20160519-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To County Court of Victoria-Re Written Submission ADDRESS To The COURT-APPEAL-15-2502

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 1
Written submissions
ADDRESS TO THE COURT
County Court of Victoria
Your Honour
County Court of Victoria at Melbourne
Cc:
Elliott Stafford and Associated lawyers@elliottstafford.com.au

Reference AP 2502 Buloke Shire Council for State of Victoria v Schorel-Hlavka
Re 30 May 2016 hearing
NO CASE TO ANSWER
Your Honour,
I am a CONSTITUTIONALIST and (retired) Professional Advocate and as such
gained over the decades an understanding about legal matters. My various written submissions in
the ADDRESSES TO THE COURT deals with various constitutional issues, and as such as set
out in those writings how this court is to invoke federal jurisdiction, or at least deemed to invoke
federal jurisdiction.
The High Court of Australia held that where a party pleads the non-application of a State Act
because of Commonwealth legislation then the State Court is exercising Federal jurisdiction.
Troy v Wrigglesworth (1919) 26 C.L.R. 305; 25 (1926) 38 C.L.R. 441; 33 A.L.R. 66.
On page 51 (and thereafter) of the 2-2-2016 written submissions of the ADDRESS TO THE
COURT I canvassed extensively Authorities as to the conduct of the court facing an
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION and rely upon them also. If therefore the Court were to
proceed without invoking formal jurisdiction the entire hearing is a sheer waste of time as any
orders will have no legal validity.
Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally; Re Wakim; Ex parte Darvall; Re Brown; Ex parte Amann; Spi [1999] HCA 27
(17 June 1999)
QUOTE
For constitutional purposes, they are a nullity. No doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel can prevail
against the Constitution. Mr Gould is entitled to disregard the orders made in Gould v Brown. No doubt, as
Latham CJ said of invalid legislation, "he will feel safer if he has a decision of a court in his favour".
That is because those relying on the earlier decision may seek to enforce it against Mr Gould.
END QUOTE
Therefore where Mr Gould could ignore court orders that he held was invalid (albeit facing a risk
if they were held valid) then the same can eventuate with County Court of Victoria orders that I
deem to be without jurisdiction.
As His Honour directed the Appeal to be heard then I provide for a NO CASE TO ANSWER.
This means that I can use any material to elicit from the witness in cross examination answers
without the court being able to use the same against me.
This is an essential concept in litigation as to avoid to deny a party to a proper cross-examination.
At the end of the Prosecutors case upon his final submissions the Court then has to determine if
the Prosecutor in fact proved his case beyond reasonable doubt and if not then the court has
no alternative but to dismiss the charge(s). Only if the court determines there is a case to answer
can it call upon the Appellant as to submit to the court what the Appellant seeks to rely upon.
I will quote merely some of the sub missions of the 425 pages written SUBMISSIONS of the
successful appeals of 19 July 2006.
QUOTE written submissions
County Court of Victoria, Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630
Your Honour,
Headings (below) are only to give some indications to assist to locate an issue but
are not to be taken to limit matters stated below it neither that other matters stated elsewhere are
not relevant.
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Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant
Appeal 15-2502
HEARING DIFFICULTIES
From onset I have to set out that I have for decades now suffered a hearing loss
which is more then 25% to each ear and for this I use hearing aids but those appear to generally
play up during Court hearings. Without proper functioning hearing aids I lack to hear certain
sounds and as such may misunderstand/misconceive what is being stated/asked by others.
What is an ADDRESS TO THE COURT?
The ADDRESS TO THE COURT is a document that enables the unrepresented Defendant or
for that matter any defendant or litigant to place before the Court in writing what he/she desires
to State, including legal arguments, so that the Court can withdraw into chambers and can at its
own leisure consider matters without having any problems as to pronunciations or misstatements
or other language problems causing frustration to those involved in the proceedings.
The ADDRESS TO THE COURT has been used in all levels of State and Federal Courts,
including the High Court of Australia, involving civil and criminal cases since 1985.
END QUOTE written submissions
And
UNREPRESENTED DEFENDANT A SELF EDUCATED CONSTITUTIONALIST
The matter before this court is a very complex and serious matter, as the end result could be a
criminal conviction. The unrepresented Defendant native language is Dutch and the Defendant
has not had any formal education in the English language and neither in legal studies. Hence, the
Defendant in that way is disadvantaged to some degree while on the other hand this was to his
benefit in that as a self trained constitutionalist he has been able to understand constitutional
provisions without being, so to say, brainwashed by legal fictions and other incorrect perceptions
that exist.
Andrei Sakharov, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/andrei_sakharov_quote_30a9)
Freedom of thought is the only guarantee against an infection of people by mass myths, which, in the hands
of treacherous hypocrites and demagogues, can be transformed into bloody dictatorships.
Alexander Hamilton, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/alexander_hamilton_quote_71c2)
No legislative act contrary to the Constitution can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy
(agent) is greater than his principal; that the servant is above the master; that the representatives of the people
are superior to the people; that men, acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not
authorize, but what they forbid. It is not to be supposed that the Constitution could intend to enable the
representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their constituents. A Constitution is, in fact, and
must be regarded by judges as fundamental law. If there should happen to be a irreconcilable variance
between the two, the Constitution is to be preferred to the statute.
Fredrich August von Hayek, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quotes_by/fredrich+august+von+hayek)
The greatest danger to liberty today comes from the men who are most needed and most powerful in modern
government, namely, the efficient expert administrators exclusively concerned with what they regard as the
public good.
Robert Lindner, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/robert_lindner_quote_a79f)
Authority has every reason to fear the skeptic, for authority can rarely survive in the face of doubt.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/friedrich_nietzsche_quote_3039)
Distrust everyone in whom the impulse to punish is powerful.
George Orwell, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/george_orwell_quote_304c)
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Appeal 15-2502

At any given moment there is an orthodoxy, a body of ideas which it is assumed all right-thinking people will
accept without question. It is not exactly forbidden to state this or that or the other, but it is not done
Anyone who challenges the prevailing orthodoxy finds himself silenced with surprising effectiveness. A
genuinely unfashionable opinion is almost never given a fair hearing, either in the popular press or in the
highbrow periodicals.
Lysander Spooner, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/lysander_spooner_quote_654e)
And the so-called sovereigns, in these different governments, are simply the heads, or chiefs, of different
bands of robbers and murderers.
Lysander Spooner, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote_blog/Lysander.Spooner.Quote.DEEB)
Our constitutions purport to be established by 'the people,' and, in theory, 'all the people' consent to such
government as the constitutions authorize. But this consent of 'the people' exists only in theory. It has no
existence in fact. Government is in reality established by the few; and these few assume the consent of all the
rest, without any such consent being actually given.
Voltaire, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/voltaire_quote_312a)
...So long as the people do not care to exercise their freedom, those who wish to tyrannize will do so; for
tyrants are active and ardent, and will devote themselves in the name of any number of gods, religious and
otherwise, to put shackles upon sleeping men.
Ludwig von Mises, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/ludwig_von_mises_quote_bca5)
This, then, is freedom in the external life of man -- that he is independent of the arbitrary power of his
fellows.
Daniel Webster, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/daniel_webster_quote_3141)
The contest, for ages, has been to rescue Liberty from the grasp of executive power.
Edward Zehr, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/edward_zehr_quote_7281)
I wouldn't call it fascism exactly, but a political system nominally controlled by an irresponsible, dumbed
down electorate who are manipulated by dishonest, cynical, controlled mass media that dispense the
propaganda of a corrupt political establishment can hardly be described as democracy either.
Ronald Reagan, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/ronald_reagan_quote_73aa)
Freedom is the recognition that no single person, no single authority or government has a monopoly on the
truth, but that every individual life is infinitely precious, that every one of us put in this world has been put
there for a reason and has something to offer. Its so hard for government planners, no matter how
sophisticated, to ever substitute for millions of individuals working night and day to make their dreams come
true. The fact is, bureaucracies are a problem around the world.
Immanuel Kant, Authority quote: (http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/immanuel_kant_quote_a319)
Freedom is independence of the compulsory will of another, and in so far as it tends to exist with the freedom
of all according to a universal law, it is the one sole original inborn right belonging to every man in virtue of
his humanity.
The Victorian Justice Handbook 1962 page 83:

ADMISSION AND CONFESSIONS.
Admissions.
In civil cases, statements made by the party to the proceedings or by his authorized agents are admissible
against, but not in favour of, such party, to prove the facts stated.
Confessions.
Confessions may be received in criminal matters. No confession which is tendered in evidence shall be
rejected on the grounds that a promise or threat has been held out to the person confessing unless the judge or
presiding officer is of opinion that the inducement was really calculated to cause an untrue admission of guilt
to be made Evidence Act 1958, section 149
There are two kinds of admissions admissions in writing and verbal admissions.
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Appeal 15-2502

In order to allow a written admission to be produced as an exhibit or allowed in, there must be some adoption
of the paper itself. That adoption may be in many ways by the signing of the document, by placing a mark
on the document or by reading of the document.
If a confession is taken down in writing and signed by the defendant, or its truth acknowledged by parol, or if
it be written by him, then it is put in as an ordinary document and read to the court. But if the confession is
taken down by a person who was present when the confession was made and is not signed or acknowledged
by the defendant the document is not itself evidence, but may be used by the person who made it to refresh
his memory. If a confession (which is in existence) contains admissible evidence, parol evidence cannot be
given of it: R. v. Kerr (No. 1) (1951). VLR., 212
Comparison between Admissions and Confessions.
ADMISSIONS.
CONFESSIONS.
1. Civil proceedings.
2. Need not be voluntary.
1. Criminal proceedings.
2. Must be voluntary.
3. May be made by agent,

counsel or solicitor.
3. Usually made only by

Prisoner himself.
For far too long the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and so also the Australian Electoral
Commission has used its might and so taxpayers funds to bulldoze any defendant as well as the Courts as to that it
can do what it does, and it is well overdue that this is stopped and we finally have that JUSTICE PREVAILS and
the lawyers who have been involved in this kind of conduct themselves face the reality of criminal charges for this
unconstitutional/illegal conduct as to protect the people against this kind of brutal force.
Issue Estoppel
Issue Estoppel or Res Judicata The civil law use of issue estoppel or res judicata (literally
translated as "the fact has been decided") is relatively uncontroversial. It expresses a general
public interest that the same issue should not be litigated more than once even when the parties
are different. The criminal law application, called double jeopardy provides that a person should
not be tried twice for the same offence. In crime/mystery fiction, it is a common plot device to
have the villain exploit the rule. In the world of real crime, some cases have achieved notoriety,
e.g. in the Birmingham Six saga, the House of Lords ruled in Hunter v. Chief Constable of the
West Midlands Police (1982) that issue estoppel applied. Lord Diplock said:
The inherent power which any court of justice must possess to prevent misuse of its
procedure in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its
procedural rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to litigation before it,
or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among rightthinking people.
[edit]
External links
On issue estoppel: House of Lords - Arthur JS Hall and Co. v. Simons

Convergence of estoppels (1) : High Court of Australia - Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v
Maher
Convergence of estoppels (2) : High Court of Australia - The Commonwealth v Verwayen
Review of the state of convergence: High Court of Australia - Giumelli v Giumelli
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estoppel"

END QUOTE
It means that matters that were litigated between myself and the Commonwealth to which with
the s78B NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS all Attorney-Generals were provided
to challenge my submissions but decided not to do so and Mr Robert Hull Attorney-General for
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the State of Victoria indicated to abode by the court decision (19-7-2006 then Mr Wayne Wall
Municipal Fire Protection Officer acting under delegated powers of the State of Victoria cannot
now seek to re-litigate the constitutional issues that were at the time before the court. To allow
otherwise would undermine the very legal principle of Res Judicata.
The reference below to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions now related to the
Prosecutor in this case.
ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2

STANDARDS OF BURDEN OF PROOF;
In criminal matters, at least as I understand it, the

Prosecutor has the burden of proof of criminal standard to
prove not only his case but to disprove each and every
element of the excuses proffered by the accused, this, while
the defendant has the civil standard of proof.
Therefore, if the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecution is unable to prove beyond
reasonable doubt any of the excuses or reasons given by the Defendant then the Court cannot
convict, this as the criminal standards of proof requires that each and every element of the
Defendants case must be disproved. It is not good enough for the prosecutor to disprove 999 of a
1000 arguments put forwards by the Defendant, as a single argument failing to be disproved is
fatal to the prosecutions case to obtain a conviction.
Denial of exhibit ADDRESS TO THE COURT, even so already filed and served!
The Defendant has in the past experienced that a judge ignored the content of the ADDRESS TO
THE COURT only for the Full Court overturning the orders as the Full Court made clear that
the trial judge erred in law not to consider the relevant material that was before the Court.
The following explains to some extend the issue of DE NOVO as I submitted at the time:
ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 3

With an OBJECTION TO LEGAL JURISDICTION, who has the carriage of the
proceedings?
&
No legal jurisdiction can be invoked with Constitutional matter before the Court.
&
NO CASE TO ANSWER
&
STANDARD OF PROOF
&
DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE
AVERTMENT
Part XXIII Miscellaneous
Section 387 384 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918

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(i) section 326 or 327 of this Act or section 28 of the

Crimes Act 1914; or
388 Averments deemed to be proved

In any prosecution in a court of summary jurisdiction in respect of
a contravention of the provisions of this Act or the regulations
relating to compulsory enrolment or compulsory voting, instituted
by an officer or by any person acting under the direction of an
officer, the averments of the prosecutor contained in the
information or complaint shall be deemed to be proved in the
absence of evidence to the contrary.
There is something illogic about this section in that it demands that unless the Defendant present
evidence to prove contrary to the averment rule that there is evidence disproving the fact alleged
by the Commonwealth director of Public Prosecution there is no requirement for the Director of
Public Prosecution to prove anything.
Now, let take this in the correct prospective by example;
A trial commence and the Prosecutor having charged the Defendant with failure to vote then
commence his case and using the averment rule does not provide any evidence to prove the
charge. The Defendant then pleads NO CASE TO ANSWER, and the judicial officer rejects this
on the basis that the averment rule applies. The Defendant then commences to open his case and
present evidence contrary to the charge. The Defendant has the conduct of civil standards of
proof and as such merely has to state that he/she attended to the polling station. And as such the
defendant has completed his contrary evidence. While the Prosecutor can now cross examine the
Defendant, something the Defendant was denied to do upon the Prosecutor as to elicit any
evidence because the Prosecutor relies upon the averment rule, now the Prosecutor ask all kinds
of questions to try to trap one way or another the Defendant to give evidence that he had perhaps
not filled in the ballot paper or otherwise did not accept them. The Prosecutor has clearly no
legal position to now call witnesses, such as those who were at the polling station as to what
actually occurred at the polling station, and so is seeking to use the Defendant to try to prove his
case. However, because of the NO CASE TO ANSWER claim the Defendant made before
opening his own case, the judicial officer must now find that the failure of the prosecutor to
present evidence and to rely now upon the Defendant to give some kind of evidence that he may
not actually have filled in any ballot paper is irrelevant as the claim of NO CASE TO ANSWER
relies upon what evidence was before the Court PRIOR TO what evidence was before the Court
when this claim was made and must disregard any evidence that was given afterwards. A Court
of Appeal, if the matter is appealed, re-assess the claim of NO CASE TO ANSWER, upon the
basis if the Prosecutor in fact had proved BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT the charge and
by this must disregard any evidence that was given after the claim of NO CASE TO ANSWER
was made. The Prosecutor having the CRIMINAL STANDARD OF PROOF there by had
the onus to disprove each and every excuse the Defendant may proffer on the CIVIL
STANDARD OF PROOF and therefore where the Prosecutor takes the gamble of relying upon
the averment rule that he takes a CALCULATED RISK that it might be fatal to his case. The
judicial officer, who becomes aware , once the Defendant opened his case, that the Defendant in
fact on CIVIL STANDARDS OF PROOF had a excuse, then is duty bound to discontinue the
trial and make a ruling that the NO CASE TO ANSWER claim by hindsight now is validated.
This, as the Prosecutor already had closed his case. To allow for the prosecutor to use crossexamination as a way to try to re-open his case and to try to thereby get away from the averment
rule and now seek to rely upon evidence elicited from the Defendant would a be gross abuse of
the legal processes and would defeat the entire purpose of what the averment rule is about and
interfere with the DUE PROCESSES OF LAW.
It, so to say, would giver the Prosecutor another bite on the cherry to re-commence his case,
having refused already to present relevant evidence. It also robs the Defendant of a FAIR and
PROPER trial as the Defendant is denied to elicit of any witnesses for the Prosecution what he
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may wish to present as simply by the averment rule application the Prosecutor can conceal
evidence from the Court that might be critical to the Defendants case.
If for example the Defendant attended to the poling station and notified staff that he had religious
objections to vote, which is provided for within Section 245 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act
1918 for an excuse not to vote, then regardless if the staff member of the Australian electoral
Commission then by error or otherwise did not mark of the name of the Defendant is not an issue
as within the legislation no charge can be upheld. Therefore, it is not relevant if the Defendant in
this example did not receive ballot papers, if his/her name was not marked of rather what is
relevant if at the time the Defendant by what occurred at the polling station was excused not
having to vote. the staff member having not issued any ballot papers may in his/her mind
correctly not mark off the name of the Defendant as after all he/she did not fill in any ballot
paper.
When then the Prosecutor, having relied upon the averment rule failed to present witnesses that
could, so to say, shed a light upon matters then this must be deemed FATAL to the charges and
no charges could be legitimately upheld.
Therefore, any evidence of by the Defendant during cross examination, if he gave such
evidence., that he did not receive any ballot papers, after attending to the polling station is not of
any standard of criminal proof by the Prosecutor that the Defendant therefore is guilty of failing
to vote.
In the proceedings before the Magistrates Court of Victoria at Heidelberg on 16 and 17
November 2005 the Prosecutor at no time did cross examine the Defendant in that case, when
advised the staff of the Australian Electoral Commission did not issue any ballot papers, if this
was because of having been made or being aware of any religious objection. The Prosecutor
neither cross examined if the Defendant had not been issued with ballot papers because of having
declared perhaps that he had already submitted a postal voting or was to do so that day. And I
raised this with the magistrate that the Prosecutor had failed to address this!
As such, what we had was a conviction where even if all issues regarding validity of citizenship,
writs, proclamation, the appointment of Governor-Generals, etc were all overcome somehow by
the Prosecutor, something I view is beyond his capacity to get around, then in the end his own
usage of the averment rule is FATAL to his case as he could not now in cross examination call
witness , such as staff members of the Australian Electoral Commission to give evidence that
either they denied any religious objection having been made or otherwise any postal voting or
pre voting was recorded.
For example, in regard of the 2004 purported federal election, standing as a candidate, I was
known to refuse to indicate a preference vote as I opposed the murderous unconstitutional
invasion into the sovereign nations Afghanistan and Iraq and did not wish to be seen to support
this by giving preference vote indications which may be seen that somehow I supported this
humanitarian disaster and warmongering. Hence, it was therefore critical to the Prosecutors case
if perhaps the staff member sitting at the table when my wife and I attended at the polling station
may have been aware or have been made aware that I opposed any kind of involvement as to the
murderous invasions and as such was not issued any ballot papers on that basis.
I was well aware during the proceedings that it didnt matter for me to give whatever evidence as
ultimately having made a NO CASE TO ANSWER the magistrate was bound by this to
reconsider then if in light of the subsequent evidence his earlier ruling to dismiss my submission
of NO CASE TO ANSWER was found to be proven where I presented a reasonable excuse that
I had attended to the polling station and as such it was not for the Court to try to score some
conviction where the Prosecutor himself had elected not to call witnesses who could have
clarified what occurred that day.
Again, it was not for the magistrate to assume what may have occurred that day where the
Prosecutor himself refused to call witnesses whom could have elaborated on what had occurred
on that day! The Defendant was denied the option to cross witnesses in that regard as there were
none who could have shed light on this and as such the Prosecutor taking the gamble to prevent
the defendant to question any staff of the Australian Electoral Commission by this had
overplayed his hand, so to say.
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Sentencing options
While it might be early in the proceedings to start about sentencing option, nevertheless the
Defendant deems it appropriate to consider this at this stage.
Evidence Act 1958 (Vic)
Act No. 6246/1958
With or without conviction, order a fine
A fine is a monetary penalty which can be imposed by the Court. The maximum amount must not
exceed $24,000.
With or without conviction, adjourn the hearing on conditions

