In search of New and Old Localism

Martin Powell
Department of Social and Policy Sciences
University of Bath
Claverton Down
Bath BA2 7AY

Tel: 01225 383585

Fax: 01225 386381
E: hssdmp@bath.ac.uk

Paper presented at ESPAnet Conference, Oxford, 9-11 September 2004.

Introduction

There has been a great increase in the use of the term 'localism' in the UK. Many
politicians and academics advocate the 'new localism. A leading critic, David Walker
(2002), has gloomily stated that 'We are all localists now'. However, it is difficult to
precisely define the new localism (Jenkin 2004; Raynsford 2004). In addition to this
conceptual problem, there are historical problems. Much of the literature tends to use
cognate terms such as centralisation, autonomy, discretion, weak local government, local
democracy, and local self-government rather than localism per se (but see Page 1991),
and so there is little literature on 'localism' per se. Thus, it is unclear how the new
localism is new. Is it simply 'new' (in the sense of happening now) or is it different from
an 'old' localism? There are similar problems with a 'new centralism'. Crouch and
Marquand (1988) use this term to describe the Conservative local government reforms of
the 1980s, but Lowndes (2003: 136) claims that the 2001 White Paper, 'Strong Local
Leadership- Quality Public Services' (DTLR 2001) represents a 'new centralism.' It is
unclear whether this is a new - and different- centralism to the 1980s term (a new, new
centralism?). Moreover, other commentators suggest some recent moves towards
localism (eg Stoker 2004), while Wilson and Game (2002: 165) see recent policies as a
mix of 'localist' and 'centralist' measures.

It is clear that localism is difficult to define and detect. This paper goes in search of
localism. First, it examines central/ local narratives for their uses of terms, evidence and

conclusions. Second, it analyses more conceptual accounts in order to suggest a

framework of localism. Finally, it focuses on the new localism literature to distill out
definitions.

Central/ Local Narratives

A large number of (poorly defined) terms have been used by commentators in different
disciplines and approaches to describe the differences between central and the local
dimensions. Writers see trends towards centralisation, central control, more central
dependence, less local discretion, weak local government and less local autonomy. Some
binary 'from-to' scales have been suggested: from partnership to agency; from localism to
centralism. This section examines accounts with a focus on definitions, measures,
evidence and chronology. It provides a very brief and selective review, adopting a rough
and ready classification of the literature with some overlaps, and with some writers
discusses in different approaches.

Municipalism

Although there are substantial overlaps with local democracy approaches, this section
focuses on functions rather than democratic control. Many historians focus on the 'gas
and water socialism' and the 'municipal socialism' of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. Many groups such as the Fabians, the Independent Labour Party and
the Socialist Medical Association advocated municipalism.

Gyford (1985: 3) examines the retreat from municipal socialism Writers such as Rowett
(1979) trace the growing gap in Labour party rhetoric and reality about localism in the
twentieth century. By 1939 the party adopted a strongly centralising attitude, almost
eclipsing the decentralist views of 1920s. Localist writers such as D N Chester (1951:
328-42), J M McIntosh(1953: 165-70.180-91) and W A Robson(1954) criticised the
Labour Party and Bevan for their treatment of local government.

Local Government, Urban and Welfare History

Most historians subscribe to a very broad centralisation thesis. Most commentators

mention the battles between the centralisers (eg Chadwick) and the decentralisers (eg
Toulmin Smith) of the nineteenth century), with the New Poor Law of 1834 seen as
increasing centralisation. This was linked to the rise in central inspection. Daunton (2000:
14) writes that the poor law was merely the most contentious example of a wider process
of monoitoring and administration by centrally-based inspectorates. Between 1832 and
1875 more than twenty central inspectorates were created to enforce local administation
of laws or standards (Driver 1993).

Prior to 1834, one of the defining characteristics of the English Poor Law had been its
'intensely localised' character (Brundage 2002: 18). Many historians of social policy point
to the centralisation associated with the New Poor Law of 1834, with Chadwick seen as
the great centraliser. However, some writers such as Fraser (2003) point out that the

central Poor Law Commission had very limited powers when faced with a union that
failed to co-operate.

A further broad strand is that the increase in central grants has led to an increase in
central control. For example, according to Smellie (1968: 48), after 1832 the central
goverment 'successively bought the rights of inspection, audit, supervision, initiative,
criticism and control, in respect of one local service after another, by the grant of annual
subventions from the national exchequer in aid of local finance'. Most commentators
point to increased centralisation during the inter-war period (eg Simey (1937; Gilbert
1970; Gladstone 1999). Finally, although some functions were lost in the nineteenth
century such as Disraeli's transfer of prisons in 1877 (Foster et al 1980: 50), it was the
twentieth century saw some loss of functions from local authorities (Dupree 2000; Simey
1937).

Fiscal Federalism

Oates (1972) takes as a crude measure of centralization the share of central government
expenditure in total public expenditure (cf Pryor 1968; Smith 1980). He acknowledges
that we require a measure of the amount of independent decision-making power in the
provision of public goods at different levels of government. A perfect measure of this
(could such be devised) would no doubt have a number of dimensions, only some of
which would involve fiscal variables. However, as taxation is of fundamental importance,
a fiscal measure may represent a reasonably satisfactory, although admittedly somewhat

imperfect, procedure. Philip (1954: 99) suggests three phases of activity: administration,
legislation and finance. In particular, centralization of finance is likely to precede a major
role for the central government in the other two phases. Sooner or later, controls are
likely to accompany central funds: state grants can be used as a battering-ram, which will
enable the state [central government] after a time to capture the management and
administration also. He finds broad trends over time of centralisation of both expenditure
and revenue in the first half of twentieth century, including non-federal countries such as
the UK. However, this trend has reversed since 1950, with centralization declining in 11
out of 15 countries.

Grant theory

This is linked with the fiscal federalism (eg Oates 1972; Bennett 1980) and the
economics of grants (eg Foster et al 1989; King 1984; Boyne 1990) literature. The basic
position that increases in central grant leads to increases in central control (eg Ashford
1986; Oates 1998; but see Midwinter 1984; Rhodes 1988; Stanyer 1976). The flourish of
behavioural research in the 1970s has rejected the central control view. There is little
evidence of this resulting dependence leading to 'control' over expenditure decisions
Research shows continuing variation and discretion in local government. Researchers
have discounted the 'agent' model (Midwinter and Carmichael 2003: 54).

Constitutional law

The formal position is that Britain is a unitary state, with power resting with the Crown in
Parliament. As such- unlike federal countries- local governments have no constitutional
status, and Parliament could- in theory- abolish them. This suggests an agency
relationship, but local authorities have democratic accountability through local elections,
and are generally seen as partners with central government. As de Smith (1971: 409)
notes, the relationship is a partnership, but 'between the rider and the horse'.

