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G.R.No.110427

TodayisSaturday,May14,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
THIRDDIVISION

G.R.No.110427February24,1997
TheIncompetent,CARMENCAIZA,representedbyherlegalguardian,AMPAROEVANGELISTA,
petitioner,
vs.
COURTOFAPPEALS(SPECIALFIRSTDIVISION),PEDROESTRADAandhiswife,LEONORAESTRADA,
respondents.

NARVASA,C.J.:
On November 20, 1989, being then ninetyfour (94) years of age, Carmen Caiza, a spinster, a retired
pharmacist,andformerprofessoroftheCollegeofChemistryandPharmacyoftheUniversityofthePhilippines,
wasdeclaredincompetentbyjudgment1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, 2 in a guardianship
proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. 3 She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and
physicalinfirmitieswhichincludedcataractsinbotheyesandseniledementia.AmparoA.Evangelistawasappointedlegal
guardianofherpersonandestate.

Caiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City. On September 17, 1990, her
guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MetroTC) of Quezon City
(Branch 35) to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. 4 The complaint was later
amendedtoidentifytheincompetentCaizaasplaintiff,suingthroughherlegalguardian,AmparoEvangelista.

The amended Complaint5 pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caiza was the absolute owner of the property in question,
covered by TCT No. 27147 that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and
sonsinlawtotemporarilyresideinherhouse,rentfreethatCaizaalreadyhadurgentneedofthehouseonaccountofher
advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical
treatment" that through her guardian, Caiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they
had refused to do so and that "by the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in
question, they . . (were) enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they . . (were) saving
moneybynotpayinganyrentforthehouse,theincompetent..(was)losingmuchmoneyasherhousecouldnotberented
byothers."Alsoallegedwasthatthecomplaintwas"filedwithinone(1)yearfromthedateofoffirstletterofdemanddated
February3,1990."

IntheirAnswerwithCounterclaim,thedefendantsdeclaredthattheyhadbeenlivinginCaiza'shousesincethe
1960'sthatinconsiderationoftheirfaithfulservicetheyhadbeenconsideredbyCaizaasherownfamily,and
the latter had in fact executed a holographic will on September 4, 1988 by which she "bequeathed" to the
Estradasthehouseandlotinquestion.
JudgmentwasrenderedbytheMetroTConApril13,1992inCaiza'sfavor, 6theEstradasbeingorderedtovacate
thepremisesandpayCaizaP5,000.00bywayofattorney'sfees.

Butonappeal,8the decision was reversed by the Quezon City RegionalTrial Court, Branch 96. 9 By judgment rendered
onOctober21,1992, 10theRTCheldthatthe"actionbywhichtheissueofdefendants'possessionshouldberesolvedis
accionpubliciana,theobtainingfactualandlegalsituation..demandingadjudicationbysuchplenaryactionforrecoveryof
possessioncognizableinthefirstinstancebytheRegionalTrialCourt."

CaizasoughttohavetheCourtofAppealsreversethedecisionofOctober21,1992,butfailedinthatattempt.In
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adecision11promulgatedonJune2,1993,theAppellateCourt 12affirmedtheRTC'sjudgmentintoto.Itruledthat(a)the
proper remedy for Caiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the
"defendantshavenotbeeninthesubjectpremisesasmeretenantsoroccupantsbytolerance,theyhavebeenthereasa
sortofadoptedfamilyofCarmenCaiza,"asevidencedbywhatpurportstobetheholographicwilloftheplaintiffand(b)
while"saidwill,unlessanduntilithaspassedprobatebythepropercourt,couldnotbethebasisofdefendants'claimtothe
property, . . it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Carmen Caiza that defendants are to remain and are to
continueintheiroccupancyandpossession,somuchsothatCaiza'ssuperveningincompetencycannotbesaidtohave
vestedinherguardiantherightorauthoritytodrivethedefendantsout."13

