Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC

THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL

DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Petitioners,

- versus -

RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO

MANALO,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 180906

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:
October 7, 2008
x- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they are not
separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in
its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of amparo filed
before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19 [1] of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court
of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The
Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents.
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) [2] filed before this
Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents)
and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners
also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders,
and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5) [3] of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6
of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including
but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them
from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their
right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 1 [4] of the 1987 Constitution.[5]
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24,
2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition
as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1)
the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 26[6] of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the
writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law and containing the

specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs
prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in
Sec. 18[7]of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs. [8]
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule and
further resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with the CA (Court of Appeals) a
verified written return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and
designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition
onNovember 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. [9]
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents), the
dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:
1.
To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this decision all official and unofficial
reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already on file herein;
2.
To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald
Caigas within five days from notice of this decision.
3.
To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military
and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this
decision.
The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his
duly authorized deputy, the latters authority to be express and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with
this directive.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents:
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several uniformed and
armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso,
Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the
soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.[11]
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon,
several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him. They
asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier
slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house,
and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly
brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay. [12]
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la
Cruz, and Pula de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While
he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house two barangay councilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo
Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.[13]
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the
faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who drove the van
was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who
entered his house and abducted him was Ganata. He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his
abductors was George who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old. [14]
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond. Both of
them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldos. The van
stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different
room. With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on
the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought
to his (Raymonds) room and it was his (Raymonds) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he
was a member of the New Peoples Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was
questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each
time he answered none, they hit him.[15]
In the next days, Raymonds interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would salute
them, call them sir, and treat them with respect.He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw
their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials was
different from those of the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes,

instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case
filed in connection with the respondents abduction. [16] While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not
manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled
respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food. [17]
On the third week of respondents detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They doused
him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched
him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could no longer endure the torture
and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room. Before their
torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back the next day and kill him. [18]
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made noise with the
chains put on him to see if they were still awake.When none of them came to check on him, he managed to free his hand
from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped near a
fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river and an
Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the road to
Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.[19] He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him
to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to another place near the entrance of
what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured
gasoline on him. Then a so-called Mam or Madam suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond before he was
killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside FortMagsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.[20]
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the wounds were
almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents guards got drunk. [21]
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all
the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels,
bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people [22] had been detained in that bartolina, including his brother
Reynaldo and himself.[23]
For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house
with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and
mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the
DTU.[24]
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their urine samples and
marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were
aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived.They also examined respondents
and gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of
respondents urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few
more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the master of the DTU, Master Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at
Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that
Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them. [25]
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other armed men wearing
fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in
a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilarios men. [26]
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo. They were
detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan for about three months. When they arrived in Sapang,
Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center of the compound
and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was about two arms length away from respondents. He
began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he
knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were made to face Gen.
Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil man. [27]
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?
Sumagot akong, Siyempre po, natatakot din
Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, bastat sundin nyo ang lahat ng
sasabihin ko sabihin mo sa magulang mo huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil
niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre
na sumuko na sa gobyerno.[28]
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the
morning, Hilario, Efren and the formers men - the same group that abducted them - brought them to their parents
house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not walk. In the
presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid,

Raymonds parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymonds parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they
would never see their children again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang. [29]
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the four masters who
were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse. [30] When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big
white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength and be healthy and
to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make
them strong. He also said that they should prove that they are on the side of the military and warned that they would not
be given another chance.[31] During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture. [32]
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named Alive,
was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take one capsule a
day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The Alive made them sleep each time they took it, and
they felt heavy upon waking up.[33]
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that
while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as Oscar, a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in
Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his house, and got acquainted with
other military men and civilians.[34]
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry Battalion. He was
fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the barracks. [35]
The next day, Raymonds chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he learned
that he was in a detachment of the Rangers.There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also
ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him
that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she
had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During
the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry. [36]
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeo and
Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with Allan whose name they later came to know as
Donald Caigas, called master or commander by his men in the 24 th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in
the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their
chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be
killed.[37]
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be thankful they
were still alive and should continue along their renewed life. Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents
were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had already left
for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November
2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name Oscar and holding himself out as a military trainee. He
got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit. [38]
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the
24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8,
2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as Mar and
Billy beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the
camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock. [39]
Raymond recalled that when Operation Lubog was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and Manuel
with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he
witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a
member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house. [40] Another time, in another Operation Lubog, Raymond
was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who
was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymonds eyes. [41]
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the
sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the
five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007. [42]
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring
food to detainees brought to the camp.Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at
nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan,
nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at itoy
sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.

Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala
sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis
ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena
at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya
tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak,
dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang
amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa
Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.
xxx xxx xxx
Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen.
Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan.Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing
sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at
nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya
kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni
Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni
Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami
kinakadena.[43]
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald
(Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the food of their
family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer
put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent
themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.[44]
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped farm adjoining
lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had saved
Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange text messages
with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some more
until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their guards lived in
the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents house did not have
electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening ofAugust 13, 2007, Nonong
and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of
the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping
guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound forManila and were thus freed from captivity.[45]
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymonds affidavit insofar as they related to matters they
witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces
of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18
months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and
told that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on
the back and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from Raymond
and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario.He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He
was instructed to use the name Rodel and to represent himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del
Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where
Hilario delivered boxes of Alive in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was
blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of their trips, they
passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, Welcome to Camp Tecson.[46]
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized
in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of human rights
violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations
on the respondents after their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical
examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with their account of physical
injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted onAugust 15, 2007, two days after respondents escape, and

the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the
Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination. [47]
Petitioners dispute respondents account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the October 25,
2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any
involvement therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held
incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military.This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas
corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners parents before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against
M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24 th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander
of the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti
dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a
return of the writ On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon,
Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then
Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon
a finding that no evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In
a Decision dated June 27, 2007, it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his
involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents
were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter. [48]
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of National Defense,
which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers alleged
abduction. He also claimed that:
7.
The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations, neither does he
undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP operations. The
principal responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the
Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
8.
In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I have directed the Chief
of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to submit report of
such compliance Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a policy directive
addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ
of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which
may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that
may have brought about the death or disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. [49]
Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that
he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he
did the following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued directive to
the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent
reappearance of the petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher headquarters and/or direct
the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on
November 05, 2007, addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24
IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX 3 of this Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to
the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as
soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the Writ of Amparo (G.R.
No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeo pending before the Supreme Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish the surrounding
circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible, including any military personnel if

shown to have participated or had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when
warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the process. [50]
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No.
179994, another amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeo and Merino, which averred among others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24 th Infantry Batallion detachment as detention area, I
immediately went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any
detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino being held captive;
11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24 th IB in Limay, Bataan;
12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine National Police,
Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that none was reported to their good office;
13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged beachhouse in Iba, Zambales
also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the
inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have been used by armed men to detain
Cadapan, Empeo and Merino.[51]
It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan
(Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured in
time for the submission of the Return and would be subsequently submitted. [52]
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall,
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based inFort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of
this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan. [53] The
24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry Division.[54]
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7 th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito
Palaran,[55] through his Assistant Chief of Staff,[56] to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU
auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz,
aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was
directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the
CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any. [57] Jimenez testified that this particular
investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the Commanding General saw
news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about what was happening
within his territorial jurisdiction.[58]
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn statements and conducting
an investigation on May 29, 2006.[59] The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening.
[60]
The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all six persons on that
day. There were no other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other witnesses
summoned and investigated[61] as according to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate the six persons. [62]
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements. [63] The six persons were not known to Jimenez as it was in
fact his first time to meet them.[64]During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of
the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to the six persons. [65]
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to
come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a power
failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their statements indicated that they were
signed on May 29, 2006.[66] When the Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation
report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006.[67] He then gave his report to
the Office of the Chief of Personnel. [68]
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenezs Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the report is herein
substantially quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken from their
respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified armed men and
thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil
court against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy
Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit B) states that he was at Sitio
Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church located nearby his
residence, together with some neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy.
Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he
was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he was a CAFGU and that they claimed that

those who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any
participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit C) states that he is a
resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato
Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active
members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA
Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and for accusing him
to be one of the suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the concrete chapel being
constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just came only to know about the incident on other day (15
Feb 06) when he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any participation
about the incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a member of the CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit O) states that he is a resident of Brgy.
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a
neighbor, he was very much aware about the background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active
supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother KUMANDER BESTRE TN: Rolando
Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan
in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident when he arrived home in their place. He claims further
that the only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their
brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason they
implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of said
Manalo brothers.
d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit E) states that he is a resident of Brgy.
Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being his barriomate when
he was still unmarried and he knew them since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006,
he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed only about the incident
lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being abducted by alleged members of the
military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they implicated him was because there are those people who are
angry with their family particularly victims of summary execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando
Manalo who is an NPA leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father and he was
living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of the Manalo
brothers.
e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit F) states that he is a resident of Sitio
Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel,
Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims further
that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being
one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and
learned only about the incident when rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely
fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit G) states that he is a resident of Sitio
Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member based at Biak na
Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in
their barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are active supporters or
sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within
the area. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the construction of their concrete
chapel in their place and he learned only about the incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the matter. He claims further that he
is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors and he considers everything fabricated in
order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the government as a CAA member.
IV. DISCUSSION
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of linking them to the alleged
abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon,
Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that incident
is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation.
Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of the father of Randy and
Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones who
did the abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos
are active sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first place, they were
in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of CAFGUs, they ought to be vigilant in

protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of the
activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned.
V.
CONCLUSION
6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction committed by the above named
respondents has not been established in this investigation.Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative
punishment and/or criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge.
VI.
RECOMMENDATIONS
7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo
F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.
8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed. [69]
In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate courts assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail the
December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELFSERVING AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN
PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND
UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE
ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF
M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR
RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF
MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL
AUGUST 12, 2007.[70]
The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to
its beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a twoday National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July
16-17, 2007. The Summit was envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances,[71] hence representatives from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as well
as all the stakeholders in the justice system[72] participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced
disappearances.[73] It was an exercise for the first time of the Courts expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our
peoples constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino
experience of the martial law regime. [74] As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings.[75] On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest,
detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the
direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.
[76]

The
writ of amparo originated
in Mexico. Amparo literally
means
protection in Spanish. [77] In 1837, de
Tocquevilles Democracy in America became available inMexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the practice of
judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists.[78] One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejn, drafted a
constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan,[79] which granted judges the power to protect all persons in the
enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation of those rights granted to
him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of
the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation, making no
general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation. [80]
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism. [81] If, after hearing, the judge
determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the officials superiors, to

cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in
question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial
power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by
protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire nation.
[82]

The writ of amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in response to
the particular needs of each country.[83] It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one
piece of Mexicos self-attributed task of conveying to the worlds legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human
dignity, her own painful history conceived. [84] What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in
violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) amparo libertad for the protection of personal
freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of
statutes; (3) amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) amparo
administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) amparo agrario for the protection of peasants rights
derived from the agrarian reform process.[85]
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against human
rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries adopted an allencompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights. [86] Other countries
like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ of amparo only to some
constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.[87]
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of amparo, several of the
above amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by the amparo contra
leyes, amparo casacion, and amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found
in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution. [88] The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial
review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.[89]
While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,[90] these remedies may not be
adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness
required to resolve a petition for a writ of amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim
and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out of
the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an
action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.[91]
The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is
curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent
investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further
commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order [92] to
stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic
rights on August 23, 2007, [93] prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including
Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable
remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When
the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as an amparo petition as
it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers enforced disappearance. The Court
granted their motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners first argument in disputing the Decision
of the Court of Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible
uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent
Raymond Manalo.[94]
In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners cause of action, to determine
whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish their claims by substantial
evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
(emphases supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.[95]
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were
abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and
were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the
respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with
countless candid details of respondents harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different
senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the following: Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong
sinisilaban si Manuel.[96] (N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko
ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. [97] May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon
nang nililinis ang bakas.[98] Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga
kadena.[99] Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang
isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar.[100]
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalos affidavit and
testimony, viz:
the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein respondents) to be
military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men who barged into his house through
the rear door were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely:
Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of
Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as
lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military men were Ganata, who headed the
abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the
petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the 7 th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and
their CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were either members or
sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the
brother of petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best, merely superficial. The investigation
of the Provost Marshall of the 7 th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries
involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the participation of
military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU
auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated
Gen. Palparans participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners
captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no
controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and
told them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparans direct and personal role in the
abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long captivity
at the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably
encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of law and without probable cause.
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon, chairman; SantiagoLagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence to establish
that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilarios involvement could not, indeed,

be then established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the petitioners were
boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52)
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which the petitioners were brought
away from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents
during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo
and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least a week in a
house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to Sapang, San
Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more
or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners came face to face with Gen.
Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners parents, where
only Raymond was presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On that
occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see their sons should they join any rallies to denounce
human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206)Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others being
Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond
to take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the petitioners saw that
Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners was
established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was
similarly established.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the abduction. We also do, for, indeed,
the evidence of their participation is overwhelming. [101]
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalos statements were not corroborated by other
independent and credible pieces of evidence. [102]Raymonds affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of
respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the
pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, [103] also corroborate respondents accounts of the
torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalos familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay
such as the DTU, as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the Division Training Unit, [104] firms
up respondents story that they were detained for some time in said military facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala,[105] a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Commission
considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by
agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The
Commissions findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by
Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal.[106] These statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took
when she was being driven out of the military installation where she was detained. [107] She was also examined by a
medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek
coincided with her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in detention. [108]
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it
logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the
veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their
statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks
they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of
witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced
disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity
and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that
they are not free in every sense of the word [109] as their movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have
named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held
accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a
position to threaten respondents rights to life, liberty and security.[110] (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that
they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of
their right to security of person.[111]
Elaborating on the right to security, in general, respondents point out that this right is often associated with liberty; it
is also seen as an expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual
punishment. Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they
submit that their rights to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention
places[112] fall under the general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo. They submit that the
Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of
the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full

respect for human rights. Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the
teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile[113] that the right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no undue
restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty [114] such as a requirement to report under unreasonable restrictions
that amounted to a deprivation of liberty[115] or being put under monitoring and surveillance.[116]
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and
a violation of their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as respondents
assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution which provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of ones person, including the extensions of his/her person houses, papers,
and effects against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the states power over a persons home and possessions,
but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself. [117] The purpose of this provision was
enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: [118]
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent violations of
private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law acting
under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York,
192U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and
happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and
correspondence. (Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional inviolability
of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is
closer to a mans soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security . Any interference
allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons. [119] (emphases supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 [120] guarantees essentially the right to be alive[121] - upon which the
enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this
life, viz: The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established
and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property pervades
the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of mans existence.[122] In a broad sense, the right to security of person
emanates in a persons legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It
includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of
life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful
desires of the individual.[123]
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas clauses, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief
and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people. ( emphasis
supplied) Some scholars postulate that freedom from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an
individual international human right.[124]It is the right to security of person as the word security itself means freedom from
fear.[125] Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.[126] (emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No
one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by
law. (emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty
or security is the actionable wrong.Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear
caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear
can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past
experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to security is actually
the freedom from threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of
the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision. [127]

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III,
Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded without a
search warrant.[128] Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute
more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical
intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical
injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. [129]
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as
to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and
psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving invasion of
bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of freedom from threat as aforediscussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the commission of
an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all the more be
protected from these degradations.
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.[130] In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully
detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of
person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides, viz: Everyone has the right to liberty
and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a
procedure prescribed by law ... (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that (n)o one shall be subjected
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Although the application failed on the facts as the alleged
ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz:
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time when they could
reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security and to investigate the circumstances in
question.
xxx xxx xxx
... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural obligation under Art.3 to
conduct an effective investigation into his allegations.[131](emphasis supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a statement that the protection of
the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz:
gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms
under general international law or under specific human rights conventions is discrimination within the meaning of
article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These rights and freedoms
include . . . the right to liberty and security of person.[132]
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. In the context
of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the
policy that the State guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. [133] As
the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and
security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are
under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and
bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of
investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,[134] viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and beassumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step
taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof,
without an effective search for the truth by the government. [135]

This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been interpreted by the
United Nations Human Rights Committee[136] in not a few cases involving Article 9[137] of the ICCPR. While the right to
security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right
to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a
deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,[138] a case involving
death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those of the
Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part of paragraph one could lead to
the view that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest and detention. The travaux prparatoires indicate that
the discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of article 9.The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to
security of the person. These elements have been dealt with in separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the
Covenant the only reference to the right of security of person is to be found in article 9, there is no evidence that
it was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations of formal deprivation of
liberty. At the same time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Covenant. It
cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of persons under their
jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are under an
obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which
would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction
would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.[139] (emphasis supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,[140] which involved a political activist and prisoner of conscience who
continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release from detention. In a catena of
cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,[141] involving
discrimination, intimidation and persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,
[142]
involving the abduction of the complainants husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v.
Angola,[143] involving the murder of the complainants partner and the harassment he (complainant) suffered because of
his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,[144] involving an assassination attempt on the chairman of an
opposition alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the right to security not only as prohibiting the
State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty.
[145]
The ECHR interpreted the right to security of person under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights
in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.[146] In this case, the claimants son had been arrested by
state authorities and had not been seen since. The familys requests for information and investigation regarding his
whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her sons right to security of person. The
ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of
national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from
arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her
whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to
safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim
that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.[147] (emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine whether there is a
continuing violation of respondents right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents life, liberty and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them, would be
killed. In Raymonds narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted
to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain Mam, who wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be
stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily
freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when
respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents captors even told them that they were still deciding
whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya
kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi. [148]

The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With their escape, this
continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the
military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared such
as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because
of the threat to their life, liberty and security.The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements
or activities.[149] Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be
expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty
and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support
a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even
executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ ofamparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of
military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture,
they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents abduction as revealed by the testimony
and investigation report of petitioners own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7 th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the
Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first
time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not
propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other
witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007,
he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in the event the
writ of amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP, which should essentially include
verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of witnesses
and securing statements from them; determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance;
identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the
suspected offenders before a competent court. [150] Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting
that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he
immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of
the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the
investigations to respondents.[151] To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner
Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation
which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of
respondents right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents right to security as freedom from threat is violated by the apparent threat to their
life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise
violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in
connection with their case, except those already in file with the court.
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo and Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records and charts, and
reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to
include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August
12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents partakes
of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must
be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the application must be under oath or affirmation;
(2) the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists
probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. [152] In the case at bar,
however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond
Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned
generally by name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced
must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been
shown.

Petitioners arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a
search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a
protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the
demand of the people such as respondents.
Instead, the amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27
of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party
to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or
control
In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad, [153] the respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued
a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books and papers of Material Distributors
(Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the search and seizure
clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that cannot be
identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook to provide results of the investigations conducted
or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in
whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present places of assignment
of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical personnel, is
irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ of amparo. They add that it
will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official functions and duties of military officers and even
unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury or even death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald
Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in
ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help
ensure that these military officers can be served with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and
action for violation of the respondents rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to
create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and
prisoners behind secret walls.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 26,
2007 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008
Facts: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were suspected of being members of the
New Peoples Army, were forcibly taken from their home, detained in various locations, and tortured by CAFGU and
military units. After several days in captivity, the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo recognized their abductors as members
of the armed forces led by General Jovito Palparan. They also learned that they were being held in place for their brother,
Bestre, a suspected leader of the communist insurgents. While in captivity, they met other desaperacidos (including the
still-missing University of the Philippines students Karen Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan) who were also suspected of being
communist insurgents and members of the NPA. After eighteen months of restrained liberty, torture and other
dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able to escape and file a petition for the writ of amparo.
Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by existing laws.
Held: Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. At its
core is the immunity of ones person against government intrusion. The right to security of person is freedom from fear, a
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity and security.
To whom may the oppressed, the little ones, the desaperacidos, run to, if the Orwellian sword of the State, wielded
recklessly by the military or under the guise of police power, is directed against them? The law thus gives the remedy of
the writ of amparo, in addition to the rights and liberties already protected by the Bill of Rights. Amparo, literally meaning
to protect, is borne out of the long history of Latin American and Philippine human rights abusesoften perpetrated by
the armed forces against farmers thought to be communist insurgents, anarchists or brigands. The writ serves to both
prevent and cure extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, and threats thereof, giving the powerless a powerful remedy
to ensure their rights, liberties, and dignity. Amparo, a triumph of natural law that has been embodied in positive law,
gives voice to the preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182795
June 5, 2008
ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA, petitioners,
vs.
NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSN., I XIII, INC., ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE present petition filed on May 26, 2008 seeks the issuance of a Writ of Amparo upon the following premise:
Petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in our Constitution, as
the result of these nefarious activities of both the Private and Public Respondents. This ardent request filed before this
Honorable Supreme Court is the only solution to this problem via this newly advocated principles incorporated in the
Rules the "RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO."1
It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City. Their
dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished
pursuant to a court judgment.
While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed to be fraudulent and spurious land titles, to wit:
Petitioners herein are desirous to help the government, the best way they can, to unearth these so-called "syndicates"
clothed with governmental functions, in cahoots with the "squatting syndicates" - - - - the low so defines. If only to give
its proper meanings, the Government must be the first one to cleans (sic) its ranks from these unscrupulous political
protges. If unabated would certainly ruin and/or destroy the efficacy of the Torrens System of land registration in this
Country. It is therefore the ardent initiatives of the herein Petitioners, by way of the said prayer for the issuance of
the Writ of Amparo, that these unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to answer their participation in the
issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in the hands of the Private Respondents. The Courts of
Justice, including this Honorable Supreme Court, are likewise being made to believe that said titles in the
possession of the Private Respondents were issued untainted with frauds.2
what the petition ultimately seeks is the reversal of this Courts dismissal of petitions in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768,
177701, 177038, thus:
That, Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be no motion for reconsideration for the second or third time to
be filed before this Honorable Supreme Court. As such therefore, Petitioners herein are aware of the opinion that this
present petition should not in any way be treated as such motions fore reconsideration. Solely, this petition is only for the
possible issuance of the writ of amparo, although it might affect the previous rulings of this Honorable Supreme Court in
these cases, G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038. Inherent in the powers of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines is to modify, reverse and set aside, even its own previous decision, that can not be thwarted nor
influenced by any one, but, only on the basis of merits and evidence. This is the purpose of this petition for
theWrit of Amparo.3
We dismiss the petition.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was affirmed with
finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among the enumeration of rights as
stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their
dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right
to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the land in question is not alleged in the petition at all. The
Court can only surmise that these rights and interest had already been threshed out and settled in the four cases cited
above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the
right sought to be protected.
Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition, only if on its face, the
court ought to issue said writ.
Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the
issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in
case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any
officer or person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than seven (7) days
from the date of its issuance.
Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be issued and the petition will be
dismissed outright.
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest
possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or

effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious
time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
CANLAS vs NAPICO HOMEOWNERSGR No. 182795, June 5, 2008
Facts:Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in the Brgy. Manggahan, PasigCity. Their dwellings have
either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or isabout to be demolished pursuant to a court
judgment.Petitioners claim that respondents holdfraudulent and spurious titles. Thus, the petition for writ of amparo. The
rule on writ of amparo isa remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatenedwith violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a privateindividual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings or disappearances.Issue: WON the writ of amparo is a correct remedy for the
petitioners.Ruling: No. The writ of amparo does not cover the cause of the petitioners. The threateneddemolition of a
dwelling by a virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included among theenumeration of rights covered by the writ.
Also, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claimto the land in question is not alleged at all in the petition.
EN BANC
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA
TAPUZ-MADRIAGA,
LIBERTY
M.
ASUNCION,
LADYLYN
BAMOS
MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA,
EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND
MARIAN TIMBAS,
Petitioners,
- versus -

G.R. No. 182484

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
*
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
* VELASCO, JR.,
* NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

HONORABLE
JUDGE
ELMO
DEL
ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of RTC Br. 5Kalibo, SHERIFF
NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as
Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
POLICE
stationed
in BoracayIsland, represented by the
PNP
STATION
COMMANDER,
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN
CEBU
18thDIVISION,
SPOUSES Promulgated:
GREGORIO SANSON & MA.LOURDES T.
June 17, 2008
SANSON,
Respondents.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x

RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;[1] and Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data[2]) is the petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the writs ofamparo and habeas data filed by the abovenamed petitioners against the Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC Br. 5, Kalibo],
Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National Police stationed in Boracay Island,
represented by the PNP Station Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu, 18 th Division, and the spouses
Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.
The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:

The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the private respondents), filed with the
Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court ofBuruanga-Malay, Aklan (the MCTC) a complaint[3] dated 24 April 2006 for forcible
entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners
Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly TapuzMadriaga,
Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the petitioners) and other John Does numbering about 120. The private
respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare
parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan (thedisputed land); (2) they were the disputed
lands prior possessors when the petitioners armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together with
unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private
respondents permission and against the objections of the private respondents security men, and built thereon a nipa and
bamboo structure.
In their Answer[4] dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint. They essentially
claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private
respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents certificate of title to the disputed property is
spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision[5] in the private respondents favor. It found prior
possession the key issue in forcible entry cases - in the private respondents favor, thus:
The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended Commissioners Report and Sketch found on
pages 245 to 248 of the records and the evidence the parties have submitted. It is shown in the Amended Commissioners
Report and Sketch that the land in question is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and green
highlighter as shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence was constructed by the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The
foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his report and sketch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they
acquired the land in question on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex A, Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276,
rec.), they caused the construction of the perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275,
rec.).
From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in actual physical possession of the
whole lot in question since 1993 when it was interrupted by the defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to
(sic) the Heirs of Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the land in question with view of inhabiting the same and building
structures therein prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU, Police Chief Inspector Jack
L. Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapao.As a result of their confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement
(Annex D, Complaint p. 20) wherein they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land in question and agreed not to
build any structures thereon.
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of January 4, 2005 when the plaintiff posted
security guards, however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the defendants some with bolos and one
carrying a sack suspected to contain firearms with other John Does numbering about 120 persons by force and
intimidation forcibly entered the premises along the road and built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex E, Complaint, p.
11) inside the lot in question which incident was promptly reported to the proper authorities as shown by plaintiffs
Certification (Annex F, Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the police blotter and on same date April 19, 2006, the plaintiffs
filed a complaint with the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but no
settlement was reached as shown in their Certificate to File Action (Annex G, Complaint, p. 13); hence the present action.
Defendants (sic) contend in their answer that prior to January 4, 2005, they were already occupants of the property, being
indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of ownership by open continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion of
other (sic). (Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25).
The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is enclosed by a perimeter fence constructed by the
plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as noted by the Commissioner in his Report and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to
conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual physical possession of the land in question from 1993 up to April 19,
2006 when they were ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of force. Applying by analogy the ruling of the
Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land were in the possession of
plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants claims to an older possession must be rejected as untenable because
possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities.
Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in question on April 18, 2006 at
about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon as shown in their Certification (Annex D, Defendants Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).

The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to the commissioner who constituted (sic)
the land in question that they built structures on the land in question only on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioners
Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247), after there (sic) entry thereto on even date.
Likewise,
said
contention
is
contradicted
by
the
categorical
statements
of
defendants
witnesses,
Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez andEdgardo Pinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143144, rec.) [sic] categorically stated that on or about April 19, 2006, a group of armed men entered the property of our said
neighbors and built plastic roofed tents. These armed men threatened to drive our said neighbors away from their homes
but they refused to leave and resisted the intruding armed men.
From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry happened on April 18, 2006 but it was only
on April 19, 2006 when the defendants overpowered by their numbers the security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to
the controversy.
Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their pictures attached as annexes to their
position paper were not noted and reflected in the amended report and sketch submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it
could be safely inferred that these structures are built and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land in question,
accordingly, they are irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of their actual possession of the
land in question prior to April 19, 2006[6].
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC, Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided
over by Judge Niovady M. Marin (Judge Marin).
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction through an Order dated 26 February 2007, with the issuance conditioned on the private respondents posting of
a bond. The writ[7] authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision was actually issued by respondent
Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the respondent Judge) on 12 March 2007 after the private respondents had complied with the
imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other
hand, filed a motion for demolition.
The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and to Defer Enforcement of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an Order dated 17 May 2007[8].
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. [9] The respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special
Order[10] a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriffs written notice to the petitioners to
voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition for Review [11] (under Rule
42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC
of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition on 19 March 2008.[12]
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last 29 April 2008. The petition contains
and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance of
a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparo under the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual positions diametrically opposed to
the MCTCs findings and legal reasons.Most importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims of prior possession of the
disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the private respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition
bases as well of the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo read:
29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot guns intruded into the property of the
defendants [the land in dispute]. They were not in uniform.They fired their shotguns at the defendants. Later the
following day at 2:00 a.m. two houses of the defendants were burned to ashes.
30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up by defendants to protect their property
from intruders. Two of the armed men trained their shotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of them

who was identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad,Iloilo, fired
twice.
31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to ashes. [...]
32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by one of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO
TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL
MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion. Their act is a blatant violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence
against women and children, which is aggravated by the use of high-powered weapons.
[]
34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered petitioners continue because the private
respondents Sansons have under their employ armed men and they are influential with the police authorities owing to
their financial and political clout.
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by defendants and the atrocities of the
terrorists [introduced into the property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses who are persons not related
to the defendants are therefore disinterested witnesses in the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac,
Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is submitted to prove that the plaintiffs
resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to unjustly evict the defendants. [13]
The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry that the private
respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691,[14] they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to or possession of real property or an
interest therein, with the assessed value of the property involved exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be
originally cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC decision was
appealed equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and could not have validly issued the assailed orders.
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and in
form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to
content and substance.
The Petition for Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify
the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners have a pending petition with
the Court of Appeals (the CA petition) for the review of the same RTC orders now assailed in the present petition, although
the petitioners never disclosed in the body of the present petition the exact status of their pending CA petition. The CA
petition, however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007, which indicates to us that the assailed orders (or
at the very least, the latest of the interrelated assailed orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at the latest. The present
petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more than eight months from the time the CA petition was
filed. Thus, the present petition is separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders by at
least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days [15] from receipt of the assailed order or orders
or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.
We note in this regard that the petitioners counsel stated in his attached Certificate of Compliance with Circular #1-88 of
the Supreme Court[16] (Certificate of Compliance) that in the meantime the RTC and the Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE
AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the same NOTICE to their counsel
on April 18, 2008 by LBC. To guard against any insidious argument that the present petition is timely filed because of this
Notice to Vacate, we feel it best to declare now that the counting of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65 cannot
start from the April 18, 2008date cited by the petitioners counsel. The Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order
that exists independently from the RTC orders assailed in this petition and in the previously filed CA petition. It is merely
a notice, made in compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is thus an administrative enforcement medium that has
no life of its own separately from the assailed order on which it is based. It cannot therefore be the appropriate subject of
an independent petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of this case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be
the material date for Rule 65 purposes as the above-mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly assailed in this
petition, as the petitions Prayer patently shows.[17]

Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate
misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping.
By the petitioners own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 02859) for
the review of the orders now also assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us, allegedly because the
CA did not act on the petition up to this date and for the petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the CA would be a waste of time and
would render the case moot and academic since the CA refused toresolve pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is
determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect of LACK OF JURISDICTION. [18]
Interestingly, the petitioners counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition - at the same time represented
in his Certificate of Compliance[19] that:
xxx
(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION copy of the
petition is attached (sic);
(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that the ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR
DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not capable of being the subject of a PETITION FOR
RELIEF, copy of the resolution of the CA is attached hereto; (underscoring supplied)
(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this date the same had not been resolved
copy of the MR is attached (sic).
xxx
The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate court level is replete with
significance regarding the petitioners intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners act of misrepresenting in the body of
their petition that the CA did not act on the petition up to this date while stating the real Court of Appeals action in the
Certification of Compliance -- the intent to hide the real state of the remedies the petitioners sought below in order to
mislead us into action on the RTC orders without frontally considering the action that the Court of Appeals had already
undertaken.
At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present petition, the same relief that it
could not wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The petitioners act of seeking against the same
parties the nullification of the same RTC orders before the appellate court and before us at the same time, although made
through different mediums that are both improperly used, constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that can
sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the petition under the combined application of the fourth and
penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules
of Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court of Appeals and possibly with us will not save the
petitioner from a forum-shopping violation where there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed interlocutory
orders, with the recourses existing side by side at the same time.
To restate the prevailing rules, forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, eithersimultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against whom an adverse judgment
or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a
special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the
administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for
summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt. [20]
Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is defective as one (1) of the seven (7)
petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign, in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all
in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court. Of those who signed, only five (5) exhibited their postal
identification cards with the Notary Public.
In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the supporting attachments, to be
devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the private respondents complaint, which specifically
alleged a cause for forcible entry and not as petitioners may have misread or misappreciated a case involving title to or
possession of realty or an interest therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended by

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases lies with the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level courts have had
jurisdiction over these cases called accion interdictal even before the R.A. 7691 amendment, based on the issue of
purephysical possession (as opposed to the right of possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed value of the
property involved; the law established no distinctions based on the assessed value of the property forced into or unlawfully
detained. Separately from accion interdictal are accion publiciana for the recovery of the right of possession as a plenary
action, and accion reivindicacion for the recovery of ownership. [21] Apparently, these latter actions are the ones the
petitioners refer to when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction may either be with the first-level courts or the
regional trial courts, depending on the assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As the complaint at the MCTC
was patently for forcible entry, that court committed no jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present
petition.
In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation of the nonforum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.

The Writ of Amparo

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address
these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as
an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance
demands requires that every petition for the issuance of the Pwrit must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to
wit:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is
unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with
any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the
identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.[22]
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable
from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights
to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations heretofore quoted, [23] that are
essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations are supported by the following documents:
(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez
and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the petitioners, id., petitioners prior possession, private
respondents intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the private respondents and their security guards on 19 April
2006;

(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.) committed by a security
guard against minors descendants of Antonio Tapuz;
(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially corroborating Nemias affidavit;
(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regarding the incident of petitioners intrusion
into the disputed land;
(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the altercation between
the Tapuz family and the security guards of the private respondents, including the gun-poking and shooting incident
involving one of the security guards;
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented
by a certain Jorge Buenavente, wasaccidentally burned by a fire.
On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding involvement of property
issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If
at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence
of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and
harassments implied from the presence of armed men bare to the waist and the alleged pointing and firing of
weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty
and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them the statements of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and
Melanie Tapuz are practically identical and unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other
hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of
two residential houses was accidental.
As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry case which rejected all
the petitioners factual claims. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they were made under a fullblown judicial process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending parties positions, evidence and arguments
and based on the report of a court-appointed commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute (with incidents giving rise to
allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the
RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still much later brought to the appellate courtwithout conclusive results; and then
brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the
petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts that
would justify the issuance of a writ ofamparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to
the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the
disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the
remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of
the writ of amparo.
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action may carry the unintended effect,
not only of reversing the MCTC ruling independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also of nullifying
the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the orderly administration of
justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not intend to weaken or negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators, clear and patent to us,
that the petitioners present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed
orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of an improper
remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of
forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo based on
grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of law
fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorarinor
that of amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo,

particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will
inordinately interfere with these processes the situation obtaining in the present case.
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the institution of separate
actions,[24] for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions, [25] and for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ
of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action. [26] These rules were adopted to promote an orderly procedure
for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts
of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the
absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security the personalconcern that the writ is
intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no
legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal
or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
The Writ of Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition
for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
(a)

The

personal

circumstances

of

the

petitioner

and

the

respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.
Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:
1. [ ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP may release the report on the
burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by the private respondents,
furnishing the Court and the petitioners with copy of the same;
[]
66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine National Police [PNP] to produce the police
report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation
report if an investigation was conducted by the PNP.
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the
petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to
privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any
need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes.
The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure
information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than
the fishing expedition that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in definingwhat
the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas data is fully in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and
substance patent from its body and attachments.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief,
Philippine National Police (PNP);
Police Chief Superintendent RAUL
CASTAEDA,
Chief,
Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent
LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police
Anti-Crime and Emergency Response
(PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO,
Regional Director of ARMM, PNP,
Petitioners,
- versus -

MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein

represented by ATTY. FELIPE P.
ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 182498

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
December 3, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari[1] the decision dated March 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.AG.R. AMPARO No. 00009.[2] This CA decision confirmed the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis)
and granted the Writ of Amparo at the petition of his wife, Mary Jean B. Tagitis (respondent). The dispositive portion of the
CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby FINDS that this is an enforced
disappearance within the meaning of the United Nations instruments, as used in the Amparo Rules. The privileges of the
writ of amparo are hereby extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG)
who should order COL. JOSE VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief, Zamboanga City, to aid him; (2) respondent GEN.
AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should order his men, namely: (a) respondent GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional
Director of ARMM PNP, (b) COL. AHIRON AJIRIM, both head of TASK FORCE TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR.
SUPERINTENDENT LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response, to aid him as their
superior- are hereby DIRECTED to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts, not only to protect the life, liberty and
security of Engr. Morced Tagitis, but also to extend the privileges of the writ of amparo to Engr. Morced Tagitis and his
family, and to submit a monthly report of their actions to this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this Court
to monitor the action of respondents.

This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, Commanding General, Philippine
Army, and as to respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief Anti-Terror Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, both being with
the military, which is a separate and distinct organization from the police and the CIDG, in terms of operations, chain of
command and budget.
This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo a protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against
the rights to life, liberty and security. [3] It embodies, as a remedy, the courts directive to police agencies to undertake
specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not
determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at
leastaccountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this
Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties
in the proper courts.Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to
those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our
primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are
restored.
We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the unique situations that call for the
issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these situations, may not at all be
the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo[4] (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in
progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive
laws that Congress may promulgate.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The background facts, based on the petition and the records of the case, are summarized below.
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong
(Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in
Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for
his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around.
[5]
The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key
with the desk.[6] Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latters Manila-based secretary who did
not know of Tagitis whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait. [7]
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis
fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. [8] On November 7, 2007,
Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis disappearance. [9]
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the
CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.[10] The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano,
Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M.
Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police AntiCrime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, AntiTerror Task Force Comet [collectively referred to as petitioners]. After reciting Tagitis personal circumstances and the facts
outlined above, the petition went on to state:
xxxx
7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but while out
on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the
latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his student, Arsimin Kunnong;

8. As instructed, in the late afternoon of the same day, Kunnong returned to the pension house, and was surprised to find
out that subject Engr. Tagitis cannot [sic] be contacted by phone and was not also around and his room was closed and
locked;
9. Kunnong requested for the key from the desk of the pension house who [sic] assisted him to open the room of Engr.
Tagitis, where they discovered that the personal belongings of Engr. Tagitis, including cell phones, documents and other
personal belongings were all intact inside the room;
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and reported the
matter to the local police agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the whereabouts of
Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer
that Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and other groups known to be fighting against the
government;
12. Being scared with [sic] these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the matter to the
[respondent, wife of Engr. Tagitis] by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators of the IDB Scholarship
Programme in the Philippines, who alerted the office of the Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC
meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
13. [Respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch, Digos
City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who could help them find/locate
the whereabouts of her husband;
14. All of these efforts of the [respondent] did not produce any positive results except the information from persons in the
military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men;
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police
intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest
attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups;
xxxx
17. [Respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, as suggested by
her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [respondents] request and pleadings failed to produce any positive
results;
18. Instead of helping the [respondent], she [sic] was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband, subject of
the petition, was not missing but was with another woman having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the
[petitioners] refusal to help and provide police assistance in locating her missing husband;
19. The continued failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to release and/or turn-over subject Engr. Tagitis to his family or
even to provide truthful information to [the respondent] of the subjects whereabouts, and/or allow [the respondent] to
visit her husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, caused so much sleepless nights and serious anxieties;
20. Lately, [the respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police Headquarters again in
Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including [those] in Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo,
and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband,
which entailed expenses for her trips to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial
help from friends and relatives only to try complying [sic] to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of
which, her efforts produced no positive results up to the present time;
21. In fact at times, some police officers, who [sympathized with] the sufferings undergone by the [respondent], informed
her that they are not the proper persons that she should approach, but assured her not to worry because her husband is
[sic] in good hands;
22. The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the [petitioners] to the [respondents] request for help and failure and
refusal of the [petitioners] to extend the needed help, support and assistance in locating the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis

who had been declared missing since October 30, 2007 which is almost two (2) months now, clearly indicates that the
[petitioners] are actually in physical possession and custody of [respondents] husband, Engr. Tagitis;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the
circumstances, [the respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of subject
Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of the [petitioners], their intelligence operatives and the like which are in
total violation of the subjects human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO. [Emphasis
supplied]
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for hearing on
January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from service of the
writ.[11]
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any involvement in or
knowledge of Tagitis alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete and did not
constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay
evidence. [12]
The affidavit of PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon, attached to the Return, stated that: he did not have any personal
knowledge of, or any participation in, the alleged disappearance; that he had been designated by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as the head of a special body called TASK FORCE USIG, to address concerns about extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances; the Task Force, inter alia, coordinated with the investigators and local police, held case
conferences, rendered legal advice in connection to these cases; and gave the following summary: [13]
xxxx
4.
a)
On November 5, 2007, the Regional Director, Police Regional Office ARMM submitted a report on the alleged
disappearance of one Engr. Morced Tagitis.According to the said report, the victim checked-in at ASY Pension House on
October 30, 2007 at about 6:00 in the morning and then roamed around Jolo, Sulu with an unidentified companion. It
was only after a few days when the said victim did not return that the matter was reported to Jolo MPS. Afterwards,
elements of Sulu PPO conducted a thorough investigation to trace and locate the whereabouts of the said missing person,
but to no avail. The said PPO is still conducting investigation that will lead to the immediate findings of the whereabouts of
the person.
b)
Likewise, the Regional Chief, 9RCIDU submitted a Progress Report to the Director, CIDG. The said report
stated among others that: subject person attended an Education Development Seminar set on October 28, 2007
conducted at Ateneo de Zamboanga, Zamboanga City together with a Prof. Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around 5:00
oclock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis reportedly arrived at Jolo Sulu wharf aboard M/V Bounty Cruise, he was then billeted
at ASY Pension House. At about 6:15 oclock in the morning of the same date, he instructed his student to purchase a fast
craft ticket bound for Zamboanga City and will depart from Jolo, Sulu on October 31, 2007. That on or about 10:00 oclock
in the morning, Engr. Tagitis left the premises of ASY Pension House as stated by the cashier of the said pension
house. Later in the afternoon, the student instructed to purchase the ticket arrived at the pension house and waited for
Engr. Tagitis, but the latter did not return. On its part, the elements of 9RCIDU is now conducting a continuous case
build up and information gathering to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis.
c)
That the Director, CIDG directed the conduct of the search in all divisions of the CIDG to find Engr. Tagitis
who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives since October 30, 2007, but
after diligent and thorough search, records show that no such person is being detained in CIDG or any of its department
or divisions.
5. On this particular case, the Philippine National Police exhausted all possible efforts, steps and actions available under
the circumstances and continuously search and investigate [sic] the instant case. This immense mandate, however,
necessitates the indispensable role of the citizenry, as the PNP cannot stand alone without the cooperation of the victims
and witnesses to identify the perpetrators to bring them before the bar of justice and secure their conviction in court.

