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Engineering Geology, 24 (1987) 217--220

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Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam -- Printed in The Netherlands

F A I L U R E OF TETON DAM, 1976 -- INVITED DISCUSSER'S


RESPONSES TO PREPARED QUESTIONS

THOMAS M. LEPS
Consulting Civil Engineer, P.O. Box 2228, Menlo Park, Calif. 94026 (U.S.A.)
(Accepted for publication December 1986)

The questions referred to above were presented in a memorandum prepared


b y Dr. G.A. Leonards, and transmitted via his Workshop Prospectus dated
August 20, 1984. The responses offered are based on the writer's overall
experience since 1939 in dam investigations, design, construction and performance monitoring, and his professional involvement in the investigation of
the failure of Teton Dam by the Independent Panel, July to December 1976.
Question 1. Is the current state-of-the-art of analysis and/or instrumentation adequate to determine reliably the state of stress and strain within earth
dams?
R e s p o n s e 1. Clearly, the answer to this question needs to be subdivided
into the two categories: (a) static loading, and (b) dynamic loading. In the
discusser's experience, static loading analysis, both for approximate stability
analyses and for detailed finite element approaches, are reasonably reliable
in their current stage of development, when one recognizes that neither can
be scientifically precise given the inhomogeneities that are inevitable in
materials utilized and in construction activities.
In the dynamic loading category, both for approximate analytic procedures
and for finite element analyses, the analytic procedures currently being used
are acceptable once one recognizes the inevitable uncertainties involved in
estimating or determining the dynamic response characteristics of an almost
infinite variety of earth materials in a similarly varying physical arrangement
of cross-sections, damsite shapes, foundation conditions, and dynamic input
parameters. Against this scenario, it seems reasonable to conclude at this
time that the available basic analytic procedures are more straight-forward
and reliable than one's ability to properly quantify all the necessary input
parameters.
In regard to the current adequacy of available instrumentation for determination of static loading stresses and strains in earth embankments, it is this
discusser's impression that the best equipment available, though not inexpensive, is fully c o m p e t e n t to provide reliable measurements. Our ability to interpret such measurements in terms of their conformance to design assumptions
is adequate; however, our ability to interpret them in terms of concluding
whether or not seriously damaging stresses or strains have been developed

0013-7952187]$03.50

1987 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.

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c o m m o n l y receives little attention, and is probably far short of the developments o f instrumentation.
With reference to the current adequacy of dynamic instrumentation of
earth dams for stresses and strains, the subject is so specialized, and records
of dynamic response t o earthquakes are so scarce, that this discusser is unable to offer an opinion. Certainly this is an area for very selective research,
and n o t one which, for the foreseeable future, need be urged as an essential
item of instrumentation f or all earth dams in earthquake country.

Question 2. To what e x t e n t can borehole data assess the potential for


hydraulic fracturing under the saturating flow conditions ext ant in an (earth)
dam?
Response 2. Hydraulic fracturing has been at least partially underst ood
and described for over f o r t y years, probably beginning with pet rol eum engineers and their experiences with drilling mud loss in the drilling and developmen t o f oil wells. .1 Concurrently, it has been well know n to f o u n d a t i o n
grouting engineers and contractors for much longer. The use of it as a technique for evaluating in situ stress conditions in a compacted earth embankment, however, is believed to be relatively recent, and to some e x t e n t its use
in the investigations of T e t o n Dam was somewhat pioneering. As such, that
use can be said to have been somewhat crude and inconclusive. Suffice it to
say that, in retrospect, something was learned but n o t much. The most imp o r t a n t item th a t emerged was the fact t ha t the field procedure requires the
use o f precise controls and great care, or else fracturing will occur prematurely
and at locations which are n o t necessarily useful in diagnosis.
In review, f o r earth dam investigation purposes, it may be t oo uncontrollable and imprecise an investigative procedure to be of value e x c e p t in the
most special o f cases, and would probably never be conclusive because the
actual nature o f the fracturing is virtually impossible to observe directly or
prove ex cep t by use o f dyes and careful excavation to locate fractures.
Question 3. What is y o u r present opinion regarding the most plausible
mechanism that initiated the failure of T e t o n Dam?
Response 3. The f u n d a m e n t a l mechanism of course was piping. Its occurrence was physically possible because the Zone 1 core material was noncohesive and fine grained, with up to 74% finer than a No. 200 screen
(0.003 in. opening), and over a large area its cont act surface with the downstream wall o f the core t r e nc h (excavated in intensely jointed rhyolite) contained many, nearly vertical, open joints in rock ranging from 0.1 to 4 in.
wide. The joints e x t e n d e d downstream beneath the e m b a n k m e n t core zone
diagonally towards the canyon wall, to free exits along the right groin of the
Dam. Hence, with no filter control on the downstream face of the core-torock contact, occurrence o f piping was just a matter of time, u n d o u b t e d l y
.l,,Comp osition and Properties of Oil Well Drilling Fluids," Walter F. Rogers, 1947,
Chapter 12, Gulf Publishing Co., Houston.

