Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 112745 October 16, 1997

AQUILINO T. LARIN, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU
OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND THE COMMITTEE CREATED TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST AQUILINO T. LARIN, COMPOSED OF FRUMENCIO A.
LAGUSTAN, JOSE B. ALEJANDRINO AND JAIME M. MAZA, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Challenged in this petition is the validity of petitioner's removal from service as Assistant
Commissioner of the Excise Tax Service of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Incidentally, he questions
Memorandum Order No. 164 issued by the Office of the President, which provides for the creation of
"A Committee to Investigate the Administrative Complaint Against Aquilino T. Larin, Assistant
Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue" as well as the investigation made in pursuance thereto,
and Administrative Order No. 101 dated December 2, 1993 which found him guilty of grave
misconduct in the administrative charge and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from office.
Likewise, petitioner seeks to assail the legality of Executive Order No. 132, issued by President
Ramos on October 26, 1993, which provides for the "Streamlining of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,"
and of its implementing rules issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, namely: a) Administrative
Order No. 4-93, which provides for the "Organizational Structure and Statement of General Functions
of Offices in the National Office" and b) Administrative Order No. 5-93, which provides for "Redefining
the Areas of Jurisdiction and Renumbering of Regional And District Offices."
The antecedent facts of the instant case as succinctly related by the Solicitor General are as follows:
On September 18, 1992, 1 a decision was rendered by the Sandiganbayan convicting herein petitioner
Aquilino T. Larin, Revenue Specific Tax Officer, then Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and his co-accused (except Justino E. Galban, Jr.) of the crimes of violation of
Section 268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 in Criminal
Cases Nos. 14208-14209, entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Aquilino T. Larin, Teodoro T.
Pareno, Justino E. Galban, Jr. and Potenciana N. Evangelista, Accused," the dispositive portion of the
judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is now rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 14208 and 14209
convicting accused Assistant Commissioner for Specific Tax AQUILINO T. LARIN,
Chief of the Alcohol Tax Division TEODORO P. PARENO, and Chief of the Revenue
Accounting Division POTENCIANA M. EVANGELISTA:
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.
The fact of petitioner's conviction was reported to the President of the Philippines by the then Acting
Finance Secretary Leong through a memorandum dated June 4, 1993. The memorandum states, inter
alia:
This is a report in the case of Assistant Commissioner AQUILINO T. LARIN of the
Excise Tax Service, Bureau of Internal Revenue, a presidential appointee, one of those
convicted in Criminal Case Nos. 14208-14209, entitled "People of the Philippines vs.

Aquilino T. Larin, et. al." referred to the Department of Finance by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.
The cases against Pareno and Evangelista are being acted upon by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue as they are non-presidential appointees.
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear from the foregoing that Mr. Larin has been found beyond reasonable doubt to
have committed acts constituting grave misconduct. Under the Civil Service Laws and
Rules which require only preponderance of evidence, grave misconduct is punishable
by dismissal.
Acting by authority of the President, Sr. Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing issued
Memorandum Order No. 164 dated August 25, 1993 which provides for the creation of an Executive
Committee to investigate the administrative charge against herein petitioner Aquilino T. Larin. It states
thus:
A Committee is hereby created to investigate the administrative complaint filed against
Aquilino T. Larin, Assistant Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue, to be
composed of:
Atty. Frumencio A. Lagustan Chairman
Assistant Executive Secretary for Legislation
Mr. Jose B. Alejandro Member
Presidential Assistant
Atty. Jaime M. Maza Member
Assistant Commissioner for Inspector Services
Bureau of Internal Revenue
The Committee shall have all the powers and prerogatives of (an) investigating
committee under the Administrative Code of 1987 including the power to summon
witnesses, administer oath or take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation
by subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum.
xxx xxx xxx
The Committee shall convene immediately, conduct the investigation in the most
expeditious manner, and terminate the same as soon as practicable from its first
scheduled date of hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, the Committee directed the petitioner to respond to the administrative charge leveled
against him through a letter dated September 17, 1993, thus:
Presidential Memorandum Order No. 164 dated August 25, 1993, a xerox copy of
which is hereto attached for your ready reference, created an Investigation Committee
to look into the charges against you which are also the subject of the Criminal Cases
No. 14208 and 14209 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Aquilino T . Larin, et. al.
The Committee has in its possession a certified true copy of the Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in the above-mentioned cases.
Pursuant to Presidential Memorandum Order No. 164, you are hereby directed to file
your position paper on the aforementioned charges within seven (7) days from receipt
hereof . . . .
Failure to file the required position paper shall be considered as a waiver on your part
to submit such paper or to be heard, in which case, the Committee shall deem the case
submitted on the basis of the documents and records at hand.

In compliance, petitioner submitted a letter dated September 30, 1993 which was addressed to Atty.
Frumencio A. Lagustan, the Chairman of the Investigating Committee. In said latter, he asserts that,
The case being sub-judice, I may not, therefore, comment on the merits of the issues
involved for fear of being cited in contempt of Court. This position paper is thus limited
to furnishing the Committee pertinent documents submitted with the Supreme Court
and other tribunal which took cognizance of the case in the past, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing documents readily show that am not administratively liable or criminally
culpable of the charges leveled against me, and that the aforesaid cases are mere
persecutions caused to be filed and are being orchestrated by taxpayers who were
prejudiced by multi-million peso assessments I caused to be issued against them in my
official capacity as Assistant Commissioner, Excise Tax Office of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.
In the same letter, petitioner claims that the administrative complaint against him is already barred: a)
on jurisdictional ground as the Office of the Ombudsman had already taken cognizance of the case
and had caused the filing only of the criminal charges against him, b) by res judicata, c) by double
jeopardy, and d) because to proceed with the case would be redundant, oppressive and a plain
persecution against him.
Meanwhile, the President issued the challenged Executive Order No. 132 dated October 26, 1993
which mandates for the streamlining of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Under said order, some
positions and functions are either abolished, renamed, decentralized or transferred to other offices,
while other offices are also created. The Excise Tax Service or the Specific Tax Service, of which
petitioner was the Assistant Commissioner, was one of those offices that was abolished by said
executive order.
The corresponding implementing rules of Executive Order No. 132, namely, Revenue Administrative
Orders Nos. 4-93 and 5-93, were subsequently issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
On October 27, 1993, or one day after the promulgation of Executive Order No. 132, the President
appointed the following as BIR Assistant Commissioners:
1. Bernardo A. Frianeza
2. Dominador L. Galura
3. Jaime D. Gonzales
4. Lilia C. Guillermo
5. Rizalina S. Magalona
6. Victorino C. Mamalateo
7. Jaime M. Maza
8. Antonio N. Pangilinan
9. Melchor S. Ramos
10. Joel L. Tan-Torres
Consequently, the President, in the assailed Administrative Order No. 101 dated December 2, 1993,
found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative charge and imposed upon him the
penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement benefits including disqualification
for reappointment in the government service.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed directly with this Court the instant petition on December 13, 1993 to
question basically his alleged unlawful removal from office.
On April 17, 1996 and while the instant petition is pending, this Court set aside the conviction of
petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 14208 and 14209.
In his petition, petitioner challenged the authority of the President to dismiss him from office. He
argued that in so far as presidential appointees who are Career Executive Service Officers are
concerned, the President exercises only the power of control not the power to remove. He also
averred that the administrative investigation conducted under Memorandum Order No. 164 is void as
it violated his right to due process. According to him, the letter of the Committee dated September 17,
1993 and his position paper dated September 30, 1993 are not sufficient for purposes of complying
with the requirements of due process. He alleged that he was not informed of the administrative
charges leveled against him nor was he given official notice of his dismissal.
Petitioner likewise claimed that he was removed as a result of the reorganization made by the
Executive Department in the BIR pursuant to Executive Order No. 132. Thus, he assailed said
Executive Order No. 132 and its implementing rules, namely, Revenue Administrative Orders 4-93
and 5-93 for being ultra vires. He claimed that there is yet no law enacted by Congress which
authorizes the reorganization by the Executive Department of executive agencies, particularly the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. He said that the reorganization sought to be effected by the Executive
Department on the basis of E.O. No. 132 is tainted with bad faith in apparent violation of Section 2 of
R.A. 6656, otherwise known as the Act Protecting the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and
Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization.
On the other hand. respondents contended that since petitioner is a presidential appointee, he falls
under the disciplining authority of the President. They also contended that E.O. No. 132 and its
implementing rules were validly issued pursuant to Sections 48 and 62 of Republic Act No. 7645.
Apart from this, the other legal bases of E.O. No. 132 as stated in its preamble are Section 63 of E.O.
No. 127 (Reorganizing the Ministry of Finance), and Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987. In addition, it is clear that in Section 11 of R.A. No. 6656
future reorganization is expressly contemplated and nothing in said law that prohibits subsequent
reorganization through an executive order. Significantly, respondents clarified that petitioner was not
dismissed by virtue of EO 132. Respondents claimed that he was removed from office because he
was found guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative cases filed against him.
The ultimate issue to be resolved in the instant case falls on the determination of the validity of
petitioner's dismissal from office. Incidentally, in order to resolve this matter, it is imperative that We
consider these questions: a) Who has the power to discipline the petitioner?, b) Were the proceedings
taken pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 164 in accord with due process?, c) What is the effect of
petitioner's acquittal in the criminal case to his administrative charge?, d) Does the President have the
power to reorganize the BIR or to issue the questioned E.O. NO. 132?, and e) Is the reorganization of
BIR pursuant to E.O. No. 132 tainted with bad faith?
At the outset, it is worthy to note that the position of Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of the
Career Executive Service. 2 Under the law, 3 Career Executive Service officers, namely,
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director,
Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may
be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, are all appointed by the President. Concededly,
petitioner was appointed as Assistant Commissioner in January, 1987 by then President Aquino.
Thus, petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service. Being a
presidential appointee, he comes under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This is in line
with the well settled principle that the "power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint" conferred
to the President by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, it is ineluctably clear that
Memorandum Order No. 164, which created a committee to investigate the administrative charge
against petitioner, was issued pursuant to the power of removal of the President. This power of
removal, however, is not an absolute one which accepts no reservation. It must be pointed out that
petitioner is a career service officer. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, career service is
characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as contra-distinguished from non-career service
whose tenure is co-terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited
to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the employment
was made. As a career service officer, petitioner enjoys the right to security of tenure. No less than
the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of security of tenure of the employees of the civil service.
Specifically, Section 36 of P.D. No. 807, as amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the

Philippines, is emphatic that career service officers and employees who enjoy security of tenure may
be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said law. In other words, the fact that petitioner
is a presidential appointee does not give the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or
at his pleasure for it is an admitted fact that he is likewise a career service officer who under the law is
the recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed for a cause and in accordance with
procedural due process.
Was petitioner then removed from office for a legal cause under a valid proceeding?
Although the proceedings taken complied with the requirements of procedural due process, this Court,
however, considers that petitioner was not dismissed for a valid cause.
It should be noted that what precipitated the creation of the investigative committee to look into the
administrative charge against petitioner is his conviction by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos.
14208 and 14209. As admitted by the respondents, the administrative case against petitioner is based
on the Sandiganbayan Decision of September 18, 1992. Thus, in the Administrative Order No. 101
issued by Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Quisumbing which found petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct, it clearly states that:
This pertains to the administrative charge against Assistant Commissioner Aquilino T.
Larin of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for grave misconduct by virtue of a
Memorandum signed by Acting Secretary Leong of the Department of Finance, on the
basis of a decision handed down by the Hon. Sandiganbayan convicting Larin, et. al. in
Criminal Case Nos. 14208 and 14209. 4
In a nutshell, the criminal cases against petitioner refer to his alleged violation of Section 268 (4) of
the National Internal Revenue Code and of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 as a consequence of his
act of favorably recommending the grant of tax credit to Tanduay Distillery, Inc.. The pertinent portion
of the judgment of the Sandiganbayan reads:
As above pointed out, the accused had conspired in knowingly preparing false
memoranda and certification in order to effect a fraud upon taxes due to the
government. By their separate acts which had resulted in an appropriate tax credit of
P180,701,682.00 in favor of Tanduay. The government had been defrauded of a tax
revenue for the full amount, if one is to look at the availments or utilization thereof
(Exhibits "AA" to "AA- 31-a"), or for a substantial portion thereof (P73,000,000.00) if we
are to rely on the letter of Deputy Commissioner Eufracio D. Santos (Exhibits "21" for
all the accused).
As pointed out above, the confluence of acts and omissions committed by accused
Larin, Pareno and Evangelista adequately prove conspiracy among them for no other
purpose than to bring about a tax credit which Tanduay did not deserve. These
misrepresentations as to how much Tanduay had paid in ad valorem taxes obviously
constituted a fraud of tax revenue of the government . . . . 5
However, it must be stressed at this juncture that the conviction of petitioner by the Sandiganbayan
was set aside by this Court in our decision promulgated on April 17, 1996 in G.R. Nos. 108037-38 and
107119-20. We specifically ruled in no uncertain terms that: a) petitioner can not be held negligent in
relying on the certification of a co-equal unit in the BIR, b) it is not incumbent upon Larin to go beyond
the certification made by the Revenue Accounting Division that Tanduay Distillery, Inc. had paid the
ad valorem taxes, c) there is nothing irregular or anything false in Larin's marginal note on the
memorandum addressed to Pareno, the Chief of Alcohol Tax Division who was also one of the
accused, but eventually acquitted, in the said criminal cases, and d) there is no proof of actual
agreement between the accused, including petitioner, to commit the illegal acts charged. We are
emphatic in our resolution in said cases that there is nothing "illegal with the acts committed by the
petitioner(s)." We also declare that "there is no showing that petitioner(s) had acted irregularly, or
performed acts outside of his (their) official functions." Significantly, these acts which. We
categorically declare to be not unlawful and improper in G.R. Nos. 108037-38 and G.R. Nos. 10711920 are the very same acts for which petitioner is held to be administratively responsible. Any charge of
malfeasance or misfeasance on the part of the petitioner is clearly belied by our conclusion in said
cases. In the light of this decisive pronouncement, We see no reason for the administrative charge to
continue it must, thus, be dismissed.

We are not unaware of the rule that since administrative cases are independent from criminal actions
for the same act or omission, the dismissal or acquittal of the criminal charge does not foreclose the
institution of administrative action nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability. 6 However, the
circumstantial setting of the instant case sets it miles apart from the foregoing rule and placed it well
within the exception. Corollarily, where the very basis of the administrative case against petitioner is
his conviction in the criminal action which was later on set aside by this Court upon a categorical and
clear finding that the acts for which he was administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular,
the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative
action against him, because in such a case, there is no more basis nor justifiable reason to maintain
the administrative suit.
On the aspect of procedural due process, suffice it to say that petitioner was given every chance to
present his side. The rule is well settled that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings
is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may
have in support of his defense. 7 The records clearly show that on October 1, 1993 petitioner
submitted his letter-response dated September 30, 1993 to the administrative charge filed against
him. Aside from his letter, he also submitted various documents attached as annexes to his letter, all
of which are evidences supporting his defense. Prior to this, he received a letter dated September 17,
1993 from the Investigation Committee requiring him to explain his side concerning the charge. It can
not therefore be argued that petitioner was denied of due process.
Let us now examine Executive Order No. 132.
As stated earlier, with the issuance of Executive Order No. 132, some of the positions and offices,
including the office of Excise Tax Services of which petitioner was the Assistant Commissioner, were
abolished or otherwise decentralized. Consequently, the President released the list of appointed
Assistant Commissioners of the BIR. Apparently, petitioner was not included.
We do not agree.
Under its preamble, E.O. No. 132 lays down the legal bases of its issuance, namely: a) Section 48
and 62 of R.A. No. 7645, b) Section 63 of E.O. No. 127, and c) Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292.
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive
Branch. The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby
directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the
delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased out or abolished,
subject to civil service rules and regulations. . . . Actual scaling down, phasing out or
abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the
purpose by the Office of the President. (emphasis ours)
Said provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of offices only
and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating
and decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62, which provides that:
Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational charges. Unless otherwise created by law or
directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit of charges in key
positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective
organization structures and be funded from appropriations by this Act. (emphasis ours)
The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational
charges including the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.
The contention of petitioner that the two provisions are riders deserves scant consideration. Well
settled is the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. 8 Unless and until
a specific provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and biding for
all intents and purposes.
Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which states:

Sec. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall
exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided
for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or which are not
delegated by the President in accordance with law. (emphasis ours)
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then
which gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 9 which amended
Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the
continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group,
consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two
decrees are unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." 10 So far, there is yet no law
amending or repealing said decrees. Significantly, the Constitution itself recognizes future
reorganizations in the government as what is revealed in Section 16 of Article XVIII, thus:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from service not for cause but as a
result of the . . . reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shall be
entitled to appropriate separation pay . . .
However, We can not consider E.O. No. 127 signed on January 30, 1987 as a legal basis for the
reorganization of the BIR. E.O. No. 127 should be related to the second paragraph of Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 6656.
Section 11 provides inter alia:
xxx xxx xxx
In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch, all departments and
agencies which are authorized by executive orders promulgated by the President to
reorganize shall have ninety days from the approval of this act within which to
implement their respective reorganization plans in accordance with the provisions of
this Act. (emphasis ours)
Executive Order No. 127 was part of the 1987 reorganization contemplated under said provision.
Obviously, it had become stale by virtue of the expiration of the ninety day deadline period. It can not
thus be used as a proper basis for the reorganization of the BIR. Nevertheless, as shown earlier,
there are other legal bases to sustain the authority of the President to issue the questioned E.O. NO.
132.
While the President's power to reorganize can not be denied, this does not mean however that the
reorganization itself is properly made in accordance with law. Well-settled is the rule that
reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. Thus, in Dario vs. Mison, this
Court has had the occasion to clarify that:
As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event no dismissal or
separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case
the security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the abolition
which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or
purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition
takes place and whatever abolition is done is void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition
as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions or where claims of
economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. 11
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that Section 2 of R. A. No. 6656 lists down the circumstances
evidencing bad faith in the removal of employees as a result of the reorganization, thus:
Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid
cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when,
pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered
redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet

the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law.
The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as
evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of the reorganization, giving rise
to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing
pattern of the department or agency concerned;
b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same
functions is created;
c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance and merit;
d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned
and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original
offices;
e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
A reading of some of the provisions of the questioned E.O. No. 132 clearly leads us to an inescapable
conclusion that there are circumstances considered as evidences of bad faith in the reorganization of
the BIR.
Section 1.1.2 of said executive order provides that:
1.1.2 The Intelligence and Investigation Office and the Inspection Service are
abolished. An Intelligence and Investigation Service is
hereby created to absorb the same functions of the abolished office and service. . . .
(emphasis ours)
This provision is a clear illustration of the circumstance mentioned in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 6656
that an office is abolished and another one performing substantially the same function is created.
Another circumstance is the creation of services and divisions in the BIR resulting to a significant
increase in the number of positions in the said bureau as contemplated in paragraph (a) of Section 2
of R.A. No. 6656. Under Section 1.3 of E.O. No. 132, the Information Systems Group has two newly
created Systems Services. Aside from this, six new divisions are also created. Under Section 1.2.1,
three more divisions of the Assessment Service are formed. With these newly created offices, there is
no doubt that a significant increase of positions will correspondingly follow.
Furthermore, it is perceivable that the non-reappointment of the petitioner as Assistant Commissioner
violates Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656. Under said provision, officers holding permanent appointments
are given preference for appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable
to their former positions or in case there are not enough comparable positions to positions next lower
in rank. It is undeniable that petitioner is a career executive officer who is holding a permanent
position. Hence, he should have been given preference for appointment in the position of Assistant
Commissioner. As claimed by petitioner, Antonio Pangilinan who was one of those appointed as
Assistant Commissioner, "is an outsider of sorts to the Bureau, not having been an incumbent officer
of the Bureau at the time of the reorganization." We should not lose sight of the second paragraph of
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656 which explicitly states that no new employees shall be taken in until all
permanent officers shall have been appointed for permanent position.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted, and petitioner is hereby reinstated to his
position as Assistant Commissioner without loss of seniority rights and shall be entitled to full
backwages from the time of his separation from service until actual reinstatement unless, in the
meanwhile, he would have reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five years in which case,
he shall be deemed to have retired at such age and entitled thereafter to the corresponding retirement
benefits.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 The Office of the Solicitor General inadvertently dated it as December 1, 1992.
2 See Floreza vs. Ongpin, G.R. Nos. 81356 and 86156, February 26, 1990 , 182 SCRA
692, 707.
3 P.D. No. 807, as amended, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines; E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987.
4 Rollo p. 94.
5 Rollo p. 113.
6 Police Commission vs. Lood, No. L-34230, March 31, 1980 , 96 SCRA 819; Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Enriquez, A.M. No. P-89-290, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA
1.
7 Midas Touch Food Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 111639, July 29, 1996, 259 SCRA 652.
8 Abbas vs. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287.
9 Official Gazette Vol. 78, No. 40, pp. 5486-2, 3.
10 Section 3 of Article XVIII.
11 176 SCRA 84.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81954

August 8, 1989

CESAR Z. DARIO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME and HON. CATALINO
MACARAIG, JR., in their respective capacities as Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of
Finance, and Executive Secretary, respondents.
G.R. No. 81967

August 8, 1989

VICENTE A. FERIA JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME, and HON. CATALINO
MACARAIG, JR., in their respective capacities as Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of
Finance, and Executive Secretary, respondents.
G.R. No. 82023

August 8, 1989

ADOLFO CASARENO, PACIFICO LAGLEVA, JULIAN C. ESPIRITU, DENNIS A.

AZARRAGA, RENATO DE JESUS, NICASIO C. GAMBOA, CORAZON RALLOS NIEVES,
FELICITACION R. GELUZ, LEODEGARIO H. FLORESCA, SUBAER PACASUM,
ZENAIDA LANARIA, JOSE B. ORTIZ, GLICERIO R. DOLAR, CORNELIO NAPA, PABLO
B. SANTOS, FERMIN RODRIGUEZ, DALISAY BAUTISTA, LEONARDO JOSE, ALBERTO
LONTOK, PORFIRIO TABINO, JOSE BARREDO, ROBERTO ARNALDO, ESTER TAN,
PEDRO BAKAL, ROSARIO DAVID, RODOLFO AFUANG, LORENZO CATRE, LEONCIA
CATRE, ROBERTO ABADA, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER SALVADOR M. MISON, COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
respondent.
G.R. No. 83737

August 8, 1989

BENEDICTO L. AMASA and WILLIAM S. DIONISIO, petitioners,

vs.
PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, respondents.
G.R. No. 85310

August 8, 1989

SALVADOR M. MISON, in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ABACA, SISINIO T., ABAD, ROGELIO C., ABADIANO,
JOSE P., ABCEDE, NEMECIO C., ABIOG, ELY F., ABLAZA, AURORA M., AGBAYANI,
NELSON I., AGRES ANICETO, AGUILAR, FLOR, AGUILUCHO MA. TERESA R.,
AGUSTIN, BONIFACIO T., ALANO, ALEX P., ALBA, MAXIMO F. JR., ALBANO, ROBERT
B., ALCANTARA, JOSE G., ALMARIO, RODOLFO F., ALVEZ, ROMUALDO R., AMISTAD
RUDY M., AMOS, FRANCIS F., ANDRES, RODRIGO V., ANGELES, RICARDO S.,
ANOLIN, MILAGROS H., AQUINO, PASCASIO E., ARABE, MELINDA M., ARCANGEL,
AGUSTIN S., JR., ARPON, ULPLIANO U., JR., ARREZA, ARTEMIO M., JR., ARROJO,
ANTONIO P., ARVISU, ALEXANDER S., ASCA;O, ANTONIO T., ASLAHON, JULAHON
P., ASUNCION, VICTOR R., ATANGAN, LORNA S., ATIENZA, ALEXANDER R., BACAL,
URSULINO C., BA;AGA, MARLOWE, Z., BANTA, ALBERTO T., BARREDO, JOSE B.,
BARROS, VICTOR C., BARTOLOME, FELIPE A., BAYSAC, REYNALDO S., BELENO,

ANTONIO B., BERNARDO, ROMEO D., BERNAS, MARCIANO S., BOHOL, AUXILIADOR
G., BRAVO, VICTOR M., BULEG, BALILIS R., CALNEA, MERCEDES M., CALVO,
HONESTO G., CAMACHO, CARLOS V., CAMPOS, RODOLFO C., CAPULONG, RODRIGO
G., CARINGAL, GRACIA Z., CARLOS, LORENZO B., CARRANTO, FIDEL U.,
CARUNGCONG, ALFREDO M., CASTRO, PATRICIA J., CATELO, ROGELIO B.,
CATURLA, MANUEL B., CENIZAL, JOSEFINA F., CINCO, LUISITO, CONDE0, JOSE C.,
JR., CORCUERA, FIDEL S., CORNETA, VICENTE S., CORONADO, RICARDO S., CRUZ,
EDUARDO S., CRUZ, EDILBERTO A., CRUZ, EFIGENIA B., CRUZADO, MARCIAL C.,
CUSTODIO, RODOLFO M., DABON, NORMA M., DALINDIN, EDNA MAE D., DANDAL,
EDEN F., DATUHARON, SATA A., DAZO, GODOFREDO L., DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA, DE
GUZMAN, ANTONIO A., DE GUZMAN, RENATO E., DE LA CRUZ, AMADO A., JR., DE
LA CRUZ, FRANCISCO C., DE LA PE;A, LEONARDO, DEL CAMPO, ORLANDO, DEL
RIO, MAMERTO P., JR., DEMESA, WILHELMINA T., DIMAKUTA, SALIC L., DIZON,
FELICITAS A., DOCTOR, HEIDY M., DOLAR, GLICERIO R., DOMINGO, NICANOR J.,
DOMINGO, PERFECTO V., JR., DUAY, JUANA G., DYSANGCO, RENATO F., EDILLOR,
ALFREDO P., ELEVAZO, LEONARDO A., ESCUYOS, MANUEL M., JR., ESMERIA,
ANTONIO E., ESPALDON, MA. LOURDES H., ESPINA, FRANCO A., ESTURCO,
RODOLFO C., EVANGELINO, FERMIN I., FELIX, ERNESTO G., FERNANDEZ, ANDREW
M., FERRAREN, ANTONIO C., FERRERA, WENCESLAO A., FRANCISCO, PELAGIO S.,
JR., FUENTES, RUDY L., GAGALANG, RENATO V., GALANG, EDGARDO R., GAMBOA,
ANTONIO C., GAN, ALBERTO R., GARCIA, GILBERT M., GARCIA, EDNA V., GARCIA,
JUAN L., GAVIOLA, LILIAN V., GEMPARO, SEGUNDINA G., GOBENCIONG,
FLORDELIZ B., GRATE, FREDERICK R., GREGORIO, LAURO P., GUARTICO, AMMON
H., GUIANG, MYRNA N., GUINTO, DELFIN C., HERNANDEZ, LUCAS A., HONRALES,
LORETO N., HUERTO, LEOPOLDO H., HULAR , LANNYROSS E., IBA;EZ, ESTER C.,
ILAGAN, HONORATO C., INFANTE, REYNALDO C., ISAIS, RAY C., ISMAEL, HADJI
AKRAM B., JANOLO, VIRGILIO M., JAVIER, AMADOR L., JAVIER, ROBERTO S.,
JAVIER, WILLIAM R., JOVEN, MEMIA A., JULIAN, REYNALDO V., JUMAMOY,
ABUNDIO A., JUMAQUIAO, DOMINGO F., KAINDOY, PASCUAL B., JR., KOH, NANIE G.,
LABILLES, ERNESTO S., LABRADOR, WILFREDO M., LAGA, BIENVENIDO M.,
LAGLEVA, PACIFICO Z., LAGMAN, EVANGELINE G., LAMPONG, WILFREDO G.,
LANDICHO, RESTITUTO A., LAPITAN, CAMILO M., LAURENTE, REYNALDO A.,
LICARTE, EVARISTO R., LIPIO, VICTOR O., LITTAUA, FRANKLIN Z., LOPEZ,
MELENCIO L., LUMBA, OLIVIA., MACAISA, BENITO T., MACAISA, ERLINDA C.,
MAGAT, ELPIDIO, MAGLAYA, FERNANDO P., MALABANAN, ALFREDO C.,
MALIBIRAN, ROSITA D., MALIJAN, LAZARO V., MALLI, JAVIER M., MANAHAN,
RAMON S., MANUEL, ELPIDIO R., MARAVILLA, GIL B., MARCELO, GIL C., MARI;AS,
RODOLFO V., MAROKET, JESUS C., MARTIN, NEMENCIO A., MARTINEZ, ROMEO M.,
MARTINEZ, ROSELINA M., MATIBAG, ANGELINA G., MATUGAS, ERNESTO T.,
MATUGAS, FRANCISCO T., MAYUGA, PORTIA E., MEDINA, NESTOR M., MEDINA,
ROLANDO S., MENDAVIA, AVELINO I., MENDOZA, POTENCIANO G., MIL, RAY M.,
MIRAVALLES, ANASTACIA L., MONFORTE, EUGENIO, JR., G., MONTANO, ERNESTO
F., MONTERO, JUAN M. III., MORALDE, ESMERALDO B., JR., MORALES, CONCHITA
D.L., MORALES, NESTOR P., MORALES, SHIRLEY S., MUNAR, JUANITA L., MU;OZ,
VICENTE R., MURILLO, MANUEL M., NACION, PEDRO R., NAGAL, HENRY N., NAPA,
CORNELIO B., NAVARRO, HENRY L., NEJAL, FREDRICK E., NICOLAS, REYNALDO S.,
NIEVES, RUFINO A., OLAIVAR, SEBASTIAN T., OLEGARIO, LEO Q., ORTEGA, ARLENE
R., ORTEGA, JESUS R., OSORIO, ABNER S., PAPIO, FLORENTINO T. II, PASCUA,
ARNULFO A., PASTOR, ROSARIO, PELAYO, ROSARIO L., PE;A, AIDA C., PEREZ,
ESPERIDION B., PEREZ, JESUS BAYANI M., PRE, ISIDRO A., PRUDENCIADO, EULOGIA
S., PUNZALAN, LAMBERTO N., PURA, ARNOLD T., QUINONES, EDGARDO I., QUINTOS,
AMADEO C., JR., QUIRAY, NICOLAS C., RAMIREZ, ROBERTO P., RA;ADA, RODRIGO
C., RARAS, ANTONIO A., RAVAL, VIOLETA V., RAZAL, BETTY R., REGALA, PONCE F.,
REYES, LIBERATO R., REYES, MANUEL E., REYES, NORMA Z., REYES, TELESFORO
F., RIVERA, ROSITA L., ROCES, ROBERTO V., ROQUE, TERESITA S., ROSANES,
MARILOU M., ROSETE, ADAN I., RUANTO, REY, CRISTO C., JR., SABLADA, PASCASIO
G., SALAZAR, SILVERIA S., SALAZAR, VICTORIA A., SALIMBACOD, PERLITA C.,
SALMINGO, LOURDES M., SANTIAGO, EMELITA B., SATINA, PORFIRIO C., SEKITO,
COSME B., JR., SIMON, RAMON P., SINGSON, MELECIO C., SORIANO, ANGELO L.,

SORIANO, MAGDALENA R., SUMULONG, ISIDRO L., JR., SUNICO, ABELARDO T.,
TABIJE, EMMA B., TAN, RUDY, GOROSPE, TAN, ESTER S., TAN, JULITA S., TECSON,
BEATRIZ B., TOLENTINO, BENIGNO A., TURINGAN, ENRICO T., JR., UMPA, ALI A.,
VALIC, LUCIO E., VASQUEZ, NICANOR B., VELARDE, EDGARDO C., VERA, AVELINO
A., VERAME, OSCAR E., VIADO, LILIAN T., VIERNES, NAPOLEON K., VILLALON,
DENNIS A., VILLAR, LUZ L., VILLALUZ, EMELITO V., ZATA, ANGEL A., JR.,
ACHARON, CRISTETO, ALBA, RENATO B., AMON, JULITA C., AUSTRIA, ERNESTO C.,
CALO, RAYMUNDO M., CENTENO, BENJAMIN R., DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA C .,
DONATO, ESTELITA P., DONATO, FELIPE S., FLORES, PEDRITO S., GALAROSA,
RENATO, MALAWI, MAUYAG, MONTENEGRO, FRANCISCO M., OMEGA, PETRONILO
T., SANTOS, GUILLERMO F., TEMPLO, CELSO, VALDERAMA, JAIME B., and VALDEZ,
NORA M., respondents.
G.R. No. 85335

August 8, 1989

FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, ADAN I. ROSETE, FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, MA. J.

ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, LEODEGARDIO H. FLORESCA, LEONARDO A. DELA PE;A,
ABELARDO T. SUNICO, MELENCIO L. LOPEZ, NEMENCIO A. MARTIN, RUDY M.
AMISTAD, ERNESTO T. MATUGAS, SILVERIA S. SALAZAR, LILLIAN V. GAVIOLA,
MILAGROS ANOLIN, JOSE B. ORTIZ, ARTEMIO ARREZA, JR., GILVERTO M. GARCIA,
ANTONIO A. RARAS, FLORDELINA B. GOBENCIONG, ANICETO AGRES, EDGAR Y.
QUINONES, MANUEL B. CATURLA, ELY F. ABIOG, RODRIGO C. RANADA, LAURO
GREGORIO, ALBERTO I. GAN, EDGARDO GALANG, RAY C. ISAIS, NICANOR B.
VASQUEZ, MANUEL ESCUYOS, JR., ANTONIO B. BELENO, ELPIO R. MANUEL,
AUXILIADOR C. BOHOL, LEONARDO ELEVAZO, VICENTE S. CORNETA, petitioners,
vs.
COM. SALVADOR M. MISON/BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and the CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, respondents.
G.R. No. 86241

August 8, 1989

SALVADOR M. MISON, in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, SENEN S. DIMAGUILA, ROMEO P. ARABE BERNARDO
S. QUINTONG, GREGORIO P. REYES, and ROMULO C. BADILLO respondents

SARMIENTO, J.:

The Court writes finis to this contreversy that has raged bitterly for the several months. It does so out
of ligitimate presentement of more suits reaching it as a consequence of the government reorganization
and the instability it has wrought on the performance and efficiency of the bureaucracy. The Court is
apprehensive that unless the final word is given and the ground rules are settled, the issue will fester,
and likely foment on the constitutional crisis for the nation, itself biset with grave and serious
problems.
The facts are not in dispute.
On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING A
NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE,
PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND
PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW
CONSTITUTION." Among other things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:
SECTION 1. ...

The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive structures,
and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime; 1
...
Pursuant thereto, it was also provided:
SECTION 1. In the reorganization of the government, priority shall be given to measures to
promote economy, efficiency, and the eradication of graft and corruption.
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution
shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year
from February 25, 1986.
SECTION 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service as a result of the
organization effected under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws then in force,
receive the retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder.
SECTION 4. The records, equipment, buildings, facilities and other properties of all
government offices shall be carefully preserved. In case any office or body is abolished or
reorganized pursuant to this Proclamation, its FUNDS and properties shall be transferred to the
office or body to which its powers, functions and responsibilities substantially pertain. 2
Actually, the reorganization process started as early as February 25, 1986, when the President, in her
first act in office, called upon "all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignation(s)
beginning with the members of the Supreme Court."3 Later on, she abolished the Batasang Pambansa4
and the positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet 5 under the 1973 Constitution.
Since then, the President has issued a number of executive orders and directives reorganizing various
other government offices, a number of which, with respect to elected local officials, has been
challenged in this Court, 6 and two of which, with respect to appointed functionaries, have likewise
been questioned herein. 7
On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order No. 17, "PRESCRIBING RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE
FREEDOM CONSTITUTION." Executive Order No. 17 recognized the "unnecessary anxiety and
demoralization among the deserving officials and employees" the ongoing government reorganization
had generated, and prescribed as "grounds for the separation/replacement of personnel," the following:
SECTION 3. The following shall be the grounds for separation replacement of personnel:
1) Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service
Law;
2) Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act as determined by the Mnistry Head concerned;
3) Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;
4) Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;
5) Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the
service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.8

On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated Executive Order No. 127, "REORGANIZING THE
MINISTRY OF FINANCE." 9 Among other offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs 10 and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.
Three days later, on February 2, 1987, 11 the Filipino people adopted the new Constitution.
On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum, in
the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders," 12 prescribing
the procedure in personnel placement. It also provided:
1. By February 28, 1988, the employees covered by Executive Order 127 and the grace
period extended to the Bureau of Customs by the President of the Philippines on
reorganization shall be:
a) informed of their re-appointment, or
b) offered another position in the same department or agency or
c) informed of their termination. 13
On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board charged with
adjudicating appeals from removals under the above Memorandum. 14 On January 26, 1988,
Commissioner Mison addressed several notices to various Customs officials, in the tenor as follows:
Sir:
Please be informed that the Bureau is now in the process of implementing the Reorganization
Program under Executive Order No. 127.
Pursuant to Section 59 of the same Executive Order, all officers and employees of the
Department of Finance, or the Bureau of Customs in particular, shall continue to perform their
respective duties and responsibilities in a hold-over capacity, and that those incumbents whose
positions are not carried in the new reorganization pattern, or who are not re- appointed, shall
be deemed separated from the service.
In this connection, we regret to inform you that your services are hereby terminated as of
February 28, 1988. Subject to the normal clearances, you may receive the retirement benefits to
which you may be entitled under existing laws, rules and regulations.
In the meantime, your name will be included in the consolidated list compiled by the Civil
Service Commission so that you may be given priority for future employment with the
Government as the need arises.
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd) SALVADOR M. MISON
Commissioner15
As far as the records will yield, the following were recipients of these notices:
1. CESAR DARIO
2. VICENTE FERIA, JR.
3. ADOLFO CASARENO
4. PACIFICO LAGLEVA
5. JULIAN C. ESPIRITU

6. DENNIS A. AZARRAGA
7. RENATO DE JESUS
8. NICASIO C. GAMBOA
9. CORAZON RALLOS NIEVES
10. FELICITACION R. GELUZ
11. LEODEGARIO H. FLORESCA
12. SUBAER PACASUM
13. ZENAIDA LANARIA
14. JOSE B. ORTIZ
15. GLICERIO R. DOLAR
16. CORNELIO NAPA
17. PABLO B. SANTOS
18. FERMIN RODRIGUEZ
19. DALISAY BAUTISTA
20. LEONARDO JOSE
21. ALBERTO LONTOK
22. PORFIRIO TABINO
23. JOSE BARREDO
24. ROBERTO ARNALDO
25. ESTER TAN
26. PEDRO BAKAL
27. ROSARIO DAVID
28. RODOLFO AFUANG
29. LORENZO CATRE
30. LEONCIA CATRE
31. ROBERTO ABADA
32. ABACA, SISINIO T.
33. ABAD, ROGELIO C.
34. ABADIANO, JOSE P

35. ABCEDE, NEMECIO C.

36. ABIOG, ELY F.
37. ABLAZA, AURORA M.
38. AGBAYANI, NELSON I.
39. AGRES, ANICETO
40. AGUILAR, FLOR
41. AGUILUCHO, MA. TERESA R.
42. AGUSTIN, BONIFACIO T.
43. ALANO, ALEX P.
44. ALBA, MAXIMO F. JR.
45. ALBANO, ROBERT B.
46. ALCANTARA, JOSE G.
47. ALMARIO, RODOLFO F.
48. ALVEZ, ROMUALDO R.
49. AMISTAD, RUDY M.
50. AMOS, FRANCIS F.
51. ANDRES, RODRIGO V.
52. ANGELES, RICARDO S.
53. ANOLIN, MILAGROS H.
54. AQUINO, PASCASIO E. L.
55. ARABE, MELINDA M.
56. ARCANGEL, AGUSTIN S, JR.
57. ARPON, ULPIANO U., JR.
58. ARREZA, ARTEMIO M, JR.
59. ARROJO, ANTONIO P.
60. ARVISU, ALEXANDER S.
61. ASCA;O, ANTONIO T.
62. ASLAHON, JULAHON P.
63. ASUNCION, VICTOR R.

64. ATANGAN, LORNA S.

65. ANTIENZA, ALEXANDER R.
66. BACAL URSULINO C.
67. BA;AGA, MARLOWE Z.
68. BANTA, ALBERTO T.
69. BARROS, VICTOR C.
70. BARTOLOME, FELIPE A.
71. BAYSAC, REYNALDO S.
72. BELENO, ANTONIO B.
73. BERNARDO, ROMEO D.
74. BERNAS, MARCIANO S.
75. BOHOL, AUXILIADOR G.
76. BRAVO, VICTOR M.
77. BULEG, BALILIS R.
78. CALNEA, MERCEDES M.
79. CALVO, HONESTO G.
80. CAMACHO, CARLOS V.
81. CAMPOS, RODOLFO C.
82. CAPULONG, RODRIGO G.
83. CARINGAL, GRACIA Z.
84. CARLOS, LORENZO B.
85. CARRANTO, FIDEL U.
86. CARUNGCONG, ALFREDO M.
87. CASTRO, PATRICIA J.
88. CATELO, ROGELIO B.
89. CATURLA, MANUEL B.
90. CENIZAL, JOSEFINA F.
91. CINCO, LUISITO
92. CONDE, JOSE C., JR.