If the court has found a matter proven, it may, with or without conviction, adjourn the case for a period of
not more than 5 years. The person can enter into an undertaking on the conditions that they may be
required to reappear before the court on the return date if called upon, to be of good behaviour during
the period of the bond, and any other special conditions that the court thinks fit.
In making such an order, the court would consider:
rehabilitation
deterrence (General & Specific)
the trivial, technical or minor nature of the offence
circumstances in which it is inappropriate to record a conviction
circumstances in which it is inappropriate to inflict any punishment other than a nominal punishment
allowance for the existence of extenuating or exceptional circumstances that justify the court showing
mercy to an offender
Convict and discharge

A court may discharge a person whom it has convicted of an offence after taking into consideration the matters
mentioned in the last paragraph.
Dismiss the charge

A court on being satisfied that a person is guilty of an offence may, (without recording a conviction), dismiss the
charge for any of the reasons mentioned in the second last paragraph.

Hansard 31-1-1898 Constitution Convention Debates [page 354]
Mr. WISE (New South Wales).It might be that a law passed by the Federal Parliament was so counter to the popular feeling of a particular
state, and so calculated to injure the interests of that state, that it would become the duty of every citizen to
exercise his practical power of nullification of that law by refusing to convict persons of offences
against it. That is a means by which the public obtains a very striking opportunity of manifesting its
condemnation of a law, and a method which has never been known to fail, if the law itself was
originally unjust. I think it is a measure of protection to the states and to the citizens of the states which
should be preserved, and that the Federal Government should not have the power to interfere and prevent the
citizens of a state adjudicating on the guilt or innocence of one of their fellow citizens conferred upon it by
this Constitution.
Every person in this case include also any judicial officer!
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While His Honour on 17 May 2016 at the Ballarat venue indicated a case could have been placed
before the Supreme Court of Victoria instead of an appeal to the County Court of Victoria, the
truth is that in the circumstances where by the time I lodged my appeal on 8 October 2015 I still
didnt have any formal sealed orders and didnt even know no conviction was recorded. So, it
would be absurd to institute legal proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria not even
knowing the precise details of the orders of 17 September 2016 and only would likely have
placed me in a very financial vulnerable position to possibly face TENS OF THOUSANDS OF
DOLALARS COST if the Court were to hold that the application to the supreme Court of
Victoria was ill conceived because it relied upon something that afterwards turned out not to be
part of a court order. No matter my repeated request for formal orders and reason of judgement
none was provided to this day.
In fact if the orders had been issued by a Registrar, as I was initially advised by the court
registry, then the Supreme Court of Victoria so to say thrown me out of the window, well the
application at least.
When I was called up about 10 years ago to serve as a juror and complained to the coordinator
that I held the instructing video was deceptive as it didnt include the right of juror to apply
NULLIFICATION I was in the end advised my services were not required.
As such the Court network also is useless because nothing will eventuate from anything. This is
what I learned being the reality in the legal processes.
Once, a woman travelled long distant to my residence (when I resided at Berriwillock) very
emotionally claiming that the expert witness had lied in court, etc. She provided me with the
court recordings and having listened to them I was able to explain to the woman that the expert
witness has stated his opinion and while she may disagree with it, her lawyer should have
cross examined him then on that and as I viewed it the expert witness was entitled to state his
opinion regardless if they were right or wrong on the facts. Here there was this woman making
a 700 kilometres trip (without I knew she would do so) where if we had proper court services
they could have explained this and then this woman could possibly have avoided all her anxiety.
Because I didnt charge people found me to be a better alternative as I was ordinary 24/7
available then to try to get something out of their lawyers. And lawyers often defrauded
Victorian Legal Aid but no matter my writings to set this out nothing ever came from this. It at
times means that a lawyer too busy with a client would tell the next client on legal aid to come
back another day but still charge as if he had a session with the client. The client wouldnt have a
clue this eventuated as possibly years later the client faced the legal Aid bill unbeknown how the
cost came about.
In one case I dared to challenge an opponent party to fake the need of a wheelchair. Well the
judge didnt take it kindly, and ordered for this party to provide a medical certificate and warned
me that it would go against me. After the party filed a medical certificate I explained to the judge
I have my self-professed crummy English and if the judge kindly could clarify me as to what a
VET was and if this was an animal doctor, and if this doctor was then permitted to deal with
human beings to issue certificates relating to a person being disabled or not.
Well, the judge nearly exploded when the opponent barrister stated that they couldnt find a
doctor willing to issue a certificate so they had engaged an animal doctor but now they would
withdraw the Affidavit and so 10 other Affidavits.
After the litigation the other party remarkably healed never again to need a wheelchair. I doubt
this was merely because I exposed it as a fraud.
Yet, judicial officers are willing to accept what a lawyer states from the Bar table as gospel rather
than to deal with them that they have no better opposition in law then their client has.
Way back in 1985 a judge made clear that I had the tactics of cross-examination of a TRAP
DOOR SPIDER and that as long as I remained within the rules of cross-examination His
Honour couldnt prevent me to cross-examine. This when the opposing barrister complained that
I was turned his witnesses against his own client.
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Another opposing barrister complained that I was surgically taking apart his witness affidavit.
Regretfully most unrepresented parties will be unable to do so or achieve this and then lawyers
having deliberately prepared some Affidavit to deceive the court by concealing the true facts will
be reworded with orders in their clients favour.
And this hardly is the kind of administration of justice the Framers of the Constitution embedded
as a legal principle in the constitution.
In view of what eventuated on 17 May 2016 at the County Court of Victoria at Ballarat venue it
is important that there is a proper understanding as to the meaning De Novo, hence I will
address this issue, with an explanation
While His Honour on 17 May 2016 stated that His Honour had read all material it seems
however His Honour may not have done so as the ADDRESS TO THE COURT and its
supplements was placed by the Registrar inn the correspondence file instead of in the court file,
meaning that I referred to this ADDRESS TO THE COURT, which was also before Counsel for
Buloke Shire Council (the prosecutor) and as such the Court doesnt have before it what the
prosecutor or myself may rely upon. Because it is containing written sub missions it must be part
of the court file and as such should be transferred to the court file. Once a judge refused a read an
ADDRESS TO THE COURT of a mere few pages on appeal the Full Court held that the trail
judge had to consider the content of it and set aside the orders.
Lawyers often dump onto the court from the Bar table huge pile of authorities as if a judge is
going to read them all there and then. Nor could the other party do so at the bar table. The written
submissions in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT provides for quoting the relevant parts of a
judgment so the court is not having to wade through hundreds of pages of one judgment merely
to try to ascertain what the party referring to the Authority is referring to. Indeed legal principles
often can be in multitude of one Authority, and for example when I appeared before His Honour
Guest J and referred to an authority His Honour had been the Counsel in and lost the case, His
Honour then denied that what I quoted of head was part of the case. However, when I invited His
Honour to check the law report His Honour then acknowledged that I was indeed correct, but His
Honour had forgotten about that issue completely. The Colosimo case opposing Counsel filed a
pile of Authorities to which I had no way the ability to read this when the proceedings were in
progress and so merely flicking through it I noticed that one Authority had a statement to which I
alerted Her Honour Harbison that in fact this proved the case of Mr Colosimo. Opposing Counsel
then as I understand it indicated not to have read the Authorities. Opposing Counsel then applied
to withdraw the CONTEMPT OF COURT application against Mr Colosimo which I representing
Mr Colosimo successfully opposed, as Her Honour Harbison agreed with my submission that a
CONTEMPT OF COURT application once filed becomes the property of the court. Her Honour
Harbison then accepted my submission to permanently stay the proceedings that only Mr
Colosimo could bring back in action.
The same legal principle applies to an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION Once it is filed (as I
have in great details set out in the written submissions in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT for
the 22 February 2016 hearing or alternative date), that once it is filed it cannot be withdrawn by
the party that filed it as it became the property of the court. This is as to avoid a party to seek to
manipulate the legal processes and frustrate the court proceedings using an OBJECTION TO
JURISDICTION Toto perhaps force ahead to get an out of court settlement. Hence, while His
Honour on the one hand claims that an Appeal is a hearing DE NOVO on the other hand His
Honour refuses to allow for this, as the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION clearly is part of the
Appeal. It is the property of the court and cannot be ignored, as otherwise the court doesnt
provide for a hearing DE NOVO. A hearing DE NOVO places actually both parties on the same
footing as was at commencement of a hearing. Because the written submissions of the
ADDRESS TO THE COURT was filed prior to the hearing and on court file, it therefore is part
of the Appeal DE NOVO hearing.
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While His Honour read out the relevant parts of what an Appeal is about, clearly none of it
inferred that the right of a party would be diminished upon an appeal of a hearing DE NOVO.
The hearing at the time before the Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud on 20 August 2016
was one where I had already provided a written submission in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT
objecting to its jurisdiction.
This court may argue that this is not part of the appeal because the Appeal was instituted against
the 17 September 2015 orders or the not making of orders, but then the 17 September 2015
hearing was because of the adjournment of the 20 August 2015 hearing and no orders were
issued to either uphold or defeat the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION and as such the
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION for all purposes and intend was to be deemed to be part of the
matter adjourned to 17 September 2015.
However, well aware that some judge may have a different line of argument another written
submission in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT was submitted then for the 17 September 2016
hearing. As such this ADDRESS TO THE COURT as well the previous one before the court on
20 August 2015 are all part of the court file. At least it should be.
QUOTE 17 September 2015 written submissions in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT

Magistrates Court of Victoria
AT: St Arnaud (or alternative court location)
IN THE MATTER:
Buloke Shire Council v Schorel-Hlavka
(Alleged) Hearing date 19-9-2015
Sir/Madam,
In my 20-8-2015 ADDRESS TO THE COURT I stated at commencement:
QUOTE
I object to the jurisdiction of this court, as I indicated to Buloke Shire Council.
As I have encountered in the past judicial officers who failed to understand/comprehend the legal processes
involved in an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTIONI I will attempt to explain this.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
I do not accept that this court can grand the summons to be withdrawn, for that unless it deals with the
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION first, this as it has no judicial powers to invoke to allow for the
summons to be withdrawn.
.
As this is an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION the court cannot take any plea.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Dillon v. Dillon, 187 P 27
Thus, where a judicial tribunal has no jurisdiction of the subject matter on which it assumes to act, its
proceedings are absolutely void in the fullest sense of the term. .
END QUOTE
While due to ill health I was not able to personally attend to the hearing at the Magistrates Court
of Victoria at St Arnaud, nevertheless having made an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION then
the issue before the Court was the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION as any matter of the
summons no longer could be heard and determined unless the court first disposed of the
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION if that is what it were to have done, not that I seek to
indicate the Court were to have done so. This ADDRESS TO THE COURT, containing the
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION was accompanied by a 17 August 2010 correspondence
which was emails to the court on 17 August 2015.
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It is my submission and set out to some extend further below in addition to my previous
writings, that the Magistrates Court of Victoria (at St Arnaud) only can but dismiss the
Summons (charges) for want of jurisdiction.
As shown below ES&a lawyers claiming to act for Buloke Shire Council has clearly indicated
not to respond to matters, and while that it its choice the Court cannot substitute this refusal as to
go along with whatever they desire. The Court is bound to follow the rule of law and where the
respondent to my OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION didnt seek to pursue this issue on 20
August 2015 and indeed doesnt seem to accept there is an issue regarding the OBJECTION
TO JURISDICTION (even suggesting I seek legal advice) then the Court is bound to dismiss
the Summons (charges) for want of jurisdiction.
I needed to do no more but state OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION but in a way to assist
also I wrote extensively about this so that they might have realized from onset they were so to
say fighting a lost cause. As shown below by the various authorities the purported orders of 20
August 2015 are no orders at all and neither can the court now provide other orders against me
because its failure to invoke jurisdiction and neither having had Buloke Shire Council lawyers
presenting any details why it hold that the magistrates Court of Victoria has jurisdiction despite
of the 19 July 2006 County Court of Victoria orders, then it is not for the court to somehow try to
infringe upon proper litigation as on its own accord to try to make a case for Buloke Shire
Council.
QUOTE Merritt v. Hunter, C.A. Kansas 170 F2d 739.
Where a court failed to observe safeguards, it amounts to denial of due process of law, court is
deprived of juris.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Norwood v. Renfield, 34 C 329; Ex parte Giambonini, 49 P. 732.