Central control

Butcher et al (1990: 22) point out that increased financial dependence on central
government was seen as just one aspect of a general trend towards more central control of
local government. Mainsteam textbooks of the 1960s and 1970s gloomily catalogued the
apparent formidable statutory, administrative, financial and judicial controls over local
authorities (eg Griffith 1966; cf Chester 1951). In retrospect this view seems exaggerated.
Some of the controls were little used, while others were not particularly restrictive.

Foster et al (1980: 34-5) argues that at a polar extreme from federalism is the agency
theory of local government. Until recently it has been the dominant theory among
political scientists and lawyers who have studied local government. The two reasons for
central dominance are grants and the desire for uniformity. There are other weapons for

control (Griffiths 1966), and of these weapons, grants as such may be among the least
important.

Wilson and Game (2002) claim that our already highly centralised system may be
becoming 'hypercentralised' (Loughlin 2001, ch 2) They examine the formal framework
of controls and constraints: legislation; statutory instruments; circulars and guidance;
judicial review; the local ombudsman'; default and intervention; inspection; statutory
appeals; and finance. They argue that in principle, the scale of central intervention in
local authorities' affairs could be relatively easily measured. We could add up all the Acts
of Parliament relating either directly or indirectly to local government, and the plethora of
regulations, circulars, guidance notes, codes of practice, and statutory instruments
emerging from Whitehall, and doubtless conclude that the scale of central oversight and
intervention is obviously massive. What is far more difficult to assess, however, is the
nature of the relationship (p. 162). Moreover, the weighting of adding 'apples' and
'oranges' appears problematic.

Central-local or intergovernmental relations

Wilson and Game (2002) set out three broad conceptual models of central-local relations.
First, the agency model sees local authorities as having a completely subordinate
relationship to central government: as arms or agents of the centre, with little discretion
in the task of implementing national policies. However, as councils still have some
discretion, the agency model is a less than fully satisfactory representation of the central-

local relationship (Rhodes 1988). Second, the power-dependence model is an elaboration

of the partnership model that sees central government and local authorities as more or
less co-equal partners. However, the concept of partnership is vague, and it disregards the
constitutional reality of Britain as a unitary state. The power-dependence model is
associated with Rhodes (1979, 1981, 1988) in a series of publications. It argues that both
central departments and local authorities have resources- legal, financial, political,
informational, and so on, which each can draw on, and focuses on the bargaining process.
Midwinter and Carmichael (2003: 54) believe that the most influential theory of centrallocal relations in this period was Rhodes power-dependence model. However, others
have argued that Rhodes' analysis understates the degree of hierarchy in the system, and
the capacity of the centre to intervene, direct and control authorities (Page 1981)

Rhodes (1988) states that the period since 1979 has seen a more sophisticated range of
theories- eg conventional public administration, intergovermental theory, public choice
and local state theory, but the list of normative criteria contained within the models is
dauntingly long, including local autonomy, individual (negative) liberty, territorial justice
(or equality) and accountable, responsive and responsible government (p. 46). However,
this appears to conflate dependent and independent variables. Bulpitt (1987: 62) suggests
grounds for caution as the whole subject is a veritable jungle of conceptual contortions
and ambiguities, especially concepts such as the unitary state, centralisation and local
democracy. He continues that it is generally agreed that centralisation is a 'bad thing'.
usually defined in terms of a central government pinching 'local' functions for itself, or
possessing considerable powers of control over elected local government. But so little

serious academic work has been done on this concept that we are in no position to engage
in easy generalisations about its nature and consequences, talk about it in abstract terms,
and cannot measure it (p,. 63). Conclusions are difficult because the subject is both
contentious and more complex than commonly supposed. If we had referees, every
account of British central-local relations in the 1980s would be given, at the outset, a
yellow card (p. 73). .

Stewart (2000: 89-90) writes that various metaphors have been used to describe centrallocal relations. Rhodes (1981) sees the extremes of partners and agents, but argues that
neither word captures the complexity of the relationship, preferring the language of
networks and resource-exchange, but recognising the superior resources of central
government, and ignoring the element of hierarchy. Bulpitt (1983) with his dual polity
model, suggests separation rather than partnership or agency (cf Saunders 1982 on the
dual state). The reality is that no simple metaphor can describe the relationship can take
many forms (Griffiths 1966) and can use many instruments (Chester 1951).

Local Democracy

Stoker (1996) discusses theories of local government. Much British thinking about local
government is rooted in the nineteenth century. It was in that century that local
government in Britain came of age. Stoker presents three phases of evolving orthodoxy
found in academic writing and official reports: the early advocates; the post-war
reformers; and the localists of the 1980s. All favour decentralisation, and complain that

there has been centralisation. For example, The Commission for Local Democracy (1995)
argues that local activity vital if democracy is to have meaning. Since the IMF crisis of
1976 a fundamental change has taken place in the power balance between local
government and the centre in Britain. This took the form of a steady restriction on the
freedom to spend money, and local authorities are increasingly agents for central
government. (p. 6). Burgess and Travers (1980:19-22) write that Britain has traditionally
enjoyed strong local government, but has weakened since the 1930s, and especially since
1945, with a loss of powers and functions, while the remaining services have been
increasingly financed by grants. Wilson and Game (2002) cite Raymond Seitz, the former
American Ambassador to Britain (1998: 270) who argues that central government divvies
up the public purse and distributes the funds evenly across a homogeneous society. Who
gets what is a national responsibility and a national preoccupation. The cost of this
egalitarianism is a 'feebleness' of local government and a 'super-centralism' of policy
making in which 'local goverment is directed from London in a semi-colonial fashion' (p.
274).

Central/ Local Frameworks

These problems of terminology, definition and measurement are associated with

differences in chronology. Ashford (1982: 59, 251) appears to argue a long decline thesis,
with his claims that the localities in Victorian Britain saw political and administrative
subordination and that British moves toward more control over local spending can easily
be traced to late Victorian England. Elsewhere Ashford (1986) suggests a long-term

decline, accelerating after 1945. The bulk of social legislation between the wars relied
heavily on local government. Perhaps the most dramatic political change associated with
the emergence of the modern welfare state after 1945 was the nationalization of social
programmes of all kinds. A long-term decline is also implied by Jennings (1947: 17) who
states that 'Under this historic system of local self-government local authorities even now
have a substantial amount of discretion' (my emphasis). Foster et al (1980: 28) write that
the nineteenth century showed a very strong movement from local autonomy to
centralisation.

Other approach suggests a rise and fall account, with the zenith in the interwar period.
One hundred years of municipal progress (Laski et al 1935) was followed by fifty years
of municipal decline (Loughlin et al 1985). In the early 1930s Robson (1933) noted the
recent erosion of local independence leading to 'the central domination of local
government by national government. This roughly fits with Stevenson's (1984: 309)
claim that the period from the late nineteenth century to Second World War was the
'heyday of local government' Lee (1988) sees the inter-war period as high period of
municipal medicine and the zenith of the autonomy of local government, while Pickstone
(1985: 6) also sees it as the high period of municipal medicine' depended on the 'slow
apparently inexorable advance of local government welfare' Mackintosh (1953: 131)
changes embodied in this great Act (the 1929 Local Government Act) mark the zenith of
responsible local government. Using a phrase later associated with the universal national
welfare state after 1945, but also echoing Sidney Webb's earlier municipalism, Mr
Marshall, a former Labour Lord Mayor of Sheffield, claimed that 'In one way or another,

local government touches our lives at all stages from the cradle to the grave' (in Powell
1995).