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speeded by the effects of critically low, intergranular, stress conditions in the
core zone near the breach location at about axis Sta. 14+ 00.
From the analytic work on e m b a n k m e n t stresses that has been done, and
from purely intuitive considerations, there is little d o u b t that (a) arching
transverse to the axis of the dam was inevitable, deep in the narrow, steep
sided, c u t o f f trench; and that (b) tensional horizontal strain of an appreciable degree occurred in Zone I due to differential settlements along the axis
of the dam down the steep right abutment. These combined actions, if not
enough to produce an actual crack through the core at about Sta. 14, through
which erosive leakage could commence, were certainly enough to so lower
the " h o r i z o n t a l " stresses parallel to the axis as to permit transverse hydraulic
fracturing at about Sta. 14 as soon as the reservoir rose sufficiently. The fact
that fatal internal erosion occurred so quickly would seem to argue more
strongly in favor of a pre-existing or rapidly formed transverse crack, than
the alternative of concentrated leakage beginning just above or just below
the grout cap, a limited area of the foundation which was generally in tight
rock, was easily inspected, and was grouted.

Question 4. Should the key trench have been omitted? Would y o u have
preferred shotcreting of open joints to the use of slush concrete?
Response 4. A key trench, but of a more conservative design, was a prudent requirement. It would have been much more acceptable if the following
requirements had been met:
(a) The side slopes should have been no steeper than 1:1. For this requirement, and including the following concepts, the trench need n o t have been
excavated to such large depth.
(b) The entire rock surface of the trench, sides and bottom, should have
been paved with a concrete slab of about 18 in. thickness.
(c) The entire paved surface should have received a pattern of consolidation
grouting to a depth of say 50 ft.
(d) At least one deep grout curtain was needed.
In review of what was known during the design stage of the exceptional
regional and local perviousness of the grossly jointed and perforated bedrock,
it is concluded t h a t the use of localized shotcrete and/or slush concrete to
cover obviously open joints should have been viewed as little more than hit
or miss, cosmetic treatments. Furthermore, it seems not unlikely that the
downdrag caused by gross differential settlement of the dam e m b a n k m e n t
down the steep right a b u t m e n t tended to further open the tops of the nearly
vertical bedrock joints, which would have damaged the integrity of any thin
surface seal such as shotcrete.
In regard to the placement of slush grout or concrete, as shown on fig.9-1
of the Independent Panel's report, extensive volumes were placed on the right
a b u t m e n t in open joints, by gravity, totaling 1830 cub. yrd. This work was
commendable as far as it went, but must have been highly subjective in
regard to decision as to where to deposit the slush grout, apparently did not
follow an engineered pattern, by its random nature could hardly have been

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expected to completely fill the open joints, was nowhere followed by pressure grouting to refusal, and was totally discontinued in the upper 120 ft. of
elevation of the right abutment. Accordingly, there was no reason to believe
that it would have adequately sealed bedrock adjacent to the cutoff trench.

Question 5. What is the origin of the " w e t " seams (or low density, high
permeability zones) in the dam? Are they likely to be present in other dams,
but have gone unnoticed? What should be done in design and/or construction stages to avoid them in the future?
Response 5. The wet seams were intensively investigated and tested, and
the findings were thoroughly reported by the Interior Review Group (IRG)
in its Final Report dated January 1980. The "probable causes" as summarized
therein may be paraphrased as follows:
"Substandard earthwork placement and control practices." This criticism
applies chiefly during May 1975, following the winter shutdown of fill placement, but also less frequently in June, July and August.
The key deficiency was placement at moisture contents which were excessively dry of optimum, resulting in low density horizons, wherein dry densities in situ of as low as 80 pcf were discovered as compared to the average
of 99 pcf for all Zone 1 compacted fill. In-situ dry densities of as low as 85%
of laboratory o p t i m u m were measured. Hence, it is clear to this discusser
that horizons of such low density material were proven to exist, and that
their existence was inevitable given the combined effects of (a) permission to
place Zone 1 as dry as 3.7% dry of o p t i m u m and (b) the reported inefficiencies in moisture conditioning and blending borrow from excessively dry
borrow sources, an inadequate construction procedure which guaranteed
that sizeable areas of placed fill were to some degree even drier than the limited test data indicated (drying by wind and solar effects).
Incidentally, it is curious that USBR permitted Zone 1 fill placement at
moisture contents as dry as 3.5% below o p t i m u m when its own laboratory
research, performed as long ago as 1942, showed that placement of impervious fill at moisture contents drier than about 2% below optimum would
result in abrupt consolidation upon subsequent saturation (Laboratory
Report No. E.M. -- 18.5).
In summary, this discusser concurs that the "wet seams" resulted from fill
placement at unacceptably low moisture contents, and the free water subsequently collected in those seams was contributed by rainfall during the construction period (frequent), and seepage during reservoir filling.
In the future, closer control of moisture content should be specified and
administered, although it certainly is not clear that these occasional seams
had anything to do with the failure of Teton Dam; and, although such seams
are probably inevitable to some degree in all impervious core zones, they
would be entirely unlikely to constitute a serious defect if appropriate filter
zones and materials are incorporated in the designs.

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