A universal principle as old as the law is that a proceedings of a court without jurisdiction are a nullity
and its judgment therein without effect either on person or property.
END QUOTE
The courts obligation was that because there was an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION then it
only could invoke judicial powers to determine the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION issue
and hand down formal orders and a reason of judgment. Where the court fails to do so then it
implies it never had jurisdiction and matters are at an end.
While the Court may adjourn matter to hear and determine the OBJECTION TO
JURISDICTION as to enable the parties to perhaps in writing set out matters, it can however
not issue orders regarding the summons charges as if no OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION
exists. Hence, I have set out below considering the writings of ES&a Lawyers for Buloke Shire
Council that it appears the Court on 20 August 2015 didnt deal formally with the
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION and as such didnt invoke jurisdiction to hear and
determine the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION or to adjourn it providing details as to for
what purpose it was adjourned and therefore the 20 August orders are claimed by ES&a Lawyers
for the adjournment of matters and to be heard in my absenteeism if I do not appear are no
orders at all and have no legal force.
In 1988 I was confronted by an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION by the State of Victoria
and in 2001 I was faced with an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION by the Commonwealth in
non-related litigation, and as such it must be clear that where it suits a Government then the
Court will deal with the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION as is legally required. What is
good for the Goose is good for the Gander and it is not the function of the court to be bias and
appear to take sides as to whom objects to the jurisdiction of the court. It must follow legal
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procedures regarding an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION regardless which party objects to
the jurisdiction of the court. Because the state and the commonwealth used the OBJECTION
TO JURISDICTION in non-related matters I am now so to say giving them some of their own
medicine. And as set out below succeeded in this on 19 July 2006. While therefore this court
could have dealt with the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION on 20 August 2015 albeit
constrained by the ruling of the County Court of Victoria of 19 July 2006 which set aside the
orders of the Magistrates Court of Victoria (at Heidelberg) that it had jurisdiction, it cannot relitigate those issues, and so in the end no matter what other rulings it may make it cannot
conclude the court has jurisdiction where it cannot overrule the 19 July 2006 County Court of
Victoria appeals rulings. Without seeking to imply that the court now can re-litigate or otherwise
litigate on matters I do provide this ADDRESS TO THE COLURT as to try to get so to say
some understanding and some sense in it all.
On 20 August 2015 the court clearly failed to follow DUE PROCESS, NATURAL
JUSTICE, ETC, and as such it cannot now try to get around its errors of 20 August 2015 as to
substitute the orders indicated by ES&a lawyers as to now pursue litigation regarding the
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION as having issued orders in defiance of the OBJECTION
TO JURISDICTION to hear and determine on 17 September 2015 the Summon charges issues
has effectively placed the court that it acted without jurisdiction and as set out below can but
only withdraw those orders and provide orders to dismiss the Summons charge(s).
I have listed below (again) various Authorities regarding the issue of an objection to the
jurisdiction of a court. Without conceding jurisdiction and/or the validity of the hearing on 19
September 2015 I will seek to set out certain issues.
I provided a 19 August 2015 correspondence that contained the following also;
QUOTE 19 August 2015 correspondence
Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud
19-8-2015
c/o the coordinator starnaudcoordinator@magistratescourt.vic.gov.au

Cc:
Elliott Stafford and Associated lawyers@elliottstafford.com.au

Buloke Shire Council buloke@buloke.vic.gov.au
Daniel Andrews Premier Victoria daniel.andrews@parliament.vic.gov.au
George Williams george.williams@unsw.edu.au
Cr Reid Mather (Mayor) MALLEE WARD crmather@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr David Pollard (Deputy Mayor) LOWER AVOCA WARD crpollard@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr Leo Tellefson MOUNT JEFFCOTT WARD crtellefson@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr Stuart McLean LOWER AVOCA WARD crmclean@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr Graeme Milne MOUNT JEFFCOTT WARD crmilne@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr Gail Sharp MOUNT JEFFCOTT WARD crsharp@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr Ellen White, MALLEE WARD, crwhite@buloke.vic.gov.au
Re: 20150819-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud

cc ES&a LA-05-06-Re Buloke Shire Council
Sir/Madam,
despite my various writings no response from ES&a, the St Arnaud coordinator or the
Magistrates Court at Collingwood about the 20 August 2015 hearing that was listed in St
Arnaud. This I view is the scandalous kind of conduct by the court. Regardless if hearing is only
held on Thursday in St Arnaud I view the coordinator should monitor email coming in and
appropriately respond to them. Even the Magistrates Court Collingwood failed to attend to my
email. I today attended to a doctor and have to attend tomorrow for testing and well over the
coming days may have further testing to be done pending what, if anything can be found. I view
sufficient evidence to show I had a justification not being able to attend. Further, as it is a
contested hearing that first requires the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION to be dealt with
then then at most the court could direct the prosecutor to file within a certain time it written
arguments why the court can invoke jurisdiction and then further time for me to respond upon
this. If the court were to issue orders adverse to me than it give s me a right of appeal to the
County Court of Victoria and as I know from the past when a Magistrate fails to deal
appropriately with an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION then the appeal has to succeed.
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At 22.00 hours on Wednesday 19-8-2015 I checked my emails and none I could locate were of
ES&a or from the court(s) as such it is clear the incurrence of any cost by ES&a is its own
making if it were to travel to St Arnaud as it failed to act reasonable and appropriately in the
circumstances. The fact the court also failed to clarify matters I view is scandalous.
This correspondence is not intended and neither must be perceived to state all issues/details.
Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Gerrit)
MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