However, others have suggested the 1945 Labour Government as the main break (eg
Blunkett and Jackson 1987). White (2004) argues that for more than 50 years English
local democracy has come under sustained attack from governments of every political
complexion. In ways that are now forgotten, this began with Attlee's post-war Labour
government. He points to an 'Indian Summer of local democracy between 1930 and the
middle of 1948' Since then, there have been some gains in function (eg planning) but
many losses. In sum, we could weigh up most of what local government controls now
and add it to 80% of the water supply, 70% of hospital beds, 66% of electricity
generation, 40% of gas manufacture, almost all post-school education outside the
universities, a good share of new house biuilding, a fair share of public transport (all
trams, some buses) all social security benefits not based on national insurance, then we
would have some idea of the extent of influence over the public sphere of local
democracy in the two decades before 1948, when services were not only locally owned
and run but locally paid for as well. At the start of the 21st century English local
government seems largely residual and exiguous to the central state machine. Two big
policy initiatives have done for the once strong constitutional position held by local
government. The first was nationalisation from 1945-50, and the second was
privatisation from 1979-97 (and since). The NHS marked the greatest creation of quangos
in British administrative history, marking the true beginning of that withering away of
local democracy recognised belatedly by the Royal Commission on Local Government in

England in 1969. It called the loss of the hospitals a 'great misfortune' that ought to be
reversed, but 5 years later, the remaining local authority health services were nationalised
too. It is no exaggeration to talk of the immersation of local government in its present
state, with powers largely abdicated to Whitehall at the centre (the Attlee model) and to
school governors, urban regeneration companies, housing associations and so on at the
periphery (the Thatcher model, still actively pursued). Local government, compared with
1946, is little more than a fiction. On the other hand, Cochrane (1993: 7) states that it is
tempting to view the years between 1945 and 1975 as a 'golden age' for British local
government, but such a picture is misleading. Moreover, he is not tempted to suggest any
other era. The CLD (1985) suggests 1976. Yet other authors point to an acceleration
under the Conservatives of 1979, but there are disagreements whether this represented
essential continuity (eg Ashford 1989; Bulpitt 1989) or change (eg Burgess and Travers
1980).

An alternative rise and fall account implies the zenith in the late nineteenth century.
Szreter (2002) regards a 'central role for local government' in late Victorian Britain. In the
early 1860s local government in most towns was in an almost farcical state of low
aspirations and low standards, but between 1865 and 1875 the prestige of local
government was revolutionalised, and the period 1870-1914 experienced a flowering in
British civic activism. According to the constitutional historian, H J Hanham, 'the extent
of local self-government during the nineteenth century appears stupefying'. The period
saw power and responsibility genuinely devolved by the centre to local authorities, which
had substantial revenue-raising powers (the share of local government of all expenditure

reached 51%- all time historic peak in 1905) and significant local revenue (raising about
half of their own funds in the pre-Great War era). Davis (2000: 271-2) states that 1888
represented the last occasion on which central government actively pursued
decentralisation for its own sake. The municipal nirvana represented in Webb's Socialism
in England is best seen as the high point of Victorian local autonomy. Bogdanor (1988)
suggests a different chronology, claiming that the Conservative Government of 1979 was
'the most centralist since the Stuart Monarchs of the 17th century'.

Foster et al (1980: 30) suggest a more complex chronology. Although in appearance the
local has always been subordinate in a unitary state, there has been in practice variation.
During some periods in the middle ages and between the Glorious Revolution of 1688
and the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act the practical independence of local government
could hardly have been greater under a federal constitution. At other times in the middle
ages, under the Tudors and at times under the Stuarts, and again in a rising curve after
1835 the power of central government has been strongly asserted. There have been
periods when despite its unitary nature, Britain's tiers of government have practised a
separation of powers more typical of federalism and others when local government has
seemed more the agent of central government.

It is hardly surprising that the literature lacks consensus as there is little agreement on
terminology, definitions, criteria, measures and the interpretation of the evidence. Writers
tend to contradict each other, and sometimes themselves, and there appear to be many
unresolved debates. One of the main problems is that writers tend to use words such as

decentralisation, discretion, and autonomy interchangeably. Another is that there have

been few attempts to operationalise concepts.

A number of writers have attempted some conceptual discussion. There are problems in
defining many of the relevant terms such as decentralisation (Smith 1980; Brooke 1984;
Burns et al 1994; ECPR 1988; Vries 2002), local autonomy (Gurr and King 1987; Boyne
1993; Pratchett 2004), local democracy (Bulpitt 1989) and localism (Page 1991). Only a
few writers have attempted to link the terms. Gray (1994: 3) argues that to discuss a
system of sub-national government implies that there is an autonomy, or freedom of
action, for the organisation that make it up. He continues that at its most simple
dececentralisation refers to the disaggregation of an organisation to smaller,
geographically-based, units. Such a simple defintion, however, actually covers a number
of distinct forms: Smith (1986) distinguished between a pure form of decentralisation.
deconcentration, and delegation. In this view, decentralisation is concerned with a fairly
formal view of power. Such as view of decentralisation is somewhat limited. It is
effectively impossible to create a completely powerless organisation, and any
disaggregation will involve some form of decentralisation according to Smith's definition.
(pp. 12-3). Gray points out that while the centre has attempted to exert a greater degree of
control over sub national government since 1979 than ever before it has been singularly
unable actually to control the system (p. 64).

Page and Goldsmith (1987: 1-2) argue that it is conventional for crossnational
descriptions to use terms such as 'centralization', 'decentralization', 'central control', and

'local autonomy', but these terms do not on their own provide adequate concepts on which
to base a comparative analysis. The terms do not clarify what particular aspect of the
process of government is 'decentralized'. Consequently, it is easy for studies to talk past
each other. In order to make valid comparisons, it is necessary to have a framework for
comparison that removes the ambiguity in existing terminology. They suggest three broad
dimensions: functions, access and discretion of local authorities. It is not sufficient to
look at what local government does. Although the scale of local government
responsibilities, relative to those of the central state, is a much-loved indicator of
centralization and decentralization among some economists and political scientists (eg
King 1984; Ashford 1979), it is clearly inadequate since the ability to make significant
decisions affecting a function is not identical with formal responsibility for it. It is
necessary to look at degree of discretion in carrying out functions They suggest four
types of discretion: general legal framework (eg ultra vires in UK); within services (eg
mandated versus permissive; detailed, centrally specified standards); non-legal forms (eg
circulars) and financial discretion. Access refers to to the nature of contacts between
central and local government actors. Local government may have limited discretion, but
if local actors have a significant influence on central decisions, they have greater scope
for shaping state services (cf Page's 1991 political dimension). Goldsmith and Page
(1987: 75) suggest that one crude indicator of discretion is the variation in spending (ie
the coefficient of variation; eg Boaden 1971; Sharpe and Newton 1984).