93. CORCUERA, FIDEL S.

94. CORNETA, VICENTE S.
95. CORONADO, RICARDO S.
96. CRUZ, EDUARDO S.
97. CRUZ, EDILBERTO A,
98. CRUZ, EFIGENIA B.
99. CRUZADO,NORMA M.
100. CUSTODIO, RODOLFO M.
101. DABON, NORMA M.
102. DALINDIN, EDNA MAE D.
103. DANDAL, EDEN F.
104. DATUHARON, SATA A.
105. DAZO, GODOFREDO L.
106. DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA
107. DE GUZMAN, ANTONIO A.
108. DE GUZMAN, RENATO E.
109. DE LA CRUZ, AMADO A., JR.
110. DE LA CRUZ, FRANCISCO C.
111. DE LA PE;A, LEONARDO
112. DEL CAMPO, ORLANDO
113. DEL RIO, MAMERTO P., JR.
114. DEMESA, WILHELMINA T.
115. DIMAKUTA, SALIC L.
116. DIZON, FELICITAS A.
117. DOCTOR, HEIDY M.
118. DOMINGO, NICANOR J.
119. DOMINGO, PERFECTO V., JR.
120. DUAY, JUANA G.
121. DYSANGCO, RENATO F.

122. EDILLOR, ALFREDO P.

123. ELEVAZO, LEONARDO A
124. ESCUYOS, MANUEL M., JR.
125. ESMERIA, ANTONIO E.
126. ESPALDON, MA. LOURDES H.
127. ESPINA, FRANCO A.
128. ESTURCO, RODOLFO C.
129. EVANGELINO, FERMIN I.
130. FELIX, ERNESTO G.
131. FERNANDEZ, ANDREW M.
132. FERRAREN, ANTONIO C.
133. FERRERA, WENCESLAO A.
134. FRANCISCO, PELAGIO S, JR.
135. FUENTES, RUDY L.
136. GAGALANG, RENATO V.
137. GALANG, EDGARDO R.
138. GAMBOA, ANTONIO C.
139. GAN, ALBERTO P
140. GARCIA, GILBERT M.
141. GARCIA, EDNA V.
142. GARCIA, JUAN L.
143. GAVIOIA, LILIAN V.
144. GEMPARO, SEGUNDINA G.
145. GOBENCIONG, FLORDELIZ B.
146. GRATE, FREDERICK R.
147. GREGORIO, LAURO P.
148. GUARTICO, AMMON H.
149. GUIANG, MYRNA N.
150. GUINTO, DELFIN C.

151. HERNANDEZ, LUCAS A.

152. HONRALES, LORETO N.
153. HUERTO, LEOPOLDO H.
154. HULAR, LANNYROSS E.
155. IBA;EZ, ESTER C.
156. ILAGAN, HONORATO C.
157. INFANTE, REYNALDO C.
158. ISAIS, RAY C.
159. ISMAEL, HADJI AKRAM B.
160. JANOLO, VIRGILIO M.
161. JAVIER, AMADOR L.
162. JAVIER, ROBERTO S.
163. JAVIER, WILLIAM R.
164. JOVEN, MEMIA A.
165. JULIAN, REYNALDO V.
166. JUMAMOY, ABUNDIO A.
167. JUMAQUIAO, DOMINGO F.
168. KAINDOY, PASCUAL B., JR.
169. KOH, NANIE G.
170. LABILLES, ERNESTO S.
171. LABRADOR, WILFREDO M.
172. LAGA, BIENVENIDO M.
173. LAGMAN, EVANGELINE G.
174. LAMPONG, WILFREDO G.
175. LANDICHO, RESTITUTO A.
176. LAPITAN, CAMILO M.
177. LAURENTE, REYNALDO A.
178. LICARTE, EVARISTO R.
179. LIPIO, VICTOR O.

180. LITTAUA, FRANKLIN Z.

181. LOPEZ, MELENCIO L.
182. LUMBA, OLIVIA R.
183. MACAISA, BENITO T.
184. MACAISA, ERLINDA C.
185. MAGAT, ELPIDIO
186. MAGLAYA, FERNANDO P.
187. MALABANAN, ALFREDO C.
188. MALIBIRAN, ROSITA D.
189. MALIJAN, LAZARO V.
190. MALLI, JAVIER M.
191. MANAHAN, RAMON S.
192. MANUEL, ELPIDIO R.
193. MARAVILLA, GIL B.
194. MARCELO, GIL C.
195. MARI;AS, RODOLFO V.
196. MAROKET ,JESUS C.
197. MARTIN, NEMENCIO A.
198. MARTINEZ, ROMEO M.
199. MARTINEZ, ROSELINA M.
200. MATIBAG, ANGELINA G.
201. MATUGAS, ERNESTO T.
202. MATUGAS, FRANCISCO T.
203. MAYUGA, PORTIA E.
204. MEDINA, NESTOR M.
205. MEDINA, ROLANDO S.
206. MENDAVIA, AVELINO
207. MENDOZA, POTENCIANO G.
208. MIL, RAY M.

209. MIRAVALLES, ANASTACIA L.

210. MONFORTE, EUGENIO, JR. G.
211. MONTANO, ERNESTO F.
212. MONTERO, JUAN M. III
213. MORALDE, ESMERALDO B., JR.
214. MORALES, CONCHITA D. L
215. MORALES, NESTOR P.
216. MORALES, SHIRLEY S.
217. MUNAR, JUANITA L.
218. MU;OZ, VICENTE R.
219. MURILLO, MANUEL M.
220. NACION, PEDRO R.
221. NAGAL, HENRY N.
222. NAVARRO, HENRY L.
223. NEJAL FREDRICK E.
224. NICOLAS, REYNALDO S.
225. NIEVES, RUFINO A.
226. OLAIVAR, SEBASTIAN T.
227. OLEGARIO, LEO Q.
228. ORTEGA, ARLENE R.
229. ORTEGA, JESUS R.
230. OSORIO, ABNER S.
231. PAPIO FLORENTINO T. II
232. PASCUA, ARNULFO A.
233. PASTOR, ROSARIO
234. PELAYO, ROSARIO L.
235. PE;A, AIDA C.
236. PEREZ, ESPERIDION B.
237. PEREZ, JESUS BAYANI M.

238. PRE, ISIDRO A.

239. PRUDENCIADO, EULOGIA S.
240. PUNZALAN, LAMBERTO N.
241. PURA, ARNOLD T.
242. QUINONES, EDGARDO I.
243. QUINTOS, AMADEO C., JR.
244. QUIRAY, NICOLAS C.
245. RAMIREZ, ROBERTO P.
246. RANADA, RODRIGO C.
247. RARAS, ANTONIO A.
248. RAVAL, VIOLETA V.
249. RAZAL, BETTY R.
250. REGALA, PONCE F.
251. REYES, LIBERATO R.
252. REYES, MANUEL E.
253. REYES, NORMA Z.
254. REYES, TELESPORO F.
255. RIVERA, ROSITA L.
256. ROCES, ROBERTO V.
257. ROQUE, TERESITA S.
258. ROSANES, MARILOU M.
259. ROSETE, ADAN I.
260. RUANTO, REY CRISTO C., JR.
261. SABLADA, PASCASIO G.
262. SALAZAR, SILVERIA S.
263. SALAZAR, VICTORIA A.
264. SALIMBACOD, PERLITA C.
265. SALMINGO, LOURDES M.
266. SANTIAGO, EMELITA B.

267. SATINA, PORFIRIO C.

268. SEKITO, COSME B JR.
269. SIMON, RAMON P.
270. SINGSON, MELENCIO C.
271. SORIANO, ANGELO L.
272. SORIANO, MAGDALENA R.
273. SUNICO, ABELARDO T .
274. TABIJE, EMMA B.
275. TAN, RUDY GOROSPE
276. TAN, ESTER S.
277. TAN, JULITA S.
278. TECSON, BEATRIZ B.
279. TOLENTINO, BENIGNO A.
280. TURINGAN, ENRICO T JR.
281. UMPA, ALI A.
282. VALIC, LUCIO E.
283. VASQUEZ, NICANOR B.
284. VELARDE, EDGARDO C.
285. VERA, AVELINO A.
286. VERAME, OSCAR E.
287. VIADO, LILIAN T.
288. VIERNES, NAPOLEON K
289. VILLALON, DENNIS A.
290. VILLAR, LUZ L.
291. VILLALUZ, EMELITO V.
292. VILLAR, LUZ L.
293. ZATA, ANGELA JR.
294. ACHARON, CRISTETO
295. ALBA, RENATO B.

296. AMON, JULITA C.

297. AUSTRIA, ERNESTO C.
298. CALO, RAYMUNDO M.
299. CENTENO, BENJAMIN R.
300. DONATO, ESTELITA P.
301. DONATO, FELIPE S
302. FLORES, PEDRITO S.
303. GALAROSA, RENATO
304. MALAWI, MAUYAG
305. MONTENEGRO, FRANSISCO M.
306. OMEGA, PETRONILO T.
307. SANTOS, GUILLERMO P.
308. TEMPLO, CELSO
309. VALDERAMA, JAIME B.
310. VALDEZ, NORA M.
Cesar Dario is the petitioner in G.R. No. 81954; Vicente Feria, Jr., is the petitioner in G.R. No. 81967;
Messrs. Adolfo Caserano Pacifico Lagleva Julian C. Espiritu, Dennis A. Azarraga Renato de Jesus,
Nicasio C. Gamboa, Mesdames Corazon Rallos Nieves and Felicitacion R. Geluz Messrs. Leodegario
H. Floresca, Subaer Pacasum Ms. Zenaida Lanaria Mr. Jose B. Ortiz, Ms. Gliceria R. Dolar, Ms.
Cornelia Napa, Pablo B. Santos, Fermin Rodriguez, Ms. Daligay Bautista, Messrs. Leonardo Jose,
Alberto Lontok, Porfirio Tabino Jose Barredo, Roberto Arnaldo, Ms. Ester Tan, Messrs. Pedro Bakal,
Rosario David, Rodolfo Afuang, Lorenzo Catre,, Ms. Leoncia Catre, and Roberto Abaca, are the
petitioners in G.R. No. 82023; the last 279 16 individuals mentioned are the private respondents in G.R.
No. 85310.
As far as the records will likewise reveal, 17 a total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau of
Customs were given individual notices of separation. A number supposedly sought reinstatement with
the Reorganization Appeals Board while others went to the Civil Service Commission. The first thirtyone mentioned above came directly to this Court.
On June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its ruling ordering the reinstatement of
the 279 employees, the 279 private respondents in G.R. No. 85310, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that:
1. Appellants be immediately reappointed to positions of comparable or equivalent rank
in the Bureau of Customs without loss of seniority rights;
2. Appellants be paid their back salaries reckoned from the dates of their illegal
termination based on the rates under the approved new staffing pattern but not lower
than their former salaries.

This action of the Commission should not, however, be interpreted as an exoneration of the
appellants from any accusation of wrongdoing and, therefore, their reappointments are without
prejudice to:
1. Proceeding with investigation of appellants with pending administrative cases, and
where investigations have been finished, to promptly, render the appropriate decisions;
2. The filing of appropriate administrative complaints against appellants with
derogatory reports or information if evidence so warrants.
SO ORDERED. 18
On July 15, 1988, Commissioner Mison, represented by the Solicitor General, filed a motion for
reconsideration Acting on the motion, the Civil Service Commission, on September 20, 1988, denied
reconsideration. 19
On October 20, 1988, Commissioner Mison instituted certiorari proceedings with this Court, docketed,
as above-stated, as G.R. No. 85310 of this Court.
On November 16,1988, the Civil Service Commission further disposed the appeal (from the resolution
of the Reorganization Appeals Board) of five more employees, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that:
1. Appellants be immediately reappointed to positions of comparable or equivalent rank
in the Bureau of Customs without loss of seniority rights; and
2. Appellants be paid their back salaries to be reckoned from the date of their illegal
termination based on the rates under the approved new staffing pattern but not lower
than their former salaries.
This action of the Commission should not, however, be interpreted as an exoneration of the
herein appellants from any accusation of any wrongdoing and therefore, their reappointments
are without prejudice to:
1. Proceeding with investigation of appellants with pending administrative cases, if any,
and where investigations have been finished, to promptly, render the appropriate
decisions; and
2. The filing of appropriate administrative complaints against appellant with derogatory
reports or information, if any, and if evidence so warrants.
SO ORDERED. 20
On January 6, 1989, Commissioner Mison challenged the Civil Service Commission's Resolution in
this Court; his petitioner has been docketed herein as G.R. No. 86241. The employees ordered to be
reinstated are Senen Dimaguila, Romeo Arabe, Bemardo Quintong,Gregorio Reyes, and Romulo
Badillo. 21
On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656, "AN ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TENURE
OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION," 22 was signed into law. Under Section 7, thereof:
Sec. 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have
been separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or
reappointed as the case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the
period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all officers and employees, including
casuals and temporary employees, who have been separated pursuant to reorganization shall, if
entitled thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and retirement and other benefits under

existing laws within ninety (90) days from the date of the effectivity of their separation or from
the date of the receipt of the resolution of their appeals as the case may be: Provided, That
application for clearance has been filed and no action thereon has been made by the
corresponding department or agency. Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid a
separation gratuity in the amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service.
Such separation pay and retirement benefits shall have priority of payment out of the savings of
the department or agency concerned. 23
On June 23, 1988, Benedicto Amasa and William Dionisio, customs examiners appointed by
Commissioner Mison pursuant to the ostensible reorganization subject of this controversy, petitioned
the Court to contest the validity of the statute. The petition is docketed as G.R. No. 83737.
On October 21, 1988, thirty-five more Customs officials whom the Civil Service Commission had
ordered reinstated by its June 30,1988 Resolution filed their own petition to compel the Commissioner
of Customs to comply with the said Resolution. The petition is docketed as G.R. No. 85335.
On November 29, 1988, we resolved to consolidate all seven petitions.
On the same date, we resolved to set the matter for hearing on January 12, 1989. At the said hearing,
the parties, represented by their counsels (a) retired Justice Ruperto Martin; (b) retired Justice Lino
Patajo. (c) former Dean Froilan Bacungan (d) Atty. Lester Escobar (e) Atty. Faustino Tugade and (f)
Atty. Alexander Padilla, presented their arguments. Solicitor General Francisco Chavez argued on
behalf of the Commissioner of Customs (except in G.R. 85335, in which he represented the Bureau of
Customs and the Civil Service Commission).lwph1.t Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla also
appeared and argued as amicus curiae Thereafter, we resolved to require the parties to submit their
respective memoranda which they did in due time.
There is no question that the administration may validly carry out a government reorganization
insofar as these cases are concerned, the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs by mandate not
only of the Provisional Constitution, supra, but also of the various Executive Orders decreed by the
Chief Executive in her capacity as sole lawmaking authority under the 1986-1987 revolutionary
government. It should also be noted that under the present Constitution, there is a recognition, albeit
implied, that a government reorganization may be legitimately undertaken, subject to certain
conditions. 24
The Court understands that the parties are agreed on the validity of a reorganization per se the only
question being, as shall be later seen: What is the nature and extent of this government reorganization?
The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure, failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
the standing of certain parties to sue, 25 and other technical objections, for two reasons, "[b]ecause of
the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service,"26 and because of
the serious implications of these cases on the administration of the Philippine civil service and the
rights of public servants.
The urgings in G.R. Nos. 85335 and 85310, that the Civil Service Commission's Resolution dated June
30, 1988 had attained a character of finality for failure of Commissioner Mison to apply for judicial
review or ask for reconsideration seasonalbly under Presidential Decree No. 807, 27 or under Republic
Act No. 6656, 28 or under the Constitution, 29 are likewise rejected. The records show that the Bureau
of Customs had until July 15, 1988 to ask for reconsideration or come to this Court pursuant to Section
39 of Presidential Decree No. 807. The records likewise show that the Solicitor General filed a motion
for reconsideration on July 15, 1988.30 The Civil Service Commission issued its Resolution denying
reconsideration on September 20, 1988; a copy of this Resolution was received by the Bureau on
September 23, 1988.31 Hence the Bureau had until October 23, 1988 to elevate the matter on certiorari
to this Court.32 Since the Bureau's petition was filed on October 20, 1988, it was filed on time.
We reject, finally, contentions that the Bureau's petition (in G.R. 85310) raises no jurisdictional
questions, and is therefore bereft of any basis as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. 33 We find that the questions raised in Commissioner Mison's petition (in G.R. 85310) are,
indeed, proper for certiorari, if by "jurisdictional questions" we mean questions having to do with "an

indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, or omission to weigh pertinent
considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation, 34 as distinguished from questions
that require "digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment 35 which is the office, on the
other hand, of review under Rule 45 of the said Rules. What cannot be denied is the fact that the act of
the Civil Service Commission of reinstating hundreds of Customs employees Commissioner Mison
had separated, has implications not only on the entire reorganization process decreed no less than by
the Provisional Constitution, but on the Philippine bureaucracy in general; these implications are of
such a magnitude that it cannot be said that assuming that the Civil Service Commission erred
the Commission committed a plain "error of judgment" that Aratuc says cannot be corrected by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari or any special civil action. We reaffirm the teaching of Aratuc as
regards recourse to this Court with respect to rulings of the Civil Service Commission which is that
judgments of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court through certiorari alone, under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In Aratuc we declared:
It is once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that there is a definite
tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as the independent
constitutional body charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest elections. The
framers of the new Constitution must be presumed to have definite knowledge of what it means
to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission "subject to review by the Supreme
Court'. And since instead of maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that the Commission's
actuations be instead 'brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari", We cannot insist that there
was no intent to change the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope of
certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in remedial law.36
We observe no fundamental difference between the Commission on Elections and the Civil Service
Commission (or the Commission on Audit for that matter) in terms of the constitutional intent to leave
the constitutional bodies alone in the enforcement of laws relative to elections, with respect to the
former, and the civil service, with respect to the latter (or the audit of government accounts, with
respect to the Commission on Audit). As the poll body is the "sole judge" 37 of all election cases, so is
the Civil Service Commission the single arbiter of all controversies pertaining to the civil service.
It should also be noted that under the new Constitution, as under the 1973 Charter, "any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari," 38 which, as
Aratuc tells us, "technically connotes something less than saying that the same 'shall be subject to
review by the Supreme Court,' " 39 which in turn suggests an appeal by petition for review under Rule
45. Therefore, our jurisdiction over cases emanating from the Civil Service Commission is limited to
complaints of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, complaints that justify certiorari under Rule 65.
While Republic Act No. 6656 states that judgments of the Commission are "final and executory"40 and
hence, unappealable, under Rule 65, certiorari precisely lies in the absence of an appeal. 41
Accordingly, we accept Commissioner Mison petition (G.R. No. 85310) which clearly charges the
Civil Service Commission with grave abuse of discretion, a proper subject of certiorari, although it
may not have so stated in explicit terms.
As to charges that the said petition has been filed out of time, we reiterate that it has been filed
seasonably. It is to be stressed that the Solicitor General had thirty days from September 23, 1988 (the
date the Resolution, dated September 20,1988, of the Civil Service Commission, denying
reconsideration, was received) to commence the instant certiorari proceedings. As we stated, under the
Constitution, an aggrieved party has thirty days within which to challenge "any decision, order, or
ruling" 42 of the Commission. To say that the period should be counted from the Solicitor's receipt of
the main Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, is to say that he should not have asked for reconsideration
But to say that is to deny him the right to contest (by a motion for reconsideration) any ruling, other
than the main decision, when, precisely, the Constitution gives him such a right. That is also to place
him at a "no-win" situation because if he did not move for a reconsideration, he would have been
faulted for demanding certiorari too early, under the general rule that a motion for reconsideration

should preface a resort to a special civil action. 43 Hence, we must reckon the thirty-day period from
receipt of the order of denial.
We come to the merits of these cases.
G.R. Nos. 81954, 81967, 82023, and 85335:
The Case for the Employees
The petitioner in G.R. No. 81954, Cesar Dario was one of the Deputy Commissioners of the Bureau of
Customs until his relief on orders of Commissioner Mison on January 26, 1988. In essence, he
questions the legality of his dismiss, which he alleges was upon the authority of Section 59 of
Executive Order No. 127, supra, hereinbelow reproduced as follows:
SEC. 59. New Structure and Pattern. Upon approval of this Executive Order, the officers and
employees of the Ministry shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective
duties and responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits unless in the
meantime they are separated from government service pursuant to Executive Order No. 17
(1986) or Article III of the Freedom Constitution.
The new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry shall be approved and prescribed
by the Minister within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this Executive
Order and the authorized positions created hereunder shall be filled with regular appointments
by him or by the President, as the case may be. Those incumbents whose positions are not
included therein or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service. Those
separated from the service shall receive the retirement benefits to which they may be entitled
under existing laws, rules and regulations. Otherwise, they shall be paid the equivalent of one
month basic salary for every year of service, or the equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable
to them on the basis of highest salary received but in no case shall such payment exceed the
equivalent of 12 months salary.
No court or administrative body shall issue any writ of preliminary injunction or restraining
order to enjoin the separation/replacement of any officer or employee effected under this
Executive Order.44
a provision he claims the Commissioner could not have legally invoked. He avers that he could not
have been legally deemed to be an "[incumbent] whose [position] [is] not included therein or who [is]
not reappointed"45 to justify his separation from the service. He contends that neither the Executive
Order (under the second paragraph of the section) nor the staffing pattern proposed by the Secretary of
Finance 46 abolished the office of Deputy Commissioner of Customs, but, rather, increased it to three.
47
Nor can it be said, so he further maintains, that he had not been "reappointed" 48 (under the second
paragraph of the section) because "[[r]eappointment therein presupposes that the position to which it
refers is a new one in lieu of that which has been abolished or although an existing one, has absorbed
that which has been abolished." 49 He claims, finally, that under the Provisional Constitution, the
power to dismiss public officials without cause ended on February 25, 1987,50 and that thereafter,
public officials enjoyed security of tenure under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution.51
Like Dario Vicente Feria, the petitioner in G.R. No. 81967, was a Deputy Commissioner at the Bureau
until his separation directed by Commissioner Mison. And like Dario he claims that under the 1987
Constitution, he has acquired security of tenure and that he cannot be said to be covered by Section 59
of Executive Order No. 127, having been appointed on April 22, 1986 during the effectivity of the
Provisional Constitution. He adds that under Executive Order No. 39, "ENLARGING THE POWERS
AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,"52 the Commissioner of Customs
has the power "[t]o appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President," 53 and that
his position, which is that of a Presidential appointee, is beyond the control of Commissioner Mison
for purposes of reorganization.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 82023, collectors and examiners in venous ports of the Philippines, say, on
the other hand, that the purpose of reorganization is to end corruption at the Bureau of Customs and

that since there is no finding that they are guilty of corruption, they cannot be validly dismissed from
the service.
The Case for Commissioner Mison
In his comments, the Commissioner relies on this Court's resolution in Jose v. Arroyo54 in which the
following statement appears in the last paragraph thereof:
The contention of petitioner that Executive Order No. 127 is violative of the provision of the
1987 Constitution guaranteeing career civil service employees security of tenure overlooks the
provisions of Section 16, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) which explicitly authorize the
removal of career civil service employees "not for cause but as a result of the reorganization
pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution." By virtue of said provision, the reorganization of the Bureau
of Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may continue even after the ratification of the
Constitution, and career civil service employees may be separated from the service without
cause as a result of such reorganization.55
For this reason, Mison posits, claims of violation of security of tenure are allegedly no defense. He
further states that the deadline prescribed by the Provisional Constitution (February 25, 1987) has been
superseded by the 1987 Constitution, specifically, the transitory provisions thereof, 56 which allows a
reorganization thereafter (after February 25, 1987) as this very Court has so declared in Jose v. Arroyo.
Mison submits that contrary to the employees' argument, Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 is
applicable (in particular, to Dario and Feria in the sense that retention in the Bureau, under the
Executive Order, depends on either retention of the position in the new staffing pattern or
reappointment of the incumbent, and since the dismissed employees had not been reappointed, they
had been considered legally separated. Moreover, Mison proffers that under Section 59 incumbents are
considered on holdover status, "which means that all those positions were considered vacant." 57 The
Solicitor General denies the applicability of Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz 58 because that case
supposedly involved a mere transfer and not a separation. He rejects, finally, the force and effect of
Executive Order Nos. 17 and 39 for the reason that Executive Order No. 17, which was meant to
implement the Provisional Constitution, 59 had ceased to have force and effect upon the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, and that, under Executive Order No. 39, the dismissals contemplated were "for
cause" while the separations now under question were "not for cause" and were a result of government
reorganize organization decreed by Executive Order No. 127. Anent Republic Act No. 6656, he
expresses doubts on the constitutionality of the grant of retroactivity therein (as regards the
reinforcement of security of tenure) since the new Constitution clearly allows reorganization after its
effectivity.
G.R. Nos. 85310 and 86241
The Position of Commissioner Mison
Commissioner's twin petitions are direct challenges to three rulings of the Civil Service Commission:
(1) the Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, reinstating the 265 customs employees above-stated; (2) the
Resolution, dated September 20, 1988, denying reconsideration; and (3) the Resolution, dated
November 16, 1988, reinstating five employees. The Commissioner's arguments are as follows:
1. The ongoing government reorganization is in the nature of a "progressive" 60 reorganization
"impelled by the need to overhaul the entire government bureaucracy" 61 following the people power
revolution of 1986;
2. There was faithful compliance by the Bureau of the various guidelines issued by the President, in
particular, as to deliberation, and selection of personnel for appointment under the new staffing pattern;
3. The separated employees have been, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, on mere
holdover standing, "which means that all positions are declared vacant;" 62

4. Jose v. Arroyo has declared the validity of Executive Order No. 127 under the transitory provisions
of the 1987 Constitution;
5. Republic Act No. 6656 is of doubtful constitutionality.
The Ruling of the Civil Service Commission
The position of the Civil Service Commission is as follows:
1. Reorganizations occur where there has been a reduction in personnel or redundancy of functions;
there is no showing that the reorganization in question has been carried out for either purpose on the
contrary, the dismissals now disputed were carried out by mere service of notices;
2. The current Customs reorganization has not been made according to Malaca;ang guidelines;
information on file with the Commission shows that Commissioner Mison has been appointing
unqualified personnel;
3. Jose v. Arroyo, in validating Executive Order No. 127, did not countenance illegal removals;
4. Republic Act No. 6656 protects security of tenure in the course of reorganizations.
The Court's ruling
Reorganization, Fundamental Principles of.
I.
The core provision of law involved is Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution. We quote:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a result
of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the
reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shag be entitled to appropriate
separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general
application in force at the time of their separation. In lieul thereof, at the option of the
employees, they may be considered for employment in the Government or in any of its
subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose
resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, had been accepted. 63
The Court considers the above provision critical for two reasons: (1) It is the only provision in so
far as it mentions removals not for cause that would arguably support the challenged dismissals by
mere notice, and (2) It is the single existing law on reorganization after the ratification of the 1987
Charter, except Republic Act No. 6656, which came much later, on June 10, 1988. [Nota been
Executive Orders No. 116 (covering the Ministry of Agriculture & Food), 117 (Ministry of Education,
Culture & Sports), 119 (Health), 120 (Tourism), 123 (Social Welfare & Development), 124 (Public
Works & Highways), 125 transportation & Communications), 126 (Labor & Employment), 127
(Finance), 128 (Science & Technology), 129 (Agrarian Reform), 131 (Natural Resources), 132
(Foreign Affairs), and 133 (Trade & Industry) were all promulgated on January 30,1987, prior to the
adoption of the Constitution on February 2, 1987].64
It is also to be observed that unlike the grants of power to effect reorganizations under the past
Constitutions, the above provision comes as a mere recognition of the right of the Government to
reorganize its offices, bureaus, and instrumentalities. Under Section 4, Article XVI, of the 1935
Constitution:
Section 4. All officers and employees in the existing Government of the Philippine Islands shall
continue in office until the Congress shall provide otherwise, but all officers whose
appointments are by this Constitution vested in the President shall vacate their respective
office(s) upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is

made within a period of one year from the date of the inauguration of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines. 65
Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Charter:
Section 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the
Philippines shall continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the
incumbent President of the Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are by this
Constitution vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate their respective offices upon the
appointment and qualification of their successors. 66
The Freedom Constitution is, as earlier seen, couched in similar language:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution
shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year
from February 25, 1986.67
Other than references to "reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution," there is no
provision for "automatic" vacancies under the 1987 Constitution.
Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They are
dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the new Constitution free from the "fetters"
of due process and security of tenure.
At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from abolition of office (not by
virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove
redundancy of functions. In the latter case, the Government is obliged to prove good faith.68 In case of
removals undertaken to comply with clear and explicit constitutional mandates, the Government is not
hard put to prove anything, plainly and simply because the Constitution allows it.
Evidently, the question is whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a
grant of a license upon the Government to remove career public officials it could have validly done
under an "automatic" vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason.
As we have seen, since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by provisions for "automatic"
vacancies. We take the silence of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a restraint upon the
Government to dismiss public servants at a moment's notice.
What is, indeed, apparent is the fact that if the present Charter envisioned an "automatic" vacancy, it
should have said so in clearer terms, as its 1935, 1973, and 1986 counterparts had so stated.
The constitutional "lapse" means either one of two things: (1) The Constitution meant to continue the
reorganization under the prior Charter (of the Revolutionary Government), in the sense that the latter
provides for "automatic" vacancies, or (2) It meant to put a stop to those 'automatic" vacancies. By
itself, however, it is ambiguous, referring as it does to two stages of reorganization the first, to its
conferment or authorization under Proclamation No. 3 (Freedom Charter) and the second, to its
implementation on its effectivity date (February 2, 1987).lwph1.t But as we asserted, if the intent
of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution were to extend the effects of reorganize tion
under the Freedom Constitution, it should have said so in clear terms. It is illogical why it should talk
of two phases of reorganization when it could have simply acknowledged the continuing effect of the
first reorganization.
Second, plainly the concern of Section 16 is to ensure compensation for victims" of constitutional
revamps whether under the Freedom or existing Constitution and only secondarily and
impliedly, to allow reorganization. We turn to the records of the Constitutional Commission:
INQUIRY OF MR. PADILLA

On the query of Mr. Padilla whether there is a need for a specific reference to Proclamation No.
3 and not merely state "result of the reorganization following the ratification of this
Constitution', Mr. Suarez, on behalf of the Committee, replied that it is necessary, inasmuch as
there are two stages of reorganization covered by the Section.
Mr. Padilla pointed out that since the proposal of the Commission on Government
Reorganization have not been implemented yet, it would be better to use the phrase
"reorganization before or after the ratification of the Constitution' to simplify the Section. Mr.
Suarez instead suggested the phrase "as a result of the reorganization effected before or after
the ratification of the Constitution' on the understanding that the provision would apply to
employees terminated because of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 and even
those affected by the reorganization during the Marcos regime. Additionally, Mr. Suarez
pointed out that it is also for this reason that the Committee specified the two Constitutions the
Freedom Constitution and the 1986 [1987] Constitution. 69
Simply, the provision benefits career civil service employees separated from the service. And the
separation contemplated must be due to or the result of (1) the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation
No. 3 dated March 25, 1986, (2) the reorganization from February 2, 1987, and (3) the resignations of
career officers tendered in line with the existing policy and which resignations have been accepted.
The phrase "not for cause" is clearly and primarily exclusionary, to exclude those career civil service
employees separated "for cause." In other words, in order to be entitled to the benefits granted under
Section 16 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of 1987, two requisites, one negative and the other
positive, must concur, to wit:
1. the separation must not be for cause, and
2. the separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned above.
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution ended on
February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February 2, 1987. 70 It Can only mean, then, that
whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present Charter, and necessarily,
upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it can not be legitimately stated that we are
merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of the Revolutionary Government had started.
We are through with reorganization under the Freedom Constitution the first stage. We are on the
second stage that inferred from the provisions of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic
document.
This is confirmed not only by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, supra, but is
apparent from the Charter's own words. It also warrants our holding in Esguerra and PalmaFernandez, in which we categorically declared that after February 2, 1987, incumbent officials and
employees have acquired security of tenure, which is not a deterrent against separation by
reorganization under the quondam fundamental law.
Finally, there is the concern of the State to ensure that this reorganization is no "purge" like the
execrated reorganizations under martial rule. And, of course, we also have the democratic character of
the Charter itself.
Commissioner Mison would have had a point, insofar as he contends that the reorganization is openended ("progressive"), had it been a reorganization under the revolutionary authority, specifically of
the Provisional Constitution. For then, the power to remove government employees would have been
truly wide ranging and limitless, not only because Proclamation No. 3 permitted it, but because of the
nature of revolutionary authority itself, its totalitarian tendencies, and the monopoly of power in the
men and women who wield it.
What must be understood, however, is that notwithstanding her immense revolutionary powers, the
President was, nevertheless, magnanimous in her rule. This is apparent from Executive Order No. 17,
which established safeguards against the strong arm and ruthless propensity that accompanies
reorganizations notwithstanding the fact that removals arising therefrom were "not for cause," and
in spite of the fact that such removals would have been valid and unquestionable. Despite that, the

Chief Executive saw, as we said, the "unnecessary anxiety and demoralization" in the government rank
and file that reorganization was causing, and prescribed guidelines for personnel action. Specifically,
she said on May 28, 1986:
WHEREAS, in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the deserving
officials and employees, particularly in the career civil service, it is necessary to prescribe the
rules and regulations for implementing the said constitutional provision to protect career civil
servants whose qualifications and performance meet the standards of service demanded by the
New Government, and to ensure that only those found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are
separated from the government service; 71
Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals should be made on the
basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to render public service.*
The President's Memorandum of October 14, 1987 should furthermore be considered. We quote, in part:
Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same subject, I have ordered that there will be no further layoffs this year of
personnel as a result of the government reorganization. 72
Assuming, then, that this reorganization allows removals "not for cause" in a manner that would have been permissible in a revolutionary setting as
Commissioner Mison so purports, it would seem that the Commissioner would have been powerless, in any event, to order dismissals at the Customs
Bureau left and right. Hence, even if we accepted his "progressive" reorganization theory, he would still have to come to terms with the Chief
Executive's subsequent directives moderating the revolutionary authority's plenary power to separate government officials and employees.
Reorganization under the 1987 Constitution, Nature, Extent, and Limitations of; Jose v. Arroyo, clarified.
The controversy seems to be that we have, ourselves, supposedly extended the effects of government reorganization under the Provisional
Constitution to the regime of the 1987 Constitution. Jose v. Arroyo73 is said to be the authority for this argument. Evidently, if Arroyo indeed so ruled,
Arroyo would be inconsistent with the earlier pronouncement of Esguerra and the later holding of Palma-Fernandez. The question, however, is: Did
Arroyo, in fact, extend the effects of reorganization under the revolutionary Charter to the era of the new Constitution?
There are a few points about Arroyo that have to be explained. First, the opinion expressed therein that "[b]y virtue of said provision the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may continue even after the ratification of this constitution and career civil
service employees may be separated from the service without cause as a result of such reorganization" 74 is in the nature of an obiter dictum. We
dismissed Jose's petition 75 primarily because it was "clearly premature, speculative, and purely anticipatory, based merely on newspaper reports
which do not show any direct or threatened injury," 76 it appearing that the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs had not been, then, set in motion.
Jose therefore had no cause for complaint, which was enough basis to dismiss the petition. The remark anent separation "without cause" was
therefore not necessary for the disposition of the case. In Morales v. Parades,77 it was held that an obiter dictum "lacks the force of an adjudication
and should not ordinarily be regarded as such."78
Secondly, Arroyo is an unsigned resolution while Palma Fernandez is a full-blown decision, although both are en banc cases. While a resolution of
the Court is no less forceful than a decision, the latter has a special weight.
Thirdly, Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz comes as a later doctrine. (Jose v. Arroyo was promulgated on August 11, 1987 while Palma-Fernandez was
decided on August 31, 1987.) It is well-established that a later judgment supersedes a prior one in case of an inconsistency.
As we have suggested, the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution allude to two stages of the reorganization, the first stage being the
reorganization under Proclamation No. 3 which had already been consummated the second stage being that adverted to in the transitory
provisions themselves which is underway. Hence, when we spoke, in Arroyo, of reorganization after the effectivity of the new Constitution, we
referred to the second stage of the reorganization. Accordingly, we cannot be said to have carried over reorganization under the Freedom
Constitution to its 1987 counterpart.
Finally, Arroyo is not necessarily incompatible with Palma-Fernandez (or Esguerra).
As we have demonstrated, reorganization under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution is not as stern as reorganization under the prior Charter. Whereas
the latter, sans the President's subsequently imposed constraints, envisioned a purgation, the same cannot be said of the reorganization inferred
under the new Constitution because, precisely, the new Constitution seeks to usher in a democratic regime. But even if we concede ex gratia
argumenti that Section 16 is an exception to due process and no-removal-"except for cause provided by law" principles enshrined in the very same
1987 Constitution, 79 which may possibly justify removals "not for cause," there is no contradiction in terms here because, while the former
Constitution left the axe to fall where it might, the present organic act requires that removals "not for cause" must be as a result of reorganization. As
we observed, the Constitution does not provide for "automatic" vacancies. It must also pass the test of good faith a test not obviously required
under the revolutionary government formerly prevailing, but a test well-established in democratic societies and in this government under a democratic
Charter.
When, therefore, Arroyo permitted a reorganization under Executive Order No. 127 after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, Arroyo permitted a
reorganization provided that it is done in good faith. Otherwise, security of tenure would be an insuperable implement. 80
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. 81 As a general rule, a reorganization is
carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal)
or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it
may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat sty of tenure, or otherwise
not in good faith, no valid "abolition' takes place and whatever "abolition' is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is
merely a change of nomenclature of positions, 82 or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. 83
It is to be stressed that by predisposing a reorganization to the yardstick of good faith, we are not, as a consequence, imposing a "cause" for
restructuring. Retrenchment in the course of a reorganization in good faith is still removal "not for cause," if by "cause" we refer to "grounds" or
conditions that call for disciplinary action.**

Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from the facts of each case. However, under Republic Act No.
6656, we are told:
SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid
cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a
need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil
Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals
made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a) Where there is a
significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) Where an office is
abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in
terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; (e) Where the removal violates the
order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof. 84
It is in light hereof that we take up questions about Commissioner Mison's good faith, or lack of it.
Reorganization of the Bureau of Customs,
Lack of Good Faith in.
The Court finds that after February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the Customs hierarchy except for the change of personnel has
occurred, which would have justified (an things being equal) the contested dismisses. The contention that the staffing pattern at the Bureau (which
would have furnished a justification for a personnel movement) is the same s pattern prescribed by Section 34 of Executive Order No. 127 already
prevailing when Commissioner Mison took over the Customs helm, has not been successfully contradicted 85 There is no showing that legitimate
structural changes have been made or a reorganization actually undertaken, for that matter at the Bureau since Commissioner Mison assumed
office, which would have validly prompted him to hire and fire employees. There can therefore be no actual reorganization to speak of, in the sense,
say, of reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions, but a revamp of
personnel pure and simple.
The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel but replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988. 86
This betrays a clear intent to "pack" the Bureau of Customs. He did so, furthermore, in defiance of the President's directive to halt further layoffs as a
consequence of reorganization. 87 Finally, he was aware that layoffs should observe the procedure laid down by Executive Order No. 17.
We are not, of course, striking down Executive Order No. 127 for repugnancy to the Constitution. While the act is valid, still and all, the means with
which it was implemented is not. 88
Executive Order No. 127, Specific Case of.
With respect to Executive Order No. 127, Commissioner Mison submits that under Section 59 thereof, "[t]hose incumbents whose positions are not
included therein or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service." He submits that because the 394 removed personnel have
not been "reappointed," they are considered terminated. To begin with, the Commissioner's appointing power is subject to the provisions of Executive
Order No. 39. Under Executive Order No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs may "appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the
President." 89
Accordingly, with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and Vicente Feria, Jr., Commissioner Mison could not have validly terminated them,
they being Presidential appointees.
Secondly, and as we have asserted, Section 59 has been rendered inoperative according to our holding in Palma-Fernandez.
That Customs employees, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 had been on a mere holdover status cannot mean that the positions held by
them had become vacant. In Palma-Fernandez, we said in no uncertain terms:
The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioner's term of office ended on 30 January 1987 and that she continued in the
performance of her duties merely in a hold over capacity and could be transferred to another position without violating any of her legal
rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a position in a hold-over capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed
on 25 February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to February 2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective
(De Leon. et al., vs. Hon. Benjamin B. Esquerra, et. al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987). After the said date the provisions of the latter on
security of tenure govern. 90
It should be seen, finally, that we are not barring Commissioner Mison from carrying out a reorganization under the transitory provisions of the 1987
Constitution. But such a reorganization should be subject to the criterion of good faith.
Resume.
In resume, we restate as follows:
1. The President could have validly removed government employees, elected or appointed, without cause but only before the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution on February 2, 1987 (De Leon v. Esguerra, supra; Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz, supra); in this connection, Section 59 (on nonreappointment of incumbents) of Executive Order No. 127 cannot be a basis for termination;
2. In such a case, dismissed employees shall be paid separation and retirement benefits or upon their option be given reemployment opportunities
(CONST. [1987], art. XVIII, sec. 16; Rep. Act No. 6656, sec. 9);
3. From February 2, 1987, the State does not lose the right to reorganize the Government resulting in the separation of career civil service employees
[CONST. (1987), supra] provided, that such a reorganization is made in good faith. (Rep. Act No. 6656, supra.)
G.R. No. 83737
This disposition also resolves G.R. No. 83737. As we have indicated, G.R. No. 83737 is a challenge to the validity of Republic Act No. 6656. In brief,
it is argued that the Act, insofar as it strengthens security of tenure 91 and as far as it provides for a retroactive effect, 92 runs counter to the transitory
provisions of the new Constitution on removals not for cause.