Our name is our motto!)
END QUOTE 19 August 2015 correspondence
I below quote part of the 2 September 2015 correspondence received from ES&a Lawyers acting
allegedly for Buloke Shire Council, I have however at the end of this ADDRESS TO THE
COURT included a s canned copy of the correspondence in full.
QUOTE (Alison J May LEGAL Practitioner ES&a 2-9-2015 correspondence)
We act on behalf of the Buloke shire Council in the above prosecution.
The above matter was listed for before the Magistrates Court at St Arnaud on 20 August 2015 and we
acknowledge your numerous items of correspondence. We do not propose to respond to a majority of the
matters raised therein.
The purpose of this letter is to confirm that as you did not appear the matter has been adjourned for hearing at
the St Arnaud Magistrates Court on 17 September 2015 at 8.30am In the event you do not appear on that
date the matter will proceed in your absence.
We confirm that the St Arnaud Magistrates Court is the appropriate venue for this matter as the offence took
place in Berriwillock. The only Court which is closer to the location of the offence is the Magistrates Court
ar Swan Hill which is a greater distance from your residence. Council will not consent to any change of
venue and we note that the Collingwood Magistrates Court is not the appropriate venue for your matter in
any event as it deals with matters only where the offence has taken place within the strict boundary of a small
proportion of the City of Yarra or where the accused resides within that same boundary.
We note your purported objection to jurisdiction contained in your letter dated 17 August 2015 and strongly
suggest that you take legal advice with respect to same.
END QUOTE (Alison J May LEGAL Practitioner ES&a 2-9-2015 correspondence)
It is therefore absolutely clear that ES&a lawyers were fully aware about my OBJECTION TO
JURISDICTION. The fact they desired not to respond to them also must be taken into account
as a failure to prove jurisdiction, this as the court cannot assume jurisdiction but the prosecutor
had to prove jurisdiction by evidence. A refusal to do so is no legal excuse and therefore the
Court on 20 August 2015 had an uncontested OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION.
END QUOTE 17 September 2015 written submissions in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT
Therefore there can be absolutely no doubt that just this part alone of the submission before the
court related to the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION.
As a party OBJECTING TO THE JURISDICTION I so to say had played my part in making
this known to the court. Besides the ill health I held I had no requirements to attend to the court
as that would defeat the very purpose of an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION as then made.
After all, the Court could have issued orders of regime of dates for the parties to provide in
writing their positions and then the Court could adjudicate upon them.
The cohurt is not some playground that a party could use the legal system to file some vexatious
application to perhaps prevent a person to travel on a pre-planned trip and then whenb the court
day arrtives the application is withdrawn but the respondent who may have filed an
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OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION nevertheless being forced to abandon a perhaps pre-paid trip
and suffer considerable losses, some which the court may never be able to compensate for, if the
trip means the lost opportunity to see a loved one overseas. Therefore the court must be very
cautious that it will not deny a party which challenge the jurisdiction of the court to nevertheless
having to attend in person where this in the circumstances is totally unreasonable.
It indeed is absurd that despite having made known my health problems that I suffered from an
illness the court went ahead despite my OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION but where Mr Wayne
Wall for whatever reason fails to notify me he isnt going to attend and cant bother to request
the court to adjourn the matter not asked my consent for this, the court somehow will go along
with this blatant disregard of legal procedures.
As these written submissions makes clear that Mr Wayne Wall cannot be interfered with as to his
duties and obligations as an appointed Municipal fire prevention Officer by Buloke Shire
Council then it is in my submission totally irrelevant that Buloke Shire Council may have
allegedly that is send him out of jurisdiction.
What I view is the critical issue is if Mr Wayne Wall made any attempt whatsoever to request the
Court to adjourn the hearing and indicating to the court what, if any, attempts he had made to
obtain my consent for the adjournment.
Mr Wayne Wall clearly defied the court, and so I submit his lawyers also and the court cannot
proceed with the matter without holding them legally accountable as they in my submission
make a mockery of the court.
What ought to be considered if a FAIR MINDED PERSON would regard the court acted
without bias where the court somehow doesnt require any legal accountability for the myriad of
inappropriate conduct and defiance of the court and its processes.
Where the court is determined to proceed despite my ill health and being the wrong venue then I
submit a FAIR MINDED PERSON could never accept that the litany of breaches of court
rules/regulations and other legal provisions including court orders/directions can be left
unattended to by the court and it merrily proceeds to a hearing as if nothing ever had eventuated
as such.
R v. Lusink and another; Ex Parte Shaw (1980) 6 FLR 235 and 236
QUOTE
However in some cases the words or conduct of a judge may be suck as to lead the parties reasonably to think
that the judge has prejudged an important question in the case, and then prohibition may issue. Of course, the
court which is asked to grant prohibition will not lightly conclude that the judge may reasonably be suspected
of bias in this sense; it must be "firmly established" that such a suspicion may reasonably be engendered in
the minds of the parties or the public, as was made clear by the court in R v Commonwealth Conciliation and
arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546 at 553-4, in the passage cited in R v
Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (132 CLR at 262).
The critical question, however, is not whether a judge believes he or she has prejudged a question, but
whether that is what a party or the public might reasonably suspect has occurred (see per Lord Denning
MR in Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC Ltd v Lannon (1969) 1 QB 577 at 599, a judgment cited with
approval by this court in R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex Parte Angliss
Group (1969) 122 CLR 546 at 553; In some circumstances repeated denials of prejudging might well convey
the impression of "protesting to much"...
END QUOTE
Dimes v. Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 II,L.C. 759
QUOTE
The fundamental rule of English (Australian) law is that "No man can be a judge in his own case". It has
long been held that if there is bias or the appearance of bias such as to deny justice or create the impression
that justice has not been done, then that bias, or apparent bias, is sufficient to invalidate the decision of
those who made the decision.
END QUOTE
Reg v. The London County Council (1894) XI .L.R. 24
Sharp v. Carey (1897) 23 V.L.R. 248 Austin Digest 17.
Reg. v. Moleswort (1893) 23 V.L.R. 582 Austin Digest 17.
Black v. Black (1951) N.Z.L.R. 723
Ex Parte Blume (1958) W.N. (N.S.W.) 411Austin Digest 93,339,457,458
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QUOTE In the Marriage of P.N. and J.S. Axtell 7 FLR 931
The test of judicial bias as laid down by the high court is whether it has been established that it might
reasonably be suspected by a fair minded person that the judge might not resolve the question before him
with a fair and unprejudiced mind
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
An appellated court has to consider whether on a reading of a transcript it should conclude that a fair
minded person would consider that the husband did not have a fair hearing and that the issues raised by his
case were not fairly considered.
END QUOTE
The book "Law Made Simple" by Colin F. Padfield, LL.B.,D.P.A.(Lond.) on page 55:
QUOTE
"The Rule against Bias. A true judicial decision can be reached only if the judge himself is impartial. This is
an obvious requirement in a court of law or a tribunal. In R. v Rand (1866) it was held that a judge is
disqualified where (i) he has a direct pecuniary interest, however small, in the subject-matter in dispute; or (ii)
there is real likelihood that the judge would have a bias in favour of one of the parties.
For example, if a judge is related to, or is a friend of, one of the parties to a dispute there would be real
likelihood of bias. It is immaterial whether a judicial decision was in fact biased, for as was said by Lord
Chief Justice Heward in R. v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy (1924): 'Justice should not only be done, but
should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.'
As an example of pecuniary bias we may quote:
Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal (1852). Lord Chancellor Cottenham made decrees in a Chancery suit in
favour of a canal company. Lord Cottenham held several shares in the company. Held: (by the House of
Lords): that the decrees be set aside on the ground of pecurniary interest. No bias was proved in fact, nor
could it be shown that Lord Cottenham was in any way influenced by his shareholding.
As an example of likelihood of bias we may quote:
R. v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy (1924). A was summoned before magistrates for a motoring
offence. The acting clerk to the justices was a member of a firm of solicitors representing A in civil
proceedings arising out of the same accident. The acting clerk did not advise the magistrates, but he retired
with them to consider their decision. Held: that as the acting clerk was connected with the case in the civil
action he ought not to advise the magistrates in the criminal prosecution. Conviction accordingly quashed,
despite the fact that the acting clerk took no part in the decision to convict and had not been asked by the
justices to give his opinion or advice. "
END QUOTE
.
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1986/11.html
BROWN v. THE QUEEN [1986] HCA 11; (1986) 160 CLR 171 No. F.C. 86/010 (20 March 1986)
QUOTE
3. The question for decision is whether s.80 contains an imperative and indispensable requirement that the
trial must be by jury whenever the accused is charged on indictment with an offence against a law of the
Commonwealth, or whether the section is intended to secure for the benefit and protection of any person so
charged a right or privilege which the accused may waive if the law governing the conduct of the trial permits
it. The argument that the requirement is indispensable and cannot be waived is an obvious enough one. The
words of s.80 appear to be both clear and mandatory; read literally, they appear to mean that "if there be an
indictment, there must be a jury", as Higgins J. said in R. v. Archdall and Roskruge; Ex parte Carrigan and
Brown (1928) 41 CLR 128, at p 139, and they do not expressly admit any exception to that rule.
4. It then becomes necessary to consider the purpose which the framers of the Constitution had, or must be
supposed to have had, in including the provisions of s.80 in the Constitution. The requirement that there
should be a trial by jury was not merely arbitrary or pointless. It must be inferred that the purpose of the
section was to protect the accused - in other words, to provide the accused with a "safeguard against the
corrupt or over-zealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge": Duncan v.
Louisiana (1968) 391 US 145, at p 156 (20 L.Ed.2d 491, at p 500). Those who advocate the retention of the
jury system almost invariably place in the forefront of their argument the proposition (sometimes rhetorically
expressed but not without some truth) that the jury is a bulwark of liberty, a protection against tyranny and
arbitrary oppression, and an important means of securing a fair and impartial trial.
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END QUOTE
In my submission this matter should be now heard before a jury as it appears to me that I
unlikely will be able to obtain any FAIR and PROPER hearing. And such a hearing before A
Jury can only come about if the Court can invoke jurisdiction in the first place. As after all the
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION requires the court to consider on the basis of all the
details/information that was provided to the court if the court can invoke jurisdiction or not.
As this issue of OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION has been part of the litigation at least since I
submitted my written submissions in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT for the 20 August 2015
hearing before the Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud, then the omission (nothing new)
of the Prosecutor to provide relevant details/information but simply disregarding the totality of
the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION despite my extensive set out in my written material then
the Court is left no option but to conclude that my OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION all along
was unopposed and hence the Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud ought to have issued
orders that the Court had no jurisdiction and the summons was struck out with cost. This would
have been in my view the proper course of action by the Court and in my submission the County
Court of Victoria as to determine jurisdiction should have substituted the orders that were issued
on 20 August 2015 with orders as such. This means that the 17 September 2015 orders were a
nullity for that also.
However, if the Court holds that as no appeal was filed against the interlocutory orders and no
final orders were issued on 20 August 2015 then the orders of 17 September 2015 can be
substituted to show that the Court strike out the summons with cost due to lack of jurisdiction.
The County Court of Victoria then can find that in view of the amended orders of the magistrates
Court of Victoria as St Arnaud having now struck out the Summons then the appeal itself no
further can be heard and is without prejudice dismissed.
The court further restrains the Municipal Fire Prevention Officer, Buloke Shire Council and its
legal representatives to institute any further legal proceedings against the Appellant without first
having obtained the leave of the court.
In my submission the court has an obligation to set Mr Wayne Wall, Buloke Shire Council and
its legal representatives as an example and warning to others they better do not engage in this
line of appalling conduct to abuse and misuse the legal processes uncalled for.
As Mr Wayne Wall decided to pursue matters by way of summons then clearly this includes my
right to have the matter heard before a jury, where the matter were to proceed for a full blown
out hearing of witnesses, etc.
I may underline that I have written about the issue of juries, and not only that this is embedded as
a legal principle but also that it has to be as they juries existed at time of federation and not one
that can be manipulated by the Parliament and/or the State Government for majority decision of
jurors.
The written submissions in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT that was before His Honour
Mullaly J on 30 October 2015 PRE APPEAL HEARING again referred to the OBJECTION TO
JURISDICTION. Therefore there can be absolutely no doubt that I did yet again rely upon it, and
my subsequent various written submissions in the documentation titled ADDRESS TO THE
COURT continue to repeat the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION. If therefore His Honour were
not to accept that the appeal is subject to the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION despite that this
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION is not so to say something new that fell out of the sky but
actually was part from onset of the litigation even before the hearing commenced on 20 August
2015 before the Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud, then His Honour would actually
deny me a hearing DE NOVO. This as I am not permitted my rights in regard of the
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION that I was from onset entitled upon.
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It is clear that the Magistrates Court of Victoria to be able to exercise any jurisdiction faced with
the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION could not do so unless it disposed of the OBJECTION
TO JURISDICTION that it was dismissed. Not that I seek to indicate that this would have been
legally appropriate to do so. Neither on 230 August 2015 or 17 September 2015 did the Court
then dismiss the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION and therefore this is a life issue. If the
Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud failed to invoke jurisdiction then any orders of 17
September 2015 are no orders at all as they are ULTRA V IRFES without any legal meaning.
This County Court of Victoria cannot deny me the right of Appeal of a hearing DE NOVO
merely because of the terminology as His Honour interpret them to be and ion the process
actually rob me of a hearing DE NOVO and so my legal rights.
Clearly if the Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud didnt invoke any jurisdiction then
regardless the Notice of Appeal must be served upon the Prosecutor (Buloke Shire Council)
nevertheless this cannot imply or otherwise grand the prosecutor a legal standing that didnt exist
as from the moment I provided to the Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud my written
submissions in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT regarding my OBJECTION TO
JURISDICTION.
The prosecutor not having any legal standing on 20 August 2015 and on 17 September 2015
cannot because of an appeal process gain a legal standing!
.
What this would mean that any court could side step an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION and
causing orders to be issued to which it had no jurisdiction and then on appeal this cannot be
redressed. In my submission His Honour made a error in law and unless and until the court issue
sealed orders still issue orders to ensure that the hearing of the APPEAL is subject to a hearing of
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION
I acknowledge that likely the County Court of Victoria may never have encountered a position
where an appellant did oppose the courts jurisdiction other than that I likewise did so
successfully on 19 July 2006 in the appeals of FAILING TO VOTE.
This is why I am proud not to be a lawyer, but a CONSTITUTIONALIST as I rely upon the true
meaning and application of the constitution.
The State of Victoria is created within section 106 of the Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act 1900 (UK) subject to this constitution
His Honour on 17 May 2016 at the Ballarat venue also appeared to have a different view as to
what constitutes legal representation etc.
As in my early days (more than 30 years ago) at the Bar table a judge made clear that it is not for
a judge to guess what a party may have intended, what is required is to show to the court relevant
correspondence between the parties that proves to the court what was communicated, as the court
was not privy to the communication otherwise.
My step daughter became a lawyer more than 30 years ago but go her horror then discovered that
when her parents had naturalised and they had the belief she was also the government had
omitted to do so, as it seemed go do with numerous other cases, and as such at that time while
she could do her articles she couldnt become a member of the Bar and so neither a legal
practitioner.
The Supreme Court of Victoria in the Moller case stated its position as to a lawyer not desiring to
make an oath to the Crown why then he couldnt be admitted as a Member to the Bar.
Moller v Board of Examiners for Legal Practitioners [1999] VSCA 116 (30 July 1999):
QUOTE
1.
Although there is substance in a number of these individual submissions, they are, in my view, not really to
the point in this appeal and of little assistance to the appellant since they raise no question of error in the
judge's reasons. As Street, C.J. Said in Re Howard [1976] 1 N.S.W.L.R., 641 at 646:"The taking of the oath of allegiance in association with admission to practice is part of
the formal ceremony attendant thereon, but the law is clear that the bond of allegiance
p18
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exists at common law, independently of whether the oath be taken or not. The formal
taking of the oath has significance in a ceremonial, but not a legal, sense. It is customary,
on admission ceremonies, to remind those newly admitted that the significance of the
oath is that the Sovereign represents the fountainhead of law and justice - the oath is a
pledge of service to the symbol of law and justice ."
And in Miller, at 383, Young, C.J. said:"But it remains important that a candidate for admission should take an oath of allegiance
to the Sovereign. Parliament has provided that it is one of the essential prerequisites for
admission to practise. In so providing Parliament has required a candidate for admission
to do what every high office holder in this State does upon his assumption of office. The
provision is thus a recognition by Parliament of the importance attaching to admission to
practise as a barrister and solicitor."
18. The thrust of these passages remains, I think, relevant, notwithstanding that it is now the Rules of Court,
rather than Parliament itself, which impose the obligation to take the oath of allegiance, and also that
various governments may have in cases such as the adoption of Australian citizenship substituted a pledge
of loyalty to Australia for the oath of allegiance to the Sovereign.
END QUOTE
I understand that my (now) step-daughter became a legal officer with a municipal council in
Melbourne. As such at the time not being able to practice law she and so many other lawyers do
are engaged in legal issues. They just cannot then represent the municipal council in court as a
legal practitioner. Even many who become barristers may never have actually been in a court as
to represent a party (unless they appear in their own case). They may become barristers without
serving in any court at the Bar table.
I met my (now) step-daughter when I was representing a party and well after her father died I
married her mother. And years later I did ask her if she was still upset about having been
defeated by me, but I recall her stating something like No Dad, you were the better lawyer of
the day. You learned it as the old English lawyers from doing cases..
The case then was about property, and the agreement to settle was on basis of proceeds and I
detected this not being net proceeds and as such the law firm involved was faced that the
agreement was immediately accepted by the party I represented, only for the other party not
wanting to accept afterwards the Agreement as it held it should have been net proceeds. When
a law firm dealing in real estate matters draft an agreement it hardly can be argued they are
unaware as to the difference between net proceeds and proceeds and as such they were
doomed to lose any litigation. Likewise, way back in about 1985 a Counsel objected to what he
considered close writings in violation to the courts rules. We end up with a hearing to determine
what was appropriate being 6 mm between the lines. At the end of the hearing His Honour held I
was correct that 6mm between the lines means base line to base line as a 6mm lined page and not
between the lowest part of a line and the highest part of the next line because that could cause
lines to jump all over the place. Consider for example if the lowest line had merely the word
hoon or moon or goon.
With my self-professed crummy English I tend to often defeat opponents on the meaning of
English words this is because they have always assumed some meaning whereas I am foreign to
the language and then research what it may mean in various ways and so often was able to show
that the word had a certain meaning that was different then the opponent lawyer perceived, or for
that even a trial judge. The meaning of DE NOVO is a clear example.
In any event as the lecture I received from the judge about putting matters in writing as otherwise
the court has no way to establish what was conveyed then my writings that I didnt accept service
nor that I acknowledged them to represent the lawyers as legal representatives cannot be
undermined by the fact that legally I am obligated to nevertheless write to them and
communicate otherwise with them.
p19
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If I had failed to do so the Court could have held that I failed to serve a Notice of appeal and so I
have no appeal to be heard. Clearly, I would be robbed of a hearing DE NOVO if somehow I
could be forced by legislation to ab and one my rights of a hearing DE NOVO by following legal
procedures. In my view it would not be what Parliament intended to do. It must be held that
while Parliament provided with a regime to orderly enable communication it was not to
undermine either party as to lose legal rights merely of following them.
What however is clear that as indicated in:
https://elo.legalaid.qld.gov.au/webdocs/dbtextdocs/internal/irregseries/cle/1997/s222just.pdf
QUOTE
(ii) To apply for leave to serve out of time
- must demonstrate no fault of appellant, e.g., by affidavit from
appellant and any other person who may assist
- may have to demonstrate prospects of success; this may
require material which discloses what evidence was given, what
submissions were made, the decision and reasons, and the basis
on which the result is aid to be appealable.
END QUOTE
https://www.courtsni.gov.uk/enGB/Judicial%20Decisions/PublishedByYear/Documents/2001/2001%20NIQB%2024/j_j_HIGC3453.htm
QUOTE
Thus a defendant is obliged to serve a notice to defend in Form 42 within 21 days from service of the Civil
Bill. Service of a notice to defend outside the 21 day period is only permitted with the consent in writing of
the other party or with the leave of the court. No consent was sought nor was any application made for leave
to serve out of time.
END QUOTE
And
https://www.courtsni.gov.uk/enGB/Judicial%20Decisions/PublishedByYear/Documents/2001/2001%20NIQB%2024/j_j_HIGC3453.htm
QUOTE
Counsel on behalf of the plaintiff submitted that what the defendant proposed was an abuse of process. No
intention to defend has been lodged, yet the defendant proposes to defend the proceedings in the High Court
on appeal. It was accepted that the defendant had a right to appeal preserved by statute, but that appeal was
limited to the proceedings on 1 October 1999, related to the assessment of damages. The defendant could
have appealed the default judgment and is now out of time or could have sought to set it aside. He has done
none of those things.
The Notice of Intention to Defend is an important part of the Civil Bill process in the County Court.
Service of the Notice determines the nature of the proceedings whether defended or undefended. It informs
the Chief Clerk when and before whom the case should be listed. Thus Order 8 Rule 2 requires a defendant
who intends to defend to serve Notice on the other party or parties within 21 days. A decision not to serve a
Notice of Intention to Defend or failure to do so, informs the court that the case is undefended. However,
Order 8 Rule 2(2) provides a saving clause where, for good reason, no notice to defend has been served
within the requisite time period. The parties can consent to late service or the court may grant leave. The
court could refuse leave, in which situation the case remains undefended. There is no reason why a refusal of
leave could not be appealed. The word decree in Article 60 of the County Court Order means no more than
an order of that court.
The instant case when it appeared in the list of the District Judge on 1 October 1999 was an
undefended matter in which the courts function was to assess damages, which it did. The decree or order of
the court on that day was an assessment of damages in a case in which interlocutory judgment had already
been entered. The defendant appeals against that order and submits that he has a right to a hearing on the
merits in the appellate court. However the case still remains an undefended case, as no notice of intention to
defend has been lodged and as an undefended case the only issue which can be the subject of appeal is the
assessment of damages. No appeal has been lodged against the interlocutory judgment. Can an appeal
against an assessment of damages, where interlocutory judgment is entered, convert an undefended case into
a defended case? I do not think it can. An appeal from the County Court to the High Court may be a
rehearing, but it is a rehearing of what was litigated in the court below. It does not seem to me that a
defendant can fail to observe the rules in the County Court and expect the High Court to ignore his failure
and treat an undefended case as a defended case. This would ignore the purpose of the rules.
In Davis v NI Carriers [199] NI 19 Lowry LCJ (as he then was) said at page 20:
Where a time-limit is imposed by statute it cannot be extended unless that or
another statute contains a dispensing power. Where the time is imposed by rules
of court which embody a dispensing power, such as that found in Order 64, rule
p20
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7, the court must exercise its discretion in each case, and for that purpose the
relevant principles are:
(1)
whether the time is sped: a court will, where the reason is a
good one, look more favourably on an application made before the time
is up;
(2)
when the time-limit has expired, the extent to which the party
applying is in default;
(3)
the effect on the opposite party of granting the application and,
in particular, whether he can be compensated by costs;
(4)
whether a hearing on the merits has taken place or would be
denied by refusing an extension;
(5)
whether there is a point of substance (which in effect means a
legal point of substance when dealing with cases stated) to be made
which could not otherwise be put forward; and
(6)
whether the point is of general, and not merely particular
significance.
To these I add the important principle:
(7)
that the rules of court are there to be observed.
In this connection I could not hope to improve on what Lord Guest has said in
Ratnam v. Cumarasamy [1965] 1 W.L.R. 8, 12:
The rules of court must prima facie be obeyed, and in
order to justify a court in extending the time during which
some step in procedure requires to be taken there must be
some material upon which the court can exercise its
discretion. If the law were otherwise, a party in breach
would have an unqualified right to an extension of time
which would defeat the purpose of the rules, which is to
provide a time table for the conduct of litigation.
The importance of the rules and compliance with them cannot be overlooked. Various savings are provided
by the County Court Rules where for good reason, the Rules have not been complied with. The issue of
liability has never been litigated in the County Court. The purpose of an appeal is to allow a party,
dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, to appeal against the decision of the lower court. The
County Court has not determined the merits of the liability issue other than to enter judgment by default. It
cannot be good law for the question of liability to be litigated for the first time in the appellate court.
Therefore my ruling is that the only issue on appeal is the assessment of damages.
END QUOTE
That where a party fails to file in time a Notice of Appearance then it is an undefended case.
It is remarkable that despite I do not have any obligation to do so I nevertheless reminded the
lawyers about the need to file an application for Leave to file and serve out of time a Notice of
Appearance albeit indicating I would oppose it. Still, it therefore cannot be argued they
somehow overlooked this and were unaware of it.
Therefore it was not for His Honour on 17 May 2016 as to somehow circumvent this because as
His Honour himself made clear that there is a separation of powers, when asking as to the
Attorney-Generals ability to get involved, where I stated that because the case was conducted
under state legal provisions of the County Fire Authority Act 1958 under delegated powers then
it was essentially a State prosecution. (Sydney Council v Commonwealth HCA 1904).
Buloke Shire Council has no delegated powers to maned the County Fire Authority Act 1958as
it has no such authorisation from the Parliament, and Mr Wayne Wall as the Municipal Fire
Protection Officer cannot amend the terms of the legislation upon his wimps either. He is bound
to comply with the legislation as is.
p21
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Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28 (28 April 1998)
Dawson J pointed out in Hunter Resources Ltd v Melville when discussing the statutory provision in
that case: "substantial compliance with the relevant statutory requirement was not possible.
Either there was compliance or there was not."
The reasoning of Fullagar J in Clayton v. Heffron (supra) in relation to the provisions of s 5B of the Constitution
Act 1902 (NSW) is material in this context:
"A manner and form are prescribed by section 5B, and that manner and form must be observed if a valid law
is to be produced. Any prescription of manner and form may be repealed or amended, but, while it stands, the
process prescribed by it must be followed. That was decided Trethowan's case and I think that the whole of
what is prescribed by section 5B relates to manner and form. It does not seem to me to be possible to say that
some of the requirements of the section are matters of manner and form while others are not. The section
describes one entire process - a series of steps, one following on another - and only the completion of the
entire process can produce a valid law." (Supra at 262)
It would be an absurdity that Parliament provides for certain legislation and Mr Wayne Wall as
Municipal Fire Prevention Officer could willy nilly amend this on his own accord. Why have this
elaborate system of a Parliament at cost of billions is someone can circumvent this upon his
wimps?
While His Honour raised the issue of the Local Government Act this clearly has been set out
extensively that this is unconstitutional and had His Honour read my written submissions in the
ADDRESS TO THE COURT such as 22 February 2016 and its supplements His Honour would
have been well aware of my set out.
Constitutionally local government is the State government and Central government is the
Federal Government and while the state can delegate powers it cannot create a level of
government not anticipated nor permitted in the provisions of the constitution.
Because to set this out at a Bar table verbally can be horrendous, in particular where I have
hearing problems (despite the yet again changed hearing aid systems) and also judges tend to
interrupt rather than waist for a few hours or days for me to explain it all verbally the ADDRESS
TO THE COURT is therefore the perfect vehicle to do so. Then again if a judge fails to consider
it then well as the Full court made clear a judge must consider it for judgment,.
As such having placed before the court this issue, as I did 10 years ago and not a single AttorneyGeneral then challenged my submissions including the section 78B NOTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES then I am entitled that as at the time the Attorney-General Mr
Robert Hulls stated that the State of Victoria would abide by the decision of the court.
Mr Wayne Wall Legal Officer might be the legal officer of Buloke Shire Council as ES&a
Associates referred to representing him in the matter but that is for Buloke Shire Council, and not
as to representing Mr Wayne Wall as the Municipal Fire Protection Officer within delegated
powers of the Country Fire Authority Act 1958. As such the difference is clear the legal
officer can be to deal with matters of Buloke Shire Council by-laws but the Municipal Fire
Protection Officer is so to say a different category of fish. He cannot enforce council by laws
merely for being a Municipal Fire protection Officer. He may not need to be a lawyer at all but
an expert in firefighting to understand and comprehend the dangers associated with fires.
It would be absurd to hold that because Mr Wayne Wall might be the legal officer for Buloke
Shire Council than somehow he against a better legal position than any other person who is
appointed as a Municipal fire Protection officer such as a captain of a local fire brigade. No such
intention appears to have been presented by the Country fire /authority act 1958 and as such the
court cannot somehow put a meaning into that.
As my previous filed written submissions in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT extensively deal
with that then I am entitled to hold the court will know the difference.
While Buloke Shire Council is legally permitted to appoint whomever as a Municipal shire
Protection Officer within the meaning of the Country fire Authority Act 19058 and it can remove
him as it pleases to reassign him. In fact they can sack Mr Wayne Wall for any wrong doing it
p22
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holds affects his position as a legal officer, it cannot however deal with a complaint in relation to
him as to the exercise of being a Municipal Fire Protection Officer.
There are good reasons for this.
After all the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 permits the Municipal fire protection officer to
take action against both the properties held by the State as well as council. Hence, any complaint
about his conduct must be dealt with not by the council but by the Officer of the country fire
authority and only upon submission to the Governor in Council can action be taken to remove a
Municipal fire Protection Office r from his position as to any alleged misconduct.
Parliament provided for this protection to ensure that the Municipal Fire Protection Officer
cannot be intimidated by the government or council for having at their cost dangerous areas
cleared. Therefore, as I recall it, whereas ES&a Associates claimed (in their correspondencereproduced in previous written submissions in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT) to represent Mr
Wayne Wall as the LEGAL OFFICER for Buloke Shire Council then clearly they do not
represent Mr Wayne Wall Municipal Fire Protection Officer acting under delegated powers of
the State Government: but any officer so nominated shall be subject to the general direction and
control of the Authority and the Chief Officer.
Country Fire Authority Act 1958 No. 6228 of 1958
QUOTE
45 Power to Governor in Council to transfer municipal officers' powers
(1) Where the Governor in Council is satisfied upon a report of the Authority that the powers and
duties conferred and imposed by this Part upon the fire prevention officer of a municipal council
are not being properly and efficiently carried out in the municipal district of any municipal council,
the Governor in Council may by Order published in the Government Gazette direct that such
powers and duties shall for such period as is specified in the Order be vested in and imposed upon a
person nominated by the Authority for the purpose in respect of any part of the country area of
Victoria within the municipal district but any officer so nominated shall be subject to the general
direction and control of the Authority and the Chief Officer.
(2)Upon the publication of any such Order the powers and duties of such fire prevention officer shall for
the specified period be so vested in and imposed upon the person named or referred to in the Order,
and the provisions of this Division shall with the necessary adaptations be read and construed
accordingly, and the expenses of the carrying out of such powers and duties, as determined by the
Governor in Council, shall (to the extent that they are not otherwise paid or recovered) be borne by
and may irrespective of amount be recovered from the municipal council by the Authority in the
Magistrates' Court as a civil debt recoverable summarily.
46 Failure by public authority etc. to observe provisions of this Act
Where the Authority upon the report of the Chief Officer or other officer exercising the powers of
the Chief Officer is satisfied that the powers and duties conferred and imposed by this Division
upon any administrative unit or public authority or upon any officer thereof or upon any municipal
council are not being properly and efficiently carried out on and in relation to any land vested in or
under the management or control of such administrative unit public authority or municipal council
or on and in relation to any road the maintenance of which is charged upon such administrative unit
public authority or municipal council, the Authority shall report thereon to the Governor in Council,
and thereupon the Governor in Council may take such action in the matter as he thinks fit.
I should be the last person having to explain to a court that there is a major difference in
legal position. As the legislation makes clear the Fire Prevention Officer is shall be subject to
the general direction and control of the Authority and the Chief Officer and not subject t to the directions
in that function to Buloke Shire council.
The fire prevention officer in his own rights can pursue by way of summons for any debt
incurred in relation to the clearance of land.
Country Fire Authority Act 1958 No. 6228 of 1958
QUOTE
41E
p23
Fire prevention infringement notices
Appeal 15-2502