Pratchett (2004) states that local autonomy is a perennial issue in the study of sub-central
government. It is used normatively to defend local government, and empirically, as either

a measure of constitutional change or as a device for comparing local democracy across

nations. It is a fundamental concept in political science. Despite the attention that it has
received, it is rarely, if ever, distinguished from local democracy. At best, local autonomy
is seen to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for local democracy to flourish.
More often, especially in policy debates surrounding local government finance, the two
terms are simply conflated. Normative political theory holds a special place for local
democracy and its institutional embodiment - local government. There are strong
normative justifications for local democracy and local government. Local autonomy is
often considered to be synonymous with local democracy. Soverignty in vested in the
Crown in Parliament, which therefore makes local autonomy a relative concept (cf
Midwinter 1984). There are three approaches to local autonomy: freedom from higher
authorities; freedom to achieve particular outcomes; as the reflection of local identity.
'Freedom from' approaches to local autonomy are based on constitutional and legal
understandings of central-local relations. This approach represents the classic political
science perspective on the topic, and defines local autonomy as the degree of discretion
that local authorities have from central government. Empirical applications suggest
increased centralisation and decreased autonomy over time. These studies have a number
of aspects: functions, legal basis and financial regime, with the latter often deemed the
most significant. In short, the argument of financial autonomy rests on the notion that
legal, political and organisational autonomy is meaningless without the resources to
realise the benefits of such autonomy. However, financial autonomy is not the only
feature of studies of increasing centralisation. In defining local autonomy as freedom
from higher authorities, there is, inevitably, a systemic concern with centralisation. A

'freedom to definition is given by Wolman and Goldsmith (1990: 3): by local autonomy
we mean much more than the traditional concern for the ability of local government's to
act unfettered by constraints from higher levels of government. Instead, we ask a much
different and, to our minds, more fundamental question: do local governments in urban
areas have autonomy in the sense that their presence and activities have independent
impacts on anything important? Does urban politics matter? This approach moves the
debate away from the degree of discretion afforded to units of local government and
places much greater attention on their capacity to influence central government Thus,
their redefinition of local autonomy concentrates on the residual ability of local
authorities, where all extraneous economic and political varaiables are taken into account,
to affect the well-being of their localities. The final approach conceptualises local
autonomy as being a bottom-up phenomenon: more broadly the capacity to define and
express local identity through political activity, which brings participatory democracy
into the analysis. While Pratchett adds to the debate, he does not focus significantly on
Gurr and King's dimensions of autonomy. More significantly, he does not cite Boyne
(1993) who has produced the most sustained effort to measure autonomy. Boyne (1993)
differentiates between aggregate and individual autonomy, and measures both
dimensions. He finds limited reductions in autonomy in Wales, and warns that it is
necessary not to confuse central intentions and local outcomes (cf Gray 1994).

Midwinter (1984: x-xi) writes that the Government's actions have been described as
heralding the end of local 'democracy' or local 'autonomy', but local discretion is not quite
the same thing as local autonomy. The concept 'autonomy' is usually regarded as an

absolute, but local government is not, and never was, autonomous. Rather, there are, with
Griffiths (1966) degrees of discretion, on a control- discretion continuum. For Wolman
(1982) autonomy is the scope for independent action by local authorities, or, put
somewhat differently, the range of choices available to local government unconstrained
by high levels of goverment. However, it is possible to take issue with both points. There
appears to be no reason why autonomy could not be measured on a continuum. Surely, in
Wolman's definition, high autonomy is very similar to high discretion.

Wilson and Game (2002: 28-9) state that UK local government could be described as
'semi-autonomous' There are semantic purists who will insist that there can be no such
phenomenon as partial autonomy, but we find it useful to be able to describe one
governmental institution as having relatively less autonomy than another, or less than it
possessed itself at some point in the past. This simply implies an ordinal scale (cf
Pratchett 2004, but contra Midwinter 1984).

These attempts to disentangle the concepts hide as much as they reveals. While some
writers appear to conflate the terms, others attempt to differentiate them, but despite
claims that terms are not similar, one concept is often discusses in terms of another. For
example, Gray (1994) discusses autonomy in terms of decentralisation. Rhodes (1988:
16) seems to equate decentralisation and local autonomy. However, defining one
problematic variable in terms of another does not advance analysis very far. Moreover,
there are few attempts to measures such concepts (but see Boyne 1993).

In other words, the terms in their ideal type sense appear- after all- to be remarkably
similar. However, it is necessary to bear in mind the different types of control (eg legal
versus fiscal; eg Chester 1951; Griffith 1966; Wilson and Game 2002) and to
differentiate potential and actual control (Boyne 1993; Gray 1994).

Localism

Centralism

Local Democracy

No Local Democracy

revenue

grants

freedom

control

discretion

no discretion

autonomy

no autonomy

partner

agent

strong LG

weak Local Government

independence

dependence

Localism

Victorian Britain attempted to devise schemes for delineating national from local
services. In 1867, Mill attempted to differentiate local (eg paving) from national business
(eg the administration of justice). However, as Foster et al (1980: 25-6) comment, 'all the
interesting issues involve exactly those functions lying between these two extremes'.
They continue that Mill classified very few functions as purely local, and leaves little

scope for local power. This argument was developed by Cannan, Marshall and Goschen
into ideas of oenerous and beneficial expenditure. The Royal Commission on Local
Taxation of 1901 and the Kempe Commission of 1914 applied more clearly the
distinction to the question of the financing of local expenditures. The clearest analysis
was by the 1901 Minority Report that differentiated between national/ onerous services
and local/beneficial services. As Foster et al (1980) comment, the logical conclusion of
the analysis should have been to transfer all the national services to the central
government, or to finance them completely from the central revenues.

The Layfield Report (1976: xxiii) notes that most of the serious problems uncovered by
the review are not new. Many of these were recognised at the turn of the century, and
have reappeared at intervals and were last reviewed by the Kempe Committee in 19111914. The Report recognised the continuing drift towards centralisation, and considered
that a decision now needed to be taken to place responsibility firmly either with the
government or with the local authorities. It is theoretically possible to contemplate a
degree of autonomy that would give the local authorities virtually unfettered discretion in
the carrying out of local services. In that case they would need to be responsible for
finding the bulk of the money from local sources of taxation. We do not consider this
possibility further as it is clearly neither politically nor financially possible. We mention
it, however, as it is necessary to bear in mind that we are not considering as the
alternative to the position of very substantial centralisation an extreme position of
autonomy, but one that stops considerably short of that point. Rather, we take greater
responsibility to include more powers of decision in services such as education, social

services, transport, and housing where government influence is at present strongest.

