Professional Documents
Culture Documents
217
THOMAS M. LEPS
Consulting Civil Engineer, P.O. Box 2228, Menlo Park, Calif. 94026 (U.S.A.)
(Accepted for publication December 1986)
0013-7952187]$03.50
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c o m m o n l y receives little attention, and is probably far short of the developments o f instrumentation.
With reference to the current adequacy of dynamic instrumentation of
earth dams for stresses and strains, the subject is so specialized, and records
of dynamic response t o earthquakes are so scarce, that this discusser is unable to offer an opinion. Certainly this is an area for very selective research,
and n o t one which, for the foreseeable future, need be urged as an essential
item of instrumentation f or all earth dams in earthquake country.
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speeded by the effects of critically low, intergranular, stress conditions in the
core zone near the breach location at about axis Sta. 14+ 00.
From the analytic work on e m b a n k m e n t stresses that has been done, and
from purely intuitive considerations, there is little d o u b t that (a) arching
transverse to the axis of the dam was inevitable, deep in the narrow, steep
sided, c u t o f f trench; and that (b) tensional horizontal strain of an appreciable degree occurred in Zone I due to differential settlements along the axis
of the dam down the steep right abutment. These combined actions, if not
enough to produce an actual crack through the core at about Sta. 14, through
which erosive leakage could commence, were certainly enough to so lower
the " h o r i z o n t a l " stresses parallel to the axis as to permit transverse hydraulic
fracturing at about Sta. 14 as soon as the reservoir rose sufficiently. The fact
that fatal internal erosion occurred so quickly would seem to argue more
strongly in favor of a pre-existing or rapidly formed transverse crack, than
the alternative of concentrated leakage beginning just above or just below
the grout cap, a limited area of the foundation which was generally in tight
rock, was easily inspected, and was grouted.
Question 4. Should the key trench have been omitted? Would y o u have
preferred shotcreting of open joints to the use of slush concrete?
Response 4. A key trench, but of a more conservative design, was a prudent requirement. It would have been much more acceptable if the following
requirements had been met:
(a) The side slopes should have been no steeper than 1:1. For this requirement, and including the following concepts, the trench need n o t have been
excavated to such large depth.
(b) The entire rock surface of the trench, sides and bottom, should have
been paved with a concrete slab of about 18 in. thickness.
(c) The entire paved surface should have received a pattern of consolidation
grouting to a depth of say 50 ft.
(d) At least one deep grout curtain was needed.
In review of what was known during the design stage of the exceptional
regional and local perviousness of the grossly jointed and perforated bedrock,
it is concluded t h a t the use of localized shotcrete and/or slush concrete to
cover obviously open joints should have been viewed as little more than hit
or miss, cosmetic treatments. Furthermore, it seems not unlikely that the
downdrag caused by gross differential settlement of the dam e m b a n k m e n t
down the steep right a b u t m e n t tended to further open the tops of the nearly
vertical bedrock joints, which would have damaged the integrity of any thin
surface seal such as shotcrete.
In regard to the placement of slush grout or concrete, as shown on fig.9-1
of the Independent Panel's report, extensive volumes were placed on the right
a b u t m e n t in open joints, by gravity, totaling 1830 cub. yrd. This work was
commendable as far as it went, but must have been highly subjective in
regard to decision as to where to deposit the slush grout, apparently did not
follow an engineered pattern, by its random nature could hardly have been
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expected to completely fill the open joints, was nowhere followed by pressure grouting to refusal, and was totally discontinued in the upper 120 ft. of
elevation of the right abutment. Accordingly, there was no reason to believe
that it would have adequately sealed bedrock adjacent to the cutoff trench.
Question 5. What is the origin of the " w e t " seams (or low density, high
permeability zones) in the dam? Are they likely to be present in other dams,
but have gone unnoticed? What should be done in design and/or construction stages to avoid them in the future?
Response 5. The wet seams were intensively investigated and tested, and
the findings were thoroughly reported by the Interior Review Group (IRG)
in its Final Report dated January 1980. The "probable causes" as summarized
therein may be paraphrased as follows:
"Substandard earthwork placement and control practices." This criticism
applies chiefly during May 1975, following the winter shutdown of fill placement, but also less frequently in June, July and August.
The key deficiency was placement at moisture contents which were excessively dry of optimum, resulting in low density horizons, wherein dry densities in situ of as low as 80 pcf were discovered as compared to the average
of 99 pcf for all Zone 1 compacted fill. In-situ dry densities of as low as 85%
of laboratory o p t i m u m were measured. Hence, it is clear to this discusser
that horizons of such low density material were proven to exist, and that
their existence was inevitable given the combined effects of (a) permission to
place Zone 1 as dry as 3.7% dry of o p t i m u m and (b) the reported inefficiencies in moisture conditioning and blending borrow from excessively dry
borrow sources, an inadequate construction procedure which guaranteed
that sizeable areas of placed fill were to some degree even drier than the limited test data indicated (drying by wind and solar effects).
Incidentally, it is curious that USBR permitted Zone 1 fill placement at
moisture contents as dry as 3.5% below o p t i m u m when its own laboratory
research, performed as long ago as 1942, showed that placement of impervious fill at moisture contents drier than about 2% below optimum would
result in abrupt consolidation upon subsequent saturation (Laboratory
Report No. E.M. -- 18.5).
In summary, this discusser concurs that the "wet seams" resulted from fill
placement at unacceptably low moisture contents, and the free water subsequently collected in those seams was contributed by rainfall during the construction period (frequent), and seepage during reservoir filling.
In the future, closer control of moisture content should be specified and
administered, although it certainly is not clear that these occasional seams
had anything to do with the failure of Teton Dam; and, although such seams
are probably inevitable to some degree in all impervious core zones, they
would be entirely unlikely to constitute a serious defect if appropriate filter
zones and materials are incorporated in the designs.