to impose a lis pendens. Two factors that should be weighed in that determination are as follows:
11
1) Regardless of the excesses afforded the Banks in Lassen Superior Court, the Banks were very,
12
very careful to conceal the settlement with St. John from the Bankruptcy Court that afforded
13
them the backdoor purchase of her vested interest in the 40-acre parcel. Their caution was very
14
understandable because even as they were attempting to unlawfully close out Bennetts
15
bankruptcy estate they violated the Automatic Stay and due process requirements. Bennett is
16
currently in discussions with an attorney that practices in the United States Bankruptcy Court,
17
Eastern District of California and anticipates that the Banks will be facing a renewal of the
18
Bankruptcy case with R.I.C.O. charges, and for multiple violations of the automatic stay, with
19
motions to void each and every act that followed a violation of the stay. Reopening the
20
adversarial and penalty phase of the bankruptcy procedure back to August 19, 2011. 2) Given the
21
collusion and culpability between St. John and the Banks in 45679 there is little doubt that their
22
settlement will be recognized for what it really was, conspiracy between joint tortfeasors to reach
23
a settlement that reduced liability for both to avoid damages with a collusive and unlawful
24
settlement. It is important to remember that Bennett was not allowed to oppose that settlement
25
26
15)
As stated supra, Wells Fargo openly violated the one action rule when it moved
27
the court to appoint an ex parte receiver to seize Bennetts and Allens personal property,
28
business property, and Bennetts chattel, then disposed of it while he was deprived of his home
for three years and not allowed by the receiver to claim any of his own property. He was also
denied the due process briefing schedule promised by the court in 2013 when the receivers
counsel ignored the courts instruction, without repercussions, and proceeded to move by
stipulated order to dispose of Bennetts personal and business property before he was even
served with the stipulated order, doubly violating his due process protections. To be perfectly
clear; that personal and business property was unencumbered. The banks have repeatedly stated
that they held no interest or rights in the converted property. Moreover, as trespassers they had
no standing and no statutory right to seize and dispose of it. While this Court considers Bennetts
vindication of criminal charges by a verdict of not guilty, reached by a jury after a trial with
10
meaningful due process and examination of the evidence: Not really exonerated, but more like
11
the O. J. Simpson Trial, not guilty because of a few problems with the evidence. In other words,
12
guilty anyway, providing a clear example of the prejudicial bias inherent in this instant case
13
that apparently cannot be overcome. The falsified allegations and end runs around procedural
14
due process practiced here do not justify allowing a lis pendens to remain lodged when the
15
equitable remedies requested by Wells Fargo do not state a claim for real property. Especially, in
16
that the Allen sale and subsequent note and deed of trust was for 14.03-acres plus improvements,
17
not for 54.03-acres plus improvements. Where the seminal event was indisputably a mistake by
18
all parties caused by the overzealous unlicensed mortgage broker and failed procedures by the
19
acting County Surveyor. Moreover, a mistake that was fully insured by an A. L. T. A. title policy
20
if Wells Fargo Bank had been able to produce the note for Chicago Title Insurance Co.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
a) (5a) Having concluded that the parties intended a secured transaction and
that an equitable mortgage was created, it follows that respondent must
follow the procedure specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 726; that is,
foreclose on the security. This section provides that "There can be but one
form of action for the recovery of any debt, or the enforcement of any right
secured by mortgage upon real or personal property, which action must be in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter...." (See Real Property and
Real Property Security: The Well-Being of the Law by John R. Hetland, 53
Cal.L.Rev., p.151.)
b) If there is in fact an equitable mortgage, the choice of which remedy to
pursue is not open to the creditor. The cases cited by respondent do not hold
otherwise. (7) It is true that the debtor may waive the rule by not affirmatively
pleading Code of Civil Procedure section 726 as a bar to an action on the
underlying obligation. Then the one action rule will operate to bar the creditor
from bringing a second action to foreclose the mortgage (Roseleaf Corp. v.
Chierighino, 59 Cal.2d 35, 38 [27 Cal. Rptr. 873, 378 P.2d 97]; James v.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
P.C.S. Ginning Co., 276 Cal. App.2d 19, 22 [80 Cal. Rptr. 457]), but he may
proceed as he started and sue on the debt. The election, however, is only with
the borrower who may raise the defense of section 726 or waive the defense
by failing to raise it. (See Salter v. Ulrich, 22 Cal.2d 263 [138 P.2d 7, 146
A.L.R. 1344].) (Kaiser Industries Corp. v. Taylor, (1971) 17 Cal. App. 3d [346,
94 Cal. Rptr. 773].). (Emphasis in original).
c) "In operation, the `one form of action' rule `applies to any proceedings or
action by the beneficiary for the recovery of the debt, or enforcement of any
right, secured by a mortgage or deed of trust. The only "action" that is
permitted is foreclosure; any other "action" is a violation of the rule that
invokes severe sanctions.' [Citation.]" (Shin v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.
App.4th 542, 545 [31 Cal. Rptr.2d 587].) If the secured creditor seeks a
personal money judgment against the debtor without first seeking foreclosure
of the mortgage or deed of trust, this is an election of remedies, and the
creditor thereby waives the right to foreclose on the security or sell the
security under a power of sale. (See Walker v. Community Bank (1974) 10
Cal.3d 729, 733 [111 Cal. Rptr. 897, 518 P.2d 329].)
