Migrants in Local Hierarchy: A Brief on American Rhetorical Context

Both the real and perceived consequences of an emergent migrant demographic

on social harmony and class structures within local communities have shaped the rhetoric
comprising the U.S. immigration debate. With the annual influx of legal U.S. migrants
(>970,000 naturalizations in 2014) accounting for ~40% of annual U.S. population
growth, native citizens are correct in suspecting that U.S. cultural influence is shifting
toward ethnic minorities (Batalova and Zong, 2015). Although demographic change is
relevant in leading democratic, political arguments nationally, the personal, local effects
of migrants on politics, class structure, and overall social discord are more rhetorically
relevant to U.S. constituencies. That is, discussion of local migrant influence allows for
more specific commonplaces, ideological devices, and most importantly, appeals to
personal experience. Community politicians and citizens alike may discuss issues specific
to their own community as opposed to defending a diffuse national identity.
In light of recent sociological studies, it is unsurprising that immigrants play an
integral role in American communities economically, socially, and politically, especially
outside of major U.S. cities where nearly 50% of immigrants, legal or illegal, are situated
(Batalova and Zong, 2015; Giovanni and Sparber, 2009; Card, 2007). For these smaller
constituencies, this paper will aim to establish, by discursive rhetorical analysis of the
U.S. immigration policy debate, that:
1) Immigrants alteration of local labor dynamics elicit generally positive
attitudes toward those migrants outside the underclass,

2) New demands brought by diverse groups causes inefficiency within local

government that destabilizes native ideological homogeny that brings
apprehension to advocates of current norms, and
3) Acknowledgment of migrants growing political sway and lack of assimilation
toward national culture raises a rhetorical dichotomy within conservative
political arguments.
These points will help illustrate the internal tension within conservative political
opinion: the desire to treat migrants unequally in a national climate that is mindful of
equality. By affirming these points, it will be possible to predict a future for conservative
rhetorics transformation, schism, or demise.
I. Labor Structures & Socioeconomics
Currently, in small U.S. communities, there exists a deep mistrust of poor or
unskilled migrants by lower class natives who claim that immigrant workers jeopardize
native employment because they accept competitive, substandard wages. Though studies
about this idea yield evidence of the contrary, this sentiment is still popular among
migrant opposition groupsparticularly among low-class workers (Ancondo, 2010). This
idea is more nuanced, however; for example, the Heritage Foundation, a conservative
U.S. think tank and data center, supports raising caps on H-1B visas (i.e. for skilled
migrants). Their own studies demonstrate that raising inflows of skilled workers can help
reduce class inequality and improve national productivitya conclusion supported by
academic and liberal studies as well. (Giovanni and Sparber, 2009; Sherk and Nell, 2008;
Batalova and Zong, 2015).

To better understand the Heritage Foundations conclusions, it should be known

how these workers alter labor structures and how this alteration affects their image. A
statistical review by the Immigration Policy Center (2010) affirms that the addition of
working age migrants to growing communities is economically profitable overall. For
instance, educated Chinese-Americans & Indian-American migrants contributed a net
gain of over $19 billion and 70,000 jobs to the national economy in 2000. This positive
influence catalyzed a stereotype of Asian economic prowess and superior intelligence.
Alternatively, conservative political and fiscal leaders remain averse to unskilled
migrants on capitalistic grounds. The ad nauseam enthymeme equating class to social
utility (i.e. poor migrants take welfare, evade taxes, lazy, etc.) presumes an incomplete
capitalistic ideaupon which conservative leaders appeal to working class citizens
that poor immigrants arent skilled enough to be profitable citizens. However, it is not
only the most skilled and educated migrants that contribute to the U.S. economy: less
skilled migrants are demonstrably valuable, as well. In fact, one 2009 study by Peri
explains the socioeconomic forces driving the correlation between job gains and
immigration growth. In short, Peri found that high influxes of unskilled laborregardless
of its origincreates demand for positions of administration, which typically command
higher wages than manual laborers. Naturally, one must only be reminded that unskilled
laborers are a source of less costly (thus, more accessible) services to businesses and
lower class citizens alike.
Regarding job scarcity, it should be stated that while migrant competition for
domestic employment does exist, it is mitigated by the fact that unskilled migrant
workers often take jobs that natives less typically occupy: namely, careers in service,
transportation, construction, and natural resources (Batalova and Zong, 2015). This in