Greater local responsibility requires two elements: less dependence on national taxation,
and bouyant local tax. The Report suggested something nearer equality in central and
local contribution. The Note of Reservation by Prof Alan Day stated that the essential
difference between my own analysis and that of the Report concerns central-local
relationships. The Report is structured around a polarisation between two sets of financial
structure, one relatively centralist and one relatively localist, but there is no justification
for this dichotimisation. Day advocates various versions of a middle way of national
public goods and local public goods (cf Victorian thinking) and a middle way of national
funding responsibility for minimum standards. The introduction to the main Report
responded to this argument: the choice is not between total local autonomy on the one
hand and complete central control on the other, but is centred around two groups of
possibilities- one based on mainly local and one based on mainly central accountability.
Within each group, there exists scope for political choice. To describe this as a
polarisation is to misunderstand its purpose. We are not posing a choice between
extremes. We are presenting two broad approaches for determining the general character
of the relationships between the two levels of government. To choose instead the socalled middle ground would not remove the present muddle (p. xxv).

Oates (1972) develops an economic approach to federalism, stating that there are two
polar types of government. At one end of the spectrum is complete centralization: a
unitary form of government, which assumes full responsibility for the three economic
functions of the public sector (after Musgrave, the allocation function or the price

mechanism; the distribution function or social policy; and the stabilization function or
economic policy). . At the other extreme, there is complete decentralization. He argues
that, for my purposes, it is useful to stop a bit short of total decentralisation, which would
presumably represent a state of anarchy. Rather, let us consider a highly decentralised
situation in which central government is almost completely devoid of economic
responsibility. He then presents the economic case for centralized and decentralized
government, pointing out that both types possess some advantages (noting that there are
also political advantages and disadvantages). In short, central is best for stabilization and
distribution, but local is best for not uniformity. What is clearly desirable is a form of
government that combines the advantages and avoids the disadvantages of these polar
types. Federalism represents, in one sense, a compromise between unitary government
and extreme decentralization.

According to Bennett (1980: 36), localist or public choice models suggest that the public
sector should be organized around various spatial scales of collective preferences.
Centralist models suggest that public goods should be allocated geographically on the
measured needs of each spatial location. Localist model are grounded in the Buchanan
and Tiebout hypotheses: 'service clubs' and 'voting with your feet'. There is also a
compromise of minimum standards financed at a national level, with variations above
this level on a local basis (cf Day/ Layfield), deriving from Adam Smith (1776) and
Hansen and Perloff (1944). Bennett (1989: 278) sets out four general structures of
government organisation. Localized is responsible for all but a few public functions and
retains these within the smallest possible groups of people. Centralised retains all powers

within a single unitary state. In practice neither of these forms is completely achieved and
most countries are governed by mixtures of centralized or localized systems as either
federal or devolved forms (eg Humes and Martin 1961) Federal divides sovereignty
between central and local levels according to the function or public good involved.
Devolved governments have limited discretionary powers in either the legislative,
executive, judicial or administrative areas, but with ultimate responsibility for all
functions retaimed at the central level.

Similar ideal types have been presented by Chester (1951: 325), Judge (1978) and by
Burgess and Travers (1980: 3). As former Chancellor, Lawson (1992: 104) put it, 'I came
increasingly to believe that the Treasury should either take complete control of local
authority expenditure, or require councils to fund all of their services from local taxation'.
However, the practical - as opposed to theoretical- limits of localism are rarely made
clear. Few commentators seem to suggest total local funding, or the 'grantless society'.
Layfield seemed to suggest an equal balance of central and local funding (cf Milburn
2004, and other new localism arguments that suggest a move towards local funding- or
the situation that existed between about 1946 and the end of the 1950s; see Burgess and
Travers 1980: 34?). This can be compared to the nineteenth century, where the vast bulk
of income was local rather than national (cf Peacock and Wiseman).

One of the few detailed discussions on localism is Page (1991: 1) who states that the
amount of 'government' can be readily measured through money, employees or
regulation, but the degree to which this government is really ' local' cannot be so easily

assessed. To be local implies some control over decisions by the community. The
principle of representative democracy suggests that this influence is exercised at least in
part through democratically elected officials. He differentiates legal and political
localism. Local political elites can influence public policy through using their
constitutional or legal position at the head of a government organization and directing it
according to their own priorities: local decision-making through raising revenue and
spending money. In contrast to this, they can influence policy by using their political
authority to influence national decisions in so far as they affect the locality (p. 5). There
is a similar distinction by the Austrian legal philosopher Hans Kelman (1949) who
distinguishes between 'static' and 'dynamic' decentralization. Static decentralization refers
to the degree to which 'norms' are uniform throughout the territory of the state, while
dynamic decentalisation refers to the degree to which the ability to make such norms is
dispersed. Mackenzie (1954) differentiates between the legal and political scale of
political integration between central and local government. The legal scale has to do with
the scope for action by the local authority in its freedom to run and shape public services.
The political scale concerns ensuring that local interests are represented at the national
level. (p. 6).

The legal scale is concerned with measuring functions and discretion. It is possible to list
all functions, or measure expenditure. The concept of discretion appears simple, but it is
fraught with problems when applied to local government. (p. 21) Although scholars such
as Ashford (1979) have sought to impute levels of 'decentralization' from spending and
central government grant data, the equation of greater decentralisation with larger range

of functions or smaller percentages of central government grants is clearly misleading (cf

Boyne 1993). The fact that services were taken away from British local authorities in
1948 does not necessarily mean that the discretion of local government in providing its
remaining services was affected. There is no simple quantitative measure of local
discretion. (p. 22) In terms of fiscal measures, a measure of centralisation is dependence
on central grants- 'he who pays the piper calls the tune (p. 32-33). Another means of
assessing local discretion in the grant system is through the structure of grant. We might
expect that a general grant, unhypothecated to any particular service, is likely to offer
greater discretion to local authorities than specific or categorical grants- ie with strings
attached. Page concludes that Britain can be regarded as an exemplary case of legal
localism (p. 41).

New Localism

Although the term 'new localism' has been used many times in recent years by academics
and politicians, it does not appear to have a clearly defined, consensual meaning. Goetz
and Clarke (1993) used the term over ten years ago. They do not clearly define the term,
but it appears to be about a 'new localism' in a global era. The term appears to re-emerge
at the turn of the millennium. However, it appears to have a different meaning to Goetz
and Clarke (1993), (making it a new-new localism?). It is most closely associated with a
series of publications from the New Local Government Network (see nlgn.org.uk).