(1) An authorised officer may serve a fire prevention infringement notice on a person the officer has
reason to believe has committed an offence against section 41D.
(1A) An offence referred to in subsection (1) for which a fire prevention infringement notice may be
served is an infringement offence within the meaning of the Infringements Act 2006.
(2) In addition to and without limiting section 12 of the Infringements Act 2006, a fire prevention
infringement notice under subsection (1) may be served in accordance with section 41A.
(3) The infringement penalty for an offence against section 41D is 10 penalty units.
*
(8) In this section, authorised officer means
(b)
(a) if the fire prevention notice was served by a fire prevention officer, a person appointed for
the purpose by the relevant municipal council;
if the fire prevention notice was served by the Chief Officer, a person appointed for the purpose by
the Chief Officer.
END QUOTE
The problems however is that to my understanding the Fire Prevention Officer is not listed as a
enforcement agency as obviously his/her identity is subject to changes of appointments and as
such I submit the Country Fire Authority itself must be deemed to be the enforcement agency
and nothing to do with Buloke Shire Council.
The by me challenged Infringement Act on constitutional grounds also requires a certain regime
to be followed and so also the Magistrates Court of Victoria legislative provisions, to which none
were followed.
As I did set out in past written submissions Mr Wayne Wall as the municipal Fire Prevention
Officer should have withdrawn the fire prevention Notice as to issue an Infringement Notice. The
Infringement Notice should have been withdrawn upon the issue of the summons. However the
Summons that was issued relies on both!
In the Colosimo case then too a Notice was issued, which the about 20 lawyers involved in the
case all overlooked how this was applicable and that the litigation subsequently instituted against
Mr Colosimo was all defective. Mr Colosimo was originally represented b y a barrister and law
lecturer but ended up being placed under administration where even Victoria Legal Aid advised
Mr Colosimo in writing he had to purge his contempt, where as I about 2 years later took over
the case to show that no contempt ever was or could have been committed, and the
administration orders were on appeal set aside as I proved the medical assessment were based
upon the non-existing conviction of contempt of court.
This was one of many cases where the lawyers and judicial officers went on and on in litigation,
at least 6 CONTEMPT OF COURT hearings only for me to take over and show Mr Colosimo
actually was never even formally charge with contempt of court, let alone convicted. Yet the
medical reports organised by the Office of the Public Advocate rested upon the advice of the
Public Advocate such conviction was made. Her Honour Harbison J is recorded in transcript to
deny Her Honour convicted Mr Colosimo when I did put this to Her Honour.
This to me shows the gigantic waste of court time and other resources where an innocent man
can be robbed of his liberty and subjected to Orders of Administration where he was all along
100% in the right but all the lawyers including the judicial officers didnt grasp the basics of
what the case was about, despite their competence in English language where I with my selfprofessed crummy English exposed the true facts of the case to succeed to get rid of litigation
and Administration orders.
The same was with my assistance in the Pauline Hanson/David Ettridge cases where I exposed in
my book INSPECTOR-RIKATI on Citizenship published about 5 weeks prior to the
Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal how it had all be based upon incorrect
interpretation/understanding of the relevant legislation.
p24
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While lawyers appearing at the Bar table ordinary do not bother to introduce themselves to me
and not provide eve n their business card in the end they may just discover that if they look down
upon me not being a lawyer they just are not even so to say reaching my ankles where it comes to
the true meaning and application of the constitution. How can anyone have respect for lawyers
who are so ignorant to even ordinary courtesy, I wonder?
When I was a constitutional; consultant to a law firm I discovered that a lawyer having for his
life been in real estate litigation and having proudly announced to me his extensive knowledge in
the end some of the basic legal provisions relating to the constitution had never been considered
by him. After challenging me on this and checking that indeed I was correct he at least admitted
that he had been wrong.
As human beings we will make errors from time to time and that so to say is part of our DNA but
when one come across lawyers like ES&a Associates who will be determine to ignore
rules/regulations and other legal provisions and refuse to comply with His Honour Mullaly J 30
October 2015 orders, even so having requested the orders as such themselves, then surely I am
proud not to be a lawyer and to pursue the true meaning and application of the constitution and
JUSTICE rather than monies.
As for the position of Mr Wayne wall his position as a Municipal Fire Prevention Officer may
allow a person to sue him for derelict of duties and negligence where this results in harm and/or
he acted outside the legal provisions of delegated powers. He is not then acting as a legal officer
of Buloke Shire Council but under the purported authority of the Country Fire Authority. Hence,
Buloke Shire Council ordinary cannot be sued for any errors Mr Wayne Wall as Municipal Fire
Prevention Officer may make, however now that Buloke Shire Council instituted the litigation,
so ES&a Associates claims, even so my previous written submissions proved that a councillor
made clear via email not to understand any of the litigation, then it is that ES&a Associates are
litigating without true consent of Buloke Shire Council as they are to represent Mr Wayne Wall
the Municipal Fire Protection Officer. As such, ES&a associates never seemed to bother to even
establish the legal position of Mr Wayne Wall and who their client really is.
As a person forced to pay the unconstitutional rates they are using my monies also paid to
Buloke Shire Council to litigate against me in a vexatious case on behalf of Buloke Shire Council
which I view has no legal standing to litigate.
And this is the kind of litigation that is going on and on before the courts as I understand it all
over Australia and well all the court rules/regulations and other legal provisions and even court
orders are so to say thrown in the gutter by lawyers not interested to check legalities but
determine to at all cost defeat an opponent no matter the illegalities they have to employ in the
process as to make themselves a lot of money.
That is the reality I learned from checking legal files of lawyers and no matter my reports to
Attorney-General they are all basically ignored. As such it only escalates and new upcoming law
students will learn also the same tricks how to deceive and undermine the judicial system to the
advantage of their clients with immunity!
This is why I take a stand and I view any judge should do so likewise and act as a sentry as a
judge of a court is obligated to do as a judicial officer.
A judge is not part of Government! His/Her position is to resolve conflicts between a
government and a citizen impartially an d without bias and without himself substituting or appear
to be substituting the Prosecutors case as if it is his own case.
A judge may receive his pay from the State Government as Mr Wayne Wall does from Buloke
Shire Council but that doesnt mean that a judge then so to say is the lapdog of the State
government.
Just as an example a person can be an executor of an estate and can make an incorrect decision,
and then the Estate might be sued but not the executor personally, unless the court finds that the
decision made involved a personal decision or otherwise which fell outside the ordinary
executive powers of an executor.
p25
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.
In my submission constitutionally a judicial officer should receive his monies from the Court
funds. The Chief Justice to place before the parliament his overall budget including cost for
maintaining court venues, employment of staff, etc, and so also for the payment of judges.
Actually the same is with as Speaker of the Lower House/House of Representatives and the
President of the Upper House/Senate which are individual entities within the constitution and any
and all payments should come from their budgets.
HANSARD 16-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention)
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-No, there would be no prohibition in that respect. The offices of
Speaker and Chairman of Committees are not offices of profit under the Crown. They are parliamentary
offices, and Parliament has always retained a power over its own Estimates to the extent that really the
Speaker and President of the local Chambers have always exercised a right to submit their own Estimates, and
those Estimates, as a rule, as far as I know in practice in my own colony, are altogether untouched by the
Government of the day. Now, these are political offices, but not offices of profit under the Crown. I think that
that is the principle that Parliament has always asserted in England and elsewhere. As to the word "person,"
the British Interpretation Act of 1889, which will be largely applied to the construction of this statute by the
Imperial authorities, provides that where the word "person" is used, unless the Act otherwise provides, the
word "corporation" shall be included.
Mr. HIGGINS (Victoria).-If a man agrees to get paid for services done in Parliament, or for the
Commonwealth, and if he does the work, and, having done the work, he resigns, is there no penalty? Is there
no punishment in such a case for a man who guarantees that he will use his position in Parliament in order to
make money, and, having made it, resigns!
Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-No; and there is a reason for that. If I recollect correctly there was
some provision in the Bill in Adelaide in that respect, but that provision was omitted in the sitting of the
Convention at Sydney as a matter [start page 2449] of policy. Mr. O'Connor suggests that it is quite probable
that in such a case an action would lie at common law. However that may be, the policy of inserting such a
provision was reversed in Sydney, and therefore the Drafting Committee could not frame any proposal to that
effect.
END QUOTE
Again The offices of Speaker and Chairman of Committees are not offices of profit under
the Crown. Each as like the Chief Justice and the Inter-State Commission are conducting their
own budgets not subject to any Government interference that might pursue to manipulate its
powers in that manner but to be subject to the Parliament as to the funding of the budget
submitted.
If this were actually followed we wouldnt have a government closing down court venues as to
place some obstacle course before opponents to make it extremely difficult for them to attend to
a court venue.
When Chief Justice Fails to ensure that matters are conducted within a budget, including court
facilities, and leaves it up to the Government of the Day to dictate what suits itself the best then
we cannot speak of an separation of powers but we have so to say in my submission a lapdog
judiciary. Never should any court produce some kind of achievement report as to conviction rates
to justify the Government of the Day to provide funds to the judiciary. This is not what the
impartial and independent administration is about.
.
The purpose of having restrictions of lawyers only being permitted to be legal practitioners is a
money pit for clients and a banking venue for the lawyers. As a CONSTITUTIONALIST I
cannot fall within the regulations of the Legal Service Commission albeit they tried badly but
failed, I can represent parties without financial interest and do so because my family crest is the
Guardian Angel (200 years before it was known as St Michaels the Guardian Angel as
p26
Appeal 15-2502

displayed proudly on my letterhead) and so to say it is in my DNA to pursue JUSTICE without
seeking financial reward.
Never mind the lack of formal legal education, I so to say have lawyers for breakfast when it
comes to constitutional matters. Anyone calling himself a constitutional lawyer refers to an
oxymoron. Like a firebug-firefighter.
I have absolutely no doubt that any honourable judicial officer will grasp my writings and will
act as a sentry to ensure that the true meaning and application of the constitution is applied,
including the existence of impartial courts, separated from any government.
Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian
Convention)
QUOTE
Mr. HIGGINS.-Suppose the sentry is asleep, or is in the swim with the other power?
Mr. GORDON.-There will be more than one sentry. In the case of a federal law, every member
of a state Parliament will be a sentry, and, every constituent of a state Parliament will be a
sentry. As regards a law passed by a state, every man in the Federal Parliament will be a
sentry, and the whole constituency behind the Federal Parliament will be a sentry.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Sir JOHN DOWNER.I think we might, on the attempt to found this great Commonwealth, just advance one step, not beyond
the substance of the legislation, but beyond the form of the legislation, of the different colonies, and say
that there shall be embedded in the Constitution the righteous principle that the Ministers of the
Crown and their officials shall be liable for any arbitrary act or wrong they may do, in the same way as
any private person would be.
END QUOTE
Likewise, a judge of a court who issue orders in disregard of not invoking jurisdiction can be
personally sued for this as he acts as a private person when disregarding the legal processes that
are required to be followed. Hence, for example, I am legally entitled to sue the judicial officer
who issued the 17 September 2015 orders against me in the magistrates Court of Victoria at St
Arnaud, as he acted as a private person where he disregarded first to deal with the OBJECTION
TO JURISDICTION. As such legally the 17 September 2015 orders are no orders at all.
However, an appeal exist (again) against the not making of orders, which includes the failing to
issue orders regarding the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION.
.
Were the court to proceed to purportedly hear the matter DE NOVO when in fact it denied the
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION that was before the court against which the appeal lies, then
the Appellant would give evidence that Mr Wayne Wall Municipal Fire Protection Officer by
prior arrangement attended to the Berriwillock property on 6 November 2015 where a like Fire
Protection Notice was issued and then indicated that what he required was some removal of
growth between some sheds (that are situated near the middle of the property) and so other
areas. As such it was a totally different kind of requirement then the fire Protection Notice
indicated year after year. Also, as for example the area between the sheds is more than 40 metres
from the road way then Mr Wayne Wall wouldnt have had any ability to observe this from the
road. As such he must have entered the property without having requested neither obtained prior
permission to do so. The appellant will give evidence that contrary to the Fire Protection Notice
Mr Wayne Wall then made known that all he needed was that the overgrow be heaped up in a
pile and as such not required at all to be removed from the property as stated in the Fire
Protection Notice.
While the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 authorise the Municipal Fire Protection Officer to
have the removal of dangerous growth removed, this is not to pretend that Mr Wayne Wall as
Municipal fire Protection Officer then will nilly can enter any property to his wimps to look
around if he can find something he might be able to use.
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As such, where the ,legislation doesnt provide for any access then the Parliament must have held
that any inspection must be resting upon what can reasonably observed from when the Municipal
Fire Protection Officer can see it when he is so to say standing in front of the property.
The High court of Australia made various rulings including against those serving warrants, etc. It
is clear that ordinary a person can enter a property as to be able to contact the
homeowner/occupier unless there is a notification by signage or otherwise that entry is
prohibited. The Appellant will give evidence that he had erected such signage at the fence line of
the property. However because what is known as the appellant being an absentee landholder then
there was clearly no need for Mr Wayne Wall to enter the property as he was sending the fire
Prevention Notice to the Appellants residential address in Viewbank (Melbourne) and as such
well aware he couldnt contact the appellant at the property.
Obviously where no evidence was placed before the magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud
then the lawyers concealed from the court that the notices were issued as result of trespassing. I
submit this is a very serious matter.
To obtain court orders with concealment of relevant fact by this is perverting the course of
justice.
.
No brief existed even as at 30 October 2015 before His Honour Mullaly J and as such the very
alleged images the prosecutor now relies upon where concealed from the Magistrates Court of
Victoria at St Arnaud that they were the product of trespassing.
Even if, not that this is conceded, Mr Wayne Wall had for argument sake desired to contact the
Appellant at Berriwillock, then the rulings of the High Court of Australia are very clear in that
this must be in the most direct path to the front door. Clearly walking about a property for the
purpose of taking images is not within the courts ruling.
The Appellant would give evidence that Mr Wayne Wall was advised by Jeff, the neighbour, that
he had twice slashed the property and as such it is clear that the lack of proper details in the fire
Prevention Notice in that regard also prevented Jeff to be aware what the Fire Prevention Notice
actually was referring to. And as was subsequently a year later clarified by Mr Wayne Wall
himself.
Therefore this is not some issue where a landholder was in blatant disregard to leave an alleged
fire dangerous situation, but where regardless of the fire Prevention Notice being valid or not
(albeit it doesnt alter the challenge to it) the appellant had obtained the service of Jeff and the
property had been slashed on 2 occasions.
The issue the court then would have to consider is if the defect in the Fire Prevention Notice was
the real culprit for not stating what was in issue and as such prevented a reasonable person to
understand/comprehend what was intended, in particular that the Fire Prevention Notice was
referring to all combustible material which could include even a motor vehicle, sheds, and other
buildings and wooden fence post and trees in addition to the residence itself.
Neither did Mr Wayne Wall in the purported brief include any images relating to his inspection
date when issuing the Fire Protection Notice as to indicate what he was referring to. It is
remarkable that he relies to images after the event but not shows the images, if they exist that is,
to the date of the Fire Protection Notice having been issued as to show to the court if there was
any change at all in the condition of the properly. It might be that if any images were taken from
the front of the property it would have shown a drastically differenced that would indicate the
property had been slashed since the Fire Protection Notice was issued. This even without
entering the property.
The Appellant intends to show that across the road and down the road growth directly along the
highway was up to 1 metres high and lots of dead wood. As such this is not some fire danger
issue as may be pursued but some conflict between Mr Wayne Wall and the Appellant which is
translated by Mr Wayne Wall using his Fire Protection Notices, due to earlier conflicts prior to
2014.
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Appeal 15-2502