Through her guardian, Caiza came to this Court praying for reversal of the Appellate Court's judgment. She
contendsinthemainthatthelattererredin(a)holdingthatsheshouldhavepursuedanaccionpubliciana,and
notanaccioninterdictal and in (b) giving much weight to "a xerox copy of an alleged holographic will, which is
irrelevanttothiscase."14
In the responsive pleading filed by them on this Court's requirement, 15 the Estradas insist that the case against
themwasreallynotoneofunlawfuldetainertheyarguethatsincepossessionofthehousehadnotbeenobtainedbythem
byany"contract,expressorimplied,"ascontemplatedbySection1,Rule70oftheRulesofCourt,theiroccupancyofthe
premisescouldnotbedeemedone"terminableuponmeredemand(andhenceneverbecameunlawful)withinthecontextof
thelaw."Neithercouldthesuitagainstthembedeemedoneofforcibleentry,theyadd,becausetheyhadbeenoccupying
thepropertywiththepriorconsentofthe"realowner,"CarmenCaiza,which"occupancycanevenripenintofullownership
oncetheholographicwillofpetitionerCarmenCaizaisadmittedtoprobate."Theyconclude,onthosepostulates,thatitis
beyondthepowerofCaiza'slegalguardiantooustthemfromthedisputedpremises.

Carmen Caiza died on March 19, 1994, 16 and her heirs the aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and
RamonC.Nevado,hernieceandnephew,respectivelywerebythisCourt'sleave,substitutedforher.17

Three issues have to be resolved: (a) whether or not an ejectment action is the appropriate judicial remedy for
recovery of possession of the property in dispute (b) assuming desahucio to be proper, whether or not
Evangelista,asCaiza'slegalguardianhadauthoritytobringsaidactionand(c)assuminganaffirmativeanswer
tobothquestions,whetherornotEvangelistamaycontinuetorepresentCaizaafterthelatter'sdeath.
I
Itisaxiomaticthatwhatdeterminesthenatureofanactionaswellaswhichcourthasjurisdictionoverit,arethe
allegationsofthecomplaintandthecharacterofthereliefsought. 18 An inquiry into the averments of the amended
complaintintheCourtoforiginisthusinorder.19

TheamendedComplaintalleges:20
6. That the plaintiff Carmen Caiza, is the sole and absolute owner of a house and lot at No. 61
ScoutTobias,QuezonCity,whichpropertyisnowthesubjectofthiscomplaint
xxxxxxxxx
9.Thatthedefendants,theirchildren,grandchildrenandsonsinlaw,wereallowedtolivetemporarily
inthehouseofplaintiffCarmenCaiza,forfree,outofherkindness
10.Thattheplaintiff,throughherlegalguardian,hasdulynotifiedthedefendants,forthemtovacate
thesaidhouse,butthetwo(2)lettersofdemandwereignoredandthedefendantsrefusedtovacate
thesame...
11.Thattheplaintiff,representedbyherlegalguardian,AmparoEvangelista,madeanotherdemand
on the defendants for them to vacate the premises, before Barangay CaptainAngelinaA. Diaz of
BarangayLagingHanda,QuezonCity,butaftertwo(2)conferences,theresultwasnegativeandno
settlementwasreached.AphotocopyoftheCertificationtoFileActiondatedJuly4,1990,issuedby
saidBarangayCaptainisattached,markedAnnex"D"andmadeanintegralparthereof
12.That the plaintiff has given the defendants more than thirty (30) days to vacate the house, but
theystillrefusedtovacatethepremises,andtheyareuptothistimeresidinginthesaidplace
13. That this complaint is filed within one (1) year from the date of first letter of demand dated
February3,1990(Annex"B")sentbytheplaintifftothedefendants,byherlegalguardianAmparo
Evangelista
14. By the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving the plaintiff of the possession of the house in
question, they are enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent plaintiff because, while
theyaresavingmoneybynotpayinganyrentforthehouse,theplaintiffislosingmuchmoneyasher
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housecouldnotberentedbyothers
15. That the plaintiff's health is failing and she needs the house urgently, so that funds could be
raisedtomeetherexpensesforhersupport,maintenanceandmedicaltreatment
16.That because of defendants' refusal to vacate the house at No. 61 ScoutTobias, Quezon City,
the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, was compelled to go to court for justice, and she has to
spendP10,000.00asattorney'sfees.
Itsprayer21isquotedbelow:
WHEREFORE,intheinterestofjusticeandtheruleoflaw,plaintiff,CarmenCaiza,representedby
her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista, respectfully prays to this Honorable Court, to render
judgmentinfavorofplaintiffandagainstthedefendantsasfollows:
1. To order the defendants, their children, grandchildren, sonsinlaw and other persons claiming
under them, to vacate the house and premises at No. 6 1 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, so that its
possessioncanberestoredtotheplaintiffCarmenCaizaand
2.Topayattorney'sfeesintheamountofP10,000.00
3.Topaythecostsofthesuit.
Inessence,theamendedcomplaintstates:
1) that the Estradas were occupying Caiza's house by tolerance having been "allowed to live
temporarily..(therein)forfree,outof..(Caiza's)kindness"
2)thatCaizaneededthehouse"urgently"becauseher"health..(was)failingandshe..(needed)
funds..tomeetherexpensesforhersupport,maintenanceandmedicaltreatment"
3) that through her general guardian, Caiza requested the Estradas several times, orally and in
writing,togivebackpossessionofthehouse
4) that the Estradas refused and continue to refuse to give back the house to Caiza, to her
continuingprejudiceand
5)thattheactionwasfiledwithinone(1)yearfromthelastdemandtovacate.
Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set out. It is settled that in an action for
unlawfuldetainer,itsufficestoallegethatthedefendantisunlawfullywithholdingpossessionfromtheplaintiffis
deemedsufficient, 22and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or
therefusaltovacateisunlawfulwithoutnecessarilyemployingtheterminologyofthelaw.23