turn allows natives to exploit the new demand for administrative and supervisory jobs
with much less competition than they would face at lower level positions. In reality, any
appreciable job loss to migrants mainly occurs at non-administrative levels; it afflicts
natives with low job security in careers that require little to no formal training (Camarota
and Jensenius, 2009).
Interestingly, the conservative distaste against an influx of people that supply
cheap labor and create businesses at greater rates than natives do is un-capitalistic; this is
a rhetorical inconsistency on the oppositions own economic views (Ancondo, 2010). On
the topic of immigration and economy, partisan arguments show tension between
defensive ideology and scientific data laced with humanism. In this strife, we observe
rhetorical conflict where the bulk of statistical, economic, and scientific data flatters
migrant inclusion bolstered with highly visible tales of abuse and migrants right to
safety, health, and prosperity. Hence, the opponents are apt to euphemize the alternative
to acceptance and discredit data, which leaves them with rhetorically diffuse options like
ideology or enthymemes (e.g. We are a nation of laws to scold the nations economic
reliance on illegal migrants). Hence, most Americanseven in religious and rural circles
are leaving this economic basis (The American Value Atlas, 2014). Yet, where
statistics has not given clear causes, public opinion is more mixed.
II. Political Discontinuity & Tension
Indeed, there is more partisanship when discussing social and political effects of
migrants on American society. In this case, the heart of this rhetorical conflict lies in the
essential discontinuity between foreigners and natives. There again exist two popular
positions along conservative and liberal lines. Conservatives argue that migrants may

jeopardize our societal integrity and values and should thus be filtered, monitored, and
given no undue advantages like welfare or amnesty. Meanwhile, liberal politicians argue
that inclusion and empowerment is the key to resolving social instability caused by
migrants (Doherty, 2013; Hayduk, 2011).
Indeed, migrants do destabilize local politics and stability to a considerable
extent, and it is important to know why. As discussed by Card (2007), immigrants bring
more than economic skills: they carry political ideas and habits, so they often have
political demands that natives may not necessarily desire or tolerate. In fact, even when
controlling for income inequality and socioeconomic factors, Alesina, et al. (1999)
modeled an inverse relation between ethnic fragmentation and spending on public goods
like sewers, schools, roads, etc. Alesina, et al. proposed that the unique lifestyles and
spending habits of segregated, ethnic groups severely reduces agreement on, compliance
with, and efficiency of public finance.
We may build a fine analogy to learn the effects of migrants on local politics by
studying interaction between fragmented ethnicities, which are essentially foreign to each
other. Consider the 1996 Ebonics case of Oakland School Board debate: when inner-city
parents requested ESL funding for black studentsmany of whom spoke an urbanized,
non-standard EnglishHispanic groups rose against the lobby. They suspected that black
ESL funding was a ploy to extort privileged funding for secondary languages, which the
Hispanic lobby felt its youth needed. Even Asian voters filed similar complaints and
protested with antagonism toward both groups. Under irreconcilable demands, the
municipal government decided to withhold any additional funding in the interest public
harmony (Baron, 1997). In the end, incorrigibility within an overly fragmented public left
its government paralyzed.