It can be seen that the Act, insofar as it provides for reinstatament of employees separated without "a valid cause and after due notice and hearing" 93
is not contrary to the transitory provisions of the new Constitution. The Court reiterates that although the Charter's transitory provisions mention
separations "not for cause," separations thereunder must nevertheless be on account of a valid reorganization and which do not come about
automatically. Otherwise, security of tenure may be invoked. Moreover, it can be seen that the statute itself recognizes removals without cause.
However, it also acknowledges the possibility of the leadership using the artifice of reorganization to frustrate security of tenure. For this reason, it has
installed safeguards. There is nothing unconstitutional about the Act.
We recognize the injury Commissioner Mison's replacements would sustain. We also commisserate with them. But our concern is the greater wrong
inflicted on the dismissed employees on account of their regal separation from the civil service.
WHEREFORE, THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DATED JUNE 30, 1988, SEPTEMBER 20, 1988, NOVEMBER 16,
1988, INVOLVED IN G.R. NOS. 85310, 85335, AND 86241, AND MAY 8, 1989, INVOLVED IN G.R. NO. 85310, ARE AFFIRMED.
THE PETITIONS IN G.R. NOS. 81954, 81967, 82023, AND 85335 ARE GRANTED. THE PETITIONS IN G.R. NOS. 83737, 85310 AND 86241 ARE
DISMISSED.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS IS ORDERED TO REINSTATE THE EMPLOYEES SEPARATED AS A RESULT OF HIS NOTICES DATED
JANUARY 26, 1988.
THE EMPLOYEES WHOM COMMISSIONER MISON MAY HAVE APPOINTED AS REPLACEMENTS ARE ORDERED TO VACATE THEIR POSTS
SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF WHATEVER BENEFITS THAT MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.
NO COSTS.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Gri;o-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority view so ably presented by Mr. Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento. While additional comments may seem superfluous in view of
the exhaustiveness of his ponencia, I nevertheless offer the following brief observations for whatever they may be worth.
Emphasizing Article XVII, Section 16 of the Constitution, the dissenting opinion considers the ongoing government reorganization valid because it is
merely a continuation of the reorganization begun during the transition period. The reason for this conclusion is the phrase "and the reorganization
following the ratification of the Constitution," that is to say, after February 2, 1987, appearing in the said provision. The consequence (and I hope I
have not misread it) is that the present reorganization may still be undertaken with the same "absoluteness" that was allowed the revolutionary
reorganization although the Freedom Constitution is no longer in force.
Reorganization of the government may be required by the legislature even independently of specific constitutional authorization, as in the case, for
example, of R.A. No. 51 and B.P. No. 129. Being revolutionary in nature, the reorganization decreed by Article III of the Freedom Constitution was
unlimited as to its method except only as it was later restricted by President Aquino herself through various issuances, particularly E.O. No. 17. But
this reorganization, for all its permitted summariness, was not indefinite. Under Section 3 of the said Article III, it was allowed only up to February
29,1987 (which we advanced to February 2, 1987, when the new Constitution became effective).
The clear implication is that any government reorganization that may be undertaken thereafter must be authorized by the legislature only and may not
be allowed the special liberties and protection enjoyed by the revolutionary reorganization. Otherwise, there would have been no necessity at all for
the time limitation expressly prescribed by the Freedom Constitution.
I cannot accept the view that Section 16 is an authorization for the open-ended reorganization of the government "following the ratification of the
Constitution." I read the provision as merely conferring benefits deservedly or not on persons separated from the government as a result of the
reorganization of the government, whether undertaken during the transition period or as a result of a law passed thereafter. What the grants is
privileges to the retirees, not power to the provision government. It is axiomatic that grants of power are not lightly inferred, especially if these impinge
on individual rights, and I do not see why we should depart from this rule.
To hold that the present reorganization is a continuation of the one begun during the transition period is to recognize the theory of the public
respondent that all officers and employees not separated earlier remain in a hold-over capacity only and so may be replaced at any time even without
cause. That is a dangerous proposition that threatens the security and stability of every civil servant in the executive department. What is worse is
that this situation may continue indefinitely as the claimed "progressive" reorganization has no limitation as to time.
Removal imports the forcible separation of the incumbent before the expiration of his term and can be done only for cause as provided by law.
Contrary to common belief, a reorganization does not result in removal but in a different mode of terminating official relations known as abolition of the
office (and the security of tenure attached thereto.) The erstwhile holder of the abolished office cannot claim he has been removed without cause in
violation of his constitutional security of tenure. The reason is that the right itself has disappeared with the abolished office as an accessory following
the principal. (Ocampo v. Sec. of Justice, 51 O.G. 147; De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294; Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903.)
This notwithstanding, the power to reorganize is not unlimited. It is essential that it be based on a valid purpose, such as the promotion of efficiency
and economy in the government through a pruning of offices or the streamlining of their functions. (Cervantes v. Auditor-General, 91 Phil. 359.)
Normally, a reorganization cannot be validly undertaken as a means of purging the undesirables for this would be a removal in disguise undertaken
en masse to circumvent the constitutional requirement of legal cause. (Eradication of graft and corruption was one of the expressed purposes of the
revolutionary organization, but this was authorized by the Freedom Constitution itself.) In short, a reorganization, to be valid, must be done in good
faith. (Urgelio v. Osmena, 9 SCRA 317; Cuneta v. Court of Appeals, 1 SCRA 663; Carino v. ACCFA, 18 SCRA 183.)

A mere recitation no matter how lengthy of the directives, guidelines, memoranda, etc. issued by the government and the action purportedly
taken thereunder does not by itself prove good faith. We know only too well that these instructions, for all their noble and sterile purposes, are rarely
followed in their actual implementation. The reality in this case, as the majority opinion has pointed out and as clearly established in the hearing we
held, is that the supposed reorganization was undertaken with an eye not to achieving the avowed objectives but to accommodating new appointees
at the expense of the dislodged petitioners. That was also the finding of the Civil Service Commission, to which we must accord a becoming respect
as the constitutional office charged with the protection of the civil service from the evils of the spoils system.
The present administration deserves full support in its desire to improve the civil service, but this objective must be pursued in a manner consistent
with the Constitution. This praiseworthy purpose cannot be accomplished by an indiscriminate reorganization that will sweep in its wake the innocent
along with the redundant and inept, for the benefit of the current favorites.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
The historical underpinnings of Government efforts at reorganization hark back to the people power phenomenon of 22-24 February 1986, and
Proclamation No. 1 of President Corazon C. Aquino, issued on 25 February 1986, stating in no uncertain terms that "the people expect a
reorganization of government." In its wake followed Executive Order No. 5, issued on 12 March 1986, "Creating a Presidential Commission on
Government Reorganization," with the following relevant provisions:
WHEREAS, there is need to effect the necessary and proper changes in the organizational and functional structures of the national and
local governments, its agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, in
order to promote economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public services
xxx

xxx

xxx

Section 2. The functional jurisdiction of the PCGR shall encompass, as necessary, the reorganization of the national and local
governments, its agencies and instrumentalities including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
xxx

xxx

xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Succeeding it was Proclamation No. 3, dated 25 March 1986, also known as the Freedom Constitution, declaring, in part, in its Preamble as follows:
WHEREAS, the direct mandate of the people as manifested by their extraordinary action demands the complete reorganization of the
government, ... (Emphasis supplied)
and pertinently providing:
ARTICLE II
Section I
xxx

xxx

xxx

The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government and eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the
previous regime;" (Emphasis supplied)
xxx

xxx

xxx

ARTICLE III GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION

Section 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided
by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a
period of one year from February 25, 1986.
Section 3. Any public office or employee separated from the service as a result of the reorganization effected under this Proclamation shall,
if entitled under the laws then in force, receive the retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder. (Emphasis ours)
On 28 May 1986, Executive Order No. 17 was issued "Prescribing Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of Section 2, Article III of the
Freedom Constitution' providing, inter alia, as follows:
Section 1. In the course of implementing Article III, Section 2 of the Freedom Constitution, the Head of each Ministry shall see to it that the
separation or replacement of officers and employees is made only for justifiable reasons, to prevent indiscriminate dismissal, of personnel
in the career civil service whose qualifications and performance meet the standards of public service of the New Government.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Ministry concerned shall adopt its own rules and procedures for the review and assessment of its own personnel, including the
identification of sensitive positions which require more rigid assessment of the incumbents, and shall complete such review/assessment as
expeditiously as possible but not later than February 24, 1987 to prevent undue demoralization in the public service.
Section 2. The Ministry Head concerned, on the basis of such review and assessment shall determine who shall be separated from the
service. Thereafter, he shall issue to the official or employee concerned a notice of separation which shall indicate therein the reason/s or
ground /s for such separation and the fact that the separated official or employee has the right to file a petition for reconsideration pursuant
to this Order. Separation from the service shall be effective upon receipt of such notice, either personally by the official or employee
concerned or on his behalf by a person of sufficient discretion.
Section 3. The following shall be the grounds for separation/ replacement of personnel:

1. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;
2. Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act as determined by the Ministry
Head concerned;
3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;
4. Misuse of Public office for partisan political purposes;
5. Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his
separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.
Section 11. This Executive Order shall not apply to elective officials or those designated to replace them, presidential appointees, casual
and contractual employees, or officials and employees removed pursuant to disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service Law and
rules, and to those laid off as a result of the reorganization undertaken pursuant to Executive Order No. 5. (Emphasis supplied)
On 6 August 1986, Executive Order No. 39 was issued by the President "Enlarging the Powers and Functions of the Commissioner of Customs", as
follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

SECTION 1. In addition to the powers and functions of the Commissioner of Customs, he is hereby authorized, subject to the Civil Service
Law and its implementing rules and regulations:
a) To appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President;
b) To discipline, suspend, dismiss or otherwise penalize erring Bureau officers and employees;
c) To act on all matters pertaining to promotion, transfer, detail, reassignment, reinstatement, reemployment and
other personnel action, involving officers and employees of the Bureau of Customs.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On 30 January 1987, Executive Order No. 127 was issued "Reorganizing the Ministry of Finance." Similar Orders, approximately thirteen (13) in all, 1
were issued in respect of the other executive departments. The relevant provisions relative to the Bureau of Customs read:
RECALLING that the reorganization of the government is mandated expressly in Article II, Section l(a) and Article III of the Freedom
Constitution;
HAVING IN MIND that pursuant to Executive Order No. 5 (1986), it is directed that the necessary and proper changes in the organizational
and functional structures of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, be effected in order to promote efficiency and effectiveness
in the delivery of public services;
BELIEVING that it is necessary to reorganize the Ministry of Finance to make it more capable and responsive, organizationally and
functionally, in its primary mandate of judiciously generating and efficiently managing the financial resources of the Government, its
subdivisions and instrumentalities in order to attain the socio-economic objectives of the national development programs.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SEC. 2. Reorganization. The Ministry of Finance, hereinafter referred to as Ministry, is hereby reorganized, structurally and functionally,
in accordance with the provisions of this Executive Order.
SEC. 33. Bureau of Customs.
... Executive Order No. 39 dated 6 August 1986 which grants autonomy to the Commissioner of Customs in matters of appointment and
discipline of Customs personnel shall remain in effect.
SEC. 55. Abolition of Units Integral to Ministry. All units not included in the structural organization as herein provided and all positions
thereof are hereby deemed abolished. ... Their personnel shall be entitled to the benefits provided in the second paragraph of Section 59
hereof.
SEC. 59. New Structure and Pattern. Upon approval of this Executive Order, the officers and employees of the Ministry shall, in a
holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective duties and responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits
unless in the meantime they are separated from government service pursuant to executive Order No. 17 (1986) or article III of the
Freedom Constitution.
The new position structure and staffing pattern of the ministry shall be approved and prescribed by the Minister within one hundred twenty
(120) days from the approval of this Executive Order and the authorized positions created hereunder shall be filled with regular
appointments by him or by the President, as the case may be. Those incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not
reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service. Those separated from the service shall receive the retirement benefits to which
they may be entitled under the existing laws, rules and regulations. Otherwise, they shall be paid the equivalent of one month basic salary
for every year of service or the equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to them on the basis of highest salary received, but in no case
shall such payment exceed the equivalent of 12 months salary.
No court or administrative body shall issue any writ or preliminary junction or restraining order to enjoin the separation/replacement of any
officer or employee affected under this Executive Order.
Section 67 All laws, ordinances, rules, regulations and other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Executive
Order, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

xxx

xxx

xxx (Emphasis ours)

On 2 February 1987, the present Constitution took effect (De Leon, et al., vs. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987153 SCRA 602).
Reorganization in the Government service pursuant to Proclamation No. 3, supra, was provided for in its Section 16, Article XVIII entitled Transitory
Provisions, reading:
Section 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to
appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the time
of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the Government or in any of
its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. Ms provision
also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, has been accepted.
On 24 May 1987 the then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander A. Padilla, transmitted to the Department of Finance for approval the proposed
"position structure and staffing pattern" of the Bureau of Customs. Said Department gave its imprimatur. Thereafter, the staffing pattern was
transmitted to and approved by the Department of Budget and Management on 7 September 1987 for implementation. Under the old staffing pattern,
there were 7,302 positions while under the new staffing pattern, there are 6,530 positions CSC Resolution in CSC Case No. 1, dated 20 September
1988, pp. 3-4).
On 22 September 1987, Salvador M. Mison assumed office as Commissioner of Customs.
On 2 October 1987 "Malacanang Memorandum Re: Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders" was issued reading,
insofar as revelant to these cases, as follows:
It is my concern that ongoing process of government reorganization be conducted in a manner that is expeditious, as well as sensitive to
the dislocating consequences arising from specific personnel decisions.
The entire process of reorganization, and in particular the process of separation from service, must be carried out in the most humane
manner possible.
For this purpose, the following guidelines shall be strictly followed:
1. By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive Orders for each agency on reorganization shall be:
a. informed of their reappointment or
b. offered another position in the same department/ agency or
c. informed of their termination.
2. In the event of an offer for a lower position, there will be no reduction in the salary.
xxx

xxx

xxx
4. Each department/agency shall constitute a Reorganization Appeals Board at the central office, on or before
October 21, 1987, to review or reconsider appeals or complaints relative to reorganization. All cases submitted to the
Boards shall be resolved subject to the following guidelines:
a. publication or posting of the appeal procedure promulgated by the Department Secretary;
b. adherence to due process;
c. disposition within 30 days from submission of the case;
d written notification of the action taken and the grounds thereof.

Action by the Appeals Review Board does not preclude appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
5. Placement in the new staffing pattern of incumbent personnel shall be completed prior to the hiring of new
personnel, if any.
xxx

xxx

xxx (Emphasis ours)

On 25 November 1987 Commissioner Mison wrote the President requesting a grace period until the end of February 1988 within which to completely
undertake the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Executive Order No. 127 dated 30 January 1987. Said request was granted in a
letter-reply by Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., dated 22 December 1987.
On 6 January 1988, within the extended period requested, Bureau of Customs Memorandum "Re: Guidelines on the Implementation of
Reorganization Executive Orders" was issued in the same tenor as the Malacanang Memorandum of 2 October 1987, providing inter alia:
To effectively implement the reorganization at the Bureau of Customs, particularly in the selection and placement of personnel, and insure
that the best qualified and most competent personnel in the career service are retained, the following guidelines are hereby prescribed for
the guidance of all concerned
1. By February 28, 1988 all employees covered by Executive Order No. 127 and the grace period extended to the Bureau of
Customs by the President of the Philippines on reorganization shall be:
a. informed of their reappointment, or

b. offered another position in the same department or agency or

c. informed of their termination.
2. In the event of termination, the employee shall:
a. be included in a consolidated list compiled by the Civil Service Commission. All departments who are recruiting
shall give preference to the employees in the list; and
b. continue to receive salary and benefits until February 28, 1988, and
c. be guaranteed the release of separation benefits within 45 days from termination and in no case later than June
15, 1988.
xxx

xxx

xxx (Emphasis supplied)

It is to be noted that paragraph 1 above and its sub-sections reproduced verbatim the Malacanang Guidelines of 2 October 1987 in that the
employees concerned were merely to be informed of their termination.
On 28 January 1988 Commissioner Mison addressed identical letters of termination to Bureau of Customs officers and employees effective on 28
February 1988.
As of 18 August 1988, Commissioner Mison appointed five hundred twenty-two (522) officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs (CSC
Resolution in CSC Case No. 1, dated 20 September 1988, p. 6). In fact, in a letter dated 27 January 1988, Commissioner Mison recommended Jose
M. Balde for appointment to President Aquino as one of three (3) Deputy Commissioners under Executive Order No. 127.
In the interim, during the pendency of these Petitions, Republic Act No. 6656, entitled "An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service
Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization" was passed by Congress on 9 June 1988. The President signed it into
law on 10 June 1988 and the statute took effect on 29 June 1988.
On 20 June 1988 Motions were filed, in these cases pending before this Court, invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 6656. The relevant
provisions thereof read:
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to protect the security of tenure of civil service officers and employees in the
reorganization of the various agencies of the National government ....
SECTION 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A
valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there
is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the
Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency
concerned;
(b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created;
(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit;
(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the original offices;
(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SECTION 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have been separated in violation of the
provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full
pay for the period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all officers and employees, including casuals and temporary employees,
who have been separated pursuant to reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and retirement and
other benefits under existing laws within ninety (90) days from the date of the effectivity of their separation or from the date of the receipt of
the resolution of their appeals as the case may be: Provided, That application for clearance has been filed and no action thereon has been
made by the corresponding department or agency. Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid a separation gratuity in the
amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. Such separation pay and retirement benefits shall have priority of
payment out of the savings of the department or agency concerned.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SECTION 11. The executive branch of the government shall implement reorganization schemes within a specified period of time
authorized by law.
In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch, all departments and agencies which are authorized by executive orders
promulgated by the President to reorganize shall have ninety (90) days from the approval of this Act within which to implement their
respective reorganization plans in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SECTION 13. All laws, rules and regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly. The rights and benefits under this Act shall be retroactive as of June 30, 1987.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours)

Given the foregoing statutory backdrop, the issues can now be addressed.
Scope of Section 16, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution
Crucial to the present controversy is the construction to be given to the abovementioned Constitutional provision (SECTION 16, for brevity), which
speaks of.
Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause
but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986
and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution ... (paragraphing supplied).
To our minds, SECTION 16 clearly recognizes (1) the reorganization authorized by Proclamation No. 3; (2) that such separation is NOT
FOR CAUSE but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to said Proclamation; and (3) that the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation
No. 3 may be continued even after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution during the transition period.
Separation NOT FOR CAUSE
The canon for the removal or suspension of a civil service officer or employee is that it must be FOR CAUSE. That means a guarantee of both
procedural and substantive due process. Basically, procedural due process would require that suspension or dismissal come only after notice and
hearing. Substantive due process would require that suspension or dismissal be 'for cause'." Bernas The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, Vol. II, First Edition, 1988, p. 334)
The guarantee of removal FOR CAUSE is enshrined in Article IX-B, Section 2(3) of the 1987 Constitution, which states that 'No officer or employee of
the civil service shall be removed or suspended except FOR CAUSE provided by law."
There can be no question then as to the meaning of the phrase FOR CAUSE. It simply means the observance of both procedural and substantive due
process in cases of removal of officers or employees of the civil service. When SECTION 16 speaks, therefore, of separation from the service NOT
FOR CAUSE, it can only mean the diametrical opposite. The constitutional intent to exempt the separation of civil service employees pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 from the operation of Article IX-B, Section 2(3), becomes readily apparent. A distinction is explicitly made between removal FOR
CAUSE, which as aforestated, requires due process, and dismissal NOT FOR CAUSE, which implies that the latter is not bound by the "fetters' of due
process.
It is obviously for that reason that Section 16 grants separation pay and retirement benefits to those separated NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result of
the reorganization precisely to soften the impact of the non-observance of due process. "What is envisioned in Section 16 is not a remedy for arbitrary
removal of civil servants enjoying security of tenure but some form of relief for members of the career civil service who may have been or may be
legally but involuntarily 'reorganized out' of the service or may have voluntarily resigned pursuant to the reorganization policy" (ibid., p. 615).
Reorganization Pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 to Continue Transitorily Even After Ratification
By its very context, SECTION 16 envisages the continuance of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 even after ratification of the
Constitution and during the transition period. The two [2] stages contemplated, namely, (1) the stage before and (2) after ratification, refer to the same
nature of separation "NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result of Proclamation No. 3." No valid reason has been advanced for a different treatment after
ratification as the majority opines i.e., that separation NOT FOR CAUSE is allowed before ratification but that, thereafter, separation can only be FOR
CAUSE.
A fundamental principle of Constitutional construction is to assure the realization of the purpose of the framers of the organic law and of the people
who adopted it.
That the reorganization commenced pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 was envisioned to continue even after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, at
least transitorily, is evident from the intent of its authors discoverable from their deliberations held on 3 October 1986 and evincing their awareness
that such reorganization had not as yet been fully implemented. Thus:
Mr. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer, on lines 2 to 5 is the clause 'pursuant to the provisions of Article III of Proclamation No. 3, issued on
March 25, 1986, and the reorganization.' Are those words necessary? Can we not just say 'result of the reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution'? In other words, must we make specific reference to Proclamation No. 3?
Mr. SUAREZ. Yes. I think the committee feels that is necessary, because in truth there has been a reorganization by virtue of Proclamation
No. 3. In other words, there are two stages of reorganization covered by this section.
Mr. PADILIA. I understand there is a reorganization committee headed by a minister?
Mr. SUAREZ. Philippine Commission on Government Reorganization.
Mr. PADILLA. But whether that has already been implemented or not, I do not believe in it. There has been a plan, but I do not think it has
been implemented. If we want to include any previous reorganization after or before the ratification, why do we not just say reorganization
before or after the ratification' to simplify the provision and eliminate two-and-a-half sentences that may not be necessary? And as a result
of the reorganization, if the committee feels there has been reorganization before ratification and there be reorganization after, we just say
'before or after the ratification of this Constitution.
Mr. SUAREZ. Something like this as a result of the reorganization effected before or after the ratification of the Constitution on the
understanding, with the statement into the records, that this would be applicable to those reorganized out pursuant to the Freedom
Constitution also.
Mr. PADILLA. That is understood if there has been a reorganization before the ratification or a reorganization after the ratification."
(RECORDS of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 5, p. 416) (Emphasis provided)

It should also be recalled that the deadline for the reorganization under Proclamation No. 3 was "one year from February 25, 1986" (Article III, Section
2), or up to February 24, 1987. Executive Order No. 17 itself provided that the review/assessment of personnel be completed "not later than February
24, 1987." But, confronted with the reality of the ratification of the Constitution before that deadline without reorganization having been completed,
there was need for a provision allowing for its continuance even after ratification and until completed. It was also to beat that deadline that EO 127
and similar issuances, providing for the reorganization of departments of government, were all dated 30 January 1987 or prior to the plebiscite held
on 2 February 1987. The intent to continue and complete the reorganizations started is self- evident in SECTION 16.
In Jose vs. Arroyo, et al. (G.R. No. 78435, August 11, 1987), which was a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition to enjoin the implementation of
Executive Order No. 127, we recognized that the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 as mandated by SECTION 16, was to continue even
after ratification when we stated:
The contention of petitioner that EO No. 127 is violative of the provision of the 1987 Constitution guaranteeing career civil service
employees security of tenure overlooks the provision of Section 16, Art. XVIII (Transitory Provisions) which explicitly authorizes the
removal of career civil service employees not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March
25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of the Constitution. By virtue of said provision, the reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may continue even after the ratification of this Constitution and career civil service employees
may be separated from the service without cause as a result of such reorganization. (Emphasis ours)
With due respect to the majority, we disagree with its conclusion that the foregoing pronouncement is mere "obiter dictum."
An obiter dictum or dictum has been defined as a remark or opinion uttered, by the way. It is a statement of the court concerning a
question which was not directly before it (In re Hess 23 A. 2d. 298, 301, 20 N.J. Misc. 12).lwph1.t It is language unnecessary to a
decision, (a) ruling on an issue not raised, or (an) opinion of a judge which does not embody the resolution or determination of the court,
and is made without argument or full consideration of the point (Lawson v. US, 176 F2d 49, 51, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 167). It is an expression
of opinion by the court or judge on a collateral question not directly involved, (Crescent Ring Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. 132 A. 106,
107, 102 N.J. Law 85) or not necessary for the decision Du Bell v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 29, So. 2d 709, 712; 211 La. 167).
In the case at bar, however, directly involved and squarely before the Court was the issue of whether EO 127 violates Section 2(3) of Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution against removal of civil service employees except for cause." Petitioner batted for the affirmative of the proposition, while
respondents contended that "removal of civil service employees without cause is allowed not only under the Provisional Constitution but also under
the 1987 Constitution if the same is made pursuant to a reorganization after the ratification of the Constitution."
It may be that the Court dismissed that Petition for being premature, speculative and purely anticipatory" inasmuch as petitioner therein had "not
received any communication terminating or threatening to terminate his services." But that was only one consideration. The Court still proceeded to
decide all the issues adversatively contested by the parties, namely "1) that the expiration date of February 25, 1 987 fixed by Section 2 of
Proclamation No. 3 on which said Executive order is based had already lapsed; 2) that the Executive Order has not been published in the Official
Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and Section 1 1 of the Revised Administrative Code; and 3) that its enforcement violates Section
2(3) of Article IX B of the 1987 Constitution against removal of civil service employees except for cause."
The ruling of the Court, therefore, on the Constitutional issues presented, particularly, the lapse of the period mandated by Proclamation No. 3, and
the validity of EO 127, cannot be said to be mere "obiter." They were ultimate issues directly before the Court, expressly decided in the course of the
consideration of the case, so that any resolution thereon must be considered as authoritative precedent, and not a mere dictum (See Valli v. US, 94
F2d 687 certiorari granted 58 S. Ct. 760, 303 U.S. 82 L. Ed. 1092; See also Weedin v. Tayokichi Yamada 4 F. (2d) 455). Such resolution would not
lose its value as a precedent just because the disposition of the case was also made on some other ground.
.....And this rule applies as to all pertinent questions although only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular
course of the consideration of the case, and lead up to the final conclusion (Northern Pac. Ry Co. v. Baker, D.C. Wash., 3 F. Suppl. 1; See
also Wisconsin Power and Light Co. v. City of Beloit 254 NW 119; Chase v. American Cartage Co. 186 N.W. 598; City of Detroit, et al. v.
Public Utilities Comm. 286 N.W. 368). Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the
disposition of the case is made on some other ground. (Wagner v. Com Products Refining Co. D.C. N.J. 28 F 2d 617) Where a case
presents two or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points,
the case is an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as having merely the status of a
dictum (See U.S. Title Insurance and Trust Co., Cal., 44 S. Ct. 621, 265 U.S. 472, 68 L. Ed. 1110; Van Dyke v. Parker 83 F. (2d) 35) and
one point should not be denied authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered.
(Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. U.S. 48 S. Ct. 194, 275 U.S. 331, 72 L. Ed. 303)"
It is true that in Palma-Fernandez vs. de la Paz (G.R. No. 78946, April 15, 1986, 160 SCRA 751), we had stated:
The argument that, on the basis of this provision (Section 26 of Executive Order No. 119, or the 'Reorganization Act of the Ministry of
Health'), petitioner's term of office ended on 30 January 1987 and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a hold-over
capacity and could be transferred to another position without violating any of her legal rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a position in a
hold-over capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the Provisional
Constitution), but advanced to 2 February 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective (De Leon, et al., vs. Hon. Esguerra, et al.,
G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987, 153 SCRA 602). After the d date the provisions of the latter on security of tenure govern.
The factual situation in the two cases, however, radically differ. In the cited case, Dra. Palma-Fernandez, the petitioner, had already been extended a
permanent appointment as Assistant Director for Professional Services of the East Avenue Medical Center but was still being transferred by the
Medical Center Chief to the Research Office against her consent. Separation from the service as a result of reorganization was not involved. The
question then arose as to whether the latter official had the authority to transfer or whether the power to appoint and remove subordinate officers and
employees was lodged in the Secretary of Health. Related to that issue was the vital one of whether or not her transfer, effected on 29 May 1987, was
tantamount to a removal without cause. Significant, too, is the fact that the transfer was basically made "in the interest of the service" pursuant to
Section 24(c) of PD No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree, and not because she was being reorganized out by virtue of EO 119 or the "Reorganization
Act of the Ministry of Health," although the said Act was invoked after the fact. And so it was that SECTION 16 was never mentioned, much less
invoked in the Palma-Fernandez case.
Finally, on this point, it is inaccurate for the majority to state that there were no reorganization orders after ratification. There were, namely, EO 181
(Reorganization Act of the Civil Service Commission), June 1, 1987; EO 193 (Reorganization Act of the Office of Energy Affairs), June 10, 1987; EO
230 (Reorganization Act of NEDA), July 22, 1987; EO 262 (Reorganization Act of the Department of Local Government), July 25, 1987; EO 297
(Reorganization Act of the Office of the Press Secretary), July 25, 1987.
The Element of Good Faith
The majority concedes that reorganization can be undertaken provided it be in good faith but concludes that Commissioner Mison was not in good
faith.

The aforesaid conclusion is contradicted by the records.

Executive Order No. 127, dated 30 January 1987, specifically authorized the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs "structurally and functionally"
and provided for the abolition of all units and positions thereof not included in the structural organization S election 55).
As stated heretofore, it was the former Commissioner of Customs, Alexander A. Padilla who, on 24 May 1987, transmitted to the Department of
Finance for approval the proposed "position structure and staffing pattern" of the Bureau of Customs. This was approved by the Department of
Finance. Thereafter, it was transmitted to and approved by the Department of Budget and Management on 7 September 1987 for implementation.
Under the old staffing pattern, there were 7,302 positions while under the new staffing pattern, there are 6,530 positions.
On 2 October 1987 "Malacanang Memorandum Re: Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders" provided:
By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive orders for each agency on reorganization shall be:
a. informed of their reappointment, or
b. offered another position in the same department or agency, or
c. informed of their termination. (emphasis supplied)
On 25 November 1987 Commissioner Mison asked for and was granted by the President an extension up to February 1988 within which to
completely undertake the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs.
On 6 January 1988, he issued Bureau of Customs Memorandum "Re Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders"
reiterating the above- quoted portion of the Malacanang Memorandum of 2 October 1987. Pursuant thereto, on 28 January 1988, Commissioner
Mison addressed uniform letters of termination to the employees listed on pages 15, 16 and 17 of the majority opinion, effective on 28 February 1988,
within the extended period granted.
The records further show that upon Commissioner Mison's official inquiry, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordo;ez, rendered the following Opinion:
. . . It is believed that customs employees who are reorganized out in the course of the implementation of E.O. No. 127 (reorganizing the
Department of Finance) need not be informed of the nature and cause of their separation from the service. It is enough that they be
'informed of their termination' pursuant to section 1(c) of the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 of President Aquino, which reads:
1. By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive orders for each agency on reorganization shall be:
xxx

xxx

xxx

c) Informed of their terminations.

The constitutional mandate that 'no officer or employee of the civil service shall be renewed or suspended except for cause as provided by
law' (Sec. 2(4) (sic), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution) does not apply to employees who are separated from office as a result of the
reorganization of that Bureau as directed in Executive Order No. 127.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Regarding your (third) query, the issue as to the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 127 is set at rest, after the Supreme Court
resolved to dismiss the petition for certiorari questioning its enforceability, for lack of merit (see Jose vs. Arroyo, et al., supra). (Opinion No.
41, s. 1988, March 3, 1988) (Emphasis supplied)
The former Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, Celerina G. Gotladera likewise periodically consulted by Commissioner Mison, also expressed
the opinion that "it is not a prerequisite prior to the separation of an employee pursuant to reorganization that he be administratively charged." (Annex
16, p. 411, Rollo, G.R. No. 85310)
Moreover, the records show that the final selection and placement of personnel was done by a Placement Committee, one of whose members is the
Head of the Civil Service Commission Field Office, namely, Mrs. Purificacion Cuerdo The appointment of employees made by Commissioner Mison
was based on the list approved by said Placement Committee.
But the majority further faults Mison for defying the President's directive to halt further layoffs as a consequence of reorganization, citing OP Memo of
14 October 1987, reading:
Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same subject, I have ordered that there will be no further layoffs this year of
personnel as a result of the government reorganization. (p. 45, Decision)
The foregoing, however, must be deemed superseded by later developments, namely, the grant to Commissioner Mison by the President on 22
December 1987 of a grace period until the end of February 1988 within which to completely undertake the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs,
which was, in fact, accomplished by 28 February 1988.
To further show lack of good faith, the majority states that Commissioner Mison failed to observe the procedure laid down by EO 17, supra, directing
inter alia that a notice of separation be issued to an employee to be terminated indicating therein the reason/s or ground/s for such separation. That
requirement, however, does not appear in Section 59 of EO 127, which provides on the contrary "that those incumbents whose positions are not
included in the new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service."
The right granted by EO 17 to an employee to be informed of the ground for his separation must be deemed to have been revoked by the repealing
clause of EO 127 (Section 67) providing that "all laws, ordinances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Executive Order, are hereby
repealed and modified accordingly."
Moreover, Section 11 of EO 17 explicitly excepts from its coverage a reorganization pursuant to EO 5. Thus

The Executive Order shall not apply to elective officials or those designated to replace them, presidential appointees, casual and
contractual employees, or officials and employees removed pursuant to desciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service law and rules,
and to those laid off as a result of reorganization undertaken pursuant to Executive Order No. 5. (Emphasis ours)
That EO 127 was issued pursuant to or in implementation of EO 5, is shown by its introductory portion reading:
Recalling that the reorganization of the government is mandated expressly by Article II, Section 1 (a) and Article III of the Freedom
Constitution;
Having in mind that pursuant to Executive order No. 5 (1986), it is directed that the necessary and proper changes in the organizational
and functional structures of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, be effected in order to promote efficiency and effectiveness
in the delivery of public service; (Italics supplied)
Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6656
The majority also relies on Republic Act No. 6656 entitled an "Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the
Implementation of Government Reorganization," particularly Section 2 thereof, to test the good faith of Commissioner Mison.
We are of the view, however, that in providing for retroactivity in its Section 13, RA 6656 clashes frontally with SECTION 16.
1) SECTION 16 clearly recognizes that career service employees separated from the service by reason of the "complete reorganization of the
government" pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 may be separated NOT FOR CAUSE. And yet, RA 6656 requires the exact opposite separation FOR
CAUSE. It would not be remiss to quote the provision again:
SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid
cause for removal exist when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a
need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil
Service law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals
made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a) Where there is a
significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) Where an office is
abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in
terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; (e) Where the removal violates the
order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof. (Republic Act No. 6156)
The standards laid down are the "traditional" criteria for removal of employees from the career service, e.g. valid cause, due notice and hearing,
abolition of, or redundancy of offices. Proclamation No. 3, on the other hand, effectuates the "progressive" type of reorganization dictated by the
exigencies of the historical and political upheaval at the time. The "traditional" type is limited in scope. It is concerned with the individual approach
where the particular employee involved is charged administratively and where the requisites of notice and hearing have to be observed. The
"progressive" kind of reorganization, on the other hand, is the collective way. It is wider in scope, and is the reorganization contemplated under
SECTION 16.
2) By providing for reinstatement in its Section 9, RA 6656 adds a benefit not included in SECTION 16. The benefits granted by the latter provision to
employees separated NOT FOR CAUSE but as a consequence of reorganization are "separation pay, retirement, and other benefits accruing to them
under the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation." The benefit of reinstatement is not included. RA 6656, however, allows
reinstatement. That it cannot do because under SECTION 16, it is not one of the laws "in force at the time of their separation."
The Constitution is the paramount law to which all laws must conform. It is from the Constitution that all statutes must derive their bearings. The
legislative authority of the State must yield to the expression of the sovereign will. No statutory enactment can disregard the Charter from which it
draws its own existence (Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674 [1952]). But, that is exactly what RA 6656
does in providing for retroactivity it disregards and contravenes a Constitutional imperative. To save it, it should be applied and construed
prospectively and not retroactively notwithstanding its explicit provision. Then, and only then, would it make good law.
Effects of Reorganization
To be sure, the reorganization could effect the tenure of members of the career service as defined in Section 5, Article IV of Presidential Decree No.
807, and may even result in the separation from the office of some meritorious employees. But even then, the greater good of the greatest number
and the right of the citizenry to a good government, and as they themselves have mandated through the vehicle of Proclamation No. 3, provide the
justification for the said injury to the individual. In terms of values, the interest of an employee to security of tenure must yield to the interest of the
entire populace and to an efficient and honest government.
But a reorganized employee is not without rights. His right lies in his past services, the entitlement to which must be provided for by law. EO 127
provides for the same in its Section 59, and so does SECTION 16 when the latter specified that career civil service employees separated from the
service not for cause:
shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application
in force at the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the
Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, has been accepted.
This is a reward for the employee's past service to the Government. But this is all There is no vested property right to be reemployed in a reorganized
office.
The right to an office or to employment with government or any of its agencies is not a vested property right, and removal therefrom will not
support the question of due process" Yantsin v. Aberdeen, 54 Wash 2d 787, 345 P 2d 178). A civil service employee does not have a
constitutionally protected right to his position, which position is in the nature of a public office, political in character and held by way of grant
or privilege extended by government; generally he has been held to have no property right or vested interest to which due process
guaranties extend (See Taylor v. Beckham 178 U.S. 548, 44 L Ed. 1187; Angilly v. US CA2 NY 199 F 2d 642; People ex. rel. Baker v.
Wilson, 39 III App 2d 443, 189 NE 2d 1; Kelliheller v. NY State Civil Service Com 21 Misc 2d 1034, 194 NYS 2d 89).
To ensure, however, that no meritorious employee has been separated from the service, there would be no harm, in fact, it could do a lot of good, if
the Commissioner of Customs reviews the evaluation and placements he has so far made and sees to it that those terminated are included in a
consolidated list to be given preference by departments who are recruiting (Section 2[a], BOC Memorandum, January 6,1988).lwph1.t

Conclusion
Premises considered, and subject to the observation hereinabove made, it is our considered view that the separation from the service "NOT FOR
CAUSE but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986" of the affected officers and employees of the
Bureau of Customs should be UPHELD, and the Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission, dated 30 June 1988, 20 September 1988, and 16
November 1988 should be SET ASIDE for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion.
Republic Act No. 6656, in so far as it provides for retroactivity, should be declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being repugnant to the letter and spirit of
Section 16, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Feliciano, Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority view so ably presented by Mr. Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento. While additional comments may seem superfluous in view of
the exhaustiveness of his ponencia, I nevertheless offer the following brief observations for whatever they may be worth.
Emphasizing Article XVII, Section 16 of the Constitution, the dissenting opinion considers the ongoing government reorganization valid because it is
merely a continuation of the reorganization begun during the transition period. The reason for this conclusion is the phrase "and the reorganization
following the ratification of the Constitution," that is to say, after February 2, 1987, appearing in the said provision. The consequence (and I hope I
have not misread it) is that the present reorganization may still be undertaken with the same "absoluteness" that was allowed the revolutionary
reorganization although the Freedom Constitution is no longer in force.
Reorganization of the government may be required by the legislature even independently of specific constitutional authorization, as in the case, for
example, of R.A. No. 51 and B.P. No. 129. Being revolutionary in nature, the reorganization decreed by Article III of the Freedom Constitution was
unlimited as to its method except only as it was later restricted by President Aquino herself through various issuances, particularly E.O. No. 17. But
this reorganization, for all its permitted summariness, was not indefinite. Under Section 3 of the said Article III, it was allowed only up to February
29,1987 (which we advanced to February 2, 1987, when the new Constitution became effective).
The clear implication is that any government reorganization that may be undertaken thereafter must be authorized by the legislature only and may not
be allowed the special liberties and protection enjoyed by the revolutionary reorganization. Otherwise, there would have been no necessity at all for
the time limitation expressly prescribed by the Freedom Constitution.
I cannot accept the view that Section 16 is an authorization for the open-ended reorganization of the government "following the ratification of the
Constitution." I read the provision as merely conferring benefits deservedly or not on persons separated from the government as a result of the
reorganization of the government, whether undertaken during the transition period or as a result of a law passed thereafter. What the grants is
privileges to the retirees, not power to the provision government. It is axiomatic that grants of power are not lightly inferred, especially if these impinge
on individual rights, and I do not see why we should depart from this rule.
To hold that the present reorganization is a continuation of the one begun during the transition period is to recognize the theory of the public
respondent that all officers and employees not separated earlier remain in a hold-over capacity only and so may be replaced at any time even without
cause. That is a dangerous proposition that threatens the security and stability of every civil servant in the executive department. What is worse is
that this situation may continue indefinitely as the claimed "progressive" reorganization has no limitation as to time.
Removal imports the forcible separation of the incumbent before the expiration of his term and can be done only for cause as provided by law.
Contrary to common belief, a reorganization does not result in removal but in a different mode of terminating official relations known as abolition of the
office (and the security of tenure attached thereto.) The erstwhile holder of the abolished office cannot claim he has been removed without cause in
violation of his constitutional security of tenure. The reason is that the right itself has disappeared with the abolished office as an accessory following
the principal. (Ocampo v. Sec. of Justice, 51 O.G. 147; De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294; Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903.)
This notwithstanding, the power to reorganize is not unlimited. It is essential that it be based on a valid purpose, such as the promotion of efficiency
and economy in the government through a pruning of offices or the streamlining of their functions. (Cervantes v. Auditor-General, 91 Phil. 359.)
Normally, a reorganization cannot be validly undertaken as a means of purging the undesirables for this would be a removal in disguise undertaken
en masse to circumvent the constitutional requirement of legal cause. (Eradication of graft and corruption was one of the expressed purposes of the
revolutionary organization, but this was authorized by the Freedom Constitution itself.) In short, a reorganization, to be valid, must be done in good
faith. (Urgelio v. Osmena, 9 SCRA 317; Cuneta v. Court of Appeals, 1 SCRA 663; Carino v. ACCFA, 18 SCRA 183.)
A mere recitation no matter how lengthy of the directives, guidelines, memoranda, etc. issued by the government and the action purportedly
taken thereunder does not by itself prove good faith. We know only too well that these instructions, for all their noble and sterile purposes, are rarely
followed in their actual implementation. The reality in this case, as the majority opinion has pointed out and as clearly established in the hearing we
held, is that the supposed reorganization was undertaken with an eye not to achieving the avowed objectives but to accommodating new appointees
at the expense of the dislodged petitioners. That was also the finding of the Civil Service Commission, to which we must accord a becoming respect
as the constitutional office charged with the protection of the civil service from the evils of the spoils system.
The present administration deserves full support in its desire to improve the civil service, but this objective must be pursued in a manner consistent
with the Constitution. This praiseworthy purpose cannot be accomplished by an indiscriminate reorganization that will sweep in its wake the innocent
along with the redundant and inept, for the benefit of the current favorites.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