CONCLUSION
10
11
12
Lassen 45679 does not state a claim for real property and while avoiding lawful procedure has
13
been no real obstacle for the banks in Lassen Superior Court, Bennett requests that the Court
14
weigh constitutional property law. It is significant that Bennett was immobilized without any
15
available method to resolve the clouded title from discovery of the errant certificate of
16
compliance in 2005 until today, eleven (11) years. The Banks avoided suit for 4 years and four
17
months, while alleging no financial interests in the outcome as agents of the beneficial owner.
18
Then reversing 180 degrees in late 2010 and suddenly alleging; Wells Fargo as Trustee is the
19
beneficiary. With that contradiction in terms, WFB entered calling for equitable remedies while
20
using fraud and brutality to destroy equity. Both acts are perfect examples of the doctrine of
21
unclean hands. Recently, the California Supreme Court explained in Yvanova v. New Century
22
Mortgage, Sup. Ct. S218973, that a deed of trust generally requires 3 parties; the mortgagee, the
23
trustee, and the mortgagor. The Trustee under the deed of trust may not initiate foreclosure
24
proceedings or otherwise act without direct orders from the beneficiary or holder of the note.
25
When Bennett asked that simple question in 2011, the only answer he received was devastating
26
loss, unbearable pain and debilitating grief. Nonetheless, the answer is mandatory, thus: Since
27
Wells Fargo Bank as Trustee acknowledges its legal authority sounds by an assignment of the
28
Deed of Trust, who then is the real party in interest in possession of the endorsed promissory
note? Wells Fargo Bank N.A. as Trustee alleges themselves the beneficiary, but the assignment
of a deed of trust does not convey beneficial ownership of the Note under Californias Civil
Code or Commercial Code. So that claim is simply not possible. It is a rather interesting
phenomena that although there is much reference to the promissory note in the banks many
requests for judicial notice, pleadings, and declarations, after eight and one half years of
litigation, and demands for prove up, discovery requests, and sanctions for abuse of discovery for
failure to produce the documentation, nowhere in the entire court file can the promissory note be
found. It is important to remember that this matter did not arise as a foreclosure case, in fact the
primary purpose of the Allen suit was to force the beneficiary or holder of the note to identify
10
themselves so that the title issues could be resolved and the bleeding stopped. From inception the
11
banks have refused to provide evidence of the note or the identity of the beneficiary. Before this
12
Court affords any more latitude for the Banks it may wish to ponder why the promissory note
13
remains missing after so many years of litigation, and how the banks managed to impose
14
summary adjudication forcing partial assignment of the debt on a third party by summary
15
procedures without first proving up ownership of the debt? Why the banks were willing to pay
16
over $6000.00 in discovery sanctions in 2012 rather than providing in camera viewing of the
17
endorsed Note? Since Mr. Ryan stated flatly, responding to a motion to compel, in a writing filed
18
into this official court record, that: Wells Fargo does not have the note, Wilshire did not have the
19
note, BAC/B of A does not have the note and his office as counsel for the banks had the
20
origination file but also did not have the note. The Note required under U. S. Bankruptcy Law for
21
any motion by a creditor to lift the automatic stay. Ryan stated by email, I dont have the
22
grounds but if we can make this Judge hate him enough, we can get it anyway. Why did
23
Nationsstar provide Mr. Allen with an Allonge unattached and endorsed in blank purporting to
24
transfer the note when allonges must be attached and fully endorsed to transfer the note? Last, in
25
California when defendants raise even a reasonable doubt as to the standing of a plaintiff the
26
burden of establishing standing turns to the plaintiff to prove up standing, there are no grounds or
27
technicalities that can prevent the prove up of standing when standing is reasonably in doubt.
28
Wells Fargo Bank, who admittedly cannot produce the note, has enjoyed the benefits of 4.33
years as non-monetary agent for the beneficiary and 4.15 years as beneficiary, for the same loan,
on the same property, in the same litigation, with the same publicly recorded documentation.
That doesnt seem even a little odd to the court? This motion to expunge the lis pendens places
the burden on the party filing the lis pendens to prove that the seminal complaint or in this case,
cross-complaint states a claim for real property, or despite the violations of seizure, ejectment,
conversion, in addition to the security first and one action rules the preponderance of
evidence will afford transfer of title or possession. Again, the Allen suit arose because the
alleged creditor/beneficiary, was unable to prove up and collect on the A.L.T.A. title policy for
the misplaced improvements. The title company requires evidence of possession of the Note,
10
Wells Fargo was unable to provide that and the truth remains hidden in the weeds. There is
11
significant evidence of what happened to the note, why Wells Fargo is not the beneficiary and
12
does not act for the beneficiary, but the banks will stop at nothing to prevent that evidence from
13
being presented. This Court at every juncture supports their wish to keep the truth from being
14
revealed.
15
The Banks have not stated a claim for real property in their cross-action and despite
16
contentions otherwise the St. John Cross-action for comparative indemnity was precisely written
17
by St. Johns attorney Michelle Verderosa to vest responsibility for wrongs in the party
18
committing those wrongs, it is not a blanket indemnification. For the reasons stated above
19
Moving Defendant respectfully requests that this Court order that Wells Fargo Banks lis
20
pendens be expunged.
21
22
23
24
25
26
__________________________________
Dwight A. Bennett, in pro per
27
28