Since immigrants oft bring social networks and new political want, unassimilated
migrants can ferment social tension & government inefficiency (Haller, et al., 2003).
Therefore, opponents of inclusive immigration reform can soundly appeal to defensive
thinking in the pragmatic style that resonates with U.S. voters. It is true: immigrants will
jeopardize and alter the current state of social harmony in the communities they enter. As
mentioned before, a majority of conservatives (up to 70%) believe that even illegal
migrants should be allowed to work and participate in the national democracy, but the
same group also fears the social result of openness, stating that it would promote illegal
behavior, enable illegal migrants, and encumber government (Doherty, 2013).
In fact, migrant empowerment comes at the price of political control and attention
to same groups that support such instabilityand away from the locals that tolerated it.
Even so, it is well accepted by the academic community that the proliferation and
political empowerment of migrants in their political locales is a key to regaining stability
in these communities (Hayduk, 2011; Haller, et al., 2003). Without this empowerment,
migrants are typically disinclined to participate in governmental initiatives, leading to a
variety of problems from protest to legal non-compliance. It is further observed that the
migrants political empowerment stimulates migrant leaders who are better equipped
rhetorically and experientially to address their constituents issues and mobilize popular
initiatives (i.e. production of public goods) that benefit all residents.
Rhetorically, this response to migrant-induced instability is vital to reform
advocates, for it exposes a factual weakness in a central and intuitive conservative
argument, which falsely presumes that migrant-induced political strife is unresolvable or
dangerous. The movement toward bolstering relevant minority leaders lies at the heart of
the liberal agenda (Hadyuk, 2011; Warwick-Menard, 2005). Generally, liberals can

exploit their agenda as an appeal to humanism and equalityvital U.S. commonplaces.

Associating migrant support with equality is more effective when considering that 13%
of the U.S. population is foreign-born and that the minority-majority demographic shift
expected to occur mid-century (Ancondo, 2010).
In light of this data, a social liberal in the U.S. can easily argue from a democratic
stance that we should assist those who are soon to form a plurality. Likewise, they may
posit that minority empowerment will form competent minority leaders, which will boost
spending on public goods. These propositions handily resolve the concrete political
tensions perceived by conservative leaders, which can now be used to discredit them
prospectively. More radical minds would fear the implications of such a rapid upheaval of
U.S. society. Necessity to defend a satisfactory social order against a frivolous revolution
is presumably reason for distress among staunch reform dissenters. Fear of empirically
unsupported or even illogical social outcomes is mainly driven by the same defensive
ideology that conservative political leaders must employ to continue the debate, for
accepting empowerment would contradict much of their current platform (e.g. rejecting
amnesty for illegal immigrants).

III. Social Assimilation: Altered Norms

As previously mentioned, migrants tend to bring foreign ideas and stress to native
U.S. governments, which can be resolved through inclusive support. Yet, conservatives
are not wrong to worry for the safety of modern societywhich can be undone through
assimilation. On this subject, Brubaker (2001) offers a fresh insight on assimilation as a
purely sociological process, further suggesting that modern immigrants are no longer
assimilating toward the ostentatious white majority of the 1920s-1960s. While they may

no longer adopt American culture per se, they are now cross-assimilating toward
multiple, non-native groups, which represents the beginning of a major demographic shift
for the U.S. However, Brubaker also finds that the public has taken this rejection of
assimilation toward the iconic American culture to mean the cessation of all assimilation
by new cultural groups. This necessarily means that those who view cross-assimilation as
non-assimilation to U.S. culture view non-native citizens outside the true American
identity. Here, there exists a greater argument regarding identity: are minorities and
migrants a part of the true American identity?
Once more, this argument splits along partisan lines with approval of identity by
liberals and more subtle rejection by conservatives. To understand why each party holds
their responses, it is important to see the importance of migrants on demographics and
their effects on voting patterns. A survey by Jones, et al. (2014) reveals an issue unique to
the U.S. conservative political partythe Grand Old Party (GOP)it must resort to a
dichotomous position to not alienate the voting base that avidly opposes an impending
demographic shift and the voters (Hispanics are the largest contributor here) that will be
that shift. In other words: stand with those who seek deportation and stiffer penalties
against migrants or the migrants themselves.
Here lies a difficult rhetorical stance for the GOP as its aversion to poor migrants
(Jones, et al. (2014) found that ~50% of GOP members see poor migrants as burdens) can
alienate new minorities, even if they themselves are fiscally/socially conservative. Such
an aversion to immigrants by the heads of conservative electorates produces an ethos that
precedes them. Thus, conservatives come to be seen as the opposition to evolving social
norms and people that demand of migrants a sort of assimilation that is receding from
national reality.