The petitioner PNP-CIDG Chief, Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, submitted as well his affidavit, also attached to the Return of
the Writ, attesting that upon receipt of the Writ of Amparo, he caused the following:[14]
xxxx
That immediately upon receipt on December 29, 2007 of the Resolution of the Honorable Special Fourth Division of the
Court of Appeals, I immediately directed the Investigation Division of this Group [CIDG] to conduct urgent investigation on
the alleged enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced Tagitis.
That based on record, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis attended an Education Development Seminar on October 28, 2007 at
Ateneo de Zamboanga at Zamboanga City together with Prof. Abdulnasser Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around six
oclock in the morning he arrived at Jolo, Sulu. He was assisted by his student identified as Arsimin Kunnong of the
Islamic Development Bank who was also one of the participants of the said seminar. He checked in at ASY pension house
located [sic] Kakuyagan, Patikul, Sulu on October 30, 2007 with [sic] unidentified companion. At around six oclock in the
morning of even date, Engr. Tagitis instructed his student to purchase a fast craft ticket for Zamboanga City. In the
afternoon of the same date, Kunnong arrived at the pension house carrying the ticket he purchased for Engr. Tagitis, but
the latter was nowhere to be found anymore. Kunnong immediately informed Prof. Abdulnasser Matli who reported the
incident to the police. The CIDG is not involved in the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis to make out a case of an
enforced disappearance which presupposes a direct or indirect involvement of the government.
That herein [petitioner] searched all divisions and departments for a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis, who was
allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives since October 30, 2007 and after a
diligent and thorough research records show that no such person is being detained in CIDG or any of its department or
divisions.
That nevertheless, in order to determine the circumstances surrounding Engr. Morced Tagitis [sic] alleged enforced
disappearance, the undersigned had undertaken immediate investigation and will pursue investigations up to its full
completion in order to aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible therefore.
Likewise attached to the Return of the Writ was PNP-PACER [15] Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espinas affidavit which alleged
that:[16]
xxxx
That, I and our men and women in PACER vehemently deny any participation in the alleged abduction or illegally [ sic]
detention of ENGR. MORCED N. TAGITS on October 30, 2007. As a matter of fact, nowhere in the writ was mentioned that
the alleged abduction was perpetrated by elements of PACER nor was there any indication that the alleged abduction or
illegal detention of ENGR. TAGITIS was undertaken jointly by our men and by the alleged covert CIDG-PNP intelligence
operatives alleged to have abducted or illegally detained ENGR. TAGITIS.
That I was shocked when I learned that I was implicated in the alleged disappearance of ENGR. MORCED in my capacity
as the chief PACER [sic] considering that our office, the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER), a special
task force created for the purpose of neutralizing or eradicating kidnap-for-ransom groups which until now continue to be
one of the menace of our society is a respondent in kidnapping or illegal detention case. Simply put, our task is to go after
kidnappers and charge them in court and to abduct or illegally detain or kidnap anyone is anathema to our mission.
That right after I learned of the receipt of the WRIT OF AMPARO, I directed the Chief of PACER Mindanao Oriental
(PACER-MOR) to conduct pro-active measures to investigate, locate/search the subject, identify and apprehend the
persons responsible, to recover and preserve evidence related to the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED TAGITIS, which
may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible, to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them
concerning the disappearance and to determine the cause, manner, location and time of disappearance as well as any
pattern or practice that may have brought about the disappearance.
That I further directed the chief of PACER-MOR, Police Superintendent JOSE ARNALDO BRIONES JR., to submit a
written report regarding the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED.
That in compliance with my directive, the chief of PACER-MOR sent through fax his written report.
That the investigation and measures being undertaken to locate/search the subject in coordination with Police Regional
Office, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (PRO-ARMM) and Jolo Police Provincial Office (PPO) and other AFP and
PNP units/agencies in the area are ongoing with the instruction not to leave any stone unturned so to speak in the
investigation until the perpetrators in the instant case are brought to the bar of justice.

That I have exercised EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE in dealing with the WRIT OF AMPARO just issued.

Finally, the PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Supt. Joel R. Goltiao (Gen. Goltiao), also submitted his affidavit detailing
the actions that he had taken upon receipt of the report on Tagitis disappearance, viz:[17]
xxxx
3) For the record:
1.

I am the Regional Director of Police Regional Office ARMM now and during the time of the incident;

xxxx
4. It is my duty to look into and take appropriate measures on any cases of reported enforced disappearances and when
they are being alluded to my office;
5. On November 5, 2007, the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office reported to me through Radio Message
Cite No. SPNP3-1105-07-2007 that on November 4, 2007 at around 3:30 p.m., a certain Abdulnasser Matli, an employee
of Islamic Development Bank, appeared before the Office of the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, and reported the
disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis, scholarship coordinator of Islamic Development Bank, Manila;
6. There was no report that Engr. Tagibis was last seen in the company of or taken by any member of the Philippine
National Police but rather he just disappeared from ASY Pension House situated at Kakuyagan Village, Village, Patikul,
Sulu, on October 30, 2007, without any trace of forcible abduction or arrest;
7. The last known instance of communication with him was when Arsimin Kunnong, a student scholar, was requested by
him to purchase a vessel ticket at the Office of Weezam Express, however, when the student returned back to ASY Pension
House, he no longer found Engr. Tagitis there and when he immediately inquired at the information counter regarding his
whereabouts [sic], the person in charge in the counter informed him that Engr. Tagitis had left the premises on October
30, 2007 around 1 oclock p.m. and never returned back to his room;
8. Immediately after learning the incident, I called and directed the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office and
other units through phone call and text messages to conduct investigation [sic] to determine the whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission, to recover and preserve evidence
related to the disappearance of Engr. Tagitis, to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning his
disappearance, to determine the cause and manner of his disappearance, to identify and apprehend the person or persons
involved in the disappearance so that they shall be brought before a competent court;
9. Thereafter, through my Chief of the Regional Investigation and Detection Management Division, I have caused the
following directives:
a)
Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1122-07-358 dated November 22, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO to conduct joint
investigation with CIDG and CIDU ARMM on the matter;
b)
Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1128-07-361 dated November 28, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO to expedite
compliance to my previous directive;
c)
Memorandum dated December 14, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO reiterating our series of directives for
investigation and directing him to undertake exhaustive coordination efforts with the owner of ASY Pension House and
student scholars of IDB in order to secure corroborative statements regarding the disappearance and whereabouts of said
personality;
d)
Memorandum dated December 24, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO directing him to maximize efforts to establish
clues on the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis by seeking the cooperation of Prof. Abdulnasser Matli and Arsimin Kunnong
and/or whenever necessary, for them to voluntarily submit for polygraph examination with the NBI so as to expunge all
clouds of doubt that they may somehow have knowledge or idea to his disappearance;

e)
Memorandum dated December 27, 2007 addressed to the Regional Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group, Police Regional Office 9, Zamboanga City, requesting assistance to investigate the cause and unknown
disappearance of Engr. Tagitis considering that it is within their area of operational jurisdiction;
f)
Memorandum from Chief, Intelligence Division, PRO ARMM dated December 30, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO
requiring them to submit complete investigation report regarding the case of Engr. Tagitis;
10. In compliance to our directives, PD Sulu PPO has exerted his [sic] efforts to conduct investigation [sic] on the matter to
determine the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and the circumstances related to his disappearance and submitted the
following:
a)

Progress Report dated November 6, 2007 through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1106-10-2007;

b)
Radio Message Cite No. SPIDMS-1205-47-07 informing this office that they are still monitoring the whereabouts of
Engr. Tagitis;
c)

Investigation Report dated December 31, 2007 from the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, Sulu PPO;

11. This incident was properly reported to the PNP Higher Headquarters as shown in the following:
a)
Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Chief, PNP informing him of the facts of the disappearance
and the action being taken by our office;
b)
Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Director, Directorate for Investigation and Detection
Management, NHQ PNP;
c)

Memorandum dated December 30, 2007 addressed to the Director, DIDM;

4) In spite of our exhaustive efforts, the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis cannot be determined but our office is continuously
intensifying the conduct of information gathering, monitoring and coordination for the immediate solution of the case.
Since the disappearance of Tagistis was practically admitted and taking note of favorable actions so far taken on the
disappearance, the CA directed Gen. Goltiao as the officer in command of the area of disappearance to form TASK FORCE
TAGITIS.[18]
Task Force Tagitis
On January 11, 2008, Gen. Goltiao designated PS Supt. Ahiron Ajirim (PS Supt. Ajirim) to head TASK FORCE TAGITIS.
[19]
The CA subsequently set three hearings to monitor whether TASK FORCE TAGITIS was exerting extraordinary efforts in
handling the disappearance of Tagitis. [20] As planned, (1) the first hearing would be to mobilize the CIDG, Zamboanga City;
(2) the second hearing would be to mobilize intelligence with Abu Sayyaf and ARMM; and (3) the third hearing would be to
mobilize the Chief of Police of Jolo, Sulu and the Chief of Police of Zamboanga City and other police operatives. [21]
In the hearing on January 17, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted to the CA an intelligence report from PSL Usman S.
Pingay, the Chief of Police of the Jolo Police Station, stating a possible motive for Tagitis disappearance. [22] The intelligence
report was apparently based on the sworn affidavit dated January 4, 2008 of Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli (Prof.
Matli), Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of the Philippines and an Honorary Student Counselor of the IDB
Scholarship Program in the Philippines, who told the Provincial Governor of Sulu that: [23]
[Based] on reliable information from the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila, Tagitis has reportedly taken and carried away
more or less Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) deposited and entrusted to his [personal] bank accounts by the Central
Office of IDB, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which [was] intended for the IDB Scholarship Fund.
In the same hearing, PS Supt. Ajirim testified that since the CIDG was alleged to be responsible, he personally went to the
CIDG office in Zamboanga City to conduct an ocular inspection/investigation, particularly of their detention cells. [24] PS
Supt. Ajirim stated that the CIDG, while helping TASK FORCE TAGITIS investigate the disappearance of Tagitis,
persistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any abduction. [25] He further testified that prior to the hearing, he had
already mobilized and given specific instructions to their supporting units to perform their respective tasks; that they even
talked to, but failed to get any lead from the respondent in Jolo. [26] In his submitted investigation report dated January 16,
2008, PS Supt. Ajirim concluded:[27]

9. Gleaned from the undersigned inspection and observation at the Headquarters 9 RCIDU and the documents at hand, it
is my own initial conclusion that the 9RCIDU and other PNP units in the area had no participation neither [sic] something
to do with [sic] mysterious disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis last October 30, 2007. Since doubt has been raised
regarding the emolument on the Islamic Development Bank Scholar program of IDB that was reportedly deposited in the
personal account of Engr. Tagitis by the IDB central office in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it could might
[sic] be done by resentment or sour grape among students who are applying for the scholar [sic] and were denied which
was allegedly conducted/screened by the subject being the coordinator of said program.
20. It is also premature to conclude but it does or it may and [sic] presumed that the motive behind the disappearance of
the subject might be due to the funds he maliciously spent for his personal interest and wanted to elude responsibilities
from the institution where he belong as well as to the Islamic student scholars should the statement of Prof. Matli be true
or there might be a professional jealousy among them.
xxxx
It is recommended that the Writ of Amparo filed against the respondents be dropped and dismissed considering on [ sic]
the police and military actions in the area particularly the CIDG are exerting their efforts and religiously doing their
tasked [sic] in the conduct of its intelligence monitoring and investigation for the early resolution of this instant case. But
rest assured, our office, in coordination with other law-enforcement agencies in the area, are continuously and religiously
conducting our investigation for the resolution of this case.
On February 4, 2008, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that TASK FORCE TAGITIS did not appear to be exerting
extraordinary efforts in resolving Tagitis disappearance on the following grounds: [28]
(1)
This Court FOUND that it was only as late as January 28, 2008, after the hearing, that GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO
and COL. AHIRON AJIRIM had requested for clear photographs when it should have been standard operating procedure in
kidnappings or disappearances that the first agenda was for the police to secure clear pictures of the missing person,
Engr. Morced Tagitis, for dissemination to all parts of the country and to neighboring countries. It had been three (3)
months since GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO admitted having been informed on November 5, 2007 of the alleged abduction of
Engr. Morced Tagitis by alleged bad elements of the CIDG. It had been more than one (1) month since the Writ of
Amparo had been issued on December 28, 2007. It had been three (3) weeks when battle formation was ordered
through Task Force Tagitis, on January 17, 2008.It was only on January 28, 2008 when the Task Force Tagitis requested
for clear and recent photographs of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, despite the Task Force Tagitisclaim that they
already had an all points bulletin, since November 5, 2007, on the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis. How could the
police look for someone who disappeared if no clear photograph had been disseminated?
(2)
Furthermore, Task Force Tagitis COL. AHIROM AJIRIM informed this Court that P/Supt KASIM was
designated as Col. Ahirom Ajirims replacement in the latters official designated post. Yet, P/Supt KASIMs subpoena was
returned to this Court unserved. Since this Court was made to understand that it was P/Supt KASIM who was the
petitioners unofficial source of the military intelligence information that Engr. Morced Tagitis was abducted by bad
elements of the CIDG (par. 15 of the Petition), the close contact between P/Supt KASIM and Col. Ahirom Ajirim of TASK
FORCE TAGITIS should have ensured the appearance of Col. KASIM in response to this courts subpoena and COL. KASIM
could have confirmed the military intelligence information that bad elements of the CIDG had abducted Engr. Morced
Tagitis.

Testimonies for the Respondent

On January 7, 2008, the respondent, Mary Jean B. Tagitis, testified on direct examination that she went to Jolo and
Zamboanga in her efforts to locate her husband.She said that a friend from Zamboanga holding a high position in the
military (whom she did not then identify) gave her information that allowed her to specify her allegations, particularly
paragraph 15 of the petition.[29] This friend also told her that her husband [was] in good hands. [30] The respondent also
testified that she sought the assistance of her former boss in Davao City, Land Bank Bajada Branch Manager Rudy
Salvador, who told her that PNP CIDG is holding [her husband], Engineer Morced Tagitis. [31] The respondent recounted
that she went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City where she met Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim ( Col. Kasim/Sr. Supt Kasim)
who read to her and her friends (who were then with her) a highly confidential report that contained the alleged activities
of Engineer Tagitis and informed her that her husband was abducted because he is under custodial investigation for being
a liaison for J.I. or Jemaah Islamiah.[32]

On January 17, 2008, the respondent on cross-examination testified that she is Tagitis second wife, and they have been
married for thirteen years; Tagitis was divorced from his first wife. [33] She last communicated with her husband on October
29, 2007 at around 7:31 p.m. through text messaging; Tagitis was then on his way to Jolo, Sulu, from Zamboanga City. [34]
The respondent narrated that she learned of her husbands disappearance on October 30, 2007 when her stepdaughter,
Zaynah Tagitis (Zaynah), informed her that she had not heard from her father since the time they arranged to meet in
Manila on October 31, 2007. [35] The respondent explained that it took her a few days (or on November 5, 2007) to
personally ask Kunnong to report her husbands disappearance to the Jolo Police Station, since she had the impression
that her husband could not communicate with her because his cellular phones battery did not have enough power, and
that he would call her when he had fully-charged his cellular phones battery. [36]
The respondent also identified the high-ranking military friend, who gave her the information found in paragraph 15 of
her petition, as Lt. Col. Pedro L. Ancanan, Jr (Col. Ancanan). She met him in Camp Karingal, Zamboanga through her
boss.[37] She also testified that she was with three other people, namely, Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin and her two friends
from Mati City, Davao Oriental, when Col. Kasim read to them the contents of the highly confidential report at Camp
Katitipan, Davao City. The respondent further narrated that the report indicated that her husband met with people
belonging to a terrorist group and that he was under custodial investigation. She then told Col. Kasim that her husband
was a diabetic taking maintenance medication, and asked that the Colonel relay to the persons holding him the need to
give him his medication.[38]
On February 11, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted two narrative reports, [39] signed by the respondent, detailing her
efforts to locate her husband which led to her meetings with Col. Ancanan of the Philippine Army and Col. Kasim of the
PNP. In her narrative report concerning her meeting with Col. Ancanan, the respondent recounted, viz:[40]
On November 11, 2007, we went to Zamboanga City with my friend Mrs. Marydel Talbin. Our flight from Davao City is
9:00 oclock in the morning; we arrived at Zamboanga Airport at around 10:00 oclock. We [were] fetched by the two staffs
of Col. Ancanan. We immediately proceed [sic] to West Mindanao Command (WESTMINCOM).
On that same day, we had private conversation with Col. Ancanan. He interviewed me and got information about the
personal background of Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. After he gathered all information, he revealed to us the contents of text
messages they got from the cellular phone of the subject Engr. Tagitis. One of the very important text messages of Engr.
Tagitis sent to his daughter Zaynah Tagitis was that she was not allowed to answer any telephone calls in his
condominium unit.
While we were there he did not tell us any information of the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis. After the said meeting with Col.
Ancanan, he treated us as guests to the city. His two staffs accompanied us to the mall to purchase our plane ticket going
back to Davao City on November 12, 2007.
When we arrived in Davao City on November 12, 2007 at 9:00 in the morning, Col. Ancanan and I were discussing some
points through phone calls. He assured me that my husband is alive and hes last looked [sic] in Talipapao, Jolo, Sulu. Yet
I did not believe his given statements of the whereabouts of my husband, because I contacted some of my friends who
have access to the groups of MILF, MNLF and ASG. I called up Col. Ancanan several times begging to tell me the exact
location of my husband and who held him but he refused.
While I was in Jolo, Sulu on November 30, 2007, I called him up again because the PNP, Jolo did not give me any
information of the whereabouts of my husband. Col. Ancanan told me that Sana ngayon alam mo na kung saan ang
kinalalagyan ng asawa mo. When I was in Zamboanga, I was thinking of dropping by the office of Col. Ancanan, but I was
hesitant to pay him a visit for the reason that the Chief of Police of Jolo told me not to contact any AFP officials and he
promised me that he can solve the case of my husband (Engr. Tagitis) within nine days.
I appreciate the effort of Col. Ancanan on trying to solve the case of my husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, yet failed to do so.

The respondent also narrated her encounter with Col. Kasim, as follows: [41]
On November 7, 2007, I went to Land Bank of the Philippines, Bajada Branch, Davao City to meet Mr. Rudy Salvador. I
told him that my husband, Engineer Morced Tagitis was presumed to be abducted in Jolo, Sulu on October 30, 2007. I
asked him a favor to contact his connections in the military in Jolo, Sulu where the abduction of Engr. Tagitis took
place. Mr. Salvador immediately called up Camp Katitipan located in Davao City looking for high-ranking official who can
help me gather reliable information behind the abduction of subject Engineer Tagitis.

On that same day, Mr. Salvador and my friend, Anna Mendoza, Executive Secretary, accompanied me to Camp Katitipan
to meet Col. Kasim. Mr. Salvador introduced me to Col. Kasim and we had a short conversation. And he assured me that
hell do the best he can to help me find my husband.
After a few weeks, Mr. Salvador called me up informing me up informing me that I am to go to Camp Katitipan to meet
Col. Kasim for he has an urgent, confidential information to reveal.
On November 24, 2007, we went back to Camp Katitipan with my three friends. That was the time that Col. Kasim read to
us the confidential report that Engr. Tagitis was allegedly connected [with] different terrorist [groups], one of which he
mentioned in the report was OMAR PATIK and a certain SANTOS - a Balik Islam.
It is also said that Engr. Tagitis is carrying boxes of medicines for the injured terrorists as a supplier. These are the two
information that I can still remember. It was written in a long bond paper with PNP Letterhead. It was not shown to us, yet
Col. Kasim was the one who read it for us.
He asked a favor to me that Please dont quote my Name! Because this is a raw report. He assured me that my husband is
alive and he is in the custody of the military for custodial investigation. I told him to please take care of my husband
because he has aliments and he recently took insulin for he is a diabetic patient.
In my petition for writ of amparo, I emphasized the information that I got from Kasim.
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin (Mrs. Talbin) to corroborate her testimony
regarding her efforts to locate her husband, in relation particularly with the information she received from Col.
Kasim. Mrs. Talbin testified that she was with the respondent when she went to Zamboanga to see Col. Ancanan, and to
Davao City at Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim.[42]
In Zamboanga, Mrs. Talbin recounted that they met with Col. Ancanan, who told them that there was a report and that he
showed them a series of text messages from Tagitis cellular phone, which showed that Tagitis and his daughter would
meet in Manila on October 30, 2007.[43]
She further narrated that sometime on November 24, 2007, she went with the respondent together with two other
companions, namely, Salvacion Serrano and Mini Leong, to Camp Katitipan to talk to Col. Kasim. [44] The respondent asked
Col. Kasim if he knew the exact location of Engr. Tagitis. Col. Kasim told them that Tagitis was in good hands, although he
was not certain whether he was with the PNP or with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). She further recounted
that based on the report Col. Kasim read in their presence, Tagitis was under custodial investigation because he was
being charged with terrorism; Tagitis in fact had been under surveillance since January 2007 up to the time he was
abducted when he was seen talking to Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a Balik Islam charged with
terrorism. Col. Kasim also told them that he could not give a copy of the report because it was a raw report. [45] She also
related that the Col. Kasim did not tell them exactly where Tagitis was being kept, although he mentioned Talipapao,
Sulu.Prof., lalabas din yan.[50] Prof. Matli also emphasized that despite what his January 4, 2008 affidavit indicated, [51] he never told
PS Supt. Pingay, or made any accusation, that Tagitis took away money entrusted to him. [52] Prof. Matli confirmed,
however, that that he had received an e-mail report [53] from Nuraya Lackian of the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila that
the IDB was seeking assistance of the office in locating the funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis personal account. [54]
On cross-examination by the respondents counsel, Prof. Matli testified that his January 4, 2008 affidavit was already
prepared when PS Supt. Pingay asked him to sign it. [55] Prof Matli clarified that although he read the affidavit before
signing it, he was not so much aware of [its] contents.[56]
On February 11, 2008, the petitioners presented Col. Kasim to rebut material portions of the respondents testimony,
particularly the allegation that he had stated that Tagitis was in the custody of either the military or the PNP. [57] Col.
Kasim categorically denied the statements made by the respondent in her narrative report, specifically: (1) that Tagitis was
seen carrying boxes of medicines as supplier for the injured terrorists; (2) that Tagitis was under the custody of the
military, since he merely said to the respondent that your husband is in good hands and is probably taken cared of
by his armed abductors; and (3) that Tagitis was under custodial investigation by the military, the PNP or the CIDG
Zamboanga City.[58] Col. Kasim emphasized that the informal letter he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate
that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG. [59] He also stressed that the information he provided to the respondent was
merely a raw report sourced from barangay intelligence that still needed confirmation and follow-up as to its veracity. [60]
On cross-examination, Col. Kasim testified that the information he gave the respondent was given to him by his
informant, who was a civilian asset, through a letter which he considered as unofficial. [61] Col. Kasim stressed that the
letter was only meant for his consumption and not for reading by others. [62] He testified further that he destroyed the letter
right after he read it to the respondent and her companions because it was not important to him and also because the

information it contained had no importance in relation with the abduction of Tagitis. [63] He explained that he did not keep the
letter because it did not contain any information regarding the whereabouts of Tagitis and the person(s) responsible for his
abduction.[64]
In the same hearing on February 11, 2008, the petitioners also presented Police Senior Superintendent Jose Volpane
Pante (Col. Pante), Chief of the CIDG-9, to disprove the respondents allegation that Tagitis was in the custody of CIDGZamboanga City.[65] Col. Pante clarified that the CIDG was the investigative arm of the PNP, and that the CIDG investigates
and prosecutes all cases involving violations in the Revised Penal Code particularly those considered as heinous crimes.
[66]
Col. Pante further testified that the allegation that 9 RCIDU personnel were involved in the disappearance of Tagitis was
baseless, since they did not conduct any operation in Jolo, Sulu before or after Tagitis reported disappearance. [67] Col.
Pante added that the four (4) personnel assigned to the Sulu CIDT had no capability to conduct any operation, since they
were only assigned to investigate matters and to monitor the terrorism situation. [68] He denied that his office conducted
any surveillance on Tagitis prior to the latters disappearance. [69] Col. Pante further testified that his investigation of Tagitis
disappearance was unsuccessful; the investigation was still facing a blank wall on the whereabouts of Tagitis. [70]
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision [71] confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an enforced
disappearance under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.
[72]
The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the
abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced disappearance. The conclusion that the CIDG was involved
was based on the respondents testimony, corroborated by her companion, Mrs. Talbin. The CA noted that the information
that the CIDG, as the police intelligence arm, was involved in Tagitis abduction came from no less than the military an
independent agency of government. The CA thus greatly relied on the raw report from Col. Kasims asset, pointing to the
CIDGs involvement in Tagitis abduction. The CA held that raw reports from an asset carried great weight in the
intelligence world. It also labeled as suspect Col. Kasims subsequent and belated retraction of his statement that the
military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as too farfetched and unbelievable and a bedlam of speculation police theories painting the
disappearance as intentional on the part of Tagitis.He had no previous brushes with the law or any record of overstepping
the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him; no student of the IDB scholarship program ever came forward
to complain that he or she did not get his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police theory that Tagitis was
trying to escape from the clutches of his second wife, on the basis of the respondents testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim
who could have many wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was no issue at all when the latter divorced his first
wife in order to marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by the
ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis disappearance, since the respondent, the police and the military noted that
there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis abduction or demand for payment of ransom the usual modus operandi of these
terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the
CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, TASK FORCE TAGITIS heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col.
Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the
life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same
time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen.
Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of
April 9, 2008.[73]
THE PETITION
In this Rule 45 appeal questioning the CAs March 7, 2008 decision, the petitioners mainly dispute the sufficiency in form
and substance of the Amparo petition filed before the CA; the sufficiency of the legal remedies the respondent took before
petitioning for the writ; the finding that the rights to life, liberty and security of Tagitis had been violated; the sufficiency
of evidence supporting the conclusion that Tagitis was abducted; the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga was
responsible for the abduction; and, generally, the ruling that the respondent discharged the burden of proving the
allegations of the petition by substantial evidence.[74]
THE COURTS RULING
We do not find the petition meritorious.

Sufficiency in Form and Substance

In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondents Amparo petition, the petitioners contend that the
petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule. Specifically, the petitioners allege that the respondent failed
to:
1) allege any act or omission the petitioners committed in violation of Tagitis rights to life, liberty and security;
2) allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was abducted, the persons responsible for his disappearance, and the
respondents source of information;
3) allege that the abduction was committed at the petitioners instructions or with their consent;
4) implead the members of CIDG regional office in Zamboanga alleged to have custody over her husband;
5) attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations;
6) allege any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in the performance of their duties in the investigation of
Tagitis disappearance; and
7) specify what legally available efforts she took to determine the fate or whereabouts of her husband.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of the portions the
petitioners cite):[75]
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any
report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or
actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts
constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. [76] In an Amparopetition, however, this requirement must
be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner
may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or
arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by
those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that
the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for
violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading
the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while
presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or private
party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to
determine if the required elements namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened
violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are present.
In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly
dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to be found despite efforts to locate
him. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7, in relation to paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable
information, police operatives were the perpetrators of the abduction. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis rights to life,
liberty and security were violated when he was forcibly taken and boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of burly men
believed to be police intelligence operatives, and then taken into custody by the respondents police intelligence operatives
since October 30, 2007, specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an earnest attempt of
the police to involve and connect [him] with different terrorist groups. [77]
These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleaders knowledge about Tagitis disappearance,
the participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or to provide

sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition
cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c)
of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the
petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be
used as the affiants direct testimony.[78] This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily
leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially
complied with the requirement by submitting a verifiedpetition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need
for the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the required
affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held
on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this
point, the petition cannot be faulted.
Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an alleged disappearance must have been made,
specifying the manner and results of the investigation. Effectively, this requirement seeks to establish at the earliest
opportunity the level of diligence the public authorities undertook in relation with the reported disappearance. [79]
We reject the petitioners argument that the respondents petition did not comply with the Section 5(d) requirements of
the Amparo Rule, as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and his companions immediately reported
Tagitis disappearance to the police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they were relatively certain that he indeed had
disappeared. The police, however, gave them the ready answer that Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf
group or other anti-government groups. The respondent also alleged in paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that she filed
a complaint with the PNP Police Station in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of an intriguing tale by the police that
her husband was having a good time with another woman. The disappearance was alleged to have been reported, too, to
no less than the Governor of the ARMM, followed by the respondents personal inquiries that yielded the factual bases for
her petition.[80]
These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have been made to the police authorities, and
that investigations should have followed. That the petition did not state the manner and results of the investigation that
the Amparo Rule requires, but rather generally stated the inaction of the police, their failure to perform their duty to
investigate, or at the very least, their reported failed efforts, should not be a reflection on the completeness of the petition.
To require the respondent to elaborately specify the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority, as well the manner and conduct of the investigation is an overly strict interpretation of Section 5(d), given the
respondents frustrations in securing an investigation with meaningful results. Under these circumstances, we are more
than satisfied that the allegations of the petition on the investigations undertaken are sufficiently complete for purposes of
bringing the petition forward.
Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition that otherwise is not supported by sufficient allegations
to constitute a proper cause of action as a means to fish for evidence. [81] The petitioners contend that the respondents
petition did not specify what legally available efforts were taken by the respondent, and that there was an undue haste in
the filing of the petition when, instead of cooperating with authorities, the respondent immediately invoked the Courts
intervention.
We do not see the respondents petition as the petitioners view it.
Section 5(e) merely requires that the Amparo petitioner (the respondent in the present case) allege the actions and
recourses taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for
the threat, act or omission. The following allegations of the respondents petition duly outlined the actions she had taken
and the frustrations she encountered, thus compelling her to file her petition.
xxxx
7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but while out
on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter
on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his student, Arsimin Kunnong;
xxxx
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and reported the
matter to the local police agency;

11. Arsimin Kunnong, including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the whereabouts of
Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer
that Engr. Tagitis could [have been] abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and other groups known to be fighting against the
government;
12. Being scared with these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the matter to the
[respondent](wife of Engr. Tagitis) by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators of the IDB Scholarship
Programme in the Philippines who alerted the office of the Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC
meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
13. [The respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch,
Digos City, Davao del Sur, who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who could help them
find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
xxxx
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police
intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt
of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups;
xxxx
17. [The respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station at the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, as suggested
by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [the respondents] request and pleadings failed to produce any
positive results
xxxx
20. Lately, [respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police Headquarters again in
Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including the police headquarters in Davao City, in Zamboanga
City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her
husband, which entailed expenses for her trips to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for
financial help from friends and relatives only to try complying to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite
of which, her efforts produced no positive results up to the present time;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the
circumstances, [respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of subject
Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of [the petitioners], their intelligence operatives and the like which are in
total violation of the subjects human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondents petition for the Writ of Amparo is sufficient in form and
substance and that the Court of Appeals had every reason to proceed with its consideration of the case.

The Desaparecidos
The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in an enforced
disappearance situation. For a deeper appreciation of the application of this Rule to an enforced disappearance situation,
a brief look at the historical context of the writ and enforced disappearances would be very helpful.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitlers Nact und Nebel
Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941. [82] The Third Reichs Night and Fog Program, a State policy, was
directed at persons in occupied territories endangering German security; they were transported secretly to Germany
where they disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited
government officials from providing information about the fate of these targeted persons. [83]
In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and outraging the world when
individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have disappeared during the military regime in
Argentina. Enforced disappearances spread in Latin America, and the issue became an international concern when the
world noted its widespread and systematic use by State security forces in that continent under Operation Condor [84] and
during the Dirty War[85] in the 1970s and 1980s. The escalation of the practice saw political activists secretly arrested,

tortured, and killed as part of governments counter-insurgency campaigns. As this form of political brutality became
routine elsewhere in the continent, the Latin American media standardized the term disappearance to describe the
phenomenon. The victims of enforced disappearances were called the desaparecidos,[86] which literally means the
disappeared ones.[87] In general, there are three different kinds of disappearance cases:
1)
those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification of the arresting agents and are never
found again;
2)
those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held in complete isolation for weeks
or months while their families are unable to discover their whereabouts and the military authorities deny having them in
custody until they eventually reappear in one detention center or another; and
3)

those of victims of salvaging who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later discovered. [88]

In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories, [89] and 855 cases were recorded
during the period of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127
were found dead. During former President Corazon C. Aquinos term, 820 people were reported to have disappeared and of
these, 612 cases were documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The
number of enforced disappearances dropped during former President Fidel V. Ramos term when only 87 cases were
reported, while the three-year term of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases. KARAPATAN, a local
non-governmental organization, reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records show that there were a total of 193 victims
of enforced disappearance under incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyos administration. The Commission on Human
Rights records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this number, 406
remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have undetermined status. [90] Currently, the United
Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance [91] reports 619 outstanding cases of enforced or
involuntary disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008. [92]
Enforced Disappearances
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.[93] We note that although the writ specifically covers enforced disappearances, this concept is neither defined nor
penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal
that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced
disappearance:[94]
JUSTICE MARTINEZ: I believe that first and foremost we should come up or formulate a specific definition [for]
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. From that definition, then we can proceed to formulate the rules,
definite rules concerning the same.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO: As things stand, there is no law penalizing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances so initially also we have to [come up with] the nature of these extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances [to be covered by the Rule] because our concept of killings and disappearances will define the
jurisdiction of the courts. So well have to agree among ourselves about the nature of killings and disappearances for
instance, in other jurisdictions, the rules only cover state actors. That is an element incorporated in their concept of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In other jurisdictions, the concept includes acts and omissions not
only of state actors but also of non state actors. Well, more specifically in the case of the Philippines for instance, should
these rules include the killings, the disappearances which may be authored by let us say, the NPAs or the leftist
organizations and others. So, again we need to define the nature of the extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances
that will be covered by these rules. [Emphasis supplied] [95]
In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of Representatives [96] and in the Senate [97] on
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear textual definition of these terms in
the Rule. The Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its power to address and
provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative
efforts.[98]

As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized
separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are
now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. [99] The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken
on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal and what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts should
carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact under the countrys constitutional
scheme and power structure.
Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances,
however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, [100] since extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the
constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Courts power is strictly procedural and as
such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very
meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court,
through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on
actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference
even if only procedurally in a situation when the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the
threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.
Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not rule on any issue of criminal
culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is an issue that requires criminal action before our
criminal courts based on our existing penal laws. Our intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance
has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate
remedies to address it. The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of
indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations
require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and
security restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly
terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete determination of the
fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her
liberty and security, and, in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.

Enforced Disappearance
Under International Law
From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced disappearance is considered a flagrant violation of human
rights.[101] It does not only violate the right to life, liberty and security of the desaparecido; it affects their families as well
through the denial of their right to information regarding the circumstances of the disappeared family member. Thus,
enforced disappearances have been said to be a double form of torture, with doubly paralyzing impact for the victims, as
they are kept ignorant of their own fates, while family members are deprived of knowing the whereabouts of their detained
loved ones and suffer as well the serious economic hardship and poverty that in most cases follow the disappearance of
the household breadwinner.[102]
The UN General Assembly first considered the issue of Disappeared Persons in December 1978 under Resolution
33/173. The Resolution expressed the General Assemblys deep concern arising from reports from various parts of the
world relating to enforced or involuntary disappearances, and requested the UN Commission on Human Rights to consider
the issue of enforced disappearances with a view to making appropriate recommendations. [103]
In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced disappearance had become a global
phenomenon, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (Declaration).[104] This Declaration, for the first time, provided in its third preambular clause a working
description of enforced disappearance, as follows:
Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced disappearances occur, in the sense
that persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials
of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or
with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, followed by a refusal to disclose

the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their
liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]

Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention).[105] The Convention was opened for signature in Paris,
France on February 6, 2007.[106] Article 2 of the Convention defined enforced disappearance as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, enforced disappearance is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any
other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of
the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis
supplied]
The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a right not to be subject to enforced
disappearance[107] and that this right is non-derogable. [108] It provides that no one shall be subjected to enforced
disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state of war, internal political instability, or any other public emergency. It
obliges State Parties to codify enforced disappearance as an offense punishable with appropriate penalties under their
criminal law.[109] It also recognizes the right of relatives of the disappeared persons and of the society as a whole to know
the truth on the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and on the progress and results of the investigation. [110] Lastly, it
classifies enforced disappearance as a continuing offense, such that statutes of limitations shall not apply until the fate
and whereabouts of the victim are established.[111]

Binding Effect of UN
Action on the Philippines
To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country is not yet committed to enact
any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific penal law, however, is not a stumbling
block for action from this Court, as heretofore mentioned; underlying every enforced disappearance is a violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect
through its rule-making powers.
Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is guided, in acting on Amparo cases, by the
reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and by the various conventions we signed and
ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans rights. Under the UN Charter, the Philippines pledged to
promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as
to race, sex, language or religion. [112] Although no universal agreement has been reached on the precise extent of the
human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed to all by the Charter, [113] it was the UN itself that issued the
Declaration on enforced disappearance, and this Declaration states: [114]
Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is condemned as a denial of the purposes of the Charter
of the United Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed and developed in international instruments in this field.
[Emphasis supplied]
As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a UN Declaration, the ban on
enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country, given our own adherence to generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. [115]
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,[116] we held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by
mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. [Emphasis supplied]

We characterized generally accepted principles of international law as norms of general or customary international law
that are binding on all states. We held further:[117]
[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of
the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law
sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion
juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in
question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. [Emphasis in the original]
The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law.[118] The material sources of custom include State practice, State legislation, international and national
judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the
practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the UN General Assembly. [119] Sometimes
referred to as evidence of international law, [120] these sources identify the substance and content of the obligations of
States and are indicative of the State practice and opinio juris requirements of international law.[121]We note the following in
these respects:
First, barely two years from the adoption of the Declaration, the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly
adopted the Inter-American Convention on Enforced Disappearance of Persons in June 1994. [122] State parties undertook
under this Convention not to practice, permit, or tolerate the forced disappearance of persons, even in states of emergency
or suspension of individual guarantees. [123] One of the key provisions includes the States obligation to enact the crime of
forced disappearance in their respective national criminal laws and to establish jurisdiction over such cases when the
crime was committed within their jurisdiction, when the victim is a national of that State, and when the alleged criminal
is within its territory and it does not proceed to extradite him, which can be interpreted as establishing universal
jurisdiction among the parties to the Inter-American Convention. [124] At present, Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and
Venezuela have enacted separate laws in accordance with the Inter-American Convention and have defined activities
involving enforced disappearance to be criminal.[125]
Second, in Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights has no explicit provision dealing with the protection
against enforced disappearance. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), however, has applied the Convention in a
way that provides ample protection for the underlying rights affected by enforced disappearance through the Conventions
Article 2 on the right to life; Article 3 on the prohibition of torture; Article 5 on the right to liberty and security; Article 6,
paragraph 1 on the right to a fair trial; and Article 13 on the right to an effective remedy. A leading example
demonstrating the protection afforded by the European Convention is Kurt v. Turkey,[126] where the ECHR found a violation
of the right to liberty and security of the disappeared person when the applicants son disappeared after being taken into
custody by Turkish forces in the Kurdish village of Agilli in November 1993. It further found the applicant (the disappeared
persons mother) to be a victim of a violation of Article 3, as a result of the silence of the authorities and the inadequate
character of the investigations undertaken. The ECHR also saw the lack of any meaningful investigation by the State as a
violation of Article 13.[127]
Third, in the United States, the status of the prohibition on enforced disappearance as part of customary international law
is recognized in the most recent edition of Restatement of the Law: The Third, [128] which provides that [a] State violates
international law if, as a matter of State policy, it practices, encourages, or condones (3) the murder or causing the
disappearance of individuals.[129] We significantly note that in a related matter that finds close identification with enforced
disappearance the matter of torture the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court held in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala[130] that the prohibition on torture had attained the status of customary international law. The court further
elaborated on the significance of UN declarations, as follows:
These U.N. declarations are significant because they specify with great precision the obligations of member nations under
the Charter. Since their adoption, "(m)embers can no longer contend that they do not know what human rights they
promised in the Charter to promote. Moreover, a U.N. Declaration is, according to one authoritative definition, "a formal
and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated.
Accordingly, it has been observed that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "no longer fits into the dichotomy of
binding treaty against non-binding pronouncement,' but is rather an authoritative statement of the international
community." Thus, a Declaration creates an expectation of adherence, and "insofar as the expectation is gradually
justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon the States."