The historical underpinnings of Government efforts at reorganization hark back to the people power phenomenon of 22-24 February 1986, and
Proclamation No. 1 of President Corazon C. Aquino, issued on 25 February 1986, stating in no uncertain terms that "the people expect a
reorganization of government." In its wake followed Executive Order No. 5, issued on 12 March 1986, "Creating a Presidential Commission on
Government Reorganization," with the following relevant provisions:

WHEREAS, there is need to effect the necessary and proper changes in the organizational and functional structures of the national and
local governments, its agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, in
order to promote economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public services
xxx

xxx

xxx

Section 2. The functional jurisdiction of the PCGR shall encompass, as necessary, the reorganization of the national and local
governments, its agencies and instrumentalities including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
xxx

xxx

xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Succeeding it was Proclamation No. 3, dated 25 March 1986, also known as the Freedom Constitution, declaring, in part, in its Preamble as follows:
WHEREAS, the direct mandate of the people as manifested by their extraordinary action demands the complete reorganization of the
government, ... (Emphasis supplied)
and pertinently providing:
ARTICLE II
Section I
xxx

xxx

xxx

The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government and eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the
previous regime;" (Emphasis supplied)
xxx

xxx

xxx

ARTICLE III GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION

Section 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided
by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a
period of one year from February 25, 1986.
Section 3. Any public office or employee separated from the service as a result of the reorganization effected under this Proclamation shall,
if entitled under the laws then in force, receive the retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder. (Emphasis ours)
On 28 May 1986, Executive Order No. 17 was issued "Prescribing Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of Section 2, Article III of the
Freedom Constitution' providing, inter alia, as follows:
Section 1. In the course of implementing Article III, Section 2 of the Freedom Constitution, the Head of each Ministry shall see to it that the
separation or replacement of officers and employees is made only for justifiable reasons, to prevent indiscriminate dismissal, of personnel
in the career civil service whose qualifications and performance meet the standards of public service of the New Government.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Ministry concerned shall adopt its own rules and procedures for the review and assessment of its own personnel, including the
identification of sensitive positions which require more rigid assessment of the incumbents, and shall complete such review/assessment as
expeditiously as possible but not later than February 24, 1987 to prevent undue demoralization in the public service.
Section 2. The Ministry Head concerned, on the basis of such review and assessment shall determine who shall be separated from the
service. Thereafter, he shall issue to the official or employee concerned a notice of separation which shall indicate therein the reason/s or
ground /s for such separation and the fact that the separated official or employee has the right to file a petition for reconsideration pursuant
to this Order. Separation from the service shall be effective upon receipt of such notice, either personally by the official or employee
concerned or on his behalf by a person of sufficient discretion.
Section 3. The following shall be the grounds for separation/ replacement of personnel:
1. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;
2. Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act as determined by the Ministry
Head concerned;
3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;
4. Misuse of Public office for partisan political purposes;
5. Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his
separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.
Section 11. This Executive Order shall not apply to elective officials or those designated to replace them, presidential appointees, casual
and contractual employees, or officials and employees removed pursuant to disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service Law and
rules, and to those laid off as a result of the reorganization undertaken pursuant to Executive Order No. 5. (Emphasis supplied)

On 6 August 1986, Executive Order No. 39 was issued by the President "Enlarging the Powers and Functions of the Commissioner of Customs", as
follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

SECTION 1. In addition to the powers and functions of the Commissioner of Customs, he is hereby authorized, subject to the Civil Service
Law and its implementing rules and regulations:
a) To appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President;
b) To discipline, suspend, dismiss or otherwise penalize erring Bureau officers and employees;
c) To act on all matters pertaining to promotion, transfer, detail, reassignment, reinstatement, reemployment and
other personnel action, involving officers and employees of the Bureau of Customs.
xxx

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xxx

On 30 January 1987, Executive Order No. 127 was issued "Reorganizing the Ministry of Finance." Similar Orders, approximately thirteen (13) in all, 1
were issued in respect of the other executive departments. The relevant provisions relative to the Bureau of Customs read:
RECALLING that the reorganization of the government is mandated expressly in Article II, Section l(a) and Article III of the Freedom
Constitution;
HAVING IN MIND that pursuant to Executive Order No. 5 (1986), it is directed that the necessary and proper changes in the organizational
and functional structures of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, be effected in order to promote efficiency and effectiveness
in the delivery of public services;
BELIEVING that it is necessary to reorganize the Ministry of Finance to make it more capable and responsive, organizationally and
functionally, in its primary mandate of judiciously generating and efficiently managing the financial resources of the Government, its
subdivisions and instrumentalities in order to attain the socio-economic objectives of the national development programs.
xxx

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xxx

SEC. 2. Reorganization. The Ministry of Finance, hereinafter referred to as Ministry, is hereby reorganized, structurally and functionally,
in accordance with the provisions of this Executive Order.
SEC. 33. Bureau of Customs.
... Executive Order No. 39 dated 6 August 1986 which grants autonomy to the Commissioner of Customs in matters of appointment and
discipline of Customs personnel shall remain in effect.
SEC. 55. Abolition of Units Integral to Ministry. All units not included in the structural organization as herein provided and all positions
thereof are hereby deemed abolished. ... Their personnel shall be entitled to the benefits provided in the second paragraph of Section 59
hereof.
SEC. 59. New Structure and Pattern. Upon approval of this Executive Order, the officers and employees of the Ministry shall, in a
holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective duties and responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits
unless in the meantime they are separated from government service pursuant to executive Order No. 17 (1986) or article III of the
Freedom Constitution.
The new position structure and staffing pattern of the ministry shall be approved and prescribed by the Minister within one hundred twenty
(120) days from the approval of this Executive Order and the authorized positions created hereunder shall be filled with regular
appointments by him or by the President, as the case may be. Those incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not
reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service. Those separated from the service shall receive the retirement benefits to which
they may be entitled under the existing laws, rules and regulations. Otherwise, they shall be paid the equivalent of one month basic salary
for every year of service or the equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to them on the basis of highest salary received, but in no case
shall such payment exceed the equivalent of 12 months salary.
No court or administrative body shall issue any writ or preliminary junction or restraining order to enjoin the separation/replacement of any
officer or employee affected under this Executive Order.
Section 67 All laws, ordinances, rules, regulations and other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Executive
Order, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
xxx

xxx

xxx (Emphasis ours)

On 2 February 1987, the present Constitution took effect (De Leon, et al., vs. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987153 SCRA 602).
Reorganization in the Government service pursuant to Proclamation No. 3, supra, was provided for in its Section 16, Article XVIII entitled Transitory
Provisions, reading:
Section 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to
appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the time
of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the Government or in any of
its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. Ms provision
also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, has been accepted.
On 24 May 1987 the then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander A. Padilla, transmitted to the Department of Finance for approval the proposed
"position structure and staffing pattern" of the Bureau of Customs. Said Department gave its imprimatur. Thereafter, the staffing pattern was
transmitted to and approved by the Department of Budget and Management on 7 September 1987 for implementation. Under the old staffing pattern,

there were 7,302 positions while under the new staffing pattern, there are 6,530 positions CSC Resolution in CSC Case No. 1, dated 20 September
1988, pp. 3-4).
On 22 September 1987, Salvador M. Mison assumed office as Commissioner of Customs.
On 2 October 1987 "Malacanang Memorandum Re: Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders" was issued reading,
insofar as revelant to these cases, as follows:
It is my concern that ongoing process of government reorganization be conducted in a manner that is expeditious, as well as sensitive to
the dislocating consequences arising from specific personnel decisions.
The entire process of reorganization, and in particular the process of separation from service, must be carried out in the most humane
manner possible.
For this purpose, the following guidelines shall be strictly followed:
1. By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive Orders for each agency on reorganization shall be:
a. informed of their reappointment or
b. offered another position in the same department/ agency or
c. informed of their termination.
2. In the event of an offer for a lower position, there will be no reduction in the salary.
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xxx

4. Each department/agency shall constitute a Reorganization Appeals Board at the central office, on or before
October 21, 1987, to review or reconsider appeals or complaints relative to reorganization. All cases submitted to the
Boards shall be resolved subject to the following guidelines:
a. publication or posting of the appeal procedure promulgated by the Department Secretary;
b. adherence to due process;
c. disposition within 30 days from submission of the case;
d written notification of the action taken and the grounds thereof.
Action by the Appeals Review Board does not preclude appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
5. Placement in the new staffing pattern of incumbent personnel shall be completed prior to the hiring of new
personnel, if any.
xxx

xxx

xxx (Emphasis ours)

On 25 November 1987 Commissioner Mison wrote the President requesting a grace period until the end of February 1988 within which to completely
undertake the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Executive Order No. 127 dated 30 January 1987. Said request was granted in a
letter-reply by Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., dated 22 December 1987.
On 6 January 1988, within the extended period requested, Bureau of Customs Memorandum "Re: Guidelines on the Implementation of
Reorganization Executive Orders" was issued in the same tenor as the Malacanang Memorandum of 2 October 1987, providing inter alia:
To effectively implement the reorganization at the Bureau of Customs, particularly in the selection and placement of personnel, and insure
that the best qualified and most competent personnel in the career service are retained, the following guidelines are hereby prescribed for
the guidance of all concerned
1. By February 28, 1988 all employees covered by Executive Order No. 127 and the grace period extended to the Bureau of
Customs by the President of the Philippines on reorganization shall be:
a. informed of their reappointment, or
b. offered another position in the same department or agency or
c. informed of their termination.
2. In the event of termination, the employee shall:
a. be included in a consolidated list compiled by the Civil Service Commission. All departments who are recruiting
shall give preference to the employees in the list; and
b. continue to receive salary and benefits until February 28, 1988, and
c. be guaranteed the release of separation benefits within 45 days from termination and in no case later than June
15, 1988.

xxx

xxx

xxx (Emphasis supplied)

It is to be noted that paragraph 1 above and its sub-sections reproduced verbatim the Malacanang Guidelines of 2 October 1987 in that the
employees concerned were merely to be informed of their termination.
On 28 January 1988 Commissioner Mison addressed identical letters of termination to Bureau of Customs officers and employees effective on 28
February 1988.
As of 18 August 1988, Commissioner Mison appointed five hundred twenty-two (522) officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs (CSC
Resolution in CSC Case No. 1, dated 20 September 1988, p. 6). In fact, in a letter dated 27 January 1988, Commissioner Mison recommended Jose
M. Balde for appointment to President Aquino as one of three (3) Deputy Commissioners under Executive Order No. 127.
In the interim, during the pendency of these Petitions, Republic Act No. 6656, entitled "An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service
Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization" was passed by Congress on 9 June 1988. The President signed it into
law on 10 June 1988 and the statute took effect on 29 June 1988.
On 20 June 1988 Motions were filed, in these cases pending before this Court, invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 6656. The relevant
provisions thereof read:
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to protect the security of tenure of civil service officers and employees in the
reorganization of the various agencies of the National government ....
SECTION 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A
valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there
is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the
Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency
concerned;
(b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created;
(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit;
(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the original offices;
(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SECTION 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have been separated in violation of the
provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full
pay for the period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all officers and employees, including casuals and temporary employees,
who have been separated pursuant to reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and retirement and
other benefits under existing laws within ninety (90) days from the date of the effectivity of their separation or from the date of the receipt of
the resolution of their appeals as the case may be: Provided, That application for clearance has been filed and no action thereon has been
made by the corresponding department or agency. Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid a separation gratuity in the
amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. Such separation pay and retirement benefits shall have priority of
payment out of the savings of the department or agency concerned.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SECTION 11. The executive branch of the government shall implement reorganization schemes within a specified period of time
authorized by law.
In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch, all departments and agencies which are authorized by executive orders
promulgated by the President to reorganize shall have ninety (90) days from the approval of this Act within which to implement their
respective reorganization plans in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
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xxx

SECTION 13. All laws, rules and regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly. The rights and benefits under this Act shall be retroactive as of June 30, 1987.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours)
Given the foregoing statutory backdrop, the issues can now be addressed.
Scope of Section 16, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution
Crucial to the present controversy is the construction to be given to the abovementioned Constitutional provision (SECTION 16, for brevity), which
speaks of.
Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause
but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986

and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution ... (paragraphing supplied).
To our minds, SECTION 16 clearly recognizes (1) the reorganization authorized by Proclamation No. 3; (2) that such separation is NOT
FOR CAUSE but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to said Proclamation; and (3) that the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation
No. 3 may be continued even after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution during the transition period.
Separation NOT FOR CAUSE
The canon for the removal or suspension of a civil service officer or employee is that it must be FOR CAUSE. That means a guarantee of both
procedural and substantive due process. Basically, procedural due process would require that suspension or dismissal come only after notice and
hearing. Substantive due process would require that suspension or dismissal be 'for cause'." Bernas The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, Vol. II, First Edition, 1988, p. 334)
The guarantee of removal FOR CAUSE is enshrined in Article IX-B, Section 2(3) of the 1987 Constitution, which states that 'No officer or employee of
the civil service shall be removed or suspended except FOR CAUSE provided by law."
There can be no question then as to the meaning of the phrase FOR CAUSE. It simply means the observance of both procedural and substantive due
process in cases of removal of officers or employees of the civil service. When SECTION 16 speaks, therefore, of separation from the service NOT
FOR CAUSE, it can only mean the diametrical opposite. The constitutional intent to exempt the separation of civil service employees pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 from the operation of Article IX-B, Section 2(3), becomes readily apparent. A distinction is explicitly made between removal FOR
CAUSE, which as aforestated, requires due process, and dismissal NOT FOR CAUSE, which implies that the latter is not bound by the "fetters' of due
process.
It is obviously for that reason that Section 16 grants separation pay and retirement benefits to those separated NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result of
the reorganization precisely to soften the impact of the non-observance of due process. "What is envisioned in Section 16 is not a remedy for arbitrary
removal of civil servants enjoying security of tenure but some form of relief for members of the career civil service who may have been or may be
legally but involuntarily 'reorganized out' of the service or may have voluntarily resigned pursuant to the reorganization policy" (ibid., p. 615).
Reorganization Pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 to Continue Transitorily Even After Ratification
By its very context, SECTION 16 envisages the continuance of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 even after ratification of the
Constitution and during the transition period. The two [2] stages contemplated, namely, (1) the stage before and (2) after ratification, refer to the same
nature of separation "NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result of Proclamation No. 3." No valid reason has been advanced for a different treatment after
ratification as the majority opines i.e., that separation NOT FOR CAUSE is allowed before ratification but that, thereafter, separation can only be FOR
CAUSE.
A fundamental principle of Constitutional construction is to assure the realization of the purpose of the framers of the organic law and of the people
who adopted it.
That the reorganization commenced pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 was envisioned to continue even after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, at
least transitorily, is evident from the intent of its authors discoverable from their deliberations held on 3 October 1986 and evincing their awareness
that such reorganization had not as yet been fully implemented. Thus:
Mr. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer, on lines 2 to 5 is the clause 'pursuant to the provisions of Article III of Proclamation No. 3, issued on
March 25, 1986, and the reorganization.' Are those words necessary? Can we not just say 'result of the reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution'? In other words, must we make specific reference to Proclamation No. 3?
Mr. SUAREZ. Yes. I think the committee feels that is necessary, because in truth there has been a reorganization by virtue of Proclamation
No. 3. In other words, there are two stages of reorganization covered by this section.
Mr. PADILIA. I understand there is a reorganization committee headed by a minister?
Mr. SUAREZ. Philippine Commission on Government Reorganization.
Mr. PADILLA. But whether that has already been implemented or not, I do not believe in it. There has been a plan, but I do not think it has
been implemented. If we want to include any previous reorganization after or before the ratification, why do we not just say reorganization
before or after the ratification' to simplify the provision and eliminate two-and-a-half sentences that may not be necessary? And as a result
of the reorganization, if the committee feels there has been reorganization before ratification and there be reorganization after, we just say
'before or after the ratification of this Constitution.
Mr. SUAREZ. Something like this as a result of the reorganization effected before or after the ratification of the Constitution on the
understanding, with the statement into the records, that this would be applicable to those reorganized out pursuant to the Freedom
Constitution also.
Mr. PADILLA. That is understood if there has been a reorganization before the ratification or a reorganization after the ratification."
(RECORDS of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 5, p. 416) (Emphasis provided)
It should also be recalled that the deadline for the reorganization under Proclamation No. 3 was "one year from February 25, 1986" (Article III, Section
2), or up to February 24, 1987. Executive Order No. 17 itself provided that the review/assessment of personnel be completed "not later than February
24, 1987." But, confronted with the reality of the ratification of the Constitution before that deadline without reorganization having been completed,
there was need for a provision allowing for its continuance even after ratification and until completed. It was also to beat that deadline that EO 127
and similar issuances, providing for the reorganization of departments of government, were all dated 30 January 1987 or prior to the plebiscite held
on 2 February 1987. The intent to continue and complete the reorganizations started is self- evident in SECTION 16.
In Jose vs. Arroyo, et al. (G.R. No. 78435, August 11, 1987), which was a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition to enjoin the implementation of
Executive Order No. 127, we recognized that the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 as mandated by SECTION 16, was to continue even
after ratification when we stated:
The contention of petitioner that EO No. 127 is violative of the provision of the 1987 Constitution guaranteeing career civil service
employees security of tenure overlooks the provision of Section 16, Art. XVIII (Transitory Provisions) which explicitly authorizes the
removal of career civil service employees not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March
25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of the Constitution. By virtue of said provision, the reorganization of the Bureau of

Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may continue even after the ratification of this Constitution and career civil service employees
may be separated from the service without cause as a result of such reorganization. (Emphasis ours)
With due respect to the majority, we disagree with its conclusion that the foregoing pronouncement is mere "obiter dictum."
An obiter dictum or dictum has been defined as a remark or opinion uttered, by the way. It is a statement of the court concerning a
question which was not directly before it (In re Hess 23 A. 2d. 298, 301, 20 N.J. Misc. 12). It is language unnecessary to a decision, (a)
ruling on an issue not raised, or (an) opinion of a judge which does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and is made
without argument or full consideration of the point (Lawson v. US, 176 F2d 49, 51, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 167). It is an expression of opinion by
the court or judge on a collateral question not directly involved, (Crescent Ring Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. 132 A. 106, 107, 102 N.J.
Law 85) or not necessary for the decision Du Bell v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 29, So. 2d 709, 712; 211 La. 167).
In the case at bar, however, directly involved and squarely before the Court was the issue of whether EO 127 violates Section 2(3) of Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution against removal of civil service employees except for cause." Petitioner batted for the affirmative of the proposition, while
respondents contended that "removal of civil service employees without cause is allowed not only under the Provisional Constitution but also under
the 1987 Constitution if the same is made pursuant to a reorganization after the ratification of the Constitution."
It may be that the Court dismissed that Petition for being premature, speculative and purely anticipatory" inasmuch as petitioner therein had "not
received any communication terminating or threatening to terminate his services." But that was only one consideration. The Court still proceeded to
decide all the issues adversatively contested by the parties, namely "1) that the expiration date of February 25, 1 987 fixed by Section 2 of
Proclamation No. 3 on which said Executive order is based had already lapsed; 2) that the Executive Order has not been published in the Official
Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and Section 1 1 of the Revised Administrative Code; and 3) that its enforcement violates Section
2(3) of Article IX B of the 1987 Constitution against removal of civil service employees except for cause."
The ruling of the Court, therefore, on the Constitutional issues presented, particularly, the lapse of the period mandated by Proclamation No. 3, and
the validity of EO 127, cannot be said to be mere "obiter." They were ultimate issues directly before the Court, expressly decided in the course of the
consideration of the case, so that any resolution thereon must be considered as authoritative precedent, and not a mere dictum (See Valli v. US, 94
F2d 687 certiorari granted 58 S. Ct. 760, 303 U.S. 82 L. Ed. 1092; See also Weedin v. Tayokichi Yamada 4 F. (2d) 455).lwph1.t Such resolution
would not lose its value as a precedent just because the disposition of the case was also made on some other ground.
.....And this rule applies as to all pertinent questions although only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular
course of the consideration of the case, and lead up to the final conclusion (Northern Pac. Ry Co. v. Baker, D.C. Wash., 3 F. Suppl. 1; See
also Wisconsin Power and Light Co. v. City of Beloit 254 NW 119; Chase v. American Cartage Co. 186 N.W. 598; City of Detroit, et al. v.
Public Utilities Comm. 286 N.W. 368). Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the
disposition of the case is made on some other ground. (Wagner v. Com Products Refining Co. D.C. N.J. 28 F 2d 617) Where a case
presents two or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points,
the case is an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as having merely the status of a
dictum (See U.S. Title Insurance and Trust Co., Cal., 44 S. Ct. 621, 265 U.S. 472, 68 L. Ed. 1110; Van Dyke v. Parker 83 F. (2d) 35) and
one point should not be denied authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered.
(Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. U.S. 48 S. Ct. 194, 275 U.S. 331, 72 L. Ed. 303)"
It is true that in Palma-Fernandez vs. de la Paz (G.R. No. 78946, April 15, 1986, 160 SCRA 751), we had stated:
The argument that, on the basis of this provision (Section 26 of Executive Order No. 119, or the 'Reorganization Act of the Ministry of
Health'), petitioner's term of office ended on 30 January 1987 and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a hold-over
capacity and could be transferred to another position without violating any of her legal rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a position in a
hold-over capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the Provisional
Constitution), but advanced to 2 February 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective (De Leon, et al., vs. Hon. Esguerra, et al.,
G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987, 153 SCRA 602). After the d date the provisions of the latter on security of tenure govern.
The factual situation in the two cases, however, radically differ. In the cited case, Dra. Palma-Fernandez, the petitioner, had already been extended a
permanent appointment as Assistant Director for Professional Services of the East Avenue Medical Center but was still being transferred by the
Medical Center Chief to the Research Office against her consent. Separation from the service as a result of reorganization was not involved. The
question then arose as to whether the latter official had the authority to transfer or whether the power to appoint and remove subordinate officers and
employees was lodged in the Secretary of Health. Related to that issue was the vital one of whether or not her transfer, effected on 29 May 1987, was
tantamount to a removal without cause. Significant, too, is the fact that the transfer was basically made "in the interest of the service" pursuant to
Section 24(c) of PD No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree, and not because she was being reorganized out by virtue of EO 119 or the "Reorganization
Act of the Ministry of Health," although the said Act was invoked after the fact. And so it was that SECTION 16 was never mentioned, much less
invoked in the Palma-Fernandez case.
Finally, on this point, it is inaccurate for the majority to state that there were no reorganization orders after ratification. There were, namely, EO 181
(Reorganization Act of the Civil Service Commission), June 1, 1987; EO 193 (Reorganization Act of the Office of Energy Affairs), June 10, 1987; EO
230 (Reorganization Act of NEDA), July 22, 1987; EO 262 (Reorganization Act of the Department of Local Government), July 25, 1987; EO 297
(Reorganization Act of the Office of the Press Secretary), July 25, 1987.
The Element of Good Faith
The majority concedes that reorganization can be undertaken provided it be in good faith but concludes that Commissioner Mison was not in good
faith.
The aforesaid conclusion is contradicted by the records.
Executive Order No. 127, dated 30 January 1987, specifically authorized the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs "structurally and functionally"
and provided for the abolition of all units and positions thereof not included in the structural organization S election 55).
As stated heretofore, it was the former Commissioner of Customs, Alexander A. Padilla who, on 24 May 1987, transmitted to the Department of
Finance for approval the proposed "position structure and staffing pattern" of the Bureau of Customs. This was approved by the Department of
Finance. Thereafter, it was transmitted to and approved by the Department of Budget and Management on 7 September 1987 for implementation.
Under the old staffing pattern, there were 7,302 positions while under the new staffing pattern, there are 6,530 positions.
On 2 October 1987 "Malacanang Memorandum Re: Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders" provided:
By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive orders for each agency on reorganization shall be:

a. informed of their reappointment, or

b. offered another position in the same department or agency, or
c. informed of their termination. (emphasis supplied)
On 25 November 1987 Commissioner Mison asked for and was granted by the President an extension up to February 1988 within which to
completely undertake the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs.
On 6 January 1988, he issued Bureau of Customs Memorandum "Re Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders"
reiterating the above- quoted portion of the Malacanang Memorandum of 2 October 1987. Pursuant thereto, on 28 January 1988, Commissioner
Mison addressed uniform letters of termination to the employees listed on pages 15, 16 and 17 of the majority opinion, effective on 28 February 1988,
within the extended period granted.
The records further show that upon Commissioner Mison's official inquiry, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordo;ez, rendered the following Opinion:
. . . It is believed that customs employees who are reorganized out in the course of the implementation of E.O. No. 127 (reorganizing the
Department of Finance) need not be informed of the nature and cause of their separation from the service. It is enough that they be
'informed of their termination' pursuant to section 1(c) of the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 of President Aquino, which reads:
1. By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive orders for each agency on reorganization shall be:
xxx

xxx

xxx

c) Informed of their terminations.

The constitutional mandate that 'no officer or employee of the civil service shall be renewed or suspended except for cause as provided by
law' (Sec. 2(4) (sic), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution) does not apply to employees who are separated from office as a result of the
reorganization of that Bureau as directed in Executive Order No. 127.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Regarding your (third) query, the issue as to the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 127 is set at rest, after the Supreme Court
resolved to dismiss the petition for certiorari questioning its enforceability, for lack of merit (see Jose vs. Arroyo, et al., supra). (Opinion No.
41, s. 1988, March 3, 1988) (Emphasis supplied)
The former Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, Celerina G. Gotladera likewise periodically consulted by Commissioner Mison, also expressed
the opinion that "it is not a prerequisite prior to the separation of an employee pursuant to reorganization that he be administratively charged." (Annex
16, p. 411, Rollo, G.R. No. 85310)
Moreover, the records show that the final selection and placement of personnel was done by a Placement Committee, one of whose members is the
Head of the Civil Service Commission Field Office, namely, Mrs. Purificacion Cuerdo The appointment of employees made by Commissioner Mison
was based on the list approved by said Placement Committee.
But the majority further faults Mison for defying the President's directive to halt further layoffs as a consequence of reorganization, citing OP Memo of
14 October 1987, reading:
Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same subject, I have ordered that there will be no further layoffs this year of
personnel as a result of the government reorganization. (p. 45, Decision)
The foregoing, however, must be deemed superseded by later developments, namely, the grant to Commissioner Mison by the President on 22
December 1987 of a grace period until the end of February 1988 within which to completely undertake the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs,
which was, in fact, accomplished by 28 February 1988.
To further show lack of good faith, the majority states that Commissioner Mison failed to observe the procedure laid down by EO 17, supra, directing
inter alia that a notice of separation be issued to an employee to be terminated indicating therein the reason/s or ground/s for such separation. That
requirement, however, does not appear in Section 59 of EO 127, which provides on the contrary "that those incumbents whose positions are not
included in the new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service."
The right granted by EO 17 to an employee to be informed of the ground for his separation must be deemed to have been revoked by the repealing
clause of EO 127 (Section 67) providing that "all laws, ordinances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Executive Order, are hereby
repealed and modified accordingly."
Moreover, Section 11 of EO 17 explicitly excepts from its coverage a reorganization pursuant to EO 5. Thus
The Executive Order shall not apply to elective officials or those designated to replace them, presidential appointees, casual and
contractual employees, or officials and employees removed pursuant to desciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service law and rules,
and to those laid off as a result of reorganization undertaken pursuant to Executive Order No. 5. (Emphasis ours)
That EO 127 was issued pursuant to or in implementation of EO 5, is shown by its introductory portion reading:
Recalling that the reorganization of the government is mandated expressly by Article II, Section 1 (a) and Article III of the Freedom
Constitution;
Having in mind that pursuant to Executive order No. 5 (1986), it is directed that the necessary and proper changes in the organizational
and functional structures of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, be effected in order to promote efficiency and effectiveness
in the delivery of public service; (Italics supplied)
Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6656

The majority also relies on Republic Act No. 6656 entitled an "Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the
Implementation of Government Reorganization," particularly Section 2 thereof, to test the good faith of Commissioner Mison.
We are of the view, however, that in providing for retroactivity in its Section 13, RA 6656 clashes frontally with SECTION 16.
1) SECTION 16 clearly recognizes that career service employees separated from the service by reason of the "complete reorganization of the
government" pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 may be separated NOT FOR CAUSE. And yet, RA 6656 requires the exact opposite separation FOR
CAUSE. It would not be remiss to quote the provision again:
SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid
cause for removal exist when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a
need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil
Service law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals
made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a) Where there is a
significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) Where an office is
abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in
terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; (e) Where the removal violates the
order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof. (Republic Act No. 6156)
The standards laid down are the "traditional" criteria for removal of employees from the career service, e.g. valid cause, due notice and hearing,
abolition of, or redundancy of offices. Proclamation No. 3, on the other hand, effectuates the "progressive" type of reorganization dictated by the
exigencies of the historical and political upheaval at the time. The "traditional" type is limited in scope. It is concerned with the individual approach
where the particular employee involved is charged administratively and where the requisites of notice and hearing have to be observed. The
"progressive" kind of reorganization, on the other hand, is the collective way. It is wider in scope, and is the reorganization contemplated under
SECTION 16.
2) By providing for reinstatement in its Section 9, RA 6656 adds a benefit not included in SECTION 16. The benefits granted by the latter provision to
employees separated NOT FOR CAUSE but as a consequence of reorganization are "separation pay, retirement, and other benefits accruing to them
under the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation." The benefit of reinstatement is not included. RA 6656, however, allows
reinstatement. That it cannot do because under SECTION 16, it is not one of the laws "in force at the time of their separation."
The Constitution is the paramount law to which all laws must conform. It is from the Constitution that all statutes must derive their bearings. The
legislative authority of the State must yield to the expression of the sovereign will. No statutory enactment can disregard the Charter from which it
draws its own existence (Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674 [1952]). But, that is exactly what RA 6656
does in providing for retroactivity it disregards and contravenes a Constitutional imperative. To save it, it should be applied and construed
prospectively and not retroactively notwithstanding its explicit provision. Then, and only then, would it make good law.
Effects of Reorganization
To be sure, the reorganization could effect the tenure of members of the career service as defined in Section 5, Article IV of Presidential Decree No.
807, and may even result in the separation from the office of some meritorious employees. But even then, the greater good of the greatest number
and the right of the citizenry to a good government, and as they themselves have mandated through the vehicle of Proclamation No. 3, provide the
justification for the said injury to the individual. In terms of values, the interest of an employee to security of tenure must yield to the interest of the
entire populace and to an efficient and honest government.
But a reorganized employee is not without rights. His right lies in his past services, the entitlement to which must be provided for by law. EO 127
provides for the same in its Section 59, and so does SECTION 16 when the latter specified that career civil service employees separated from the
service not for cause:
shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application
in force at the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the
Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, has been accepted.
This is a reward for the employee's past service to the Government. But this is all There is no vested property right to be reemployed in a reorganized
office.
The right to an office or to employment with government or any of its agencies is not a vested property right, and removal therefrom will not
support the question of due process" Yantsin v. Aberdeen, 54 Wash 2d 787, 345 P 2d 178). A civil service employee does not have a
constitutionally protected right to his position, which position is in the nature of a public office, political in character and held by way of grant
or privilege extended by government; generally he has been held to have no property right or vested interest to which due process
guaranties extend (See Taylor v. Beckham 178 U.S. 548, 44 L Ed. 1187; Angilly v. US CA2 NY 199 F 2d 642; People ex. rel. Baker v.
Wilson, 39 III App 2d 443, 189 NE 2d 1; Kelliheller v. NY State Civil Service Com 21 Misc 2d 1034, 194 NYS 2d 89).
To ensure, however, that no meritorious employee has been separated from the service, there would be no harm, in fact, it could do a lot of good, if
the Commissioner of Customs reviews the evaluation and placements he has so far made and sees to it that those terminated are included in a
consolidated list to be given preference by departments who are recruiting (Section 2[a], BOC Memorandum, January 6,1988).
Conclusion
Premises considered, and subject to the observation hereinabove made, it is our considered view that the separation from the service "NOT FOR
CAUSE but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986" of the affected officers and employees of the
Bureau of Customs should be UPHELD, and the Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission, dated 30 June 1988, 20 September 1988, and 16
November 1988 should be SET ASIDE for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion.
Republic Act No. 6656, in so far as it provides for retroactivity, should be declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being repugnant to the letter and spirit of
Section 16, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Feliciano, Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81385 February 21, 1989
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER AND CONRADO S. REYES in their official capacity as FISCAL
AGENTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 48,
MANILA, PRESIDED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE DEMETRIO M. BATARIO, JR., M.B.
OLIVARES, AUGUSTO VILLANUEVA, ARACELLI LINSANGAN, LUISA LINSANGAN,
ALEJANDRO MARAMAG, MANUEL SALAK, TURNITA SORIANO, LINO SISON
DOMINGO FLORES, MILAGROS HIZON and CARIDAD ORPIADA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Delia L. Hermoso for private respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The parameters of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts in relation to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Sandiganbayan are put into issue in this petition.
On December 17, 1987, private respondents filed a complaint for injunction and damages,
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila against petitioners and Winston Marbella,
Gaston Ortigas, Robeto Federis, Manuel C. Villa-Real, Emanuel Soriano, Jack Arroyo and
Benjamin Tulio.
The complaint alleges, among others, that private respondents are the only stockholders with
the right to vote of the Philippine Journalists, Inc. (PJI) Publisher of several daily periodicals
such as Manila Journal, People's Journal, etc. Sometime in 1977, PJI obtained from the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) certain financing accommodations and as
security thereof executed a first mortgage in favor of DBP on its acts enumerated in a list
attached to the mortgage. The PJI stockholders assigned to DBP the voting rights over 67%
of the total subscribed and outstanding voting shares of stock of the company held by them.
The DBP appointed said PJI stockholders as proxies to exercise its right to vote. Due to
some financial difficulty on its part, PJI requested for a restructuring of its loan obligation with
certain conditions. The request was granted by the DBP in a letter dated August 4, 1986. Due
to the default on the part of the PJI the DBP cancelled the proxies in favor of the assigning
stockholders on September 30, 1986 and designated as its proxies petitioner Eduardo
Olaguer, Jose Mari Velez and Manuel de Leon. DBP scheduled a special stockholders
meeting for the purpose of electing a new set of directors.
It is also alleged in the complaint that before the special meeting, petitioner Olaguer asked
private respondent Rosario M. Barreto Olivares to assign qualifying shares not only to the
three proxies of DBP but also to two others to be chosen by him so as to enable the five of
them to sit in the PJI board of directors, and that, accordingly, they may be able to coordinate
more effectively with DBP as regards the early evaluation and approval of the request for
another restructuring of the PJI loan. Thus respondent Olivares assigned her shareholdings
covered by Stock Certificate. No. 34 (which were at that time assigned to DBP) to petitioner
Olaguer, Marbella, Ortigas, Mari Velez and De Leon, at one share each. The deeds of
assignment provided that the said assignment are valid only as long as the nominee is the
person designated by the DBP as its representative to sit in the board of directors.

The complaint also alleges that although Olaguer was elected chairman of the board and
chief executive officer of PJI he failed to comply with his commitment and that this gave
private respondents a reason to cancel the assignment. Olaguer also committed certain
illegal acts which gave rise to the filing of several complaints against him. However, before
these cases could be resolved, Olaguer's appointment as member of the board of directors of
DBP was terminated by President Corazon C. Aquino effective September 9, 1987. He was
informed about his termination through two letters dated August 27 and October 12, 1987.
It is likewise alleged that, the termination notwithstanding, Olaguer continued to exercise and
retain full management and control of PJI The DBP chief legal counsel wrote to petitioner
Reyes informing him of Olaguer's removal from office and enjoining him from implementing or
complying with any instructions from Olaguer and from disposing of the properties of PJI and
disbursing any funds without prior approval of the board of directors of PJI which will soon be
elected, except such amounts needed in the ordinary course of business. Accordingly, the
DBP, acting through its Chairman, Jesus Estanislao and its Director-in-Charge, Jose Mari
Velez, entered into an Interim Agreement with private respondents. The said agreement
called for a special stockholders meeting for the purpose of electing a new board of directors
which shall hold office until the next regular stockholders meeting to be held on February 2,
1988.
The complaint further alleges that in a letter dated December 14, 1987, the DBP chief legal
counsel informed the private respondents that the said Interim Agreement cannot be
implemented because Olaguer claims that he has just been designated the fiscal and team
leader of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) assigned to the PJI and
that all his actions are sanctioned and reported to PCGG Chairman Ramon A. Diaz, and that
it is the PCGG which exercises the voting rights of all PJI common stocks sequestered since
1986, including those assigned to DBP and that the PJI qualifying share now held by PJI
Directors came from shares sequestered by the PCGG. These observations are contained in
a letter dated October 31, 1987 written by petitioner Reyes in his capacity as chief legal
counsel and corporate secretary of PJI It is stated therein that Olaguer, together with
Marbella, Ortigas, Soriano, Federis, Arroyo and Villa-Real have been acting as corporate
officers and/or members of the board without their having been elected by the majority vote of
stockholders and without their owning in their own right even a single qualifying share.
In addition, it is alleged that petitioner Reyes had been sending out notices to private
respondents about an alleged stockholders meeting to be held on December 21, 1987 at the
PJI building, and that in the letter written by the DBP chief legal counsel, 1 it is stated that
petitioner Olaguer and his associates who claim to be members of the board and corporate officers of PJI do not
represent DBP and that they are not authorized to act in its behalf.
The complaint emphasizes that the claim of petitioner Reyes that Olaguer can sit as chairman of the board of
directos of PJI even if he is no longer a director of DBP but as long as he is the fiscal agent and team leader of
the PCGG assigned is baseless because: (a) the writs of sequestration on the shares of respondents Hizon,
Orpiada, Maramag, Flores and Sison, served on them on or about February 19, 1987, and on respondents
Linsangan, Salak, Soriano and Villanueva, served on them on or about April 28, 1987, bad been automatically
lifted last August 19, 1987 and October 28, 1987, respectively, pursuant to Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution; and only the sequestration on the shares of respondent Olivares has not been lifted since a
complaint was filed against her before the expiration of the constitutional deadline for filing cases; (b) the
sequestered shares of respondent Olivares could not be voted upon by petitioners herein and their companions
under their claim of being PCGG fiscal agents under the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in several
cases clearly stating that sequestration does not involve the right of ownership; (c) no other meeting has been
validly called for the election of a new set of directors after the members of the board elected last October 2,
1986 had ceased to be such directors, either by virtue of the cancellation of their qualifying shares or their
resignation; (d) with the filing of Civil Case No. 35 before the Sandiganbayan where the PJI was listed as one of
the involved corporations, all actions affecting said corporation, including those which will affect rights of
ownership and disposition of assets, must have the prior approval of the Sandiganbayan which excercises
jurisdiction over these corporations as one of the properties in litigation; and (e) by order of President Aquino,
petitioner Olaguer's separation from the PJI was called for; that the acts of all the petitioners and their
companions of either continuing to sit in the board of directors of PJI and/or representing and acting as its
corporate officers are illegal and are the acts of usurpers and intruders violative of the rights of private
respondents as stockholders and are causing great damage and prejudice to them as well as to the rights of the
DBP under the Deed of Assignment, and that such acts of usurpation should be enjoined by the trial court.

