Professional Documents
Culture Documents
APPEALS
FACTS:
Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created
by Presidential Decree No. 272 dated August 9, 1973
in order, to develop and promote the iron and steel
industry in the Philippines. P.D. No. 272 initially
created petitioner ISA for a term of 5 years, and when
ISAs original term expired on October 10, 1978, its
term was extended for another 10 years. The National
Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned
subsidiary of the National Development Corporation,
which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National
Government, embarked on an expansion program
embracing, among other things, the construction of
an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Pursuant to the
expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239
was issued by the President of the Philippines on
November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or
settlement a large tract of public land located in Iligan
City and reserving that land for the use and
immediate occupancy of NSCs. Since certain portions
of the public land subject matter of Proclamation No.
2239 were occupied by a non-operational chemical
fertilizer plant owned by private respondent Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277,
also dated16 November 1982, was issued directing
the NSC to negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for
and on behalf of the Government, for the
compensation of MCFCs present occupancy rights
on the subject land. LOI No. 1277 also directed that
should NSC and private respondent MCFC fail to reach
an agreement within a period of 60 days from the
date of the LOI, petitioner ISA was to exercise its
power of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and to
initiate expropriation proceedings in respect of
occupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating
to the subject public land as well as the plant itself
and related facilities and to cede the same to the
NSC. Negotiations between NSC and private
respondent MCFC did fail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is
entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the
expiration of ISA's term.
HELD:
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or
attributes
normally
associated
with
juridical
personality but did not possess general or
comprehensive juridical personality separate and
distinct from that of the Government. The ISA in fact
appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency
or instrumentality of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines. ISA may thus be properly regarded
ANTONIO
AUDIT
A.
MECANO
vs.
COMMISSION
ON
FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses
on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in
his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioners claim on the
ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec.
Order No. 292), solely for the reason that the same
section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter.
Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of
Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon
stating that the issuance of the Administrative Code
did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety
the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the
other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of
the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke
or supplant in its entirety the RAC.
ISSUE:
HELD:
HELD:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due
course on petitioners claim for benefits.
BUKLOD VS ZAMORA
FACTS:
During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she
created the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to primarily conduct anti-smuggling
operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000, President
Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He
subsequently ordered the employees of EIIB to be
separated from the service. Thereafter, he created the
Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force Aduana,
which EIIB employees claim to be essentially the
same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through the
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme
Courts power of judicial review in questioning the
said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the
president has no power to abolish a public office, as
that is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and
that the abolition violates their constitutional right to
security of tenure.
ISSUE:
BAGAOISAN
VS
NAT'L
TOBACCO
ADMINISTRATION. G.R. No. 152845 : August 5,
2003.
FACTS:
The petitioner was terminated from there position in
the national tobacco administration as a result of the
executive order issued by president Estrada which
mandates for the stream lining of the national
tobacco administration, a government agency under
the department of agriculture. The petitioners filed a
letter of appeal to the civil service commission to
recall the order. Petitioner all file a petition for
ISSUE:
HELD:
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the reorganization of the national
tobacco administration is valid true issuance of
executive order by the president.
HELD:
According to the supreme court, the president has the
power to reorganize an office to achieve simplicity
,economy and efficiency as provided under executive
order 292 sec. 31 and section 48 of RA 7645 which
provides that activities of executive agencies may be
scaled down if it is no longer essential for the delivery
of public service.
GSIS vs CSC
FACTS:
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for En Banc
resolution and the Petition for an En Banc Resolution
are DENIED for lack of merit. Let entry of judgment be
made in due course. No costs.
FACTS:
Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, and makes it mandatory for
candidates for public office, students of secondary
and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public
and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other
personalities, to undergo a drug test. Hence, Senator
Pimentel, who is a senatorial candidate for the 2004
synchronized elections, challenged Section 36(g) of
the said law.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit, is a
constitutional
commission
invested
by
the
Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority
to administer the civil service, but also with quasijudicial powers. It has the authority to hear and
decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted
directly with it or brought to it on appeal. The Civil
Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89779 adopting, approving and putting into effect
simplified rules of procedure on administrative
disciplinary and protest cases, pursuant to the
authority granted by the constitutional and statutory
provisions. The provisions are analogous and entirely
consistent with the duty or responsibility reposed in
the Chairman by PD 807, subject to policies and
resolutions adopted by the Commission. In light of all
the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions,
it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service
Commission the power or authority to enforce or
order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders
which, it should be stressed, it has been exercising
through the years. It would seem quite obvious that
the authority to decide cases is inutile unless
accompanied by the authority to see that what has
been decided is carried out.