Indeed, several commentators have concluded that the Universal Declaration has become, in toto, a part of binding,
customary international law. [Citations omitted]
Fourth, in interpreting Article 2 (right to an effective domestic remedy) of the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the Philippines is both a signatory and a State Party, the UN Human Rights Committee,
under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, has stated that the act of enforced disappearance violates
Articles 6 (right to life), 7 (prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and 9 (right to
liberty and security of the person) of the ICCPR, and the act may also amount to a crime against humanity. [131]
Fifth, Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court ( ICC) also covers
enforced disappearances insofar as they are defined as crimes against humanity, [132] i.e., crimes committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. While more than 100
countries have ratified the Rome Statute, [133] the Philippines is still merely a signatory and has not yet ratified it. We note
that Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute has been incorporated in the statutes of other international and hybrid tribunals,
including Sierra Leone Special Court, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste, and the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.[134] In addition, the implementing legislation of State Parties to the Rome Statute of
the ICC has given rise to a number of national criminal provisions also covering enforced disappearance. [135]
While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced disappearance (or by the
specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared enforced disappearance as a specific crime, the above
recital shows that enforced disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by the international community,
so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of international law, which we should consider a part
of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws and the
international conventions that bind us.
The following civil or political rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and the International
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) may be infringed in the course of a disappearance: [136]
1) the right to recognition as a person before the law;
2) the right to liberty and security of the person;
3) the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
4) the right to life, when the disappeared person is killed;
5) the right to an identity;
6) the right to a fair trial and to judicial guarantees;
7) the right to an effective remedy, including reparation and compensation;
8) the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of a disappearance.
9) the right to protection and assistance to the family;
10) the right to an adequate standard of living;
11) the right to health; and
12) the right to education [Emphasis supplied]
Article 2 of the ICCPR, which binds the Philippines as a state party, provides:
Article 2
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy,
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent
judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system
of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. [Emphasis supplied]
In General Comment No. 31, the UN Human Rights Committee opined that the right to an effective remedy under Article 2
of the ICCPR includes the obligation of the State to investigate ICCPR violations promptly, thoroughly, and effectively, viz:
[137]

15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of Covenant rights, States Parties must ensure
that individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those rights The Committee attaches
importance to States Parties' establishing appropriate judicial and administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of
rights violations under domestic law Administrative mechanisms are particularly required to give effect to
the general obligation to investigate allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and effectively through

independent and impartial bodies. A failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of violations could in and of itself
give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of an ongoing violation is an essential element of the right to an
effective remedy. [Emphasis supplied]
The UN Human Rights Committee further stated in the same General Comment No. 31 that failure to investigate as well
as failure to bring to justice the perpetrators of ICCPR violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the
Covenant, thus:[138]
18. Where the investigations referred to in paragraph 15 reveal violations of certain Covenant rights, States Parties must
ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.As with failure to investigate, failure to bring to justice
perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. These
obligations arise notably in respect of those violations recognized as criminal under either domestic or
international law, such as torture and similar cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (article 7), summary and
arbitrary killing (article 6) and enforced disappearance (articles 7 and 9 and, frequently, 6). Indeed, the problem of
impunity for these violations, a matter of sustained concern by the Committee, may well be an important contributing
element in the recurrence of the violations. When committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian
population, these violations of the Covenant are crimes against humanity (see Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, article 7). [Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,[139] this Court, in ruling that the right to security of persons is a guarantee of
the protection of ones right by the government, held that:
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for
human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government
does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of
justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez
Case, viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step
taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof,
without an effective search for the truth by the government. [Emphasis supplied]
Manalo significantly cited Kurt v. Turkey,[140] where the ECHR interpreted the right to security not only as a prohibition on
the State against arbitrary deprivation of liberty, but also as the imposition of a positive duty to afford protection to the
right to liberty. The Court notably quoted the following ECHR ruling:
[A]ny deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of
national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from
arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual, it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her
whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to
safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim
that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since. [Emphasis supplied]
These rulings effectively serve as the backdrop for the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which the Court made effective on
October 24, 2007. Although the AmparoRule still has gaps waiting to be filled through substantive law, as evidenced
primarily by the lack of a concrete definition of enforced disappearance, the materials cited above, among others,
provide ample guidance and standards on how, through the medium of the Amparo Rule, the Court can provide
remedies and protect the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that underlie every enforced
disappearance.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed
by the Unique Nature of an
Enforced Disappearance

Before going into the issue of whether the respondent has discharged the burden of proving the allegations of the petition
for the Writ of Amparo by the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule, we shall discuss briefly the unique evidentiary
difficulties presented by enforced disappearance cases; these difficulties form part of the setting that the implementation
of the Amparo Rule shall encounter.
These difficulties largely arise because the State itself the party whose involvement is alleged investigates enforced
disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators. [141] Experts note that
abductors are well organized, armed and usually members of the military or police forces, thus:
The victim is generally arrested by the security forces or by persons acting under some form of governmental authority. In
many countries the units that plan, implement and execute the program are generally specialized, highly-secret bodies
within the armed or security forces. They are generally directed through a separate, clandestine chain of command, but
they have the necessary credentials to avoid or prevent any interference by the "legal" police forces. These authorities take
their victims to secret detention centers where they subject them to interrogation and torture without fear of judicial or
other controls.[142]
In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are usually afraid to speak out
publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for their own lives. [143] We have had occasion to note this difficulty
in Secretary of Defense v. Manalo [144] when we acknowledged that where powerful military officers are implicated, the
hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central piece
of evidence in an enforced disappearance i.e., the corpus delicti or the victims body is usually concealed to effectively
thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of one that may have begun. [145] The problem for the victims family is
the States virtual monopoly of access to pertinent evidence. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed in
the landmark case of Velasquez Rodriguez[146] that inherent to the practice of enforced disappearance is the deliberate use
of the States power to destroy the pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the concealment as a clear attempt by the
State to commit the perfect crime.[147]
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced disappearance
ever occurred.[148] Deniability is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the absence of any proven
disappearance makes it easier to escape the application of legal standards ensuring the victims human rights.
[149]
Experience shows that government officials typically respond to requests for information about desaparecidos by
saying that they are not aware of any disappearance, that the missing people may have fled the country, or that their
names have merely been invented.[150]
These considerations are alive in our minds, as these are the difficulties we confront, in one form or another, in our
consideration of this case.
Evidence and Burden of Proof in
Enforced Disappearances Cases
Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the nature of an Amparo proceeding and the degree and burden of proof
the parties to the case carry, as follows:
Section 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or judge may
call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and
admissions from the parties.
xxxx
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish their claims by substantial
evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and
regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws,
rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed
or evade responsibility or liability.

Section 18. Judgment. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
[Emphasis supplied]

These characteristics namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in
contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings) reveal the clear
intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially
conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of diligence required the duty of public officials and employees
to observe extraordinary diligence point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional
rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form
requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a
rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of
diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place under
circumstances showing a violation of the victims constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part
of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond.
The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations [151] provided the Court its first opportunity to define the
substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay:
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute provides that the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling. The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be
deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. [citations omitted] But this
assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in
evidence having rational probative force. [Emphasis supplied]

In Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,[152] which was the Courts first petition for a Writ of Amparo, we recognized that the full
and exhaustive proceedings that the substantial evidence standard regularly requires do not need to apply due to the
summary nature of Amparo proceedings. We said:
The remedy [of the writ of amparo] provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal
guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings. [Emphasis supplied]
Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of Amparo petitions are the unique difficulties presented by the
nature of enforced disappearances, heretofore discussed, which difficulties this Court must frontally meet if
the Amparo Rule is to be given a chance to achieve its objectives. These evidentiary difficulties compel the Court to adopt
standards appropriate and responsive to the circumstances, without transgressing the due process requirements that
underlie every proceeding.
In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez,[153] the IACHR faced with a lack of direct evidence that the government of
Honduras was involved in Velasquez Rodriguez disappearance adopted a relaxed and informal evidentiary standard, and
established the rule that presumes governmental responsibility for a disappearance if it can be proven that the
government carries out a general practice of enforced disappearances and the specific case can be linked to that practice.
[154]
The IACHR took note of the realistic fact that enforced disappearances could be proven only through circumstantial or
indirect evidence or by logical inference; otherwise, it was impossible to prove that an individual had been made to
disappear. It held:
130. The practice of international and domestic courts shows that direct evidence, whether testimonial or documentary, is
not the only type of evidence that may be legitimately considered in reaching a decision. Circumstantial evidence,
indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so long as they lead to conclusions consistent with the facts.

131. Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in allegations of disappearances, because this
type of repression is characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the kidnapping or the
whereabouts and fate of the victim. [Emphasis supplied]
In concluding that the disappearance of Manfredo Velsquez (Manfredo) was carried out by agents who acted under cover of
public authority, the IACHR relied on circumstantial evidence including the hearsay testimony of Zenaida Velsquez,
the victims sister, who described Manfredos kidnapping on the basis of conversations she had with witnesses who saw
Manfredo kidnapped by men in civilian clothes in broad daylight. She also told the Court that a former Honduran military
official had announced that Manfredo was kidnapped by a special military squadron acting under orders of the Chief of
the Armed Forces.[155] The IACHR likewise considered the hearsay testimony of a second witness who asserted that he had
been told by a Honduran military officer about the disappearance, and a third witness who testified that he had spoken in
prison to a man who identified himself as Manfredo.[156]
Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances that enforced disappearance
cases pose to the courts; to have an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be responsive to the evidentiary
difficulties faced. On the one hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the admission and appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness
entails violation of rights and cannot be used as an effective counter-measure; we only compound the problem if a wrong
is addressed by the commission of another wrong. On the other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules
and cannot consider evidence the way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely, the proceedings before us are
administrative in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of evidence are not strictly observed. Thus, while we must follow
the substantial evidence rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take into account.
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider
any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence
to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence
can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all novel in the Philippine legal
system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness [157] is expressly recognized as an
exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or
attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of
cross-examination by the adverse party. The admission of the statement is determined by the court in light of specified
subjective and objective considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child witness. [158] These requisites
for admission find their counterpart in the present case under the above-described conditions for the exercise of flexibility
in the consideration of evidence, including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Assessment of the Evidence
The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an enforced disappearance within the meaning of this term under
the UN Declaration we have cited?
The Convention defines enforced disappearance as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of
liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of
the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of
the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law. [159] Under this definition, the
elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold: [160]
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared person; and
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only shows that
Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard
of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned the petitioner, Tagitis colleagues and even the police

authorities is that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again. The respondent
injected the causal element in her petition and testimony, as we shall discuss below.
We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP CIDG Zamboanga abducted or arrested Tagitis. If at all,
only the respondents allegation that Tagistis was under CIDG Zamboanga custody stands on record, but it is not
supported by any other evidence, direct or circumstantial.
In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two sources of information as her bases for her allegation that Tagistis
had been placed under government custody (in contrast with CIDG Zamboanga custody). The first was an unnamed friend
in Zamboanga (later identified as Col. Ancanan), who occupied a high position in the military and who allegedly
mentioned that Tagitis was in good hands. Nothing came out of this claim, as both the respondent herself and her
witness, Mrs. Talbin, failed to establish that Col. Ancanan gave them any information that Tagitis was in government
custody. Col. Ancanan, for his part, admitted the meeting with the respondent but denied giving her any information
about the disappearance.
The more specific and productive source of information was Col. Kasim, whom the respondent, together with her
witness Mrs. Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in Davao City. To quote the relevant portions of the respondents testimony:
Q: Were you able to speak to other military officials regarding the whereabouts of your husband particularly those in
charge of any records or investigation?
A: I went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City. Then one military officer, Col. Casim, told me that my husband is being
abducted [sic] because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly parang liason ng J.I., sir.
Q: What is J.I.?
A: Jemaah Islamiah, sir.
Q: Was there any information that was read to you during one of those visits of yours in that Camp?
A: Col. Casim did not furnish me a copy of his report because he said those reports are highly confidential, sir.
Q: Was it read to you then even though you were not furnished a copy?
A: Yes, sir. In front of us, my friends.
Q: And what was the content of that highly confidential report?
A: Those alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis, sir.[161] [Emphasis supplied]
She confirmed this testimony in her cross-examination:
Q: You also mentioned that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And a certain Col. Kasim told you that your husband was abducted and under custodial investigation?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And you mentioned that he showed you a report?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Were you able to read the contents of that report?

A: He did not furnish me a copy of those [sic] report because those [sic] were highly confidential. That is a military
report, maam.
Q: But you were able to read the contents?
A: No. But he read it in front of us, my friends, maam.
Q: How many were you when you went to see Col. Kasim?
A: There were three of us, maam.
Q: Who were your companions?
A: Mrs. Talbin, tapos yung dalawang friends nya from Mati City, Davao Oriental, maam.[162]
xxxx
Q: When you were told that your husband is in good hands, what was your reaction and what did you do?
A: May binasa kasi sya that my husband has a parang meeting with other people na parang mga terorista na
mga tao. Tapos at the end of the report is [sic] under custodial investigation. So I told him Colonel, my husband is
sick. He is diabetic at nagmemaintain yun ng gamot. Pakisabi lang sa naghohold sa asawa ko na bigyan siya ng gamot,
maam.[163]
xxxx
Q: You mentioned that you received information that Engineer Tagitis is being held by the CIDG in Zamboanga, did you go
to CIDG Zamboanga to verify that information?
A: I did not go to CIDG Zamboanga. I went to Camp Karingal instead. Enough na yun na effort ko because I know that
they would deny it, maam.[164]

On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Talbin to corroborate her testimony that her husband was
abducted and held under custodial investigation by the PNP-CIDG Zamboanga City, viz:
Q: You said that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City sometime November 24, 2007, who was with you when you
went there?
A: Mary Jean Tagitis, sir.
Q: Only the two of you?
A: No. We have some other companions. We were four at that time, sir.
Q: Who were they?
A: Salvacion Serrano, Mini Leong, Mrs. Tagitis and me, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk, see some other officials at Camp Katitipan during that time?
A: Col. Kasim (PS Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim) only, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The four of you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What information did you get from Col. Kasim during that time?

A: The first time we met with [him] I asked him if he knew of the exact location, if he can furnish us the location of Engr.
Tagitis. And he was reading this report. He told us that Engr. Tagitis is in good hands. He is with the military, but he
is not certain whether he is with the AFP or PNP. He has this serious case. He was charged of terrorism because he
was under surveillance from January 2007 up to the time that he was abducted. He told us that he was under
custodial investigation. As Ive said earlier, he was seen under surveillance from January. He was seen talking to
Omar Patik, a certain Santos of Bulacan who is also a Balik Islam and charged with terrorism. He was seen
carrying boxes of medicines. Then we asked him how long will he be in custodial investigation. He said until we can get
some information.But he also told us that he cannot give us that report because it was a raw report. It was not official, sir.
Q: You said that he was reading a report, was that report in document form, in a piece of paper or was it in the computer
or what?
A: As far as I can see it, sir, it is written in white bond paper. I dont know if it was computerized but Im certain that it was
typewritten. Im not sure if it used computer, fax or what, sir.
Q: When he was reading it to you, was he reading it line by line or he was reading in a summary form?
A: Sometimes he was glancing to the report and talking to us, sir. [165]
xxxx
Q: Were you informed as to the place where he was being kept during that time?
A: He did not tell us where he [Tagitis] was being kept. But he mentioned this Talipapao, Sulu, sir.
Q: After that incident, what did you do if any?
A: We just left and as Ive mentioned, we just waited because that raw information that he was reading to us [ sic] after the
custodial investigation, Engineer Tagitis will be released. [Emphasis supplied] [166]
Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and her friends, and that he provided them information based
on the input of an unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his testimony that the informal letter he received from his
informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG. He also stressed that the information he
provided the respondent was merely a raw report from barangay intelligence that still needed confirmation and follow up
as to its veracity.[167]
To be sure, the respondents and Mrs. Talbins testimonies were far from perfect, as the petitioners pointed out. The
respondent mistakenly characterized Col. Kasim as a military officer who told her that her husband is being abducted
because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly parang liason ng J.I.The petitioners also noted that
Mrs. Talbins testimony imputing certain statements to Sr. Supt. Kasim that Engr. Tagitis is with the military, but he is not
certain whether it is the PNP or AFP is not worthy of belief, since Sr. Supt. Kasim is a high ranking police officer who
would certainly know that the PNP is not part of the military.
Upon deeper consideration of these inconsistencies, however, what appears clear to us is that the petitioners never really
steadfastly disputed or presented evidence to refute the credibility of the respondent and her witness, Mrs. Talbin. The
inconsistencies the petitioners point out relate, more than anything else, to details that should not affect the credibility of
the respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the inconsistencies are not on material points. [168] We note, for example, that these
witnesses are lay people in so far as military and police matters are concerned, and confusion between the police and the
military is not unusual. As a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than
prevarication[169]and only tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses
dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to were
integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated story. [170]
Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary situation in enforced disappearance cases, we hold it
duly established that Col. Kasim informed the respondent and her friends, based on the informants letter, that
Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been under surveillance since January 2007, was in good hands
and under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a
certain Santos of Bulacan, a Balik Islam charged with terrorism. The respondents and Mrs. Talbins testimonies

cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasims plain denial and his claim that he had destroyed his informants letter, the
critical piece of evidence that supports or negates the parties conflicting claims. Col. Kasims admitted destruction of this
letter effectively, a suppression of this evidence raises the presumption that the letter, if produced, would be proof of what
the respondent claimed.[171] For brevity, we shall call the evidence of what Col. Kasim reported to the respondent to be the
Kasim evidence.
Given this evidence, our next step is to decide whether we can accept this evidence, in lieu of direct evidence, as proof that
the disappearance of Tagitis was due to action with government participation, knowledge or consent and that he was held
for custodial investigation. We note in this regard that Col. Kasim was never quoted to have said that the custodial
investigation was by the CIDG Zamboanga. The Kasim evidence only implies government intervention through the use of
the term custodial investigation, and does not at all point to CIDG Zamboanga as Tagitis custodian.
Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay evidence i.e., evidence whose probative value is not
based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col. Kasim himself) but on the
knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand (the informant). [172]
To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it substantively states is to
acknowledge as the petitioners effectively suggest that in the absence of any direct evidence, we should simply dismiss the
petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this reason is no different from a statement that the Amparo Rule
despite its terms is ineffective, as it cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present
in Amparosituations, particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not
promulgated with this intent or with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was
promulgated to provide effective and timely remedies, using and profiting from local and international experiences in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as the situation may require. Consequently, we have no choice but to
meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties demand.
To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we should at least take a
close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence even of those usually
considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the
test of reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement. In the present case, we should at least
determine whether the Kasim evidence before us is relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and
reasonably consistent with other evidence in the case.
The evidence about Tagitis personal circumstances surrounded him with an air of mystery. He was reputedly a consultant
of the World Bank and a Senior Honorary Counselor for the IDB who attended a seminar in Zamboanga and thereafter
proceded to Jolo for an overnight stay, indicated by his request to Kunnong for the purchase of a return ticket to
Zamboanga the day after he arrived in Jolo. Nothing in the records indicates the purpose of his overnight sojourn in Jolo . A
colleague in the IDB, Prof. Matli, early on informed the Jolo police that Tagitis may have taken funds given to him in trust
for IDB scholars. Prof Matli later on stated that he never accused Tagitis of taking away money held in trust, although he
confirmed that the IDB was seeking assistance in locating funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis personal
account. Other than these pieces of evidence, no other information exists in the records relating to the personal
circumstances of Tagitis.
The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as his personal circumstances. While the Amparo petition recited that he
was taken away by burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, no evidence whatsoever was introduced to
support this allegation. Thus, the available direct evidence is that Tagitis was last seen at 12.30 p.m. of October 30, 2007
the day he arrived in Jolo and was never seen again.
The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct evidence on the above aspects of the case, as it
supplies the gaps that were never looked into and clarified by police investigation. It is the evidence, too, that colors a
simple missing person report into an enforced disappearance case, as it injects the element of participation by agents of
the State and thus brings into question how the State reacted to the disappearance.
Denials on the part of the police authorities, and frustration on the part of the respondent, characterize the attempts to
locate Tagitis. Initially in Jolo, the police informed Kunnong that Tagitis could have been taken by the Abu Sayyaf or other
groups fighting the government. No evidence was ever offered on whether there was active Jolo police investigation and how
and why the Jolo police arrived at this conclusion. The respondents own inquiry in Jolo yielded the answer that he was not
missing but was with another woman somewhere. Again, no evidence exists that this explanation was arrived at based on
an investigation. As already related above, the inquiry with Col. Ancanan in Zamboanga yielded ambivalent results not

useful for evidentiary purposes. Thus, it was only the inquiry from Col. Kasim that yielded positive results. Col. Kasims
story, however, confirmed only the fact of his custodial investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest or abduction), without
identifying his abductor/s or the party holding him in custody. The more significant part of Col. Kasims story is that the
abduction came after Tagitis was seen talking with Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a Balik Islam charged
with terrorism. Mrs. Talbin mentioned, too, that Tagitis was being held at Talipapao, Sulu. None of the police agencies
participating in the investigation ever pursued these leads. Notably, TASK FORCE TAGITIS to which this information was
relayed did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the case.
More denials were manifested in the Returns on the writ to the CA made by the petitioners. Then PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I.
Razon merely reported the directives he sent to the ARMM Regional Director and the Regional Chief of the CIDG on
Tagitis, and these reports merely reiterated the open-ended initial report of the disappearance. The CIDG directed a search
in all of its divisions with negative results. These, to the PNP Chief, constituted the exhaustion of all possible efforts.PNPCIDG Chief General Edgardo M. Doromal, for his part, also reported negative results after searching all divisions and
departments [of the CIDG] for a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis . . . and after a diligent and thorough research,
records show that no such person is being detained in the CIDG or any of its department or divisions. PNP-PACER Chief
PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espina and PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Superintendent Joel R. Goltiao did no better in
their affidavits-returns, as they essentially reported the results of their directives to their units to search for Tagitis.
The extent to which the police authorities acted was fully tested when the CA constituted TASK FORCE TAGITIS, with
specific directives on what to do. The negative results reflected in the Returns on the writ were again replicated during the
three hearings the CA scheduled. Aside from the previously mentioned retraction that Prof. Matli made to correct his
accusation that Tagitis took money held in trust for students, PS Supt. Ajirim reiterated in his testimony that the CIDG
consistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any abduction and said that there was no basis to conclude that the
CIDG or any police unit had anything to do with the disappearance of Tagitis; he likewise considered it premature to
conclude that Tagitis simply ran away with the money in his custody. As already noted above, the TASK FORCE notably did
not pursue any investigation about the personal circumstances of Tagitis, his background in relation to the IDB and the
background and activities of this Bank itself, and the reported sighting of Tagistis with terrorists and his alleged custody
in Talipapao, Sulu. No attempt appears to have ever been made to look into the alleged IDB funds that Tagitis held in
trust, or to tap any of the assets who are indispensable in investigations of this nature. These omissions and negative
results were aggravated by the CA findings that it was only as late as January 28, 2008 or three months after the
disappearance that the police authorities requested for clear pictures of Tagitis. Col. Kasim could not attend the trial
because his subpoena was not served, despite the fact that he was designated as Ajirims replacement in the latters last
post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not then questioned. No investigation even an internal one appeared to have been made to
inquire into the identity of Col. Kasims asset and what he indeed wrote.
We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the governments denial of any
complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the respondent at
Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure that Tagitis was under
custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive trait that runs through these developments is
the governments dismissive approach to the disappearance, starting from the initial response by the Jolo police to
Kunnongs initial reports of the disappearance, to the responses made to the respondent when she herself reported and
inquired about her husbands disappearance, and even at TASK FORCE TAGITIS itself.
As the CA found through TASK FORCE TAGITIS, the investigation was at best haphazard since the authorities were
looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even secure. The returns and reports made to the CA fared no better,
as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching for custodial records of Tagitis in their various departments and
divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis was a black operation because it was unrecorded or officially
unauthorized, no record of custody would ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the
usual police or CIDG detention places. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful results or
details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. To be sure, reports of top police officials indicating the
personnel and units they directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal
detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from the
very beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.

CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY

Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasims disclosure, made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally
point to some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard
investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why would the government and its officials engage in their chorus
of concealment if the intent had not been to deny what they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth
and thorough investigation that at least credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the governments cap under
the circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim
evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the
UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted,[173] the evidence at hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact of
the enforced disappearance and government complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded government
denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law a
situation that will subsist unless this Court acts.
This kind of fact situation and the conclusion reached are not without precedent in international enforced disappearance
rulings. While the facts are not exactly the same, the facts of this case run very close to those of Timurtas v. Turkey,[174] a
case decided by ECHR. The European tribunal in that case acted on the basis of the photocopy of a post-operation report
in finding that Abdulvahap Timurtas (Abdulvahap) was abducted and later detained by agents (gendarmes) of the
government of Turkey. The victim's father in this case brought a claim against Turkey for numerous violations of the
European Convention, including the right to life (Article 2) and the rights to liberty and security of a person (Article
5). The applicant contended that on August 14, 1993, gendarmes apprehended his son, Abdulvahap for being a leader of
the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in the Silopi region. The petition was filed in southeast Turkey nearly six and one half
years after the apprehension. According to the father, gendarmes first detained Abdulvahap and then transferred him to
another detainment facility. Although there was no eyewitness evidence of the apprehension or subsequent
detainment, the applicant presented evidence corroborating his version of events, including a photocopy of a
post-operation report signed by the commander of gendarme operations in Silopi, Turkey. The report included a
description of Abdulvahap's arrest and the result of a subsequent interrogation during detention where he was accused of
being a leader of the PKK in the Silopi region. On this basis, Turkey was held responsible for Abdulvahaps enforced
disappearance.
Following the lead of this Turkish experience - adjusted to the Philippine legal setting and the Amparo remedy
this Court has established, as applied to the unique facts and developments of this case we believe and so hold
that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of these
organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.
The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the PNP Law,
[175]
specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of
criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution. The PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane Pante
(then Chief of CIDG Region 9) testified, is the investigative arm of the PNP and is mandated to investigate and prosecute all
cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, particularly those considered as heinous crimes. [176] Under the PNP
organizational structure, the PNP-CIDG is tasked to investigate all major crimes involving violations of the Revised Penal
Code and operates against organized crime groups, unless the President assigns the case exclusively to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI).[177] No indication exists in this case showing that the President ever directly intervened by
assigning the investigation of Tagitis disappearance exclusively to the NBI.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their duties when
the government completely failed to exercise the extral'>To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the
CA for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and
the validation of their results through hearings the CA may deem appropriate to conduct. For purposes of these
investigations, the PNP/PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the CA a plan of action for further investigation, periodically
reporting the detailed results of its investigation to the CA for its consideration and action. On behalf of this Court, the CA
shall pass upon: the need for the PNP and the PNP-CIDG to make disclosures of matters known to them as indicated in
this Decision and as further CA hearings may indicate; the petitioners submissions; the sufficiency of their investigative
efforts; and submit to this Court a quarterly report containing its actions and recommendations, copy furnished the
petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this
Decision. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigation. The CA shall submit
its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4 th quarter counted from the finality of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit,
and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the following terms:

a.
Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance covered by
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
b.
Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the government
(through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim accountable for the enforced disappearance of
Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
c.
Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;
d.
Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly responsible for the
disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices regarding the disappearance of Engineer Morced
N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper investigations using extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show
investigation results acceptable to this Court;
e.
Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with the
obligation to disclose information known to him and to his assets in relation with the enforced disappearance of Engineer
Morced N. Tagitis;
f.
Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of
the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially
present to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting their results to the Court of
Appeals for consideration and action;
g.
Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its recommendations, copy
furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the end
of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;
h.
The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the Court of
Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4 th quarter counted from the
finality of this Decision;
These directives and those of the Court of Appeals made pursuant to this Decision shall be given to, and shall be directly
enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine National Police and its Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group, under pain of contempt from this Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and
investigation constitute less than the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the circumstances
of this case demand. Given the unique nature of Amparo cases and their varying attendant circumstances, these
directives particularly, the referral back to and monitoring by the CA are specific to this case and are not standard
remedies that can be applied to every Amparo situation.
The dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and
General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong
(Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in
Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for
his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer
around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room
key with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latters Manila-based secretary who did
not know of Tagitis whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis
fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On November 7, 2007,
Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis disappearance.
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), Mary Jean Tagitis filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with
the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano,
Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M.
Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police AntiCrime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, AntiTerror Task Force Comet.

Mary Jean said in her statement that she approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch,
Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who could help them
find/locate the whereabouts of her husband. All of her efforts did not produce any positive results except the information
from persons in the military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men.
According to reliable information she received, subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives,
specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve
and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.
She then filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, seeking their help to find
her husband, but was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband was not missing but was with another
woman having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the refusal of the PNP to help and provide police
assistance in locating her missing husband.
Heeding an advise of one police officer, she went to the different police headquarters namely Police Headquarters in
Cotabato City, Davao City, Zamboanga City and eventually in the National Headquarters in Camp Crame in Quezon City
but her efforts produced no positive results. These trips exhausted all of her resources which pressed her to ask for
financial help from friends and relatives.
She has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances, she has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of her husband, Engr. Morced Tagitis, from the
illegal clutches of his captors, their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subjects human
and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for hearing on
January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from service of the
writ.
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any involvement in or
knowledge of Tagitis alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete and did not
constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay
evidence. In addition, they all claimed that they exhausted all means, particularly taking pro-active measures to
investigate, search and locate Tagitis and to apprehend the persons responsible for his disappearance.
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced
disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.
The CA held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It also labeled as "suspect"
Col. Kasims subsequent and belated retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in
the abduction of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police theories painting the
disappearance as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the law or any record of
overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him; no student of the IDB scholarship program ever
came forward to complain that he or she did not get his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police theory
that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his second wife," on the basis of the respondents testimony that
Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when the
latter divorced his first wife in order to marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu
Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis disappearance, since the respondent, the police and the
military noted that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis abduction or demand for payment of ransom the usual
modus operandi of these terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the
CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col.
Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the
life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same
time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen.
Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of
April 9, 2008.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
RULING:
The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an enforced disappearance, thus the privilege of the Writ of
Amparo applies.
Under the UN Declaration enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of
liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of
the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of
the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law." Under this definition, the elements
that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold:
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared person;
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.
There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only shows that
Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard
of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned the petitioner, Tagitis colleagues and even the police
authorities is that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of the portions the
petitioners cite):
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any
report;(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission.
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or
actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts
constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. 76 In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must
be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner
may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or
arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by
those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that
the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for
violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading
the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances,
while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or
private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component
parts, to determine if the required elements namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or
threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are present.
The properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleaders knowledge about Tagitis disappearance, the participation by
agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information
about his whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any
failure in its statement of a cause of action.

If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c)
of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the
petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be
used as the affiants direct testimony. This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily
leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially
complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need
for the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the required
affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held
on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this
point, the petition cannot be faulted.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitlers Nact und Nebel
Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941. The Third Reichs Night and Fog Program, a State policy, was
directed at persons in occupied territories "endangering German security"; they were transported secretly to Germany
where they disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited
government officials from providing information about the fate of these targeted persons.
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories, and 855 cases were recorded
during the period of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127
were found dead. During former President Corazon C. Aquinos term, 820 people were reported to have disappeared and of
these, 612 cases were documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The
number of enforced disappearances dropped during former President Fidel V. Ramos term when only 87 cases were
reported, while the three-year term of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases. KARAPATAN, a local
non-governmental organization, reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records show that there were a total of 193 victims
of enforced disappearance under incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyos administration. The Commission on Human
Rights records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this number, 406
remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have undetermined status.Currently, the United
Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance reports 619 outstanding cases of enforced or
involuntary disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008.
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof."We note that although the writ specifically covers "enforced disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor
penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal
that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced
disappearance:
Justice Puno stated that, as the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction
are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced
disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws.
Although the Courts power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights,
the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural
standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional
rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference even if only procedurally in a situation when
the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional
rights.
The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold.
The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from
this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require. The second is to address the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these senses, our
orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing
or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim,
by the production of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper case,
by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.

During the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (in Paris, France on
February 6, 2007, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, we held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by
mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for
human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if
government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families,
and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious
manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of an Enforced Disappearance
The unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance cases; these difficulties form part of the setting
that the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter. These difficulties largely arise because the State itself the
party whose involvement is alleged investigates enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show
that the evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators. In addition, there are usually no
witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are usually afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on the
disappearance out of fear for their own lives.
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central piece of
evidence in an enforced disappearance
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced disappearance ever
occurred. "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the absence of any proven disappearance
makes it easier to escape the application of legal standards ensuring the victims human rights.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.
The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal
guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all novel in the Philippine legal
system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness is expressly recognized as
an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing
any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain
prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the adverse party.

CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY

Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasims disclosure, made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally
point to some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard
investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why would the government and its officials engage in their chorus

of concealment if the intent had not been to deny what they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth
and thorough investigation that at least credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the governments cap under
the circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim
evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the
UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted, evidence at hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact of the
enforced disappearance and government complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded government denials
and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law a
situation that will subsist unless this Court acts.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their duties when
the government completely failed to exercise the extral.'

To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at the
monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their results through hearings
the CA may deem appropriate to conduct.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182161
December 3, 2009
Reverend Father ROBERT P. REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the secretary of the COURT OF APPEALS, secretary DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, AND COMMISSIONER MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For resolution is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 4, 2008 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 00011 which dismissed the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo under
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, as amended. It also assails the CAs Resolution dated March 25, 2008, denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration of the aforesaid February 4, 2008 Decision.
The undisputed facts as found by the CA are as follows:
Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007. In the morning of
November 30, 2007, petitioner together with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings.
In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco,
Phillip L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was probable
cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.
On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), respondent DOJ
Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to
include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49
others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety.
On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion under
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City.
On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Release of the Accused
Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific
participation in the crime charged; and that under the Constitution, the determination of probable cause must be made
personally by a judge.
On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for
lack of probable cause. The trial court ratiocinated that the evidence submitted by the DOJ Panel of Investigating

Prosecutors failed to show that petitioner and the other accused-civilians conspired and confederated with the accusedsoldiers in taking arms against the government; that petitioner and other accused-civilians were arrested because they
ignored the call of the police despite the deadline given to them to come out from the 2nd Floor of the Hotel and submit
themselves to the police authorities; that mere presence at the scene of the crime and expressing ones sentiments on
electoral and political reforms did not make them conspirators absent concrete evidence that the accused-civilians knew
beforehand the intent of the accused-soldiers to commit rebellion; and that the cooperation which the law penalizes must
be one that is knowingly and intentionally rendered.
On December 18, 2007, petitioners counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of
HDO No. 45 in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 07-3126.
On even date, Secretary Gonzales replied to petitioners letter stating that the DOJ could not act on petitioners request
until Atty. Chavezs right to represent petitioner is settled in view of the fact that a certain Atty. J. V. Bautista representing
himself as counsel of petitioner had also written a letter to the DOJ.
On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the rebellion case against
petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists; that on December 19, 2007, petitioner was held by BID officials at the NAIA as his
name is included in the Hold Departure List; that had it not been for the timely intervention of petitioners counsel,
petitioner would not have been able to take his scheduled flight to Hong Kong; that on December 26, 2007, petitioner was
able to fly back to the Philippines from Hong Kong but every time petitioner would present himself at the NAIA for his
flights abroad, he stands to be detained and interrogated by BID officers because of the continued inclusion of his name
in the Hold Departure List; and that the Secretary of Justice has not acted on his request for the lifting of HDO No. 45.
Petitioner further maintained that immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of the writ is exigent as the
continued restraint on petitioners right to travel is illegal.
On January 24, 2008, respondents represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed the Return of the Writ
raising the following affirmative defenses: 1) that the Secretary of Justice is authorized to issue Hold Departure Orders
under the DOJ Circulars No. 17, Series of 1998 2 and No. 18 Series of 20073 pursuant to his mandate under the
Administrative Code of 1987 as ahead of the principal law agency of the government; 2) that HDO No. 45 dated December
1, 2007 was issued by the Sec. Gonzales in the course of the preliminary investigation of the case against herein petitioner
upon the request of the DILG; 3) that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is premature in view of public respondents pending Motion
for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2008 filed by the respondents of the Order dated December 13, 2007 of the RTC
dismissing Criminal Case No. 07-3126 for Rebellion for lack of probable cause; 4) that petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies by filing a motion to lift HDO No. 45 before the DOJ; and 5) that the constitutionality of Circulars
No. 17 and 18 can not be attacked collaterally in an amparo proceeding.
During the hearing on January 25, 2008 at 10:00 a.m. at the Paras Hall of the Court of Appeals, counsels for both parties
appeared. Petitioners counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez manifested that petitioner is currently in Hong Kong; that every time
petitioner would leave and return to the country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for
several minutes because of the existing HDO; that the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO has no legal basis; and
that petitioner did not file a motion to lift the HDO before the RTC nor the DOJ because to do so would be tantamount to
recognizing the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO.
For respondents part, the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) maintained that the Secretary of the DOJs power to issue
HDO springs from its mandate under the Administrative Code to investigate and prosecute offenders as the principal law
agency of the government; that in its ten-year existence, the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17 has not been
challenged except now; and that on January 3, 2008, the DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors had filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of Dismissal of the trial court.
On February 1, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation attaching thereto a copy of the Order dated January 31, 2008 of the
trial court denying respondent DOJs Motion for Reconsideration for utter lack of merit. The trial court also observed that
the said Motion should be dismissed outright for being filed out of time. 4
The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated petitioners constitutional right to
travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject
HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed.
On February 4, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition and denying the privilege of the writ
of amparo.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration5 thereon was also denied in the assailed Resolution6 dated March 25, 2008.
Hence, the present petition which is based on the following grounds:
I.
THE DOJ SECRETARYS ARROGATION OF POWER AND USURPATION OF AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A HOLD DEPARTURE
ORDER CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED THROUGH A RATIONALE THAT IT HAS SUPPOSEDLY BEEN "REGULARLY EXERCISED
IN THE PAST" OR HAS "NEVER BEEN QUESTIONED (IN THE PAST).
II.