The Appellant is to give evidence that while he is the property owner his son Richard first as a
single father and later on his own actually resides there under the condition that he looks after the
property and pays all incoming bills, and in fact the water bill was put in Richards name for this.
The Appellant would give evidence that due to drug problems Richard had various other
problems and Jeff and his wife were in their own way trying to assist Richard and Jeff was
slashing the property in that regard also to assist.
The Appellant would give evidence that in 2013 he purchased an about $2,500 valued ride on
mower to be used at Berriwillock, as he has no need for this in Viewbank, and used this in 2013
to slash the property but was advised in 2014 by Jeff that he had already slashed the property and
copies of this correspondence (emails) was provided to Mr Wayne Wall in relation to the 2014
issues.
The Appellant will give evidence that he attended in company of Mr Frank Colosimo to the
property in 2015 and as Jeff had slashed the property he did bring along fencing and other
material and spend time to clear what Mr Wayne Wall at the time on the visit indicated he held
should be cleared. No Infringement Notice resulted after that.
The submission of the appellant therefore is that the Fire Protection Notice being vague and aloof
and requiring the removal of all combustible material in violation to the legislative provisions
is the real culprit.
Has Mr Wayne Wall conducted matters in 2014 as he did in 2015 then clearly he could have
clarified what he was seeking to be attended to. He could have done so without any trespassing
as he now did in 2014.
Where Mr Wayne Wall has failed to ensure that along a busy highways the area directly along
this highway is cleared from overgrow and dead woods, etc, then also for this a landholder may
assume that the general condition left for years on end is the kind of condition that the Fire
Prevention Notice appears to indicate to be acceptable. After all Mr Wayne Wall so to say should
conduct himself as a model citizens to display the kind of clearance of a property he demands.
Despite that the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 authorised Mr Wayne Wall (not Buloke Shire
Council) as Municipal fire Protection officer to engage others to remove fire hazards even at cost
of the property owner (including State and municipal council) and this appears not to have
eventuated that the images the Appellant provided to Mr Wayne Wall long before the litigation
commenced, underlines that in real terms there was never any fire danger.
The Appellant submits that in view of the extensive communication by the Appellant to Mr
Wayne Wall from onset long before any litigation was commenced in the Magistrates Court of
Victoria at St Arnaud then a reasonable/FAIR MINDED PERSON would never have engaged in
the kind of litigation Mr Wayne Wall no engaged in. Despite that the Appellant communicated in
correspondences to be of ill health, etc, ES&a Associates nevertheless went ahead to have the
hearing held as the most difficult place of venue and dis regarded any so to say common sense
approach. The Appellant submits that considering all the correspondence by the Appellant, even
before any litigation was commenced, and since it ought to have been clear that the failure of the
fire Prevention Notice itself was the real problems by being vague and aloof.
The Appellant submits that as the lawyers for Buloke Shire Council did seek and obtain cost on
17 September 2015 in the magistrates Court of Victoria relating documents then as the appellant
I am entitled to have these documents placed on court file as they must be deemed to form part of
the court file and I am entitled to pursue them if it was not so to say mere blank pages, etc.
I am also entitled to cross examine the lawyer who obtained cost from the court regarding the
documentation, as this lawyer placed himself/herself in that position. After all this brings into
question if the lawyer claimed cost why then did the lawyer not inform the court of the content of
the documentation? The lawyer is not obligated to conduct matters on behalf of the appellant
(then the accused) but is obligated to give a brief outline of the accused writings so the court can
ascertain if the documentation are or are not relevant to the case or for all it may be a part of a
book that might be totally irrelevant to the proceedings.
p29
Appeal 15-2502

The appellant in the past cross examined a lawyer who initially refused to be cross examined but
the trail judge made clear that I had every right to do so.
It is perhaps also for this that on 17 May 2016 Alison May the legal practitioner wasnt in
attendance as I did notify her that I could cross-examine her. I do not need to subpoena her as
once she is in court room she can be called into the witness box, even as a hostile witness.
As such I had no surprise when neither Alison May or Mr Wayne Wall refrained from attending
to the Court hearing, as in some way I could have expected this.
Obviously the court has to consider if it will accept this kind of conduct or will hold them legally
accountable.
After all where ES&a Associates obtained court orders for cost regarding documentation but
never provided me with copies what they used in the hearing that too might underline how
absurd their conduct is.
It is clear that often a court will dismiss an appeal and enforce the orders appealed against. It
would be a gross injustice if a court were to do so where the original orders were say obtained in
the manner as I have set out about the 17 September 2015 orders as then the DE NOVO hearing
really is not a DE NOVO hearing at all!
What needs to be understood is that the Appeal is derived from conduct by Mr Wayne Wall and
so ES&a Associates and their conduct is relevant to the Appeal. After all had they not pursued to
obtain court orders, as they did, there would have no need for an Appeal. As such indirect
evidence is as much relevant as direct evidence to establish the conduct of Mr Wayne wall and
ES&a Associates in obtaining court orders and if in the overall of the matters their conduct was
reasonable and appropriate.
While the Legal Service Commissioner dismissed my complaint, and referred to a debt I will
pursue this matter later because whomever did do the assessment clearly failed to be open
minded and consider the true facts, as no debt existed. And as Mr Wayne Wall was not to deal
with matters as a legal officer but as the Municipal Fire Protection Officer, and as such didnt
need (if he has any) legal qualifications then in that regard I view the LSC was misguided.
After all it didnt seem to establish if Mr Wayne Wall had any legal qualifications to act as he did
where ES&a Associates refers to him as if he is acting on their behalf. As he certainly was not
nor could have acted for Buloke Shire Council as a legal officer. His position in regard of being a
Municipal Fire Protection Officer is one that he didnt need any legal qualifications but could
have been anyone who may have been trained in fire safety issues, this is another point in
contention, and as such I submit it would be inappropriate for ES&a Associates to refer to some
council worker, in this case Mr Wayne Wall as purported legal officer instead of Mr Wayne Wall
as the Municipal fire Protection officer.
Because Mr Wayne Wall as Municipal Fire Protection Officer was exercising or purport to
exercise State delegated powers outside the purported Local Government Act then his position as
a legal officer with Buloke Shire Council in my submission was totally irrelevant. In my view the
LSC failed to consider this appropriately, but as I stated I will follow this up at a later time.
Because of the issues canvassed above I consider it better to place it in writing to give advance
notification of issues so that the opponent lawyers involved can consider matters. I had many a
judge complimenting me for doing so rather than to dump it at the bar table to prevent the
opponent to be able to appropriately consider it all and provide a response. Regretfully, my
courtesy of doing so, as legally I am not required to so to say show my had of cards, lawyers
generally do not give their responses until at the Bar table but then find that they are caught out,
because had they responded to me they could have matters clarified they had misconstrued.
The way this litigation went on in the court is how I understand is so often eventuating and
people then in desperation contemplate suicide because they cant handle it. That is why I view
every time a judge fails to deal with lawyers who are misusing/abusing the legal processes/
system it becomes worse.
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Appeal 15-2502

Because I am the Appellant the case is beyond the powers of Mr Wayne Wall to withdraw. At
most he and the lawyers, for so far they have a legal standing can follow the example of 2006
case not to submit any evidence. But, as the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION is in fact part of
the appeal then the Court has no alternative but to hear the matters DE NOVO commencing with
the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION to which Alison May legal practitioner herself alluded to
in her 2 September 2015 correspondence to me, which was prior to the 17 September 2015
hearing and as such a known issue.
Essentially I know that the more relevant information I provide to an opponent the more likely
they are to ignore it and then not uncommon request the court to adjourn when suddenly they
discover having made a fatal decision doing so, but then this adjournment is refused.
The documentation that was provided to Mr Wayne Wall prior to him instituting litigation in the
Magistrates Court of Victoria made clear that I relied upon my 19 July 2006 successful appeals
in the Country Court of Victoria and so the issue of citizenship, separation of powers, etc.
It therefore cannot be argued that he neither the lawyers were not aware of this, in fact obtained
cost regarding my writings. Well, then they made it clearly part of the case!
The problem is however that because Mr Robert Hulls as the Attorney-General stated that the
State of Victoria would abide by the courts decision it prevents this court to allow the state of
Victoria via Mr Wayne Wall exercising State delegated powers to re-litigate the issues.
For sure the State of Victoria may now like to re-argue issues but that is about 10 years too late.
His Honour on 17 May 2016 during the Ballarat venue hearing himself I understood to refer to
the issue of separation of powers, not aware that as a CONSTITUTIONALIST I placed this
before the County Court of Victoria in Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630.
Granted I have my self-professed crummy English as English is not my native language and had
no formal education in law, but my desire has been the true meaning and application of the
(Dutch) grondwet (constitution) and when then I moved to the Commonwealth of Australia in
1971 it became the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK).
Transcript 16 March 2009 before Her Honour Habrison J.
Transcript 16 March 2009 Harbison J
QUOTE Her Honour at page 21 line 30
Now, having heard that you can take a seat and I can have Mr Shorel-Hlavkia speak on your behalf.
Mr Shorel-Hlavkia, what were the matters that you wanted to put?
MR SHOREL-HLAVKIA : First of all, Im not a lawyer. Ive no legal training. Im a constitutionalist. That
means I deal with matters on constitutional matters mainly.
HER HONOUR : All right. Do you have some you dont have any legal training?
.
MR SHOREL-HLAVKIA : Absolutely not.
HER HONOUR : Do you have any qualification in what you say you are?
MR SHOREL-H;LAVKIA : No, I have no I am a constitutionalist, so I do assist with parties with
barristers and everything else to assist them with legal work, you know, constitutional matters and
everything else, or the Government. You know, thats ongoing. I publish books about it under the
Inspector (indistinct) at Trademark, they are published and (indistinct).
END QUOTE Transcript 16 March 2009 Harbison J
As I understand it Mr Wayne Wall issues thousands of Fire Prevention Notices every year and
despite my FOI request on 9 December 2015 to be provided by the State Government details this
so far was not complied with. The appellant will give evidence that he understands that people
who have no grass in their yards nevertheless are receiving Fire Protection Notices as if they are
send out like candy, without any formal inspection to justify them. Some then end up paying an
Infringement Notice issued as to them it is a lost cause. This is not what our Framers of the
p31
Appeal 15-2502

constitution desired to have as a legal system. As such where Mr Wayne Wall took it upon
himself to litigate despite my past writings then he has no basis to complain about the volume of
written material because so to say it is self-inflicted.
.
Ordinary for a party to seek cost the court requires that this party has a genuine case for cost.
Lets consider then the Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud 17 September 2015 orders
where the then legal representatives claimed as I understand it more than $1,600.00 cost without
a shred of evidence. Not even any proper response upon the volume of documentation it claimed
to justify cost. As such what the court proved is that it takes as gospel whatever a lawyer claims
(in clear violation to the authority http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2010/386.html Hobsons
Bay City Council v Viking Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 386 (27 August 2010)) whereas
an unrepresented party is subjected to DOUBLE STANDARDS.
Regarding the 20 August 2015 hearing before the Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud I
provided the following written submission in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT:
QUOTE written submissions 20-8-2015
ISSUE OF COST & OTHER ISSUES
Hansard 20-4-1897 Constitution Convention Debates
QUOTE
Mr. HIGGINS:
I think it is advisable that private people should not be put to the expense of having important
questions of constitutional law decided out of their own pockets.
END QUOTE
In my 19 June 2015 correspondence to the Prosecutor as well as to ES&a legal representatives I

stated the following:
QUOTE 19-6-2015 CORRESPONDENCE
QUOTE my 2-5-2015 CORRESPONDENCE TO Buloke Shire Council
I draw your attention to the decision in Hobsons Bay Council v Viking in Supreme Court
of Victoria re an infringement notice, where the Supreme Court upheld the Magistrates
decision that cost should not be awarded where cost isnt applied if the Police prosecuted
for the same. (I have reproduced the decision below)
END QUOTE my 2-5-2015 CORRESPONDENCE TO Buloke Shire Council
I inderstand you can download the decision from the following weblink:
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2010/386.html
Hobsons Bay City Council v Viking Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 386 (27 August 2010)
I understand that at times the Supreme Court of Victoria ordered cost against the legal
practitioners themselves where shoddy and/or other inappropriate conduct was held to have
eventuated by the Court.
END QUOTE 19-6-2015 CORRESPONDENCE
QUOTE Hobsons Bay City Council v Viking Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 386 (27 August 2010)
Conclusion and orders
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Appeal 15-2502

176 For these reasons the plaintiff Council is entitled to relief, substantially in the form it seeks, against
all of the defendants and the defendants counterclaims must be dismissed. I will hear counsel as to the
appropriate form of orders to give effect to these conclusions.
Costs
177 In view of the fact that the plaintiff did not plead or rely upon the statutory answers to the
defendants estoppel claims until after the Court raised the matter on the first day of the hearing,
whereby delay and extra cost were encountered; and in view of the additional time, trouble and
expense to which the parties and the Court have been put as a result of non-compliance with the pretrial direction for an agreed statement of facts and as a result of the case not being properly prepared
for hearing on either side, for all of which the plaintiff Council appears to be partly responsible, I am
provisionally inclined to make considerable allowance in favour of the defendants in relation to costs. I
will hear counsel on that issue as well.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Last Updated: 27 August 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
Not Restricted
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
VALUATION, COMPENSATION & PLANNING LIST
No. 689 of 2010
and No. 690 of 2010
HOBSONS BAY CITY COUNCIL
Appellant
v
VIKING GROUP HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN
133 909 145)
Respondent
and
HOBSONS BAY CITY COUNCIL
Appellant
v
VIKING ASSET MANAGEMENT PTY LTD
(ACN 112 893 884)
Respondent
--JUDGE:
WHERE HELD:
DATE OF HEARING:
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:
MEDIUM NEUTRAL
CITATION:
p33
OSBORN J
Melbourne
13 August 2010
27 August 2010
Hobsons Bay City Council v Viking
[2010] VSC 386
Appeal 15-2502

--COMMON LAW Appeal from Magistrates Court cost award in criminal proceeding Costs awarded
covered disbursements fees only - Review of discretionary judgments - Presumption in favour of the
correctness of the decision - Appellant must demonstrate a vitiating error of law - It was open to the
Magistrate to exercise his discretion in award of costs Consistency of cost awards - Proportionality of cost
awards - Magistrates Court Act 1989 s 131(1)
--APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant
Counsel
Mr A Marshall
Solicitors
Brand Partners Commercial
Lawyers
For the Respondent
Mr J Searle
Viking Group
TABLE OF CONTENTS
HIS HONOUR:
1 These appeals relate to orders made in the Magistrates Court at Sunshine in January 2010.
2 In the first proceeding, the presiding Magistrate, following conviction of the respondent in respect of six
charges under the Victorian Road Rules relating to parking offences, ordered that the respondent pay an
aggregate fine of $600 and costs in the amount of $180.80.
3 In the second proceeding the presiding Magistrate convicted the respondent of two further such offences
and fined it an aggregate fine of $250 and ordered it to pay costs in the sum of $65.20.
4 In each proceeding the matters were initially listed for hearing on a mention day and following no
appearance by the respondent were listed for ex parte hearing.
5 At the conclusion of the first case the solicitor for the appellant applied for costs comprising legal fees of
$1,470.26, service fees of $91.10, filing fees of $66.60 and a courtesy letter of $23.10. The solicitor deposes
that these were a true calculation of the amounts properly incurred by the Council in the prosecution of the
case.
6 After the Magistrate awarded costs in the sum of $180.80[1] he was asked to give reasons for his order. He
then stated:
The application for legal costs is refused on the basis that I think that theyre disproportionate to the
criminality of the defendants conduct. I believe weve had this discussion in the past Mr Prosecutor, but the
same reasons apply. It seems to me to be unfair to award costs based on the defendants bad luck in being
prosecuted by a council rather than by the police as a matter of principle, it cannot be or should not be the
defendant that incurs the additional liability of substantial costs based on who prosecutes. It strikes me as
unfair that an award of costs against the defendant when thieves, drug traffickers and other wrongdoers who
do far more harm than the defendant has, are not asked to pay costs. Additionally, citizens pay rates and taxes
for services, including the cost of prosecuting, supervising and imprisoning wrongdoers. It seems to me that
principle ought to apply to this prosecution as well and as I also say that the costs are disproportionate to the
criminality of the defendants conduct (sic). In the exercise of my discretion, the application for costs is
refused.[2]
7 At the conclusion of the second case the Magistrate again received an application for costs consisting of
legal fees of $170.50, filing fees of $42.10 and a courtesy letter of $23.10. The solicitor for the appellant
again deposes that the costs for which application was made comprised a true and correct calculation of
amounts properly incurred by the appellant in the prosecution of the case.
8 The Magistrate refused the greater portion of the application for costs on the same basis as he had refused
the greater portion of the application for costs in the first matter.[3]
9 It can be seen that the Magistrates reasons invoke notions of proportionality and consistency.
p34
Appeal 15-2502