Under the second cause of action for damages, it is alleged that Olaguer acted illegally and outside the authority
granted him as nominee of DBP and, accordingly, Olivares cancelled the Deed of Assignment of one qualifying
share to him as well as the Deed of Assignment in favor of Marbella and Ortigas. The notice of cancellation was
served upon them on December 5, 1986. As a consequence of such cancellation, the three failed to qualify to sit
as members of the board of PJI.
Private respondents also alleged that despite such notice, petitioner and his associates continued to sit in the
board and that Olaguer took over the complete management of the corporation and even caused the
appointment of other members of the board and/or corporate officers even if such appointees do not own PJI
shares of stock in their own right. It is likewise alleged that the petitioner and his associates should be enjoined
from committing further acts of usurpation and that they should be held liable for all unlawful disbursements they
have made. It is further alleged that some of the private respondents had been unlawfully dismissed and/or
retired one after another thereby depriving them of all benefits they are entitled to and subjecting them to great
mental anguish, sleepless nights, deep humiliation and great anxiety for which they must be paid damages in an
amount left to the sound discretion of the court. Private respondents also asked for exemplary damages as well
as the sum of P200,000.00 for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
Private respondents prayed that pending a hearing on the merits of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction or a
temporary restraining order be issued against petitioner Reyes enjoining him from holding the special
stockholders meeting scheduled at 8:00 A.M. on December 21, 1987, and enjoining Olaguer and his associates
from sitting and acting as members of the board of directors of PJI or as corporate officers. Private respondents
also prayed that such temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be made permanent after
due hearing and that Petitioner Olaguer and his associates be made to pay, jointly and severally, actual
damages as may be proved after audit, including moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses in the amount of P200,000.00, and the costs of the suit. 2
On December 18, 1987, an order was issued by the trial court setting the petition for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction for bearing on January 4, 1988 at 1:30 in the afternoon. A temporary restraining order was
issued enjoining petitioner Reyes from holding the special stockholders meeting scheduled for December 21,
1987 and enjoining all the other petitioners including Olaguer from sitting and acting as members of the board
and/or corporate officers of PJI until further orders of the court.
On January 4, 1988, a motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners on the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners; that they were not served summons and that the subject matter of
the action involves controversies arising out of intra-corporate relations between and among stockholders which
are covered by the provisions of Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A so that the matter is within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); that the venue for a
petition seeking injunctive relief should be the Sandiganbayan where aforesaid PCGG Case No. 0035 against
Benjamin Romualdez, Rosario Olivares, et al. is pending, pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 defining the
jurisdiction over cases involving the alleged ill-gotten wealth of Former President Marcos, et al.; that it is the
SEC which should exercise jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A;
and that the complaint states no cause of action inasmuch as the petitioners and the other defendants hold
shares emanating from the PCGG, and not from the DBP; that the shares issued to DBP for Olivares, et al. on
the basis of an erroneous DBP legal opinion have been declared void ab initio and cancelled by the PCGG on
November 4, 1987 so that the DBP is not a stockholder of record; that the call for the stockholders meeting by
petitioner Reyes was with the approval of the PCGG Chairman; that PJI is a sequestered corporation listed as
item No. 49 under "Shares of Stock" in "Assets and Other Property of Benjamin Romualdez" marked Annex "A",
in Case No. 0035 for "Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages," entitled "Republic of
the Philippines, plaintiff versus Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et al.,"; that the PJI pursuant to its Board
Resolution No. 43, dated November 14, 1987, has authorized the filing of criminal complaints against Benjamin
(Kokoy) Romualdez, Rosario Olivares, Tuynita Soriano, Jose T. Abundo, Evelyn Nicasio, Alejandro Maramag,
Caridad Orpiada and other former and present PJI officers and employees who defrauded the company by
conspiring in and/or authorizing the illegal disbursements of PJI funds amounting to P 10.6 million, all for the
account and upon instructions of said Romualdez who was neither an officer, director, stockholder of record of
PJI nor a creditor or supplier thereof; that regarding the sequestration of PJI pursuant to orders of the PCGG
dated April 22, 1986 and February 19, 1987, the actual sequestration proceedings have not been terminated
upon the filing of PCGG Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan on July 31, 1987.
Petitioners maintain that under the pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution, the commencement of a judicial
action does not ipso facto lift the sequestration order. It is the non-filing of a judicial action within six months
from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution if the sequestration order is issued before the ratification, or within
six months from the time sequestration order was issued if the same was issued after such ratification, which
will automatically lift the sequestration order. Petitioners also stated that while the PJI suffered huge loses under
the administration of private respondents, the corporation realized profits under the management of petitioner
Olaguer. All the common and preferred stocks of private respondents have been sequestered pursuant to the
orders of the PCGG dated April 22, 1986 and February 19, 1987 and it is the PCGG which exercises the voting
rights pertaining to said sequestered shares pursuant to the Memorandum of President Aquino to the PCGG
dated June 26, 1986.

A Memorandum in support of the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and opposition to the
motion to dismiss was filed by counsel for private respondents.
On January 14, 1988, an order was issued by the trial court denying the motion to dismiss and issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction as prayed for upon a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 to be filed by private respondents.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/ or a writ of preliminary injunction wherein the main issue is whether or not the trial court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
On January 26, 1988, a resolution was issued by this Court requiring the respondents to comment therein within
ten (10) days from notice. A temporary restraining order was issued enjoining the respondent judge to cease
and desist from enforcing the order of the trial court dated January 14, 1988 in Civil Case No. 87-43156 as well
as the writ of preliminary injunction issued against petitioners.
Acting on the manifestation and motion filed by counsel for private respondents on February 4, 1988, this Court
issued a resolution enjoining petitioner Reyes and/or the corporate officers of PJI from holding another special
stockholders meeting on February 5, 1988 or at any date thereafter pending resolution of this case, and
directing the parties to maintain the status quo until further orders from the Court.
The private respondents filed their comment on the petition. Thereafter, the petitioners filed their reply. On April
5, 1988, the court resolved to give due course to the petition and considered the case submitted for decision.
Nevertheless, the private respondents filed a rejoinder.
The petition is impressed with merit. There is no dispute that the PJI is now under sequestration by the PCGG
and that Civil Case No. 0035 was filed in the Sandiganbayan wherein the PJI is listed as among the
corporations involved in the unexplained wealth case against former President Marcos, Romualdez and many
others. The records likewise show that petitioner Olaguer, among others, is a fiscal agent of the PCGG and that
as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the PJI he was acting for and in behalf of the PCGG. Under Section 2
of Executive Order No. 14, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases regarding
"the funds, moneys, assets and properties illegally acquired by Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or
nominees," 3 civil or criminal, including incidents arising from such cases. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan is
subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. 4
In the exercise of its functions, the PCGG is a co-equal body with the regional trial courts and co-equal bodies
have no power to control the other. 5 The regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals have no jurisdiction over
the PCGG in the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Section 26, Article XVIII of
the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of
the PCGG. 6 By the same token, the regional trial courts have no jurisdiction over the acts of fiscal agents of the
PCGG acting for and in behalf of said commission.
The Commission should not be embroiled in and swamped by legal suits before inferior courts all over the land.
Otherwise, the Commission will be forced to spend valuable time defending all its actuations in such courts. This
will defeat the very purpose behind the creation of the Commission. Accordingly, Section 4(a) of Executive
Order No. 1 expressly accorded the Commission and its members immunity from suit for damages in that: "No
civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge
of the task contemplated by this order."
Civil Case No. 87-43156 pending before the respondent judge is denominated as one for "injunction with prayer
for writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages." Particularly, under paragraph
17(d) of the complaint, private respondents admitted that the PJI is listed as one of the involved corporations in
Civil Case No. 0035 pending before the Sandiganbayan which now exercises jurisdiction over the said
corporation. Petitioners Olaguer and Reyes appear to be fiscal agents of the PCGG. There can be no doubt,
therefore, that the subject matter of the action (the PJI its properties and assets) falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners, as fiscal agents of the PCGG, cannot be sued in such capacity before the ordinary courts. The
tribunal for such purpose is the Sandiganbayan.
It necessarily follows that the issues raised by the private respondents before the respondent judge to the effect
that petitioners are usurpers and have no right to sit in the board of directors or act as corporate officers of the
PJI are issues which should be addressed to the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondent judge is permanently enjoined from enforcing the
order of the trial court dated January 14, 1988. The restraining order issued by this Court dated February 4,
1988 enjoining petitioner Reyes and/or the corporate officers of the PJI from holding the special stockholders
meeting on February 5, 1988 or at any date thereafter, and to preserve and maintain the status quo, is hereby

lifted. The order of the trial court dated January 14, 1988 is hereby SET ASIDE and another order is hereby
issued dismissing the complaint, without pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result, for the reasons and with the qualifications set out in my separate
opinion in PCGG vs. Pena G.R. No. 77553, 12 April 1988.
GUTIEEREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I reiterate my dissent in PCGG vs. Pena G.R. No. 77663, April 12,1988.

Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result, for the reasons and with the qualifications set out in my separate
opinion in PCGG vs. Pena G.R. No. 77553, 12 April 1988.
GUTIEEREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I reiterate my dissent in PCGG vs. Pena G.R. No. 77663, April 12,1988.
Footnotes
1 Annex "C" to the Complaint.
2 Annexes "A-D", Petition.
3 See Executive Order No. 2 issued on March 12, 1986.
4 Section 7, Presidential Decree No. 1606.
5 National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza, 138 SCRA 632 (1985).
6 PCGG vs. Hon. Emmanuel G. Pena, et al., G.R. No. 77663, April 12, 1988.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 109406 September 11, 1998

REMEDIOS T. BLAQUERA, ROMEO T. ACOSTA, DINAH A. AGATI, RODRIGO AGIR JR., REY M. T. AGUINALDO, ELEAZAR S. ALAIRA,
MARCIAL C. AMARO JR., LEONOR M. ARZADON, MARLENE C. ARZAGA, MIGUEL G. BADION, NORMITA S. BALLON, SOCORRO B. DEL
MONTE, TEODORA B. CABRERA, ERLINDA CANTIL, ARIEL P. CATINDIG, MA. HAYLEY N. CONCEPCION, MARY ANN C. CRUZ, MA.
VICTORIA ASUMPTU P. DACANAY, FEBES M. DE LEON, LIBERTY M. DELIMA, MARITESS I. ESCUBIO, RITA D. FLORELIZ, CARIDAD C.
FRANCISCO, LEVI F. CABALFIN, FE GARRIDO, JULIE GOROSPE, NELSON V. GOROSPE, IMELDA GUINTANGUIJO, NENITA GUTIERREZ,
SALLY B. IMPERIAL, NERISSA B. JARABE, FE G. LOO, MA. IRENE E. LORENZO, LORIDA D. MACARAAN, DANILO P. MANOLOTO,
ADORACION M. MENDOZA, CECILIA MENDOZA, EMMANUEL MIRAFLORES, LLARINA S. MOJICA, ZENAIDA B. MUNOZ, ALICIA S. NERY,
NOEL O. PADILLA, ERVY C. PASCUAL, MA. MADELINE R. PATAWARAN, CRISTINA B. PAULINO, IRENEO T. PEREZ, MA. EVELINA RASCO,
AUDREY T. ROSETE, LUMINADA C. ROTOL, FRANCISCO SANTOS, JR., JULIET U. TEXON, HELEN A. TOBIAS, LARRY R.VILLAFLOR,
RAYMOND R. VIRGINO, LILY YBAO, VICKY U. YLAGAN, NENITA R. ZABALA, CHARLIE U. AGATI, NOEL C. AQUINO, ERLINDA P. AYAP,
CONRADO A. BRAVANTE, JR., EMMA F. CABRERA, MAY R. CANLAS, SUSAN CASTILLA, CORAZON B. CHECA, BLESILDA T. CORRO,
EMMA DIEZ, MA. LOURDES G. FERRER, LILIHUA B. GARCIA, JESLINA B. GOROSPE, MYRNA GUMANGAN, LERMA D. HONRADO, ISRAEL
S. INOCENCIO, JONAS P. LEONES, AVEL A. MORADO, JUANITA NACINO,GENEVIEVE AUSTRIA PADILLA, ALMA O. PELOBELLO, NELIA J.
QUESADA, CRISTINA M. REGUNAY, DEMILOUR B. REYES, MOLINA REYNALDO, GLENN ADONIS M. RICO, BELEN E. SOTALBO, ANDREA
B. TALOSIG, FLORDELIZA TENAZAS, MERLY B. TOMILLUSO, MA. ROSALINA VELASCO, NATIVIDAD YABES, PAULO F. ABESAMIS,
FELICITAS AREVALO, FORCIA B. ATOS, BELINDA I. DEANG, CONSUELO T. DUANO, ERNESTINA JOSE, GERARDO O. MENDOZA,
LUZVIMINDA P. MENDOZA, AMANTE S. PERALTA, YOLANDA M. TATANG, DOLORES M. ANGCO, MA. VENUS BERONGOY, LYDIA M.
BONA, MA. LOURDES CASAL, MABEL COLOMA, MARY JUNE D. DANDAN, ERLINDA O. DOMINGO, JOSEPHINE P. EBORA, ELENA B.
FERNANDEZ, EVANGELINE FERRER-LIMYOLO, AMPARO V. GEREZ, ZENAIDA V. GUTIERREZ, MILAGROS C. IMBAO JULIE JALAAN,
LETICIA A. LLAMERA, CAROLINA A. LOPEZ, MARIUS NORMAN MACALALAD, ALICIA L. MALLILLIN, REMEDIOS L. MERCADO, DINA B.
MONTEALEGRE, SUSAN MORTOS, JUANITO F. MUNSAYAC, PAULA ONG, DALISAY PASCUAL, MA. ALMA M. PILIPINA, NICETA A.
ROXAS, AMADOR ATENDIDO, LUZCELY H. VEDAN, NELLY VILLARAMA, ESTALA S. AGUILES, JEAN F. ALLADO, YVONNE B. BALDADO,
EUPREFIA BALDEMOR, NICETAS B. BAUTISTA, ANTONIO BENITEZ, JANETTE BERNARDO, MARIA B. BONGCO, GREGORIO ALEXIS M.
CAAYAO, FREDESVINDA G. CASUNCAD, ROSA G. COPON, AMILYN DANTES, HERMINIA ECLEO, FILIPINA V. EDRALIN, ROSALINA O.
ENRIQUEZ, MARY FERNANDEZ, VICTORIA B. GIMENO LEONARDO C. HERNANDEZ, ERLINDA MENDOZA, AURORA V. PIDO, FORTUNATA
C. RAYOSO, MARIA V. RICAFORT, DORINA S. ROJAS, LEONITA R. SIBUNGA, ERNA D. SY, ALMEIDA J. TAGALA, EDGARDO TUBANG,
SOFIA VELACRUZ, EUGENE N. ANTOLIN, MA. ELVIRA P. JAVIER, LISETTE G. MONENO, CLEOFE P. PATANAO, MARY JEAN V. REYES,
SHIRLEY G. AQUINO, CHRISTY GEMPES, JOSE FEDERICO M. GEMDRANO, JOSEPHINE G. RANCAP, JOSETTE B. SAN LUIS, MARINA A.
BORRETA, CHERRY B. CID, OLIVIA P. JOVE, MA. TERESA M. MARING, BETTY P. MOJICA, EDITHA T. MUNIELA, EMMANUEL T. PILAR,
JOVITA C. ROBOSA, MA. NENA M. VILLANUEVA, MARK A. ANTONIO, PRISCILLA G. BACENA, SUSAN C. BENOZA, RHODORA A.
CALUNGCAGIN, ANA MARIA M. CRISOSTOMO, ELENITO E. CUNANAN, ROMANA A. DE LEON, EDMUNDO B. FLORENDO, DANIEL
GARCIA, AMELIN F. MAGAT, PATRIA A. NULLAS, MYRNA S. TADENA, THELMA TOTANES, ALFONSO A. VERGARA, BELEN M.
ANTIPORDA, ROSALINA B. CARANDO, ESTELLA P. DE LEON, CRESENCIA I. OLIVAR, LOURIE A. OLIVERIO, TERESITA A. RAMOS,
ELISEO T. REYES, PUREZA T. SAYON, JOSEFINA B. TEJANA, VILLAROSA C. ABEN, JONATHAN ACABAL, POLICARPIO ALCARAZ,
TERESITA C. AMOG, GLORIA AROGANTE, EVENLYN BANDOLIN, GERRY BANDOLIN, ADOR BARROS, CELSO L. BAUTISTA, FELICITAS S.
BAUTISTA, CRISTNINA DE GUZMAN, ESTELA C. FACELO, RAMON FLORES, ANGELITO V. FONTANILLA, GERMAN GALAOS, REMEDIOS
S. GARCIA, MANNY G. GINGCO, VIRGILIO HALILI, ZENAIDA IBAY, ERNESTO B. JARABE, OSCAR LEANO, TEODORA O. LEONCIO,
CARMEN R. LUARCA, EMER REX MATIBAG, MARLYN R. MENDOZA, BIBIANO C. MIRANDA, ROMERICO MA. T. MOLINA, ERLINDA C.
PAYOTAS, GIANINA H. PUNZALAN, CRISTINA H. REYES, PETER RAMIL REYES, RUTH JEAN B. SOLANO, WILFREDO C. TORREDONDO,
NARCISO VILLAMOR, ERLINDAS S. VILLANUEVA, OSCAR H. VILLAS, GUILLERMA B. ALCONIS, AGNES CAMPO, JOCELYN CLEMENTE,
AMADO B. ESPANOL, LEONILO G. GONZALES, FE A. MENDIZABAL, TERESITA MORANARTE, ERLINDA P. ROMULO, FLORA TANGCO,
HONARIO T. TORRENUEVA, WILMA YNGENTE, SUSANA N. ANTOLIN, JOEL U. BAUN, RHODORA C. BRUCAL, CARMELITA G. CAYABAN,
CARIDAD CLARIN, LIDINILA N. CONCEPCION, FARIDA F. FLAVIANO, TEODORA B. MACARAYAN, HILARIA G. MAGCULANG, HERNAN
MARILLA, MONINA R. MENDRES, HERMINA A. MOLINA, YOLANDA GIGI H. MOLINA, RHODORA C. PADILLA, SANTIAGO PALACPAC, JR.,
ROMMEL PANGILINAN, DIANA JEAN N. PINAROC, MELANIE C. REY, MERCY L. REYES, HELEN RUTH BRIONES TABION, MARIA AMELITA
DJ ORTIZ TAMAYO, LEONIDES VALER, NELIA F. VILLANUEVA, MA. CRISTINA F. ABAYA, MACARIO A. BASCON, NANCY ROSE CAUGMA,
ELIGIO T. ILDEFONSO, MA. DELIA P. MEIMBAN, ROMEO G. MENDIZABAL, MICHAEL LL. TADEO, JOSE HENRY M. TALABIS, MELCHOR R.
TARUC, PONCIANO M. ARANEZ, REMEDIOS A. ASUNCION, EDILBERTA BUENO, ELIZABETH F. CRUZ, ARACELI V. ESPINO, RICARDO A.
FIAN, LOURDES JM. FLORES, MA. ELIZABETH GALANG, JOSE C. MORALES, JR., JOSELITO R. OCHING, JANET REYES, BENITO C.
SORIANO, MARCELO B. VALDERAMA, LINDBERG M.S. VALEROS, SARITA RENDON VALEROS, STEPHEN E. ABELLA, MARIA FRANCIA
ALFEREZ, FELY BALABBO, FE BOJOCAN, CARMELO Z. CAUSAPIN, NIDA R. DEDEL, JOSEFINA S. DIMALANTA, MARIA TERESITA
ESPINOL, BELEN FERNANDEZ, GERUNDO C. FERNANDEZ, HELEN LEE D. JIMENEZ, JAKE MAKI, ROSITA M. PINIANO, CHITO REYES,
EFREN F. REYES, EVELYN REYES, ENRICO A.O. SANTOS, NELIE VALLANGCA, VALENTE VILLANUEVA, MANUEL D. ROJAS, PAULINA G.
CASTRO, FANCY M. LEONES, ZENAIDA R. OPENA, FRANCISCO B.A. SAAVEDRA, ARNOLD L. SINZACA, MANUEL P.S. SOLIS, DEMETRIA
STA. ANA, LALLY JEAN S. AGUILAR, ELENA D. APOLONIO, RODOLFO A. DE AUSEN, MARITES O. DELFIN, EMMANUEL M. ESGUERRA,
NELSON ITLIONG, ALBINO A. BELEN, ROBERTO E. BELEN, FELIPE H. CALLORINA, JR., ANTONIO CENTENO, ERNESTO R. FRUTAS,
JOSEFINA C. IGNACIO, PEDRITO N. KALALANG, BELLA P. MILLO, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., CERLINO ALMENDAREZ, WILLIE V. AMBROCIO,
MA. TERESA G. AQUINO, JUANITA BAUTISTA, CELODONIO C. BERNABE, REMEDIOS T. BLAQUERA, ALICIA CASTILLO, ANITA D.
ESPARES, JOEL FLORES, CITA G. GERADA, ROBERTO O. IGSOC, ANNALISA V. JAVIER, VICTORIA B. MALACAD, ANTONIO C. MANILA,
EVELYN MENDEZ, LERMA M. MENDOZA, EUFEMIA NUCUM, LEONVINA A. OLIVO, AMIE T. RABANG, LILIA J. RADA, DELAGIA D. ROBEL,
DEGNISITA G. SERRANO, PETRONIO TADIOSA, RODERICO A. TAN, CHARLITO VALDEZ, ALMA M. VAZQUEZ, PEDRO E. VICTORIA,
SERGIO ABUAN, RODOLFO ANGELES, MARTINIANO ROTOL, MERLIE T. CASIGAY, THELMA F. CHUSON, ENCARNACION CONCEPCION,
IMELDA CORTEZ, OBDULIA B. DORADO, EVELYN S. ESTRADA, MARIO S. FERNANDEZ, RUPERTO E. GABUTAN, SONIA R. IGAYA,
RAYMUNDA O. LABUGUEN, AUREA LACHICA, LINA M. MANALAYSAY, SALVADOR MANIOSO BERLINA B. MANOSO, FLORANGEL
MEDRANO, TERESITA S. MESTA, JOCELYN MONTILLANO, LUZ C. PERALTA, SOFIO B. QUINTANA, YOLANDA B. QUINTANA, SANTOS
RABARA, ROSALINO R. ROMUALDO, MARIFE RUBA, CRISTETTA RULLODA, RHODORA SANTOS, VICTOR SEE, ELNORA G. TALEON,
VIRGINIA V. TALEON, MELCHOR U. TAMAYO, MILAGROS VALDEZ, MARITA WELGAS-BRIZ, VISITACION A. ZANO, ELVIRA D. AGPOON,
VIRGINIA ANGELES, ISABELITA V. AUSTRIA, ADELAIDA S. BALANZA, ORPHA B. BALILIA, FE T. CARPIO, LOIDA E. HUNAT, ROSEMARIE
LABIS, LUZ MARIA S. LANSIGAN, BONIFACIO RABANG, ANGELITA RECELI, BERTRAM SIGAION, SARAH F. TUBIG, MYRNA M. VILORIA,
LOURDES C. WAGAN, SILVERIA M. ANTOLIN, BONOFACIO ARCE, MARINA ASIAO, PERIGRINO S. BAGUNU, ARISCALITA A. BAKER,
MARIETTA L. BAL, NELY M. BUTIC, MOISES H. BUTIC, GLORIA S. CABATIC, GERARDO T. CABREROS, BENJAMIN C. CARINO, ERASMO
M. CORTADO, EVANGELINE J. DE LEON, EVARISTO C. EUSEBIO, EDEN M. GAZAL, EVA M. JACA, VELERIANO V. LADIA, JR., NORMA
CASUCOG, FELIX L. LECHONCITO, MA. DOLORES M. LEGARDA, RODOLFO P. LIPAOPAO, JR., LETY A. LORENZO, MARLON C.
MELCHOR, ELPIDIO M. MOLINYAWE, JUAN S. ODANGA, SUEMELITO V. PAA, VENIA T. RAYALA, FLORDELINO M. REY, CARME T.
ROSETE, CORAZON C. SALAMAT, ANASTACIO B. SISON, VICENTA F. GAERLAN, JULIET G. TOLENTINO, GLORIA E. URBIZTONDO,
ANDRA C. ABARQUEZ, THELMA S. ALCARAZ, SALVE A. ASUNCION, ALLAN V. BARCENA, NERA S. BAYANI, NEMESIO GERONILLA, PIO
P. BOTE. DOLORES R. CATINDIG, CORWIN B. CECILLANO, ALEX Z. CHENG, GERTRUDEZ C. CORTEZ, ARNULFO A. ESCOBIDO,
EUEGENE V. ESTRADA, GENESIS J. FRANCISCO, VIVIEN O. GALEON, FLORDELIZA D. GARCIA, MITCHELLE A. LACHICA, THELMA I.
LAGMAN, MA. CAROLINA G. MELICOR, MA. MAGDALENA E. MORENO, FRANCIONIE G. NONO, BERNARDO A. RESURRECCION, VILMA A.
SABADO, ELVIRA G. SABANDO, ALEJANDRO R. SIBUCAO, JR., WILFREDO H. ZAPANTA, HERMENIGILDO S. ALLASCO, REBECCA

BURGOS, MARIEL D. GARCIA, BELINDA M. LEAL, AGAPITA MAGBOJOS, MA. LOURDES VICTUELLES, CARMELITA ALMENDAREZ,
PERLA ABELLA, ESMERALDA R. DE CLARO, LOURDES DECAMORA, ROMUALDO DELA CRUZ, RUFINO DIAROG, HAYDEE LATTO,
CARMEN MELCHOR, MERCEDES U. ULIBAS, EMY R. ZAPANTA, NELDA C. ABLAN, VENERANDO R. ATUD, NESTOR A. BAMBALAN,
PROCESO V. BAUTISTA, EMMA C. CONCEPCION, JUAN G. DAYAG, ELISA Q. FARRO, EMILIE M. LICO, TEODORA B. PAJARILLAGA,
CONSESA P. QUINONES, VERONICA G. REY, TERESITA O. SERRANO, AVELINA VALDEZ, ELVIRA L. ADVINCULA, RENATO P. AGUILAR,
ROSALINA ALFORJA, LORENSO ALMENDAREZ, SATA H. ALTAP, JAIME AQUINO, DOMINICO ARROBAN, JR. OCTAVIUS L. ASPACIO,
MYRNA V. BERNABE, CRESENSIO R. CALDERON, JR., RUPITO C. CARACAS, PILAR F. CHUA, ENGRACIA M. CRUZ, MANUEL CRUZ,
AGUSTIN DELASAN, NATIVIDAD C. ESPIRITU, ROLANDO I ETEROSA, EDEN FABIAN, LILIA A. FILAMOR, MIGUEL O. GAPAS, ODENCIO
GARCIA, PIEDAD R. GARCIA, BIEN GUICO, PRESENTASION O. HAZAL, MARILYN B. LAGADAY, LORENZO LAMENDAREZ, ALEJANDRINO
MANAS, ROMEO L. MANOSO, MELINDA MARTINEZ, JOYBERT MIJARES, WENCESLADA A. MIRAN, TEOFILO V. OBLENA, AMELIA C.
OLIVERIA, SOCORRO C. PALENCIA, NELSON PANGILINAN, FAUSTINO PASON, ELIAS PATAL, ANDRES PELA, AURORA V. PIOL, NOLI
PRADO, ANITA C. RAMBAYON, EVANGELINE E. RODRIGUES, ROSE R. SUNICO, JULIETA F. TABERNILLA, SALVACION B. VAZQUEZ,
EMILY VERANO, EDWIN VILLANUEVA, JOEL V. VILLAR, SATURNINA VITE, DON ABARRIENTOS, JOSENDEL O. AGRA, MARISTELA ARIEL,
JOHN B. ARROBANG, ALBERTO A. BANATAO, FEDERICO M. BARREDA, PAULO BERINA, RENATO M. BORJA, GENARO BORQUIN, FLOR
A. CABUNOG, ELIZABETH S. CALDERON, FRESCILLA N. CALIMAG, CRISTETA A. CASTRO, MA. ELENA CONSTANTINO, MILA CORRE,
RENATO D. CRUZ, JOSEFINA L. DE LEON, RHODORA R. DE VEYRA, CONSOLADORA A. DIMARANAN, ERNESTO R. DIONISIO, ERNESTO
S. DIONISIO, JR., LIGAYA B. DIONISIO, OSCAR EMBERGA, PEDO FALLARIA. MA. LOURDES V. FELICITAS, GRISELDA V. GALEON,
CRESENCIO MAXIMO GARCIA, MARY ANN GENEROSO, WHYLEEN SM. GONZALES, ANGELINA C. GREGORIO, SALVADOR B. JANA JR.,
LYNETTE T. LAROYA, OFELIA G. LIPORADA, GRACIANO MANUEL, BIBIANO H. MEJINO, THEODORE MORAL, ANTONIO P. MORENO, JR.,
ANICETO D. ORDEN, IMELDA C. PANGGA, CONSOLACION PANGILINAN, ROSITA P. PARINA, ELPIDIO N. QUITERO, MYRNA RAMOS,
GLENDA B. REFIL, MA. TERESA REFORSADO, HEIDI D. REGALA, RUFINA R. REYES, SUSAN H. ROQUERO, AJIT RYE II, LEO J.
SAGUGUIT, MARINO K. SANTOS, LINA D. SEGUNIAL, ALBA SORIANO, JESSICA SORIANO, ROMEO B. TRONO, ANGELITA T. VILORIA,
TIRSO ABAD, FEDERICO ABILO, LOLITA L. ANOVA, OPRIASA ANTONIO, JERRY B. AQUINO, RODERICK ARAO, RENATO ARROYO,
RUBEN ASENSI, ERNESTO BALINGIT, ALBERTO A. BANATA, JOSEPHINE BARRIENTOS, MARCELINO BERINA, WILFREDO BONILCA, ED
C. BONILLA, FRANCISCO BRAZA, ANONINA S. BRILLANTES, ROGELIO O. CADADAN, RENE CALICA, TERESITA CALUMA, EDGARDO
CAPARAS, ALEX M. CARANDANG, MIGNON C. CARLOS, CRISTETA CASTRO, MA. ERLINDA B. CAUSAY, REYNALDO M. CENTENO,
DANILO CERVANTES, ELEJIA R. CHARIE, CARMEN G. CLUTARIO, MANUEL F. CRUZ, DOMINGO DE GUZMAN, ABAS DE JESUS, ROMULO
DEL MUNDO, JUAN B. DESPABELADERO, GAVINO ESMERO, FIDEL C. ESTANISLAO, ROWEN A. EUSTAQUIO, CORAZON FERNANDEZ,
ALBERTINE FLORES, RIOLITA H. GALLEGO, MARCELINO GATCHALEAN, JIMMY GIDRAMA, RUFINO GUTIERREZ, MERCEDITA S.
HARING, MAY HARINGA, ROMEO P. IBARRIENTOS, BERLINO INFANTE, JOSELYN V. VILLA, CATALINO LIMBO, ORIOSA LISING, BOYET F.
LITA, ENRICO LIWANAG, ALTHEA O. LOTA, VINA P. MACATANGAY, NORBERTO MADADO, FLORINIA NADADO, JAIME NADADO, CONNIE
NAGAMOS, TESSIE NAGAMOS, AMALIA U. NELL, EDILBERTO OROCAY, RESTITUTO P. PARDINAS, ROSITA P. PARINA, EUGENIO
PATAG, FERMIN PAVIA, BERNARDO PENA, JOSEMARIA P. PEREZ, ARMIDA D. PULLO, LAURO S. PUNZALAN, JUSTINA QUINORES,
NANOY C. REANO, EDDIE REYES, FRANCISCO ROMERO, SUSAN ROQUERO, WILFREDO RUZGAL, CONRADO SALAZAR, ODENCIA C.
SALVADOR, TEODORA B. SANDOVAL, RODANTE SANTIAGO, GLORIA SANTOS, JOSE C. SANTOS, FLORANTE P. SOMERA, MELISSA B.
STA CRUZ, JOSE TABIGAN, ANTONIO TALASTAS, DOMINGO G. TARNATE, JR., IGMEDIO TIONGSON, STEPHEN U. TOLEDO, ROMEO
UMAYAN, BENJAMIN URBANO, MALOU B. VERA, JERRY VISTO, AUGUSTO YUSON, JOSE S. AGUSTIN, LEIS ALEJANDRO, EDWIN E.
ALLADA, ROLANDO ANDRADE, LHITA CABUNGAN, LOUIE CATUDIO, REYNALDO M. CENTENO, DIOSMEDADO T. COCAL, EVANGELINE I.
CORCUERA, REMY D. CORTEZ, JONATHAN C. DANGA, FRED DE CLARO, MAURO DE JESUS, EFREN DE JUCOS, GEORGE DE LEON,
SHIRLEY DEPASUCAT, MARIA REYNA DONDAY, AURA ALELI P. DUIROS, DIONICA DURANTE, MARCELO ENRIQUE, FERDINAND
ESPIRITU, MIRASOL ESPIRITU, RUBY T. FAMORCAN, JOSE C. FORTUNO, BEVERLY FRANCISCO, JOSE Z. GALLARDO, REYNALDO
GANTONG, NILO GARCIA, LONESTO GENOVEZA, FELIPE HERRERA, FELIPE G. ISIP, JR., RANDY C. MABANA, CESAR MACAALAY,
ROGELIO MANGILIT, EMILIO MANUEL, JOSE MARINAS, JAIME MATA, DANILO MIANO, JOVITO NAROG, FELISA A. NUESCA, REYNALDO
OLAHAY, ANSELMO PARANAS, JR., RESTITUTO P. PARDINAS, MARIAN G. PASCUAL, MARCELLANO P. PEREZ, NEIL PIAMONTE,
REYNALDO QUIROS, EFREN RAMOS, CARLOS RAMOS, MAMERTO RESURRECCION, QUINONES RONILO, ARTURO C. SANTOS, M.C.
SANVICTORES, ROMEO G. SUMULONG, AURELIO G. TAN, JUNIFER TAN, TERESITA B. TOMAS, APOLLO URBANO, VICTORIA B. VALDEZ,
CONCESA L. ALDAY, ELMER Y. CORPUZ, ANNIE L. CORPUZ, ZENAIDA M. DE GUZMAN, MERLINDA V. DE JESUS, ISAURO R. DOROSAN,
MA. ELENA D. EBONA, LETICIA C. EUSEBIO, ALEJANDRO V. FERNANDEZ, EVITA B. GARABLIES, NELSON GARCIA, ROWENA M.
HUISCA, JESSIE LADISLA, JUVY P. LADISLA, RANDY LAGUNILLA, LANIE A. MABANA, SAMSON MACOB, ANTONIO MAMMAY, RICARDO
PALAGANAS, LUNINGNING C. PANGILINAN, VILMA PORCADELA, ROGELIO RONQUILLO, MA. VICTORIA P. SOMERA, MIRASOL R.
TUGADE, DOMINADOR ABAD, BRICCIO P. ABAN, KELVIN C. ABARRA, NESTOR ABENIS, SYLVIA C. ABUNGAN, (ATTY.) ANSELMO
ABUNGAN, ELENITA A. ACUNA, DANILO C. ADINA, PETRONIO C. AGUILA, SYLVIA S. ALCANTARA, MARCELO ALILIO, ROMEO L.
ALMEDA, NORBETO ALMERINO, LUISITO M. ALMOGELA, DAHLIA R. ALMOSARA, JOEL P. ALMOSARA, CATER AMBROSIO, EDITHA A.
AMISCARAY, MA. VICTORIA I. AMORES, LEONARDO APIL, ANTONIO N. APOSTOL, JR., NENA T. AQUINO, PATRICIO M. ARAGON, JR.,
SYLVIA ARBOLEDA, JOSE P. ARZADON, MARIO ASIS, ADELAIDA AUAYANG, MARIO A. AURELIO, ROBERTO M. AVELLANA, TERESITA J.
AVENTURADO, EMOLYN E. AZURIN, EDITHA BACHAR, GLORIA M. BACONG, GERONIMO BADULIS, JR., GLADIOLA M. BAGADIONG,
AMELIA G. BALAIS, FEDERICO A. BALANON, RODRIGO BALILLA, JOFFER L. BALLESTEROS, TERESITA P. BALMES, ANITA. BAURA,
CRISANTO A. BAURA, JR., SERVIN BAUTISTA, GABINO BELLEZA, FLORENCIA P. BENOSA, DANNY BERCHES, HERNANI BERNAL,
ELVIRA V. BERSABE, ISMAEL C. BOCO, MARCIAL BENJAMIN BUNGOLAN, FELY A. BOSTON, ANGEL A. BRAVO, RAUL BRITANICO,
LILITA G. BROCES, EDUARDO S. BUTIERREZ, JOSEFA C. CAABAY, MICHAEL B. CABALDA, SIROLAN B. CABE, CESAR B. CABRERA,
BENJAMIN S. CADAWAN, JR., VERONA J. CALAMANAN, ADELAIDA B. CALOOY, ROBERT F. CALUGAY, JUANITO CALVEZ, NECITA M.
CAMANGONAN, SATURNINO Y. CAMANGONAN, JUAN G. CANLAS, FRANCISCA D. CANUEL, ARTURO D. CANUELA, EVELYN CANUELA,
JESUS CANUELA, NELIA D. CANUELA, AVELINO C. CAPARAS, RICARDO R. CARINGAL, MA. LOURDES CASIMIRO, ARCADIO I. CASIS,
DANIEL C. CASIS, ELENA C. CASIS, ROBERTO S. CASTILLO, FELIPE P. CASUNCAD, JUANITO A. CATOR, RENATO CATOR, JONAS R.
CHECA, RENE A. CILINDRO, ELWIN B. CINCO, ROSALINDA CIPRIANO, JOSE MARIE CLOMA, MARJORIE COLLADO, ELVETA C. COMSTI,
ALLAN ANTONIO C. CONDA, APOLONIO V. CRUZ, FE C. CRUZ, FLORDELIZA CRUZ, LEODEGARIO CUEVAS, OLIVER CUEVAS, REMEDIOS
CUEVAS, GLORIA T. DACANAY, MARIBEL DAMIAN, MARY ANNE C. DE CASTRO, CESAR S. DE CHAVEZ, ANICET F. DE GUZMAN,
AURELIO DE GUZMAN, JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, RUBY B. DE GUZMAN, BERNARD DE LARA, ALFONSO S. DE LEON, DANILO DE LEON,
RETITUTO C. DE LEON, EDWIN L. DEVERA, HAROLD T. DE VERA, CESAR M. DE VEYRA, ANACLETO C. DEL MUNDO, ALFONSO P. DELA
CRUZ, JR., EMERITA M. DELA CRUZ, HELEN T. DELA CRUZ, RIZALYN C. DELA CRUZ, SERVILLANO R. DELA CRUZ, JOSE DELA FUENTE,
WILFREDO C. DELA FUENTE, ARNOLD DELGADO, JAIME DELOS REYES, MANUEL T. DEPANES, ANTONIO DEQUINA, ROLANDO D.
DESTACAMENTO, MARIETA L. DETERA, PRESENTACION C. DIEZ, RAUL S. DIMALANTA, WENCESLAO DIZON, EDWIN G. DOMINGO,
MELANIO O. DONES, JR., ESTELITO DOROSAN, ISAURO DOROSAN, JR., CHARLIE M. DULAY, ESTEBAN DULAY, JR., SATURNINO
DULAY, MA. AIDA C. DUROY, RIZAL P. ECHECHE, GASPAR G. ESCOBAR, GASPAR T. ESCOBAR, ALICIA S. ESGUERRA, JACKSON I.
ESPERO, LILIA ESTOPAGE, DIGNA G. EVANGELISTA, REYNALDO FALLESGON, ROQUE M. FAMILARA, JERRY FARINAS, NIEVA
FARINAS, NARCELYN FELIPE, ERNESTO H. FELIX, MARIANNE V. FERNANDEZ, ALVIN LUCIO M. FERNANDO, ALFREDO V. FERRER,
NOEL V. FERRER, ELENA G. FETIZA, AUGUSTUS C. FLORES, SANTIAGO R. FRAGANTE, MA. LUISA FRANCISCO, EDWARD FRANCO,
HELENITA EVELYN FRANCO, NOE FREOLO, EDUARDO VICTORIO FREYRA, EDITHA P. FRIGILLANA, TEOFILO D. FRONDA, ESTER M.
FRONTERAS, HELENA GADDI, ROBERTO D. GADDI, FELISA C. GALARAGA, ELLENGRACE R. GALISTE, RESTITUTO G. GALO, MAXIMO V.
GARCIA, JAIME M. GATAN, MARIO GUERRERO, ANTONIO GUINSING, JR., ANGELINA P. GUTIERREZ, AURELIO P. GUTIERREZ, HERMINIO
O. GUTIERREZ, NELIA C. HALCON, LOURDES V. HERNANDEZ, DIONISIO S. INCIONG, MARIO Z. JANDUMON, RICARTE JAVELOSA,
ADONIS S. JAVIER, ANGELO JAVIER, LOUELLA G. JIMENEZ, LYNDA JIMENEZ, NONITA JORDAN, ROLANDO LACANDASO, ELIZABETH C.
LACSAMANA, BERNARD LANUZA, PATRICIO B. LANUZA, SALVIO B. LASERNA, FLORINIO B. LAZO, RODOLFO M. LEE, BEATRIZ D.
LEGASPI, AMOR M. LIM, JAIME D. LOMABAO, REGINA LOPEZ, REBE M. LOZANO, DANILO N. LUCAS, EDEL LUPOS, CESAR LUCERO, SL
MIRA, PATERNO M. MABASA, RAMON V. MACABUHAY, EDITA M. MACALALAD, DIGNA V. MACAPAGAL, LOUIE MADRID, POSALITO
MAESTRO, ENRIQUE S. MAGLANQUE, WENCESLAO MAGO, ERNESTO A. MALICAD, MA. SOCORRO A. MALLARE, CLARO JOSE C.
MANIPON, ELEAZAR C. MANDARING, ELVIRA MARANAN, GERARDO MARCIANO, SALVADOR MARTIN, ELENITA MARTINEZ,
CRISOSTOMO V. MASANGKAY, MAXIMO MATURAN, CONCHITA J. MEDINA, LAMBERTO R. MELAD, EDUARDO MELEGRITO. (ATTY.)
ADORACIO MENDOZA, ARLENE MENDOZA, BERNARDO N. MENDOZA, LUIS C. MENDOZA, TITA M. MENDOZA, GINA MAY P. MERCADO,
TERESITA L. MIDEL, JULIET M. MIGUEL, VIRGINIA B. MILANO, CONRADO MIRANDA, LIDA R. MIRANDA, LEOCADIO MOLINA,
ALEJANDRO M. MONTERO, JR., BENJAMIN J. MONZON, ELSA Y. MULA, PERFECTO NACAR, JOEL A. NATIVIDAD, RUBEN C. NATIVIDAD,
GLENN MARCELO C. NOBLE, NICASIO NOGUERAS, LIWAYWAY A. NUNEZ, ESTELA V. OSORIO, ELIZA PABELICO, ERNANI BERNAL
PADILLA, JESUS M. PADILLA, GERARD A. PANGILINAN, OMLYMPIA V. PARFILES, ELMER PASCUA, ISABEL PASCUAL, MA. ISABEL M.
PASCUAL, MELODIE PASCUAL, SALVADOR L. PATA, PETRONILLA PAZ, JOSEFA B. PELIAS, NESTOR PENA, NESTOR PENA, ROLANDO
PENA, RENE PERALTA, JOSUE L. PEREZ, SIMEON T. PERMEJO, ALFREDO PERUCHO, REY V. PERUCHO, RENALDO J. POBLETE,