As is widely recognized, liberal platforms rarely struggle to enthuse poor and

minority votes (except perhaps when raising their turnout), for these are the groups
toward which most modern liberal policies are geared like the Affordable Health Care
Act, gay marriage rights, and so on. Liberal political advertising and rhetoric to be
slightly exploits this fact to be more direct with a wider coalition, often focusing its
rhetoric on realism and struggle, appeals to humanism, and equality. In fact, this is the
idea espoused by Richardson Jr. (2006) who also argues that dedication to realism can
lead to a more hostile characterization of conservatism, being illustrated as a ploy by the
powerful to maintain their socioeconomic privilege, even though this drive is rare among
the conservative voters (PIRI, 2014). Regardless, this hostility mixed with liberal favor
with novel U.S. demographics (Batalova and Zong, 2015) provides an advantageous
polarization for liberal politicians, which is increasingly in their favor.
However, it should be noted that Richardson Jr. also finds that GOP rhetoric is
overall less polarizing than that of Democrats. Conservative rhetoric in political
advertising tends to focus around universal ideas of liberation, simplicity, piety, and
patriotism. Although this strategy seems optimal for the conservative situation, it is
precisely the semantic nature of this rhetoric that reduces its power. Unless the audience
already agrees with the definitions of freedom and fairness posited by conservative ideas,
GOP rhetoric is not likely to actually persuade rivals or dispel the anti-migrant ethos that
plagues its public image. Unless the GOP builds a rhetorical bridge for the opposing and
undecided audience to share in its premises, all enthymemes, references, & appeals to
pathos are lost on the audience.

IV. Discussion & Predictions

Now that all three initial points were discussed at length in their own contexts, it
will be useful to frame them into a single, comprehensive illustration of the rhetorical
situation. Hence, we will rephrase each point into succinct, logically workable ideas:
1.) Migrant economic potential fosters general inclusion by both parties, but to the
exclusion of underclass migrants in conservative politics due to their perceived
lack of productivity. This is not economically realistic: there is no significant
data suggesting migrant class is costly to the U.S. economy.
2.) Tension caused by migrants foreign views distress civil efficiency and
harmony. Liberal advocates find sociology resolves this through inclusion, but
it also brings societal upheaval. The GOP is apprehensive of such change, and
to avoid concession, they oppose liberal bases: science, trickle-up economics,
and global humanism.
3.) Non-national assimilation by rising numbers of migrant voters drives the
GOPs conflict: must they favor migrants for electoral sustainability at their
current blocs expense or vice versa? Indecision has made GOP rhetoric
euphemistic and generalized, but Democrats enjoy a growing demographic and
supporting data, which permits their polarizing, logos-based rhetoric.

Although different points within the immigration debate begat each of these
rhetorical divisions, two factors were common to across all three points discussed: there
exists a constant rhetorical struggle of logic versus idealism, and there exists a uniquely