10 The appellant acknowledges:
(a) the power of the Court to award costs is contained in s 131(1) of the Magistrates Court Act 1989 which
states:
The costs of, and incidental to, all proceedings in the Court are in the discretion of the Court and the Court
has full power to determine by whom, to whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid.
(b) such discretion is effectively unfettered.
11 As counsel for the respondent emphasised, the latter part of s 131(1) emphasises the full power of the
Court to determine the question of costs.
12 The grounds of appeal allege that the Magistrate failed to exercise his discretion properly or at all, and in
the alternative that he purported to act for improper reasons and/or took into account irrelevant matters. In the
further alternative it is alleged that the Magistrate failed to take relevant considerations into account.
13 The fundamental question raised by the appeal is whether it was open to the Court to exercise its
discretion as it did. The general principles governing appeals from the exercise of discretion as to costs were
expressed by Kitto J in Australian Coal and Shale Employees Federation v The Commonwealth:[4]
..the true principle limiting the manner in which appellate jurisdiction is exercised in respect of decisions
involving discretionary judgment is that there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the
decision appealed from, and that that decision should therefore be affirmed unless the court of appeal is
satisfied that it is clearly wrong. A degree of satisfaction sufficient to overcome the strength of the
presumption may exist where there has been an error which consists in acting upon a wrong principle, or
giving weight to extraneous or irrelevant matters, or failing to give weight or sufficient weight to relevant
considerations, or making a mistake as to the facts. Again, the nature of the error may not be discoverable,
but even so it is sufficient that the result is so unreasonable or plainly unjust that the appellate court may infer
that there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first
instance: House v. The King[5]....
14 His Honour went on to endorse the following statement by Jordan CJ in Schweppes Limited v Archer:[6]
In appeals as to costs, the principles to be applied are these. The Court will always review a decision of a
Taxing Officer where it is contended that he has proceeded upon a wrong principle, for the purpose of
determining the principle which should be applied; and an error in principle may occur both in determining
whether an item should be allowed and in determining how much should be allowed. Where no principle is
involved, and the question is, whether the Taxing Officer has correctly exercised a discretion which he
possesses and is purporting to exercise, the Court is reluctant to interfere. It has undoubted jurisdiction to
review the Taxing Officer's decision even where an exercise of discretion only is involved, and will do so
freely on a proper case, using its own knowledge of the circumstances, but it will in general interfere only
where the discretion appears not to have been exercised at all, or to have been exercised in a manner which is
manifestly wrong; and where the question is one of amount only, will do so only in an extreme case.
(Citations omitted)
15 In Urban No 1 Co-operative Society v Kilavus & Anor,[7] Hedigan J observed that in cases involving the
review of discretionary judgments there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the decision
appealed from and the general rule is that the decision should be affirmed unless the appellate court of review
is satisfied that it is clearly wrong.
16 In Kenyon v Drissen,[8] Ashley J (as he then was) observed:
It is true that an exercise of discretion is not to be tested by an appeal court asking itself whether it would
have exercised the discretion in the same or a different way to the way in which it was exercised in fact. On
the other hand, the appeal court, before it interferes with an exercise of discretion, must be satisfied that the
decision was clearly wrong. In my opinion the correct approach is that in considering that question an appeal
court is not constrained to hold that an exercise of discretion was wrong only by reason that weight was given
to some irrelevant consideration, or by reason only of complaint that insufficient weight was given to some
relevant consideration. It may be, despite such matters, that the decision was very evidently supportable by
pertinent grounds relied upon by the decision-maker.
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17 These observations and the observations of Hedigan J were made in the context of appeals from the
Magistrates Court to this Court. These reflect the need for an appellant in an appeal on questions of law to
demonstrate not only that an error of law occurred but that it was a vitiating error.[9]
18 In Kymar Nominees Pty Ltd v Sinclair,[10] Cavanough J stated:
There is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of a discretionary judgment of a court, and all the
more so in relation to the taxation of costs. Although, strictly speaking, the present question is not one of
taxation of costs but of the extent of the parties respective liability, a reviewing court will rarely interfere on
such a question, especially in an appeal limited to questions of law.
19 The right of appeal to this Court from final orders within criminal proceedings of the Magistrates Court is
one on questions of law only.[11] Accordingly, just as it is not open to challenge the weight given to relevant
factors in reaching a conclusion of fact, it is not open to challenge the weight given to relevant factors bearing
on the exercise of a discretion.[12] The critical question is whether it was open to the Magistrate to conclude
as he did having regard to relevant factors.[13]
Preliminary questions
20 The appellant relied on the decision in Latoudis v Casey.[14] It must be recognised however that the
present case is not one such as Latoudis, where a successful defendant, having been brought to Court by the
informant, is ordinarily entitled to his or her costs.
21 In Oshlack v Richmond River Council[15] Kirby J observed:[16]
The decision in that case [Latoudis] does not, and could not, lay down a general rule that the only
consideration to be taken into account in the exercise of a statutory costs discretion is the compensation of the
successful party for the recoverable expense to which it has been put by the litigation. With respect to the
learned judges of the Court of Appeal, this reads too much into Latoudis. Such a rule was required neither by
the matter which was before this Court for decision in that case nor by the majority's reasons.
22 Likewise, cases such as Ohn v Walton,[17] which was concerned with a power in the Medical Tribunal of
New South Wales to order the complainant ... to pay such costs to such person as the Tribunal may
determine, are of no real assistance in the present case.
23 It was next submitted that if costs were not ordinarily recoverable by the Council then the Council would
be deterred from bringing further prosecutions of the type in issue. I do not accept this inference should be
drawn. Such prosecutions enforce a system of parking regulation from which municipal councils derive
significant revenue and the evidence simply does not establish the conclusion contended for.
24 The appellant also placed substantial emphasis on the following observations by McHugh J in
Oshlack:[18]
Nor is the status of the respondent as a public authority presently relevant. The law judges persons by their
conduct not their identity. In the exercise of the costs discretion, all persons are entitled to be treated equally
and in accordance with traditional principle. The fact that a successful respondent is a public authority should
not make a court less inclined to award costs in its favour. Gone are the days when one could sensibly speak
of a public authority as having available to them almost unlimited public funds.[19] Moreover, if costs
awards are not made in favour of successful respondents such as the Council, the public services which those
authorities provide must be adversely affected. Every irrecoverable dollar spent on litigation is one dollar less
to spend on the services that public authorities do and ought to provide. Often enough the services that will be
reduced will be those that favour the politically weak children, the unemployed, the disabled and the aged.
Such results cannot be in the public interest.
25 These observations do not assist the appellant because:
I do not accept that the learned Magistrate refused the appellant costs simply because it is a municipal
council. Rather as I have said, he considered the issue of costs by reference to broader notions of consistency
and proportionality.
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Oshlack was concerned with fundamentally different proceedings. It was concerned with the costs of a
successful council responding to an unsuccessful claim for injunctive relief, brought by a member of the
public seeking to ventilate issues of the public interest.
McHugh Js observations were made in dissent and the majority of the High Court affirmed the breadth of
the discretion available to the Court of first instance.
Consistency
26 I turn then to the underlying bases of the Magistrates reasons. In my view it cannot be said that it was not
open to the learned Magistrate to take into account questions of consistency. Counsel for both parties referred
to the observations of Mason and Deane JJ in Norbis v Norbis[20] (a case concerning the exercise of
discretion as to costs under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)):
The point of preserving the width of the discretion which Parliament has created is that it maximizes the
possibility of doing justice in every case. But the need for consistency in judicial adjudication, which is the
antithesis of arbitrary and capricious decision-making, provides an important countervailing consideration
supporting the giving of guidance by appellant courts, whether in the form of principles or guidelines.
27 Brennan J, who agreed generally with the reasons of Mason and Deane JJ stated at 536:
The orderly administration of justice requires that decisions should be consistent one with another and
decision-making should not be open to the reproach that it is adventitious ... An unfettered discretion is a
versatile means of doing justice in particular cases, but unevenness in its exercise diminishes confidence in
the legal process.
28 In the present case it should be noted that breaches of the Victorian Road Rules with respect to parking
infringements may be prosecuted either by a police officer, an authorised council officer or certain other
authorised persons.[21]
29 It was open to the Magistrate to form the view that the discrepancy in costs outcomes between police
prosecutions and council prosecutions in respect of the same offence and more generally raised a relevant
issue of consistency. Inconsistent outcomes do not support a system in which the public may be expected to
have confidence. They give rise to a system which may appear adventitious and arbitrary in its outcomes.
Proportionality
30 Likewise the related issue of proportionality was a relevant factor. In some jurisdictions, achieving
proportionality of procedural costs to the dispute in issue is an explicit obligation of civil case
management.[22]
31 The same underlying concept is relevant here, but in the criminal jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court the
notion of proportionality has a further dimension. Proportionality is a touchstone of just outcomes of the
criminal justice system. In Hoare v The Queen[23] the High Court stated:
Secondly, a basic principle of sentencing law is that a sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court should
never exceed that which can be justified as appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered
in the light of its objective circumstances (see Veen v The Queen [No 2]).[24]
32 In R v Young[25] the Victorian Court of Appeal addressed a sentence in which Veen [No 2] and
associated cases had been misinterpreted. The Court said at 953:
... there is nothing whatever new in what the learned judge called the principle of proportionality. We shall
have to return to the question later but for the moment it is sufficient to say that for as long as any member of
the court can remember it has been the law in Victoria that an offender must not be sentenced to a more
severe punishment than is appropriate or proportionate to the offence which he has committed...
33 Proportionality in sentencing is necessarily a matter of judgment on which individual views may differ. In
The Queen v S[26] the Court of Appeal adopted with approval the following further statement in Young:[27]
What is a sentence proportionate to an offence is a matter of discretion and there must in most cases be a
range of sentences open to a sentencing judge which are proportionate to the offence.
p37
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34 I accept that the purpose of an award of costs is not to punish the unsuccessful party but to indemnify the
successful party. Nevertheless, in the present case the Magistrate was in my view entitled to compare total
outcomes in terms of fines plus costs, with other outcomes of the summary prosecution system not only as
informing a view as to consistency, but also as informing a conclusion as to the proportionality of the costs
sought to the criminality of the conduct in issue.
35 It was in turn open to him to conclude that the costs sought were disproportionate to the criminality of the
respondents conduct. The conclusion he reached was one by a member of the court which is confronted with
a large number of summary offences on a daily basis and accordingly, the issue is one on which the
Magistrate was well placed to form an opinion.
36 I am not persuaded that it was not open to him to conclude that the costs sought were disproportionate to
the criminality of the respondents conduct.
37 It is submitted for the appellant that the notion of proportionality might have justified the award of a lesser
award of costs, but it could not justify the award of effectively no professional costs. This submission enters
into questions of the weight of relevant factors. It is not for this Court however to weigh up the relevant
factors. It is simply for this Court to ensure that the Magistrates Court did not have regard to irrelevant
factors and reached a conclusion open to it. I accept that the view put forward on behalf of the Council might
be accepted, but not that it was the only view open to the Magistrate.
38 It is clear from the terms of his reasons that the Magistrate regarded his conclusions as to proportionality
as fundamental to the proper exercise of his discretion. In turn his discretionary decision must stand if, as I
have said, the view he reached is regarded as open to him.
Irrelevant considerations
39 Insofar as the appeal is put on the basis that the Magistrate failed to take into account relevant
considerations, there is no evidence that, save in one respect, the matters relied on were expressly urged upon
him and I am not able to infer that a failure to refer to them in his reasons means that he did not take account
of them. The matters allegedly overlooked are stated in the amended notice of appeal as follows:
... relevant material considerations including:
(a) the cost to municipal councils in properly prosecuting council by-laws and other laws;
(b) prevention of breaches of council by-laws;
(c) failure of the respondent to pay on-the-spot fines;
(d) deterrence to wrongdoers.
40 Factor (a) was of course squarely put before the Magistrate and factors (b), (c) and (d) were implicitly
caught up in the question of proportionality.
41 The relevant principle is that in some circumstances a failure to advert to particular matters in reasons will
enable an inference to be drawn that regard was not had to those matters in reaching the decision in issue. In
others it will not.[28] This is not a case in which an inference adverse to the Magistrate can be drawn.
Conclusion
42 In order to succeed in an appeal of this type the appellant must satisfy the Court that the Magistrates
decision was vitiated by reason of the matters to which he or she had regard, or that the decision was simply
not open to him or her.
43 In my view the factors upon which the Magistrate based his decision in the present case were capable of
being regarded as relevant to the exercise of his discretion and the consequent exercise of that discretion was
open to him.
44 Accordingly the appeal must be dismissed.
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[1] The summation of the disbursement charges plus the courtesy letter.
[2] Affidavit of Lloyd Dewar sworn 15 February 2010, [7].
[3] The cost award was the summation of the disbursement charge and courtesy letter.
[4] [1953] HCA 25; (1953) 94 CLR 621, 627.
[5] [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-505.
[6] (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 178, cited in Australian Coal and Shale Employees Federation v The
Commonwealth [1953] HCA 25; (1953) 94 CLR 621, 628-9.
[7] [1993] VicRp 69; [1993] 2 VR 201.
[8] Unreported decision, 6 October 1994.
[9] Portland Properties Pty Ltd v Melbourne & Metropolitan Board of Works (1971) 38 LGRA 6, 18 and 22.
[10] [2006] VSC 488, [61].
[11] Criminal Procedure Act 2009, s 272(1).
[12] Secombs (a firm) v Sadler Design Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 79, [58]-[59]; Transport Accident Commission v
Hoffman [1989] VicRp 18; [1989] VR 197, 199.
[13] S v Crimes Compensation Tribunal [1998] 1 VR 83, 89 per Phillips JA.
[14] [1990] HCA 59; (1990) 170 CLR 534.
[15] [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72 (Oshlack).
[16] Ibid, 118.
[17] (1995) 36 NSWLR 77.
[18] [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72, 107.
[19] Kent v Cavanagh (1973) 1 ACTR 43, 55, cited in Oshlack.
[20] [1986] HCA 17; (1986) 161 CLR 513, 518.
[21] Road Safety Act 1986, s 87(1) read with s 77(2).
[22] See, eg Calabro v Zappia [2010] NSWDC 127.
[23] [1989] HCA 33; (1989) 167 CLR 348, 354.
[24] [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465, 472, 485-486, 490-491, 496, cited ibid, 354.
[25] [1990] VicRp 84; [1990] VR 951 (Young).
[26] [2006] VSCA 134.
[27] At 960 as cited ibid, [20].
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[28] The accepted test is stated by Sholl J in Yendall v Smith Mitchell & Co Ltd[1953] VicLawRp 53; [1953]
VLR 369, 379 as set out by his Honour in Harrison v Mansfield [1953] VicLawRp 60; [1953] VLR 399, 404.
END QUOTE Hobsons Bay City Council v Viking Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 386 (27 August 2010)
QUOTE
Mr. HIGGINS.-Suppose the sentry is asleep, or is in the swim with the other power?
Mr. GORDON.-There will be more than one sentry. In the case of a federal law, every member of a
state Parliament will be a sentry, and, every constituent of a state Parliament will be a sentry.
As regards a law passed by a state, every man in the Federal Parliament will be a sentry, and the whole
constituency behind the Federal Parliament will be a sentry.
END QUOTE
END QUOTE written submissions 20-8-2015
QUOTE written submissions 14-9-20125 for the 17 September 2015 hearing
QUOTE 20150502-Schorel-Hlavka to Buloke Shire Council care of Mayor
As indicated above the problem is that Buloke Shire Council is faced with my successful 19-72006 County Court of Victoria decision to uphold both my appeals. As this included (Not
challenged by the Attorney-General for the State of Victoria or any other Attorney-General for
that!) and considering that the High Court of Australia would be bias to hear and determine any
matter that directly involves the judges own standing, then Buloke Shire Council would have to
get a hearing before the Privy Council to have the matter heard. And this besides the fact that it
may have no legal standing as it seeks to enforce State of Victoria legislation in regard of a
matter the State of Victoria for which it allegedly acts has been comprehensively defeated on 19
July 2006 in this matter. So to say no second bite on the cherry.
END QUOTE 20150502-Schorel-Hlavka to Buloke Shire Council care of Mayor
QUOTE 20150619-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Elliott Stafford and Associates Your ref LA-05-06-Re Buloke Shire Council
I take offence also to the statement:

QUOTE
END QUOTE
.
Using the term which will involve and not which may involve the correspondence therefore
has already decided for any court, that is if any court actually was to hold it can invoke
jurisdiction as I have from onset objected to this, then nevertheless the issue of cost already has
been dictated to the court to be issued against me.
.