Filkin et al (2000) state that we need strong, open and flexible local governance. These
truths have received insufficient attention from central government for much of the last
three years and for most of the last half century. The core role of local government is
community leadership. They argue that the local authority should be the guardian of the
public realm, the champion and protector of consumers, the supporter of social
citizenship goals and of civic society and the promoter of the economic and social health
of the community and of inclusive and cohesive local communities (pure
NewLabourSpeak) They claim that community leadership, defined in this concrete way
is, in many respects, more challenging than the production of services. They argue for a
'New Localism' for three fundamental reasons: a vibrant, reinvigorated local governance,
working in partnership with the centre; different needs and priorities; and participation.
Local government seen primarily as an agent of central government is a contradiction in
terms. They claim (p.11) that 'new localism' is 'new' in four ways: a celebration of local
people involved in governance (not simply councillors); high quality vertical as well as
horizontal linkages; community leaders rather than primarily service producers; and a
fundamental change in local government working. However, much of this is far from
clear, and borders on the tautalogical: a 'fundamental' change- by definitiondifferentiates 'old' from 'new'.

Corry and Stoker (2002) argue that the government has discovered some of the limits of
top-down approaches but have yet to find a way to commit themselves to a strategy of
devolution and decentralisation. This does not mean moving to full-blown localism in
one easy step. New Labour's moved from its initial approach of 'chaotic centralism'

towards 'steering centralism' where the centre steers and facilitates rather than commands
and controls, giving up degrees of freedom to localities, but in a very controlled way,
with local discretion in service delivery alongside a commitment to national standards
(quality versus quantity? or means versus ends?). This has been termed ' earned
autonomy' or 'decentralisation by degrees' (Mulgan and 6, 1996). However, it is
ultimately a cousin of the centralist approach. As Tony Wright MP, Chair of PACSC,
'earned autonomy' is a phrase that would only be understood in a system where the centre
calls the shots. There has been some notable steps towards new localism. Ed Balls (2002)
refers to 'constrained discretion', but the degree to which this is a true localist model will
depend on whether in the case of locally elected government (as opposed to non-elected
elements of service delivery, where accountability will be primarily to local rather than
national electorates and whether the goals will be set mainly by local rather than central
government. The jury is still out, but the model best described as 'steering localism': the
thrust has moved towards the local, but the centre still has a large hand hovering above
the tiller. Our vision of new localism starts with a full-blooded acceptance of the
importance of the democratic functions of sub-national tiers of government. With
reference to the critique by Walker (2002; see below), there will have to be limits to
localism, and some degree of equalisation will be necessary.

MacLean and McMillan (nd) regard that Chadwick as 'the UK's greatest centralist', and
Gladstone as the greatest localist. However, this appears to be concerned with his
championing of Home Rule for Ireland, which hardly makes him a 'localist' in most
writers' terms. They argue that a government can be consistently centralist. Starting with

education and police, it could abandon any pretence of local autonomy and take over the
services as a function of central government. That would be new centralism. New Labour
has moved from 'chaotic centralism' to 'steering centralism', and a mix of steering
centralism and new localism can be found in policies. No government can be serious
about new localism without looking at the tax bases available to local and regional
government. More autonomy is the core of new localism: local governments must be
allowed to make their own decisions in their own way on devolved matters, and face the
real fiscal implications (but this appears to be old localism?) New localism in public
finance requires some radical changes such as a robust non-political grants commissions
(cf Australia), independent of central government, to determine needs both at regional
and local authority level. The balance of funding for local services must be switched
towards the localities, or it could be decided that services such as fire and police are not
local.

Stoker (2004) argues that many observers have noted top-down elements, but there are
also localist and decentralist noises. The idea of earned autonomy is a distinctive feature
of New Labour's managerial style. There is a feeling that certain services should be a
matter of national standards and not local variation: for example, education is now clearly
defined as a national service delivering outcomes central to the nation's economic future,
and social services is another area where opinion has moved against the 'postcode lottery'.
Although traditionalists assert that only an increase in proportion of local revenue will
ensure real local accountability, there is comparative evidence of countries with visibly
autonomous local governments with high (eg Nordic) and low (eg Netherlands, Italy)

local revenues. There are four criteria for a local finance system: transparency;
equalization; flexibility and bouyancy; and some capacity for consistent budgeting to
funding. However, the post-Layfield debate has focused attention only on accountability.
but accountability is more complex than post-Layfield debate. The choices are moving to
new univeralism, with Whitehall responsibility, contracting with local authorities (ie
100% central finance) for certain services (cf Layfield centralism) or a new localist
solution, with grants giving near full equalisation for services such as education, and
social services, but with local areas able to top up or reduce expenditure below this norm.
In a pure version of the new localist solution, for all other services (eg fire; environmental
protection; local roads; planning; street lighting; arts and leisure and all other services)
there would be no grant support at all. Unlike the choices laid down by Layfield, the new
universalism and localist perspectives are not mutually exclusive. (cf Day's middle way).
Both systems have strengths and weaknesses. New universalism is high on transparency;
high on equity; low on flexibility; and low on holism, whereas new localism is
respectively medium; low; high and high. New Localism does not imply that local
government can do everything and that the centre should stop doing everything (cf dual
state; high and low politics), but that local government can do some things better than the
centre [cf Hansard debate of 1940s: what is new?]. Thus New Localism is not against
equalization measures to ensure the fair funding of public services or the idea of
nationally defined rights to high-quality services. Local government is there to be a
community leader but this is not an authority-based model. Rather it is premised on the
establishment of a pluralistic and open politics at the local level.

There have been many speeches by Ministers and advisors (eg Taylor in Filkin et al 2000,
Balls in Corry and Stoker 2002, Wood in MacLean and McMillan, nd, Reid 2003;
Milburn 2003, 2004, Blunkett 2004, Raynsford 2004) advocating new localism and
decentralisation. Blair (2002) wondered whether Labour took the wrong road historically
in downplaying a previous tradition of 'mutualism, localism and devolution'.

Milburn (2003) wishes to make the case for 'real localism'. The 'one size fits all' era
should be replaced by decentralisation, diversity and choice. The NHS took power away
from local communities and vested it is the central state. This was a profound weakness
since needs can only be met locally not nationally, services are delivered locally not
nationally and in a consumer society people are demanding services that are responsive to
their needs. At the end of the Second World War, whilst across Europe other left parties
were championing community involvement and ownership - and Cole and Tawney (?)
were advocating a similar approach here- we ended up with too close an affinity between
state ownership and public ownership. It is right to set standards nationally but it is wrong
to try to run the NHS nationally. Whereas some suggest that there is a choice between
national standards and local autonomy, I believe that this is a false dichotomy. We have
been moving- in health care and local government- from a centralised command and
control model to new localism. NHS Foundation Hospitals are so important. They are not
about relinquishing a little central control, but relocating ownership out of the hands of a
state bureaucracy and into the hands of the local community (why not LA?), modelled on
co-operative societies and mutual organisations. The New Deal for Communities Boards
in some cases have twice the turnout for local authority elections. With greater local

control, there will inevitably be grater diversity, but uniformity has not brought equality.
He quotes Tawney's famous passage that 'equality of provision is not identity of
provision' 'Diversity, in other words, can bolster the pursuit of equality rather than
undermine it. We must decentralise from the nation to the region; from Whitehall to the
town hall, from local councils to local schools and to local housing estates. And in the
NHS we must give communities more voice as well as giving patients more choice.
These are the building blocks of real localism. This speech contains some bizarre claims.
Few writers would regard Tawney and Cole as localists. How Milburn sees Tawney's
differentiation of different types of equality as advocacy for 'diversity' is quite incredible.