conservative problem of diffuseness in the rhetorical setting. Here, the latter can be used
to explain the prior phenomenon. That is, in national context, conservative leaders must
appeal to mixed audience with widely varying ideological and political affiliations to
ensure rhetorical survival. Here, the party can only resort to general appeals to pathos and
American ideologies of freedom, rule of law, and security to avoid alienating their current
voting bloc while also appealing to a new migrant blocthe majority of whom support
Democratic views on immigration reform. Notably, this rhetorice fails locally where
political differences and economic consequences on low-class natives are starker and
generate immediate consequences within local governments.
In contrast, with much of the academic data and demographics in liberal favor,
Democrats have more rhetorical options when it comes to engaging their audiences: they
hold a wider variety of more specific commonplaces for different minorities, low-class
natives, and immigrants, which allow for more effective enthymemes and a greatly
strengthened rhetorical triangle as opposed to ideological generality; they may use factual
data with any number of styles whether high, simple, or even hostile; they can use the
conservatives rhetorical situation of necessary generality against them, claiming that the
party is obsolete and out of touch with the American public.
In light of demographic trends and the rhetorical choices taken by both sides of
the debate, it can be reasonably expected that the conservative views on immigration will
face increasing difficulties as the voting block upon which their platform is based shrinks
as a proportion of U.S. voters. Since many of the factors that are making the conservative
situation difficult are empirically progressive (e.g. demographic shifts, more liberal
progeny, rising immigration, etc.), conservatives in the near future will require some sort
of liberalization or radicalization to avoid extensive rhetorical irrelevance. To accomplish

this, the party will need to abandon those ideologies or premises that disallow rhetorical
engagement of the coming majority (or minority in prospect). In any case, such changes
would demolish the identity of the contemporary GOP. Which rhetorical transformation
the GOP plans to make, if any, remain to be seen.
Works Cited
Ancondo, Leo. Top 10 Myths about Immigration. Immigration Policy Center. 2010.
Web. 09 Apr. 2010.
Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly. Public Goods and Ethnic
Divisions. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999. Web. 20 Apr. 2015.
Baron, Dennis. Hooked on Ebonics. The Chronicle of Higher Education, 1997. Web. 21
Apr. 2015.
Batalova, Jeanne, and Zong, Jie. Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigration and
Immigrants in the United States. Migration Policy Institute, 2015. Web. 20 Apr.
2015.
Brubaker, Rogers. The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration
and its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States. Ethnic and Racial
Studies 24.4 (2001): 531-548. Web. 21 Apr. 2015.
Card, David. How Immigration Affects U.S. Cities. Oxford University, 2007. Web. 09
Apr. 2015.
Camarota, Steven A., and Karen Jensenius. Jobs Americans Wont Do? A Detailed Look
at Immigrant Employment by Occupation. Center for Immigration Studies, 2009.
Web. 21 Apr. 2015.
Doherty, Carroll. 5 Facts about Republicans and Immigration. Pew Research Center.
2013. Web. 21 Apr. 2015.
Haller, William, Alejandro Portes, and Luis E. Guarniz. Assimilation and
Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among
Contemporary Migrants. American Journal of Sociology 108.6 (2003): 12111248. Web. 10 Apr. 2015.
Hayduk, Ron. Democracy for All?: The Case for Restoring Immigrant Voting in the
United States. City University of New York, 2011. Web. 21 Apr. 2015.

Jones, Robert P., Daniel Cox, Juhem Navarro-Rivera, E.J. Dionne Jr., and William A.
Galston. What Americans Want from Immigration Reform in 2014. Public
Religion Research Institute; The Brookings Institution, 2014. Web. 21 Apr. 2015.
Peri, Giovanni and Chad Sparber. The effect of immigrants on U.S. employment and
productivity. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1.3 (2009): 135167. Web. 09 Apr. 2015.
Richardson Jr., Glenn W. How Liberals and Conservatives Think: Evidence on Lakoffs
Theory in the Rhetoric of Political Advertising. Kutztown University of
Pennsylvania, 2006. Web. 21 Apr. 2015.
Sherk, James, and Guinevere Nell. More H-1B Visas, More American Jobs, A Better
Economy. The Heritage Foundation, 2008. Web. 20 Apr. 2015.
Warwick-Menard, Julia. Intergenerational Trajectories and Sociopolitical Context.
TESOL Quarterly 39.2 (2005): 165-185. Web. 10 Apr. 2015.
Illegals Taking U.S. Jobs (2013). Federation for American Immigration Reform, 2013.
Web. 21 Apr. 2015.
The American Value Atlas. Public Religion Research Institute, 2015. Web. 21 Apr.
2015.