THE DOJ HAS CLAIMED A POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO INDEPENDENT OF THAT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS,
HENCE, PETITIONER CANNOT MERELY RELY ON THE RESIDUAL POWER OF THE RTC MAKATI IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.
07-3126 TO ASSAIL SUCH CLAIMED POWER.
III.
THE UTMOST EXIGENCY OF THE PETITION IS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE CONTINUING ACTUAL RESTRAINT ON
PETITIONERS RIGHT TO TRAVEL THROUGH THE MAINTENANCE OF HIS NAME IN THE HDO LIST AND DOES NOT
SIMPLY HINGE ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL DESPITE SUCH A
RESTRAINT.
IV.
DOJ CIRCULAR 17 SERIES OF 1998 PROVIDES NO STATUTORY BASIS FOR THE DOJ SECRETARYS CLAIMED POWER
TO ISSUE AN HDO FOR IT IS NOT A STATUTE. THE CIRCULAR ITSELF APPEARS NOT TO BE BASED ON ANY STATUTE,
HENCE, IT DOES NOT HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW AND NEED NOT BE ATTACKED IN A DIRECT PROCEEDING. 7
Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to situations of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances but encompasses the whole gamut of liberties protected by the Constitution. Petitioner argues
that "[liberty] includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude and includes
the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways." Part of the right to liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution is the right of a person to travel.
In their Comment,8 both respondents Secretary Gonzalez and Commissioner Libanan argue that: 1) HDO No. 45 was
validly issued by the Secretary of Justice in accordance with Department of Justice Circular No. 17, Series of 1998, 9 and
Circular No. 18, Series of 2007, 10 which were issued pursuant to said Secretarys mandate under the Administrative Code
of 1987, as head of the principal law agency of the government, to investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute
offenders, and provide immigration regulatory services; and; 2) the issue of the constitutionality of the DOJ Secretarys
authority to issue hold departure orders under DOJ Circulars Nos. 17 and 18 is not within the ambit of a writ of amparo.
The case hinges on the issue as to whether or not petitioners right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation
by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.
The petition must fail.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., 11 made a categorical pronouncement that the Amparo
Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," or to
threats thereof, thus:
x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced
disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal
killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the
other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of
a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence
of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law." 12
In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,13 the Court laid down the basic principle regarding the rule on the writ of amparo as follows:
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address
these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as
an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither
is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in
line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires that
every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is
unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the
identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs." 14
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable
from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights
to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. (Emphasis supplied)
Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his right to travel. He insists
that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual
restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to travel is covered by the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the
following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.
In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,15 the Court explained the concept of right to life in this wise:
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive- upon which the enjoyment of
all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The
life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated
by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will
protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property pervades the whole history of
man. It touches every aspect of mans existence." In a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a persons
legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to
exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those
things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the
individual."16
The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., 17 in this manner:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be
free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by
his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." x x x
Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.18 thoroughly expounded on the import of the right to security, thus:
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom
from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some
scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international
human right. It is the "right to security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear." Article 3 of the
UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
xxx
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty
or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused
by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can
vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past
experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually
the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of
the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II
of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded without a search
warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than
a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion.
As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries
constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.
xxx
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. In the context of the
writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the
State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government

is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person
is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to
victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders
to the bar of justice. x x x (emphasis supplied) 19
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. 20 As we have stated in Marcos v.
Sandiganbayan,21 "xxx a persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of
safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for
humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts sound discretion." 22
Here, the restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him
was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the
extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily
available legal recourse or remedy.
In Canlas et al. v. Napico Homeowners Association I XIII, Inc. et al., 23 this Court ruled that:
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest
possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or
effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious
time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
We find the direct recourse to this Court inappropriate, considering the provision of Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo which reads:
Section 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for
the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.1avvphi1
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of amparo.
Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45
in Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the DOJs HDO, as his
co-accused did in the same criminal case. Petitioner argues that it was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the
said HDO, and that it is his intention not to limit his remedy to the lifting of the HDO but also to question before this
Court the constitutionality of the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue an HDO. 24 We quote with approval the CAs ruling
on this matter:
The said provision [Section 22] is an affirmation by the Supreme Court of its pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul 25that
once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests
on the sound discretion of the court. Despite the denial of respondents MR of the dismissal of the case against petitioner,
the trial court has not lost control over Criminal Case No. 07-3126 which is still pending before it. By virtue of its residual
power, the court a quo retains the authority to entertain incidents in the instant case to the exclusion of even this Court.
The relief petitioner seeks which is the lifting of the HDO was and is available by motion in the criminal case. (Sec. 22,
Rule on the Writ of amparo, supra).26
Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to separately and directly intervene through
the writ of amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz v. Del Rosario, 27 thus:
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts
of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the
absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security the personal concern that the writ is
intended to protectis immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar,
however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on
certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his
motion to lift the HDO.28 Petitioners apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear
threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also
renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998
(Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18, Series of
2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for Other
Purposes).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the CA dated February 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. No. 00011
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief,
Philippine National Police (PNP);
Police Chief Superintendent RAUL
CASTAEDA,
Chief,
Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent
LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police
Anti-Crime and Emergency Response
(PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO,
Regional Director of ARMM, PNP,
Petitioners,
- versus -

MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein

represented by ATTY. FELIPE P.
ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 182498

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

February 16, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Resolution the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners -- Gen. Avelino I. Razon, former Chief
of the Philippine National Police (PNP);[1] Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, former Chief of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG), PNP;[2] Police Senior Superintendent Leonardo A. Espina, former Chief of the Police Anti-Crime
and Emergency Response (PACER), PNP;[3] and Gen. Joel Goltiao, former Regional Director of the PNP-Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao[4] (petitioners) -- addressing our Decision of December 3, 2009. This Decision affirmed the Court of
Appeals (CA) decision of March 7, 2008 confirming the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and
granting the Writ of Amparo.
Our December 3, 2009 Decision was based, among other considerations, on the finding that Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim
(Col. Kasim) informed the respondent Mary Jean Tagitis (respondent) and her friends that her husband had been under
surveillance since January 2007 because an informant notified the authorities, through a letter, that Tagitis was a liaison

for the JI;[5] that he was in good hands and under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen
talking to one Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a Balik Islam charged with terrorism (Kasim evidence).
We considered Col. Kasims information, together with the consistent denials by government authorities of any complicity
in the disappearance of Tagitis, the dismissive approach of the police authorities to the report of the disappearance, as
well as the haphazard investigations conducted that did not translate into any meaningful results, to be indicative of
government complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis (for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo).
We explained that although the Kasim evidence was patently hearsay (and was thus incompetent and inadmissible under
our rules of evidence), the unique evidentiary difficulties posed by enforced disappearance cases compel us to adopt
standards that were appropriate and responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced.We noted that while we must follow
the substantial evidence rule, we must also observe flexibility in considering the evidence that we shall take into
account. Thus, we introduced a new evidentiary standard for Writ of Amparo cases in this wise:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider
any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence
to the issue at hand and its consistency with all the other pieces of adduced evidence, Thus, even hearsay
evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this minimum test. [Emphasis in the original]

We held further that the Kasim evidence was crucial to the resolution of the present case for two reasons: first, it supplied
the gaps that were never looked into or clarified by police investigation; and second, it qualified a simple missing person
report into an enforced disappearance case by injecting the element of participation by agents of the State and thus
brought into question how the State reacted to the disappearance.
Based on these considerations, we held that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in
particular, the Chiefs of these organizations, together with Col. Kasim, were fully accountable[6] for the enforced
disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, we held Col. Kasim accountable for his failure to disclose under oath information
relating to the enforced disappearance; for the purpose of this accountability, we ordered that Col. Kasim be impleaded as
a party to this case.Similarly, we also held the PNP accountable for the suppression of vital information that Col. Kasim
could, but did not, provide with the same obligation of disclosure that Col. Kasim carries.
The Motion for Reconsideration
The petitioners cited two grounds in support of their Motion for Reconsideration.
First, the petitioners argue that there was no sufficient evidence to conclude that Col. Kasims disclosure unequivocally
points to some government complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, the petitioners contend that this Court
erred in unduly relying on the raw information given to Col. Kasim by a personal intelligence asset without any other
evidence to support it. The petitioners also point out that the Court misapplied its cited cases (Secretary of Defense v.
Manalo,[7]Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,[8] and Timurtas v. Turkey[9]) to support its December 3, 2009 decision; in those
cases, more than one circumstance pointed to the complicity of the government and its agents. The petitioners emphasize
that in the present case, the respondent only presented a token piece of evidence that points to Col. Kasim as the source
of information that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for having been suspected as a terrorist supporter. This,
according to the petitioners, cannot be equated to the substantial evidence required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.[10]
Second, the petitioners contend that Col. Kasims death renders impossible compliance with the Courts directive in
its December 3, 2009 decision that Col. Kasim be impleaded in the present case and held accountable with the obligation
to disclose information known to him and to his assets on the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. The petitioners alleged
that Col. Kasim was killed in an encounter with the Abu Sayaff Group on May 7, 2009. To prove Col. Kasims death, the
petitioners attached to their motion a copy of an article entitled Abus kill Sulu police director published by the Philippine
Daily Inquirer on May 8, 2009.[11] This article alleged that Senior Supt. Julasirim Kasim, his brother Rosalin, a police trainee,
and two other police officers were killed in a fire fight with Abu Sayyaf bandits that started at about 1 p.m. on Thursday,
May 7, 2009 at the boundaries of Barangays Kulasi and Bulabog in Maimbung town, Sulu. The petitioners also attached an
official copy of General Order No. 1089 dated May 15, 2009 issued by the PNP National Headquarters, indicating that PS
SUPT [Police Senior Superintendent] Julasirim Ahadin Kasim 0-05530, PRO ARMM, is posthumously retired from PNP
service effective May 8, 2009.[12] Additionally, the petitioners point out that the intelligence assetswho supplied the

information that Tagitis was under custodial investigation were personal to Col. Kasim; hence, the movants can no longer
comply with this Courts order to disclose any information known to Col. Kasim and his assets.
The Courts Ruling
We hold that our directive to implead Col. Kasim as a party to the present case has been rendered moot and
academic by his death. Nevertheless, we resolve to deny the petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
Paragraph (e) of the dispositive portion of our December 3, 2009 decision directs:
e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with the obligation to
disclose information known to him and to his assets in relation with the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N.
Tagitis;

Undisputably, this directive can no longer be enforced, and has been rendered moot and academic, given Col. Kasim's
demise. His intervening death, however, does not necessarily signify the loss of the information Col. Kasim may have left
behind, particularly the network of assets he utilized while he was in the service. Intelligence gathering is not an activity
conducted in isolation, and involves an interwoven network of informants existing on the basis of symbiotic relationships
with the police and the military. It is not farfetched that a resourceful investigator, utilizing the extraordinary diligence
that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires,[13]can still access or reconstruct the information Col. Kasim received from
his asset or network of assets during his lifetime.
The extinction of Col. Kasims personal accountability and obligation to disclose material information, known to him and
his assets, does not also erase the burden of disclosure and investigation that rests with the PNP and the CIDG. Lest this
Court be misunderstood, we reiterate that our holding in our December 3, 2009 Decision that the PNP -- through the
incumbent PNP Chief; and the PNP-CIDG, through its incumbent Chief -- are directly responsible[14] for the disclosure of
material facts known to the government and to their offices regarding the disappearance of Tagitis; and that the conduct
of proper investigation using extraordinary diligence still subsists. These are continuing obligations that will not truly be
terminated until the enforced disappearance of the victim, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis, is fully addressed by
the responsible or accountable parties, as we directed in our Decision.
We now turn to the petitioners substantial challenge to the merits of our December 3, 2009 decision.
We see no merit in the petitioners submitted position that no sufficient evidence exists to support the conclusion that the
Kasim evidence unequivocally points to some government complicity in the disappearance. Contrary to the petitioners
claim that our conclusions only relied on Col. Kasims report, our Decision plainly and pointedly considered other evidence
supporting our conclusion, particularly the consistent denials by government authorities of any complicity in the
disappearance of Tagitis; the dismissive approach of the police authorities to the report of the disappearance; and the
conduct of haphazard investigations that did not translate into any meaningful results. We painstakingly ruled:
To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we should at least take a
close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence even of those usually
considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the
test of reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement. In the present case, we should at least
determine whether the Kasim evidence before us is relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and
reasonably consistent with other evidence in the case.
xxx
The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct evidence on the above aspects of the case, as it
supplies the gaps that were never looked into and clarified by police investigation. It is the evidence, too, that colors a
simple missing person report into an enforced disappearance case, as it injects the element of participation by agents of
the State and thus brings into question how the State reacted to the disappearance.
xxx

We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the governments denial of any
complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the respondent
at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure that Tagitis was under
custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive trait that runs through these developments is
the governments dismissive approach to the disappearance, starting from the initial response by the Jolo police to
Kunnongs initial reports of the disappearance, to the responses made to the respondent when she herself reported and
inquired about her husbands disappearance, and even at TASK FORCE TAGITIS itself.
As the CA found through TASK FORCE TAGITIS, the investigation was at best haphazard since the authorities were
looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even secure. The returns and reports made to the CA fared no better,
as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching for custodial records of Tagitis in their various departments and
divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis was a black operation because it was unrecorded or officially
unauthorized, no record of custody would ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the
usual police or CIDG detention places. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful results or
details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. To be sure, reports of top police officials indicating the
personnel and units they directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal
detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from the
very beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires. [Emphasis in the original]

Likewise, we see no merit in the petitioners claim that the Kasim evidence does not amount to substantial evidence
required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is not a new issue; we extensively and thoroughly considered and
resolved it in our December 3, 2009 Decision. At this point, we need not go into another full discussion of the
justifications supporting an evidentiary standard specific to the Writ of Amparo. Suffice it to say that we continue to
adhere to the substantial evidence rule that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires, with some adjustments for flexibility
in considering the evidence presented. When we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually considered inadmissible under the
general rules of evidence) may be admitted as the circumstances of the case may require, we did not thereby dispense with
the substantial evidence rule; we merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on the admissibility of evidence, maintaining all the
time the standards of reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary situation. This, we did, by considering the
totality of the obtaining situation and the consistency of the hearsay evidence with the other available evidence in the
case.
We also cannot agree with the petitioners contention that we misapplied Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,[15] Velasquez
Rodriguez v. Honduras,[16] andTimurtas v. Turkey[17] to support our December 3, 2009 decision. The petitioners make this
claim with the view that in these cases, more than one circumstance pointed to the government or its agents as the
parties responsible for the disappearance, while we can only point to the Kasim evidence. A close reading of ourDecember
3, 2009 Decision shows that it rests on more than one basis.
At the risk of repetition, we stress that other pieces of evidence point the way towards our conclusion, particularly the
unfounded and consistent denials by government authorities of any complicity in the disappearance; the dismissive
approach of the police to the report of the disappearance; and the haphazard handling of the investigation that did not
produce any meaningful results. In cruder but more understandable language, the run-around given to the respondent
and the government responses to the request for meaningful investigation, considered in the light of the Kasim evidence,
pointed to the conclusion that the Tagitis affair carried a foul smell indicative of government complicity or, at the very
least, an attempt at cover-up and concealment. This is the situation that the Writ of Amparo specifically seeks to address.
Manalo, Velasquez Rodriguez and Timurtas, read in proper perspective, fully support our findings and conclusions in this
case.
Manalo is different from Tagitis in terms of their factual settings, as enforced disappearance was no longer a problem in
that case. The enforced disappearance of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo effectively ended when they
escaped from captivity and surfaced, while Tagitis is still nowhere to be found and remains missing more than two years
after his reported disappearance. An Amparo situation subsisted in Manalo, however, because of the continuing threat to
the brothers right to security; the brothers claimed that since the persons responsible for their enforced disappearance
were still at large and had not been held accountable, the former were still under the threat of being once again abducted,
kept captive or even killed, which threat constituted a direct violation of their right to security of person. In ruling that
substantial evidence existed to support the conclusion that the respondents right to security had been violated, the Court
not only considered the respondents affidavit and testimony which positively identified the perpetrators, but also noted

other evidence showing the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military. The Court significantly
found that:
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of
military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and
torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents abduction as revealed by
the testimony and investigation report of petitioners own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of
the 7th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the
Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first
time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not
propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other
witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007,
he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in the event the
writ of amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP, which should essentially include
verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of witnesses
and securing statements from them; determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance;
identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the
suspected offenders before a competent court. Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that
he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he
immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of
the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the
investigations to respondents. To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner
Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation
which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of
respondents right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government. [Emphasis supplied][18]
Similarly in Velasquez Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) acknowledged that when the
Honduran Government carried out or tolerated enforced disappearances, the police customarily used a distinctive form of
kidnapping. Consequently, the IACHR presumed that Velasquez disappeared at the hands of or with the acquiescence of
those officials within the framework of that practice. Moreover, the IACHR found that negative inferences may be
drawnfrom the fact that the government failed to investigate or to inquire into his disappearance, and thwarted the
attempts by the victims family to do so; these according to the Court strongly suggested the governments involvement
in the disappearance, even if there was no direct evidence indicating that the government kidnapped Velasquez. [19] The
Court thus held:[20]
iii. In the case of Manfredo Velsquez, there were the same type of denials by his captors and the Armed Forces, the
same omissions of the latter and of the Government in investigating and revealing his whereabouts, and the same
ineffectiveness of the courts where three writs of HABEAS corpus and two criminal complaints were brought ( testimony of
Miguel Angel Pavn Salazar, Ramn Custodio Lpez, Zenaida Velsquez, press clippings and documentary evidence ).
h. There is no evidence in the record that Manfredo Velsquez had disappeared in order to join subversive groups, other
than a letter from the Mayor of Langue, which contained rumors to that effect. The letter itself shows that the Government
associated him with activities it considered a threat to national security. However, the Government did not corroborate the
view expressed in the letter with any other evidence. Nor is there any evidence that he was kidnapped by common
criminals or other persons unrelated to the practice of disappearances existing at that time."
148. Based upon the above, the Court finds that the following facts have been proven in this proceeding: (1) a practice of
disappearances carried out or tolerated by Honduran officials existed between 1981 and 1984; ( 2) Manfredo Velsquez
disappeared at the hands of or with the acquiescence of those officials within the framework of that practice; and (3) the
Government of Honduras failed to guarantee the human rights affected by that practice.
Finally, in Timurtas, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) altered the prevailing jurisprudence by permitting a
lesser evidentiary burden in cases of enforced disappearances. The ECHR dismissed the need for direct
evidence previously held necessary in the leading case of Kurt v. Turkey,[21] and insteadpermitted the use of
circumstantial evidence to establish a violation of the right to life. It stated that whether the failure on the part of
authorities to provide a plausible explanation as to a detainees fate, in the absence of a body, might raise issues
under Article 2 of the Convention (right to life), will depend on the circumstances of the case and, in particular, on the

existence of sufficient circumstantial evidence based on concrete elements, from which it may be concluded to the
requisite standard of proof that the detainee must be presumed to have died in custody. [22] The ECHR found that:[23]
Noting that more than six and a half years has gone by since Abdulvahap Timurtas apprehension and having regard to all
the other circumstances of the case, the Court found that the disappearance of Abdulvahap Timurtas after he had
been taken into detention led, in the circumstances of this case, to a presumption that he had died . No explanation
having been provided by the Government as to what had happened to him during his detention, the Government was
liable for his death and there was a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. [Emphasis supplied]
Significantly (in the context of the present case), the ECHR also noted that the inadequacy of the investigation into the
disappearance of Timurtas also constituted a violation of his right to life under Article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights.
Thus viewed, common threads that plainly run in the three cited cases are applicable to the present case. There is the
evidence of ineffective investigation inManalo and Velasquez Rodriguez, while in all three was the recognition that the
burden of proof must be lowered or relaxed (either through the use of circumstantial or indirect evidence or even by logical
inference); the requirement for direct evidence to establish that an enforced disappearance occurred -- as the petitioners
effectively suggest -- would render it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that an individual has been made to
disappear. In these lights, we emphasized in our December 3, 2009 Decision that while the need for substantial evidence
remains
the
rule,
flexibility
must
be
observed
where
appropriate (as
the
Courts
inVelasquez
Rodriguez and Timurtas did) for the protection of the precious rights to life, liberty and security. This flexibility, we noted,
requires that we should take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence
even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence taking into account the surrounding
circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement. From these perspectives,
we see no error that we should rectify or reconsider.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to GRANT the motion to declare the inclusion of PS/Supt. Julasirim
Ahadin Kasim moot and academic, but, otherwise, DENY the petitioners motion for reconsideration. Let this case be
remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings as directed in our Decision of December 3, 2009.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
GEN. ALEXANDER B. YANO, Chief of Staff,
Armed Forces of the Philippines, LT. GEN.
VICTOR S. IBRADO, Commanding General,
Philippine Army, and MAJ. GEN. RALPH A.
VILLANUEVA,
Commander,
7th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army,
Petitioners,

- versus -

CLEOFAS
SANCHEZ
MEDINA,
Respondents.

and

MARCIANA

G.R. No. 186640

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
February 11, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On December 28, 2007, respondent Cleofas Sanchez (Cleofas) filed before this Court a petition docketed as G.R. No.
180839 for issuance of a Writ of Amparowith Motion for Production and Inspection directed against Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon (Gen. Esperon), the then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
On January 2, 2008, the Court [1] resolved to issue a Writ of Amparo and ordered Gen. Esperon to make a verified return of
the writ before Court of Appeals Justice Edgardo Sundiam, who was ordered to hear and decide the case which was
eventually redocketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00010 WR/A.
Cleofas amended her petition[2] on January 14, 2008 to include herein co-respondent Marciana Medina (Marciana) as
therein additional petitioner, and to implead other military officers [3] including Lt. Ali Sumangil (Lt. Sumangil) and Sgt. Gil
Villalobos[4] (Sgt. Villalobos) as therein additional respondents.
In the Amended Petition, Cleofas and Marciana (respondents) alleged that on September 17, 2006 at around 8:00 p.m.,
their respective sons Nicolas Sanchez and Heherson Medina were catching frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin,
Barangay Bueno, Capas, Tarlac; that at around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, September 18, 2006, Nicolas wives Lourdez and
Rosalie Sanchez, who were then at home, heard gunshots and saw armed men in soldiers uniforms passing by; that at
around 4:00 a.m. of the same day, Lourdez and Rosalie went out to check on Nicolas and Heherson but only saw their
caps, slippers, pana and airgun for catching frogs, as well as bloodstains; and that they immediately reported the matter
to the barangay officials.
Respondents narrated that they, together with other family members, proceeded on September 19, 2006 to the Capas
Station of the Philippine National Police (PNP).Accompanied by officials of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP),[5] they also tried to search for Nicolas and Heherson at the Camp Detachment of the 71 st Infantry Batallion of the
Philippine Army (Army) in Barangay Burgos, San Jose, Tarlac, and at the Camp of the Bravo Company of the Armys
71st Infantry Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City, but to no avail.
Furthermore, respondents alleged that Josephine Galang Victoria, also known as Antonina Galang (Josephine), niece of a
neighbor, later informed them that she had seen two men inside Camp Servillano Aquino of the Northern Luzon
Command (Nolcom) in San Miguel, Tarlac City on September 21, 2006, whom Josephine later identified as Nicolas and
Heherson (the victims) after respondents had shown her their photographs; and that Josephine informed them that she
saw the victims again on September 24, 2006 and November 1, 2006, [6] this time at the Camp of the Bravo Company of the
Armys 71st Infantry Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita, where she had occasion to talk to Lt. Sumangil and Sgt.
Villalobos. Respondents filed a case on December 21, 2006 before the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), which
endorsed[7] the same to the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
Contending that the victims life, liberty and security had been and continued to be violated on account of their forced
disappearance, respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of Amparo, the production of the victims bodies during the
hearing on the Writ, the inspection of certain military camps, [8] the issuance of temporary and permanent protection
orders, and the rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.[9]
Meanwhile, a consolidated Return of the Writ,[10] verified by Gen. Esperon, Lt. Sumangil, Sgt. Villalobos, Maj. Gen. Juanito
Gomez (Maj. Gen. Gomez) as Commander of the Armys 7 th Infantry Division, and Lt. Col. Victor Bayani (Lt. Col. Bayani) as
Camp Commander of Camp Servillano Aquino of the Nolcom in Tarlac City, was filed with the appellate court on January
24, 2008. Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano (Lt. Gen. Yano), Commanding General of the Army, filed a Return of the Writ upon his
return from an official trip abroad.
In their Return, the military officers denied having custody of the victims. They posited that the proper remedy of
respondents was to file a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus, since the petitions ultimate objective was
the production of the bodies of the victims, as they were allegedly abducted and illegally detained by military personnel;
[11]
that the petition failed to indicate the matters required by paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), Section 5 of the Rule on the Writ
ofAmparo, such that the allegations were incomplete to constitute a cause of action, aside from being based on mere
hearsay evidence, and are, at best, speculative; that respondents failed to present the affidavits of some other competent
persons which would clearly validate their claim that the military violated the victims right to life, liberty or security by
abducting or detaining them; and that the petition did not allege any specific action or inaction attributable to the military
officers with respect to their duties; or allege that respondents took any action by filing a formal complaint or visiting the
military camps adverted to in order to verify Josephines claim that she saw the victims on two different occasions inside
the camps, or that they took efforts to follow up on the PNP Capas Stations further action on their complaint. [12]

Denying he violated the victims right to life, liberty and security, Gen. Esperon specifically asserted that, in compliance
with the Defense Secretarys directive in relation to cases of Writ of Amparo against the AFP, he issued directives to the
Nolcom Commander and the Armys Commanding General to investigate and establish the circumstances surrounding
reported disappearances of victims insofar as the claim on the possible involvement of the military units was
concerned; and undertook to bring any military personnel involved, when warranted by the evidence, to the bar of justice.
[13]

Maj. Gen. Gomez likewise denied having custody or knowledge of the whereabouts of the victims, stating that it was not
army policy to abduct civilians in his area of responsibility, [14] and that he was away on official business at the time of the
alleged disappearance of the victims.[15]
Lt. Col. Bayani attested that he was designated Camp Commander only on September 1, 2007 and thus had no personal
knowledge about the victims alleged disappearance or abduction on September 18, 2006; that he was informed by his
immediate predecessor that no individuals were detained in the camp as it did not even have detention facilities; and that
in compliance with Gen. Esperons directive, their command was conducting further investigation to verify the allegations
in the petition.[16]
Lt. Sumangil denied having spoken to Josephine inside the camp on September 24, 2006, on which date civilians were not
allowed to enter except on official missions or when duly authorized to conduct transactions inside the camp. He thus
concluded that Josephine lied in claiming to have seen the two victims inside the Camp of the Bravo Company of the
71st Infantry Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita on September 24, 2006 or at any time thereafter. He instead recounted that
on September 24, 2006, he spoke for the first and only time, but only at the gate of the camp, with a person who identified
herself as Antonina Galang, who informed him about the disappearance of the victims since September 18, 2006. Warning
him that these men were members of the New Peoples Army (NPA), she advised him not to entertain any queries or
complaints relative to their alleged disappearance. [17]
Sgt. Villalobos echoed Sumangils disclaimer about having any of the victims in his custody or meeting anyone named
Josephine Victoria, or about the latter having entered the camps kitchen to drink water.
Lt. Gen. Yano stated that upon his return from his official functions overseas, he immediately inquired on the actions
taken on the case. He averred that he had never participated directly or indirectly; or consented, permitted or sanctioned
any illegal or illegitimate military operations. He declared that it had always been his policy to respect human rights and
uphold the rule of law, and to bring those who violated the law before the court of justice.
In opposing the request for issuance of inspection and production orders, the military officers posited that apart from
compromising national security should entry into these military camps/bases be allowed, these orders partook of the
nature of a search warrant, such that the requisites for the issuance thereof must be complied with prior to their
issuance. They went on to argue that such request relied solely on bare, self-serving and vague allegations contained in
Josephines affidavit, for aside from merely mentioning that she saw Nicolas and Heherson on board an army truck near
the Nolcom gate and, days later, inside the kitchen of the 71 st Infantry Battalion Camp inside Hacienda Luisita and while
logging outside said camp, Josephine had stated nothing more to ascertain the veracity of the places where she allegedly
saw Nicolas and Heherson.[18]
On whether the impleaded military officers were either directly or indirectly connected with the disappearance of the
victims, the appellate court, after hearing, absolved, by the assailed Decision of September 17, 2008,[19] Gen. Esperon, Lt.
Gen. Yano, Maj. Gen. Gomez, and Lt. Col. Bayani for lack of evidence linking them to the disappearances, and further
ruled as follows:
All said, this Court is convinced that petitioners have not adequately and convincingly established any direct or indirect
link between respondents individual military officers and the disappearances of Nicolas and Heherson. Neither did the
concerned Philippine Army Units have exerted fully their efforts to investigate and unearth the truth and bring the
culprits before the bar of justice.
The concerned Philippine Army units (such as the Northern Command and the 7 th Infantry Division, which had
jurisdiction over the place of disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson, should exert extraordinary diligence to follow all
possible leads to solve the disappearances of Nicolas and Heherson. The Philippine Army should be reminded of its
constitutional mandate as the protector of the people and the State.

RELIEFS
While as We stated hereinbefore that We could not find any link between respondents individual military officers to the
disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson, nonetheless, the fact remains that the two men are still missing. Hence, We find
it equitable to grant petitioners some reliefs in the interest of human rights and justice as follows:
1. Inspections of the following camps: Camp Servillano Aquino, San Miguel, Tarlac City, any military camp of the
7th Infantry Division located in Aqua Farm, Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City, within reasonable working hours of any day
except when the military camp is on red alert status.
2. Thorough and Impartial Investigation for the appropriate Investigating Unit of the Philippine Army at Camp Servillano
Aquino and the Philippine Army, 7th Infantry Division in Fort Magsaysay to conduct their respective investigation of all
angles pertaining to the disappearances of Nicolas and Heherson and to immediately file charges against those found
guilty and submit their written report to this Court within three (3) months from notice.
SO ORDERED.[20] (underscoring supplied)

The military officers filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Motion), arguing in the main that since respondents failed
to prove the allegations in their petition by substantial evidence, the appellate court should not have granted those reliefs.
[21]

The appellate court denied the Motion by the assailed Resolution of March 3, 2009.[22]
Taking up the cudgels for the military, Gen. Alexander Yano,[23] Lt. Gen. Victor Ibrado,[24] and Maj. Gen. Ralph
Villanueva[25] (petitioners) filed the present petition for review of the appellate courts assailed issuances, faulting it for
. . . NOT CATEGORICALLY DENYING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO PURSUANT TO SECTION 18 OF THE
RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARODESPITE ITS FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE THEIR
ALLEGATIONS IN THEIR PETITION FOR AMPARO BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. . . . [AND] . . . DIRECTING
PETITIONERS TO:
(A) ALLOW RESPONDENTS TO INSPECT CAMP SERVILLANO AQUINO, NORTH LUZON COMMAND, PHILIPPINE ARMY,
SAN MIGUEL, TARLAC CITY AND ANY MILITARY CAMP OF THE 7 TH INFANTRY DIVISION LOCATED IN AQUA FARM,
HACIENDA LUISITA, TARLAC CITY; AND.
(B) CONDUCT THOROUGH AND IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE AGGRIEVED PARTIES,
FILE CHARGES AGAINST THOSE FOUND GUILTY AND SUBMIT WRITTEN REPORT WITHIN THREE MONTHS FROM
NOTICE.[26] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court finds merit in the petition.

In ruling in favor of Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos, the appellate court resolved the case on the basis of the credibility of
Josephine as a witness. It arrived at the following findings:
To prove that these two military officers took or have custody of Nicolas and Heherson, petitioners presented Josephine
Galang Victoria, also known as Antonina Galang, a niece of petitioner Cleofas Sanchez neighbor, who allegedly saw Nicolas
and Heherson inside Camp Servillano Aquino on September 21, 2006 when she visited her uncle, a certain Major Henry
Galang, who is allegedly living inside the camp; that a few days later, she again saw Nicolas and Heherson at Aqua Farm
at Hacienda Luisita, where the camp of Bravo Company of the 71 st Infantry Battalion is located and where Heherson was
seen sweeping the floor and Nicolas was seen cooking, having wounds in their legs near the feet as if sustained from a
gunshot wound; that on November 1, 2006, she went back upon advice of Lt. Sumangil to give her a cellfone which Tech.
Sgt. Villalobos handed to her for her to know where Nicolas and Heherson will be brought; that they [sic] saw the two
outside getting some woods under the watchful eye of a soldier when Sumangil kicked Nicolas for being slow and
thereafter, she did not see the two anymore.
While Josephine Galang Victorias story of how she saw the subject two missing persons (Nicolas and Heherson) appeared
initially as plausible, however, her credibility as a witness had been successfully destroyed by the following witnesses
presented by the respondents.

1) Barangay Captain Rodolfo P. Supan of Cut-Cut II, Tarlac City, attested that she knows a certain woman named
Josephine Galang Victoria who introduces herself as Antonina Galang, niece through the cousin of his wife and a longtime resident of Cut-Cut II since birth until she lived with her partner Philip Victoria and they still visit and goes to her
auntie or siblings house; that he knows the reputation of Josephine Victoria as bad regarding her telling the truth, her
truthfulness and integrity, known to fool others and invents stories for money reasons, that she cannot be trusted even if
she is under oath before God and the State.
2) As if that is not yet enough, Gloria Galang Mansalay testified that she is a resident of Cut-Cut II since birth in 1964
and she knows Josephine Galang Victoria because she is her niece being the daughter of her older brother; that she even
took care of Antonina as a child but her general reputation in telling the truth, her fidelity and integrity is bad, known to
fool others, a liar and invent [sic] stories for reason of money.
3) Clarita Galang Ricafrente saying that she is a resident of Cut-cut II and Antonina Galang is a niece and attested the
same negative reputations against Antonina.
It appears that said negative testimonies of Josephine Galang Victorias relatives were never successfully rebutted by her
and the Court gives credence to them. No ill motive [sic] were established against the said witnesses to testify against
Antonina Galang.
Furthermore, Antonina Galang stated that she was in Camp Servillano Aquino when she first saw Nicolas and Heherson
riding in an army truck because she was visiting her uncle, Major Henry Galang, allegedly living in the camp.
Parenthetically, this story of Antonina Galang was put to doubt. TSG Edgard Reyes who attested that as a meter reader in
the camp, Major Galang was no longer residing there in September 2006. This testimony and revelation of TSG Reyes only
bolstered the testimonies of the other witnesses on Antonina Galangs penchant to invent stories or tell a lie.
In sum, We are not inclined to give credence to the claims of Antonina Galang that the two missing person [ sic] she saw
first in Camp Servillano Aquino and later, in Aqua Farm, were Nicolas and Heherson. Notably, Antonina Galang never did
see the faces of the two but were known to her through photographs. Certainly, there may be a difference between
photographs and the faces in person.
To be noted also is that even the two wives of Nicolas did not make an express attestation that they saw Nicolas and
Heherson in the company of those armed men who passed their place in the early morning of September 18, 2006.
[27]
(underscoring supplied)

NOTABLY, respondents neither moved for reconsideration nor appealed the appellate courts September 17, 2008 Decision.
The entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who did not appeal cannot assign such errors as are
designed to have the judgment modified.All that said appellee can do is to make a counter-assignment of errors or to argue
on issues raised at the trial only for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in his favor, even on grounds not included in
the decision of the court a quo or raised in the appellants assignment of errors or arguments. [28]
This tenet is enshrined as one of the basic principles in our rules of procedure, specifically to avoid ambiguity in the
presentation of issues, facilitate the setting forth of arguments by the parties, and aid the court in making its
determinations. A party who fails to acquire complete relief from a decision of the court has various remedies to correct an
omission by the court. He may move for a correction or clarification of judgment, or even seek its modification through
ordinary appeal. There is thus no basis for the Court to skip the rule and excuse herein respondents for failure to properly
avail themselves of the remedies in the face of the parties contentions that have remained disputed. [29]
What is thus left for the Court to resolve is the issue of whether the grant of the RELIEFS[30] by the appellate court after
finding want of substantial evidence are valid and proper.
Sections 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule lay down the requisite standard of proof necessary to prove either partys
claim, viz:
SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claim by substantial
evidence.

The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws,
rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws,
rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed
to evade responsibility or liability.
SEC. 18. Judgment. - The Court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for
decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ
and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The requisite standard of proof substantial evidence - speaks of the clear intent of the Rule to have the equivalent of an
administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in resolving amparo petitions.
To the appellate court, the evidence adduced in the present case failed to measure up to that standard substantial
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Since respondents did not avail of
any remedy against the adverse judgment, the appellate courts decision is, insofar as it concerns them, now beyond the
ambit of review.
Meanwhile, the requirement for a government official or employee to observe extraordinary diligence in the performance of
duty stresses the extraordinary measures expected to be taken in safeguarding every citizens constitutional rights as well
as in the investigation of cases of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances. [31]
The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result
in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her
claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the public official provides, however, some basis for
the petitioner to move and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs.
In line with this, Section 14 of the Amparo Rule provides for interim or provisional reliefs that the courts may grant in
order to, inter alia, protect the witnesses and the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant evidence, viz:
SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or judge may
grant any of the following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or
the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited
person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association
or institution referred to in Section 3 (c) of this Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall
issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the
court, justice or judge.
(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in
possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of
witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, the court, justice
or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.

The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be
threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place and
manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The
order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.
(c) Production Order. The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in
possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or
the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, in which
case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of
the amparo petition. For the appellate court to, in the present case, still order the inspection of the military camps and
order the army units to conduct an investigation into the disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson afterit absolved
petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs granted by the appellate court to respondents are not in sync with a finding
that petitioners could not be held accountable for the disappearance of the victims.
Respondents posit that there appears to be some shared confusion as to whether the reliefs granted by the appellate court
are final or interlocutory. They thus implore this Court to modify the appellate courts judgment by considering the reliefs
as temporary or interlocutory and by adding thereto an order for the production of logbooks and reports. [32]
At this late stage, respondents can no longer avail themselves of their stale remedies in the guise of praying for affirmative
reliefs in their Comment. No modification of judgment could be granted to a party who did not appeal.[33]
If respondents believed that the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court was merely interlocutory, they had
every opportunity to question the conclusion of said court, but they did not. They could have opposed petitioners motion
for reconsideration filed with the appellate court, it being a prohibited pleading [34] under the Amparo Rule, but they did
not.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 17, 2008 Decision and March 3, 2009 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, insofar as it grants the assailed earlier-quoted reliefs are SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 189155 : February 07, 2012]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, PETITIONER, - VERSUS - GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT
TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT.
LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN
PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAMES DEX, RC AND ROSE, RESPONDENTS.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated FEBRUARY 7, 2012, which reads as follows:cralaw
"G.R. No. 189155 (In The Matter Of The Petition For The Writ Of Amparo And The Writ Of Habeas Data In Favor Of
Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa C. Roxas, petitioner, - versus - Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,[*]Gilbert Teodoro, Gen. Victor S.
Ibrado, P/Dir. Gen. Jesus Ame Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin N. Bangit, PC/Supt. Leon Nilo A. Dela Cruz, Maj. Gen. Ralph