Milburn (2004) develops some of these themes. He argues that our next term should
forge a new settlement between central government, local government and new forms of
local governance. Compared to most other European countries our finance system is
highly centralised. We have reached the high water mark of the post-1997 verticallydriven target-based system. In the last couple of years the direction has been towards
greater devolution in local government, health or education. Following hard on the heels
of NHS Foundation Hospitals, proposals have been floated for giving local people a
greater say over how services as diverse as leisure and schools are run and organised. We
need to extend real power in local communities eg NDC with a bigger role for voluntary,
community and residents organisations (cf care IN and BY the community). This is not a
rather naive form of localism; it is the correct balance. Indeed for some services where
local preferences vary little and which rely on highly specialised skills, more
centralisation not less might be required. Fire services or housing benefit administration -

perhaps regionally controlled- are examples (cf Ewen 2004). However, the overall
presumption should be towards a more diverse, more devolved, more flexible system of
governance. In the end devolution depends upon power being relinquished. In this new
world, the centre will need to accept that there will be local variations. Greater financial
freedoms should flow too. Our over centralised system of local government funding is
creaking. Whatever the outcomes of the Government's review, the transition must be
towards more equality between local and national funding. We should examine whether
over time a 50/50 split is feasible. The direction of travel should be towards greater
autonomy for local services. However, there is precious little evidence that the simple
devolution of powers from one tier of government to another of itself produces services
that are more responsive or effective. It is for this reason that devolution cannot stop at
the town hall door. Instead it has to reach down into local communities and empower
individual users. Active citizenship will not be forged by a local elite running a
managerialist state (ie an elected local authority) any more than a national elite running
one. Local authorities will increasingly focus on commissioning not providing. They will
exercise genuine community leadership by building communities own capacity to lead.
individual choice. However, in services where there is less opportunity for individuals to
exercise consumer choices- eg policing- it means passing power downwards and
outwards to communities. In other words, it is important to strengthen both individual
and collective choice (voice?) eg more use of local referenda, direct elections to some
services, and the power to control- or maybe raise- at least some of the finances local
boards have at their disposal should also be considered. It is one of the great political
ironies that the very figure most identified with the most centralised, statist approach of

the last century should have formulated what I believe should be our political mantra for
this new century. When Bevan proclaimed that the purpose of winning political power is
to give it way, he reached into a rich Labour movement heritage in which empowerment
for individuals and communities was the great political cause. When it comes to localism,
it is time to stop talking the talk and start walking the walk.

Blunkett (2004) believes that there is a cross party commitment to localism which
sometimes comes and goes- and which at the moment seems to have come to all political
parties. The speech addresses local identity rather than local government. It concerns
building from the bottom- from neighbourhood goose and burial clubs, working men's
societies, and local education trusts 'I think that we need to turn to that localism again' (ie
old). We have created new forms of relationships between the centre and the locality such
as Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships, with the intention to engage people in
making decisions (but not part of traditional local government- ie return to ad hoc bodies;
see White 2004).

Raynsford (2004) states that localism is a term that is being used increasingly commonly,
in a range of contexts. With the prefix 'new', it is appearing in a number of different
publications and indeed Minister's speeches. It is a central theme in the Government's
thinking. Like many well-used phrases, it will I suspect be open to a range of different
interpretations. Indeed if the 'Local Government Chronicle' were to ask all of you here
today to submit a brief explanation of what you understand by the term 'new localism', I
suspect next week's issue would be a bumper edition, packing with a wide range of subtly

differering interpretations. Many believe a caricature of central government politicians

with devolutionary rhetoric in opposition, but with a controlling centralising tendency in
power. The public is in favour of devolution in principle, but also against the postcode
lottery. The 19th century is seen, with the benefit of hindsight and through somewhat
rose-tinted spectacles, as the heyday of localist initiative, but also a period of stark
inequalities, with the reaction of a shift to univeralist and centralising solutions in the
20th century. By the later decades of the 20th century, the centralising tendency had gone
to extreme and undesirable lengths and localism is once more on the agenda. However, it
is not just a process of reversing the excessive centralism of the immediate past (ie back
to 1997?). There are three themes in the White Paper, Strong Local Leadership, Quality
Public Services (DTLR 2001: providing national standards and accountability for high
quality services; devolving power to councils and giving additional freedom to meet local
needs; and building capacity at local level to deliver better services and providing
effective community leadership for new localism. It has five main principles: one size
does not fit all; reciprocal acceptance of responsibility; performance matters; effective
local leadership is absolutely central; and devolution does not stop at the town hall. As
Sir Jeremy Beecham puts it, 'we who preach devolution and decentralisation must
practice it'. We are entering a more mature relationship between central and local
government based on greater trust and better mutual understanding, devolving power and
responsibility to local decision makers rather than command and control, with real
progress in removing controls. On finance, the Balance of Funding Review will be the
most significant examination of this subject since Layfield, asking difficult questions

such as is less equalisation a price that is worth paying for grater local financial freedom?'
We have clearly committed ourselves to a new localist ethos'.

The Conservative spokesperson, Bernard Jenkin (2004) advocates the denationalisation

of local government. One of the real failures of the modern British political system is the
cycle of centralisation. The effect of creeping centralisation of the British political system
over a century or more is today suffocating the spirit of local communities, denying local
democracy. Ever since parliament started to vote grants to local government in the
nineteenth century, national politics has been drawn into the cycle of centralisation that
continues to this day. The Attlee Government crowned the central state as the great
equalizer at the heart of everything, obsessed with equality and centralisation at the cost
of efficiency and local diversity, as shown by Douglas Jay's famous remark that the
'Gentleman in Whitehall' knows best. We decentralised administration in the NHS to
Trusts and GPFH, and empowered school governing bodies, but ironically 18 years of
Conservative government not only failed to halt many aspects of centralisation but
unwittingly accelerated it. The reality is that after a hundred years of equalisation and
central government intervention, there is still massive variation in the provision and
quality of public services across the nation. England has the most intricate and
sophisticated grant equalisation arrangements in the world. Local government has
progressively been stripped of independence and fiscal autonomy- it has been effectively
nationalised and turned into little more than a Whitehall franchise. The so-called 'new
localism' fudges the real question. New localism is defined as 'devolution from the centre
within nationally agreed frameworks'. For 'nationally agreed frameworks', read 'targets

dictated by ministers'. New localism's concept of earned autonomy still presumes an

omniscent centre. It fears 'unchecked, 'free for all' localism in which a shared sense of
citizenship across the nation is abandoned'. The reality is that the new localism means
different things to different people. To Gordon Brown, it means 'region'; to David
Blunkett it means 'local police initiatives'; and to Alan Milburn it means 'foundation
hospitals'. Yet behind these policies lies the same belief in state centralism. Only last
month, Raynsford argued that 'much more discretion' to local government was 'not the
right way forward'. Labour's approach, under the cover of pseudo-localism, is destroying
any sense of local democracy, local empowerment and local citizenship. We need 'real
decentralisation' - nothing short of a revolution in the way we think. There are four main
principles for decentralisation in England: we need to decide who does what; we need to
create no new layers of government, and no new banks of politicians (ie local not
regional); we must enable local councils to become less dependent upon central
government grant, and you can only achieve this if you let go at least some of the
equalisation agenda; and we must embrace diversity and pursue not the equalisation of
outcomes, but the maximisation of opportunities for all. So far it is Labour that has
claimed the language of decentralisation, but we believe in localism; in decentralisation,
in diversity.