RAMON D. QUEBRAL, ROLENDO C. QUEMADO, EDNA V. RAGILES, ALVIN C. RAMOS, EMERITO RAMOS, MAMERTO RESUBAL, ANGELA
P. REVILLA, ALICE REYES, DAISY M. RICAFORT, WILFREDO RICAFORT, RAMONCITO L. RIVERA, REYNALDO RODELAS, FLORO
RODRIQUEZ, LILIAN A. ROLLAN, ROMUALDO AGUILOS, ANGELO A. ROMULO, JOSE N. RONAN, TOMOSHENKO RONQUILO, NENITA A.
ROQUE, BENJAMIN R. ROSALDO, FIDEL ROVIRA, LIBERTY RUBIN, LIBERTY L. RUBIN, MA. SALLY P. SAGRAGAO, REINHOLD PERFECTO
M. SALAS, VIRGILIO SALAS, ALEJANDRO B. SALONGA, EDWIN B. SANTELICES, EMMANUEL A. SANTOS, FELIPE B. SANTOS, LETICIA C.
SANTOS, ADRIANO R. SARIAN, MA. CORAZON E. SERVANDO, RODOLFO SESPENE, FERNANDO G. SOJANA, EXPIDITO SORIA, NORMA
G. SORIANO, RONALD G. STO. TOMAS, LUCIO R. SUYAT, JOYCELYN F. TAAL, BARBARA BABSI I. TABACO, DELIA S. TALITE,
ANUNSACION E. TAN, MARIETTA N. TAN, HERMINIO G. TAQUIQUI, EDGARDO L. TOLENTINO, MARCELINA M. TONDO, ANIANO D.
TORRES, SALVADOR D. TORRES, BEATRIZ L. TRINIDAD, RICARDO P. UGALE, ALICIA S. UMEREZ, VIRGILIO B. URBANO, JOSEPHINE R.
UYACO, RIZALINO N. UYACO, LOYOLA M. VALDEZ, JEFFREY VAZQUEZ, RODOLFO L. VELASCO, JR., JOSELITO G. VELASQUEZ,
EVELYN A. VIDAD, VICTORINO M. VILLAGRACIA, ARIEL VILLANUEVA, CLARISSA G. VILLANUEVA, JOCELYN C. VILLANUEVA,
WILFREDO VILLANUEVA, RICARDO VILLARBA, TITO S. VILLARIN, CARMELITA B. YALONG, ROBERTO A. YAZON, LUCILLE V. ABAD,
SILVESTRE L. ABAYA, ELIGIO L. ABRIGANA, ANGELINA O. ABRIL, LORENA AFRICA, INOCENCIO A. AGRON, CRISTINA P. AGUILAR,
ARLEAN L. ALAMARES, ADORACION L. ALEJANDRINO, RUTH B. ALICER, ROSALINA V. ALMONEDA, ALFREDO ALVAREZ, ISABEL M.
AMISCARAY, OSROXSON L. AMPARO, ANGEL B. ANDEN, CAROLINA M. ANORES, THELMA P. ARTIFICIO, ANTONIO A. ASADA, JR., MA.
LUZ M. ASCANO, APOLINAR B. ASENCION, EDWIN AZANON, ERLINDA M. BAGUE, ANGELINA R. BALAGTAS, RENATO T. BANAGA,
VALENTIN BARCENAL, ADELAIDA C. BARRIDA, BENJAMIN P. BATOLINA, MARCELO BAUTISTA, SIMPLICIO BAYRON, CORAZON C.
BERNIDO, GLENDA P. BILOG, ALAN M. BORRAS, TERESA L. BORRAS, EVANGELISTA BORROMEO, BEVERLY R. BRIONES, NESTOR J.
BUGADISAN, ADELINA DM. BULOS, SYLVIA S. BUSINE, EVANGELINE M. CABATUANDO, EDUARDO T. CABILDO, ELIZABETH P.
CABILDO, EMMANUEL P. CAJIPE, JOSE N. CALAYCAY, VIRGINIA S. CALIX, LOPITO CALUAG, EMMA L. CANCINO, ESPERANZA I.
CANCIO, BUENAVENTURA E. CANSINO, PERCIDITA T. CANSINO, GRACE M. CARLOS, PATRICIA ANDREA V. CARRILLO, SOLEDAD S.
CASTANEDA, MARILYN K. CASTILLO, JEAN M. CASYAO, JUSTINA S. CERBOLLES, MARIA LUCIA C. COBAR, AVELINO COLOMA, ANA
ELENA L. CONJARES, ALVARO CORDERO, ESTRELLA B. CORTEZ, DANILO A. CUYCO, RUBEN DACOCO, ROSITA R. DAROY, DENIA A.
DATO-ON, PABLO DE CASTRO, MARIO M. DE GUZMAN, ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, AZUCENA C. DE VERA, CECILIA M. DE VERA, LOUIE A.
DE VERA, NATHANIEL B. DE VERA, SALVACION O. DEAN, SOLIDAD Z. DEL CASTILLO, ADELAIDA Q. DEL ROSARIO, ARMANDO DELA
CRUZ, FE M. DELA CRUZ, IMELDA S. DELFIN, DANILO D. DIAZ, FE R. DISCAYA, EMERANCIANA B. DURAN, JAVIER M. EDUARDO, ELIXA
ENRIQUEZ, SOFRONIO ENRIQUEZ, LUZ V. ESGUERRA, JAIME B. ESTEBAN, MERIAM F. FABRIGAS, LOURDES G. FERNANDEZ, LOURDES
R. FONTANILLA, ROBERTO FONTANILLA, REY M. GABRIEL, RICARDO L. GALLARDO, CORAZON M. GARCIA, NARDO Q. GARCIA,
TEOFILO Y. GARCIA, TEOFILO Y. GARCIA, IRENEO GERILLA, NOEL B. GERILLA, ALFONSO GRAFIA, JUANA S. GREGORIO, LEONARDO
G. GUMASING, LUZVIMINDA M. IGNACIO, RESTITUTO B. ILAGAN, ABELARDO A. INOVERO, DOMINGO P. JACINTO, REYNALDO P.
JACINTO, GLENDA S. JAVIER, GLORIA JIMENEZ, REYNALDO S. JIMENEZ, JESULITO B. JUNIO, JULIETA JUSON, JOCELYN S. LAGARDE,
ALICIA F. LAGUNZAD, LUNINGNING M. LANSANGAN, LUVIMINA G. LANUZA, AVELINA G. LAPADE, DOLORES M. LAZO, RHODORA
LEONIN, TEOFILO V. LEONIN, JR., LEONARDO S. LEOPANDO, LAURA F. LEYVA, CRISANTO LIMEN, ROEL LOTERINA, PABLITO MAAT,
RUBY LIZA J. MAGLALANG, WILFEREDO MAGSAMBOL, HILARION E. MAMARIL, MILA A. MANALO, BENJAMIN F. MANDINGUIADO,
AURELIO MANINGAS, ANGELES MARCELO, EDITHA A. MARCELO, VERONICA J. MARCELO, RONNIE MARCOS, REYNALDO R. MARIANO,
JOHNNY R. MARIN, BENEDICTO E. MARISFOSQUE, JOHN M. MARQUEZ, ALEJANDRO J. MATEO, JOHNYLEN V. MELENDEZ, JORGE
MENDOZA, JULIETA C. MENDOZA, LUCY MENDOZA, QUIRINO M. MENDOZA, MYLENE M. MOLO, NELIA M. MONTILLA, DEMETRIO A.
MOOG, ERLINDA NATERA, JOSEFINA G. NATERA, NICANOR P. NICOLAS, CARL M. NOHAY, VIDAL T. OLANDA, JOSEFINA J. OMANDAM,
CELIA M. OPRENARIO, NORMA L. PABLO, LAMBERTO E. PALAD, FRANCISCO A. PANCHO, ROMEO PARADERO, VANGELINE K. PARAMI,
RENATO H. PECHO, REYNALDO V. PEDREGOSA, CECILIA T. PEREZ, MARY AGNES PEREZ, CHRISTINA A. PETRACHE, FEDERICO L.
PINEDA, JR., LAURA R. PINEDA, MYRNA E. PIQUERO, EDGARDO E. POBLETE, DIOSDADO A. QUIAMBAO, BERNARDINO H. QUIZON,
BOGAR G. RACHO, MANNY G. RAMA, ANGELITO F. RAMOS, AURORA D. RAPADAS, ANTONIO E. REFRE, ROSALINO B. REJAS,
ESTRELLA D. RELUNIA, EDILBERTO A. REMENTILLA, SOTERO RESILVA, ROLANDO Y. REYES, GERARDO M. ROBLES, MARISSA
ROBLES, CRISPINA M. ROSALES, BERNADETTE C. SABLAN, CESAR M. SALABIT, MA. TERESITA A. SALABIT, ARTURO F. SALIH,
VIRGILIO R. SANTIAGO, FLORA L. SANTOS, GABRIEL SANTOS, JR., IBARRA S. SANTOS, JULIETA E. SEGUIS, ROSALIE SEMANA,
ELVIRA SOMBRION, RODRIGO TABIOS, ESTELLITA U. TABORA, ANGILEO P. TAGUIBAO, CARLITO G. TAMBOOM, MERRIAN DC.
TANGONAN, RICARDO TEMPLONUEVO, ANTONIO E. TIONG, MITOS M. TOLENTINO, LUZ G. USMAN, FLORANTE M. VALDERAMA,
BALDOMERO VALENZUELA, ANA MARIA S. VELUZ, ERNESTO S. VENTURA, CRISOL P. VILLANUEVA, PORTIA T. VILLEGAS, ARMINDA F.
VINAS, MAGNO B. YOSHISAKI, MA. TERESA YULO-NAZAREA, BRAHIM T. ABAS, RAUL G. ABIQUE, LEZA A. ACORDA, ADELIA F.
AGUILAR, REYNALDO P. ALLANCES, BERNADETTE M. ANGCO, CLARISSA C. ARIDA, LEONITA D. BAETIONG, EDNA R. BARLIS, SONIA
R. BARLIS, BERNA A. BONDOC, NANETTE BORJA, CORAZON S. BUSTAMANTE, VICTORIA ORMIN R. CABRAL, WILLIE A. CANDELARIO,
ARLINA G.A. CANTADA, ARACELI CANTRE, JERRY CAPULONG, JEANNIE C. CASAURAN, REBERTO CO, EMERLINDA N. DACARA,
TERESITA T. DAVID, ELENIDA DEL ROSARIO, MANUEL DELA CRUZ, VICENTE DIAZ LERMA DIMAYUGA, BERNARDITA M. DUNGO,
ANTONIO P. FAJARDO, CHARLES C. FORONDA, AURORA V. GALVEZ, DAVINA CLEOFE GONZALES, NICK D. GUILLERMO, REBECCA P.
GUITERREZ, JOSEFINA P. HIPOLITO, EVELYN R. INCIONG, IMMACULADA F. LA ROSA, ANABELLA C. LABORTE, NAPOLEON R. LAPUZ,
AMY LECCIONES, SAMUEL LIBOON, DEAN R. LOPEZ, MYLEEN Z. LUZ, MERLINA G. MABUTOL, ALBERT A. MAGALANG, ROMANA B.
MAGAT, VICTORIA MALIHAN, JAIME MALLARE, REMY MAMON, ELVIRA T. MANALO, ANDRES G. MANUELE, EVALINDA MERCADO, MA.
GERARDA MERILO, FATIMA MOLINA, JOSEPHINE L. MONILLA, EDWIN ROMEL N. NAVALUNA, PERSEVERANDA-FE OTICO, FELIX A
PASCUA, JR., MARINELA T. PASCUA, ALBERTO C. PECHO, TERESITA PERALTA, ELVIRA D. PIMENTEL, CRISTINA S. PIZARRO, ISAGANI
R. POTES, HARRY R. QUIAOIT, LINDA A. QUIOCSON, SOLON C. RATIVO, MARCELINO R. RIVERA, JANE G. RODRIGO, DAMIAN P. RUBIO,
ESPERANZA A. SAJUL, ELVIRA L. SALVANI, MARICHU SANTIBANEZ, VIRGILIO G. SANTOS, GERI GERONIMO R. SANEZ, REBECCA E.
SARACHO, MA. CECILIA B. STA. INES, PEDE SUMILDE, JESSIE TANOLA, ROMEO T. TARRAY, DOLORES F. TOLENTINO, GRACIOLO DS.
TORRE, EDGARDO TORRES, ENRICA I. TUMBAGAHAN, MA. LOURDES P. VARGAS, RENATO VENGCO, GRACE L. ALMERO, JUANITA P.
ARSOLON, LETECIA M. CENDANA, ELIZABETH A. CHUA, MABEL C. CRISPARIL, MANUEL T. ESCASURA, JUANITA G. FERNANDEZ,
VIRGILIO O. FERRER, DELIA P. GEDALA, LAURO M. HERMOSURA, NATIVIDAD V. IGAYA, ROSABEL T. JOSUE, EVELYN V. LLAMAS,
ANNIE LOMIBAO, ARLINE LUNA, BRILLA P. MALAMUG, ADELINDA L. MANALILI, ROMUALDO S. MERCENE, JANET MIRANDA, LYDIA
NUQUE, FRUCTUOSA R. OBAY, CATALINA G. PRESTOZA, ROLANDO P. RANES, JULIETA RIVERA, LOURDES T. SELLEZA, JESUSA A.
VELASCO, YOLANDA A. VERDIJO, JOSE VIDAL, FLORA ABADIN, ROMMEL D. ABAN, ALLEN M. ABLANG, NORMA N. AGIR, RODRIGO
AGIR III, MARDONIO M. ALCANTARA, ROSALINDA ANGER, DANILO T. ANONUEVA, REMEDIOS M. ANONUEVO, BONIFACIO APOLONIO,
MARIO G. AQUINO, MA. CHONA ARISTOTELES, DICK G. BACUNO, NILDA C. BALAMONG, ARTHUR M. BALATBAT, FLORANTE G.
BONGALON, CEPRIANA S. BORJA, CRISANTO BRUSAS, RUFINO M. BUSTAMANTE, MELICITA CAPULONG, AMADEO G. CARDINO,
BONIFACIO CARLING, LULU C. CORALES, JIMMY J. CRISOLOGO, CELIA J. CRUZ, NOEL C. CRUZ, NORBERTO G. CRUZ, AMBROSIO
DAGUPAN, MA. THERESA M. DATU, JAIAME C. DE GUZMAN, ROLAND A. DE JESUS, MONA LISA F. DE OCAMPO, SONIA C.
DIMACULANGAN, LAUREANA C. ESTOROQUE, PABLITO ESTOROQUE, JR., MARIO M. ESTRELLA, ANGEL FERNANDEZ, ZENAIDA P.
FERNANDEZ, EVELYN C. FLORES, VERONICA T. GARCIA, JOSE M. GATONGAY, ARIEL A. HIMOC, BONNIE P. LISING, LOTA S. LIZARDA,
RUFINA LOPEZ, EDGARDO K. MAGNO, RODELIO M. MALICAD, ZENAIDA MALLETE, MARILYN V. MANGEURRA, CONSTANCIO
MARIROSQUI, HIDELISA P. MARQUEZ, ROSARIO J. MENDOZA, ELISA N. MOLA, NILO A. NERA, JUSTO NEYRA, JR., ANACLETA P. NILLO,
RIBOMAJAL A. OBA, RODOLFO N. ORTIZ MARITES O. PADOR, MA. VICTORIA P. PAELMO, MA. JANET PASCUA, ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO,
ESTELITO PENA, JOSIE S. PEREZ, ZENAIDA T. RABAYA, JOSEFINA D. RAMOS, JENNIE P. SALVADOR, RODOLFO S. SANTOS, LORETA
C. TABAS, RAMONITO TALABUCON, PATRICIA N. TALAMISAN, JULIE N. TANGUILIG, NUNILON R. TANGUILIG, DOMINGA D. TOLENTINO,
CLYDIE TORRES, ABRAHAM R. VILLANUEVA, AGNES VINUMA, LUZ ANACTA, EDUARDO BALLESTEROS, RUBY BAUTISTA, ELIZALDE
BERANIA, CHARLITA BONGALON, ESTER CADANO, ALMA CRISTINA COLLADO, EVELINDA CORONEL, BRIGIDA CORPUS, HILARIA
DEZA, LUCIA DIAGCO, CRISTINA ESGUERRA, EDNA ESQUILLO, RHODORA ESTRELLA, CECILLA FRANCISCO, EMELLINA GAMBA,
MARCELA GARCIA, DIVINA GATMAITAN, ASUNCION GERVACIO, MA. ASUNCION LAQUINDANUM, LYLEEN LIBAN, ZAIDA LIBAN,
BERNANDINO MANOSO, MARITESS PABLO, ANITA PANER, EDERLINA RABE, JOSE RABE, ROSALIA REBULLANTE, ROBERTO
SABELLA, JUDITH SADALIA, CIELITA SARMIENTO, LUTHER VILLAMIN, ANITA A. AALA, MARILOU L. ABARRO, PORFIRIO L.
ALCACHUPAS, ISABEL V. ARANZAZU, ROSIE L. ARENAS, CLARO S. ASTOVEZA, SUSAN C. BONDOC, DOMINGO BRAVO, MARIANITO Z.
CAJUCOM, SOFIA T. CAMPOS, SONI G. CASTILLO, CRISTINA D. COMIE, ADELINA G. CORTIGUERRA, VIRGINIA DE SAGUN, DANIEL
DELOS SANTOS, NIDA C. DILAN, SELFA C. FERNANDEZ, LIGAYA G. GARCIA, MARLYN A. GARCIA, SONIA B. IBANEZ, BONIFACIO S.
LABANGCO, SR., JEAN LADIA PERLA G. LORENZO, VIRGINIA B. LUNA, EDNA C. MABULAY, MARILI T. MALASAGA, MELE T. MALASAGA,
MA. TERESA E. MAPILI, DAVID P. MARIANO, FRISCA P. MAYAMAYA, MARLENE S. MELARPIS, ROLAND P. MENDOZA, VENER C.
MERANA, LAMBERTA N. MERENA, FELISA G. NARCIDA, NORMA M. NORIEL, FRANCISCO PANGAN, APOLONIO C. SALANGA, JR.,
CARLOS E. SANCHEZ, SOFREMEO F. SANTIAGO, JR., LUISA L. SANTOS, SOFIA S. SOLACITO, GENOFREDO S. SOLMARIN, VIOLETA G.
SORIANO, JUAN STA. ANA, SANNY B. SULIBA, CARMELITA P. TAMARGO, ANTONIO P. TULLAS, JR., VIOLETA A. VELA, CHONA C.
ZAMORA, MA. THERESA P. EMPAYNADO, MABEL GRASPARIL, EDMUND RAUL KAABAY, JR., MAGIN LABANGUIS, REY B. SELLEZA,

PERCIVAL VALDEZ, NORMA C. VASQUEZ, JUDY ABLAN, MARIBEL M. ALCANTARA, ANGELITA C. AUKAY, MARLENE M. BADILLA,
DOMINADOR L. BIGSOT, ABRAHAM D. CABALSE, EUFRECINA T. EUSEBIO, MARLON Q. GA, JOCELYN P. ILUSTRE, PERCIDA G.
NORTON, GODOFREDO RAMONES, ELISEO A. VILLASTIQUI, ELY R YRA, VIRGINIA D. CADAVIS, CONSOLACION CAYABYAB,
PATROCINIA A. DIMAGUILA, JOLIZA O. ENCISA, LUCILA M. FELIX, SALVACION T. GALLEGO, ELVIRA GEALON, WILMA T. LAGRIMAS,
REMEDIOS B. LIBERATO, JAIME MADAMBA, BERNICE R. MANALATA, VILMA S. PALMES, EMPERATRIZ R. PIOQUID, LIGAYA R. SAMSON,
ROSALIE M. SANCHEZ, MARCEBENI D. TALABUCON, LILIA C. TAMAYO, MERCELINA A. TUBALLA, ELDA Y. ZURBITO, ROWENA
ANDAYA, JACINTA B. ANONUEVO, BEATRIZ N. BELEN, TERENCIO CADUYAC, RAMON C. DELA FUENTA, MIGUEL C. FERNANDEZ,
DOLOR MORADA, CLEMENCIO C. PAJARILLO, ELENILA PASCUAL, TERESITA ADA, MARIO AQUINO, ROLANO BAGUNU, MARGIE I.
BALLESTEROS, ROMULOS BELTRAN, ANTONIO CORIA, EDWIN DELA CRUZ, YOLANDA DELA CRUZ, ERLINDA ESTRELLA, AURELIO
GUERRERO, MANUEL H. HIZOLA, RUBEN A. MAGTIBAY, NICOLAS MASANGKAY, FRACTUOSA R. OBAY, LIGAYA PASCUAL, NECETE
PASTORFIDE, TRANQUILINO PUNZALAN, MYRNA P. SUNIO, ARMANDO VILLAFLOR, MARIANO VILLANUEVA, REMEDIOS ANONUEVO,
RIBOMAPIL CLOA, MARINA COLLANTES, ERLINDA DIMAPAWI, HEDELISA MARQUEZ, MA. VICTORIA PAELMO, ILUMINADA SABORRIDO,
DOMINGA D. TOLENTINO, MA. VICTORIA ABRERA, ALFREDO AGACETA, JR., WILFREDO ANONUEVO VERGILIO, BAGTAS, ROBERTO
BERNAL, LORETO BOQUIREN, RAMIR BUIZA, CELSO BULADO, NOEL CASTELO, WILLIAM DELA CRUZ, GRACIA DIAZ, ROBERT ENCISO,
ANTONIO FAJARDO, ROMEO GIANA, JOYCELYN GOCO, JOSE GONZALES, TEMOTEO IDEA, EMMIE IGNACIO, MA. VICTORIA LANDICHO,
MARCIANO MANIEGO, CECILIA MERCADO, REGULO QUEJADA, ARNEL ROMERO, MANUEL SABATER, NELIA SANTOS, AMELIA DULCE
SUPETRAN, ERNESTO J. ANDRES, LIBRADO S. GESALTA, LORNA JEAN H. PALAD, PABLO SALIGAN, ZENY DE GUZMAN, LORETO
GALLER, EMMALYN C. TRIA, SEVILIO D. DAVID, PASENCIA A. VOTACION, LEONIDO J. AMANTE, ALMA M. SACOPLA, MARIETA
CABREROS, EUGENIO O. DIAZ, JR., GUENDOLYN C. BAMBALAN, GUYETO CABADING, MA. THERESA ENRIQUEZ, MA. VICTORIA V. DE
CASTRO, BENJAMIN DEVERA, JAIME OBAR, RAUL VARELA, STEPHEN C ACEBEDO, ELEUTERIO AGBAY, ALMA G. ALMONEDA,
ANTONIO S. ARELLANO, FILIPINAS G. ATACADOR, MARIA M. ATIENZA, MAGAMPON Q. BABISTA, HERMINILDA S. BALDEMOR,
ANGELITA I. BALIGAD, EDUARDO J. BANAWA, CARLOS P. BASILIO, ALEJANDRO T. BATUHAN, ROLANDO BELANO, MARIVIC
BERNARDO, ADALIA A. BISCOCHO, NATIVIDAD B. BITOON, VICTORIA P. BORAC, M. BURCE JR., YOLANDA M. BUSTAMANTE, PACITA C.
CABANSAG, GEMMA P. CAGUA, EDITHA T. CAPISTRANO, LOPE O. CARIO JR., EDUARDO M. CARPIO, EDUARDO CAVIZO, ROSALINA
C. CERNADILLA, ERNESTO C. CORPUZ JR., RENAN M. CRUZADO, CRISTINA T. DE MESA, DANIEL C. DIAZ, DIOSDADO DOCTOR,
ADELAIDA C. DUAD, INOCENCIA A. DUMLAO, JAIME D. DYSUNANGCO, BENJAMIN A. EMANUEL, MARIO EPAN, JR., VIRGINIA G.
ESCOBAR, JOSEFINA P. ESPERAS, ERLYN C. EZPELETA, ARNEL F. FERAREZA, AMELIA A. FINO, DOMINGO FRANCISCO, TIMOTEO
GAMIT, CRISTETA GARCIA, MILAGROS GERONIMO, GINALYN GONZALES, QUINCHITA J. GRICALDA, RAFAEL JARILLA, JR., VALE JOSE
EXEQUIEL, JR., LUZ P. LAGUNERA, ROGELIO M. LAPUS, RODOLFO A. LOPEZ, PATRICIA MALIHAN, GLORIA MANALANSAN,
EVANGELINE MARCELINO, JOYCE J. MARCIANO, ELIZABETH Y. MATIBAG, CESAR D. MOMERACION, SALVACION R. NOVINO, MARTINO
B. OSITE, ELIZABETH PACUBAS, SATURNINO S. PACUBAS, JR., SERAPIO S. PAHIGDANA, LEMELIE PASCUA, ALMA A. PASCUAL,
ARNOLD T. PASIA, JAIME PEDROCHE, MARILOU L. PERALTA, HOMOBNUS PIDO II, ALFREDO G. PUNO, MARIVIC S. QUIDES, MYRNA
QUIPIT, PAULINO R. RECONDO, NELLIE REGINIO, JOSE V. REYES, CHERRY B. RIVERA, SUSANA T. ROBOSA, YOLANDA RODRIGUEZ,
DIANA A. ROMERO, REY S. ROSALES, LUCIO G. SANTIAGO, JOBINO S. SEVALLA, ULYSSES J. SIGATON, SUSAN T. SOLOMON,
LUZVIMINDA B. TABLATE, ROWENA R. TESTON, ERLINDA TOLENTINO, JOSEFINA G. URRUTIA, LILIBETH L. VELOSO, OSCAR VENTURA,
JOSE VICTORIA, JR., ARNOLD N. VILLADOS, NOE L. ZETA, EUGENIO ESGUERRA, ERNESTO ESPIRITU, DANIEL GARAS, MA. LEONORA
PADILLA, MAXIMIANO RAMOS, VILLELA REYNALDO, ANGELICA SAJONA, ROSARIO SANTOS, ANGELITA L. CRUZ, EDWIN A. LLAGAS,
LUCILA SEVILLA, MERCEDES D. AGALOOS, VICENTA V. AONUEVO, DALISAY S. AVELLANA, GERAROO BERNAL, LILIBETH L.
CANDONITA, FLORNIDO P. CASTRO, WILFREDO CINCO, LINO N. DIMAPILIS, TITA P. DUEAS, WILFREDO C. ECAMINO, MYRNA D.
HABAGA, MARY JUNE F. MAYCA, NENITA G. MONTOYA, EDITHA N. RECTRA, RICHARD G. SANDI, ROBERTO D. SHEAN, JUSTINA Q.
UMALI, VIOLETA B. VALERO, TELESFORO R. VILLAMAR, DANILO N. VILLANUEVA, EUGENIO U. VILLANUEVA, EFREN R. WAKA, MARIO
W. ALBAN, EFREN ANONUEVO, VICENTA V. ANONUEVO, ROSALINDA C. ANGEL, VIOLETA A. BUAGAN, ELENITA D. CABUEOS,
FLORIAN S. CANTOS, LOPE M. CARIO, SR., ROLANDO G. CLEMENTE, AREJOLA P. CORAZON, ANTONIO D. CORIA, VIRGINIA I. DELOS
SANTOS, LILY S. DEROCA ERLINDA A. DIMAPAWI, RANDOLPH DISCIPULO, TITA P. DUEAS, ERMIE B. DAGDAGAN, CORAZON Y.
FERNANDEZ, NIDA G. GUARINO, GLENN HERALDO, ESTELA B. HERMOSURA, ADORACION U. HERNANDEZ, GONZALO IMPERIAL,
DOLORES B. LA GUARDIA, PERCIVAL LADUB, AGNES H. LAGON, TERESA M. MAALAC, ISAGANI V. MANALILI, CONSTANCIO F.
MARISFOSQUI, VIRGINIA A. MELCHOR, RONALDO J. MIRANDA, FRANCIS M. MIRTO, EDWIN M. MOJARES, ELISA D. MOLA, BENJAMIN
MORTOS, CLEMENCIO A. PAJARILLO, LAURO J. PANERIO, ELENITA G. PASCUAL, EXZER R. RABANG, EMILIO RAMOS, VICENTE A.
REGODON, ANDREA H. REYES, MA. CORAZON V. STA. ANA, ZENAIDA P. STO. DOMINGO, ILUMINADA S. TALABUCON, ANNIE E.
TANTOY, MARLOU D. VAQUILAR, NOEL B. VELASQUEZ, NANCY V. VILLAPANDO, ELISA B. VILLAR, BELOISIE M. ALMAZAN, GLADYS B.
BOQUIREN, ELIZABETH CARIO, LIZ CARPIO, LORMELYN E. CLAUDIO, JOSE CORTEZ, ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, NORBERTO A. DEL
ROSARIO, VILMA C. ELPA, OTTO E. ESPILOY, ALLAN L. LEUTERIO, EMMANUELITA D. MENDOZA, NICANOR E. MENDOZA, CONCEPCION
C. OCAMPO, CARMELITA M. PASSE, JOSE SALVADOR PASSE JR., MORENO M. PENALBA, ELVIRA P. PIMENTEL, VIRGINIA V. QUIMO,
NAP ROQUE, CESAR S. SIADOR, JR., ILUMINADA SORIA JULITO G. TANGALIN, GREGORIO A. TOMILLOSO, FELICISIMO I. VICENCIO,
RICARDO D. VICENTINO, RODOLFO ARELLANO, MYRNA R. CORTEZ, EMMA N. CRUZ, CONCEPCIO C. CUNANAN, NELSON ITLIONG,
RESTITUTO S. MAGPANTAY, CATHERINE F. MANALANSAN, HENRY B. MANDOCDOC, ISIDORO MONTOYA, JR., ANDREA A. RAMOS,
ARSENIA E. SAN DIEGO, VILMA SANTIAGO, PETRA T. TABUCOL, BRIGIDA T. TACUBOY, MARILOU A. TIBOR, CORAZON R. VALDEZ,
NESTOR U. VENTURILLO, MARILYN ACOB, EMMA AGOT, DENCIO R. DADIS, MA. AVA DATA, NORLIE N. DAVID, IRENE S. DELA CRUZ,
NESTOR T. GUERREN, GUILLERMA LACUMBAY, ANNA LEAH MELEGRITO, EDITO MISTA, BELEN C. NUNEZ, ESTELA B. SARMIENTO,
FRANCISCO TY, CYNTHIA L. AUSTRIA, CORITA M. BARTOLO, AMELIA L. FLORES, PRISCILA M. MOLINA, CORAZON P. PEREZ,
MANOLITA L. VELASCO, ANTONIO E. VELOIRA, OFELIA B. VELOIRA, MEMORY FABIAN, ROSARIO MENESES, JULIANA M. ABEN,
REMEDIOS F. BONIFACIO, MA. THERESA M. ENRIQUEZ, OFELIA B. MENDOZA, LILY T. REYES, NARCISA B. SESE, MA. THERESA M.
VILLARUEL, JOHN R. ALMAZAN, DOLORES C. VELASQUEZ, ALFREDO FERRER, ADGARDO CORPUZ, ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ,
CONSOLACION B. CACULITAN, NORA Y. CALIJA, YVONNE V. CARABEO, AIDA C. CORPUZ, ROSA P. DORAD0, MINDA C. DUAD, CECILIA
B. HIWATIG, RITA ORISTINA V. LAPUS, CASILDA C. MAROHOM. CLEMENCIA A. MARQUEZ, MAXIMA MATIBAG, EMELITA R. MENDOZA,
CRISNATA S. MONTRESCLAROS, TERESITA L. OBIAS, CHONA R. PASTORFIDE, MERLY H. PATUNGAN, ALNA U. PINEDA, ANGELITO T.
PINEDA, VILMA G. QUIAMBAO, ESTELITA T. RAGASA, LUZVIMINDA L. RAMOS, NERISSA B. RAPANUT, CARMENCITA S. SANCHEZ, ELSA
M. SIGUE. ROWENA L. TEJADA, MYRNA M. TORREGOZA, LERMA AQUINO, CORNELIA M. ARANETA, FERDINAND BANGCUA, REYNALDO
BARBADILLO, ALFREDO A. CLAVERIA, DAN JORGE CRUZ, ERLINDA O. DAQUIGAN, REBECCA C. DE VERA, ERLINDA B. DIZON,
MARILYN P. ESTADILLA, CATALINA G. GARINGARAO, MYRNA MALINAO, SILVESTRE C. MANGAWANG, FLORENCIO C. NAVALED, NOEL
D. OBRA, NELIO T. PAGLINAWAN, ANA MARIE PASCUAL, ARTURO R. PRENDOL, OTELLA O. SANCHEZ, REYNALDO TEJADA, CRISANTO
BADENHOP, JEAN C. BORROMEO, ANA MARIA C. BUESING, MARIA TERESA CHAVEZ, GIL F. FERAREZA, MARITES L. GALVEZ, MIGUEL
B. JIMENEZ, JR., RODANTE JOCSON, MICHAEL A. JOSE, ARNEL H. LUZ, ARNEL C. MATREO, EDUARDA P. MERCADO, BENEDICTO P.
MURILLO, MINDA A. OSORIO, GLEN Q. PASTORFIDE, ISMAEL S. RUIZ, FE B. SENDIN, HENRY P. SORIANO, JOYCE SORIANO, FLORENCE
V. VELASQUEZ, PRUDENCIO M. VENTURA, ROY ALAN D. VIANZON, LORETO H. VILLAS, JR., CELESARIA C. ZACARIAS, GEORGE P.
ABAYA, ELIZABETH E. AMOR, LORNA ASIS, IMELDA J. BALLON, LILIA M. BALTAZAR, AURORA I. BELEN, ELSA B. BURGOS, CORAZON
D. CALAMNO, FLORENCIO L. CARANDANG, CYNTHIA V. CARPIO, ADAMELIA DE ONON, AMPARO L. DE RAMA, LUVIMIN L. DELA CRUZ,
VIOLETA R. GARCIA, PERLA P. MUOZ, PAULINA D. PAGUINTO, JOEL PAJARILLO, ENCARMILA PANGANIBAN, ERLINDA M. PARRENO,
MA. SALVACION M. PEREZ, ALBINA L. PINEDA, RAYMOND SANTIAGO, BRIGIDO G. SISON, REMEGIO SULLEZA, TRAZION E. TUSCANO,
MYRA B. VILLANUEVA, HENRY ABONETALLA, MARILYN BABAAN, ELISA A. BERE, JUANITO J. BOLISAY, NORMA S. CABALLA, ELMER
CALLOPE, ELPIDIO T. DE LARA, AGNES G. DE LEON, GERARDO R. ESPIRITU, ONOFRE P. LAXAMANA, ANSELMO LEGASPI, CONSUELO
MAGAYANES, DELEON L. MAROHOM, MARIO MELGAR, CHOLITA R. ORTEGA MODESTA S. PADUADA, PATRIA C. PATRICIO, LORETA N.
RAMIREZ, TERESITA C. SAN JUAN, FELICISIMA SUMAGUE, SOLAIMAN TAWA, VICTOR TOLENTINO, ANGELITO U. VALENZUELA,
DIOSDADO VELARDE, ROBERTO M. BASCO, JESUS B. CRUZ, JR., JOSEPHINE ESTRADA, LUCIA L. ESTRADA, LIGAYA C. EULOGIO,
LEONARD FALLER, DANILO J. GALAGNARA, MA. LOURDES P. GOROBIA, JUAN ILARDE, ISMAEL R. JOSE, RICARDO P. MACALINO, JR.,
ROPERTO MANALO, VIOLETA A. MARIANO, NOBLEZA C. MERINO, PILAR C. MIGALANG, ALEJANDRO S. MINGOY, DANILO D.
PONZALAN, SERGIO TAMAYO, VIRGILIO V. URGEL, GLORIA VILLAMAR, JULIETA ACHICO, FREDDIE P. AGAZETA, PEDRO AGONIAS,
ALBERTO G. ALBERTO, CRISTINA ALTOAR, SALVADOR BACANI, LEONIDA BALINGAW, IMELDA BAUZON, VIRGILIO BELGIRA,
GAUDENCIA CABACUNGAN, LEONORA DAVID, VIRGILIO D. ESTRADA, CORSINO GLORY, PRECIOSO A. LABUGUEN, BENJAMIN
LACESTE, ROSITA MACARANAS, FELIX MAURILLO, JOVENCIO PERALTA, RUBEN R. PRENDOL, CORNELIO RETUTA, JERRY RETUTA
BENEDICTO P. RIVERA, CORNELIO TABLANTE, LEONILA VERGARA LAMBERTO VILLAFUERTE, OFELIA B. AYSON, EDITA M. BALANZA,
ROLANDO M. BAUTISTA, OFELIA L. BUENO, CARMELITA G. CAJIPO, TERESITA C. CANLAS, ROMEO C. ESTEBAL, IBANA FALLAR,
ANASTACIO M. FLORES JR., DEMOSTHENES GOTHIS, MENCHELITA M. GUCILA, EDMUNDO C. LAGRIMA, ALLAN C. LEONCIO, MARVIN
M. MORALES, DIGNA Z. OBSTACULO CORNELIO O. PERALTA, CARLITO B. POMBO, MARIETA R. RED, TRINIDAD A. TALARO, ADELA T.
TONGCO, REGINA B.VILLADOS, JESSICA R. ALMAZAN, PERFECTO U. ALMAZAN, BERARDO BADERE, GENOVEVA A. BIGORNIA,