Villanueva, PS/Supt. Rudy Gamido Lacadin, And Certain Persons Who Go By The Names Dex, Rc And
Rose, respondents.)
RESOLUTION
The Antecedents
In Our 7 September 2010 Decision, [1] after finding that the failure of the petitioner to present substantial proof as to the
respondents' responsibility anent her abduction and torture was in part attributable to the lack of extraordinary diligence
on the part of existing police and military investigations, this Court ordered the conduct of further investigations, this
time, to be spearheaded by the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as the designated lead investigating agency for
purposes of this petition. The CHR was then required to submit a report of its investigations as well as a recommendation
to the Court of Appeals which, in the meantime, retained jurisdiction of this case. Finally, We also directed the Court of
Appeals to monitor the investigations and submit to this Court its own report and recommendation, for Our consideration
and, ideally, final disposition. Specifically, Our directive reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision:
xxxx
4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows
a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation
regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights shall, under the
norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps; (a) to identify the persons described in the
cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant
to petitioner's abduction and torture.
b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the Commission
on Human Rights, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the
petitioner's abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.
c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, to furnish to this Court,
the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt
of this decision.
d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days
from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and (b) to
provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as
may hereinafter be determined by this Court.
5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following purposes:
a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR;
b. To DETERMINE, whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the CHR, the abduction and torture of the
petitioner was committed by persons acting under any of the public respondents; and on the basis of this determination

c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and recommendation of the Commission on
Human Rightsits own report, which shall include a recommendation either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as against
the public respondents who were found not responsible and/or accountable, or for theAPPROPRIATE REMEDIAL
MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against
those found responsible and/or accountable.
Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for any responsibilities
and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.
Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA that are not
contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED.[2]
On 14 February 2011, the CHR submitted its Compliance Report[3] to the Court of Appeals.
The Compliance Report of the CHR
The Compliance Report of the CHR consists of the following:
CHR Resolution (IV) No. A2010-130 dated 14 February 2011, including its annexes. [4] The resolution contains the findings
of
the
CHR en
banc based
on
the
investigations
conducted
as
well
as
its
recommendation.
Report on the CHR Investigations. The report includes the records of public inquiries conducted by the CHR [5] and the
actual
evidence
it
gathered
during
the
course
of
its
investigations.
Confidential Reports. These consist of two (2) folders marked as Annexes "A1" and "A2." [6] Inside these folders are photos
and statements from informants and witnesses taken by the CHR from its ocular inspections and field investigations, as

well as reports from its regional office. The CHR considers these documents as containing information sensitive in nature
and has asked that they be treated as confidential documents. [7]
In CHR Resolution (IV) No. A2010-130, the CHR made the following findings:
That complainant, Melissa Roxas, was forcibly taken from the house of Jesus Paulo at Sitio Bagong
Sikat,Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac on 19 May 2009 by unidentified armed men, along with two of her
companions,
in
violation
of
her
human
right
to
be
secure
in
her
person.
That complainant, Melissa Roxas, was kept in captivity against her will in a still-unidentified location, by persons
yet unknown, in violation of her human right to liberty, to be secure in her person and her right to not to be arbitrarily
and
involuntarily
detained.
That complainant, Melissa Roxas, suffered physical and psychological maltreatment, inflicted by persons yet unknown,
in the form of handcuffing, blows to her head and body, deprivation of food, threats and intimidation including threats to
her life, deprivation of sleep, and intimidating phone calls made after her release to the cell phone given to her by her
captors, and other actions. These actions comprise, at the very least, violations of the human right not to be subjected to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and could even be acts of torture, if committed by agents of the state. (Emphasis
supplied).[8]
CHR Resolution (IV) No. A2010-130 recommends that the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the National Bureau of
Investigation to take over the investigations for this case, particularly on the aspect of identifying the individuals behind
the abduction and torture of petitioner, because the CHR does not have the manpower, intelligence capability and local
presence otherwise available to these agencies that are necessary to conduct surveillances and manhunts. [9]
Having gone over the Compliance Report of the CHR, including all the reports and evidence contained therein, the Court of
Appeals, for its part, submitted to this Court its own Report and Recommendation[10] on 14 July 2011.
Report and Recommendation of the Court of Appeals
In its Report and Recommendation, the Court of Appeals commended the extent by which the CHR has engaged itself in
the resolution of this case.[11] The appellate court noted with particularity the field investigations, military camp
inspections and coordination with some non-governmental and related organizations on top of the public inquiries
conducted by the CHR just to shed light on petitioner's abduction. [12]
The Court of Appeals, however, pointed out that the depth of the investigations conducted by the CHR actually yielded
even more unsettling evidence.[13] As it turns out, a handful of reports prepared by the CHR-Region III Regional Office that
were included in the Confidential Reports submitted to the Court, contradict the very heart of the allegations made by the
petitioner in her amparo and habeas data petition.[14] These reports are purportedly based from statements and interviews
of CHR field investigators with some rebel-returnees and witnesses to the abduction who, while identified by name in the
reports, plea that their identities be kept secret from the general public in order to avoid possible reprisal from the persons
or group of persons they implicate.
The Court of Appeals stressed that such reports and statements, by themselves, have poor intrinsic legal value.
[15]
Nonetheless, the appellate court expressed optimism that the persons involved in such reports may be pursued via an
executive court hearing, so that their credibility may properly be tested in a judicial proceeding. [16]
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the sad fact that even with the CHR at the helm of investigatory
efforts, there was still scarcity of evidence linking any of the public respondents in the abduction and torture of the
petitioner.
Thus, the Court of Appeals gave Us a two-pronged recommendation:
II. RECOMMENDATION
We respectfully recommend that, subject to the approval of the Honorable Supreme Court and to such concomitant rules
it may prescribe, a summary hearing may be conducted by this Court to require the personal appearance of those
confidential witnesses interviewed by the CHR and affirm their allegations under oath; or to provide an avenue for CHRgathered material to stand the test of authenticity and credibility within the parameters of the law and the rules of
evidence, and, to ultimately identify the perpetrators of this crime;
or
that the petition should be DISMISSED now as against the public respondents who are still not shown to be responsible
and/or accountable for the abduction of the petitioner; neither is there any evidence that the same was committed by
persons acting under any of the public respondents. [17]
Our Ruling
The recommendation of the Court of Appeals with regard to conducting a summary hearing is well taken.
This Court is faced with the peculiarity that, while the CHR investigations have already been concluded, no additional
evidence tending to implicate any of the public respondents in the abduction and torture of the petitioner have
materialized. CHR Resolution (IV) No. A2010-130 is quite clear that the evidence gathered during the CHR investigations
were still not sufficient to identify any of the respondents, or anyone in particular for that matter, as the persons

responsible for petitioner's abduction. Neither did the ocular inspections of various military facilities and firing ranges in
Pampanga, conducted by the CHR, definitively point that petitioner was detained in any of them.
In other words, from an evidentiary point of view, We are in a position no better than We were the first time this case was
decidedit is established that petitioner and her companions were abducted, but the perpetrators thereof remain
unidentified.
Be that as it may, this Court chooses not to dismiss this case outright. For one thing, We do not want to preempt the
parallel investigation being conducted by the PNP in pursuit of those identified in petitioner's sketches. [18]Dismissing the
case right now may send the wrong message that any further inquiries as to the abduction and torture of petitioner
must ipso facto be considered closed or terminated. It must be emphasized that the respondents, or their successors,
remain accountable, even though still not found to be responsible.
But perhaps more importantly, this Court has now been made aware of the existence of a slew of CHR-Region
IIIconfidential reports that undermine the accusations hurled by petitioner against the respondents. These reports, it must
be borne in mind, have never been considered before in resolving this petition.
One of such reports, as ably pointed out by the Court of Appeals, features an alleged interview of a CHR field investigator
with Joseph Edward Jandoc (Mr. Jandoc)one of those abducted along with petitioner on 19 May 2009. Without going
into any specifics that the CHR may not want to be publicized, the information given by Mr. Jandoc appears to have direct
significance to this petition because he claims, like petitioner, to have seen the face of one of their abductors. But unlike
petitioner, Mr. Jandoc actually disputes any government intervention in their abduction and torture. This pivotal
information, in all likelihood, may have been the one that influenced the CHR not to accept the allegations of the petitioner
hook, line and sinker in reporting its findings in CHR Resolution (IV) No. A2010-130.
Unfortunately, however, such report also revealed that Mr. Jandoc refused to execute any written statement in connection
with the information he relayed. Mr. Jandoc, unlike petitioner, never affirmed the truth of his allegations before the Court
of Appeals and was never cross-examined by the latter. Thus, this Court shares the Court of Appeals' apprehension that
the said reports, as they stand, may not have much evidentiary value given that their credibility were never properly
verified.
This Court, therefore, agrees that bringing the persons interviewed in the CHR-Region III confidential reports or at the
least, the CHR field investigators themselves, before a summary hearing before the Court of Appeals will serve as a huge
step towards identifying the persons behind the abduction and torture of petitioner. Certainly, it may aid an on-going
investigations by pointing them at an alternative, if not the right direction. Before disposing of this case once and for all,
We must ensure that each and every possible lead or theory was pursued and verified, and no stone left unturned.
In order, however, to accommodate the CHR's plea for the confidentiality of their investigators and informants,
the summary hearing will be held in an executive session closed to the public. At any time after issuing the
appropriate subpoena, the Court of Appeals may, with conformity of the witnesses, place them under a Witness Protection
Order under Section 14(d) of the Rules on the Writ of Amparo.[19]
This Court is nothing short of hopeful that conducting this summary hearing may finally bring Us closer to the elusive
final disposition of this case.cralaw
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court RESOLVES to REQUIRE the Court of Appeals to:
CONDUCT a SPECIAL SUMMARY HEARING involving the witnesses and/or informants, as well as the field investigators,
in relevant to CHR confidential reports in CHR-NCR Case No. 2009-0139, including but not limited to the following:
Progress Report dated 20 August 2009,
Progress Report dated 26 June 2009,
Summary Report dated 18 December 2009,
Progress Report dated 29 October 2009,
Final Report dated 1 December 2009;
CONDUCT such hearing in a CLOSED-DOOR EXECUTIVE SESSION. Both parties or their representatives, however, may
be
present
thereat;
RE-EVALUATE the standing evidence in this case vis-a-vis the new testimonies that may be yielded by such hearing and,
on
the
basis
thereof;
SUBMIT to this Court, within ten (10) days from the termination of such hearing an EVALUATION REPORT determining
whether the new testimonies obtained in such hearing suffices to rebut the allegations of petitioner about the complicity
of the respondents in her abduction.
In order to accomplish its tasks under this Resolution, the Court of Appeals retains jurisdiction over this case."
Del Castillo, J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 190108
October 19, 2010
DAVID E. SO, on behalf of his daughter MARIA ELENA SO GUISANDE, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR., Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 208; and DR. BERNARDO A.
VICENTE, National Center for Mental Health, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 190473
HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaluyong City, Branch 208; and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DAVID E. SO, on behalf of his daughter MARIA ELENA SO GUISANDE, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions:
(1) A petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo against Judge Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. (Judge Tacla) of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 208, Mandaluyong City, and Dr. Bernardo A. Vicente (Dr. Vicente) of the National Center for
Mental Health (NCMH), docketed as G.R. No. 190108; and
(2) G.R. No. 190473, which is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente of the NCMH, assailing the Resolution 1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) rendered in open court on December 3, 2009, in the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00039.
The antecedents are:
Petitioner David E. So (So) in G.R. No. 190108 filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo on behalf of his
daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande (Guisande), accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending before Judge Tacla.
Petitioner So alleged, among others, that Guisande was under a life-threatening situation while confined at the NCMH, the
government hospital ordered by the RTC Mandaluyong City to ascertain the actual psychological state of Guisande, who
was being charged with a non-bailable offense.
Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings before the RTC, Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric
treatment and care at the Makati Medical Center (MMC). Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest of Guisande,
issued by Judge Tacla, stated that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood Disorder and that she was "not
ready for discharge," as certified by her personal psychiatrist, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Tan.
Acting on the prosecutions Urgent Motion to Refer Accuseds Illness to a Government Hospital, Judge Tacla ordered
Guisandes referral to the NCMH for an independent forensic assessment of Guisandes mental health to determine if she
would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft.
Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that accused Guisande be physically brought to the
NCMH, with NCMH Chief Dr. Vicente to have temporary legal custody of the accused, and thereafter, Judge Tacla would
issue the corresponding order of confinement of Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMHs determination that
she was ready for trial.
Accused Guisande was confined at the NCMH Payward, Pavilion 6-I-E, instead of Pavilion 35, Forensic Psychiatric Section,
where female court case patients are usually confined at the NCMH. In connection therewith, Dr. Vicente issued a special
Memorandum on November 9, 2009, reiterating existing hospital policies on the handling of court case patients
undergoing evaluation procedures to foreclose any possibility of malingering 2 on the patients part, specifically patients
accused of a non-bailable crime.
Eventually, claiming "life-threatening" circumstances surrounding her confinement at the NCMH which supposedly
worsened her mental condition and violated her constitutional rights against solitary detention and assistance of counsel,
accused Guisande and her father simultaneously, albeit separately, filed a Motion for Relief from Solitary Confinement
before the RTC Mandaluyong City, and the present petition in G.R. No. 190108 for the issuance of the writs of habeas
corpus and amparo.

On the Motion for Relief filed with RTC Mandaluyong City, Judge Tacla issued the following Order:
The Court rules to Grant accuseds [Guisandes] motion subject to the condition that only the accuseds counsel and the
accused physician on her hypothyroid condition are allowed to visit the accused in coordination with the respective
psychiatrist/doctor of the NCMH taking charge of the psychiatric examination upon accused. 3
On the petition for habeas corpus and amparo, this Court issued a Resolution on November 24, 2009, to wit:
G.R. No. 190108 (David E. So, in Behalf of his Daughter Maria Elena So Guisande vs. Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., Regional
Trial Court of Mandaluyong, Branch 208, Dr. Bernardo A. Vicente, National Center for Mental Health). Acting on the
Petition for Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo, the Court Resolved to
(a) ISSUE a JOINT WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND AMPARO;
(b) REFER the petition to the Court of Appeals, Manila, for (i) IMMEDIATE RAFFLE among the Members of the said Court;
(ii) HEARING on December 3, 2009, Thursday, at 10:00 a.m.; and (iii) DECISION within ten (10) days after its submission
for decision; and
(c) ORDER the respondents to make a verified RETURN of the Joint Writ of Habeas Corpus and Amparo before the Court
of Appeals, Manila, on December 1, 2009, and to COMMENT on the petition before said date. 4
As directed by this Court, Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente appeared before the CA on December 1, 2009 and, in the
afternoon, filed their Consolidated Return of the Writ.
On December 3, 2009, the NCMH submitted its Evaluation Report to the RTC Mandaluyong City:
ASSESSMENT AND REMARKS:
Review of the history and clinical reports from Makati Medical Center revealed that Ma. Elena So-Guisande was diagnosed
and managed as Bipolar I Disorder. On the other hand, based on a series of mental status examinations and observations
at our center, she is found not manifesting signs and symptoms of psychosis at the present time. Neither a manic episode
nor a severe depressive episode was manifested during her confinement at our center, despite voluntarily not taking her
medication is. Although she is complaining of mood symptoms, these are not severe enough to impair her fitness to stand
trial.
Ms. Guisande does have sufficient understanding of the nature and objective of the court proceedings and the possible
consequences of her cases. She is likewise capable of communicating with her counsels.
She is therefore deemed COMPETENT to stand the rigors of court trial. (Emphasis supplied.)
On even date, pursuant to the directive of this Court, the CAs Special Seventeenth Division held a hearing. Thereafter,
Justice Normandie B. Pizarro (Justice Pizarro), to whom the petition was raffled, disposed, in this wise:
JUSTICE PIZARRO:
The essence of the deliberation this morning is on the proceedings that obtained pursuant to the September 22, 2009
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 208, Mandaluyong City. The parties heard the arguments of the Petitioner on
the right of the subject patient, Ma. Elena, to avail of extended medical treatment citing the Constitution and the Geneva
Convention on Human Rights.
In the course of the proceedings this morning, Judge Tacla, Jr., informed this Court that the NCMH submitted to him a
report consisting of eight (8) pages at about 8:46 this morning. The parties, specifically the petitioner, were shown the said
report. Afterwards, Judge Taclas opinion on the matter was heard and he did not interpose any objection thereto. The
Accused, subject of this case, Ma. Elena So-Guisande, may now be discharged from the custody of the NCMH and is
considered fit for the rigors of trial. The parties were heard on the matter and all of them were in accord with the
dispositive portion of the aforesaid report.
After a prolonged discussion on the matter, and without objection on the part of the parties, as the Accused should now
proceed to trial in accordance with law, and at the same time recognizing the right of the Accused to avail of further
medication, this Court decrees the following set up that should cover this proceedings: The trial of this case shall resume
and the arraignment at the Court a quo shall push through as originally scheduled on February 2, 2010. To balance the
situation, the right to seek medical treatment of the subject is hereby recognized by all and the patient shall be confined
at the St. Clares Medical Center, 1838 Dian St., Palanan, Makati City, her hospital of choice, under the headship of Dr.
Yat, subject to the twenty-four (24) hour custodial control of the NBI.
xxxx
JUSTICE PIZARRO:
Dr. Yat is directed to submit, again by agreement of the parties, a periodic report every fifteen days to the RTC, Branch
208, for its evaluation. The first report shall be submitted on or before December 18, 2009.
In this regard, the Director Nestor M. Mantaring of NBI is politely DIRECTED to cause the transfer from NCMH to the St.
Clares Medical Center of the subject Accused, Ma. Elena So-Guisande, and to provide two (2) or three (3) security
personnel to the Accused after making the proper coordination with the RTC, Branch 208. Director Mantaring is to
submit a one (1) page compliance on the matter within three (3) days from receipt of this Resolution furnishing Judge
Tacla, Jr. a copy thereof.
xxxx
It is understood that the case pending before RTC, Branch 208, involves a non-bailable offense where normally the
Accused should have been confined in jail. But considering the peculiarities of this case, the parties have all agreed to the

set up as provided in this Order. It is also understood by the parties that henceforth the control of the trial proceedings as
well as the control over the custody of the accused/patient shall be in the hands of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 208,
Mandaluyong City.
STATE SOL. DE VERA:
Your honor, the Hospital fees to be settled before the transfer, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PIZARRO:
As committed in open-Court, Atty. Carpio shall insure the settlement of the fees for the confinement of Accused/patient at
the NCMH, as a pre-condition for her release therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considering considered, this petition for Habeas Corpus and Amparo is considered CLOSE
and TERMINATED. All parties are notified in open court of this Order.
xxxx
JUSTICE PIZARRO:
Let copies of this Order be furnished the RTC, Br. 208, Mandaluyong City, the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation as well as the Supreme Court, and all the parties.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, the petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 190473, filed by the OSG, which was consolidated with
G.R. No. 190108.
During the pendency of these consolidated cases, various events occurred which ultimately led to the incident before this
Court, i.e., a Manifestation and Motion6 dated March 11, 2010, filed by the OSG on behalf of public respondents, Judge
Tacla and Dr. Vicente, to wit:
1. On February 4, 2010, acting on the City Prosecutors January 25, 2010 Motion to Withdraw Information, public
respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. MC019-12281. Hence, their Urgent Prayer for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before this Honorable Court has been rendered moot and academic. A copy of the
February 4, 2010 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. MC019-12281 is attached herewith as Annex "A."
2. Furthermore, in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. MC019-12281 from which the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and Writ of Amparo (docketed before the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 190108 and Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP
No. 00039) and the Petition for Review (docketed as G.R. No. 190473) stemmed from, these cases and pending incidents
thereon should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Writ of Amparo (docketed before
the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 190108 and Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 00039) and the Petition for Review
(docketed as G.R. No. 190473) and all other pending incidents thereon be DISMISSED for having been rendered moot and
academic.
Petitioner So filed a Comment7 refuting the OSGs motion to dismiss G.R. Nos. 190108 and 190473. Through counsel, and
using strong words, he vehemently opposed the dismissal of the petitions because they had filed criminal complaints and
an administrative case against respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente, as well as the NCMH and an attending doctor
thereat, for purported violations of accused Guisandes rights during her confinement at the NCMH. Adding to the flurry
of cases, petitioner So filed a Verified Petition to cite Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in contempt before the CA for their
supposed submission of an altered and falsified document, which was attached to, and formed an integral part of, their
Consolidated Return of the Writ.
Posthaste, and even without us requiring the OSG to file one, it filed a Motion to Admit Reply 8 with its Reply9 to the
Comment of petitioner So attached thereto. The OSG clarified and denied outright petitioner Sos allegation in the
Comment that the criminal case for Qualified Theft against accused Guisande was a prevarication and concoction of
private complainant10 and that Judge Tacla had conspired to falsely accuse petitioner Sos daughter, Guisande. In all, the
OSG reiterated that GR. Nos. 190108 and 190473 had been rendered moot and academic with the dismissal of the
criminal case for Qualified Theft against Guisande.
Significantly, on August 25, 2010, the OSG filed another Manifestation and Motion 11 informing this Court of the following:
(1) Resolution dated June 7, 2010 issued by Assistant City Prosecutor Teresa D. Escobar-Pilares (Assistant City Prosecutor
Escobar-Pilares), dismissing the charge of petitioner So against Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente and their counsels for
Falsification under Article 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as I.S. No. XV-07-INV-10B-01371, for
insufficiency of evidence;12 and
(2) Resolution dated July 27, 2010 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 00039, where petitioner Sos verified petition for contempt
was dismissed for lack of merit, and where the CA ordered the petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo closed and
terminated.13
Likewise, the OSG reiterated its motion to dismiss the instant consolidated petitions.
We completely agree with the OSG. Accordingly, we deny the petitions in G.R. Nos. 190108 and 190473 for having been
rendered moot and academic by the dismissal of Criminal Case No. MC09-12281 for Qualified Theft pending before the
RTC Mandaluyong City.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo was based on the criminal
case for Qualified Theft against petitioner Sos daughter, Guisande. To recall, petitioner So claimed that the conditions and

circumstances of his daughters, accused Guisandes, confinement at the NCMH was "life threatening"; although Guisande
was accused of a non-bailable offense, the NCMH could not adequately treat Guisandes mental condition. Thus, to
balance the conflicting right of an accused to medical treatment and the right of the prosecution to subject to court
processes an accused charged with a non-bailable offense, the CA directed the transfer of Guisande from the NCMH to St.
Clares Medical Center, while noting that because of the peculiarities of this case, there was a deviation from the regular
course of procedure, since accused Guisande should have been confined in jail because she was charged with a nonbailable offense.
Notably, nowhere in the transcript of the CA hearing on December 3, 2009, nor in the Order recited in open court by
Justice Pizarro, is there an affirmation of petitioner Sos claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the NCMH
was illegal. Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the
mental condition of accused Guisande to withstand trial declared unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed
government forensic facility, albeit not held in high regard by petitioner Sos and accused Guisandes family, had assessed
Guisande fit for trial.
The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the threatened act or omission
complained of - confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a persons life, liberty,
and security for amparo cases - should be illegal or unlawful.
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court on Habeas Corpus provides:
Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo states:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Our decisions on the propriety of the issuance of these writs reiterate the foregoing rules. In Lourdes D. Rubrico, Jean
Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen.
Avelino Razon, Maj. Darwin Sy a.k.a Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, a certain
Jonathan, P/Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, Arsenio C. Gomez, and Office of the Ombudsman, 14we qualified:
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security
of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and
adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the
remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and
undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and
protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.15
In the recent Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan v. Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, RTC, Manila, Branch 37, Director General Avelino
Razon, Jr., Director Geary Barias, PSSupt. Co Yee M. Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson, 16 we intoned:
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally
deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrainted
via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of
habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A
prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely
nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. xxx
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being
restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where
such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the
petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the
filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition
is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being
unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or
restraining the applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. 17
In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the NCMH or a medical facility of
accuseds own choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for treatment of a supposed mental condition. 18 In addition,

we note that it was procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accuseds mental fitness to
be arraigned and stand trial. Be that as it may, the CA allowed the transfer of accused to St. Clares Medical Center under
the custody of Dr. Rene Yat, who was required periodically to report on his evaluation, every fifteen (15) days, to the RTC
Mandaluyong City, although in the same breath, the CA also ordered the continuation of the arraignment and trial of the
accused for Qualified Theft before the same trial court. In other words, Guisande remained in custody of the law to answer
for the non-bailable criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to pursue medical treatment in the hospital and
from a doctor of her choice.1avvphi1
Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be
confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisandes person, and treatment of any medical
and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong
City. In short, the cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v. MacapagalArroyo,19 is defined as "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."
Finally, the Resolutions of the CA and Assistant City Prosecutor Escobar-Pilares, unmistakably foreclose the justiciability
of the petitions before this Court.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 00039, the CA said:
We are also not swayed by [David Sos] argument that [petitioners] advanced lies to this Court when they stated in their
petition that Elena was facing two (2) non-bailable offenses. During the hearing on the petition for habeas corpus/writ of
amparo, the counsel for [David So] stated that Elena was facing only one (1) non-bailable offense to which [petitioners] did
not anymore object. Besides, the number of non-bailable offenses is not even material in the instant case for habeas
corpus/writ of amparo as the only issue to be determined here was whether or not Elenas confinement at NCMH was
lawful.
Finally, the issue in the verified petition, of whether [petitioners] were in contempt of court, is rendered moot and
academic considering that this Court had already rendered its open court Order on December 8, 2009, which was
favorable to [David So], and it was only later that the latter raised the issue of contempt.
Finding no merit in [David Sos] verified petition for contempt against [Judge Tacla, Dr. Vicente and the NCMH], and there
being no other objections made by the parties against Our March 17, 2010 Resolution, the instant petition for habeas
corpus/writ of amparo is declared CLOSED and TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED.20
In XV-07-INV-10B-01371 for Falsification under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, the Assistant City
Prosecutor made the following findings:
x x x [T]he undersigned finds no probable cause that respondents committed the charges filed against them.
Examination of the Contract of Confinement which was claimed to have been falsified reveals that it was merely a
photocopy. The supposed full photocopy of the original copy of the subject contract did not contain any alteration (change)
or intercalation (insertion) that could have changed its meaning or that could have made it speak of something false. The
contents of the contract depicting that [Guisandes] yaya (Ms. Galleto) was indeed confined at the NCMH as claimed by
respondents to accompany [Guisande], [Sos] daughter who was confined thereat remained the same. Respondents
explained that they were unaware of the inadvertent partial reproduction of the document and supported the same with
an affidavit of good faith executed by an NCMH clerk explaining why it was only partially reproduced.
Likewise, respondents statement that [Guisande] is "facing non-bailable offenses" is not absolutely false. Respondents
satisfactorily explained that at the time of the filing of their pleading, they believed in good faith that she was facing more
than one non-bailable offenses (sic) as she was charged with Qualified Theft before the Mandaluyong City RTC, Branch
208 and Syndicated Estafa before the San Juan Prosecutors office. While it may be true that [Guisande] has only one (1)
non-bailable offense pending in court, respondents proved with their evidence that she had others pending at the time in
other forum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the charges for Falsification under Articles 171
and 172 of the Revised Penal Code filed against all respondents namely: (1) Judge Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., (2) Dr. Bernardino
A. Vicente, (3) ASG General Magtanggol M. Castro, SSS Diana H. Castaeda-de Vera, SS Charina A. Soria and AS
Jefferson C. Secillano, be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. 21
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 190108 and 190473 for the Writs of Habeas
Corpus and Amparo, and review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are DENIED for being moot and
academic. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC

EDITA T. BURGOS,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 183711

- versus -

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,

GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT.
GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN.
JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN
BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL.
MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and DIRECTOR
GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------x
EDITA T. BURGOS,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 183712

- versus -

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,

GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT.
GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN.
JUANITO GOMEZ, LT. COL. MELQUIADES
FELICIANO, and LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------x
EDITA T. BURGOS,
Petitioner,

- versus -

CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES

OF THE PHILIPPINES; GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, JR.; Commanding General of the
Philippine Army, LT. GEN. ALEXANDER
YANO; and Chief of the Philippine National
Police, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO
RAZON, JR.,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 183713

Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
*
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:

June 22, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

On July 17, 2008, the Court of Appeals (CA) issued a decision[1] in the consolidated petitions for the Issuance of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus,[2] for Contempt[3] and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo[4] filed by petitioner Edita T. Burgos on behalf
of her son Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, who was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four men and by a woman from the
extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue,
Quezon City, on April 28, 2007. This CA decision[5] dismissed the petitioners petition for the Issuance of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus; denied the petitioners motion to declare the respondents in contempt; and partially granted the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo in favor of the petitioner.
The Antecedents
The established facts, as found by the CA, are summarized below: [6]
The established facts show that at around one oclock in the afternoon of April 28, 2007, Jonas Joseph T. Burgos a farmer
advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan (a chapter of the militant peasant organization Kilusang
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas) was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four (4) men and a woman from the extension
portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon
City.On his way out of the restaurant, Jonas told the manager, Maam aktibista lang po ako! When a security guard tried
to intervene, after he noticed that the group was forcibly dragging a male person out of the restaurant, he was told, Pare,
pulis! The guard then backed off but was able to see that Jonas was forced into the rear portion of a plain maroon colored
Toyota Revo with plate number TAB 194. The guard then noted the plate number and reported the incident to his
superiors as well as to the police on duty in the said mall.
On April 30, 2007, the petitioner held a press conference and announced that her son Jonas was missing. That same day,
the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if the person abducted was her son Jonas. Upon subsequent police
investigation and LTO verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu XLT
vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong. It was also later confirmed by employees of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) that Mudlong was arrested and his 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was seized on June 24, 2006 by
Cpl. Castro Bugalan and Pfc. Jose Villea of the 56 th Infantry Battalion (IB) of the Philippine Army for transporting timber
without permit. As agreed upon by the DENR employees and officers of the 56 th IB, the vehicle with the license plate no.
TAB 194 was impounded in the 56th IB headquarters whose commanding officer at that time was Lt. Col. Noel Clement.
The established facts also show that Lt. Col. Clement and the soldiers of the 56 th IB went on retraining at the
Headquarters of the First Scout Rangers Regiment (Camp Tecson) in Brgy. Tartaro, San Miguel, Bulacan starting
November 28, 2006. A left-behind force or a squad remained in the camp of the 56 th IB to secure the premises and
equipment as it awaited the arrival of the 69 th IB, headed by Lt. Col. Edison Caga, which took over the 56 th IBs area of
responsibility for the duration of the retraining. The 69th IB arrived at Camp Tecson on December 1, 2006, and remained
there until March 7, 2007, when the 56 th IB returned. There was no formal turnover or inventory of equipment and
vehicles when the 69th IB arrived on December 1, 2006.

Meanwhile, on January 17, 2007, Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano took command of the 56 th IB from Lt. Col. Clement. The
actual turnover of command took place atCamp Tecson where the 56th IB was retraining. At the time Jonas was abducted
on April 28, 2007, Lt. Col. Feliciano was the 56 th IBs commanding officer. Earlier, on March 23, 2007, 2nd Lt. Dick A.
Abletes, a member of the 56 th IB, was caught on video talking to two persons, a male and a female, at McDonalds
Bocaue. In the video, he was seen handing a document to the two persons. On March 26, 2007, 2nd Lt. Abletes was
arrested and charges were soon filed against him with the Judge Advocate General for violations of Articles 82, 96 and 97
of the Articles of War.
Prior to Jonas abduction, Mudlongs 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle remained impounded at the 56 th IBs Headquarters. In May
2007, right after Jonas abduction was made public, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 of this 1991 Isuzu XLT
vehicle was missing, and the engine and other spare parts were cannibalized.
On direct examination, the petitioner testified before the CA that the police was able to generate cartographic sketches of
two (one male and one female) of the abductors of Jonas based on its interview of eyewitnesses. [7] The petitioner narrated
further that these cartographic sketches were identified by State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco of the Department of
Justice (DOJ); that when she went to see State Prosecutor Velasco personally, he gave her five names who were allegedly
involved in the abduction of Jonas (namely T/Sgt. Jason Roxas, Cpl. Joana Francisco, M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo, and 1 st Lt.
Jaime Mendaros);[8] and that the information from State Prosecutor Velascos sources corroborated the same information
she received earlier from her own sources.[9] The petitioner also testified that nothing came out of the information given by
State Prosecutor Velasco because he was pulled out from the investigation by the DOJ Secretary, [10] and that the police,
particularly P/Supt. Jonnel C. Estomo, failed to investigate and act upon these leads. [11]
On August 30, 2007, P/Supt. Estomo (the lead investigator in the investigation conducted by the Philippine National
Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group [PNP-CIDG]) testified before the CA that he did not investigate or look
into the identities of the cartographic sketches of the two abductors provided by the PNP Criminal Investigation
Unit, Quezon City.[12] P/Supt. Estomo testified further that he showed the photos of Cpl. Bugalan and Pfc.Villea to witness
Larry Marquez for identification but failed to show any photos of the other officers and men of the 56 th IB.[13] Finally,
P/Supt. Estomo also testified that he did not propound any clarificatory questions regarding the disappearance of Jonas
Burgos to Lt. Cols. Feliciano, Clement, and Caga of the 56 th IB who merely voluntarily submitted their statements. [14]
On August 29, 2007, the PNP-CIDG presented Emerito Lipio @ KA TIBO/KA CRIS, Marlon D. Manuel @ KA CARLO, and
Melissa Concepcion Reyes @ KA LISA/RAMIL to support the theory that elements of the New Peoples Army (NPA)
perpetrated the abduction of Jonas. [15] In his Sworn Statement, Lipio admitted that he is a member of the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP)/NPA and that the NPA was behind the abduction of Jonas. Lipio revealed that Jonas is
known as @KA RAMON in the communist movement. He claimed further that he and @KA RAMON belonged to the
Bulacan Party Committee, assigned to the White Area Committee doing intelligence work for the movement under the
leadership of Delfin de Guzman @ KA BASTE, and that @KA RAMON was their political instructor and head of the
intelligence unit in the province.[16]
Sometime early April of 2007, Lipio was present in a meeting between @KA BASTE and @KA RAMON. At this meeting, the
two had a heated argument. For this reason, @KA BASTE instructed Lipio to place @KA RAMON under surveillance as
they suspected him of pilfering funds from the party and of acting as a military agent. [17]
Lipio further averred that upon instruction of @KA BASTE, he and a certain @KA CARLO proceeded to Ever Gotesco Mall
on April 28, 2007 to monitor the reported meeting between @KA RAMON and other party members. At one oclock in the
afternoon, Lipio and @KA CARLO (who stationed themselves near the entrance/exit of the mall) saw a man, who they
recognized as @KA RAMON, forcibly taken by four men, brought outside of the mall, and shoved inside a Toyota
Revo. Lipio further alleged that he recognized two of the abductors as @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO who he claims to be
members of the CPP/NPAs guerilla unit (RYG).[18]
In his Sworn Statement, Manuel affirmed and substantiated Lipios statement that @KA RAMON and Jonas are one and
the same person and that he is a member of the communist movement in Bulacan. Manuel also corroborated Lipios
statement regarding the circumstances of the abduction of @KA RAMON at Ever Gotesco Mall on April 28, 2007; he
confirmed that he and @ KA TIBO witnessed the abduction. [19]
Reyes, a rebel-returnee, provided in her Sworn Statement additional material information regarding the disappearance of
Jonas. Reyes alleged that she was supposed to meet with @KA RAMON and another comrade in the movement (whom she
identified as @KA JO) to discuss the possibility of arranging a meeting with a contact in the military. She averred that she
met @KA JO at about 11:30 a.m. at the Baliaug Transit Terminal, Cubao enroute to Ever Gotesco mall where they would

meet with a certain @KA RAMON. Reyes further narrated that they arrived about noon at Ever Gotesco mall; @KA JO left
her at McDonalds and told her to wait while he went to look for @KA RAMON. After an hour, @KA JO arrived without @KA
RAMON and told Reyes to go home and just keep in touch through text messaging. Reyes alleged further that she has not
heard from @KA JO since.[20]
The CA Findings
In its July 17, 2008 decision, the CA found that the evidence the petitioner presented failed to establish her claimed direct
connection between the abductors of Jonas and the military. The CA noted that the evidence does not show how license
plate number TAB 194 (supposedly attached to the 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle impounded at the 56 th IB Headquarters) came
to be attached to the getaway Toyota Revo on April 28, 2007, and whether the two license plates are one and the same at
all. The CA emphasized that the evidence does not indicate whether the abductors are members of the military or the
police or are civilians; if they are civilians, whether they acted on their own or were following orders, and in the latter case,
from whom.
The CA also found that the investigations by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the PNP leave much to be
desired as they did not fully exert their effort to unearth the truth and to bring the real culprits before the bar of justice.
[21]
The CA held that since the petitioner has established that the vehicle used in the abduction was linked to a vehicle
(with license plate number TAB 194) impounded at the headquarters of the 56 th IB, it became the burden of the AFP to
exercise extraordinary diligence to determine the why and the wherefore of the loss of the license plate in their custody
and its appearance in a vehicle (a maroon Toyota Revo) used in Jonas abduction. The CA also ruled that the AFP has the
burden of connect[ing] certain loose ends[22] regarding the identity of @Ka Ramon (as referred to by the petitioners
witnesses) and the allegation that @Ka Ramon is indeed Jonas in the Order of Battle.
As for the PNP-CIDG, the CA branded its investigation as rather shallow and conducted haphazardly. The CA took note
that P/Supt. Estomos investigation merely delved into the administrative liability of Lt. Col. Clement, Lt. Col. Feliciano and
Lt. Col. Caga of the 56th IB, and failed to consider them as suspects in the abduction of Jonas. The CA emphasized that
the PNP-CIDGs investigation should focus on the criminal aspect of the present case pursuant to Section 24 of Republic
Act No. 6975, which mandates the PNP to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring
offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution.
The CA also found P/Supt. Estomos recommendation that appropriate charges be filed against Mauro Mudlong (registered
owner of the impounded 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle with plate license no. TAB 194) to be without any factual basis since no
evidence was presented to connect the latter to the loss of the license plate as well as to the abduction of Jonas. The CA
stressed that it could not find any valid reason why Mudlong should be treated any differently from the three 56 th IB
colonels whom the PNP-CIDG did not consider as suspects despite the established fact that license plate no. TAB 194 was
lost while in their custody.
On the PNP-CIDGs new information from Lipio who claimed to have seen Jonas being abducted by a certain @KA DANTE
and @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG, and on Marlon Manuel, who corroborated Lipios statements, the CA
held that steps should be taken by the PNP-CIDG to verify the veracity of these statements. Notwithstanding the new
information, the CA noted that the PNP-CIDG should not discount the possible involvement of members of the AFP. Thus,
the CA concluded that the PNP must exert extraordinary diligence in following all possible leads to resolve the crime
committed against Jonas. Finally, the CA noted - based on the Certification issued by the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor,
DOJ dated March 5, 2008 - that no case has been referred by the PNP to the DOJ for preliminary investigation in relation
to the abduction and disappearance of Jonas. This is contrary to PNPs manifest representation that it had already
forwarded all pertinent and relevant documents to the DOJ for the filing of appropriate charges against the suspects ( i.e.,
@KA DANTE and @KA ENSO).

The CA also held that the petitions for habeas corpus and contempt as against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo must be
dropped since she enjoys the privilege of immunity from suit. The CA ruled that the Presidents immunity from suit is a
settled doctrine citing David v. Arroyo.[23]
Our Ruling
Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the
AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and
to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires.

Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using
extraordinary diligence, is undertaken.
From the records, we note that there are very significant lapses in the handling of the investigation - among them
the PNP-CIDGs failure to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of
Jonas based on their interview of eyewitnesses to the abduction. This lapse is based on the information provided to the
petitioner by no less than State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco of the DOJ who identified the persons who were possibly
involved in the abduction, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air
Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group
15 of Intelligence Service of the AFP. [24] No search and certification were ever made on whether these persons were AFP
personnel or in other branches of the service, such as the Philippine Air Force. As testified to by the petitioner, no
significant follow through was also made by the PNP-CIDG in ascertaining the identities of the cartographic sketches of two of
the abductors despite the evidentiary leads provided by State Prosecutor Velasco of the DOJ. Notably, the PNP-CIDG, as the
lead investigating agency in the present case, did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the case.
We note, too, that no independent investigation appeared to have been made by the PNP-CIDG to inquire into the veracity
of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and a certain @KA ENSO of the
CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG. The records do not indicate whether the PNP-CIDG conducted a follow-up investigation to
determine the identities and whereabouts of @KA Dante and @KA ENSO. These omissions were aggravated by the CA
finding that the PNP has yet to refer any case for preliminary investigation to the DOJ despite its representation before the
CA that it had forwarded all pertinent and relevant documents to the DOJ for the filing of appropriate charges against
@KA DANTE and @KA ENSO.
Based on these considerations, we conclude that further investigation and monitoring should be
undertaken. While significant leads have been provided to investigators, the investigations by the PNP-CIDG, the AFP
Provost Marshal, and even the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) have been less than complete.The PNP-CIDGs
investigation particularly leaves much to be desired in terms of the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo requires. For this reason, we resolve to refer the present case to the CHR as the Courts directly commissioned
agency tasked with the continuation of the investigation of the Burgosabduction and the gathering of evidence, with the
obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to this Court. We take into consideration in this regard that the
CHR is a specialized and independent agency created and empowered by the Constitution to investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights of all persons within the Philippines.[25]
Under this mandate, the CHR is tasked to conduct appropriate investigative proceedings, including field investigations
acting as the Courts directly commissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo with the tasks
of: (a) ascertaining the identities of the persons appearing in the cartographic sketches of the two alleged abductors as
well as their whereabouts; (b) determining based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of the persons
identified by State Prosecutor Velasco alleged to be involved in the abduction of Jonas, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas
(Philippine Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an
alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the AFP; further
proceedings and investigations, as may be necessary, should be made to pursue the lead allegedly provided by State
Prosecutor Velasco on the identities of the possible abductors; (c) inquiring into the veracity of Lipios and Manuels claims
that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG; (d) determining
based on records, past and present, as well as further investigation, the identities and whereabouts of @KA DANTE and
@KA ENSO; and (e) undertaking all measures, in the investigation of the Burgos abduction that may be necessary to live
up to the extraordinary measures we require in addressing an enforced disappearance under the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the foregoing reasons, the Court RESOLVES to:
(1) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to conduct appropriate investigative proceedings, including field
investigations acting as the Courts directly commissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - with
the tasks of: (a) ascertaining the identities of the cartographic sketches of two of the abductors as well as their
whereabouts; (b) determining based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of the persons identified by
State Prosecutor Velasco alleged to be involved in the abduction of Jonas namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army),
Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all
reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines;

further proceedings and investigations, as may be necessary, should be made to pursue the lead allegedly provided by
State Prosecutor Velasco on the identities of the possible abductors; (c) inquiring into the veracity of Lipios and Manuels
claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG; (d)
determining based on records, past and present, as well as further investigation, the identities and whereabouts of @KA
DANTE and @KA ENSO; and (e) undertaking all measures, in the investigation of the Burgos abduction, that may be
necessary to live up to the extraordinary measures we require in addressing an enforced disappearance under the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo;
(2) REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to make
available and to provide copies, to the Commission on Human Rights, of all documents and records in their possession
and as the Commission on Human Rights may require, relevant to the case of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, subject to
reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws;
(3) DIRECT the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to submit to the Commission on Human Rights the records and
results of the investigation the PNP-CIDG claimed to have forwarded to the Department of Justice, which were not
included in their previous submissions to the Commission on Human Rights, including such records as the Commission
on Human Rights may require, pursuant to the authority granted under this Resolution;
(4) Further DIRECT the PNP-CIDG to provide direct investigative assistance to the Commission on Human Rights as it
may require, pursuant to the authority granted under this Resolution;
(5) AUTHORIZE the Commission on Human Rights to conduct a comprehensive and exhaustive investigation that extends
to all aspects of the case (not limited to the specific directives as outlined above), as the extraordinary measures the case
may require under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; and
(6) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court a Report with its recommendations, copy
furnished the petitioner, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents, within
ninety (90) days from receipt of this Resolution.
In light of the retirement of Lt. General Alexander Yano and the reassignment of the other respondents who have all been
impleaded in their official capacities, all subsequent resolutions and actions from this Court shall also be served on, and
be directly enforceable by, the incumbents of the impleaded offices/units whose official action is necessary. The present
respondents shall continue to be personally impleaded for purposes of the responsibilities and accountabilities they may
have incurred during their incumbencies.
The dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE
BALAO,
JONILYN
BALAO-STRUGAR
and
BEVERLY LONGID,
Petitioners,

- versus -

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA,

GILBERTO TEODORO, RONALDO PUNO, NORBERTO
GONZALES, Gen. ALEXANDER YANO, Gen. JESUS
VERZOSA, Brig. Gen. REYNALDO MAPAGU, Lt. P/Dir.
EDGARDO
DOROMAL,
Maj.
Gen.
ISAGANI
CACHUELA, Commanding Officer of the AFP-ISU
based in Baguio City, PSS EUGENE MARTIN and
several JOHN DOES,

G.R. No. 186050

Respondents.
x-------------------------x
PRESIDENT
GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, SECRETARY
GILBERTO TEODORO, SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO,
SECRETARY
NORBERTO
GONZALES,
GEN.
ALEXANDER YANO, P/DGEN. JESUS VERZOSA, BRIG
GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU, MAJ. GEN. ISAGANI
CACHUELA ANDPOL. SR. SUPT. EUGENE MARTIN,
Petitioners,

- versus -

ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE

BALAO,
JONILYN
BALAO-STRUGAR
and
BEVERLY LONGID,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 186059

Present:
CORONA,C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:

December 13, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us are consolidated appeals under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparofrom the January 19, 2009
Judgment[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63, in Special Proceeding No. 08-AMP-0001,
entitled In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo in favor of James Balao, Arthur Balao, et al. v. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. The RTC granted the petition for the writ of amparo but denied the prayer for issuance of
inspection, production and witness protection orders.
The Antecedents
On October 8, 2008, Arthur Balao, Winston Balao, Nonette Balao and Jonilyn Balao-Strugar, siblings of James Balao, and
Beverly Longid (petitioners), filed with the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo[2] in
favor of James Balao who was abducted by unidentified armed men on September 17, 2008 in Tomay, La Trinidad,
Benguet. Named respondents in the petition were then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Executive Secretary Eduardo
R. Ermita, Defense Secretary Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.,Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo V. Puno, National
Security Adviser (NSA) Norberto B. Gonzales, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Alexander B. Yano,
Philippine National Police (PNP) Police Director General Jesus A. Verzosa, Philippine Army (PA) Chief Brig. Gen. Reynaldo
B. Mapagu, PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) Chief Lt. P/Dir. Edgardo Doromal, Northern
Luzon Command (NOLCOM) Commander Maj. Gen. Isagani C. Cachuela, PNP-Cordillera Administrative Region Regional
Director Police Senior Supt. Eugene Gabriel Martin, the Commanding Officer of the AFP Intelligence Service Unit (AFPISU) based in Baguio City and several John Does.
James M. Balao is a Psychology and Economics graduate of the University of the Philippines-Baguio (UP-Baguio). In 1984,
he was among those who founded the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), a coalition of non-government organizations
(NGOs) working for the cause of indigenous peoples in the Cordillera Region. As head of CPAs education and research
committee, James actively helped in the training and organization of farmers. He was also the President of Oclupan Clan
Association which undertakes the registration and documentation of clan properties to protect their rights over ancestral

lands. In 1988, while working for the CPA, he was arrested on the charge of violation of the Anti-Subversion Law but the
case was eventually dismissed for lack of evidence.
The testimonies and statements of eyewitnesses established the following circumstances surrounding Jamess
disappearance:
On September 17, 2008, at around 8:30 in the morning, a man clad in black jacket, black shirt, black visor and gray
pants was standing infront of Saymors[3]Store at Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet. He had a belt bag and a travelling bag
which was placed on a bench. Vicky Bonel was at the time attending to the said store owned by her brother-in-law while
Aniceto G. Dawing, Jr. and his co-employee were delivering bakery products thereat. A white van then arrived and stopped
infront of the store. Five men in civilian clothes who were carrying firearms alighted from the van and immediately
approached the man poking their guns on him. They grabbed and handcuffed him. The man was asking why he was being
apprehended. One of the armed men addressed the people witnessing the incident, saying they were policemen. Another
warned that no one should interfere because the man was being arrested for illegal drugs. Thereafter, they pushed the
man inside the van.One of the armed men went back to the store to get the mans travelling bag. Before leaving the place,
one of the armed men was also heard telling the driver of the van that they are going to proceed to Camp Dangwa (PNP
Provincial Headquarters in La Trinidad, Benguet). The van headed towards the direction of La Trinidad town proper. The
witnesses later identified the man as James Balao after seeing his photograph which appeared in posters announcing him
as missing.
The petition alleged that in May 2008, James reported surveillances on his person to his family, particularly to his sister
Nonette Balao (Nonette), and to CPA Chairperson Beverly Longid (Beverly). James supposedly observed certain vehicles
tailing him and suspiciously parked outside his residence, one of which was a van with plate number USC 922. He also
claimed to have received calls and messages through his mobile phone informing him that he was under surveillance by
the PNP Regional Office and the AFP-ISU. To prove the surveillance, the informer gave the exact dates he visited his family,
clothes he wore, and dates and times he goes home or visits friends and relatives. Attached to the petition were the
affidavits[4] of Nonette and Beverly attesting to Jamess reports of surveillance to his family and to the CPA.
It was further alleged that on September 17, 2008, around 7:00 in the morning, James sent a text message to Nonette
informing her that he was about to leave his rented house in Fairview Central, Baguio City and that he was going to their
ancestral residence in Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet to do his laundry. The travel time from Fairview, Baguio City to Pico
usually takes only 20 to 45 minutes. Around 8:00 a.m., Nonette, after discovering that James never reached their parents
house at Pico, started contacting their friends and relatives to ask about Jamess whereabouts. No one, however, had any
idea where he was.
Thus, the Balao family, with the assistance of the CPA and other NGOs, tried to locate James. Teams were formed to follow
Jamess route from Fairview, Baguio City to Pico, La Trinidad and people along the way were asked if they happened to see
him. These searches, however, yielded negative results. One of the teams also went to the office of the AFP-ISU (PA-ISU) in
Navy Base and the office of the Military Intelligence Group in Camp Allen, both in Baguio City, but the personnel in said
offices denied any knowledge on Jamess whereabouts. The family likewise went to Baguio Police Station 7 to report
Jamess disappearance. The report was duly entered on the blotter but there have been no developments as of the filing of
the petition. They also sought the help of the media to announce Jamess disappearance and wrote several government
agencies to inform them of his disappearance and enlist their help in locating him.
Petitioners, moreover, enumerated in their petition several incidents of harassments and human rights violations against
CPA officers, staff and members.
Contending that there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy for them to protect Jamess life, liberty and security,
petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ ofamparo ordering the respondents to disclose where James is detained or
confined, to release James, and to cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his person. They likewise prayed for
(1) an inspection order for the inspection of at least 11 military and police facilities which have been previously reported as
detention centers for activists abducted by military and police operatives; (2) a production order for all documents that
contain evidence relevant to the petition, particularly the Order of Battle List and any record or dossier respondents have
on James; and (3) a witness protection order.
Petitioners simultaneously filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion [5] for the immediate issuance of a writ of amparo pursuant to
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo.
On October 9, 2008, the Writ of Amparo[6] was issued directing respondents to file their verified return together with their
supporting affidavit within five days from receipt of the writ.
Respondents in their Joint Return [7] stated: (1) that President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is immune from suit and should
thus be dropped as party-respondent; (2) that only Arthur Balao should be named petitioner and the rest of the other
petitioners dropped; (3) that there is no allegation of specific wrongdoing against respondents that would show their
knowledge, involvement or participation in the abduction of James; (4) that Exec. Sec. Ermita, Sec. Teodoro, Sec. Puno,
Sec. Gonzales, Gen. Yano, Gen. Cachuela, Gen. Mapagu and Gen. Verzosa in their respective affidavits denied having such
participation or knowledge of Jamess abduction, set forth their actions taken in investigating the matter and undertaking
to continue exerting extraordinary diligence in securing the liberty of James and bring all those responsible for his
disappearance to the bar of justice, including military or police personnel when warranted by the findings of the

investigations; (5) that Supt. Martin already ordered an investigation, came up with interviews of several witnesses, and
held a dialogue with the Commander of the Military Intelligence Group I (MIG1) and the Commanding Officer of the
Internal Service Unit-Internal Security Group, Philippine Army;and (6) that petitioners themselves did not cooperate with
police authorities in the investigation and neither did they ask the National Bureau of Investigation to locate James.
Respondents contended that the petition failed to meet the requirement in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo that claims
must be established by substantial evidence considering that: (1) petitioners allegations do not mention in anyway the
manner, whether directly or indirectly, the alleged participation of respondents in the purported abduction of James; (2)
Nonette and Beverly do not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the abduction of James, hence,
their statements are hearsay with no probative value; and (3) the allegations in the petition do not show the materiality
and relevance of the places sought to be searched/inspected and documents to be produced, specifically the requirement
that the prayer for an inspection order shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal
knowledge of the whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
Respondents further argued that it is the PNP as the law enforcement agency, and not the respondent military and
executive officials, which has the duty to investigate cases of missing persons. At most, the AFP may inquire on the
matters being alluded to them as may be ordered by the proper superior, which is primarily done for possible court
martial proceedings. Hence, their common denials of having any knowledge, participation or authorization for the alleged
disappearance of James Balao. Nonetheless, respondents executed their affidavits to show the actions they have taken
and reports submitted to them by the proper authorities, as follows:
Executive Secretary Ermitastated that upon receipt of copy of the petition for a writ of amparo, he caused the issuance
of a letter addressed to the PNP Chief and AFP Chief of Staff for the purpose of inquiring and establishing the
circumstances surrounding the alleged disappearance of James Balao, and which letters also called for the submission of
pertinent reports on the results of the investigation conducted, if any. [8]
Secretary Teodoro declared that soon after the promulgation by this Court of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, he issued
Policy Directive on the Actions and Defenses Under the Amparo Rule which instructed members of the AFP to undertake
specific measures even without waiting for the filing of an amparo petition in court whenever any member of the AFP or
any of its commands or units have been reported or published as being involved in the alleged violation of an individuals
right to life, liberty and security or threat thereof, as a preparatory step in the filing of a verified return as required by
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC. The AFP was therein also directed to immediately coordinate with the PNP, NBI, DOJ and other
government agencies in the attainment of the desired actions in the event a petition is filed. Said policy directive was
contained in his Memorandum dated October 31, 2007 to the Chief of Staff, AFP, and there is no reason for him to doubt
that the AFP will comply with it insofar as the present petition for writ of amparo is concerned.[9]
Secretary Puno confirmed receipt of a copy of the petition and said he will write to the PNP Chief to call for pertinent
reports relative to the circumstances of the alleged taking of the person in whose favor the writ of amparo was sought. He
undertook to make available any report he will receive from the PNP on the matter. [10]
NSA Gonzales asserted that as a public officer, he is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with law,
which presumption remains undisturbed amid gratuitous assumptions and conclusions in the petition devoid of factual
and legal basis. Upon receipt of a copy of the petition, he caused to be issued letters/communications to the Director
General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, the PNP Chief and the AFP Chief of Staff for the purpose of
making active inquiries and establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance insofar as the possible
involvement of military/police personnel is concerned. He undertook to provide the material results of investigations
conducted or to be conducted by the concerned agencies. [11]
General Yano narrated that prior to the receipt of a copy of the petition, he received a memorandum from the Department
of National Defense transmitting the letter of Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro A. Casio inquiring about the alleged
abduction of James Balao. On the basis of said memo, he directed by radio message the NOLCOM Commander to conduct
a thorough investigation on the matter and to submit the result thereof to the AFP General Headquarters. This was also
done in compliance with the Policy Directive issued by Defense Secretary Teodoro. He reiterated his October 6, 2008
directive to the PA Commanding General in another radio message dated October 16, 2008. He undertook to provide the
court with material results of the investigations conducted by the concerned units as soon as the same are received by
Higher Headquarters.[12]
Lt. Gen. Cachuela said that even prior to the receipt of a copy of the petition, he was already directed by Higher
Headquarters to conduct a thorough investigation on the alleged abduction of James Balao. Acting on said directive, he in
turn directed the 5th Infantry Division, PA to investigate the matter since the place of the commission of the abduction is
within its area of responsibility. He undertook to furnish the court with a copy of the result of the investigation conducted
or to be conducted, as soon as NOLCOM receives the same. [13]
BGen. Mapagu on his part declared that there is nothing in the allegations of the petition that would show the
involvement of the PA in the reported disappearance of James Balao. He claimed that he immediately called the attention
of the concerned staff to give some information regarding the case and directed them to submit a report if they are able to
obtain information.[14]

Pol. Dir. General Verzosa set forth the actions and steps taken by the PNP, particularly the PNP Regional OfficeCordillera (PRO-COR) headed by PCSupt. Eugene Martin, being the lead PNP unit investigating the case of James Balao. [15]
Pol. Chief Supt. Martin recounted that in the afternoon of September 17, 2008, CPA Chairperson Beverly Longid called
up and informed him of the disappearance of James. On September 20, 2008, he was informed that James was allegedly
missing and immediately ordered the Office of the Regional Intelligence Division (RID) to send flash alarm to all lower
units to look for and locate James Balao. This was followed by a Memorandum with his picture and description. Upon his
orders, Police Station 1 of the Baguio City Police Office (BCPO) immediately conducted inquiries at the boarding house of
James at Barangay Fairview, Baguio City. Likewise, he ordered the creation of Task Force Balao to fast track the
investigation of the case. He further instructed the RID to exert all efforts and supervise all lower units to intensify their
investigation and ascertain the whereabouts and other circumstances surrounding the disappearance of James. Results
of the investigations conducted were set forth in his affidavit. He had constant coordination with the CPA leaders and
Balao family who divulged the plate numbers of vehicles allegedly observed by James prior to his disappearance as
conducting surveillance on his person. Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office, the said vehicles were found
to be registered under the following persons: TNH 787 Narciso Magno of #20 Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas; and USC 922 G
& S Transport Corp. On October 6, 2008, he received information regarding an abduction incident in Tomay, La Trinidad
whereupon he ordered the Provincial Director of Benguet to conduct an in-depth investigation; said investigation disclosed
that the person abducted was indeed James. On October 8, 2008, Task Force Balao with the help of the CPA and Balao
family were able to convince two witnesses in the abduction incident in Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet to shed light on the
incident; as a result, cartographic sketches of the suspects were made. In the morning of October 9, 2008, he presided
over a dialogue which was attended by the Group Commander, MIG1 and Commanding Officer of ISU, ISG and PA, for the
coordinated efforts to locate James. In the afternoon of the same day, he met with the family and relatives of James to
inform them of initial efforts and investigation of the case. The Task Force Balao was also able to secure the affidavits of
witnesses Aniceto Dawing and Vicky Bonel, and invited some members of the CPA who retrieved Jamess personal
belongings in Fairview, Baguio City and his companions prior to his disappearance on September 17, 2008 to appear
before the Task Force Balao for some clarifications but none of them appeared. The case is still under follow-up and
continuing investigation to know what really happened, identify the abductors, determine the real motive for the abduction
and file the necessary charges in court against those responsible. [16]
Also attached to the Return are the more detailed reports (with attached affidavits of other witnesses) dated October 14,
2008 and October 6, 2008 submitted by Task Force Balao Commander P/S Supt. Fortunato B. Albas to the PNP Cordillera
Regional Director. Pertinent portions of the two reports read:
xxxx
2. Inquiries conducted from Mr. Zusimo Unarosa, a resident of Nr 126, Purok 3, Central Fairview, Baguio City, claimed
that on the 1st week of September 2008, he frequently observed two (2) unidentified male persons aged 50-70 years old
and about 51 to 55 in height, bringing boxes from the house, the contents of which could not be determined. However,
averred that these two (2) male personalities are not familiar in the barangay. He further stated that he had never seen a
van conducting surveillance on the house and have not heard of any incident of kidnapping or abduction in the
community.
3. Mr[.] Anselmo Alukim, a neighbor, residing adjacent to the house of the subject, when interviewed, averred that he
observed some unidentified male and female persons visiting the said house.
4. Interview conducted on Mr[.] Danny Griba, a resident of said barangay averred that James Balao is not a resident or
occupant of the said house and claimed that he only saw the subject last summer and stated there are five (5) unidentified
persons occupying the said house. He further stated that three (3) male persons aged 40 to 50 years old and a female aged
between 20-30 years old goes out during day time with several boxes and returns at about 6:00 PM to 7:00 PM on board a
taxi cab again with some boxes of undetermined contents.
5. Mrs[.] Corazon Addun, resident of Nr 114, Purok 3, Central Fairview, Baguio City averred that the subject is not
residing in the said place and saw him only once, sometime on April 2008. She further narrated that a certain Uncle John
aged 40 to 50 years old and a male person aged 20 to 30 are among the occupants of said house.Accordingly, on
September 21, 2008, Uncle John went to the house of Mrs. Addun and over a cup of coffee told her that he will be going to
Sagada, Mountain Province purposely to locate a missing colleague who was sent there. Accordingly[,] he received a phone
call that his missing colleague (James Balao) did not reach the municipality and reported missing. After that short talk,
she never saw Uncle John again. Additionally, she did not notice any vehicle conducting surveillance therein and any
unusual incidents that transpired in said place.
xxxx
7. This office has likewise coordinated with MIG-1 and ISU, ISG, PA but both offices denied any knowledge on the alleged
abduction of James Balao.
8. It was found out that it was SPO4 Genero Rosal, residing within the vicinity, who followed-up the incident because it
was reported to him by his neighbors. That after he learned about [James abduction], he contacted PDEA, La Trinidad PS,
RID ad Intel BPPO to verify if they had an operation in Tomay, La Trinidad but all of them answered negative.
x x x x[17]

xxxx
3. A photocopy of the photograph of James Balao was presented to the witnesses wherein they confirmed that the picture
is the same person who was arrested and handcuffed. Another witness divulged that prior to the arrest of the person in
the picture/photograph, a red motorcycle with two (2) male riders allegedly conducted surveillance along the highway
about ten (10) meters away from the place where the victim was picked-up. Minutes later, a white Mitsubishi Adventure
arrived and took the victim inside the car. The motorcycle riding in tandem followed the Mitsubushi Adventure en route to
Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet. Another witness overheard one of the abductors instructing the driver to quote pare
sa Camp Dangwa tayo.
4. Follow[-]up investigation resulted in the identification of a certain KULOT who also witnessed the alleged
abduction. However, he was hesitant to talk and instead pointed to the driver of the delivery van of Helens Bread. At about
8:30 AM of October 9, 2008, Aniceto Dawing Jr[.] y Gano, the driver of the delivery van of Helens Bread, surfaced and gave
his statements on what he witnessed on the alleged abduction.
5. On October 12, 2008, one Vicky Bonel y Felipe, 19 years old, single, native of Atok, Benguet, resident of Tomay, LTB and
store keeper of Saymor[s] Store appeared before the office of Benguet PPO and gave her sworn statement on the alleged
abduction. A cartographic sketch was made on the person who identified himself as policeman. She further stated that it
was when while she was tending her brother-in-laws store, gun-wielding men, of about six or more, handcuffed and shove
the victim inside their vehicle. She recalled that she can recognize the abductors if she can see them again.
6. Another witness stated that she was preparing her merchandise in the waiting shed of Lower Tomay when she noticed a
parked motorcycle beside the elementary school at about 7:00 AM of September 17, 2008. The rider of the bike was
suspiciously scouring the area and kept on calling someone from his cellular phone before the abduction was made.
7. Baguio City Police Office conducted follow-up investigation and were able to secure affidavit of Florence Luken y
Mayames, 47 years old, married, and a resident of 135 Central Fairview averred that James Balao together with a certain
Uncle John about 65-75 years old, about 54 in height and a certain Rene about 30-35 years old and stands 55, were her
neighbors for almost one year. She further stated that James Balao and company do not mingle with their neighbors and
only one person is usually left behind while James and Rene goes out at 6:00 or 7:00 AM and goes back at around 6:00 or
7:00 PM.
She further averred that she did not notice any van or any kind of vehicle parked along the roadside infront of any
residence not his neighbors nor any person or persons observing the occupants of the said house. Accordingly, at around
1:00 PM of September 26, 2008, a closed van (Ca[n]ter) with unknown plate number was seen parked infront of the said
house and more or less (10) unidentified male person[s] aging from 20-23 and an unidentified female entered the alleged
rented house of James Balao and took some table, chairs and cabinets then left immediately to unknown destination.
8. Mrs[.] Mina Cabati Serdan the owner of the house being rented by James Balao averred that sometime May of 2007, a
certain Mr[.] June, a realtor agent, recommended to her that a certain James Balao will rent the house for one (1) year
term with an agreed monthly rent of fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00). She stated that James Balao had extended his
stay for almost 4 months. On the last week of August 2008, Mrs[.] Serdan called up James Balao through phone to inform
him that she will terminate his stay at the rented house on September 30, 2008. Mrs[.] Serdan further stated that
[she]visited the rented house only twice and that was the only time she saw James Balao with an unidentified
companions.
That she only discovered that James Balao was missing when a certain Carol informed her that he was missing. [Sh]e
further stated that she visited her house and found out that the said occupants have already left on September 26, 2008
and discovered that all personal belongings of the occupants have already been taken out by the relatives.
xxxx
VI. ACTIONS TAKEN:
1.
That a composite team TASK FORCE BALAO from this office and the Regional Headquarters headed by [P/S SUPT]
FORTUNATO BASCO ALBAS was formed.
2.
That the composite team of investigators conducted ocular inspection on the area.
3. On October 8, 2008, two (2) witnesses namely: Marjore Domingo Hipolito and Jenny Lynn Malondon Valdez gave their
sworn statements and cartographic sketch of one of the abductors.
4. On the morning of October 9, 2008, a dialogue was presided by RD, PRO-COR and attended by the Group Commander,
MIG1 and Commanding Officer of ISU, SG, PA. Both commanders denied the accusations against them.
5. In the afternoon of the same day, a meeting with the family and relatives of James Balao was again presided by RD,
PRO-COR wherein the results of the initial efforts and investigation were given to the family. He also reported the
surfacing of another two (2) witnesses who described the suspect who handcuffed James Balao.
6. PRO-Cordillera wrote a letter to the Cordillera Peoples Alliance requesting them to present Uncle John, Rene and his
other companions who are then residing in the same boarding house including all his companions on September 17, 2008
and prior to his disappearance.
REMARKS:

Case is still under follow-up investigation to identify the alleged abductors to determine the real motive of the abduction
and to file necessary charges against them in court.[18]
During the hearing, the affidavits and testimonies of the following witnesses were presented by petitioners:
Aniceto Dawing[19] testified that on September 17, 2008, around 8:00 in the morning, while he was delivering bread at
Saymors Store in Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet, a white van stopped infront of them and five armed men alighted. The
armed men, who introduced themselves as policemen in Filipino, held and pointed a gun at one male person. The armed
men told the male person that he was being apprehended for illegal drugs. They then let the male person board the vehicle
and informed him that they will proceed to Camp Dangwa. Dawing admitted that he did not know that it was James
whom he saw that time and came to know only of his identity when he saw a poster bearing Jamess photograph. On
cross-examination, he stated that the white van did not have any markings that it was a police vehicle and that the armed
men were in civilian clothes and did not wear any police badges or identification cards. He just assumed that they were
policemen because of their posture and haircut and because they introduced themselves as such.
Anvil Lumbag stated in his affidavit[20] that he was also at Saymors Store in the morning of September 17, 2008 to buy
chicken. He said that a ToyotaRevo stopped infront of the store from where four men alighted. The men handcuffed a man
who was standing infront of the store and uttered Walang makikialam, drugs kaso nito while pointing a gun at the said
man. Then, they forced the man to board the Revo. Before the Revo fled, Lumbag heard one of the men say that they will
be going to Camp Dangwa. Lumbags affidavit, however, did not mention if it was James who was forcibly taken by the
armed men.
Beverly Longid[21] testified that she got to know James when she was a member of the CPA youth organization in her
student days. Every time James will have an activity that is CPA-related, he would coordinate with Beverly, she being the
CPA chair. She also testified that prior to his disappearance, the last time she talked with James was in July or August of
2008 when he reported surveillances on his person by the PNP and the AFP. In her affidavit, she alleged that James
reported to her several vehicles tailing him, one of which was a green van with plate number USC 922, the same plate
number she had seen at the Intelligence Security Unit in Navy Base, Baguio City, and which was attached to a silver grey
van.
Beverly admitted that at the time of the alleged abduction, she was in Baguio City, at the Office of the Cordillera Peoples
Legal Center and that she only came to know that James was missing in the afternoon of September 18, 2008. She also
confirmed that they met with Pol. Supt. Martin to seek assistance regarding Jamess disappearance.
Nonette Balao[22] testified that she was at her bakeshop located in Km. 4, La Trinidad, Benguet in the morning of
September 17, 2008. At around 6:30 a.m., she received a text message from James saying that he will be going home to
their ancestral home to do some laundry. Thirty minutes later, she received another text message from James saying that
he was already leaving his place in Fairview, Baguio City. When around 8:00 a.m. James had not yet arrived at their
ancestral home, she got worried. She texted him but failed to get a reply, so she tried to call him. His phone, however, had
already been turned off. She then called the CPA office to check if James was there. She was told that he was not there so
she went to Jamess house in Fairview at around 9:00 a.m. Jamess housemates, however, told her that he left at 7:00 a.m.
Nonette also testified that they only reported Jamess disappearance to the police on September 20, 2008 because they
thought that it was necessary that a person be missing for at least 48 hours before the disappearance could be
reported. They went to Sub-Station Police Precinct No. 1 in Baguio and to the police precinct in La Trinidad to report the
matter. They also went to Camp Dangwa to see if James was there.
Nonette claimed that she became worried because James never switched off his mobile phone and since he already texted
her that he was coming home, he could have texted again if there was a change of plans. Also, James had told them since
April 2008 that he had been under surveillance. She does not know why James went to Tomay, La Trinidad.
Samuel Anongos stated in his affidavit[23] that he is a member of the Education Commission of the CPA. He claimed that
when they conducted trainings and educational discussions on mining education in Abra, members of the AFP harassed
the community and committed various human rights violations. The AFP also allegedly held community meetings where
they said that the CPA is part of the New Peoples Army. Attached to Anongoss affidavit is a copy of a paper that the AFP
was allegedly distributing. It shows the organizational structure of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples
Army (CPP-NPA) wherein CPA was identified as one of the organizations under the National Democratic Front (NDF). [24]
RTC Ruling
On January 19, 2009, the RTC issued the assailed judgment, disposing as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
ISSUE a Writ of Amparo Ordering the respondents to (a) disclose where James Balao is detained or confined, (b) to release
James Balao considering his unlawful detention since his abduction and (c) to cease and desist from further inflicting
harm upon his person; and
DENY the issuance of INSPECTION ORDER, PRODUCTION ORDER and WITNESS PROTECTION ORDER for failure of
herein Petitioners to comply with the stringent provisions on the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and substantiate the same. [25]

In denying respondents prayer that President Arroyo be dropped as party-respondent, the RTC held that a petition for a
writ of amparo is not by any stretch of imagination a niggling[,] vexing or annoying court case [26] from which she should be
shielded. The RTC ruled that said petition is nothing more than a tool to aid the president to guarantee that laws on
human rights are devotedly and staunchly carried out. It added that those who complain against naming the president as
party-respondent are only those who either do not understand what the Writ of Amparo is all about or who do not want to
aid Her Excellency in her duty to supervise and control the machinery of government. [27]
In upholding the standing of Jamess siblings and Beverly to file the petition, the RTC held that what Section 2 of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparorules out is the right to file similar petitions, meaning there could be no successive petitions for the
issuance of a writ of amparo for the same party.
The RTC further held that more likely than not, the motive for Jamess disappearance is his activist/political leanings and
that Jamess case is one of an enforced disappearance as defined under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In so ruling, the
RTC considered (1) the several incidents of harassment mentioned in Beverlys testimony and enumerated in the petition;
and (2) the references in the petition to the CPA as a front for the CPP-NPA.
The RTC likewise ruled that the government unmistakably violated Jamess right to security of person. It found the
investigation conducted by respondents as very limited, superficial and one-sided. The police and military thus miserably
failed to conduct an effective investigation of Jamess abduction as revealed by the investigation report of respondents own
witnesses, Supt. Martin and P/S Supt. Fortunato Basco Albas, the Commander of Task Force Balao. It further noted that
respondents did not investigate the military officials believed to be behind the abduction as said military officials were
merely invited to a dialogue and there was no investigation made in Camp Dangwa where the abductors were believed to
have taken James as narrated by the witnesses. Moreover, the RTC observed that despite the undertaking of respondents
to investigate the abduction and provide results thereof, four months have passed but petitioners have not been furnished
reports regarding the investigation.
As to the denial of the interim reliefs, the RTC stated that the stringent provisions of the rules were not complied with and
granting said reliefs might violate respondents constitutional rights and jeopardize State security.
Both parties appealed to this Court.
The Consolidated Petitions
Petitioners, in G.R. No. 186050, question the RTCs denial of the interim reliefs.
Respondents, on the other hand, assail in their petition in G.R. No. 186059, the issuance of the writ of amparo. They raise
the following arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURTS JUDGMENT ORDERING RESPONDENT-PETITIONERS TO: (A) DISCLOSE WHERE JAMES BALAO IS
DETAINED AND CONFINED; (B) TO RELEASE JAMES BALAO CONSIDERING HIS UNLAWFUL DETENTION SINCE HIS
ABDUCTION AND (C) TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM FURTHER INFLICTING HARM UPON HIS PERSON IS BASED
PURELY ON CONJECTURES, SURMISES AND HEARSAY EVIDENCE; HENCE, IT MUST BE SET ASIDE.
II
RESPONDENT-PETITIONERS HAD PROVEN THAT THEY OBSERVED EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE AS REQUIRED BY
APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES.
III
THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THE MANALO CASE ARE TOTALLY DIFFERENT
FROM THE CASE AT BAR; HENCE, THE TRIAL COURT GROSSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULING THEREIN TO THE
CASE AT BAR.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PETITIONER-RESPONDENTS PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF AN
INSPECTION ORDER, PRODUCTION ORDER AND A WITNESS PROTECTION ORDER. [28]
Our Ruling
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated on October 24, 2007 amidst rising incidence of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. It was formulated in the exercise of this Courts expanded rule-making power for the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, albeit limited to these two
situations. Extralegal killings refer to killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings.[29] On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention, or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with
the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such person outside the protection of
law.[30]
Section 18 of the Amparo Rule provides:

SEC. 18. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for
decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the
writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (Emphasis supplied.)
The threshold issue in this case is whether the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required by
the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.
In granting the privilege of the writ of amparo, the trial court ratiocinated:
On record is evidence pointing to the more likely than not motive for James Balaos disappearance his activist/political
leanings. This is shown by the several incidents relating to harassments of activists as mentioned in the unrebutted
testimony of Beverly Longid and the enumeration made in par. 48 (a) to (cc) of the petition. There were also references in
the petitions pars. 52 et. seq. to the CPA (of which James Balao was an active staff) as a front organization of the
Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army. More likely than not he was not taken to parts unknown for
reasons other than his involvement in the CPA, that is, politically-motivated. The Court considers these facts enough
circumstances to establish substantial evidence of an enforced disappearance as defined under the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo. For after all, substantial evidence requires nothing greater than more likely than not degree of
proof.[31](Emphasis supplied.)
The trial court gave considerable weight to the discussion in the petition of briefing papers supposedly obtained from the
AFP (Oplan Bantay-Laya implemented since 2001) indicating that the anti-insurgency campaign of the military under the
administration of President Arroyo included targeting of identified legal organizations under the NDF, which included the
CPA, and their members, as enemies of the state. The petition cited other documents confirming such all-out war policy
which resulted in the prevalence of extrajudicial killings: namely, the published reports of the Melo Commission and the
UNHRCs Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Mr. Philip Alston. The petition also
enumerated previously documented cases of extralegal killings of activists belonging to militant groups, including CPA
leaders and workers, almost all of which have been preceded by surveillance by military or police agents and acts of
harassment.Consequently, petitioners postulated that the surveillance on James and his subsequent abduction are
interconnected with the harassments, surveillance, threats and political assassination of other members and officers of
CPA which is his organization.
We hold that such documented practice of targeting activists in the militarys counter-insurgency program by itself does
not fulfill the evidentiary standard provided in the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.
In the case of Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[32] the Court noted that the similarity between the circumstances attending a
particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily,
carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. Accordingly, the trial court in this case
cannot simply infer government involvement in the abduction of James from past similar incidents in which the victims
also worked or affiliated with the CPA and other left-leaning groups.
The petition further premised government complicity in the abduction of James on the very positions held by the
respondents, stating that -The abduction of James Balao can only be attributed to the Respondents who have command responsibility of all the
actions of their subordinates and who are the primary persons in the implementation of the governments all out war
policy.[33] (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo[34] had the occasion to expound on the doctrine of command responsibility and
why it has little bearing, if at all, inamparo proceedings.
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed
combats. According to Fr. Bernas, command responsibility, in its simplest terms, means the responsibility of commanders
for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict. In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity.
The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of
holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control
over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is an omission mode of individual criminal liability, whereby the
superior is made responsible forcrimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as
opposed to crimes he ordered).
The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to which the
Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military commanders for crimes
committed by forces under their control. The country is, however, not yet formally bound by the terms and provisions
embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to extend concurrence in its ratification.
While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that provides for criminal
liability under that doctrine.
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for
extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that
the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in

accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these
proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal
complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach
of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if
incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed
in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo), the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective
procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the
corresponding amparo suit, however, is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt
x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. Of the
same tenor, and by way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis:
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial
killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance [threats thereof or
extrajudicial killings] for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or
extrajudicial killings].
xxxx
As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized
separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are
now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken
on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature
has the power to enact. x x x[35]
Subsequently, we have clarified that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding
does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in
the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. Commanders may therefore be impleadednot
actually on the basis of command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at
leastaccountability.[36]
In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,[37]the Court defined responsibility and accountability as these terms are applied
to amparo proceedings, as follows:
x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. x x x[38] (Emphasis supplied.)
Assessing the evidence on record, we find that the participation in any manner of military and police authorities in the
abduction of James has not been adequately proven. The identities of the abductors have not been established, much less
their link to any military or police unit. There is likewise no concrete evidence indicating that James is being held or
detained upon orders of or with acquiescence of government agents. Consequently, the trial court erred in
granting amparoreliefs by ordering the respondent officials (1) to disclose where James Balao is detained or confined, (2)
to release him from such detention or confinement, and (3) to cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his
person. Such pronouncement of responsibility on the part of public respondents cannot be made given the insufficiency of
evidence.[39] However, we agree with the trial court in finding that the actions taken by respondent officials are very
limited, superficial and one-sided. Its candid and forthright observations on the efforts exerted by the respondents are
borne by the evidence on record, thus:
x x x the violation of the right to security as protection by the government is unmistakable. The police and the military
miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of James Balaos abduction as revealed by the investigation report
of respondents own witnesses Honorable Chief Superintendent Eugene Martin and Honorable Senior Superintendent
Fortunato Albas. The investigation was to use the words in The Secretary of National Defense, et. al., v. Manalo et.
al. verylimited, superficial and one-sided.
The actions taken were simply these: (a) organization of the Task Force Balao; (b) conduct of ocular inspection at the place
of abduction; (c) taking of sworn statements of civilian witnesses, whose testimonies did not prove much as shown by the
continued disappearance of James Balao; (d) dialogue with implicated military officials as well as family members and
friends of James Balao; and (e) writing of letter to the CPA. The Court does not want to second-guess police protocols in
investigation but surely some things are amiss where the investigation DID NOT INVESTIGATE the military officials
believed to be behind the abduction as they were merely invited to a dialogue and where the investigation DID NOT LEAD
to Camp Dangwa where the abductors were supposed to have proceeded as narrated by the witnesses. To the mind of this
Court, there is a seeming prejudice in the process of investigation to pin suspects who are not connected with the military

establishments. By any measure, this cannot be a thorough and good faith investigation but one that falls short of that
required by the Writ of Amparo.[40]
Respondents reiterate that they did their job the best they could and fault the petitioners instead for their non-cooperation
which caused delay in the investigation. They particularly blamed Beverly who failed to attend the October 15, 2008
invitation to appear before the investigators and shed light on Jamess disappearance.
We are not persuaded.
First, the Task Force Balao had acknowledged the fact that Pol. Chief Supt. Martin was already in constant coordination
with the Balao family and CPA, and hence the investigators could have readily obtained whatever information they needed
from Beverly. Pol. Chief Supt. Martin even mentioned in his affidavit that Task Force Balao was able to secure the
testimonies of two eyewitnesses with the help of Beverly and the Balao family, and that as a result cartographic sketches
were made of some suspects.[41] Moreover, Beverly had explained during the cross-examination conducted by Associate
Solicitor Paderanga that she was at the time coordinating with national and local agencies even as the police investigation
was ongoing.[42] There is nothing wrong with petitioners simultaneous recourse to other legal avenues to gain public
attention for a possible enforced disappearance case involving their very own colleague. Respondents should even
commend such initiative that will encourage those who may have any information on the identities and whereabouts of
Jamess abductors to help the PNP in its investigation.
Assuming there was reluctance on the part of the Balao family and CPA to submit Jamess relatives or colleagues for
questioning by agents of the PNP and AFP, they cannot be faulted for such stance owing to the militarys perception of their
organization as a communist front: ergo, enemies of the State who may be targeted for liquidation. But more important,
such non-cooperation provides no excuse for respondents incomplete and one-sided investigations. As we held in Rubrico
v. Macapagal-Arroyo[43]:
As regards P/Supt. Romero and P/Insp. Gomez, the Court is more than satisfied that they have no direct or indirect hand
in the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats against her daughters. As police officers, though,
theirs was the duty to thoroughly investigate the abduction of Lourdes, a duty that would include looking into the
cause, manner, and like details of the disappearance; identifying witnesses and obtaining statements from them;
and following evidentiary leads, such as the Toyota Revo vehicle with plate number XRR 428, and securing and
preserving evidence related to the abduction and the threats that may aid in the prosecution of the person/s
responsible. As we said in Manalo, the right to security, as a guarantee of protection by the government, is breached by
the superficial and one-sidedhence, ineffectiveinvestigation by the military or the police of reported cases under their
jurisdiction. As found by the CA, the local police stations concerned, including P/Supt. Roquero and P/Insp. Gomez, did
conduct a preliminary fact-finding on petitioners complaint. They could not, however, make any headway, owing to what
was perceived to be the refusal of Lourdes, her family, and her witnesses to cooperate. Petitioners counsel, Atty. Rex
J.M.A. Fernandez, provided a plausible explanation for his clients and their witnesses attitude, [They] do not trust the
government agencies to protect them.The difficulty arising from a situation where the party whose complicity in
extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance, as the case may be, is alleged to be the same party who investigates it is
understandable, though.
The seeming reluctance on the part of the Rubricos or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a hindrance
to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end . To repeat what the
Court said in Manalo, the right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of ones right by the
government. And this protection includes conducting effective investigations of extra-legal killings, enforced
disappearances, or threats of the same kind. The nature and importance of an investigation are captured in
the Velasquez Rodriguez case, in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced:
[The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not a step taken
by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer of proof, without an
effective search for the truth by the government.[44] (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, why zero in on Jamess own kin and colleagues when independent eyewitnesses already provided firsthand
accounts of the incident, as well as descriptions of the abductors? With the cartographic sketches having been made from
interviews and statements of witnesses, the police investigators could have taken proper steps to establish the personal
identities of said suspects and yet this was not done, the police investigators not even lifting a finger to ascertain whether
the cartographic sketches would match with any enlisted personnel of AFP and PNP, or their civilian agents/assets. As to
the vehicles, the plate numbers of which have earlier been disclosed by James to his family and the CPA as used in
conducting surveillance on him prior to his abduction, the military merely denied having a vehicle with such plate
number on their property list despite the fact that the same plate number (USC 922) was sighted attached to a car which
was parked at the PA-ISU compound in Navy Base, Baguio City. As to the other plate number given by James (TNH 787),
while the police investigators were able to verify the name and address of the registered owner of the vehicle, there is no
showing that said owner had been investigated or that efforts had been made to locate the said

vehicle.Respondents insistence that the CPA produce the alleged companions of James in his rented residence for
investigation by the PNP team, while keeping silent as to why the police investigators had not actively pursued
those evidentiary leads provided by eyewitnessesand the Balao family, only reinforce the trial courts observation that the
investigators are seemingly intent on building up a case against other persons so as to deflect any suspicion of military or
police involvement in James Balaos disappearance.
In view of the foregoing evidentiary gaps, respondents clearly failed to discharge their burden of extraordinary diligence in
the investigation of Jamess abduction. Such ineffective investigation extant in the records of this case prevents us from
completely exonerating the respondents from allegations of accountability for James disappearance. The reports
submitted by the PNP Regional Office, Task Force Balao and Baguio City Police Station do not contain meaningful results
or details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court observed that such reports
of top police officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and
meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search for the victim. [45] In
the same case we stressed that the standard of diligence required the duty of public officials and employees to observe
extraordinary diligence called for extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the
consequent handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
As to the matter of dropping President Arroyo as party-respondent, though not raised in the petitions, we hold that the
trial court clearly erred in holding that presidential immunity cannot be properly invoked in an amparo proceeding. As
president, then President Arroyo was enjoying immunity from suit when the petition for a writ of amparo was filed.
Moreover, the petition is bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to
violate petitioners protected rights. [46]
In order to effectively address thru the amparo remedy the violations of the constitutional rights to liberty and security of
James who remains missing to date, the Court deems it appropriate to refer this case back to the trial court for further
investigation by the PNP and CIDG and monitoring of their investigative activities that complies with the standard of
diligence required by the Amparo Rule. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the PNP Law [47] specifies
the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate to [i]nvestigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal
offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution. The trial court should further validate the results of
such investigations and actions through hearings it may deem necessary to conduct.
Lastly, on the denial of the prayer for interim reliefs under the Amparo Rule.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in
an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. [48] A basic requirement before an amparo court may
grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party
seeking the order.[49] In this case, the issuance of inspection order was properly denied since the petitioners specified
several military and police establishments based merely on the allegation that the testimonies of victims and witnesses
in previous incidents of similar abductions involving activists disclosed that those premises were used as detention
centers. In the same vein, the prayer for issuance of a production order was predicated on petitioners bare allegation that
it obtained confidential information from an unidentified military source, that the name of James was included in the socalled Order of Battle. Indeed, the trial court could not have sanctioned any fishing expedition by precipitate issuance of
inspection and production orders on the basis of insufficient claims of one party.
Nonetheless, the trial court is not precluded, as further evidence warrants, to grant the above interim reliefs to aid it in
making a decision upon evaluation of the actions taken by the respondents under the norm of extraordinary diligence.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 186050 and 186059 are PARTLY GRANTED. The Judgment dated January 19,
2009 of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63, in Special Proceeding No. 08-AMP-0001
is MODIFIED as follows:
1) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo;
2) AFFIRMING the denial of the prayer for inspection and production orders, without prejudice to the subsequent grant
thereof, in the course of hearing and other developments in the investigations by the Philippine National Police/Philippine
National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group and the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
3) ORDERING the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, and the incumbent
Director General of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, to CONTINUE the investigations and actions already
commenced by the Philippine National Police Regional OfficeCordillera, Baguio City Police, Northern Luzon Command,
Philippine National Police/Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Philippine ArmyIntelligence Service Unit and other concerned units, and specifically take and continue to take the necessary steps:
(a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by Task Force Balao;
(b) to locate and search the vehicles bearing the plate numbers submitted by the petitioners and which James Balao had
reported to be conducting surveillance on his person prior to his abduction on September 17, 2008, and investigate the
registered owners or whoever the previous and present possessors/transferees thereof; and to pursue any other leads
relevant to the abduction of James Balao;