There have been few critiques of the new localism. The most detailed is Walker (2002|)
who claims that 'We are all localists and decentralisers now'. In the salons, it has become
highly fashionable to demonise the 'centre', 'centralisation', 'command and control'.
(Wintour 2002) Since the 2001 election, there has been a spasm of anti-centralism, but

Walker argues for more, not less centralism. He argues that the left-of-centre celebrates
local activism, its pin ups R H Tawney and G D H Cole. Some of this criticism of
'centralism' must be conceded, but there is a danger of throwing the baby out with the
bathwater. The case for a strong centre.is based around the major challenge of equality.
People in modern Britain expect uniformity in welfare and public services. At this point
some localists demand a grants system that somehow combines equity at the national
level with freedom for local or regional spenders. True devolution must mean devolving
decisions on tax as well as spend. And fiscal devolution is, potentially, a recipe for
greater inequality. At the heart of the argument for devolution is a wish to see more
difference. Localists and advocates of regionalism need to be aware of becoming stalking
horses for smaller and weaker government, with a danger of becoming a fifth column for
economic liberalism.

Pratchett (2004: 368) refers to the 'so-called new localism'. He argues that superficially,
the new localism offers many of the characteristics of local autonomy developed in this
article (see above). It has two key features. Firstly, it recognises the importance of
national standards and priorities as a driving force for public policy. Secondly, however,
it also recognises the primacy of the institutions of local governance in delivering public
services on behalf of the centre. This appears to be the 'cake and eat it' school of social
analysis, and contains no mention of community leadership Consequently, expressions
such as 'constrained discretion' and 'earned autonomy' lie at the heart of the new localism
vision. The new localism is more than simply policy rhetoric. The policy debate has
moved beyond a straightforward focus on 'freedom from' type conceptualisations of

autonomy. Policy attention has begun to focus much more on 'freedom to' types of
autonomy, but the extent to which new localism supports the reflection of local identity
as an ideal form of local autonomy is more questionable.

White (2004) focuses on Reid's (2003) 'Localising the NHS' speech where we find the
first real questioning by government of what 'national' has come to mean. Reid argues
agianst a 'national uniform approach' and advocates 'new localism. It is 'new' in his terms
because it consciously sets out to bypass the old local government. The problem is that
the tradition of local government is that it encourages politicians to believe the local can
and should operate completely autonomously from the national government. Mr Reid sets
up an Aunt Sally in an entirely autonomous local government: there has never been any
such thing, since at least 1834. Reid's model is the London School Board. So for the
flagship of new localism, Foundation Hospitals, Reid proposes a special-purpose local
body along the lines of the LSB. The government's consultation on police accountability
floats the possibility of 'directly elected police boards' as a 'pure form of local
democracy'. In reviving special, single purpose local authorities, we can see that new
localism is very old localism indeed. It takes us back beyond living memory, before
anything that we would now recognise as local government to 'pure' eighteenth century
forms where local magistracies wielded undemocratic power. The demise of the
archetypical special purpose authority, the Board of Guardians, in 1930s lay in
governments' frustration with boards at West Ham, Poplar and elsewhere. Nor does
history bode well for special purpose authorities in other directions. The main argument
against them in that they fragment local democracy and create divisions between

services. They were generally absorbed into multi-purpose local authorities in the
nineteenth century. It was just this argument that convinced those who welcomed the
abolition of the LSB in 1904. Reid implies that fragmentation can be overcome with
partnership, but joint planning between NHS and local authorities since 1974 have been
an expensive failure. Instead, White advocates 'new forms of genuine local democracy'

Conclusions

It is difficult to distill the main characteristics of localism - old or new- from the
literatures. First, the term is rarely used in contrast to more common discussions of
decentralisation and autonomy, and the literature is unclear about the extent to which the
terms mean similar things. Second, the new localism literature tends not to specify clear
key characteristics. For some (eg Stoker 2004) it is about community leadership, but
Pratchett (2004) does not mention this dimension. Pratchett (2004) claims that
expressions such as 'constrained discretion' and 'earned autonomy' lie at the heart of the
new localism vision. However, it might be argued that these are best associated more
towards the 'centralist' pole of the centralist-localist spectrum (cf Stoker 2004). It is
unclear where new localism fits along this spectrum. The Layfield Report (1976) makes it
clear that it is not advocating anything close to the localist pole. Day's 'middle way'
suggests a central position. Mulgan and 6 (1996: 9) state that local self-government is
neither a viable nor a desirable goal. Milburn (2003) advocates 'real localism, but
suggests a roughly 50/ 50 fiscal balance. Jenkin's (2004) 'real decentralisation' accepts
less equalisation and more diversity. In short, there seems to be little consensus on the

degree of autonomy in terms of power or finance, and the level of financial equalisation.
Moreover, there are different emphases by different writers. For some, decentralisation
from the town hall is a major theme, while for others it is replacing the town hall with ad
hoc local bodies. If new localism is about 'participation' or 'active citizenship', then there
are earlier parallels in the decentralisation of the new urban left (eg Burns 1994) or the
Conservatives' active citizenship. For example, Douglas Hurd (1988, in Heater 1990)
stated that 'The diffusion of power is a bulwark against despotism and corruption, and
the key to active and responsible citizenship ... So the thrust of government policy is to
shift power outwards, away from the corporatist battalions to the small platoons' Hurd
makes it clear that local authorities figure among the 'big battalions', so 'some aspects of
our policy, like the national curriculum or the business rate, involve taking power from
local councils to the centre in order to prevent its abuse or atrophy'. Third, the discussion
of the new localism makes either little or problematic use of history and the 'old
localism'. Historical evidence from the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and
debates on local and national services and the Hansard Debates of the 1940s tend not to
be used. Figures such as Tawney seem to be incorrectly appropriated (yet again) for
bolstering claims rather than the arguably better advocates of localism such as Morrison,
Robson, the early Webbs and Fabians, the Independent Labour Party and the Socialist
Medical Association. As White (2004) points out, some of the characteristics of the 'new'
localism are very old. If 'new localism' is to be more than a vague and meaningless
'hurrah' term, then more work is required on its conceptual and historical dimensions.

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