NATIVIDAD J. BOCAL, LORNA CABADING, EFREN E. CAWALING, AVELINA T. DURAN, ROMEO A. FELIPE, CORAZON GARAPAN, ANITA
B. IBARDOLASA, MARCIAL M. JACOBIA. JOSE V. JARTEL, PIDO LOUISA, BASILIO H. MORENO, CARONIA L. MURCIA, NONILA T. OMANA,
AIDA P. PANGANIBAN, SUSAN CULANE PAZ, ANITA Q. PEREYRA, MAMERTO C. PESTON JR., ROLANDO S. RABE, VILMA SANSORONA,
VICTOR TOLENTINO, LUZVIMINDA O. YAGYA, JULIET S. AYENTO, DIGNO D. AYSON, NORENA R. CIASICO, JOVENCIA L. FERNANDEZ,
EMILIANO P. KEMPIS, EUFROCINA B. QUIJANO, SIXTO E. TOLENTINO JR., AMPARO P. ABAYA, CR1STINA M. ARINGO, LEONILO WILLOU
M. BERANO, JOEY B. CASTILLO, BERNARDO CLARION, MATIAS V. CRUZ, ERLINDA O. DELGACO, ERLINDA B. DIZON, SENECIO D.
FESTIN, FLORENTINA C. VALENCIA, SARAH ABUNGAN, JUPITER C. ALMAZAN, OFELIA BIRON, MAMERTO C. BOLIVAR, BIENVENIDO R.
CINCO, METEDIO ESTRADA JR., GINALYN GONZALES, ANTONIO M. LACHICA, NEMESIO RABAJANTE, NELZON TENIOSO,
HERMENEGILDO URRUTIA, JR., VIOLETA C. VALDEZ, CRISANTO VAQUILAR, JOFRE B. ALTAREJOS, EDGARDO L. BALDEDARA, RAUL
SAUDE G. BECARES, RAMON R. BOADO, MELCHOR R. BORLON, GEMMA CARINO, GEORGE M. CARPIO, CARMELITA S. CUNANAN,
ONESIMO A. DE CASTRO, PURIFICACION R. DE GUZMAN, LEOPOLDO S. J. DE JESUS, JOCELYN R. DELA CRUZ, DOMINGO U.
ESGUERRA, VIRGINIA R. ESTRELLA, OFELIA A. HERNANDEZ, TRINIDAD JAVIER, EUGENIA L. LAGMAY, ANGELITA B. LIBIRAN, ARSENIO
R. LIBIRAN, CARLOS M. LOPE, RODOLFO A. LOPEZ, CELSO MAALIW, ROMUALDO E. MENDOZA, CRISPULO A. OCAMPO, ANGELITA
OLOG, EVANGELINE O. OPO, MAXIMO L. PEREZ, JOSE PONPONILLA, SIXTO P. RIVAS, LYDIA C. OMERO, CATALINA F. SIGATON, JESUS
S. VIJIGA, MYRA K. VILLAPANDO, GALICANO I. NER, OSCAR R. LAVIN, ESTEBAN S. CARAG, GRACE M. VILLACRUSIS, JULIETA C.
BONDAD, NILDA S. LINING, LUCY GRACE C. BURGOS, MARIFE CHARO N. DOMINGO, MA. VICTORIA P. DA ROZA, NILDA CATALAN,
RAUL T. ORTEGA, EWARDO R. JOSON, PRUDENCIO M. DELA CRUZ, FRANCISCO L. CONDE, ARNEL M. ZURITA, EDISON A. CALAOUR,
VICTOR C. CANTOR, CARMELITA M. QUIRINO, AMBROSIO ESTABILLO, ESPERANZA B. DALUSON, ALBERTO M. MADRILEJOS,
ROLANDO C. MANALO, RODOLFO R. RANGES, PHILIP A. PICHAY, REYNALDO C. ALAMPAY, RENE E. FAJARDO, CELSO A. AGUILAR,
REMEDIOS E. ABING, JOSEFINA M. GAWARAN, FRANCISCO S. PANGANIBAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and HON. CARLITO R.
ALETA, in his capacity as the Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute, respondents.
G.R. No. 110642 September 11, 1998
BERNARDO BALGOS, NICOMEDES C. AGBADA, EUFRONIO R. ALANO JR., ERNIE S. ALINO, CORNELIO A. ARTIENDA. CARY L. ASANA,
TRANQUILINO ATIENZA, JR., JONATHAN A. AZUCENA, ROY M. BARCERO, CLARITA S. BELONIO, WILFREDO E. CABEZON, CANDIDO A.
CABRIDO, JR., AMELITA B. CALER, DAREF MARCELINO M. CANET, RONALD CANTONG, ALEJANDRO J. CATIPAY, JR., HERMINIA
COLAR, ELIZABETH A. DAYTO, SALOME G. DE JESUS, JOSEFINA ESTRADA, AURORA M. FIGUEROA, MA. ANGELITA A. GADDI, RIO L.
GULAPO, MA. THERESA M. GUMABON, ANTONIO A. GUNAY, GERARD HURTADO, ARIEL ILAGAN, WILMAR L. INFANTE, FLORECER M.
LEACHON, ANNA MA. VICTORIA LELINA, LIZA NONETTE A. MAIBO, EUGENIO P. MANUEL, EDUARDO A. MENGUITO, ERIC AGAPITO
NATIVIDAD, LEONIDES N. NAVEA, MA. PERPETUA OCAMPO, REDENTOR B. PACANO, ALMOND C. PALABRICA, ELMER T. PASCUA,
CRISTY CRISTETA A. RAMOS, HENRY B. RELLOSA, ROWENA M. RODANILLA, JOSEPH SALVADOR, CARMELLE GEORGINA SIENA,
CRECENCIANO I SUAN, CESAR TAN, CECILIA T. VARGAS, GIL NOEL VILLANUEVA, ANALYN S. VISTA, BENITO YU, JR., EDUARDO
AKIATE, EARTHA G. ALINO, TERESITA ANASTACIO, JOSELITO O. AVERION, ELINO BAGOSO, FERDINAND B. BARBERO, ELSA J.
BAUTISTA ELMER CALDERON, FRANCIS CAMELLO, RENE CANARES, RODELIO B. CARATING, JULIETA S. CONSTANTINO, EASTER LIZA
CUETO, NANCY V. CUETO, MARIFE DELOS REYES, JERWYN L DEMETRIO, EDUARDO DIOKNO, MARGARET T. ESTANISLAO, MA.
ARLENE M. EVANGELISTA, SALVADOR A. FABULA, IRENE P. GERPACIO, ALMA GONZALES, RICHMOND GONZALES, BENIE E. ILAGAN,
OSCAR JALALON, JOSEFINA JONAS, ELEANOR M. LIGANOR, FLORDELIZA MALLARI, ROSARIO MAACAP, JOSE A. MANANGHAYA,
JULIET R. MANGUERRA GLENN A. MANILA, ANGELITA C. MARCIA, CECILIA MARQUESES, GINA MARZAN, RICHARD M. MOJICA,
JOSEFINA MORALES, SANTIAGO MOSQUEDA, MELCHITO B. NOCEDA, SEGUNDO, PACARDO, SONNY PACUNLA, ALEXANDER PANO,
MA. ENQUITA PANOTES, ROMMEL M. PARCASIO, IAN A. PEDALIZO, ROSANA PERMALINO, EVELYN PITOGO, LOLITA POLIQUIT,
LOURDES REGALA, MARIBEL REYES, JOVETTE TENORIO, HIDALGO TOLENTINO, LUISITO TRINIDAD, MA. BLANCA A. VALDEAVILLA,
EDGARDO YBURAN, ROWENA ABELLANA, ARTURO ACOBA, PALMAREN AGACIA, FLORENTINO AGUSTIN, JAIME ALAN, EDUARDO
ALBERTO, MACARIO ANACAN, HENRY APOLINARES, EVELYN AUSAN, REBECCA BACUS, MARYLOU BARATANG, LORENZO BERMILLO,
LIGAYA BOBIS, MA. TERESA BOLOFER, ERNESTO BRAMPIO, FLORA CABLIN, HENRY CACAYAN, LILIA CALICA, MA. ANA CASUPANG,
CHARITO CAUTON, ARMELYN Y. CLEMENTE, ROOSBELT CREENCIA, FRANCISCO CRUZ, MARCELO DAYO, MARITES DE LEON, JANE
DELA CRUZ, EDGARDO DELOS SANTOS, IMELDA DELOS SANTOS, RODEL DELOS SANTOS, ELISA DIZON, SUSAN DUMOT, JOVEN
ESPINELI, LEANDRO EVANGELISTA, EVANGELINE FERRER, NESTOR FRANCISCO, CESARIO GEMINO, LAURO G. HERNANDEZ, RACHEL
HILARIO, MIGUEL IRACTA, OBEN LABONETE, JAIME LADANGA, ISIDRO LEGAN, ELMIE MADRIAGA, DIOSDADO MANALUS, OSCAR
MANOIS, CRISTINA MEDRANO, LILIAN MILLAN, GLICERIO MONTALLA, MADELEINE NAVARCE, MA. ANA ORQUIZA, PINKY PADILLA, LUZ
BRENDA PAGLINAWAN, PURISIMA PAJARO, JOSEPHINE PASION, JOCELYN RAMOS, DOMINGO RODULFO, DELIA SADIASA, VIRGINIA
SALILI, GETULIO SAN JUAN, FLORFINA SANCHEZ, LEOLITA SIASI, GLORIA TEJADA FRANCIS TORRES, ERNESTO VALMEO, WILFREDO
VELASCO, EPIFANIA VILLA JUAN, RAFAEL ACENA ELMER ADRAQUE, EDITHA AIZON, RIZALDY ALBERTO, RAMON ALOBBA, ALAN
ANIDA, BERTOLIO ARELLANO, VERONICA AVILA, MAY BABARAN, JOAQUIN BANZALI, MARILYN CAACO, ROSE NELIE CABATLAO,
JUANITA CALONGE, NILDA CAPANPANGAN, CECILIA CAPUNO, TRINIDAD CARLOS, SALVACION CAS, AMADO CREUS, PEDRO DAILEG,
VIRGINIA DAILEG, NELITA DE GUZMAN, ROWENA DE GUZMAN, ALMA ARRO DEL ROSARIO, AMELYN ANG, BERNADETTE ESPINOSA,
ESTRELITA FIDER, REYNALDO GABALLO, NOEMI GABATO, ELMER GABAYA, MARIBELLE GAON, LILIA GONZALES, CARISA GOSO,
ROMEO HERNANDEZ, MYRNA JOVELLANA, RONALDO LIM, GREGORIO LLANES, ROBERTO MABUTI, DANILO MACANSANTOS,
CRISOSTOMO MAMORBOR, MA. CONCEPCION MANZO, ROBERT MARGES, ANDRE JOHN MARTINEZ, EUFRONIO MOJICA, HENRY
MOJICA, LILIAN MONJE, MA. RAYSOLYN NATIVIDAD, LAMBERTO NERI, NICANDRO OBEDENCIO, LISETTE ORENSE, LEA PARDE,
JEFFREY PAYNOR, EVA PUGAY, GODOFREDO RAMOS, CRISPINA RAYO, CECILIA RITO, SALVACION RITUAL, CRISTINA SANGALANG,
ELVIRA SEGOVIA, RENE STA. MARIA, GENOVEVA TULLAO, GLORIA URRIZA, RESTITUTO VEJERANO, RAUL VILLACORTE, ZENYBEL
VILLEGAS, ZARAH YAP, PHILIP YASAY, TRINIDAD ACERON, FLORENTINO C. AGUSTIN, CRISOSTOMO ANGUE, CESAR ATIENZA,
CARLOTA AUSTRIA, JOVITA AUSTRIA, VICTORIA BAHALLA, ALLAN BATUSBATUSAN, ALTAIR BAUTISTA, SONNY BILBAO, GINA
BRUGADA, AMELIA CABRERA, FRANCIA CAMUA, RENATO CARRASCAL, RUSELL CASTRO, EDUARDO CAUSAREN, NELSON
CONCEPCION, MYRNA CORILLA, ROSALIA FLORA COSTALES, NELSON CUSTODIO, DENNIS DE GUZMAN, EUFRACIO DE LUNA,
LUCIANA DELA CRUZ, JR., VENER DILIG, YOLANDA DINO, REMEGIO DIWA, EDWIN DOGOMEO, MANUEL ELLANO, MITHI ENCIO,
REYNALDO ESPINO, DAVID ESPIRITU, EMILIANA GAMIT, ENRICO HERNANDEZ, DORIS JAVATE, ALICIA JIMENEZ, ELEAZAR LOPEZ, MA.
SUSANA MARIANO, RONALDO MARAVILLA, PETER MAURICIO, ANITA OBRERO, ARLENE OLEA, ROEL PARDE, MELCHOR PEREZ,
ROGER PRINCIPE, PRIMA PUJANTE, LILIA RAFAEL, AMELIA RALA ANTONIO RIVERA, LIWAYWAY RONSARIO, ERLINDA SALCEDO,
OFELIA SANGALANG LUZVIMINDA SANTOS, EDESIA SEVILLEJA, NANETTE SUSA, NEIL VALENTON, FILIPINA VENTIGAN, MA. IDA
VILLARALVO, ADELINE ABANCE, RAUL ACOSTA, MA. CECILIA ADAOAG, GLEN BABANTUGAN, REMIGIO BACUS, PANTALEON BADION,
JIMMY BAJADO, ARTHUR BARAOIDAN, JULIE CABALLERO, FRANCISCO CADAJAS, EDITHA CASIBANG, NORMAN CONDE, MENA
CREUS, MARY CRUZ, MACARIO DE GUZMAN, LUPO DE LUNA, RODOLFO DOMINGO, EMILIA EVANGELISTA, REYNALDO FAUSTINO,
ALICIA DELA CRUZ FERNANDEZ, IAN FEROLINO, GIL GALAN, ANALIZA GARIBAY, JESUS GARRIDO, FLORENCIO GATCHALIAN,
CONSORIO GERONES, VERONICA GULAFO, ALMA HERMINIA, PAUL RODERICK HOFELINA, IDA JACA, ENRIQUE JACSON, NENEVEH
LAPUZ, ROLANDO LEAL, MILLER MANILA, DESALE MANZANO, ROLANDO MARAON, MARIANO MARIANO, RODELIO MENORIA ROMEO
MERIDA, JOSEFINA MONJARDIN, NILO PARDE, EMMANUEL PASCO, NONITA QUITO, GLEN RANCE, BONIFACIO RENOBLAS, JESUS
REYES, JOSE REYES, RIZAL REYLES, JUAN ROQUE, NENITA SALGADO, GAUDENCIO SALONGA GALLARDO TOLENTINO, ALBERTO
TRINIDAD, MA. FELISA VARGAS, ROGELIO VAZQUEZ, WILLIAM VEJERANO, ELIZABETH VILLANUEVA VIRGINIA VILLARUEL, SERGIO
YEBAN, EVELYN M. ALONSO, MIE ARCA, ARTHUR BARAOIDAN, CATHERINE BATUSBATUSAN, IRENEA CARANDANG, LOURDES
CARLENGGA, MA. ANNA F. CASUPANG, ROSALIA FLORA O. COSTALES, ELSA DIZON, HENRY ESPINELI, JOVEN ESPINELI, RICHARD
FELIX, MA. CRISTINA M. FERNANDEZ, RENATO C. FERNANDO, LYDIA A. FULGOSINO, RENATO GONZALES, BONIFACIO JOGNO, OSCAR
MANAOIS, JULITA MOJICA, ANGELINA MOYA, LUISITO NACO, MA. ANA ORQUIZA, SUSAN PRIANES, EDMOND PRINCIPE, TERESA A.
RAMOS, ROBERTO REYES, MARTINET ROBLE, GRETA SALVIEJO, PEPITO SAMSON, SALVADOR SOLIVEN, JOSE F. SUMINISTRADO,
ADELINA TRINIDAD, LUCITO AMISCARAY, FRANK JAIME AQUINO, MARIO BAISA, ALTAIR BAUTISTA, TEODORO R. BERSABE,
MODESTO L. BORJA (DR.), EUGENIA A. BRIONES, CONRADO S. COMIA, BLESILDA C. CONCEPCION, NELSON CUSTODIO, DENNIS A. DE
GUZMAN, EUFRACIO V. DE LUNA, LUCIANO DELA CRUZ, JR., REYNALDO ESPINO, DAVID F. ESPIRITU, EDUARDO FERUELO, JORGE Y.
LILLO RONALDO I. MARAVILLA, CONRADO A. MERCADO, LEILANI G. NAGA, NOE NAMBATAC, LARRY P. PINERA, BENEDICTO M.
QUITAIN, ERIBERTO L. RODRIGUEZ, FEDERICO SABADO, JR., OSCAR C. SALONGA, OSCAR C. SANGANBAYAN, FERIOLA M. SERRANO,
ANDRES P. SEVILLEJA, FELICIDAD T. ZAMORA, ARIEL ARENAS, LOUIE CRISMO, ALBERTO DE GUZMAN, GIDEON DE LUNA, JUNIBERT

DE SAGUN, ANGELICA ECITO, CLARON ESPESO, PORFERIO ESPINA, LEVIN GABUTAN, NORMAN GALLEMIT, DIOSDADO JOSE,
ANSELMA JUNIO, MILA LAGRIMAS, NOEMI LASPINAS, SINFROSA PASCUA, RENATO POLIDO, ROMY RAGMA, ROEL REYES, MARIBEL
SANTOS, EVELYN SERISOLA RAIDA V. ALEGRE, MINDA A. AMON, GREGORIO P. ANTOLIN, JR., LUZ B. ARVIZO, ANDRES F. BAES, JR.,
ALEJANDRO R. BALOLOY, BERNARDO B. BAYANGOS, NORA S. BOQUIREN, ELMER B. BORRE, EDUARDO A. BRION, JAIME C.
CABANDE, DELIA A. CALIXTO, REYNALDO N. CONCEPCION, FARLEY O. CONDE, BIENVENIDO L DE GUZMAN, CONRADO C. DE JESUS,
CORAZON T. DE JESUS, JOSEFINA G. DILOY, ASUNCION A. DIMAGUILA, ONOFRE DOLAR, JR., SERGIO S. ENRIQUEZ, CORAZON P.
ESPINO, SILVINO M. FELLO, COLITA J. FRANCISCO, FEDERICO G. GOLDING, RENATO G. GONZALES, ELIZABETH M. HERNANDO, LILIAN
T. HURTADO, GLORIA C. MACASAET, ERIC N. MARASIGAN, MARINA P. MARGES, NORMA M. MAURICIO, GINA P. NILO, JANET G.
OPERARIO, JULIANA J. ORDOA, BERNARDO B. PASCUA, ELIODORA D. RAMOS, EVELYN C. RAMOS, PERFECTO O. REYES, VICENTE V.
ROBLES, FLORENCIO A. ROJALES, CORAZON B. ROSALES, TEOTIMO L. ROTERSOS, ELIZABETH C. SADORRA, FE D. SALIWAN,
MOISES T. SANCHEZ, ESTER S. SANTOS, RUFINO L. SANTOS, EMILIANO M. SIBOLBORO, BAYANI V. VILLANUEVA, ERNESTO G.
ALMENDRAL, TERESITA AVISO, CLARITA BACATIO, ALFONSO G. BAUTISTA, NARDA A. BLASCO, LUNINGNING J. BONDOC, JOSE B.
BURA, ODON CAPANGPANGAN, VIRGILIO A. CASTAEDA, MARIO B. COLLADO, ARSENIO L. CALONGE, LUISITO F. COSTELO, OSCAR F.
COSTELO, NILO A. CRUCENA, ARTURO A. DAYOT, SUNNY A. DE GUZMAN, WILFREDO B. DELA CRUZ, JULIETA G. ESPENELI, CECILIA C.
ESTRADA, PERFECTO P. EVANGELISTA, MAGDALENA Q. FAVIS, CRISTINA M. FERNANDEZ, RENE D. FERNANDEZ, LOURDES S.
GALANTA, RAYMUNDO G. GALANTA, REDENTOR S. GATUS, JOSE G. GERPACIO, ARNULFO B. GESITE, CLEOFE C. GONZALES, BELLA
V. HERNANDO, CARMELITA B. INCILLO, LIGAYA H. ISON, AIDA T. LATOZA, DEOGRACIAS R. MAGTALAS, FLORENCIO G. MANANGHAYA,
MAMERTO F. MARTINEZ, NESTOR T. MERJILLA, ALENJANDRO G. MICOSA, PABLO M. MONTALLA, EDGAR P. NATIVIDAD, QUERUBIN A.
NAVERO, HENRY E. NOCEDA, NOEMI M. PASCUAL, BERNA G. PASTOR, MADONNA H. PEALBA, CRISTY C. PERLADO, DOMINCIANO D.
RAMOS, JR., LEO RETAMAR, TERESITA V. RETAMAR, ANDRES ARIEL B. REYES, JOSE D. RONDAL, MILAGROS F. ROSALES, OSCAR C.
SALONGA, EDNA L. SAMAR, ANTONIO SAN ANDRES, MANUEL S. SANDOVAL, SHIRLEY A. SANTOS, MANUEL S. STA. ANA, NESTOR M.
TICSON, LORENZO M. TOMAS, REYNALDO R. VILLANUEVA, MARIO E. VINLUAN, LOLITA C. AGUSTIN, CRISOSTOMO B. ALCALDE, DIGNA
R. ALLAG, MERLYNA F. ATIL, ELISA AYO, JULITA M. AYUYAO, VICTORCITO V. BABIERRA, AMELIA A. BANGALAN, ELVIRA M. BAUTISTA,
ERLINDA D. BAUTISTA, CELSO R. BERSABE, APOLINARIO P. CARANDANG, VIOLETA E. CASTAEDA, JOSEFINA L. CREENCIA,
ROGELIO CREENCIA, ESPERANZA V. DACANAY, LEONARDO M. DE LEON, LEONORA P. DE LEON, LUCIANO C. DELA CRUZ, AURORA B.
DELOS SANTOS, ROMEO P. DELOS SANTOS, DAISY T. ELICANO, MARCIANA B. ENRIQUEZ, NATIVIDAD P. ESCOBAR, VIRGINCITO G.
ESTOCONING, REDEMCION B. GRIFAL, CELIA C. GROSPE, LORNA L. GULAFO, VIRGINIA S. HIIARIO, ARNIE C. ILAN, ELISA N. LADANGA
IGMIDIO B. LAPIS, ULYSIS M. LATOZA, BEATRIZ C. MAGNO, JOSE D. MANGUERRA, MA. TERESA T. MANUEL, SERAFIN B. MATAWARAN
CONRADO A. MERCADO, RAFAEL A. MONTE, VENERANDO F. NABOA, CLEOTILDE M. NICOLAS, ELSIE V. OBRERO, MAXIMINA
OMANITO, EMILIO M. OSALVO, JOEY V. PADILLA, MARCELINA J. PALIS, REYNALDO G. PALIS, PERLA PANGANIBAN, WILLIE C.
PERLATA, IRENEO B. RAMAT, PERLITA M. RAMOS, EDGARDO R. REYES, JOSEPH B. ROJALES, LEOGARDA T. RUBITE, JACQUELINE A
SABINO, ANITA M. SALANDANAN, MEDARDO P. SALVADOR, WILFREDO B. SANIDAD, IMELDA E. SANTOS, LEONARDO A. SEMANA,
CARLOS P. SERRANO, FLORENCIO C. STA MARIA, RAMON P. ULIBAS, GAVINO ISAGANI P. URRIZA, PETRONILLA T. VALENZUELA,
SALVADOR F. VILLAREY, AMY O. YAMBOT, FELIX N. ALBANO, RICARDO C. ALEGRID, ARIEL G. ALMEDA, JULITA V. AONUEVO,
ULDARICO A. ANDAL, JAIME S. ANTONIO, REYNALDO P. BAJAR, BERNARDO D. BALGOS, JOSELITO N. BANGAWAN, LEOVIGILIO R.
BANTIQUE, ELVIRA M. BAUTISTA, ERNESTO BELO, LUZ C. CABAMONGAN, ANDRES B. CALIMUTAN, MARCELO S. CRISOSTOMO,
AGNEZ CRUZ, BERNARDINA I. DAGUIO, ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, MARCELINO P. DE LEON, CARMEN P. DEL ROSARIO, EDIZA A. DIAZ,
TEODORICO C. ERNI, JULIANA M. FAJARDO, TEORODICO M. FAJARDO, LEOVENILDA A. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN M. GALLARITA,
CONSTANCIA R. GANTIOQUI, EUGENIA G. GARCIA JOSE G. HAPAN, NORA B. INCIONG, LALAINE JAVINEZ, GERMAN M. JONAS, BELTHA
B. LANDICHO, ERLINDA LOVERIZA, CLARITA J. MAESTRADO, JOSELITO MAGNO, EDUARDO B. MALAPITAN, EDUARDO A. MANZANO,
NAPTHALI Q. MAYUGA, REMEDIOS B. MILLER, AMELIA R. MORENO, PONCIANO L. MURILLO, JOSEPHINE L. NANA, ISABEL D. NASIS,
MERCEDES V. OCAMPO, GODOFREDO R. ODEJAR, TERESITA OLMELLA, GERMAN L. OMAA, CECILIA B. ORLANES, BELINA P.
PAJARITO, LUCINDA S. PANGCO, JAIME PASCUAL, TERESITA S. PERLADO, VILMA M. QUIMSON, CESAR H. RAMOS, ROMEO L.
SACDALAN, CRISTINA M. SANDOVAL, TERESITA S. SANDOVAL, FELICIANA A. SANTIAGO, LORNA F. SANTOS, LUZDIVINA R. SISON,
CRESENCIO O. SOLANO, NELSON B. STA. CLARA, ANSELMA B. STA. CLARA, ANSELMA B. TAJON, FE P. VADIL, ARTHUR O. ACHA,
DANILO E. ADRIATICO, MERLYN ALDABA, ARNALDO B. ALVAREZ, REYNALDA T. AMADA, NELSON ANGELES, FRANCISCO A.
BAYALAS, TEODORO R. BERSABE, ELSA C. BORJA, MODESTO L. BORJA, EDUARDO O. BREGANZA, EUGENIA A. BRIONES, EDMUNDO
P. BUSTILLO, RENATO S. CABRERA, MARINA N. CAMACHO, OSCAR O. CARPIO, BLESILDA C. CONCEPCION, SAMUEL M. CONTRERAS,
CORAZON J. CORPUZ, YOLANDA S. COSTELO, RAMON S. ENRIQUEZ, MERCEDES S. FERNANDO, JOSE ANTONIO GUATLO, MARUJA
JARABEJO, RAUL M. LAURENA, TERESITA D. LIZARDO, RODOLFO L. LUCAS, CESAR M. MAGADIA, RICARTE A. MELCHOR, JOSIE P.
MERCADO, LEILANI G. NAGA, AURORA N. NOROMBABA, WILMA G. NOTA, REYNALDO O. PEREGRINO, SALVACION L. PLANAS,
ROGELIO L. PUMARAS, NARCISA D. RAMIS, ROSEMELINDA R. REFORMA, ROBERTO R. REYES, LOLITA M. RONDON, SONIA M.
SALGUERO, NORBERTO SALILI, NATIVIDAD M. SALONGA, ROSEMARIE C. SISON, VICTOR J. VILLANUEVA, ARMANDO ARCAMO,
BELINDA CABALLA, TERESITA DIVAD, PEPITO ESPENILLI, BERCELIZA FAJARDO, NELIA GULAPO, CHRISTINE MANAGBANAG,
REYNALDO MANAGBANAG, LUIS MENDOZA, OSCAR OSTING, EDGARDO REYES, DINO VELASQUEZ, MA. CECILIA O. DELA PEA,
ILUMINADA POJAS, NORA ABAYA, MARIETTA S. ABCEJO, VICTORIA E. ABELLA, FILOMENA L. ABEN, MA. VICTORIA D. ABESAMIS, NITA
D. ABID, VERONICA ABIERO, RONELLO ABILA, DANILO ABON, EVA ABON, EVA FE J. ABRAHAM, EDGAR A. ABRIOL, RUBY I. ABRIOL,
REMEDIOS ACASIO, ROMEO L. ACEDO, RIZALINA M. ACORDA SUSAN B. AGAPITO, RODOLFO T. AGONCILLO, MARGARITA N. AGOOT,
MARIA H. AGOOT, ELIZABETH AGPAOA, AVELINO AGUINALDO, JOSE R. AJON, LOURDES ALAG, LUZVIMINDA ALBAO, LUCITA
ALEGRE, EXPEDITA S. ALEJON, MELENIDA ALMAZAN, MANUEL T. ALMOGUERRA, CAROLINA J. ALVIAR, ELVIRA D. AMA, JOHN
AMARRA, BENEDICTO ARABIT, AURORA M. ANCHETA, RAYMUNDO ANDAY, ERIC J. ANONAS, ROSEMARIE N. ANTEGRO, CARMENCITA
APELO (DR.), ESTER AQUINO, ALEX AQUITAA, EDUARDO ARCA, NANCY I. ARCANGEL, CRISPINO ARIAS, GAUDENCIO ARIAS,
ESTHERLINA D. ARIFALO, ALICIA C. ARJONA-LAYSON, RODRIGO L. ARMENIO, ABELARDO E. ARNAO, ROSALINDA M. ARVESU,
JOSEPHINE B. ASAS, MA. WYNNE A. ASTUDILLO, VICTOR C. ATIENZA, DAVID AVANTE, LUISITO AVANTE, ANITA C. AVILLA, HERNANDO
F. AVILLA EUSTAQUIO AWTTAN, ERNESTO BACOLOR, EFREN BACONAWA, MYRNA D. BALDECAAS, JUANA BALOTRO, LORY C.
BANGALISAN, GERMELINA T. BAOY, ELVIRA BARREDA, DOLORES BAUTISTA, NIEVES V. BAUTISTA, RENATO BAUTISTA, MELINDA A.
BAYOT, EDNA T. BEGINO, BELLA C. BELOY, CAROLYN C. BENIGNO, CALIXTA C. BERBA, JOSE C. BERNAL, LILIA B. BERNAL, CALIXTO
BERNARDO, DANTE C. BERNARDO, ERNESTO BERNARDO, RENATO BERNARDO, MELENCIO BERNARDO, ONOFRE S. BONIGFACIO,
JOCELYN B. BOREJON, EDWARD S. BRIONES, ROSALINDA R. BUADO, ERNESTO BUENAFLOR, FELIX BUTUHAN, CECILLO CABUANG,
GILDA CABUANG, WILFREDO CABUANG, ROLANDO A. CAMBA, RONNIE CAPILI, AURORA CAPIRAL, MARILOU CAPUNO, LEONCIO
CARAAN, ESTELITA R. CARANDANG, REMIA B. CARPIO, EDUARDO CASTELLANO, LOLITA A. CASTILLO, BELLA U. CATACUTAN,
CARINA P. CATIMBANG, MAURO CAYETA, CRISANTO P. CEREZO, FELICIANO CONCEPCION, VIVIAN D. CONCEPCION, RODANTE
CONSTANTE, ADELA B. CONTRERAS, JOSEFINA A. CONTRERAS, ANAMARIE P. CORONEL, CRISOSTOMO A. CORTEZ, ERLINDA
CORTEZ JOSEPH ALAN D. COSTALES, ROSARIO M. COSTALES, RUBINA O. CRESENCIO, ANTONIO CRISTOBAL, BALGAMEL C. CROOC,
VIRGINIA CRUZ, LEONILO A. DABBAY, ROGELIO V. DACULLA, AZUCENA DAMANG, LINO I. DANTE, ERLINDA N. DAUZ, KAREN ROSE C.
DAZO, DOLORES T. DE GUZMAN, MARISSA DE GUZMAN, MYRILOU DE DUZMAN, NATALIA C. DE GUZMAN, REDEDIOS DE JESUS,
EMELINA C. DE LEON, ANGELES DE MAYO, VICTORIA B. DEL PRADO, CESAR M. DELA CRUZ, ESTENELY M. DELA CRUZ, JOSE K. S.
DELA CRUZ, NICANOR S. DELA CRUZ, EDUARDO DELA TORNE, REYNALDO DELOS SANTOS, VERONICA DELOS SANTOS, EVELYN
DELOS TRINOS, GLICERIA DERROTA GERMAN DIAZ, AUGUSTO DIMAMENT, MEDIATRIX DIRECTO, ROMULO S. DIRECTO, JR., STELLA
DOCENA, RODOLFO DOMDOM, JACQUELINE DONESA, ALFREDO DUCUSIN, PETRONILO B. DUMANGAS, LORNA D. EBIO, GILBERT R.
EGAA, ROBERT EGAA, ROMULO ELAMPARO, MARLENE ENRIQUEZ, NICERATA ERMITA, LOURDES R. ERSANDO, HERMINIO
ESCALONA, NESTOR B. ESCANDOR, PEDRO ESCREZA, MARILOU B. ESCUREL, TERESITA G. ESPOCIA, MARINA M. ESTACIO, NANETHA
ESTANTE, ELSIE ESTOPACE, MALANIE M. ESTOLE, RODOLFO C. ESTRELLA, RICA EVASCO, LIWANAG C. FELICIANO, EDNA A. FELIPE,
EVA FEMENTIRA, BERNARDINO FERIDO, JR., PURIFICACION C. FERRER, FRANCISCO FETALBERO, LUCIA FLORES, MA. GRACIA D.
FLORES, NILO FRANCISCO (DR.), ZENAIDA F. FRANCISCO, MANOLITA Z. GAERLAN, EDITHA S. GOLLA, ANTONIO A. GANNABAN,
CARLOS GARCIA, CORAZON A. GARCIA, JULIE G. GARCIA, LIZA S. GAYAS, EVAN R. GERONIMO, BONIFACIO GODOY, ARLENE
GONZALES, HILDENCE B. GONZALES, ILUMINADA B. GONZALES, GRACE L. GUILLERMO, BENJAMIN C. GUTIERREZ, RODOLFO
GUTIERREZ, ALEJANDRINO HADUCA, MARILYN P. HERNANDEZ, NILDA HERNANDEZ, FREDERICO HIFE, ERQUITA HORCA, LORETO
HUMARANG, REBECCA M. IBAROLA, MELINDA O. IGNACIO, FRANCIA ILAO, AURORA C. INDICO, DIANA INOCENCIO, ALICIA M. IRANGA,
DEOGRACIAS JAVIER, NELLY A. JIAO, CHARITO GIMENO, DIDETTE M. JOCO, LOLITA JUNIO, LEWELLIE R. KAMPITAN, ESTRELLITA
KARGANILLA, GREGORIO LACSA, JR., ANTONIO LANDRITO, LETICIA R. LANDRITO, ANDRES LANGIT, MAXIMA R. LAPUZ, ANICIA
LAUREL, FLORENCIA B. LAURENCIANO, MARCELINO E. LEGASPI, MARIO T. LEGASPI, FIDEL LIBAO, IMELDA LIBERATO, ANITA
LIBRADO, LILIA G. LIWANAG, EDEN P. LLANES, ANTONIO C. LOPEZ, CERELINO LOPEZ, EMELINA A. LOPEZ, VIRGILIO LORENZO,
FLORO MAGO, JR., ZENAIDA MADERA, MELCHOR MAGNAYE, ARLENE B. MAGPANTAY, FERMINA MAGPANTAY, MAGNO MALABANAN,
PABLO B. MALABANAN, LUISA MALALOAN, MERCIA MALLARI, RICARDO MALLARI, RONALDO MALLARI, RUSTICO MALLARI, ANGELI,