QUOTE Mr. OCONNER (New South Wales).Because, as has been said before, it is [start page 357] necessary not only that the administration of
justice should be pure and above suspicion, but that it should be beyond the possibility of suspicion;
END QUOTE
In my view it may be held to be CONTEMPT OF COURT for seeking to predetermine what a

court may or may not do. This as I view it is to seek to intimidate the recipient of the
correspondence that the court will issue involve substantially cost, this even so the Supreme
Court of Victoria made clear:
QUOTE my 2-5-2015 CORRESPONDENCE TO Buloke Shire Council
I draw your attention to the decision in Hobsons Bay Council v Viking in Supreme Court
of Victoria re an infringement notice, where the Supreme Court upheld the Magistrates
decision that cost should not be awarded where cost isnt applied if the Police prosecuted
for the same. (I have reproduced the decision below)
END QUOTE my 2-5-2015 CORRESPONDENCE TO Buloke Shire Council
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I inderstand you can download the decision from the following weblink:
END QUOTE 20150619-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Elliott Stafford and Associates Your ref LA-05-06-Re Buloke Shire Council
There can be no question about it that obviously I made clear to Buloke Shire Council and its
legal representatives that I objected to the enforcement of any Infringement Notice.
And that the Infringement Act provisions couldnt be enforced against me. Yet this is what
Buloke Shire Council through its legal representatives seeks to do, as the Summons clearly relies
upon the Infringement Notice which as an offence seems to be a notice.
Without seeking to concede the validity of the Infringement Act 2006 it appears to me clearly
that s22 should have applied considering the special circumstances outlined to council.
It may be noted that there was no alteration of details of the Fire Notice even so after this notice
the property again had been slashed. As such the Infringement Notice relied upon a Fire Notice
that related to details that were altered. If a proper inspection had been made then it should have
been established that the property was slashed again and as such the structure of the fire notice
had to be reviewed if it was at all applicable as such, and not merely issue an Infringement
Notice based on a fire notice that no longer as such could be applicable.
QUOTE Version No. 044 Infringements Act 2006, No. 12 of 2006 Version incorporating amendments as at 1 August 2015
END QUOTE written submissions 14-9-20125 for the 17 September 2015 hearing
What this court would require to do is to embark upon a gigantic case of legal technicalities in a
DE NOVO hearing (Which includes the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION that was before the
magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud) and yet cannot go behind the issues that were raised
as constitutional issues on 19 July 2006 as the Court has to accept those unchallenged
submissions to have been upheld.
The Court cannot accept litigation of a summons based upon an alleged Infringement Notice
where I clearly disputed the validly of the Infringement Act all along. No such thing as cherry
picking what may or may not suit Mr Wayne Wall.
And getting back to Mr Wayne Wall, while he may be a council employee I submit that his
position to litigate was not as a council employee (regardless his position depends upon being a
council employee) but that as being a Municipal Fire protection Officer. As such to allow an y
excuses that he might have travelled out of jurisdiction, for whatever reason, for Buloke Shire
Council matters never can be accepted by the court to justify his absenteeism, this as we can look
at examples of Authorities such as a judge of a court cannot be directed by the Chief Justice to do
something like say in violation to his oath of office. A Chief Justice cannot dictate a judge to
absent himself from hearing a case midway. Likewise, the High Court of Australia made clear
that it is not for the Commonwealth to place burdens upon a State employee that may interfere
with his/her function. For those Members of Parliament cannot be subjected to taxation
conditions which may interfere or undermine their ability to perform in their duties.
Mr Wayne Wall as a Municipal fire Prevention Officer commenced litigation and I submit it was
beyond the powers of Buloke Shire Council to one way or another send Mr Wayne Wall on a trip
outside the courts jurisdiction and by this undermine the authority of the Court.
Mr Wayne Wall priority was to the court where he instituted the litigation and I submit Buloke
Shire Council had no authority to intervene in this.
If Buloke Shire Council were entitled to do so then if Mr Wayne Wall as Municipal fire
prevention officer were to say institute legal proceedings against Buloke Shire Council itself or
any councillor then all council needed to do is to send Mr Wayne Wall on a trip and the case
would collapse against the council or councillor. It is this very manipulation that I view
parliament sought to avoid by placing not a council but a person to exercise delegated powers as
a Municipal Fire Prevention Officer. It is also why the Infringement Notice is invalid because Mr
Wayne Wall is not an authorised enforcement agency as I understand it within the meaning of
the act. Hence, as I exposed in past writings the Infringement Notice is to undermine the
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constitutional requirement of Consolidated Revenue funds to be the receiver of monies and only
by way of Appropriation Bills can monies be withdrawn. We now have a system created that
billions of dollars are defrauded from Consolidated Revenue funds and yet not a court ever
became aware of this constitutional disaster.
Never mind my crummy English, my spelling/grammatical and other typing errors, what we are
about is that we have the courts permitting unconstitutional defrauding of Consolidated Revenue
Funds because no one seems to comprehend this to be going on. Well I do not desire any part to
be associated with. Why indeed did the court order payment of an Infringement Notice to
Buloke Shire Council instead of into Consolidated Revenue Funds when it was in fact a State
matters in which Mr Wayne Wall (purportedly) acted within delegated powers. As such the State
and not Buloke Shire Council should be receiving monies relating to State legislative provisions
where the court holds a breach was committed and a fine payable.
It should be understood that the Hobson Bay case was one as I understand it to by-laws of a
council and as such payments can be ordered as such to a council but in this matter it relates to
State legislation to which Buloke Shire Council has no delegated legislative powers and as such I
submit it is fraud to claim in court payment of something that belongs to the State, if an order
was made for payment.
It is for this also that the Legal Service Commission hardly could have properly investigated
matters as it claimed because it referred to a debt to Buloke Shire Council when it was none of
the business of Buloke Shire Council.
As I indicated the Act Interpretation Act 1980 prohibits fines before conviction and therefore an
Infringement Notice is no more but so to say an invitation to pay or face litigation. We have lots
of conman/conwoman who charges rents, etc, who which they are not entitled to, it doesnt make
it a debt merely because they demand the monies1
We have a constitution and if the courts and others desire to act outside our constitutional
framework then it has no legal powers whatsoever.
As I placed before the County Court of Victoria in my successful appeals the court must also be
seem as impartial and independent and as such it cannot share any ABN number with the
Department of Justice, nor allow its computers to be accessed by public servants engaged by the
Government. When I represented Mr Johnson QC before His Honour Smithers J with the
opponent being the legal Service commission I then expressed my concerns as to the implied bias
by His Honour considering the governments involvement.
As a CONSTITUTIONALIST I regretfully cannot accept we have a valid legal system let alone
proper judiciary because legislative provisions, court rules and regulations places it beyond the
understanding/comprehension of the unlettered person. Any legal pro vision within the
framework of the constitution must be that the unlettered person can understand. If an unlettered
person cannot understand it but requires a legal practitioner who may neither understand it (as
many dont and lose their clients cases) then is it expected that every citizen walks around being
held by the hand by a legal practitioner who may or may not have the correct legal opinion to
what is legally applicable?
When Mr Wayne Wall himself is vague and aloof in his Fire Prevention Notices then how on
earth can he expect anyone else to understand what he might have in mind? Are landholders now
to become crystal ball specialist?
In the written submissions (which His Honour held up on 17 May 2016) in the folder
Supplement 2 dated at footing 17-2-2016 it includes copies of the various Fire Prevention
Notices, etc. It also has included on the first page a copy of an envelope that purports to be
service of a Notice of appearance. If the court were to accept this kind of dumping of
documentation in a letterbox then why indeed have all the court rules/regulations and other legal
provisions and why have as party bothering to go to court and seek orders if the other party can
flaunt those orders willy nilly and a judge will ignore proper legal procedures to hold them
legally accountable?
p42
Appeal 15-2502

.
As I understood His Honour to state it is not for him to rectify the system but surely His Honour
shouldnt contribute to what is also drastically done wrong.
From time to students in law (legal provisions) ask me why I am not a lecturer at a university and
give me the understanding they really like my kind of writings. But it seems that it is not what
you understand/comprehend but merely if you can show some law degree even if knowing next
to nothing or as some reportedly did buy them then it appears somehow one has more credibility.
I hold a different view that our youth of today greatly disrespect what is right because they see it
in the politicians and the courts that corruption, etc, pays.
In understand from many that my writings will be a sheer waste of time as there will be no judge
who will actually act by his/her oath of office. Regretfully this far too often is my experience.
What is needed is a judge who will take it that every case is important to the parties and time
limits should not prevent proper considerations. The government must provide sufficient court
venues and failing this cases may be dismissed for undue difficulties upon the accused by doing
so. The court is and never was, no matter what any judge may claim otherwise, the 3rd
department of Government. The courts are part of the constitution and must be independent.
Any judge who doesnt understand that the Section 101 Inter-State Commission is a part of the
constitution could hardly understand what the constitution is about. Yet, for example we have
numerous court hearings where commerce and trade are within the powers of the Inter-State
commission but the Inter-State Commission is not in place, even so constitutionally required to
be always, and so the ACCC is doing it without legal justification but judges will rely upon
legislative provisions regardless that it is unconstitutional.
QUOTE
Mr. DEAKIN (Victoria).-The position of my honorable and learned friend (Mr. [start page 2092] Higgins)
may be perfectly correct. It may be that without any special provision the practice of the High Court, when
declaring an Act ultra vires, would be that such a declaration applied only to the part which trespassed
beyond the limits of the Constitution. If that were so, it would be a general principle applicable to the
interpretation of the whole of the Constitution.
END QUOTE
.

QUOTE
Mr. GORDON.-Well, I think not. I am sure that if the honorable member applies his mind to the subject he
will see it is not abstruse. If a statute of either the Federal or the states Parliament be taken into court the court
is bound to give an interpretation according to the strict hyper-refinements of the law. It may be a good law
passed by "the sovereign will of the people," although that latter phrase is a common one which I do not care
much about. The court may say-"It is a good law, but as it technically infringes on the Constitution we will
have to wipe it out." As I have said, the proposal I support retains some remnant of parliamentary
sovereignty, leaving it to the will of Parliament on either side to attack each other's laws.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
Mr. GLYNN.-I think they would, because it is fixed in the Constitution. There is no special court, but
the general courts would undoubtedly protect the states. What Mr. Isaacs seeks to do is to prevent the
question of ultra vires arising after a law has been passed.
[start page 2004]
Mr. ISAACS.-No. If it is ultra vires of the Constitution it would, of course, be invalid.
END QUOTE
As such regardless if His Honour may rely for example upon the purported Local Government
Act reality is this is unconstitutional. Likewise as His Honour French J (as His Honour at the
time was in WA but now CJ of the High Court of Australia) s51(xxvii) is not at all a
constitutional provision to give the States powers to refer legislative powers it is merely to allow
the Commonwealth to accept this.
p43
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Section 123 of the constitution actually requires a State Referendum to approve any reference of
legislative powers but that is generally always ignored, meaning that references of legislative
powers are all invalid.
Likewise, the issue this court often may deal with is speeding infringements. Not a single speed
detection camera in my view in the State of Victoria is constitutionally valid because none to my
understanding are approved by the commonwealth within its powers of weights and measures.
The nonsense of concurrent legislative powers should be addressed in that the legislative
powers within s51 of the constitution only was permissible until the Commonwealth itself began
to legislate upon the subject matter.
This too is relevant because Buloke Shire Council is charging me rates (Sydney Council v
Commonwealth 1904 HCA held this was a delegated power of land taxation) this even so when
the Commonwealth commenced on 11 November 1910 its Land Tax Office (forerunner of the
ATO) then all State land taxation and so municipal/shire council rates became unconstitutional.
As such Buloke Shire Council charging me unconstitutional rates clearly undermines my
financial ability as a pensioner. This was well set out in the material the lawyers seemed to have
used to obtain orders for cost, and so deemed part of litigation.
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-I was going to explain when I was interrupted that the moment the Commonwealth
legislates on this subject the power will become exclusive.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-If this is left as an exclusive power the laws of the states will
nevertheless remain in force under clause 100.
Mr. TRENWITH.-Would the states still proceed to make laws?
Mr. BARTON.-Not after this power of legislation comes into force. Their existing laws will, however,
remain. If this is exclusive they can make no new laws, but the necessity of making these new laws will be
all the more forced on the Commonwealth.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
My only desire is to give power to the Federal Parliament to achieve a scheme for old-age pensions if it be
practicable, and if the people require it. No power would be taken away from the states. The sub-section
would not interfere with the right of any state to act in the meantime until the Federal Parliament took
the matter in hand.
END QUOTE
I naturalised and made a pledge to uphold the constitution and I do not have to think twice that I
shall do so regardless of the adversities I may face. I view a man is not worth his words if he like
politicians so often do is to make pledges during an election and after being elected betrays the
electors. If any judicial officer doesnt like this then that is his/her problem but should not make
it mine. I honour my pledge to the best of my ability and this makes me to be proud to be an
Australian. That is also why I am not going on the run so to say with my tail between my legs as
with having conducted a special life line service since 1982 under the motto MAY JUSTICE
ALWAYS PREVAIL I am too much aware about people seeing suicide as the only way out
having lost any confidence in the legal processes and so the courts. We need to simplify court
rules/regulations, etc, so that the unlettered person can understand in simple English format what
is required and not that even legal practitioners havent got a clue and/or ability to comply!
If the court doesnt formally deal with the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION and provide a
REASON OF JUDGMENT as to why it upholds or dismiss the OBJECTION TO
JURISDICTION then the court doesnt invoke any jurisdiction.
The Court may desire to have this matter placed before the High Court of Australia albeit not at
my cost, or alternatively the Prosecutor, this is because the moment a party objects to the
p44
Appeal 15-2502

jurisdiction on constitutional grounds then the onus is upon the Prosecutor to prove jurisdiction.
It cannot be transferred to place the onus upon the appellant to disprove jurisdiction, as this
would deny the legal principle of a DE NOVO hearing, where originally the onus was upon the
Prosecutor to prove jurisdiction.
I might not be a lawyer but it ought to be clear that the written submissions in the ADDRESS TO
THE COURT has considerably advanced my legal position that the OBJECTION TO
JURISDICTION was on court file and therefore had to be dealt with but wasnt whereas had I
been able to present matters orally from the bar table I may have been prevented doing so.
.
Obviously it is of concern that the Registrar of the Ballarat venue placed my written submissions,
at least while she was in control, in the correspondence file because they are submissions and as
such she undermined my right to place matters before the court as if she was at the bar table and
doing it there. As the Registrar is not an OFFICER OF THE COURT but a public servants it
should be ensured that such a public servant is not in employment with the government but with
the court itself. This is needed as otherwise a Registrar could influence/dictate how a court case
will or might proceed by excluding material what may suit best a government or a party
representing the Governments interest. As such being it computer experts or other staff,
including cleaners and security personnel they all should be employed by the court itself and not
by the government, otherwise there can be no issue of separation of powers for this also.
What now appeared to have ended up is that His Honour honestly believed to have read all
material when in fact the written submissions in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT and its
supplements were left unknown to His Honour, hence the issue raised as to what I did ab out the
non-compliance by ES&a Associates, as had His Honour read it all His Honour would have been
well aware I canvassed it extensively.
My submission is that the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION is part of the appeal process but
must be dealt with prior to any hearing of the disputed issues because of the Fire Prevention
Notice. If the Prosecutor, and this is stated without conceding legal standing, fails to submit to
the court any material as to prove jurisdiction then the court can only find that the Court has no
jurisdiction and neither so had the Magistrates Court of Victoria and on that basis the orders of
the Magistrates Court of Victoria are a nullity as they are in violation to legal provisions. In those
circumstances the court is entitled to make orders for exemplary damage (20160110-SchorelHlavka O.W.B. to Mr Wayne Wall & ORS-Re APPEAL-15-2502-Re exemplary damagesetc) against the (purported) Prosecutor and can restrain the Prosecutor (so the party) from re
litigating the same issues again against me.
No one in his right mind would accept that after all the work I had to do and the cost involved
in printing, etc, that is well beyond my financial ability as a pensioner then somehow Mr Wayne
Wall, Buloke Shire Council and ES&a Associates can get away with it without having to face
any compensation bill, in particular where they acted in a dismissal manner blatantly
disregarding proper conduct as may be expected from a party and its legal representatives.
.
As I indicated above in my submission that I view if the matter were to proceed for a full blown
hearing (which depends upon the outcome of the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION) than it
should be by way of trial before a jury. With the powers of nullification as embedded in the
constitution.
.
Any appearance by me to a 30 May 2016 hearing will be under objection and is not
intended and neither must be perceived that I discontinue any objections.
Appellant
p45
G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
Appeal 15-2502

20160519-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To County Court of Victoria-Re Written Submission ADDRESS To The COURT-APPEAL-15-2502

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20160519-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To County Court of Victoria-Re Written Submission ADDRESS To The COURT-APPEAL-15-2502

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Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 1

Elliott Stafford and Associated lawyers@elliottstafford.com.au

Re 30 May 2016 hearing

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 2

Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 3

The Victorian Justice Handbook 1962 page 83:

Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 4

3. May be made by agent,

3. Usually made only by

On issue estoppel: House of Lords - Arthur JS Hall and Co. v. Simons

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estoppel"

Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 5

ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2

In criminal matters, at least as I understand it, the

ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 3

Section 387 384 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918

Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 6

(i) section 326 or 327 of this Act or section 28 of the

388 Averments deemed to be proved

Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 7

Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 8

With or without conviction, adjourn the hearing on conditions

Convict and discharge

Dismiss the charge

END QUOTE written submissions

Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 9

Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 10

Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 11

ADDRESS TO THE COURT

Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 12

QUOTE Norwood v. Renfield, 34 C 329; Ex parte Giambonini, 49 P. 732.

Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 13

Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud

c/o the coordinator starnaudcoordinator@magistratescourt.vic.gov.au

Elliott Stafford and Associated lawyers@elliottstafford.com.au

Re: 20150819-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 14

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

END QUOTE 19 August 2015 correspondence

Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 15

Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 16

Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 17

Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 18

Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 19

Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant

Re 30-5-2016 hearing Page 20

Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Objector/Appellant