ISSUES:
FACTS:
FACTS:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo
Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 yearold daughter of his common-law spouse and the
imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said
crime.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
HELD:
R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which
define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out
its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which
will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A.
No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death
sentence shall be executed under the authority of the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so
far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person
under the sentence during the lethal injection as well
as during the proceedings prior to the execution."
Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to
be administered is sufficient to cause the
instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature
also mandated that "all personnel involved in the
administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior
to the performance of such task." The Court cannot
see that any useful purpose would be served by
requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the
definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but
the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed
by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is
sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by
the administrative officials concerned is, canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing.
ISSUEs:
Whether or
Constitution
not
RA
6975
is
contrary
to
the
HELD:
Power of Administrative Control
Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commanderin-chief powers. It simply provides for the transition
period or process during which the national police
would gradually assume the civilian function of
safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under
this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates
nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state,
in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of
the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties
under the Commander-in-Chief provision represent
only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him.
All his other functions are clearly civil in nature. His
position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent
with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle
that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over
the military.
Under
this
doctrine,
which
recognizes
the
establishment of a single executive, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of
the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law
to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of
the memorandum order issued by the Regional Exec.
Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of
the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to
Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued
pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the
DENR Secretary.
Issue:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to
reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.
HELD:
The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries
of such departments, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is
corollary to the control power of the President as
provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987
Constitution: "The President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
HELD:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights
to have no such power; and that it was not meant by
the fundamental law to be another court or quasijudicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less
take over the functions of the latter.
FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass
concerted actions to protest the alleged failure of
public authorities to act upon their grievances. The
mass actions consisted in staying away from their
classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio,
gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary
of Education served them with an order to return to
work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to
heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the
Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively
charged, preventively suspended for 90 days
pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily
replaced.
An
investigation
committee
was
consequently formed to hear the charges.
ISSUE:
Power to Investigate
Manner of Appeal
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the assignment of herein petitioner on
temporary detail to the office of Commodore Santiago
Nuval, Presidential Assistant on Ports and Harbors, by
the President of the Philippines thru the Executive
Secretary, constitutes removal from office without
cause.
RULING:
According to paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of
our Constitution, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to
act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the
executive department and the acts of the secretaries
of such departments, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The
detail of petitioner to the Office of the President is
unobjectionable. By no stretch of the imagination
could it be considered a removal. It was not even a
transfer. Even if it could be so viewed, the same
conclusion would emerge, as such was allowable
under the Civil Service Act provision then in force, so
long as there be no reduction in rank or salary, such
transfer therefore not being considered disciplinary
when made in the interest of public service. Nor is
there any merit to the assertion made in the brief of
petitioner that the directive of the Executive
Secretary, acting upon authority of the President,
needed the approval of the Civil Service Commission
and the Commissioner of the Budget for its
enforcement. Such a thought is repugnant to the very
concept of a single, not a plural, executive in whom is
vested the whole panoply of executive power. It is not
only illogical, but it does not make sense, to require
as a prerequisite to its validity the approval of
subordinate to an action taken by their superior, the
President, who tinder the Constitution is the
Executive, all prerogatives attaching to such branch
being vested in him solely. In that sense, for those
discharging purely executive function in the national
government, he lie gives orders to all and takes
orders from none.
CORONA
VS.
ASSOCIATION
FACTS:
UNITED
HARBOR
PILOTS
ISSUE:
Whether or not PPA-AO No. 04-92 is constitutional.
HELD:
FACTS:
Private respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit
institution, which conducts various programs and
activities that are beneficial to the public, especially
the young people, pursuant to its religious,
educational and charitable objectives. YMCA earned
an income from leasing out a portion of its premises
to small shop owners and from parking fees collected
from non-members. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment for deficiency
income tax, deficiency expanded withholding taxes on
rentals and professional fees and deficiency
withholding tax on wages. YMCA protested the
assessment.