The incumbent Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff, Philippine National Police Director General, or their
successors, shall ensure that the investigations and actions of their respective units on the abduction of James Balao are
pursued with extraordinary diligence as required by Sec. 17 of theAmparo Rule.
For purposes of these investigations, the Philippine National Police/Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group shall periodically report the detailed results of its investigation to the trial court for its consideration and
action. On behalf of this Court, the trial court shall pass upon the sufficiency of their investigative efforts. The Philippine
National Police and the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group shall have six (6) months
from notice hereof to undertake their investigations. Within fifteen (15) days after completion of the investigations, the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the DirectorGeneral of the Philippine National Police shall submit
a full report of the results of the said investigations to the trial court. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the trial court
shall submit its full reportto this Court.
These directives and those of the trial court made pursuant to this Decision shall be given to, and shall be directly
enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff, Director General of
the Philippine National Police and Chief of the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group and
other concerned units, under pain of contempt from this Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and
investigation constitute less than the EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE that the Amparo Rule and the circumstances of the
case demand;and
4) DROPPING former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party-respondent in the petition for writ of amparo;
This case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63 for continuation of
proceedings in Special Proceeding No. 08-AMP-0001 for the purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives
and determining whether, in the light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already be sufficient
evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible, or, at least, accountable. After making such determination,
the trial court shall submit its own report and recommendation to this Court for final action. The trial court will continue
to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision;
Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for any responsibilities
and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic
Supreme
Baguio City
EN BANC

of

RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA

LOZADA and ARTURO LOZADA,
Petitioners,

- versus -

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO,

EDUARDO
ERMITA,
AVELINO
RAZON,
ANGEL
ATUTUBO
and
SPO4
ROGER
*
VALEROSO,
Respondents.

the

G.R. Nos. 184379-80

Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
April 24, 2012

Philippines
Court

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
What the Court decides today has nothing to do with the substance or merits surrounding the aborted deal of the
Philippine government with the National Broadband Network and ZTE Corporation, or any allegation of petitioner Rodolfo
Noel June Lozada, Jr., (Lozada) regarding the same. There is only one issue that we decide today whether circumstances
are adequately alleged and proven by petitioner Lozada to entitle him to the protection of the writ of amparo. Before us is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision dated 12 September 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dismissing the
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo.[1]
Petitioner Lozada was the former President and Chief Executive Officer of the Philippine Forest Corporation (PFC), a
government-owned- and -controlled corporation under the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
[2]
Petitioner Violeta Lozada (Violeta) is his wife, while petitioner Arturo Lozada (Arturo) is his brother.
At the time the Petition for the Writ of Amparo was filed, respondent former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former
President Arroyo) was the incumbent President of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Eduardo Ermita (ES Ermita) was then the
Executive Secretary; Avelino Razon (Razon), the Director General of the Philippine National Police (PNP); Angel Atutubo
(Atutubo), the Assistant General Manager for Security and Emergency Services of the Manila International Airport Authority;
and Rodolfo Valeroso (Valeroso), an agent of the Aviation Security Group (ASG) of the PNP.
Antecedent Facts
The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated by a transaction between the Philippine
government, represented by the National Broadband Network (NBN), and ZTE Corporation (ZTE), a Chinese manufacturer
of telecommunications equipment.[3] Former National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary Romulo Neri
(Sec. Neri) sought the services of Lozada as an unofficial consultant in the ZTE-NBN deal. [4] The latter avers that during
the course of his engagement, he discovered several anomalies in the said transaction involving certain public officials.
[5]
These events impelled the Senate of the Philippines Blue Ribbon Committee (Blue Ribbon Committee) to conduct an
investigation thereon,[6] for which it issued a subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify on 30 January 2008. [7]
On that date, instead of appearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Lozada left the country for a purported official trip
to London, as announced by then DENR Secretary Lito Atienza (Sec. Atienza). [8] In the Petition, Lozada alleged that his
failure to appear at the scheduled hearing was upon the instructions of then Executive Assistant Undersecretary Manuel
Gaite (Usec. Gaite).[9] Consequently, the Senate issued an Order dated 30 January 2008: (a) citing Lozada for contempt; (b)
ordering his arrest and detention; and (c) directing the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms to implement the Order and make a
return thereon.[10]
While overseas, Lozada asked Sec. Atienza whether the former could be allowed to go back to the Philippines. [11] Upon the
approval of Sec. Atienza, Lozada informed his family that he was returning from Hong Kong on 5 February 2008 on board
Cathay Pacific Flight No. 919, bound to arrive in Manila at 4:40 p.m. on the same day. [12]
In the Petition, Lozada claims that, upon disembarking from the aircraft, several men held his arms and took his bag.
Although he allegedly insisted on meeting with his family, he later realized that it was wiser to just follow them, especially
when he overheard from their handheld radio: [H]wag kayong dumaan diyan sir nandyan ang mga taga senado.[13]
Lozada asked if he could go to the comfort room, an opportunity he used to call up his brother, petitioner Arturo, and
inform him of his situation. [14] The men thereafter led him through the departure area of the airport and into a car waiting
for them.[15] They made him sit alone at the back of the vehicle, while a man, whom he later discovered to be respondent
Valeroso, took the passenger seat and was always in contact with other individuals. [16] Lozada observed that other cars
tailed their vehicle.[17]
Sec. Atienza then phoned Lozada, assuring the latter that he was with people from the government, and that the former
was going to confer with ES and Ma[a]m. Lozada surmised that these individuals referred to ES Ermita and former
President Arroyo, respectively.[18] Sec. Atienza also purportedly instructed Lozada to pacify his wife, petitioner Violeta, who
was making public statements asking for her husbands return. [19]
The vehicle traversed the South Luzon Expressway and drove towards the direction of Laguna. [20] Along the way, the men
asked Lozada to draft an antedated letter requesting police protection. [21]
Lozada requested that he be brought home to Pasig, but the men were allegedly compelled to deny his request on account
of unidentified security risks. [22]Eventually, however, the vehicle turned around and drove to Libis, Quezon City. The group
stopped at The Outback restaurant to meet with certain individuals, who turned out to be Atty. Antonio Bautista (Atty.
Bautista) and Colonel Paul Mascarinas (Col. Mascarinas) of the Police Special Protection Office (PSPO). At the restaurant,
Lozada claimed that he was made to fill in the blanks of a prepared affidavit. [23]
After the meeting, the men informed Lozada that they were going to billet him in a hotel for a night, but he suggested that
they take him to La Salle Green Hills instead. The men acquiesced. [24]

Upon arriving in La Salle Green Hills, Lozada was met by Violeta and his sister, Carmen Lozada (Carmen). [25] He observed
that the perimeter was guarded by policemen, purportedly restraining his liberty and threatening not only his security,
but also that of his family and the De La Salle brothers. [26]
On 6 February 2008, at around 10:00 a.m., Col. Mascarinas supposedly brought Lozada to the office of Atty. Bautista to
finalize and sign an affidavit.[27]
At about 1:00 p.m., Violeta filed before this Court a Petition for Habeas Corpus, docketed as G.R. No. 181342 (the Habeas
Corpus case).[28] Arturo likewise filed before this Court a Petition for a Writ of Amparo, docketed as G.R. No. 181356
(the Amparo case), and prayed for the issuance of (a) the writ of amparo; (b) a Temporary Protection Order (TPO); and (c)
Inspection and Production Orders as regards documents related to the authority ordering custody over Lozada, as well as
any other document that would show responsibility for his alleged abduction. [29]
At around the same time that Arturo filed the Petition for a Writ of Amparo, Col. Mascarinas drove Lozada back to La Salle
Green Hills.[30] Lozada was then made to sign a typewritten, antedated letter requesting police protection. [31] Thereafter,
former Presidential Spokesperson Michael Defensor (Sec. Defensor) supposedly came and requested Lozada to refute
reports that the latter was kidnapped and to deny knowledge of alleged anomalies in the NBN-ZTE deal. Sec. Defensor
then purportedly gave Lozada P50,000 for the latters expenses.[32]
On 7 February 2008, Lozada decided to hold a press conference and contact the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, who served the
warrant of arrest on him. [33] Lozada claimed that after his press conference and testimony in the Senate, he and his family
were since then harassed, stalked and threatened.[34]
On the same day, this Court issued a Resolution (a) consolidating the Habeas Corpus case and the Amparo case; (b)
requiring respondents in the Habeas Corpus case to comment on the Petition; (c) issuing a Writ of Amparo; (d) ordering
respondents in the Amparo case to file their verified Return; (e) referring the consolidated Petitions to the CA; and (f)
directing the CA to set the cases for hearing on 14 February 2008. [35] Accordingly, the court a quo set both cases for
hearing on 14 February 2008.[36]
On 12 February 2008, respondents filed before the CA a Manifestation and Motion, praying for the dismissal of
the Habeas Corpus case.[37] They asserted that Lozada was never illegally deprived of his liberty and was, at that time, no
longer in their custody. They likewise averred that, beginning 8 February 2008, Lozada had already been under the
supervision of the Senate and, from then on, had been testifying before it. [38]
In their verified Return, respondents claimed that Sec. Atienza had arranged for the provision of a security team to be
assigned to Lozada, who was then fearful for his safety. [39] In effect, respondents asserted that Lozada had knowledge and
control of the events that took place on 5 February 2008, voluntarily entrusted himself to their company, and was never
deprived of his liberty. Hence, respondents prayed for the denial of the interim reliefs and the dismissal of the Petition. [40]
During the initial hearing on 14 February 2008, Lozada and Violeta ratified the Petition in the Amparo case[41] to comply
with Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo,[42] which imposes an order to be followed by those who can sue for the
writ.[43] The CA also dismissed the Habeas Corpus case in open court for being moot and academic, as Lozada was
physically present and was not confined or detained by any of the respondents. [44] Considering that petitioners failed to
question the dismissal of the Habeas Corpus case, the said dismissal had lapsed into finality, leaving only
the Amparo case open for disposition.
Thereafter, Lozada filed a Motion for Temporary Protection Order and Production of Documents, [45] while Arturo filed a
Motion for Production of Documents.[46] Additionally, Arturo also filed a Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad
Testificandum and Presentation of Hostile Witnesses and Adverse Parties Romulo Neri, Benjamin Abalos, [Sr.], Rodolfo
Valeroso, Jaime the Driver and Other Respondents. Respondents opposed these motions. [47] The CA denied the Motion for
the Issuance of Subpoena on the ground that the alleged acts and statements attributed to Sec. Neri and Benjamin Abalos
(Abalos) were irrelevant to the Amparo case, and that to require them to testify would only result in a fishing expedition.
[48]
The CA likewise denied Arturos subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. [49]
In its Resolution dated 5 March 2008, the CA dropped former President Arroyo as a respondent on the ground that at the
time the Petition in the Amparo case was filed, she was still the incumbent President enjoying immunity from suit.
[50]
Arturo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[51] which the CA denied in its Resolution dated 25 March 2008. [52]
On 12 September 2008, the CA rendered its Decision denying petitioners the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and
dismissing the Petition.[53] The CA found that petitioners were unable to prove through substantial evidence that
respondents violated, or threatened with violation, the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada.
Petitioners thus filed the instant Petition, praying for: (a) the reversal of the assailed CA Decision; (b) the issuance of the
TPO; and (c) the accreditation of the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines and the De La Salle
Brothers as the sanctuaries of Lozada and his family. [54] In the alternative, petitioners pray that this Court remand the
case to the CA for further hearings and reverse the latters Orders: (a) denying the Motion to Issue a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum and (b) dropping former President Arroyo as a respondent. Petitioners raise the following issues:
(1)
Whether the Court a [q]uo erred in ruling to dismiss the petition for a writ of amparo and deny Petitioners
prayer for a Temporary Protection Order, inter alia, because there is no substantial evidence to prove that the right to life,
liberty or security of Jun Lozada was violated or threatened with violation. This rule is not in accord with the rule on the
writ of amparo and Supreme Court jurisprudence on substantial evidence[.]

(2)
Whether the Ponencia erred and gravely abused its discretion by prematurely ruling that the testimony of
witnesses which Petitioners sought to present and who are subject of the Motion for Issuance of Subpoena ad
testificandum were irrelevant to the Petition for a Writ of Amparo in a way not in accord with the Rules of Court and
Supreme Court decisions.
(3)
Whether the Court a quo erred in using and considering the affidavits of respondents in coming up with the
questioned decision when these were not offered as evidence and were not subjected to cross-examination. This ruling is
not in accord with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
(4)
Whether the Court a [q]uo erred in dropping as respondent Pres. Gloria Arroyo despite her failure to submit a
verified return and personally claim presidential immunity in a way not in accord with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. [55]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that petitioners failed to adduce substantial evidence, as the allegations
they propounded in support of their Petition were largely hearsay. [56] The OSG also maintains that it was proper for the CA
to have dropped former President Arroyo as respondent on account of her presidential immunity from suit. [57]
Respondent Atutubo also alleges, among others, that: (a) Lozada voluntarily asked for security and protection; (b) Lozada
willingly submitted himself to the company of the police escorts; (c) Atutubo merely accompanied him to pass through the
contingency route customarily provided to VIP passengers, public figures, foreign dignitaries, and the like; and (d) Atutubo
only performed his job to ensure security and maintain order at the airport upon the arrival of Lozada. [58]
In the face of these assertions by respondents, petitioners nevertheless insist that while they have sufficiently established
that Lozada was taken against his will and was put under restraint, respondents have failed to discharge their own burden
to prove that they exercised extraordinary diligence as public officials. [59]Petitioners also maintain that it was erroneous for
the CA to have denied their motion for subpoena ad testificandum for being irrelevant, given that the relevancy of evidence
must be examined after it is offered, and not before. [60] Finally, petitioners contend that the presidential immunity from
suit cannot be invoked in amparoactions.[61]
Issues
In ruling on whether the CA committed reversible error in issuing its assailed Decision, three issues must be discussed:
I.
Whether the CA committed an error in dropping former President Arroyo as a respondent in
the Amparo case.
II.
Whether the CA committed an error in denying petitioners Motion for the Issuance of a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum.
III.
Whether petitioners should be granted the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Discussion
The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief to protect the peoples right
to life, liberty and security.[62] Having been originally intended as a response to the alarming cases of extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances in the country, it serves both preventive and curative roles to address the said human rights
violations. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is
curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation
and action.[63]
As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to
threats thereof.[64] Considering that this remedy is aimed at addressing these serious violations of or threats to the right to
life, liberty and security, it cannot be issued on amorphous and uncertain grounds, [65] or in cases where the alleged threat
has ceased and is no longer imminent or continuing.[66] Instead, it must be granted judiciously so as not to dilute the
extraordinary and remedial character of the writ, thus:
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of
persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and
adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the
remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and
undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to
secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.[67](Emphasis supplied.)
Using this perspective as the working framework for evaluating the assailed CA decision and the evidence adduced by the
parties, this Court denies the Petition.
First issue: Presidential immunity from suit
It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his or her tenure of office or actual
incumbency.[68] Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for
acts committed during his or her tenure. [69]

In the case at bar, the events that gave rise to the present action, as well as the filing of the original Petition and the
issuance of the CA Decision, occurred during the incumbency of former President Arroyo. In that respect, it was proper for
the court a quo to have dropped her as a respondent on account of her presidential immunity from suit.
It must be underscored, however, that since her tenure of office has already ended, former President Arroyo can no longer
invoke the privilege of presidential immunity as a defense to evade judicial determination of her responsibility or
accountability for the alleged violation or threatened violation of the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada.
Nonetheless, examining the merits of the case still results in the denial of the Petition on the issue of former President
Arroyos alleged responsibility or accountability. A thorough examination of the allegations postulated and the evidence
adduced by petitioners reveals their failure to sufficiently establish any unlawful act or omission on her part that violated, or
threatened with violation, the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada. Except for the bare claims that: (a) Sec. Atienza
mentioned a certain Ma[a]m,[70] whom Lozada speculated to have referred to her, and (b) Sec. Defensor told Lozada that the
President was hurting from all the media frenzy, [71] there is nothing in the records that would sufficiently establish the link of
former President Arroyo to the events that transpired on 5-6 February 2010, as well as to the subsequent threats that
Lozada and his family purportedly received.
Second issue: Denial of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum
This Court, in Roco v. Contreras,[72] ruled that for a subpoena to issue, it must first appear that the person or documents
sought to be presented are prima facierelevant to the issue subject of the controversy, to wit:
A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at
any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition.
In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces
tecum. The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the production of books, records,
things or documents therein specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil Company:
The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the exception that it
concludes with an injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the examination the books,
documents, or things described in the subpoena.
Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the following
requisites are present: (1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the
issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to
be readily identified (test of definiteness).[73] (Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, the CA correctly denied petitioners Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum on the
ground that the testimonies of the witnesses sought to be presented during trial were prima facie irrelevant to the issues
of the case. The court a quo aptly ruled in this manner:
The alleged acts and statements attributed by the petitioner to Neri and Abalos are not relevant to the
instant Amparo Petition where the issue involved is whether or not Lozadas right to life, liberty and security was
threatened or continues to be threatened with violation by the unlawful act/s of the respondents. Evidence, to be relevant,
must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence. Further, Neri, Abalos and
a certain driver Jaime are not respondents in this Amparo Petition and the vague allegations averred in the Motion with
respect to them do not pass the test of relevancy. To Our mind, petitioner appears to be embarking on a fishing expedition.
Petitioner should present the aggrieved party [Lozada], who has been regularly attending the hearings, to prove the
allegations in the Amparo Petition, instead of dragging the names of other people into the picture. We have repeatedly
reminded the parties, in the course of the proceedings, that the instant Amparo Petition does not involve the
investigation of the ZTE-[NBN] contract. Petitioner should focus on the fact in issue and not embroil this Court into
said ZTE-NBN contract, which is now being investigated by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the Office of the
Ombudsman.[74] (Emphasis supplied.)
All the references of petitioners to either Sec. Neri or Abalos were solely with respect to the ZTE-NBN deal, and not to the
events that transpired on 5-6 February 2008, or to the ensuing threats that petitioners purportedly received. Although the
present action is rooted from the involvement of Lozada in the said government transaction, the testimonies of Sec. Neri or
Abalos are nevertheless not prima facie relevant to the main issue of whether there was an unlawful act or omission on
the part of respondents that violated the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada. Thus, the CA did not commit any
reversible error in denying the Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum.
Third issue: Grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo
A. Alleged violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada
Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires the parties to establish their claims by substantial
evidence,[75] or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [76] The use
of this evidentiary threshold reveals the clear intent of the framers of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo to have the
equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing amparo situations.[77]

In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security has already ceased, it is necessary for the petitioner in
an amparo action to prove the existence of a continuing threat. [78] Thus, this Court held in its Resolution in Razon v.
Tagitis:[79]
Manalo is different from Tagitis in terms of their factual settings, as enforced disappearance was no longer a problem in
that case. The enforced disappearance of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo effectively ended when they
escaped from captivity and surfaced, while Tagitis is still nowhere to be found and remains missing more than two years
after his reported disappearance. An Amparo situation subsisted in Manalo, however, because of the continuing
threat to the brothers right to security; the brothers claimed that since the persons responsible for their enforced
disappearance were still at large and had not been held accountable, the former were still under the threat of being once
again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which threat constituted a direct violation of their right to security of person.
[80]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioners failed to meet the threshold of substantial evidence.
Sifting through all the evidence and allegations presented, the crux of the case boils down to assessing the veracity and
credibility of the parties diverging claims as to what actually transpired on 5-6 February 2008. In this regard, this Court
is in agreement with the factual findings of the CA to the extent that Lozada was not illegally deprived of his liberty from
the point when he disembarked from the aircraft up to the time he was led to the departure area of the airport, [81] as he
voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of respondents:
[Lozada] was one of the first few passengers to get off the plane because he was instructed by Secretary Atienza, th[r]ough
a phone call on the night of 04 February 2008, while he was still in Hong Kong, to proceed directly to the Bureau of
Immigration so that few people would notice him and he could be facilitated in going out of the airport without
any hassle from the people of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms. Again, [Lozada] stated that he wanted to get away from the
Senate people. [Lozada] even went to the mens room of the airport, after he was allegedly grabbed, where he made a call to
his brother Arturo, using his Globe phone, and he was not prevented from making said call, and was simply advised by
the person who met him at the tube to (sic) sir, bilisan mo na. When they proceeded out of the tube and while walking,
[Lozada] heard from the radio track down, wag kayo dyan, sir, nandyan yong mga taga Senado, so they took a detour and
went up to the departure area, did not go out of the normal arrival area, and proceeded towards the elevator near the
Duty Free Shop and then down towards the tarmac. Since [Lozada] was avoiding the people from the Office of the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, said detour appears to explain why they did not get out at the arrival area, where
[Lozada] could have passed through immigration so that his passport could be properly stamped.
This Court does not find any evidence on record that [Lozada] struggled or made an outcry for help when he was
allegedly grabbed or abducted at the airport. [Lozada] even testified that nobody held him, and they were not
hostile to him nor shouted at him. With noon day clarity, this Court finds that the reason why [Lozada] was fetched at
the airport was to help him avoid the Senate contingent, who would arrest and detain him at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms, until such time that he would appear and give his testimony, pursuant to the Order of the Senate on
the NBN-ZTE Project. [Lozada] clearly knew this because at that time, it was still his decision not to testify before
the Senate. He agreed with that plan.[82] (Emphases supplied.)
The foregoing statements show that Lozada personally sought the help of Sec. Atienza to avoid the Senate personnel, and
thus knew that the men who met him at the airport were there to aid him in such objective. Surely, the actions of Lozada
evinced knowledge and voluntariness, uncharacteristic of someone who claims to have been forcibly abducted.
However, these mens subsequent acts of directing Lozada to board the vehicle and driving him around, without disclosing
the exact purpose thereof, appear to be beyond what he had consented to and requested from Sec. Atienza. These men
neither informed him of where he was being transported nor provided him complete liberty to contact his family members
to assure them of his safety. These acts demonstrated that he lacked absolute control over the situation, as well as an
effective capacity to challenge their instructions.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally restrained, so much so that his right to
liberty and security had been violated, the acts that manifested this restraint had already ceased and has consequently
rendered the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo moot. Whether or not Lozada was deprived of his liberty from the
point when he was led inside the vehicle waiting for him at the airport up to the time he was taken to La Salle Green Hills,
petitioners assertions that Lozada and his family continue to suffer various threats from respondents remain unproven.
The CA correctly found as follows:
The supposed announcement of General Razon over the radio that [Lozada] was in the custody of the PNP can
neither be construed as a threat to [Lozadas] life, liberty and security. Certainly, no person in his right mind would
make that kind of media announcement if his intent was indeed to threaten somebodys life, liberty and security.
xxx xxx xxx
He claims that he is threatened by the alleged presence of armed men riding in motorcycle passing outside the De La
Salle premises where he and his family are staying and by alleged threats of armed men around him at places where he

went to. Again, these alleged threats were not proven by any evidence at all, as having originated from any of the
respondents.
[Lozada] also considers the installation of the surveillance camera at the De La Salle and at St. Scholastica as
indirect threat to his right to life, liberty and security. He claims that these are spy cameras. However, save for [Lozadas]
self-serving claim, he simply failed to prove that they were installed or ordered installed by the respondentsfor the
purpose of threatening his right to life, liberty and security.
[Lozada] further maintains that there is an alleged trend, i.e., wherever he goes, there is a bomb threat. There were bomb
threats in the places where he went to like in [the Polytechnic University of the Philippines], Dagupan, Cebu and Bohol.
However, [Lozada] himself testified that he did not try to ascertain where the bomb threats emanated. Plainly, there is no
evidence on record that the bomb threats were made by the respondents or done upon their instigation.
Moreover, [Lozada] views the pronouncement of the Secretary of Justice that he was put on the watch list of the Bureau of
Immigration as a threat to his life, liberty and security. This alleged threat is again unsupported by evidence, as in fact,
[Lozada] testified that he did not ascertain from the Bureau of Immigration whether his name was actually in the
official watch list of the Bureau. At any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not one of the respondents in
the amparo petition, and there is no showing in the record that it was the respondents who ordered the same for the
purpose of threatening him.
[Lozada] harps on the filing of alleged frivolous cases against him and his family as threat to his life, liberty and
security. xxx However, [Lozada] himself testified that he does not know whether the respondents or any of the
respondents ordered the filing of these cases against him. In any event, said purported cases are to be determined
based on their own merits and are clearly beyond the realm of the instant amparo petition filed against the
respondents.[83] (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, petitioners insist that while they were able to sufficiently establish their case by the required evidentiary standard,
respondents failed to discharge their burden to prove their defenses by substantial evidence and to show that respondents
exercised extraordinary diligence as required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.[84] This Court has squarely passed upon
this contention in Yano v. Sanchez,[85] to wit:
The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result
in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her
claim by substantial evidence.
Thus, in amparo actions, petitioners must establish their claims by substantial evidence, and they cannot merely rely on
the supposed failure of respondents to prove either their defenses or their exercise of extraordinary diligence. In this case,
the totality of the evidence presented by petitioners fails to meet the requisite evidentiary threshold, and the privilege of
the writ of amparo has already been rendered moot and academic by the cessation of the restraint to Lozadas liberty.
B. Propriety of the privilege of the writ of amparo and its interim reliefs
As previously discussed, there is no basis to grant Lozada the privilege of the writ of amparo, considering that the illegal
restraint alleged in this case had already ceased and there is no imminent or continuing restriction on his
liberty. In Castillo v. Cruz,[86] this Court held as follows:
Although respondents release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent
any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty ,
and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the
issuance of the writ cannot be justified. (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, it appears that Lozada had already filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ) a Complaint charging
respondents with kidnapping and attempted murder, docketed as I.S. No. 2008-467. [87] In this regard, this Courts ruling
in Rubrico v. Arroyo[88] is worth considering:
First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for arbitrary detention rooted in the same acts and
incidents leading to the filing of the subjectamparo petition has been instituted with the OMB, docketed as OMBP-C-O7-0602-E. The usual initial steps to determine the existence of a prima facie case against the five (5) impleaded
individuals suspected to be actually involved in the detention of Lourdes have been set in motion. It must be pointed out,
though, that the filing of the OMB complaint came before the effectivity of the Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007.
Second, Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action have, in the
meanwhile, been commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23, on the other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is filed
subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action where the AmparoRule
shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule. Under the terms of said Sec. 22, the present petition
ought to have been dismissed at the outset. But as things stand, the outright dismissal of the petition by force of that
section is no longer technically feasible in light of the interplay of the following factual mix: (1) the Court has, pursuant to
Sec. 6 of the Rule, already issued ex parte the writ of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary hearing, has dismissed the
petition, but not on the basis of Sec. 22; and (3) the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named as respondents only those
believed to be the actual abductors of Lourdes, while the instant petition impleaded, in addition, those tasked to

investigate the kidnapping and detention incidents and their superiors at the top. Yet, the acts and/or omissions subject
of the criminal complaint and the amparo petition are so linked as to call for the consolidation of both proceedings to
obviate the mischief inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation.
Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the writ of amparo as an inexpensive and effective
tool to protect certain rights violated or threatened to be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a degree the literal
application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly address the situation obtaining under the premises. Towards
this end, two things are at once indicated: (1) the consolidation of the probe and fact-finding aspects of the instant
petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal
complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right to security. Withal, the OMB should be
furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid that body in its own investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-CO7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall be given easy access to all pertinent documents and evidence, if any, adduced before
the CA. Necessarily, Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so minded, to amend her
basic criminal complaint if the consolidation of cases is to be fully effective. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, if the Complaint filed before the DOJ had already progressed into a criminal case, then the latter action can more
adequately dispose of the allegations made by petitioners. After all, one of the ultimate objectives of the writ of amparo as
a curative remedy is to facilitate the subsequent punishment of perpetrators. [89]On the other hand, if there is no actual
criminal case lodged before the courts, then the denial of the Petition is without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
administrative, civil or criminal case, if applicable, against those individuals whom Lozada deems to have unduly
restrained his liberty.
Finally, with respect to the interim reliefs sought by petitioners, this Court, in Yano v. Sanchez,[90] declined to grant the
prayer for the issuance of a TPO, as well as Inspection and Production Orders, upon a finding that the implicated public
officials were not accountable for the disappearance subject of that case. Analogously, it would be incongruous to grant
herein petitioners prayer for a TPO and Inspection and Production Orders and at the same time rule that there no longer
exists any imminent or continuing threat to Lozadas right to life, liberty and security. Thus, there is no basis on which a
prayer for the issuance of these interim reliefs can be anchored.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for being moot and academic. The Court of Appeals denial of the privilege of
the writ of amparo is herebyAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
EDGARDO NAVIA,[1] RUBEN
DIO,[2] and ANDREW BUISING,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 184467

Present:

- versus -

CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in

behalf and in representation of
Promulgated:
BENHUR V. PARDICO
Respondent.
June 19, 2012
x--------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are
missing are not enough. It must also be shown by the required quantum of proof that their disappearance was carried out by, or with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of, [the government] or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge [the
same or] give information on the fate or whereabouts of [said missing] persons.[3]
This petition for review on certiorari[4] filed in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC[5] challenges the July 24, 2008 Decision[6] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Malolos City which granted the Petition for Writ of Amparo[7] filed by herein respondent
against the petitioners.
Factual Antecedents
On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation[8] (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita
M. Lapore (Lolita) located at 7A Lot 9, Block 54, Grand Royale Subdivision, Barangay Lugam, Malolos City. The arrival of the vehicle
awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went
out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they
could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the
security office of Asian Landbecause a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision.[9]
Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale
Subdivision.[10] The supervisor of the security guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia (Navia), also arrived thereat.
As to what transpired next, the parties respective versions diverge.
Version of the Petitioners
Petitioners alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to their office because they received a report from a certain Mrs. Emphasis, a
resident of Grand Royale Subdivision, that she saw Bong and Ben removing a lamp from a post in said subdivision. [11] The reported
unauthorized taking of the lamp was relayed thru radio to petitioners Ruben Dio (Dio) and Andrew Buising (Buising), who both work
as security guards at the Asian Land security department. Following their departments standard operating procedure, Dio and
Buising entered the report in their logbook and proceeded to the house of Mrs. Emphasis. It was there where Dio and Buising were
able to confirm who the suspects were. They thus repaired to the house of Lolita where Bong and Ben were staying to invite the two
suspects to their office. Bong and Ben voluntarily went with them.
At the security office, Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and Ben. The suspects admitted that they took the lamp but clarified that
they were only transferring it to a post nearer to the house of Lolita. [12] Soon, Navia arrived and Buising informed him that the
complainant was not keen in participating in the investigation. Since there was no complainant, Navia ordered the release of Bong and
Ben. Bong then signed a statement to the effect that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or injury to him. [13] His
mother Lolita also signed the logbook below an entry which states that she will never again harbor or entertain Ben in her
house. Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left the security office.
Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him about those who might be involved in the reported loss of electric wires and
lamps within the subdivision. After a brief discussion though, Navia allowed Ben to leave. Ben also affixed his signature on the
logbook to affirm the statements entered by the guards that he was released unharmed and without any injury.[14]
Upon Navias instructions, Dio and Buising went back to the house of Lolita to make her sign the logbook as witness that they indeed
released Ben from their custody. Lolita asked Buising to read aloud that entry in the logbook where she was being asked to sign, to
which Buising obliged. Not contented, Lolita put on her reading glasses and read the entry in the logbook herself before affixing her
signature therein. After which, the guards left.
Subsequently, petitioners received an invitation[15] from the Malolos City Police Station requesting them to appear thereat on April 17,
2008 relative to the complaint of Virginia Pardico (Virginia) about her missing husband Ben. In compliance with the invitation, all
three petitioners appeared at the Malolos City Police Station. However, since Virginia was not present despite having received the
same invitation, the meeting was reset to April 22, 2008.[16]
On April 22, 2008, Virginia attended the investigation. Petitioners informed her that they released Ben and that they have no
information as to his present whereabouts.[17] They assured Virginia though that they will cooperate and help in the investigation of
her missing husband.[18]

Version of the Respondent

According to respondent, Bong and Ben were not merely invited. They were unlawfully arrested, shoved into the Asian Land vehicle
and brought to the security office for investigation. Upon seeing Ben at the security office, Navia lividly grumbled Ikaw na naman?
[19]
and slapped him while he was still seated. Ben begged for mercy, but his pleas were met with a flurry of punches coming from
Navia hitting him on different parts of his body.[20] Navia then took hold of his gun, looked at Bong, and said, Wala kang nakita at wala
kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben.[21]
Bong admitted that he and Ben attempted to take the lamp. He explained that the area where their house is located is very dark and
his father had long been asking the administrator of Grand Royale Subdivision to install a lamp to illumine their area. But since
nothing happened, he took it upon himself to take a lamp from one of the posts in the subdivision and transfer it to a post near their
house. However, the lamp Bong got was no longer working. Thus, he reinstalled it on the post from which he took it and no longer
pursued his plan. [22]
Later on, Lolita was instructed to sign an entry in the guards logbook where she undertook not to allow Ben to stay in her house
anymore.[23] Thereafter, Navia again asked Lolita to sign the logbook. Upon Lolitas inquiry as to why she had to sign again, Navia
explained that they needed proof that they released her son Bong unharmed but that Ben had to stay as the latters case will be
forwarded to the barangay. Since she has poor eyesight, Lolita obligingly signed the logbook without reading it and then left with
Bong.[24]At that juncture, Ben grabbed Bong and pleaded not to be left alone. However, since they were afraid of Navia, Lolita and Bong
left the security office at once leaving Ben behind.[25]
Moments after Lolita and Bong reached their house, Buising arrived and asked Lolita to sign the logbook again. Lolita asked Buising
why she had to sign again when she already twice signed the logbook at the headquarters. Buising assured her that what she was
about to sign only pertains to Bongs release. Since it was dark and she has poor eyesight, Lolita took Buisings word and signed the
logbook without, again, reading what was written in it. [26]
The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit her husband Ben, but only to be told that petitioners
had already released him together with Bong the night before. She then looked for Ben, asked around, and went to
the barangay. Since she could not still find her husband, Virginia reported the matter to the police.
In the course of the investigation on Bens disappearance, it dawned upon Lolita that petitioners took advantage of her poor eyesight
and naivete. They made her sign the logbook as a witness that they already released Ben when in truth and in fact she never
witnessed his actual release. The last time she saw Ben was when she left him in petitioners custody at the security office.[27]
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo[28] before the RTC of
Malolos City. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the amparo court issued an Order[29] dated June 26, 2008
directing, among others, the issuance of a writ of amparo and the production of the body of Ben before it on June 30, 2008. Thus:
WHEREFORE, conformably with Section 6 of the Supreme Court Resolution [in] A.M. No. 07-[9]-12-SC, also known as The Rule On
The Writ Of Amparo, let a writ of amparo be issued, as follows:
(1)
ORDERING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising of the Asian Land Security Agency to produce before
the Court the body of aggrieved party Benhur Pardico, on Monday, June 30, 2008, at 10:30 a.m.;
(2)
ORDERING the holding of a summary hearing of the petition on the aforementioned date and time, and DIRECTING the
[petitioners] to personally appear thereat;
(3)
COMMANDING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising to file, within a non-extendible period of seventytwo (72) hours from service of the writ, a verified written return with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain
the following:
a) The lawful defenses to show that the [petitioners] did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party, through any act or omission;
b)
The steps or actions taken by the [petitioners] to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person
or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
c)
party.

All relevant information in the possession of the [petitioners] pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved

(4)
GRANTING, motu proprio, a Temporary Protection Order prohibiting the [petitioners], or any persons acting for and in their
behalf, under pain of contempt, from threatening, harassing or inflicting any harm to [respondent], his immediate family and any
[member] of his household.
The Branch Sheriff is directed to immediately serve personally on the [petitioners], at their address indicated in the petition, copies of
the writ as well as this order, together with copies of the petition and its annexes.[30]

A Writ of Amparo[31] was accordingly issued and served on the petitioners on June 27, 2008.[32] On June 30, 2008, petitioners filed
their Compliance[33] praying for the denial of the petition for lack of merit.
A summary hearing was thereafter conducted. Petitioners presented the testimony of Buising, while Virginia submitted the sworn
statements[34] of Lolita and Enrique which the two affirmed on the witness stand.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 24, 2008, the trial court issued the challenged Decision[35] granting the petition. It disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the privilege of the writ of amparo, and deems it proper and appropriate, as follows:
(a)
To hereby direct the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to immediately conduct a deep and thorough investigation of the
[petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising in connection with the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of
[Benhur] Pardico, utilizing in the process, as part of the investigation, the documents forming part of the records of this case;
(b)
To hereby direct the NBI to extend to the family of [Benhur] Pardico and the witnesses who testified in this case protection as
it may deem necessary to secure their safety and security; and
(c)
To hereby direct the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to investigate the circumstances concerning the legality of
the arrest of [Benhur] Pardico by the [petitioners] in this case, utilizing in the process, as part of said investigation, the pertinent
documents and admissions forming part of the record of this case, and take whatever course/s of action as may be warranted.
Furnish immediately copies of this decision to the NBI, through the Office of Director Nestor Mantaring, and to the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bulacan.
SO ORDERED.[36]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[37] which was denied by the trial court in an Order[38] dated August 29, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues for our consideration:
4.1. WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO.
4.1.1. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT PETITIONERS HAVE COMMITTED OR ARE COMMITTING
ACTS IN VIOLATION OF HER HUSBANDS RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY, OR SECURITY.
4.1.2. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR
PARDICO.
4.1.3. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE ALLEGED DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO
WAS AT THE INSTANCE OF HEREIN PETITIONERS.[39]
Petitioners Arguments

Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the writ of amparo is available only in cases
where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened violation of the aggrieved partys right to life, liberty and security are
clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at bench, Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its
face as it failed to state with some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners constituting a violation of

or a threat to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence Virginia adduced that Ben is
missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance. On the other hand, the entries in the logbook which bear the
signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners released Ben on March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners
thus posit that the trial court erred in issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for Bens disappearance.
Our Ruling
Virginias Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective and must perforce be dismissed, but not for the reasons adverted to by the
petitioners.
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity. [40]
Here, Bens right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as the parties do not dispute his identity as the same person summoned
and questioned at petitioners security office on the night of March 31, 2008. Such uncontroverted fact ipso facto established Bens
inherent and constitutionally enshrined right to life, liberty and security. Article 6[41]of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights[42] recognizes every human beings inherent right to life, while Article 9 [43] thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty
and security. The right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and security cannot be impaired except on grounds
provided by and in accordance with law. This overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and security without due
process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.[44]
The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Bens disappearance as alleged in Virginias petition and proved during the
summary proceedings conducted before the court a quo, falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and relevant laws.
It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis ours.)

While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs coverage, said Rules does not, however, define extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. This omission was intentional as the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court which drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12SC chose to allow it to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through substantive laws as may be promulgated by Congress.
[45]
Then, the budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis[46] when this Court defined enforced
disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally accepted principles of international law and adopted the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances definition of enforced disappearances, as the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of
the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.[47]
Not long thereafter, another significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC came about after Congress enacted Republic Act
(RA) No. 9851[48] on December 11, 2009. Section 3(g) thereof defines enforced or involuntary disappearances as follows:
(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing
from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

Then came Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo[49] where Justice Arturo D. Brion wrote in his Separate Opinion that with the enactment of RA
No. 9851, the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to the rights to life,
liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition as well of what an enforced or involuntary disappearance is.[50] Therefore,
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs reference to enforced disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or involuntary disappearance
of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of RA No. 9851. Meaning, in probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851.