TheEstradas'firstproffereddefensederivesfromaliteralconstructionofSection1,Rule70oftheRulesofCourt
whichinteraliaauthorizestheinstitutionofanunlawfuldetainersuitwhen"thepossessionofanylandorbuilding
isunlawfullywithheldaftertheexpirationorterminationoftherighttoholdpossession,byvirtueofanycontract,
expressorimplied."Theycontendthatsincetheydidnotacquirepossessionofthepropertyinquestion"byvirtue
of any contract, express or implied" they having been, to repeat, "allowed to live temporarily . . (therein) for
free,outof..(Caiza's)kindness"innosensecouldtherebean"expirationorterminationof..(their)rightto
holdpossession,byvirtueofanycontract,expressorimplied."Norwouldanactionforforcibleentrylieagainst
them, since there is no claim that they had "deprived (Caiza) of the possession of . .(her property) by force,
intimidation,threat,strategy,orstealth.
The argument is arrant sophistry. Caiza's act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her house, rentfree, did not
create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Common sense, and the most
rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require that that act of liberality be implicitly, but no less certainly,
accompaniedbythenecessaryburdenontheEstradasofreturningthehousetoCaizauponherdemand.More
than once has this Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate
upondemand,failingwhichasummaryactionforejectmentistheproperremedyagainsthim. 24 The situation is
notmuchdifferentfromthatofatenantwhoseleaseexpiresbutwhocontinuesinoccupancybytoleranceoftheowner,in
which case there is deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession as of the date of the demand to
vacate.25Inotherwords,onewhosestayismerelytoleratedbecomesadeforciantillegallyoccupyingthelandorproperty
themomentheisrequiredtoleave.26Thus,inAssetPrivatizationTrustvs.CourtofAppeals,27whereacompany,having
lawfully obtained possession of a plant upon its undertaking to buy the same, refused to return it after failing to fulfill its
promiseofpaymentdespitedemands,thisCourtheldthat"(a)fterdemandanditsrepudiation,..(its)continuingpossession
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..becameillegalandthecomplaintforunlawfuldetainerfiledbythe
..(plant'sowner)wasitsproperremedy.