ISSUE:
HELD:
YMCA argues that Art. VI, Sec. 28(3) of the
Constitution exempts charitable institutions from the
payment not only of property taxes but also of income
tax from any source. The Court is not persuaded. The
debates, interpellations and expressions of opinion of
the framers of the Constitution reveal their intent.
Justice Hilario Davide Jr., a former constitutional
commissioner, stressed during the Concom debate
that what is exempted is not the institution itself;
those exempted from real estate taxes are lands,
buildings and improvements actually, directly and
exclusively used
for
religious,
charitable
or
educational purposes. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, an eminent
authority on the Constitution and also a member of
the Concom, adhered to the same view that the
exemption created by said provision pertained only to
property taxes. In his treatise on taxation, Justice Jose
Vitug concurs, stating that the tax exemption covers
property taxes only. Indeed, the income tax
exemption claimed by YMCA finds no basis in Art. VI,
Sec. 28(3) of the Constitution.
FACTS:
YNOT VS. IAC
FACTS:
There had been an existing law which prohibited the
slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the
law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned
the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as
well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984,
Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of
EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional
for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due
process. He said that the authority provided by EO
626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without
being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled
against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of
police power in order to promote general welfare so
as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos.
On 16 January 1989, per advice of the PSU Auditor-inCharge with respect to the payment of honoraria and
per diems of PSU personnel engaged in the review
and evaluation project, PSU Vice President for
Research and Extension and Assistant Project Director
Victorino P. Espero requested the Office of the
President, PSU, to have the University's Board of
Regents ("BOR") confirm the appointments or
designations of involved PSU personnel including the
rates of honoraria and per diems corresponding to
their specific roles and functions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD:
The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed
violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption
based on the judgment of the executive. The
movement of carabaos from one area to the other
does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same
would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself
and explain why the carabaos are being transferred
before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the
challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to
the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the
owner of the property confiscated is denied the right
to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the
guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers
to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.
ISSUE:
ESLAO VS. COA
HELD:
The instant evaluation project being a ForeignAssisted Project, the PSU personnels involved in the
project shall be paid according to the Budget Estimate
schedule of the MOA.
FACTS:
Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec
Chairman Ramon Felipe as Manager of the Education
and Information Department of the Comelec on May
1986, at which time Toledo was already more than 57
years old. Toledos appointment papers and his oath
of office were endorsed by the Comelec to the CSC on
June 1986 for approval and attestation. However, no
prior request for exemption from the provisions of
Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAPwhich prohibits the
appointment of persons 57 years old or above into
government service without prior CSC approvalwas
secured. Petitioner then reported for work.
HELD:
No. The Civil Service Act of 959 (RA 2260), which
established the CSC, contained no provision
prohibiting appointment or reinstatement into
government service of any person already 57 years
old. Sec 5 Rule 6 of the Revised Civil Service Rules,
which prohibits such, was purely the creation of CSC.
Marcoss PD 807 (Civil Service Decree), which
established a new CSC and superseded RA 2260, also
provided that rules and regulations shall become
effective only 30 days after publication in the OG or in
any newspaper of general circulation. The new CSC
adopted the CSRPAP . No provision re prohibition of
appointment of 57 year old made in PD 807;
prohibition was purely created by CSC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CSRPAP provision is valid.
FACTS:
ATC et al filed before the Philippine Patent Office
concerning the use of trade mark and trade name.
ATC et al challenged the validity of Rule 168 of the
Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent
Office in Trademark Cases as amended, authorizing
the Director of Patents to designate any ranking
official of said office to hear inter partes
proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that all
judgments determining the merits of the case shall be
ISSUE:
HELD:
The SC ruled that the power to decide resides solely
in the administrative agency vested by law, this does
not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a
hearing on the basis of which the decision of the
administrative agency will be made. The rule that
requires an administrative officer to exercise his own
judgment and discretion does not preclude him from
utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative
procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and
report to him the facts, on the basis of which the
officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the
judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of
the officer authorized by law. Neither does due
process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing
require that the actual taking of testimony be before
the same officer who will make the decision in the
case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to
present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof, and the decision is supported by the
evidence in the record, there is no question that the
requirements of due process and fair trial are fully
met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility
on the part of the officer concerned as the actual
decision remains with and is made by said officer. It
is, however, required that to give the substance of a
hearing, which is for the purpose of making
determinations upon evidence the officer who makes
the determinations must consider and appraise the
evidence which justifies them.