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that constitute it:
(a)

that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b)

that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;

(c)
that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d)

that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof
are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same
or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
indispensable element of government participation.
In the present case, we do not doubt Bongs testimony that Navia had a menacing attitude towards Ben and that he slapped and
inflicted fistic blows upon him. Given the circumstances and the pugnacious character of Navia at that time, his threatening
statement, Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben, cannot be taken lightly. It unambiguously showed his
predisposition at that time. In addition, there is nothing on record which would support petitioners assertion that they released Ben
on the night of March 31, 2008 unscathed from their wrath. Lolita sufficiently explained how she was prodded into affixing her
signatures in the logbook without reading the entries therein. And so far, the information petitioners volunteered are sketchy at best,
like the alleged complaint of Mrs. Emphasis who was never identified or presented in court and whose complaint was never reduced in
writing.
But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that
such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This
indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity,
and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact,
none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginias amparo petition whether as responsible or
accountable persons.[51] Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Bens
disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the Court
willdefinitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or
accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if
the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government
involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale
Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the
government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental
operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be
attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from
an ordinary case of a missing person.
WHEREFORE, the July 24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Malolos City, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Petition for Writ of Amparo filed by Virginia Pardico is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic
SUPREME
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 204528

of

February 19, 2013

the

Philippines
COURT

SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0.
ESMERALDA, Petitioners,
vs.
MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Submitted for our resolution is a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin "the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Manila from implementing its Decision x x x in Civil Case No.
12-127405 granting respondent's application for the issuance of inspection and production orders x x x." 1 This is raised
through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 from the "Decision" rendered by the Regional Trial Court dated 20
March 2012.
From the records, it appears that on 27 February 2012, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance
of a Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 2 This case was docketed as In the Matter of the Petition for
Issuance of Writ of Amparo of Atty. Magtanggol B. Gatdula, SP No. 12-127405. It was raffled to the sala of Judge Silvino T.
Pampilo, Jr. on the same day.
The Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy
Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for brevity). Gatdula wanted De
Lima, et al. "to cease and desist from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges
of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the alleged ambush incident." 3
Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an
Answer.4 He also set the case for hearing on 1 March 2012. The hearing was held allegedly for determining whether a
temporary protection order may be issued. During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not
an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases.5
In an Order dated 2 March 2012,6 Judge Pampilo insisted that "[s]ince no writ has been issued, return is not the required
pleading but answer".7 The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in Amparo cases.8 He opined that the
Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer. 9
Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on 7 March 2012. 10 Even without a Return nor an
Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda within five (5) working days after that hearing. Since the
period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed by then, the judge also decided that the memorandum of De Lima, et al. would
be filed in lieu of their Answer.11
On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The RTC also granted the
interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection, production and inspection orders. The production and inspection
orders were in relation to the evidence and reports involving an on-going investigation of the attempted assassination of
Deputy Director Esmeralda. It is not clear from the records how these pieces of evidence may be related to the alleged
threat to the life, liberty or security of the respondent Gatdula.
In an Order dated 8 October 2012, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 March 2012 filed by De Lima,
et al.
Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court assailing the RTC "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through
a Petition for Review on Certiorari (With Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of
Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45, as enunciated in Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9- 12-SC,
25 September 2007), viz:
SEC. 19. Appeal. Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The
appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both. x x x (Emphasis supplied).
It is the Courts view that the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ of Amparo is not the judgment or final
order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this
time.
The RTC and the Parties must understand the nature of the remedy of Amparo to put its procedures in the proper context.
The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life,
liberty12 and security13 as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. 14 The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise
of the Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. 15 It
aims to address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. 16
Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was devised to afford swift but decisive
relief.17 It is initiated through a petition18 to be filed in a Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or
the Supreme Court.19 The judge or justice then makes an "immediate" evaluation20 of the facts as alleged in the petition
and the affidavits submitted "with the attendant circumstances detailed". 21 After evaluation, the judge has the option
to issue the Writ of Amparo22 or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the petition and the supporting
affidavits do not show that the petitioner's right to life, liberty or security is under threat or the acts complained of are not
unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in motion presumptive judicial protection for the

petitioner. The court compels the respondents to appear before a court of law to show whether the grounds for more
permanent protection and interim reliefs are necessary.
The respondents are required to file a Return23 after the issuance of the writ through the clerk of court. The Return serves
as the responsive pleading to the petition.24 Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside from identifying the
issues in the case. Respondents are also required to detail the actions they had taken to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to state the actions they had taken to: (i) verify
the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii) recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person
identified in the petition; (iii) identify witnesses and obtain statements concerning the death or disappearance; (iv)
determine the cause, manner, location, and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may
have brought about the death or disappearance; and (vi) bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. 25 Clearly
these matters are important to the judge so that s/he can calibrate the means and methods that will be required to
further the protections, if any, that will be due to the petitioner.
There will be a summary hearing26 only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition and whether
interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte.27 After the hearing, the court will
render the judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. 28
If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as
may be proper and appropriate. 29 The judgment should contain measures which the judge views as essential for the
continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures must be detailed enough so that the judge may
be able to verify and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject to appeal to
the Supreme Court via Rule 45.30 After the measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied.
In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioners life, liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by the
court that renders the judgment. Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through consolidation should a
subsequent case be filed either criminal or civil. 31 Until the full satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary remedy
of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of constitutional rights.
The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not be the judgment or final order that is
appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is clear from the tenor of the dispositive portion of
the "Decision", to wit:
The Branch Clerk of Court of Court [sic] is hereby DIRECTED to issue the Writ of Amparo.
Likewise, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to effect the service of the Writ of Amparo in an expeditious
manner upon all concerned, and for this purpose may call upon the assistance of any military or civilian agency of the
government.
This "Decision" pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, not
thejudgment under Section 18. The "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary
protection, production and inspection orders were given together with the decision. The temporary protection, production
and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final
judgment is rendered.32
The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the RTC.
First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for
petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to
provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In
utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.
Judge Pampilos basis for requiring an Answer was mentioned in his Order dated 2 March 2012:
Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ of Amparo], the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not
inconsistent with the said rule.
Considering the summary nature of the petition, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure shall apply.
Section 5. Answer Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his Answer to the complaint
and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. x x x
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the respondents are required to file their Answer ten (days) from receipt of this
Order.33
The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special rule that the Court has devised for the following
circumstances:
SECTION 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within
their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases:
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x.
(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the plaintiffs claim does not exceed x x x.

B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six
months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, x x x.
xxxx
It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how
this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary
procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. 34 It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.
The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a
Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.
Worse, is the trial courts third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer) of De
Lima, et al.
The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done
prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is
a final pleading usually required before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these
submissions have different functions in facilitating the suit.
More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.35
The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. In the body of its decision, the RTC stated:
"Accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and the interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner."
(Emphasis supplied).
This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since the phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo:
"SEC. 18. Judgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for
decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the
writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis supplied).
The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The
privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo. After
examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary hearing, the
judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or
the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.1wphi1 It is tantamount to a failure of the
judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ
ofAmparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or
ritualistic as "granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo."
The procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that petitioners used in elevating the matter to this
Court.
It is the responsibility of counsels for the parties to raise issues using the proper procedure at the right time. Procedural
rules are meant to assist the parties and courts efficiently deal with the substantive issues pertaining to a case. When it is
the judge himself who disregards the rules of procedure, delay and confusion result.
The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order denominated as "Decision"dated 20 March
2012. A Petition for Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited. 36 Simply dismissing the present petition, however, will
cause grave injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo were promulgated.
In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules in order to promote a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. 37 The rules can be suspended on the following grounds: (1) matters
of life, liberty, honor or property, (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of the case, (4) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (5) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.38
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the irregularities committed by the trial court judge, and by
virtue of its powers under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution, the Court RESOLVES to:
(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. after respondent Gatdula
filed the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo;

(2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt of this Resolutionwhether the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of this Resolution on Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of
Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for his proper guidance together with a WARNING that further deviation
or improvisation from the procedure set in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC shall be meted with severe consequences.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 183460
March 12, 2013
Spouses NERIO and SOLEDAD PADOR and REY PADOR, Petitioners,
vs.
Barangay Captain BERNABE ARCAYAN, Barangay Tanod CHIEF ROMEO PADOR, Barangay Tanods ALBERTO
ALIVIO, CARMELO REVALES, ROBERTO ALIMORIN, WINELO ARCAYAN, CHRISTOPHER ALIVIO & BIENVENIDO
ARCAYAN, all of Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assails the Resolution2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Cebu City, in
Spec. Proc. No. 16061-CEB. The RTC Resolution denied the Petition for a Writ of Amparo filed by petitioner-spouses Nerio
and Soledad Pador and Rey Pador against respondents - Barangay Captain Bernabe Arcayan, Barangay Tanod Chief
Romeo Pador, and Barangay Tanods Alberto Alivio, Carmela Revales, Roberto Alimorin, Winelo Arcayan, Christopher Alivio
and Bienvenido Arcayan.
On 22 March 2008, petitioners filed with the RTC a Verified Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo. 3
Petitioners alleged that in February 2008, rumors circulated that petitioner Nerio Pador was a marijuana planter in
Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City.4 On 17 March 2008, respondents Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales and Roberto Alimorin
raided their ampalaya farm to search for marijuana plants, but found none. 5 After the raid, petitioners Nerio and Rey
Pador received invitation letters for a conference from respondent Barangay Captain Arcayan. 6They referred the invitation
letters to their counsel, who advised them not to attend and, instead, send a letter-reply to Barangay Captain Arcayan.
When the latter received the letter-reply, he allegedly read its contents, got one copy, and refused to sign a receipt of the
document.7 Petitioners then concluded that the conduct of the raid, the sending of the invitation letters, the refusal of
respondent barangay captain to receive their letter-reply as well as the possibility of more harassment cases, false
accusations, and possible violence from respondents gravely threatened their right to life, liberty and security and
necessitated the issuance of a writ of amparo. 8
After examining the contents of the petition and the affidavits attached to it, the RTC issued the Writ and directed
respondents to make a verified return. 9
In compliance with the RTCs directive, respondents filed their Verified Return and/or Comment. 10 In their counterstatement of facts, they alleged that on 16 March 2008, respondent Winelo Arcayan received a report regarding the alleged
existence of a marijuana plantation in a place called Sitio Gining in Barangay Tabunan. 11He then referred the matter to
Barangay Tanod Chief Romeo Pador and Barangay Captain Arcayan, who commenced to organize a patrol. 12
On the morning of 17 March 2008, while the barangay tanods were having a final briefing, Carmelo Revales left the place
to take his breakfast. 13 While he was taking his breakfast, Nerio Pador, who was riding a motorcycle, stopped and accused
the former of uprooting the marijuana plants. 14 Carmelo denied any knowledge about the incident, and Nerio thereafter
threatened to have him killed. Carmelo promptly reported this threat to the other barangay tanods. 15
Respondents recounted that, notwithstanding Nerios actions, they proceeded to patrol the area. 16 When they passed by
the house of Nerio, he angrily uttered in Cebuano, "If I will be informed who reported the matter to the police, I will attack
the informant." Carmelo then asked him, "Who reported to you?" Nerio replied, "I will tell you later once I will be captured
by police authorities. All of us will be dead this afternoon. I want a shoot out!" 17
Respondents thereafter commenced their patrol of a place owned by a certain David Quintana, but their rounds yielded a
negative result.18
Later that evening, while respondent Alberto Alivio was passing by the house of Nerio, the latter threatened to kill him,
saying, "I want to kill now!" 19 Alberto then asked him, "Who reported to you so that the truth will come out?" Nerio then
punched the door of his house and said, "I will tell you later when I will be captured by the police authorities!" Alberto
then left the place and reported the matter to respondent Barangay Captain Arcayan. 20

In response to the reports, Barangay Captain Arcayan stated that he ordered his secretary to prepare invitation letters for
petitioners Nerio and Rey Pador, as the allegations of threats and intimidation made by Nerio against some of the barangay
tanods were serious. Barangay Captain Arcayan explained that he no longer signed a copy of petitioners letter-reply, as he
had already been given a copy of it.21
The RTC then heard the Petition. On 3 July 2008, it issued the assailed Resolution 22 finding that petitioners claims were
based merely on hearsay, speculations, surmises and conjectures, and that respondents had sufficiently explained the
reason behind the issuance of the letters of invitation. It thereafter proceeded to deny petitioners the privilege of the writ
of amparo.23
Dissatisfied with the ruling of the RTC, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review 24 before this Court, ascribing grave
and serious error on the part of the trial court. 25
The Courts Ruling
We uphold the RTCs Resolution and deny the instant Petition.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo 26 provides for the grounds that may be relied upon in a petition therefor, as
follows:
SEC. 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Thus, to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitioners must prove by substantial evidence 27 that their rights to life,
liberty and security are being violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission.
A closer look at the instant Petition shows that it is anchored on the following allegations: first, that respondents
conducted a raid on the property of petitioner based on information that the latter were cultivators of marijuana; second,
that respondent barangay captain sent them invitation letters without stating the purpose of the invitation; third, that
respondent barangay captain refused to receive petitioners letter-reply; and fourth, that petitioners anticipate the
possibility of more harassment cases, false accusations, and potential violence from respondents.
All these allegations are insufficient bases for a grant of the privilege of the writ.
On the first allegation, we find that the supposed raid on petitioners
ampalaya farm was sufficiently controverted by respondents.
Respondents alleged, and the trial court found, that a roving patrol was conducted, not on the ampalaya farm of Nerio
Pador, but on an area locally called Sitio Gining, which was beside the lot possessed by David Quintana. 28
Assuming, however, that respondents had in fact entered the ampalaya farm, petitioner Rey Pador himself admitted that
they had done so with his permission, as stated in his affidavit:
5. Around 8:00 a.m., I saw Tabunan barangay tanod Roberto Alimorin. I greeted him good morning. He told me that there
are reports that marijuana plants were grown at our ampalaya farm and that there is already a raid.
6. Being innocent and nothing to hide, I allowed Mr. Alimorin to search the ampalaya farm for marijuana plants. 29
Finally, even assuming that the entry was done without petitioners permission, we cannot grant the privilege of the writ
of amparo based upon a trespass on their ampalaya farm. Granting that the intrusion occurred, it was merely a violation
of petitioners property rights. In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, 30 we ruled that the writ of amparo does not envisage the protection
of concerns that are purely property or commercial in nature, as follows:
The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is
intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a
writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds.31 x x x. (Emphasis in the original)
We therefore rule that the alleged intrusion upon petitioners ampalaya farm is an insufficient ground to grant the
privilege of the writ of amparo.
On petitioners second and third allegations, we find that the barangay captains act of sending invitation letters to
petitioners and failure to sign the receiving copy of their letter-reply did not violate or threaten their constitutional right to
life, liberty or security. The records show that Barangay Captain Arcayan sufficiently explained the factual basis for his
actions. Moreover, the records are bereft of any evidence that petitioners were coerced to attend the conference through
the use of force or intimidation. On the contrary, they had full freedom to refuse to attend the conference, as they have in
fact done in this case.1wphi1
The fourth allegation of petitioner that, following these events, they can anticipate more harassment cases, false
accusations and possible violence from respondents is baseless, unfounded, and grounded merely on pure speculations
and conjectures. As such, this allegation does not warrant the consideration of this Court.
On a final note, we reiterate that the privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy adopted to address the
special concerns of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. "Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and
granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of

amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations."32
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The 3 July 2008 Resolution of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cebu City, in Spec. Proc. No. 16061-CEB is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 191805
April 16, 2013
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL
RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT,
MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M.
DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name "HARRY,"
ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 193160
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL
RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR. GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE VERA,
1ST LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and
VICENTE A. CALLAGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
On 15 November 2011, the Court promulgated its Decision in the present case, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the Petition for Review in
G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G.
Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vincent Callagan
for lack of merit.
This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to take the
appropriate action with respect to any possible liability or liabilities, within their respective legal competence, that may
have been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor lbrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor
Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col. Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ
are ordered to submit to this Court the results of their action within a period of six months from receipt of this Decision.
In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives mandated in this Decision and
in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against the incumbent officials holding the relevant positions. Failure to comply
with the foregoing shall constitute contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.
After a careful examination of the records, the Court was convinced that the Court of Appeals correctly found sufficient
evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military abducted petitioner
Rodriguez on 6 September 2009, and detained and tortured him until 17 September 2009.
Pursuant to the Decision ordering the Office of the Ombudsman to take further action, Ombudsman Conchita Carpio
Morales sent this Court a letter dated 23 May 2012, requesting an additional two-month period, or until 24 July 2012,
within which to submit a report. The Ombudsman stated that Noriel Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and his family refused to
cooperate with the investigation for security reasons.
On 6 January 2012, respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration, 1 arguing that the soldiers belonging to the 17th
Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military cannot be held accountable for authoring the abduction and
torture of petitioner. Their arguments revolve solely on the claim that respondents were never specifically mentioned by
name as having performed, permitted, condoned, authorized, or allowed the commission of any act or incurrence omission

which would violate or threaten with violation the rights to life, liberty, and security of petitioner-respondent and his
family.2
On 18 January 2013, the Ombudsman submitted the Investigation Report, as compliance with the Courts directive to
take appropriate action with respect to possible liabilities respondents may have incurred. The exhaustive report detailed
the steps taken by the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman, concluding that no criminal, civil,
or administrative liabilities may be imputed to the respondents. It was reflected therein that the lawyers for the
Rodriguezes had manifested to the FIO that the latter are hesitant to appear before them for security reasons, viz:
Karapatan (a non-governmental organization that provides legal assistance to victims of human rights violations and their
families) could not locate Noriel and Rodel. As of this writing, the Rodriguezes refused to participate in the present factfinding investigation for security reasons. Atty. Yambot disclosed (through a Manifestation dated March 30, 2012 that
despite efforts to convince Noriel to participate in the present proceedings, the latter remains unconvinced and unwilling
to this date.
Recent information, however, revealed that Noriel and his family are no longer interested in participating in the present
case.
Instead of appearing before this Office for a conference under oath, SPO1 Robert B. Molina submitted an Affidavit dated
June 13, 2012 stating that on September 15, 2009, at around 11:00 oclock in the morning, Wilma H. Rodriguez appeared
before the Gonzaga Police Station and requested to enter into the blotter that her son, Noriel, was allegedly missing in
Sitio Comunal, Gonzaga, Cagayan. Thereupon, he gathered information relative to Wilmas report "but the community
residence failed to reveal anything".3
The other accounts specifically that of respondent Antonino C. Cruz, Special Investigator II of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR), as well as the claims of respondents Mina and De Vera that they had disclosed to the CHR that
Noriel had become an agent ("asset") of the 17th Infantry Battalion have been thoroughly evaluated and ruled upon in
our Decision. The OMB further laments, "If only he (Noriel) could be asked to verify the circumstances under which he
executed these subsequent affidavits, his inconsistent claims will finally be settled," and that "(I)f there is one person who
can attest on whether detention and torture were indeed committed by any of the Subjects herein, it is Noriel Rodriguez
himself, the supposed victim."4
The purported unwillingness of the petitioner to appear or participate at this stage of the proceedings due to security
reasons does not affect the rationale of the writ granted by the CA, as affirmed by this Court. In any case, the issue of the
existence of criminal, civil, or administrative liability which may be imputed to the respondents is not the province of
amparo proceedings -- rather, the writ serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of
these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to
subsequent investigation and action.5 In this case then, the thrust of ensuring that investigations are conducted and the
rights to life, liberty, and security of the petitioner, remains.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
The writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate
interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. As explained in the Decision, it is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
even administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence. The totality of evidence as a standard for the grant of the
writ was correctly applied by this Court, as first laid down in Razon v. Tagitis:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider
any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the
issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted
if it satisfies this basic minimum test.6 (Emphasis supplied.)
No reversible error may be attributed to the grant of the privilege of the writ by the CA, and the present motion for
reconsideration raises no new issues that would convince us otherwise.
Respondents claim that they were not competently identified as the soldiers who abducted and detained the petitioner, or
that there was no mention of their names in the documentary evidence, is baseless. The CA rightly considered Rodriguezs
Sinumpaang Salaysay7 as a meticulous and straightforward account of his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the
manner in which he was captured and maltreated on account of his suspected membership in the NPA. 8
Petitioner narrated that at dawn on 9 September 2009, he noticed a soldier with the name tag "Matutina," who appeared
to be an official because the other soldiers addressed him as "sir." 9 He saw Matutina again at 11:00 p.m. on 15 September
2009, when his abductors took him to a military operation in the mountains. His narration of his suffering included an
exhaustive description of his physical surroundings, personal circumstances, and perceived observations. He likewise
positively identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his abduction, detention and
torture.10 These facts were further corroborated by Hermie Antonio Carlos in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 16
September 2009,11 wherein he recounted in detail the circumstances surrounding the victims capture.

Respondents main contention in their Return of the Writ was correctly deemed illogical and contradictory by the CA. They
claim that Rodriguez had complained of physical ailments due to activities in the CPP-NPA, yet nevertheless signified his
desire to become a double-agent for the military. The CA stated:
In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP members alleged that petitioner confided to his military handler, Cpl. Navarro,
that petitioner could no longer stand the hardships he experienced in the wilderness, and that he wanted to become an
ordinary citizen again because of the empty promises of the CPP-NPA. However, in the same Return, respondents state
that petitioner agreed to become a double agent for the military and wanted to re-enter the CPP-NPA, so that he could get
information regarding the movement directly from the source. If petitioner was tired of life in the wilderness and desired to
become an ordinary citizen again, it defies logic that he would agree to become an undercover agent and work alongside
soldiers in the mountains or the wilderness he dreads to locate the hideout of his alleged NPA comrades. 12 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Respondents conveniently neglect to address the findings of both the CA and this Court that aside from the abduction of
Rodriguez, respondents, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the formers right to security when they
made a visual recording of his house, as well as the photos of his relatives. The CA found that the soldiers even went as
far as taking videos of the photos of petitioners relatives hung on the wall of the house, and the innermost portions of the
house.13 There is no reasonable justification for this violation of the right to privacy and security of petitioners abode,
which strikes at the very heart and rationale of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. More importantly, respondents also
neglect to address our ruling that the failure to conduct a fair and effective investigation similarly amounted to a violation
of, or threat to Rodriguezs rights to life, liberty, and security. 14
The writs curative role is an acknowledgment that the violation of the right to life, liberty, and security may be caused not
only by a public officials act, but also by his omission. Accountability may attach to respondents who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. 15 The duty to
investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. 16
The CA found that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG Verzosa, LT. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera, and Lt. Col.
Mina conducted a perfunctory investigation which relied solely on the accounts of the military. Thus, the CA correctly held
that the investigation was superficial, one-sided, and depended entirely on the report prepared by 1st Lt. Johnny Calub.
No efforts were undertaken to solicit petitioners version of the incident, and no witnesses were questioned regarding
it.17 The CA also took into account the palpable lack of effort from respondent Versoza, as the chief of the Philippine
National Police.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with FINALITY. Let a copy of this
Resolution be furnished the Ombudsman for whatever appropriate action she may still take under circumstances.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 193652
August 5, 2014
Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM, Petitioner,
vs.
Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C. YANGCO,Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, and
Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo2 seeking to set aside the August 17, 2010 3 and September 6, 20104 Orders
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City, in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604. The RTC had dismissed
petitioners petition for the issuance ofa writ of amparo which petitioner filed in order for her to regain parental authority
and custody of Julian Yusay Caram (Baby Julian), her biological child, from the respondent officers of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). The factual antecedents as gleaned from the records follow:
Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III
(Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the latters child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant,
Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of
her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun
and Moon) in Paraaque City to avoid placing her family ina potentially embarrassing situation for having a second
illegitimate son.5

On July 26, 2009, Christina gavebirth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial MedicalCenter, Marikina City. 6Sun
and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby
Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment 7 to the DSWD.
On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died 8 without knowing about the birth of his son.
Thereafter, during the wake, Christina disclosed to Marcelinos family that she and the deceased had a son that she gave
up for adoption due to financial distress and initial embarrassment. Marcelinos family was taken aback by the revelation
and sympathized with Christina. After the emotional revelation, they vowed to help her recover and raise the baby. 9 On
November 27, 2009, the DSWD, through Secretary Esperanza I. Cabral issued a certificate 10 declaring Baby Julian as
"Legally Available for Adoption." A local matching conference was held on January 27, 2010 and on February 5, 2010,
Baby Julian was "matched" with the spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina (Medina Spouses) of the Kaisahang Bahay
Foundation. Supervised trial custody then commenced.11
On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWDasking for the
suspension of Baby Julians adoption proceedings. She alsosaid she wanted her family back together. 12
On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui, sent a Memorandum 13 to DSWD Assistant
Secretary Vilma B. Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had
attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which
terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State. The said Memorandum was noted
by respondent Atty. Sally D. Escutin, Director IV of the Legal Service, DSWD.
On July 12, 2010, Noel Gicano Constantino, Marcelinos brother, sent a letter to Atty. Escutin informing her that a DNA
testing was scheduled on July 16, 2010 at the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the University of the Philippines. 14
On July 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary Cabrera sent a letter 15 to Noel Constantino stating that it would not allow Baby
Julian to undergo DNA testing. Assistant Secretary Cabrera informed Noel Constantino that the procedures followed
relative to the certification on the availability of the child for adoption and the childs subsequent placement to prospective
adoptive parents were proper, and that the DSWD was no longer in the position to stop the adoption process. Assistant
Secretary Cabrera further stated that should Christina wish to reacquire her parental authority over Baby Julian or halt
the adoption process, she may bring the matter to the regular courts as the reglementary period for her to regain her
parental rights had already lapsed under Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9523. 16
On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition 17 for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of Quezon City seeking to
obtain custody of Baby Julian from Atty. Segui, Atty. Escutin, Assistant Secretary Cabrera and Acting Secretary Celia C.
Yangco, all of the DSWD.
In her petition, Christina accused respondents of "blackmailing" her into surrendering custody of her childto the DSWD
utilizing what she claims to be an invalid certificate of availability for adoption which respondents allegedly used as basis
to misrepresent that all legal requisites for adoption of the minor child had been complied with.
Christina argued that by making these misrepresentations, the respondents had acted beyond the scope of their legal
authority thereby causing the enforced disappearance of the said child and depriving her of her custodial rights and
parental authority over him.
On the basis of the said petition,the RTC, Branch 106 of Quezon City, through its Presiding Judge, the Honorable
Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-Sale, issued a Writ of Amparo 18 on July 28, 2010 commanding the four respondents to produce
the body of Baby Julian at a hearing scheduled on August 4, 2010. Respondents were alsorequired to file their verified
written return to the writ pursuant to Section 9 19 of the Amparo Rule, within five working days from the service of the
writ.
The respondents complied with the writ and filed their Return 20 on August 2, 2010 praying that the petition be denied for
being the improper remedy to avail of in a case relating toa biological parents custodial rights over her child.
On August 4, 2010, respondents appeared before the RTC but respondents did not bring the child, stating that threats of
kidnapping were made on the child and his caregivers. To give respondents another chance, the RTC reset the hearing to
August 5, 2010.
At the August 5, 2010 hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance as representative of the
State and prayed that its lawyers be given time to file their memorandum or position paper in this case. In turn, the RTC
acknowledged the appearance of the OSG and allowed its representatives to actively participate in the arguments raised
during the said hearing. Relative to the matter of the parties submitting additional pleadings, Judge Sale narrowed the
issues to be discussed by providing for the following guidelines, thus:
To abbreviate the proceedings, in view of all the manifestations and counter-manifestations made by the counsels, the
court enjoined the parties to file their respective position papers on the following issues:
1. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction over the instant case;
2. Whether or not this petition isthe proper remedy based on the facts of the case and prayer in the petition; and
3. Whether or not the prayer in the petition should be granted and custody of the child be given to his biological mother.
The parties were given five (5) days from today to file their respective position papers based on these three main issues.
They may include other related issues they deem essential for the resolution of this case. Set this case for further hearing,
if necessary, on August 18, 2010 at 9:00 a.m. 21

In the same order, Judge Sale alsoacknowledged that the child subject of the case was brought before the court and the
petitioner was allowed to see him and take photographs of him.
On August 17, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of amparo without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate action in court. The RTC held that Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child Baby
Julian.22 The RTC further stated that Christina should have filed a civil case for custody of her child as laid down in the
Family Code and the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. If there is
extreme urgency to secure custody of a minor who has been illegallydetained by another, a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus may be availed of, either as a principal or ancillary remedy, pursuant to the Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus inRelation to Custody of Minors. 23
On August 20, 2010, Christina filed a motion for reconsideration 24 arguing that since the RTC assumed jurisdiction of the
petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo, the latter is duty-bound to dispose the case on the merits. 25The RTC,
however, deniedChristinas motion for reconsideration on September 6, 2010 maintaining that the latter availed of the
wrong remedy and that the Supreme Court intended the writ of amparo to address the problem of extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances.26
On September 28, 2010, Christina directly elevated the case before this Court, via a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in relation to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In
her petition, Christina prayed that the Court (1) set aside the August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of the RTC,
(2) declare R.A. No. 9523 unconstitutional for being contrary to A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, 27 which was promulgated by the
Supreme Court, and for violating the doctrine of separation of powers, (3) declare the "enforced separation" between her
and Baby Julian as violative of her rights to life, liberty and security, and (4) grant her the privilege of availing the benefits
of a writ of amparo so she could be reunited with her son. 28
The only relevant issue presented before the Court worthy of attention is whether a petition for a writ of amparo is the
proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child. This Court will not belabor to discuss
Christinas argumentsrelating to the supposedunconstitutionality or R.A. No. 9523 as Congress has the plenary power to
repeal, alter and modify existing laws 29 and A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC functions only as a means to enforce the provisions of all
adoption and adoption-related statutes before the courts.
Now, in her petition, Christina argues that the life, liberty and security of Baby Julian is being violated or threatened by
the respondent DSWD officers enforcement of an illegal Deed of Voluntary Commitment between her and Sun and Moon.
She claims thatshe had been "blackmailed" through the said Deed by the DSWD officers and Sun and Moons
representatives into surrendering her child thereby causing the "forced separation" of the said infant from his mother.
Furthermore, she also reiterates that the respondent DSWD officers acted beyond the scope of their authority when they
deprived her of Baby Julians custody.30
The Court rejects petitioners contentions and denies the petition.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparois a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful actor omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., 31 this Court held:
[T]he AmparoRule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances,"
its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings
committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced
disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groupsor private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v. MacapagalArroyo32 where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in
Navia v. Pardico33 enumerated the elementsconstituting "enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in
Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 985134 to wit:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State ora political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparopetition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal isto remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time.1wphi1
In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced separation" from Baby Julian and
that their action amounted to an "enforced disappearance" within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her

position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a
copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum 35 explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina
Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that
the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August
5, 2010.36 There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and
fourth elements are missing.
Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for
adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly
indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting
custody over him.37 Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the
exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State,
the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a
public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life,
liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 106, Quezon City in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604 are AFFIRMED without prejudice to petitioner's right to avail
of proper legal remedies afforded to her by law and related rules.
No costs.

SO ORDERED

EN BANC
G.R. No. 210759, June 23, 2015
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRPERSON 1 OF BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION,2Petitioner, v. HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-MANILA, BRANCH 47 AND JA HOON KU, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 211403]
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, AS THE CHAIRPERSON OF BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, Petitioner, v. HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT-MANILA, BRANCH 47 AND JA HOON KU, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 211590]
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHAIRPERSON OF BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
AND DEPORTATION, Petitioner, v. JA HOON KU, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy adopted to address the special concerns of extra-legal
killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the
ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes
less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations. 3redarclaw
For the consideration of the Court are three consolidated petitions assailing the Orders dated 28 January 2014, 4 29
January 2014,5 and 18 February 2014,6 as well as the Resolution dated 14 March 2014,7 all issued by respondent
Presiding Judge Paulino Gallegos (Judge Gallegos) of the Regional Trial Court-Manila, Branch 47 in SP. PROC. No. 14131282.
The records show that on 23 December 2013, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) of Seoul, Republic
of Korea sent a Notice8 to Interpol Manila requesting assistance in the location and deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku
(Ku) for arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve fund of Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. Consequently, the Embassy of the
Republic of Korea wrote a Letter-Request9to petitioner, Hon. Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration
(BI), for the immediate arrest and deportation of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable alien.

Meanwhile, on 1 January 2014, Kus visa expired. 10redarclaw

On 3 January 2014, Special Prosecutor Maria Antonette Bucasas-Mangrobang charged Ku for being a risk to public
interest pursuant to Sec. 69, Act No. 2711.11 This finding was approved by the BI Board of Commissioners which, on 16
January 2014, issued a Summary Deportation Order. 12redarclaw
On the same day, 16 January 2014, BI officers, with the assistance of the Manila Police District-Warrant and Subpoena
Section, arrested Ku. Upon arrival at the BI detention center, Ku was detained. 13redarclaw
On 17 January 2014, the Republic of Korea voided Kus passport. 14redarclaw
Also on 17 January 2014, Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies, docketed as SP
PROC. No. 14-131282.15 On 22 January 2014, he also filed a Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Amparo.16 Finding said supplemental petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Judge Gallegos, in an Order dated
22 January 2014, issued a Writ of Amparo.17 On 24 January 2014, Ku filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO).18 Judge Gallegos then set the hearing on the TPO on 27 January 2014 at 8:30 a.m., 19while he set
the hearing on the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo on 29 January 2014 at 8:30 a.m.20redarclaw
In the afternoon of 27 January 2014, petitioner filed his Return of the Writ. 21 He was then notified that a hearing on the
TPO was held earlier in the morning and that the same was already submitted for resolution. 22 Petitioner then filed an
Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of TPO on 28 January 2014. 23redarclaw
On 28 January 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the first assailed Order granting the motion for issuance of TPO, entrusting
Kus custody to the Philippine National Red Cross and/or its Chairman CEO Richard Gordon, and directing the Philippine
National Police-Police Security and Protection Group (PNP-PSPG) to protect Ku and his immediate family. 24 On 29 January
2014, Judge Gallegos issued the second assailed Order directing the transfer of custody and protection of Ku to the PNPPSPG.25 Petitioner challenged these orders before the Court via a Petition for Certiorari26 docketed as G.R. No. 210759.
On 4 February 2014, the Court issued a Resolution in G.R. No. 210759 issuing a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
enjoining the enforcement of the Orders dated 28 and 29 January 2014 and directing the BI to retain custody of Ku, as
well as requiring Ku to comment on the petition.27 In issuing this resolution, the Court intimated the possibility of misuse
by Ku of the writ of amparo given that he was validly arrested and placed under the jurisdiction and custody of the BI;
thus the case cannot be categorized as one of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance. 28redarclaw
Owing to the Courts Resolution dated 4 February 2014, in the hearing set on 11 February 2014 before the trial court,
petitioner verbally moved for the dismissal of the amparo petition.29 On 18 February 2014, however, Judge Gallegos issued
the third assailed order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. 30 Thus, petitioner appealed the matter to the
Court via the Petition forCertiorari and Prohibition31 docketed as G.R. No. 211403.
On 25 February 2014, Ku filed an appeal memorandum on his deportation order addressed to the Office of the President
(OP).32redarclaw
On 14 March 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the assailed Resolution granting the privilege of the writ ofamparo, to
wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the privilege of the Writ of Amparo is hereby GRANTED. [Ku] is ordered immediately released from
[petitioners] custody without prejudice to the institution of the proper remedy to extradition. Moreover, the [petitioner]
and/or agents are ordered to cease and desist from further violating the right to liberty of [Ku] and the members of his
family by filing cases to legitimize his detention.33
Meanwhile, in the Resolution dated 18 March 2014 in G.R. No. 211403, the Court issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from
enforcing the Order dated 18 February 2014 and from further proceeding with the case. 34redarclaw
On 19 March 2014, the OP granted Ku provisional liberty only until 31 August 2014 or until his appeal was resolved,
whichever came first.35 Ku then moved for the release of his passport before the RTC, which petitioner opposed and to
which he filed a counter-motion for the RTC to release said passport to the BI, given that such was one of the conditions
for the OPs grant of provisional liberty to Ku. 36In the Order dated 26 March 2014, however, Judge Gallegos merely noted
petitioners motion for being moot, considering that he already released Kus passport on 20 March 2014, upon the
personal request of Ku.37redarclaw

Due to the complexities involved, petitioner filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R. No. 211590, essentially
assailing the Resolution dated 14 March 2014.
Condensing the various issues raised in these petitions, 38 we come to the central question of whether or not the privilege
of the writ of amparo was properly granted in the case at bar.
We rule in the negative.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule)39 provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
On 25 September 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of the prevalence of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. It was an exercise for the first time of the Courts expanded power to promulgate rules to protect
our peoples constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino
experience of the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest,
detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the
direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law.40redarclaw
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v. MacapagalArroyo41 where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes enforced disappearance, the Court
in Navia v. Pardico42 enumerated the elements constituting enforced disappearances as the term is statutorily defined in
Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851,43 to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a)
that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b)
that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
(c)
that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparopetition; and
(d)
that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.44
As clarified in Navia, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9851, the Amparo Rule is now a procedural law anchored, not only on
the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition as well of what an enforced or
involuntary disappearance is. Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs reference to enforced disappearances should be construed
to mean the enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851. Meaning, in
probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to R.A. No. 9851. 45redarclaw
Guided by the parameters of R.A. No. 9851, we can readily discern that Kus circumstance does not come under the
statutory definition of an enforced or involuntary disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the BI, but there
was no refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to give information on the
whereabouts of Ku. Neither can it be said that the BI had any intention to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a
prolonged time.
Although Ku claims that he was arbitrarily arrested and detained by agents of the BI, that he was not read his rights
under the constitution and was not informed of the reason for his arrest, nor provided a copy of any document leading to
his arrest and detention,46 the arresting officers are all consistent in testifying that, upon Kus arrest, they introduced
themselves as agents of the BI, presented to Ku the Warrant of Deportation, and informed him of his constitutional rights
as well as the expiration of his visa.47redarclaw
More importantly, there was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts. Within the Bureau, Kus
arrest and the fact that he was in their custody was not obscured as, in fact, these were well-documented as evidenced by

the Return of Warrant of Deportation dated 20 January 2014 48 and the After-Mission Report dated 17 January
2014.49 More importantly, in the Return of the Writ, petitioner readily disclosed to the trial court that Ku was in the
custody of the BI pursuant to a Warrant of Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order. 50redarclaw
These documents and pleading show that there was never any intention on the part of the BI to remove Ku from the
protection of the law for a prolonged time. Besides, when Ku was arrested at 9:30 p.m. on 16 January 2014, and received
at the BI Detention Center at 11:30 p.m. also on 16 January 2014, 51 the following day or on 17 January 2014, Kus
counsel was immediately able to file his Entry of Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration before the BI, 52 thereby
showing that Kus legal rights were amply guarded and that he was never removed from the protection of the law.
Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo petition should contain, among which is the right to life, liberty
and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent,
and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits, to
wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a)
The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b)
The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name
is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
(c)
The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d)
The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any
report;
(e)
The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and
the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f)
The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.
Ku claims that he fears for his life and feels the serious danger of being detained for a long period of time without any
cause, and that he fears that the BI will fabricate criminal cases against him to hold him under detention. 53 According to
Ku, what he seeks to obtain in filing an amparo petition is the protection it will give to his person against the actions of
some government officials who will likely take advantage of their positions and use the power of the government at their
command. Ku adds that the longer he stays in confinement the more he is exposed to life-threatening situations and the
further the violation of his guaranteed rights.54redarclaw
The allegations of Ku, though, are specious. It is to be noted that the Amparo Rule requires the parties to establish their
claims by substantial evidence.55 Other than making unfounded claims, however, Ku was not able to present evidence that
he was exposed to life-threatening situations while confined at the BI Detention Center. On the contrary, the records
show that he is afforded visitorial rights and that he has access to his counsel.
Moreover, his primary fear, which prompted him to file the amparo petition, was that the BI would trump up charges
against him so as to justify his detention. The fact remains, however, that even before his arrest, deportation charges
against him were already duly filed and ruled upon by the BI.
As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTCs grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo was improper in this case
as Ku and his whereabouts were never concealed, and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security were
unfounded and unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause
the disclosure of details concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party. As Ku
and his whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the
case at bar.
It is to be additionally observed that Ku is guilty of forum shopping. Being the subject of a Warrant of Deportation and a
Summary Deportation Order, Kus proper recourse is with the BI and, thereafter, with the DOJ and the OP. 56 Ku knows
this and, in fact, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the BI and an Appeal before the OP. When Ku, however,
injudiciously filed a Petition and a Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo, he committed forum
shopping by seeking a remedy which he had already solicited from another tribunal.

In Kiani v. BID,57 where petitioner therein filed before the trial court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to have
the detention of her husband declared as illegal and to order the latters release, and where her husband filed before the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) an omnibus motion seeking to question the summary deportation order
issued against him, the Court held that petitioner indulged in forum shopping.
The Court clarified that under Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, the power to deport aliens
is vested in the President of the Philippines, subject to the requirements of due process. The Immigration Commissioner is
vested with authority to deport aliens under Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. Thus, a
party aggrieved by a Deportation Order issued by the BOC is proscribed from assailing said Order in the RTC even via a
petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus. Conformably with ruling of the Court in Domingo v. Scheer, such party may file a
motion for the reconsideration thereof before the BOC. 58redarclaw
Citing Balite v. Court of Appeals,59 the Court held that there is forum shopping when a party seeks to obtain remedies in
an action in one court, which had already been solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in other tribunals.
While a party may avail of the remedies prescribed by the Rules of Court, such party is not free to resort to them
simultaneously or at his/her pleasure or caprice. A party should not be allowed to present simultaneous remedies in two
different forums, for it degrades and wreaks havoc to the rule on orderly procedure. A party must follow the sequence and
hierarchical order in availing of such remedies and not resort to shortcuts in procedure or playing fast and loose with the
said rules. Forum shopping, an act of malpractice, is considered as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It
is improper conduct and degrades the administration of justice.
On a final note, the Court observes that Judge Gallegos knowingly disregarded the Courts directives as regards this case.
The records show that the Courts Resolution dated 4 February 2014, wherein we issued a TRO enjoining the enforcement
of the Orders dated 28 and 29 January 2014 and intimated the impropriety of the amparo petition, was received by the
RTC on 5 February 2014.60This should have alerted Judge Gallegos to proceed with caution and restraint in granting the
privilege of the writ of amparo. And yet, despite having knowledge of the Courts pronouncements, Judge Gallegos
proceeded to grant the said privilege.
Also, the records show that the Courts Resolution dated 18 March 2014, wherein we issued a TRO enjoining the
enforcement of the Order dated 18 February 2014 and enjoining the RTC from further proceeding with the case, was
received by the RTC on 20 March 2014 at 9:00 a.m. 61 Although by then, Judge Gallegos already issued the Resolution
dated 14 March 2014 which granted the privilege of the writ of amparo, his receipt of the Courts Resolution dated 18
March 2014 should have forewarned him against releasing Kus passport. That he did so demonstrates his resistance and
unwillingness to follow the Courts edicts.
It is well to note that a resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, and should be
complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in
character, but also disrespect for the Courts lawful order and directive. 62redarclaw
Judge Gallegos should know that judges must respect the orders and decisions of higher tribunals, especially the
Supreme Court from which all other courts take their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court is not to be construed
as a mere request nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. 63redarclaw
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. The exacting standards of conduct
demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When
the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute,
encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself. 64redarclaw
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a)
GRANT the present petitions, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Resolution dated 14 March 2014 of the Regional
Trial Court which granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo;
b)

DENY the privilege of the Writ of Amparo sought via the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ ofAmparo and the
Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Amparo in SP. PROC. No. 14-131282 before the Regional Trial of
Manila, Branch 47; and

c)

DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to file the appropriate administrative charge/s against Judge Paulino
Q. Gallegos in accordance with the tenor of this Decision, and to forthwith submit to the Court its report and
recommendation thereon.

SO ORDERED.c