Itmaynotbeamisstopointoutinthisconnectionthatwheretherehadbeenmorethanonedemandtovacate,
the oneyear period for filing the complaint for unlawful detainer must be reckoned from the date of the last
demand,28thereasonbeingthatthelessorhastheoptiontowaivehisrightofactionbasedonpreviousdemandsandlet
thelesseeremainmeanwhileinthepremises. 29Now,thecomplaintfiledbyCaiza'sguardianallegesthatthesamewas
"filedwithinone(1)yearfromthedateofthefirstletterofdemanddatedFebruary3,1990."Althoughthisavermentisnotin
accord with law because there is in fact a second letter of demand to vacate, dated February 27, 1990, the mistake is
inconsequential,sincethecomplaintwasactuallyfiledonSeptember17,1990,wellwithinoneyearfromthesecond (last)
writtendemandtovacate.

The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the owner's express permission. That permission was
subsequentlywithdrawnbytheowner,aswasherrightanditisimmaterialthatthewithdrawalwasmadethrough
herjudicialguardian,thelatterbeingindisputablyclothedwithauthoritytodoso.Norisitofanyconsequencethat
CarmenCaizahadexecutedawillbequeathingthedisputedpropertytotheEstradasthatcircumstancedidnot
givethemtherighttostayinthepremisesafterdemandtovacateonthetheorythattheymightinfuturebecome
ownersthereof,thatrightofownershipbeingatbestinchoate,notransferofownershipbeingpossibleunlessand
untilthewillisdulyprobated.
Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the Estradas had no legal right to the property,
whetheraspossessorsbytoleranceorsufferance,orasowners.Theycouldnotclaimtherightofpossessionby
sufferance that had been legally ended. They could not assert any right of possession flowing from their
ownershipofthehousetheirstatusasownersisdependentontheprobateoftheholographicwillbywhichthe
propertyhadallegedlybeenbequeathedtothemaneventwhichstillhastotakeplaceinotherwords,priorto
theprobateofthewill,anyassertionofpossessionbythemwouldbeprematureandinefficacious.
In any case, the only issue that could legitimately be raised under the circumstances was that involving the
Estradas'possessionbytolerance,i.e.,possessiondefacto,notdejure.Itisthereforeincorrecttopostulatethat
theproperremedyforCaizaisnotejectmentbutaccionpubliciana,aplenaryactionintheRTCoranactionthat
isoneforrecoveryoftherighttopossessiondejure.
II
TheEstradasinsistthatthedeviseofthehousetothembyCaizaclearlydenotesherintentionthattheyremain
in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them
therefrom,sincetheirousterwouldbeinconsistentwiththeward'swill.
Awillisessentiallyambulatoryatanytimepriortothetestator'sdeath,itmaybechangedorrevoked 30and until
admittedtoprobate,ithasnoeffectwhateverandnorightcanbeclaimedthereunder,thelawbeingquiteexplicit:"Nowill
shallpasseitherrealorpersonalpropertyunlessitisprovedandallowedinaccordancewiththeRulesofCourt"(ART.838,
id.).31Anowner'sintentiontoconfertitleinthefuturetopersonspossessingpropertybyhistolerance,isnotinconsistent
withtheformer'stakingbackpossessioninthemeantimeforanyreasondeemedsufficient.Andthatinthiscasetherewas
sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on
accountofthephysicalinfirmitiesafflictingher,arisingfromherextremeage.

AmparoEvangelistawasappointedbyacompetentcourtthegeneralguardianofboththepersonandtheestate
of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her Letters of Guardianship 32 dated December 19, 1989 clearly installed her as the
"guardianoverthepersonandpropertiesoftheincompetentCARMENCANIZAwithfullauthoritytotakepossessionofthe
property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts
necessaryforthemanagementofherproperties.." 33By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her
aunt'sperson,toattendtoherphysicalandspiritualneeds,toassureherwellbeing,withrighttocustodyofherpersonin
preference to relatives and friends. 34 It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over,
Caiza'sproperty,bothrealandpersonal,itbeingrecognizedprinciplethatthewardhasnorighttopossessionorcontrolof
hispropertyduringherincompetency. 35Thatrighttomanagetheward'sestatecarrieswithittherighttotakepossession
thereofandrecoveritfromanyonewhoretainsit, 36andbringanddefendsuchactionsasmaybeneedfulforthispurpose.
37

Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely discharging the duty to attend to "the
comfortableandsuitablemaintenanceoftheward"explicitlyimposedonherbySection4,Rule96oftheRulesof
Court,viz.:
Sec.4.Estatetobemanagedfrugally,andproceedsappliedtomaintenanceofward.Aguardian
must manage the estate of his ward frugally and without waste, and apply the income and profits
thereof,sofarasmaybenecessary,tothecomfortableandsuitablemaintenanceofthewardandhis
family, if there be any and if such income and profits be insufficient for that purpose, the guardian
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maysellorencumbertherealestate,uponbeingauthorizedbyordertodoso,andapplytosuchof
theproceedsasmaybenecessarytosuchmaintenance.
Finally,itmaybepointedoutinrelationtotheEstradas'sdefensesintheejectmentaction,thatasthelawnow
stands,evenwhen,inforcibleentryandunlawfuldetainercases,thedefendantraisesthequestionofownership
inhispleadingsandthequestionofpossessioncannotberesolvedwithoutdecidingtheissueofownership,the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the
undoubtedcompetencetoresolve"theissueofownership..onlytodeterminetheissueofpossession."38
III
As already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away during the pendency of this appeal. The Estradas thereupon
moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Caiza's death automatically terminated the guardianship,Amaparo
Evangelistalostallauthorityasherjudicialguardian,andceasedtohavelegalpersonalitytorepresentherinthe
presentappeal.Themotioniswithoutmerit.
Whileitisindeedwellestablishedrulethattherelationshipofguardianandwardisnecessarilyterminatedbythe
death of either the guardian or the ward, 39 the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as
niece of Carmen Caiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C.
Nevado.OntheirmotionandbyResolutionofthisCourt 40ofJune20,1994,theywereinfactsubstitutedaspartiesinthe
appealatbarinplaceofthedeceased,inaccordancewithSection17,Rule3oftheRulesofCourt,viz.:41

Sec.18.Deathofaparty.Afterapartydiesandtheclaimisnottherebyextinguished,thecourt
shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be
substituted for the deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted.Ifthelegalrepresentativefailstoappearwithinsaidtime,thecourtmayordertheopposing
party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be
specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
interestofthedeceased.Thecourtchargesinvolvedinprocuringsuchappointment,ifdefrayedby
the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substitutedforthedeceased,withoutrequiringtheappointmentofanexecutororadministratorand
thecourtmayappointguardianadlitemfortheminorheirs.
To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Caiza's demise did not extinguish the desahucio
suitinstitutedbyherthroughherguardian.42Thataction,notbeingapurelypersonalone,survivedherdeathherheirs
havetakenherplaceandnowrepresentherinterestsintheappealatbar.

WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED.TheDecisionoftheCourtofAppealspromulgatedonJune2,1993
affirming the Regional Trial Court's judgment and dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari is REVERSED
andSETASIDE,andtheDecisiondatedApril13,1992oftheMetropolitanTrialCourtofQuezonCity,Branch35,
inCivilCaseNo.3410isREINSTATEDandAFFIRMED.Costsagainstprivaterespondents.
SOORDERED.
Narvasa,C.J.,Davide,Jr.,Melo,FranciscoandPanganiban,JJ.,concur.
Footnotes
1Petition,Annex"D",Rollo,pp.4143
2PresidedoverbyJudgeDelilahVidallonMagtolis
3DocketedasSP.PROC.No.Q892603ofBranch107,entitled"PetitionforGuardianshipofthe
PersonandEstateoftheIncompetentCarmenCaniza,AmparoA.Evangelista,Petitioner."
4DocketedasCivilCaseNo.3410forEjectmentwithDamages
5Petition,Annex"K",Rollo,pp.5559
6Petition,Annex"B,"Rollo,pp.3335
8DocketedasCivilCaseNo.Q9212554
9PresidedOverbyJudgeLucasP.Bersamin
10Rollopp.3640
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11Rollo,pp.2732
12SpecialFirstDivisioncomposedofVailoces,J.,ponente,withLantinandMabutas,Jr.,JJ.,
concurring
13CADecision,p.4,Rollo,p.30
14Petition,p.11,Rollop.18
15Rollo,pp.97112
16ManifestationdatedMarch25,1994
17SecondDivisionResolutiondatedJune20,1994
18Sumulongvs.CourtofAppeals,232SCRA372[1994],citingAbrinvs.Campos,203SCRA420
(1991)Mariateguivs.CourtofAppeals,205SCRA337[1992)Abadvs.CourtofFirstInstance,206
SCRA567[1992]DelCastillovs.Aguinaldo,212SCRA169[1992)Santosvs.CourtofAppeals,
214SCRA162[1992]Ganadinvs.Ramos,99SCRA6132(1980)Ramirezv.Chit,21SCRA1364
[1967]Mediranvs.Vilanueva,37Phil.752[1918]
19Sarmientovs.CourtofAppeals,150SCRA108[1995]
20Rollo,pp.5657,emphasisinoriginaltext
21Rollo,pp.5758
22Sumulongvs.CourtofAppeals,232SCRA372[1994],citingMaddamuvs.JudgeofMunicipal
CourtofManila,74Phil.230[1943]
23Sumulongvs.CourtofAppeals,supra,citingCoTiamcovs.Diaz,75Phil.672[1946]Valderama
LumberManufacturer'sCo.vs.L.S.SarmientoCo.,5SCRA287[1962]Pangilinanvs.Aguilar,43
SCRA136[1972]
24Yuvs.deLara,6SCRA785[1962]Pangilinanvs.Aguilar,43SCRA136[1972]Dakudaovs.
Consolacion,122SCRA877[1983]Peranvs.PresidingJudge,Br.II,CFI,Sorsogon,125SCRA78
[1983]BancodeOroSavingsandMortgageBankvs.CourtofAppeals,182SCRA464[1990].
25Vda.deCatchuelavs.Francisco,98SCRA172[1980]citingCalubayanvs.Pascual21SCRA
146,148[1967]
26Odsiguevs.CourtofAppeals,233SCRA626[1994]
27229SCRA627,636[1994]
28Sarmientovs.CourtofAppeals,250SCRA108[1995]citingSarona,etalvs.Villegas,etal,22
SCRA1257[1968]
29Penas,Jr.vs.CourtofAppeals,233SCRA744[1994]citingRacazavs.SusanaRealty,Inc.18
SCRA1172[1966].
30ART.828,CivilCode
31ART.838,CivilCode
32Petition,Annex"E",Rollo,p.44
33Emphasissupplied
34Francisco,TheRevisedRulesofCourtinthePhilippines,1970Ed.,Vol.VB,p.457,citingEx
parteFletcher,142So.3039C.J.S.86
35Francisco,TheRevisedRulesofCourtinthePhilippines,1970Ed.Vol.VB,p.458,citing39
C.J.S.114115.
36CastilloV.Bustamante,64Phil.839[1937],citedinMoran,CommentsontheRulesofCourt,Vol.
3,1980ed.,p.570
37ConchitaJuachonvs.FelixManalo,G.R.No.L42,77Phil.1092,[January20,1947,unreported],
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citedinMoran,CommentsontheRulesofcourt,1979Ed.,VolumeI,p.176
38Sec.3,R.A.No.7691,amendingSec.33ofB.P.129SEEWilmonAutoSupplyCorp.vs.Courtof
Appeals,208SCRA108[1992].
39Francisco,TheRevisedRulesofCourtinthePhils.,Vol.VB,1970Ed.,citing25Am.Jur.37
40SecondDivisionSEEfootnote17,supra
41Emphasissupplied
42Vda.deSalazarvs.CourtofAppeals,etal.,250SCRA305(Nov.23,1995)citingVda.de
Haberesvs.CourtofAppeals,104SCRA534[1981]Republicvs.Bagtas,6SCRA242[1962]
FlorendoJr.vs.Coloma,129SCRA304[1984].
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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