FACTS:
By virtue of RA 5514, Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation was granted a franchise to
establish, construct, maintain and operate in the
Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select,
station or stations and associated equipment and
facilities for international satellite communications.
Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the
authority to construct and operate such ground
facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications
services from the communications satellite system
and ground terminal or terminals. Under Sec 5 of the
same law, PhilComSat was exempt from the
jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public
Service Commission later known as the National
Telecommunications Commission. However, EO 196
was later proclaimed and the same has placed
PhilComSat
under
the
jurisdiction
of
NTC.
Consequently, PhilComSat has to acquire permit to
operate from NTC in order to continue operating its
existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but
it however directed PhilComSat to reduce its current
rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on
EO 546. PhilComSat assailed the said directive and
holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of respondent
NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service
communications does not provide the necessary
standards constitutionally required hence there is an
undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the
adjudicatory powers of NTC. PhilComSat asserts that
nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the
creation of respondent NTC and granting its ratefixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing petitioner under
the jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred
that respondent NTC is guided by any standard in the
exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers.
PhilComSat subsequently clarified its said submission
to mean that the order mandating a reduction of
certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but
of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the
exercise of which allegedly requires an express
conferment by the legislative body.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD:
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative
power may be sustained only upon the ground that
some standard for its exercise is provided and that
the legislature in making the delegation has
prescribed the manner of the exercise of the
delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative
agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a
rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and must
have been established in the manner prescribed by
the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed
standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing
FACTS
In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R.
Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire
Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary
of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a
regular employee, having been appointed as clerktypist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a
permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of
petitioner company's "General Information, Office
Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the
same year, without change in his positiondesignation, he was transferred to the Claims
Department and his salary was increased to P450,00
a month. In 1980, he was transferred to the
Underwriting Department and his salary was
increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living
allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire
Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made
an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary
of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is still within the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
HELD:
The record shows that the employer (petitioner
herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor
Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension
of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11,
1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April
22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the
National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid
motion for extension of time was denied in its
the
authority
to
HELD:
None.
Test for determining the existence of authority
The commission cites no provision of law expressly
supporting its rule against double listing. It suggests
that the power is necessary for the execution of the
functions vested in it. It argues that said rule was
approved by the Department Head before the war and
it is not in conflict with the provisions of the Securities
Act. The approval of the Department, by itself, adds
no weight in judicial litigation.
The test is not whether the Act forbids Commission
from imposing a prohibition but whether it empowers
the Commission to prohibit.
Commission without power to impose prohibition
The Commission possesses no power to impose the
condition of the rule which results in discrimination
and violation of constitutional rights. It is fundamental
that an administrative officer has such powers as are
expressly granted to him by statute, and those
necessarily
implied
in
the
exercise
thereof.
Accordingly, the license of Makati Stock Exchange is
approved without such condition against double
listing.
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasilegislative power of the Committee expressly
authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly
on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the
Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not
germane to the object and purpose of the statute it
seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the
regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the
same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by
the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative
power, the judicial course to assail its validity must
follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although
the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does
not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice
of court forum.
True, this Court has the full discretionary power to
take cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of
the issues raised, so warrant. A direct invocation of
the Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition.
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy
to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasilegislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary
writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial
or
ministerial
functions,
ordering
said entity or person to desist from further
proceedings when said proceedings are without or in
excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are
accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[20]
[21]
Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions,
but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of
prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of
its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration
of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper
remedy to afford relief against usurpation of
jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in
the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly
within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses
the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there
is
no
adequate
remedy
available
in
the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be
obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to
invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary
action for its nullification, an action which properly
falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents
are performing or threatening to perform functions
without or in excess of their jurisdiction may
appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a
writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is
DISMISSED.
PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION
EXPORTERS VS TORRES
OF
SERVICE
HELD:
FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their
authority
and
did
not
commit
grave
abuse
of
powers
in
administrative
bodies
is
FACTS:
DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department
bound workers.
business
Filipino
of
obtaining
land-based
overseas
workers
filed
employment
a
petition
for
for
prohibit implementation.
ISSUES:
Code of 1987.)
Prohibition granted.