MALONZO, PEDRO M. MANAIG, FLORITA S. MANGABAT, NEMESIA C. MANGABAT, MANOLITO M. AVANTE, BERNARDO S. MANUEL,
CECILIA MANUEL, ROBERTO MANUEL, CLARIBEL MANZANO, PABLO MARASIGAN, PEAFRANCIA H. MARASIGAN, RHODORA
MARASIGAN, ANNABELLE F. MARBELLA, FLORENCIO MARCIAL, HERMINIO D. MARCIAL. RICARDO F. MARERO, JUANITO R. MARTIN,
JR., BALTAZAR MATEO, ROSALINDA P. MATEO, ESTELA MAYO, SOCORRO G. MERCADO, AVELINO G. MILLORA, APOLINAR MIMIS,
NORMA MIMIS, AL MINAO, CONSUELO MIRANDA, LEONARDO MIRANDA, REBECCA R. MIRANDA, LILIA B. MOSLARES, MARLYN
MULATO, MA. VICTORIA L. MUNN SHA KHATA, LEONCIA N. NABONG, AMELIA A. NACIONAL, FLORENCIO R. NAGAO, JOEY N. NAPIZA,
MARION NAPIZA, ZENAIDA NATIVIDAD, ABELO NAVARRO, NICETAS S. NICOLAS, VICENTE M. NIM, JUAN NIOLAR, LYDIA E. NONES,
MARILOU W. NUESTRO, CLEOTILDE D. OLAYRES, SUSAN R. OLID, AMELITA A. OLIVAS, BIENVENIDO L. OPEA, FRANCISCA S.
ORELLANO, CONSTANCIA ORLANDA, GUELLERMO ORTICIO, BONIFACIO ORTILLANO, ANGEL PABLO, EDUARDO PABLO, GENEROSO
PACLITA, RAYMUNDO PADILLA, NANIE L. PALABAY, ANGELINA N. PALOS, ALAN B. PANCHO, MELITA PANCHO, ESTRELLA C.
PANGANIBAN, GINA C. PANGANIBAN, LERMA V. PANGANIBAN, PEDRO A. PANGANIBAN, RITO PARTOSA, CYNTHIA PASADILLA,
PRISCILLA E. PASCUA, JOCELYN C. PASCUAL, REBECCA PASCUAL, FLORENCIO PASTULERO, GERMAN PATNONGON, VENANCIO
PATRICIO, CARLEEN R. PERALTA, MARITON T. PEREZ, IMELDA D. PILLAS, RICARDO B. PINAY-AN, JUDITH A. PLATERO, EMILY J.
POLON, BILLYADONA B. PONCE, RAUL R. PONSECA, RAMY PRADO, BERNADEL M. PRIVADO, FERNANDO S. PRONUEVO, CARMELITA
C. PUTOLINO, NORA QUINTOS, EDNA D. RAGUINDIN, JULIAN D. RAGUINDIN, ANACLETA G. RAMILO, FRUTO RAMOS, JULIETA RAMOS,
ROMEO R. RAMOS, SABINA RAYMUNDO, FE BIEN R. REALON, ALFREDO RECTRA, IRENEO REGIDOR, RACHEL C. REGIDOR, ALICE
REYES, ELIZABETH L. REYES, FLORDELIZA REYES, DOLORES E. RICAFRANCA, MANUEL RICARDO, ROBERTA L. RIGUER, GRETEL F.
RIVERA, EFREN ROBLES, PROCESO RODRIGUEZ, REMEDIOS F. RONATO, EDEN ROSON, LEOPOLDO U. ROXAS, MOISES SADURAL,
SR., MOISES A. SADURAL, JR., VALENTIN SADURAL, JOSEFINA A. SAGUN, RUBY F. SAHAGUN, MAURA M. SALIBA, GERLIE SALVA,
LEONCIO SALUDARES, AVELINA M. SAMIANO, REYNALDO A. SAMIANO, JAIME G. SAN PABLO, VERONIDIA G. SAN PABLO,
BARTOLOME SANCHEZ, JOSEPHINE L. SANDOVAL, EDA SANOPO, ELIZA C. SANTIAGO, JOEL G. SANTIAGO, TIMOTEO SANTIAGO,
CONCEPCION W. SANTOS, FELIXBERTO SANTOS, JR., JOSEFINA C. SANTOS, MARCELINO SANTOS, RODOLFO SANTOS CESARIO
SANTOSAN, JUMELLE G SARABIA, JOSEPHINE SARMIENTO, OFELIA SARMIENTO, AURORA C. SAVELLANO, SALLY SERRANO,
RODOLFO R. SIBALUCA, MARINA SILVESTRE, BASILISA C. SISON, EDUARDO N. SISON, SYLVANA R. SISON, ESTER SOBREMONTE,
JAIME SOBREMONTE, ALFREDO SORIANO, JR., JULIA PAULA M. SORIANO, CARMEN STA. AGATA, DOMINGA SUBA, TETERIO SUER,
JEROME SUPLIDO, LINA A. TABUAR, FERMIN TACAZON, LORENZO TALATALA, ADORA V. TAN, NELCY L. TAEDO, MILAGROSA T.
TANALGO, ALBERTO C. TANCHANCO, MELECIO TARIFE, ROSARIO K. TATLONGHARI, RUFINA B. TAYAG, HERMINIA A. TECSON, PAPA
TENGCO, LOURDES L. TEVES, CRESENCIANA R. TIMBOL, NOLI N. TIONG, VIRGINIA B. TIONG, LILIA TIONGSON, MA. ASUNCION N.
TIONGSON, JOSEPHINE TOLENTINO, BENJAMIN TORRENTE, OSCAR TORRES, SONIA M. TRINIDAD, RIZALINA TROPA, CRISTINA
TUAZON, HOMER E. TUAZON, RICARDO TUBUNGBAMA, HYDEE N. TUYAY, MERCY URRUTIA, LARNE VALCARCEL, EMILIANO B.
VALDEZ, JR., REMEDIOS S. VALDEZ, JOSIE VARGAS, FELINO VELASQUEZ (DR.), PEDRO A. VELASQUEZ, RAFAEL A. VELEZ, SYLVIA I.
VERGARA, BLESILDA VERIN, ADRIANO VICTORIO, JR., DOMINADO VICTORIO, EMILY E. VICTORIO, GLORIA VIDA, LOURDES M.
VILLAFLOR, ALBERTO A. VILLAFLORES, LEONIDO Z. VILLAFLORES, ALICE VILLALOBOS, CATHERINE P. VILLANUEVA, EDWIN G.
VILLANUEVA, TERESITA S. VILLARIAZA, FREDERICO G. VILLARTA, EDGAR VINCULADO, ZENAIDA C. VINCULADO, EDITHA VITALICIA,
AVELINO C. VIVO, ARLENE V. VYTIACO, MILAGROS WABE, RODOLFO WENCESLAO A. WONOSUWAN, HERMINIA V. YALUNG, LAARNI
ZAMORA, MARY ANN R. ZEPEDA, FERNANDO SQ, LATI M. SIRIOS, JOEL BOREJON, CONCHITA PUBLICO, AGRIPINA BRIONES, MILTON
SACRO, LOLITA RAZON, CONSOLACION GUERRA, ANDRES ARAO, MARCELINO JUSTO, ROSALES REGINIO, PEDRO RUBALA, BENJO
BONIFACIO, ANGEL MATEO, EDUARDO QUE MODESTA M. ANDAYA, ANTONIETTA M. APALISOK, VIENNA E. BELTRAN, LORENZO N.
BRIANA, CRISELDA L. CASTILLO, JUANITO B. CHAN, JR., ORLANDO S. CUYUGAN, ZORAIDA F. DE GUZMAN, VITO F. DEL FIERRO, JR.,
RELITA A. ROSA, HERMINIA S. DELOS REYES, BEATRIZ C. DIZON, SUSAN A. FORONDA, MARY ANN P. FRANCO, ROMULO M. GARCIA.
JOVITA M. GONZALES, REBECCA O. JOSE, MARCIA B. LANUZA, ALBERTO G. LEGASPI, ANGELINA A. MABUNGA, CONSUELO B.
MANGUBAT, ILUMINADA G. MAPAYE, AMELIA V. MARCELO, GLENDA S. MARQUEZ, LOURDES IRENE N. MIOZA, EULOGIO M.
MONTEALTO, MARIO P. MUECO, LUCILDA L. PADAUAN, EDGARDO V. SAN JUAN, MA. FATIMA S. SENGCO, CAROLYN O. TABANGCURA,
MARIETA U. TIBAYAN, MARIETA E. TUGADE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. GODOFREDO N. ALCASID, JR., in this official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of Soils and Water Management. HON. ROMEO
N. ALCASID, in hit official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, and HON. PEDRO O. OCAMPO, in his official capacity
as the Executive Director of the Livestock Development Council, respondents.
G.R. No. 111494 September 11, 1998
DIONELO D. IBABAO, ELVIRA F. SIMON, AURORA M. CRISTOBAL ONOFRE T. SUBA, NELITA DIAZ, ERNESTO NUVAL, ENRIQUE LACSA,
SABINA DIAZ, MAGTANGGOL SANTIAGO, VALENTIN TANZUACO, ANGELITO TABORA, LOIDA CAINGLIT, ALBERTO SANTIAGO III,
HOSPICIO C. MAHILUM, FRANCISCO SANTOS, JR., PABLO RABINO, LORETO GANIR, MODESTO DAYON, GLICERIA TUAZON, HONOLITA
ALMONTE, RAQUEL RAMOS, ADORACION C. JASTILLANA, RICARDO ESGUERRA, JONATHAN DICKSON, ROBERTO TIONGSON,
BIENVENIDO RICAFRENTE, ALFREDO TAYAG, ROLANDO CAJANDING, AMELITO GOLLOSO, REYNALDO RONQUILLO, LEONCIO
LEGASPI, REYNALDO DELA CRUZ, NICANOR LLAMAS, MARIANO ODHOY, LORETO GANIR, TERESITA MALLA, ORBETA GUERRERO,
HILARION LAGUA, PABLO ABAD, ALBERTO LAPERAL JR., CLARITA ULANDAY, TERESITA LOPEZ, CRSENCIA MALONZO, NATIVIDAD
LAGUA, JERICARDO MONDRAGON, FILOMENA GANTE, JESUSA WAJI, LEONORA SIGNE, MARILOU ROSANA, JOSEFINA FRANCISCO,
MARIA AFRICA MENDIORO, SEVERO BALANE, JR., TEODORO JOCSON, MARISSA ALBALADEJO, FLORA CASEM, MILAGROS FLORADA,
TOMASA CARANDANG, MERLY REPANI, SUSAN GARCIA, BENJAMIN NUNEZ, ANA MARIE ARENAS, ROMUALDO POL, JULITA LAVARO,
HERMINIO MAHILUM, AMIANA ABELLA, ADELAIDA ALCISTO, RIZALINA M. LEGASTO, MILAGROS LEDESMA, LORNA P. ANACLETO,
AUGUSTO T. REGIO, CYNTHIA P. ISAAC, FELIPE ALBANO, ROSALINDA Q. DE LA CRUZ, MITZI C. FERNANDEZ, RUSSEL DIAZ VALENTINO
MACASAET, SALVADOR DELFINO, MAXIMO ESGUERRA, JR., JUNELITA PACIO, ERNESTO TUZON, VIOLA MARIANO, LUTGARDA
SEBASTIAN, MARCO PEREZ, ISABELO MACABUGAO, FRANCISCO FABRO, ERLINDA CLAVO, DOMINGO JOCSON, ENECITAS
TABORADA, LUISA TUASON, ROSALIO BAZ, JR., LUZVIMINDA SALDUA, TEODORA OAMINAL, LEONOR BRINGAS, DAISY LADRA,
MERCEDES SANGREO, ZENAIDA MUNON, ANTONIO AMURAO, PERCIVAL ECITO, SYLVIA MON, LOURDES MANGASI, BENIGNO MAGNO,
ZOILO AQUINO, ROSARIE ARREZA, PILAR FONTELAR, FLOR ABELLA, MERCEDITA BANTAYA, PACIENCIA FIGUEROA, HILDA BALLO,
MAURICIO BALLO, RODOLFO C. PINTO, CESAR GUERRERO, VIRGINIA DE LOS SANTOS, ALICE CORDERO, MYRNA ABILAR, ROSA
BASSIG, ADORACION OBINQUE, AMELITA MAGBAGO, MACARIA ANDRADE, CONSUELO BALTAZAR, ELIZABETH VIANA, ROSARIO
RAGAZA, JOSEFINO MONDRAGON, CONRADO GANIR, FILIPINA GOJAR, EMILIA BARRAMEDA, CIRILA LEYVA, FREDA ROXAS,
CORAZON DE LA CRUZ, ROSITA CALVELO, ROSARIO LIZARDO, CRISTINA NUQUI, FELICISIMA MAXINO, JACINTO ARUCAN, JR.,
LORETA DE GUZMAN, LEONORA DE LEON, LYDIA AGUILING, DALISAY MONEDA, LOURDES LIZA, PAZ LADERAS, EFREN LUNA,
EVELYN CABUS, ESTER CONCEPCION, ARIEL BAUTISTA, FRANCIA AMAQUI, FRANCISCA BIANES, PAZ LUCERO, ERLINDA ESPINOSA,
TERESITA CATACUTAN, REGINO OGSIMER, ESTRELLA ORENSE, MARYLOU VILLAREAL, ALMA DICKSON, NATIVIDAD RAZO, ALICIA
SUALOG, ERLINDA ARALAR, REDENTOR GATUS, FORTUNATO CABEZAS, CECILIA REYES, AURORA REYES, BARTOLOME, SANTIAGO,
JESUS DELA TORRE, CONSOLACION SEVILLA, HENRY LUGAYAN, ANGELES GALERA, REUBEN A. GANADEN, JULITA ABULON, LINA
SANTOS, GLORIA C. BERGADO, ANSELMA S. LEGASPI, LEONORA RIVER, EDITHA MALOLOS, JESUS SANCHEZ, ALBERTO MOLERO,
DOMINGO TUAZON, JR., SOFIA S. BASA, SUSANA EDIC, FELIPE ELEDA, ARMANDO LANDAYAN, RICARDO MAR, JR., AUGUSTO
SANTOS, ARSENIA AREVALO, ERLINDA ABUEVA, VIRGILIO SANTOS, GAUDENCIO BADIOLA, JR., MODESTA ANGELES, RENATO
GUTIERREZ, LUCERNA ICAPIN, MARLENE CALANGIAN, NEMENCIO AREVALO, NENITA DE GUZMAN, LOURDES PALO, MANUEL
CABRERA. BENJAMIN MAGAT, ERNESTO REYES, EUGENE SANGALANG, ARMANDO ALCAZAR, JOSELITO MAGHIRANG, ROMEO DIETA,
ROFER ESQUIRRES, DONATO ALMARINEZ, MELITA CONSULTA, RENATO VILLAFRANCA, LEONCIO ALVAREZ, MANUEL SOTOMAYOR,
LEOVELITO CATALLA, APOLINARIO GICOS, FLORIDA ARBOLEDA, ROMEO PORNOBI, CANDIDO SOTOMAYOR, GREGORIO BARRION,
CARMELA EUBION, DANILO NAGPALA, ANGELITO VALDEZ, LEONARDO SAN JUAN, CLAUDIO RESMA, CESAR GALERA. DANTE
AMURAO, FLORDELIZA DE JESUS, EULENIA FERNANDO, BENEVERT FERNANDO, AQUILINO RONQUILLO, MONA NARVAZ, VIVIAN
NEBRES, ALBERTO NUNEZ, MARINA DUMOL, ARCADIO ISON, NORMA BORJA, REYMUNDO NEBRES, ALEX MOLE, NALDA TANADA,
ARMANDO VILLANUEVA, NIDA BALANE, ROSALIND SANTOS, NITA MITRA MEDRANO, ELIZABETH BAUN, ALFREDO VILLATUYA, ROY
GARCIA, AVELINA BIERNES, RODOLFO ASIS, ARTEMIO GINES, AURITA CASTILLO, HOMERTO RIOMALOS, ALICIA DELOS SANTOS,
GRACE DE VEYRA, SALUD R. GANADEN, LOLITA SUIZO, ERLINDA PICHAY, NELIA TIEL, DORIS FRIAS, JOSIE SAN PEDRO, JOHNNY
ICONAR, AURORA ROCABO, ALICIA BORROMEO, RAMIR MASAYDA, JUANITA AMURAO, BELINDA SAN DIEGO, SIMEONA REGIDOR,
JOSEFINA GENESERA, PATRICIA AQUINO, EDWYN ALESNA, HECTOR BAUN, DANILO LUCERO, PURITA DELA PENA, FELIONOR
ELESERIO, AUGUSTO HERNANDEZ, LINA ZULUETA, PHOEBE LAQUINDANUM, ELMER ALBA, MYRNA RAMOS, EFIPANIO ABAYA,

LUZVIMINDA MATIGNAS, GUILLERMO AQUINO, JR., RICARDO VERSOZA, NELSON FRANCISCO, EDUARDO BUTAC, ADORADO
CAINGLIT, ROLANDO SIKAT, THELMO MAGSUMBOL ELOISA UZON, JUSTONATO PENIANO, PEDRO NATIVIDAD, DOMINGO ASUNCION,
NARCISO GARCIA, RESTITUTO SANCHEZ HELEN IBARRA, ALFREDO DUCANTE, ARMANDO MARTINEZ, GLORIA PASCO, EMMA
MARFORI, RICARDO MENDOZA, ANTONIO MORALES, EDUARDO TOLENTINO, TITO DELA CRUZ, REGINALD GONZALES, JOSE
PACLIBARE, JOSELITO SONGA, VIRGILIO LEOPANDO, LEVITA ZAPANTA, FELIPA LOPEZ, ELPIDIO MENDOZA, EDMUNDO EDROSO,
DOMINGO CATALLA, VERGEL BIADO, DIEGO BUTAC, PROSPERO PASTORAL, CESAR AMINES, REGINO OPORTO, JR., ARMANDO
LAGUIDAO, REYGALDINE RAMIREZ, SEVERINO ESCOBAR, JR., BERNABE GONZALES, MAXIMO GATDULA, ALEMAR SABATIN,
BONIFACIO GANDULLAS, MARCELINO TACADAO, SEVERINO BARICANOSA, PACIFICO FRANCISCO, EDUARDO SALCEDO, RODOLFO
SINGH, FLORENCIO SERANILLO, ELPIDIO MACABALOS, FEDERICO TRINIDAD, JOSE LACTAO, JULITA FADRIGUELA, PERFECTO
GUERRERO, JR., EDITHO DEMDAM, ROMEO B. DE SAGUN, VIOLETA RAMOS, VIRGINIA LOPEZ, CARMENCITA TOCINO, SALVADOR
NIERRAS, MARILYN BERNALDO, CELIA BUSQUE, JOSE CALDERON, AMADO ANONUEVO, LEODEGARIO CAWALING, CELSO IGANCIO,
MARCIAL CAGUICLA, CRISPIN DELA CRUZ, GIL FERRER, FARIDA BATOLOS, MARGIE KILAKIL, EMMA BOROMEO, HERMINIO LEYVA
ROGELIO BERNABE, OSCAR BANDIOLA, MELCHOR TAYAMEN, RUBEN REYES, ANGELITA SALGUET, JOEDOCIEL DANTING, ALMA
MENDOZA, RENATO MENDOZA, FRANK QUIMSON, EVELYN ZAFRA, MELITONA PENADA, BENICIO SINGQUENCO, NICANOR
CRISOSTOMO, ROSEBELLA JUMARAN, ABNER BUENAVENTURA, ADELAIDA PALMA, MARCELO VALDEZ, LILIBETH AFAN, JOSE
NAVIDAD, JUANITO BACANI, ROGELIO LONGALONG, GLICERIO SANTOS, AMOR SANTOS, FE DE JESUS, JAIME DE JESUS, JOSE
VICTORIO, ENRIQUE MARQUEZ, EDMUNDO GADUANG, WESLEY ROSARIO, ROLANDO MIRANDA, WILHELMINA NATIVIDAD, JOSE
NATIVIDAD, GUILLERMO OQUENDO, CLETO RAFER, JR., LEDA G. HANDOG, CORAZON MANUBAY, ELADIO GONZALES, JOY DELA
CRUZ, ADAN DIAMANTE, ELADIO VILLAMATER, GLORIA MATIAS, VIRGINIA S. LUYUN, FIDELITO CALUPIG, RODOLFO JEREMIAS,
JOSEPH BANDALA, CONCEPCION JUICO, PRISCILLA ANGELES, ALFREDO SANTOS, JR., PROCOPIO MACOLOR, AURELIA RABARA,
DANILO SINGQUENCO, HARRIETO CAMARINES, NAMNAMA JAVELLOSA, AMELIA S. MAALA, RAFAEL RAMISCAL, FRANCISCO
TABORDA, CATALINO REYES, NELSON CALVELO, JOHN TABAY, BENJAMIN PINEDA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, In His Capacity As Secretary Of The Department Of Agriculture and HON. GUILLERMO R. MORALES, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Fisheries, and Aquatic Resources, respondents.
G.R. No. 112056 September 11, 1998
JUVY CLAVEL P. GACULA, ANDY R. RIVERA, LORENZO T. SUBARIA, LEO J. BERNAL, CYNTHIA L. DE VEAS, AVELINA L. DIOCES, FE Y.
FELICIANO, THELMA A. GECOLEA, RODOLFO R. PANGAN, MAURA JASMIN A. REYES, PENNY MARIE G. TAN, TERESITA V. CHAN, NENA
A. INOCENCIO, PELAGIA O. ABAYA, FELIX P. BERNARDINO, MA. LUISA M. CALDITO, EDGARDO F. DE JESUS, PARALUMAN T. DELA
PAZ, RENATO F. GILERA, LEOVIGILDO G. MALZAN, CLARITA O. OLANO, HERNAN Z. PEREZ, MILAGROS S. PILAPIL, GAUDENCIO L.
RAMOS, JR., ADORACION J. SANTIAGO, ANDREA O. TAMINA, TRINIDAD N. TOLENTINO, CARMELITA F. ZAFRA, CARMELO P. ABADILLA,
EMMA L. LOGRONIO, CARMELITA B. AGPOON, ANTONIO G. ARIZALA, DOHME C. ARPON, RENATO A. BACLAGAN, MANOLITO A.
CUETO, REYNALDO G. CUSTODIO, ROBLETO M. GULOY, OLIMPIO P. MARIBAO, JR., MANUEL V. MIRANDA, JOSE RANADA, JR., JESUS
R. REVIDAD, REX P. SEVILLA, FEDERICO D. SORIANO, BENEDICTO L. STA. ANA, DANIEL S. TOLENTINO, WILFREDO G. VILLANUEVA,
GUILLERMO O. BALURAN, JOSE G. BATTUNG, MANOLITO J. BERNAL, DELFIN R. BRAVO, PATRICK V. CALDITO, DANILO L. CATIPUNAN,
ANTONIO G. COSTOSA, ROLANDO S. EBERO, BENITO W. GONZAGA, DIVINA S. LEANO, FREDDIE D. LESTINO, RAUL A. LLAANZANA,
JUANITO M. MANSANADEZ, IMELDA M. MIRANDA, ROGELIO J. ORDONEZ, ESTEBAN M. PAREDES, ROMEO S. CARDOSO, ROBERTO E.
CASAYURAN, RAQUEL V. CATIPUNAN, MARCIANO F. CRUZ, JULIEN C. DE TORRES, RAYMUNDO N. GABAY, CRISANTA B. MALICDEM,
GLENADO A. MIJARES, EDA R. NOCON, ERNESTO Q. OBRIQUE, ROMEO D. SISNERO, ANGELITO C. TALAGON, SOLEDAD S. CRUZ,
JOSELITA G. ENCISO, JOSE CARMELO N. LEANO, ROMEO S. SILORIO, EDGARDO L. VIBAR, LOURDES F. ELARDE, ANGELINA E.
RACHO, ROMILDA DE ASIS, GLYCIDAS P. INIGO, CONCHITA M. LACEDA, AUREA M. LUCAS, JOSE ROLANDO J. MANLULU, SERGIO R.
MANRIQUE, ELVIRA G. NAZARET, JOSELINE P. NIWANE, LYDIA J. RUIZ, ALFREDO M. TORRES, CESAR A. AQUINO, MANUEL P.
BALATINSAYO, MONETTE B. CADIANG, RODRIGO O. ESTAMO, ADELAIDA Y. FERRER, EDNA L. LOGRONIO, LEONARDO B.
PONFERRADA, SUSANA M. SANTOS, CONCHITINA Y. SEVILLA, LIBERTY Z. VALLESTERO, LERMA G. VILLANUEVA, ESPERANZA J.
MERCADO, MA. BESSIE P. DIAMANTE, ROSARIO G. MAYRINA, MAXIMINA C. SABINORIO, YOLANDA G. ZALDUA, MA. VICTORIA B.
ANGELES, NOLASCO K. BALIBALOS, EDNA C. BAYUGA, MANUELITO C. BONGABONG, GINA B. CRISOSTOMO, TERESITA N. CUNANAN,
FILIPINA G. DE MESA, LOIDA M. GARCIA, GODREY T. GOLLAYAN, CYNTHIA B. LAGASCA, DIEMMA C. MUNDO, LEONOR S. PALMA,
DELFIN V. PILLE, PATRICIO G. REYES, JR., LOIDA M. VILLANUEVA, EVA G. ZOSA, FELY C. ARANO, RUEL E. BADINAS, IMELDA F.
BARRACA, HELEN GRACE N. CRUZ, ERNESTO P. GIMAS, ALEX D. GUARDIAN, BEHILDA L. HEZETA, JOCELYN D. NAGUIT, EDMUNDO A.
NUEVO, SOLOMON F. PAZ, LOURDES C. BALING, EMPERATRIZ N. NEPOMUCENO, ROSAL C. GUARDIAN, REMEDIOS A. ANCHETA,
ROSEMARIE L. BOBIER, MA. ALICIA BONOAN, GEMMA V. BORJA. ANELY BURGO, FINARDO G. CABILAO, ROSALIE F. DOBLES, EDNA E.
FRANCISCO, ANGELINA V. OPLEDA, MARITES K. RANESES, LIBERTY D. RESTAN, ANNABEL ARRIETA, OSCAR B. BALAYAN, THELMA
BALAYAN, JESUSA A. CABILAO, ELISEO C. COPIAN, FERNANDO C. DELA CRUZ, JESUS S. FAR, JOSE G. FUERTES, HANNIBAL A.
GALANG, RICARDO M. GALING II, ARNEL B. GARCIA, IRISH B. MANJARES, MARITESS M. MARISTELA, SYLVIA S. RED, ARLENE M.
REYES, DELILAH H. SAMSON, FARAH D. SELGA, ERNESTINA Z. SOLLOSO, HELEN URBANO, MARIVIC L. UY, OLIVIA A. UY, ROMEO S.
ZAFRA, CECILIA G. ALEMAN, JULIETA A. ALFEREZ, PERPETUA BALIBALOS, MARILOU C. BANCUD, ARABECQUE T. BATILONG,
PORFIRIO R. BATUYONG, TONI BINALLA, AIDA E. BORINES, ELISIA D. CLAVANO, ESTER R. EGAMINO, RAMIL R. EGAMINO, MARIAN L.
LOFRANCO FLORESA T. MARANAN, CYMBELINE S. MARTINEZ, LORELIE A. SUELO, MARLYN B. AMIGO, LINA A. ARANETA, JOSEPHINE
G. BANAAG, ROWENA CABANERO, IRENE O. DE OCAMPO, LEAH C. EDADES, FILOMENA LA CORTE, MILAGROS P. ORTICIO, MERLINDA
C. SABIO, ADANIA SAKALURAN, PRISCILA M. YBERA, DELIA G. CORPUZ, PILAR B. MUSCAT, LIGAYA M. ORGANO, BARBARA LUZ R.
PEREZ, NIMFA MARIA C. VIDAR, CRISTINO G. BABIDA, NENITA G. CRUZ, MERLITA B. CRUZADO, AMELITA O. DABBAN, EMMA C.
DERICO, EMMANUEL M. LASAC, ARACELI V. MALABANAN, MA. TERESA T. MONTALBO, LOLITA R. NOBIO, GUILLERMO A. PINGOL, JR.,
JUDITH R. VILLEGAS, CONSOLACION O. DELA CRUZ, ROSALINA J. DITAN, CARMEN I. MONARES, DOMINGO O. JAVIER, JESUS B.
REMEGIO, MARILOU S. REMEGIO, ELSA L. MAGAT, RICARDO P. MASINSIN, SANDRA B. PANAHON, MARIETTA T. FLOTILDES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CORAZON ALMA G. DE LEON, in her capacity as the Secretery of the Dept. of Social Welfare and Development, respondent.
G.R. No. 119597 September 11, 1998
ASSOCIATION OF DEDICATED EMPLOYEES OF THE PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY (ADEPT), petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), respondent.

PURISIMA, J.:
These are cases for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality and validity of Administrative Order Nos. 29 and 268 on
various grounds.
The facts in G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and 112056 are undisputed, to wit:
Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies who were paid incentive benefits for the year
1992, pursuant to Executive Order No. 292 1 ("EO 292"), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V 2 of EO 292. On January 19, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos ("President Ramos") issued Administrative Order
No. 29 ("AO 29") authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 3 and
reiterating the prohibition 4 under Section 7 5 of Administrative Order No. 268 ("AO 268"), enjoining the grant of productivity incentive

benefits without prior approval of the President. Section 4 of AO 29 directed "[a]ll departments, offices and agencies which authorized
payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount authorized under Section 1 hereof [are hereby directed] to
immediately cause the return/refund of the excess within a period of six months to commence fifteen (15) days after the issuance of this
Order." In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned, who are the herein respondents,
caused the deduction from petitioners' salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments. To prevent the
respondents from making further deductions from their salaries or allowances, the petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief.
In G.R. No. 119597, the facts are different but the petition poses a common issue with the other consolidated cases. The petitioner,
Association of Dedicated Employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority ("ADEPT"), is an association of employees of the Philippine
Tourism Authority ("PTA") who were granted productivity incentive bonus for calendar year 1992 pursuant to Republic Act No. 6971 ("RA
6971"), otherwise known as the Productivity Incentives Act of 1990. Subject bonus was, however, disallowed by the Corporate Auditor on
the ground that it was "prohibited under Administrative Order No. 29 dated January 19, 1993." 6 The disallowance of the bonus in question
was finally brought on appeal to the Commission an Audit (COA) which denied the appeal in its Decision 7 of March 6, 1995, ratiocinating,
thus:
. . . Firstly, the provisions of RA #6971 insofar as the coverage is concerned refer to business
enterprises including government owned and/or controlled corporations performing proprietary
functions.
Sec. 1a of the Supplemental Rules Implementing RA #6971 classified such coverage as:
All business enterprises, with or without existing duly certified labor
organizations, including government owned and/or controlled corporations
performing proprietary functions which are established solely for business or
profit and accordingly excluding those created, maintained or acquired in
pursuance of a policy of the State enunciated in the Constitution, or by law
and those whose officers and employess are covered by the Civil Service.
(emphasis supplied)
The PTrA is a GOCC created in pursuance of a policy of the State, Section 9 of
Presidential Decree No. 189 states that "To implement the policies and
program of the Department (Dept. of Tourism), there is hereby created a
Philippine Tourism Authority, . . ." Likewise, Section 21 of the same decree
provides that "All officials and employees of the Authority, . . ., shall be
subject to Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and the coverage of the
Wage and Position Classification Office.
Furthermore, although Supplemental Rules and Regulations implementing
R.A. #6971 was issued only on December 27, 1991, the law itself is clear that it
pertains to private business enterprises whose employees are covered by the
Labor Code of the Philippines, as mentioned in the following provisions:
Sec. 5. Labor Management Committee. . . . that at the reguest of any party to
the negotiation, the National Wages and Productivity Commission of the
Department of Labor and Employment shall provide the necessary studies, . . .
.
Sec. 8. Notification. A business enterprise which adopts a productivity
incentive program shall submit copies of the same to the National Wages and
Productivity Commission and to the Bureau of Internal Revenue for their
information and record.
Sec. 9. Disputes and Grievances. Whenever disputes, grievances, or other
matters arise from the interpretation or implementation of the productivity
incentive program, . . . may seek the assistance of the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and Employment for such
purpose. . . .
Therefore, considering the foregoing, the PTrA is within the "exclusion" provision of the
Implementing Rules of RA #6971 and so, it (PTrA) does not fall within its coverage as being
entitled to, the productivity incentive bonus under RA #6971.
Secondly, Administrative Order No. 29 which is the basis for the grant of the productivity incentive
bonus/benefits for CY 1992 also explessly provides "prohibiting payments of similar benefits in
future years unless duly authorized by the President."
Thirdly, the disallowance of the Auditor, PTrA has already been resolved when this Commission
circularized thru COA Memorandum #92-758 dated April 3, 1992 the Supplemental to Rules
implementing RA 6971 otherwise known as the "Productivity Incentives Act of 1990." . . .
Lastly, considering the title of RA #6971, i.e. "An Act to encourage productivity and maintain
industrial peace by providing incentives to both labor and capital", and its implementing rules and
regulations prepared by the Department of Labor and Employment and the Department of Finance,
this Office concludes that said law/regulation pertains to agencies in the private sector whose
employees are covered by the Labor Code.
With the denial of its appeal, petitioner found its way here via the petition in G.R. No. 119597, to seek relief from the aforesaid
decision of COA.
We will first resolve the issue on the applicability of RA 6971 to petitioner ADEPT in G.R. No. 119597 before passing upon the
constitutionality or validity of Administrative Orders 29 and 268.
Sec. 3 of RA 6971, reads:

Sec. 3. Coverage. This Act shall apply to all business enterprises with or without existing and duly
recognized or certified labor organizations, including government-owned and controlled
corporations performing proprietary functions. It shall cover all employees and workers including
casual, regular, supervisory and managerial employees. (emphasis ours)
Pursuant to Section 10 8 of RA 6971, the Secretary of Labor and Secretary of Finance issued Supplemental Rules to Implement
the said law, as follows:
Sec. 1. Paragraph (a) Section 1, Rule II of the Rules Implementing RA 6971, shall be amended to
read as follows:
Coverage. These Rules shall apply to:
(a) All business enterprises with or without existing duly certified labor organizations, including
government-owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary functions which are
established solely for business or profit or gain and accordingly excluding those created,
maintained or acquired in pursuance of a policy of the state, enunciated in the Constitution or by
law, and those whose officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service. (emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner contends that the PTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation performing proprietary function, and therefore the
Secretary of Labor and Employment and Secretary of Finance exceeded their authority in issuing the aforestated Supplemental Rules
Implementing RA 6971.
Government-owned and controlled corporations may perform governmental or proprietary functions or both, depending on the purpose for
which they have been created. If the purpose, is to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the function is proprietary. If
it is in the interest of health, safety and for the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the public in general, the function is
governmental. 9 Powers classified as "proprietary" are those intended for private advantage and benefit. 10
The PTA was established by Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 564 ("PD 564").
Its general purposes 11 are:
1. To implement the policies and programs of the Department of Tourism
("Department");
2. To develop tourist zones;
3. To assist private enterprises in undertaking tourism projects;
4. To operate and maintain tourist facilities;
5. To assure rand availability for private investors in hotels and other tourist
facilities;
6. To coordinate all tourism project plans and operations.
Its specific functions and powers 12 are:
1. Planning and development of tourism projects
a. To assist the Department make a comprehensive
survey of the physical and natural tourism resources of
the Philippines; to establish the order of priority for
development of said areas; to recommend to the
President the proclamation of a tourist zone; and to define
and fix the boundaries of the zone;
b. To formulate a development plan for each zone;
c. To submit to the President through the National
Economic and Development Athority for review and
approval all development plans before the same are
enforced or implemented;
d. To submit to the President an Annual Progress Report;
e. To assist the Department to determine the additional
capacity requirements for various tourist facilities and
services; to prepare a ten-year Tourism Priorities Plan; to
update annually the ten year Tourism Priorities Plan.
f. To gather, collate and analyze statistical data and other
pertinent information for the effective implementation of
PD 564.
2. Acquisition and disposition of lands and other assets for tourist zone
purposes

a. To acquire possession and ownership of all lands

transferred to it from other government corporations and
institutions and any land having tourism potential and
earmarked in the Tourism Priorities Plans for intensive
development into a tourist zone or as a part thereof,
subject to the approval of the President.
b. To acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by
condemnation proceedings any private land within and
without the tourist zones for any of the following reasons:
(a) consolidation of lands for tourist zone development
purposes, (b) prevention of land speculation in areas
declared as tourist zones, (c) acquisition of right of way to
the zones, (d) protection of water shed areas and natural
assets with tourism value, and (e) for any other purpose
expressly authorized under PD 564.
c. For the purpose of providing land acquisition
assistance to registered tourism enterprises, to sell,
subdivide, resell, lease, sublease, rent out, or otherwise,
to said registered tourism enterprises under sufficiently
soft terms for use specifically in the development of
hotels, recreational facilities, and other tourist services.
d. To develop and/or subdivide any land in its name or
undertake condominium projects thereon, and sell
subdivision lots or condominium units to private persons
for investment purposes.
e. To take over or transfer to a registered tourism
enterprise in accordance with law any lease on foreshore
areas within a tourist zone or adjacent thereto, in cases
said areas are not being utilized in accordance with the
PTA's approved zone development plan and wherein the
lessee concerned does not agree to conform accordingly.
f. To arrange for the reclamation of any land adjacent to or
adjoining a tourist zone in coordination with appropriate
government agencies.
3. Infrastructure development for tourist zone purposes
a. To contract, supervise and pay for infrastructure works
and civil works within a tourist zone owned and operated
by the PTA.
b. To coordinate with appropriate government agencies
the development of infrastructure requirements
supporting a tourist zone.
c. To take water from any public stream, river, creek, lake,
spring, or waterfall and to alter, straighten, obstruct or
increase the flow of water in streams.
4. Zone adminstration and control
a. To formulate and implement zoning regulations.
b. To determine and regulate the enterprises to be
established within a tourist zone.
c. To ensure, through the proper authorities concerned,
the ecological preservation, maintenance and/or
rehabilitation of the common and the public areas within a
tourist zone and the environment thereof.
d. To identify and recommend to the President the
preservation and/or restoration of national monuments or
preserves; to arrange for the preservation and/or
restoration of the same with appropriate government
agencies or with the private sector or with the owners
themselves of said tourist attractions; and to identify and
recommend to the appropriate authorities concerned the
declaration of tourist areas and attractions as national
monuments and preserves.
5. Project and investment promotions
a. To identify, develop, invest in, own, manage and
operate such projects as it may deem to be vital for
recreation and rest but not sufficiently attractive
economically for private investment.

b. To construct hotel buildings and other tourist facilities

within a tourist zone and in turn lease such facilities to
registered tourism enterprises for operation, management
and maintenance.
c. To organize, finance, invest in, manage and operate
wholly-owned subsidiary corporations.
6. Direct assistance to registered enterprises
a. To administer the tax and other incentives granted to
registered enterprises.
b. To evaluate, approve and register or reject any and all
tourism projects or enterprises established within the
tourist zones.
c. To grant medium and long-term loans and/or re-lend
any funds borrowed for the purpose to duly qualified
registered tourism enterprises.
d. To guarantee local and foreign borrowings of registered
enterprises.
e. To provide equity investments in the form of cash
and/or land.
f. To extend technical, management and financial
assistance to tourism projects.
g. To identify, contact and assist in negotiations of
suitable partners for both local and foreign investors
interested in investment or participation in the tourism
industry.
h. To assist registered enterprises and prospective
investors to have their papers processed with dispatch by
government offices.
7. Other powers and functions
a. To engage or retain the services of financial,
management, legal, technical, and/or project consultants
from the private or government sector.
b. To have the power to succeed by its corparate name.
c. To adopt, alter, and use a corporate seal.
d. To sue and be sued under its corporate name.
e. To enter into any contracts of any kind and description.
f. To own or possess personal and/or real property.
g. To make, adopt and enforce rules and regulations to
execute its powers, duties and functions.
h. To purchase, hold, and alienate shares of stock or
bonds of any corporation.
i. To collect fees or charges as may be imposed under PD
564.
j. To contract indebtedness and issue bonds.
k. To fix and collect rentals for the lease, use or
occupancy of lands, buildings, or other property owned or
administered by PTA.
l. To do any and all acts and things necessary to carry out
the purposes for which the PTA is created.
Categorited in light of the foregoing provisions of law in point, PTA's governmental functions include the first, third, fourth, and sixth of the
aforesaid general purposes. The second 13 and fifth general purposes fall under its proprietary functions.
With respect to PTA's specific functions and powers, the first and fourth are governmental in nature while the specific functions and
powers are proprietary in character. The second, third, sixth, and seventh specific functions and powers can be considered partlygovernmental and partly-proprietary, considering that 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 3(a), 6(c), 6(d), 6(e), 7(h), 7(j), and 7(k) are proprietary

functions while 2(f), 3(b), 3(c), 6(a), 6(b), 6(f), 6(g), 6(h), 7(a), 7(b), 7(c), 7(d), 7(f), 7(g), and 7(l) are governmental functions. The specific
functions and powers treated in 7(e) and 7(i) may be classified either as propietary or governmental, depending on the circumstances
under which they are exercised or performed.
The aforecited powers and functions of PTA are predominantly governmental, principally geared towards the development and promotion
of tourism in the scenic Philippine archipelago. But it is irrefutable that PTA.also performs proprietary functions, as envisaged by its
charter.
Reliance on the above analysis of the functions and powers of PTA does not suffice for the determination of whether or not it is within the
coverage of RA 6971. For us to resolve the issues raised here solely on the basis of the classification of PTA's powers and functions may
lead to the rendition of judgment repugnant to the legislative intent and to established doctrines, as well, such as on the prohibition
against government workers to strike. 14 Under RA 6971, the workers have the right to strike.
To ascertain whether PTA is within the ambit of RA 6971, there is need to find out the legislative intent, and to refer to other provisions of
RA 6971 and other pertinent laws, that may aid the Court in ruling on the right or officials and employees of PTA to receive bonuses under
RA 8971.
Petitioner cites an entry in the journal of the House of Representatives to buttress its submission that PTA is within the coverage of RA
6971, to wit:
Chairman Veloso: The intent of including government-owned and controlled corporations within
the coverage of the Act is the recognition of the principle that when government goes into
business, it (divests) itself of its immunity from suit and goes down to the level of ordinary private
enterprises and subjects itself to the ordinary laws of the land just like ordinary private
enterprises. Now, when people work therefore in government-owned or controlled corporations, it
is as if they are also, just like in the private sector, entitled to all the benefits of all laws that apply
to workers in the private sector. In my view, even including the right to organize, bargain. . . .
VELOSO (Bicameral Conference Committee on Labor and Employment, pp. 15-16)
After a careful study, the Court is of the view, and go holds, that contrary to petitioner's interpretation, the government-owned and
controlled corporations Mr. Chairman Veloso had in mind were government-owned and controlled corporations incorporated under the
general corporation law. This is so because only workers in private corporations and government-owned and controlled corporations,
incorporated under the general corporation law, have the right to bargain (collectively). Those in government corporations with special
charter, which are subject to Civil Service Laws, have no right to bargain (collectively), except where the terms and conditions of
employment are not fixed by law 15. Their rights and duties are not comparable with those in the private sector.
Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers
cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions
from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial
peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and
their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of
wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the
unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government
employment however, it is the legisleture and, where properly given delegated power, the
administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is
effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective
bargaining agreements. (Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment,
124 SCRA 1) (emphasis ours)
Government corporations may be created by special charters or by incorporation under the general corporation law. Those created by
special charters are governed by the Civil Service Law while those incorporated under the general corporation law are governed by the
Labor Code. 16
The legislative intent to place only government-owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary functions under the coverage of
RA 6971 is gleanable from the other provisions of the law. For instance, section 2 17 of said law envisions "industrial peace and harmony"
and "to provide corresponding incentives to both labor and capital;" section 4 18 refers to "representatives of labor and management,"
section 5 19 mentions of "collective bargaining agent(s) of the bargaining unit(s);" section 6 20 relates to "existing collective bargaining
agreements," and "labor and management;" section 7 21 speaks of "strike or lockout;" and section 9 22 purports to "seek the assistance of
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and Employment" and "include the name(s) of the voluntary
arbitrators or panel of voluntary arbitrator." All the aforecited provisions of law apply only to private corporations and government-owned
and controlled corporations organized under the general corporation law. Only they have collective bargaining agents, collective
bargaining units, collective bargaining agreements, and the right to strike or lockout.
To repeat, employees of government corporations created by special charters have neither the right to strike nor the right to bargain
collectively, as defined in the Labor Code. The case of Social Security System Employees Associalion indicates the following remedy of
government workers not allowed to strike or bargain collectively, to wit:
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the
Congress the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of
legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those
which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to
the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil
service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in
the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their demands, (supra, footnote 14, p.
698; emphasis ours)
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of
the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 23 The
provisions of RA 6971, taken together, reveal the legislative intent to include only government-owned and controlled corporations
performing proprietary functions within its coverage.
Every statute must be construed harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 24 We note Section 1, Rule
X of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292, which reads:
Sec. 1. Each department or agency of government, whether national or local, including bureaus
and agencies, state colleges and universities, and government owned and controlled corporations

with original charters, shall establish its own Department or Agency Employee Suggestions and
Incentives Award System in accordance with these Rules and shall submit the same to the
Commission for approval. (emphasis ours)
It is thus evident that PTA, being a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter subject to Civil Service
Law, Rules and Regulations, 25 is already within the scope of an incentives award systern under Section 1, Rule X of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing EO 292 issued by the Civil Service Commission ("Commission"). Since government-owned and
controlled corporations with original charters do have an incentive award system, Congress enacted a law that would address
the same concern of officials and employees of government-owned and controlled corporations incorporated under the general
corporation law.
All things studiedly considered in proper perspective, the Court finds no reversible error in the finding by respondent Commission that
PTA is not within the purview of RA 6971. As regards the promulgation of implementing rules and regulations, it bears stressing that the
"power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in
the legislative enactment." 26 In the case under scrutiny, the Supplementary Rules Implementing RA 6971 issued by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment and the Secretary of Finance accord with the intendment and provisions of RA 6971. Consequently, not being covered by
RA 6971, AO 29 applies to the petitioner.
We now tackle the common issue posited by the consolidated petitions on the constitutionality of AO 29 and AO 268.
Petitioners contend and argue, that:
I. AO 29 AND AO 268 ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF EO 292 AND,
HENCE, NULL AND VOID.
II. AO 29 AND AO 268 UNLAWFULLY USURP THE CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY GRANTED SOLELY TO THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
III. THE FORCED REFUND OF INCENTIVE PAY IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
IMPAIRMENT OF A CONTRACTUAL OBLIGAITION.
IV. ASSUMING, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT ONLY, THAT THE GRANT OF
PRODUCTIVITY INCENTIVE BENEFITS WAS INVALID, THE SAME SHOULD BE
THE PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICIALS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE
THEREFOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 9 OF AO 268.
Issued by the then President Corazon Aquino ("President Aquino") on July 25, 1987 in the exercise ol her legislative powers under the 1987
Constitution, 27 EO 292, or the Administrative Code or 1987, provided for the following incentive award system:
Sec. 31. Career and Personnel Development Plans. Each department or agency shall prepare a
career and personnel development plan which shall be integrated into a national plan by the
Commission. Such career and personnel development plans which shall include provisions on
merit promotions, performance evaluation, in-service training, including overseas and local
schorlarship and training grants, job rotation, suggestions and incentive award systems, and such
other provisions for employees' health, welfare, counseling, recreation and similar services.
Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award Syatem. There shall be established a
government-wide employee suggestions and incentive awards system which shall be
administered under such rules, regulations, and standards as maybe promulgated by the
Commssion.
In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Commission, the
President or the head of each department or agency is authorized to incur whatever necessary
expensesd involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the
government who by their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal
efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations, or
who perform such other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in connection with, or
in relations to, their official employment.
Sec. 36. Personnel Relations. (1) It shall be the concern of the Commission to provide
leadership and assistance in developing employee relations programs in the department or
agencies.
(2) Every Secretary or head of agency shall take all proper steps toward the creation of an
atmosphere conducive to good supervisor-employee relations and the improvement of employee
morale.
Pursuant to the provision of Section 12(2), 28 Chapter 3, Book V or EO 292, the commission adopted and prescribed the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292 which, among others, provide:
Sec. 1. Each department or agency of government, whether national or local, including bureaus
and agencies, state colleges and universities, and government owned and controlled corporations
with original charters, shall establish its own Department or Agency Employee Suggestions and
Incentives Award System in accordance with these Rules and shall submit the same to the
Commission for approval.
Sec. 2. The System is designed to encourage creativity, innovativeness, efficiency, integrity and
productivity in the public service by recognizing and rewarding officials and employees,
individually or in groups, for their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishments, and other
personal efforts which contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement in government
operations, or for other extraordinary acts of services in the public interest.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The incentive awards shall consist of, though not limited to, the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Productivity Incentive which shall be given to an employee or group of employees who has
exceeded their targets or has incurred incremental improvement over existing targets.
On February 21, 1992, President Aquino issued AO 268 which granted "each official and employee of the government the productivity
incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to thirty percent (30%) of his one (1) month basic salary but in no case shall such
amount be less than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00)," 29 for those who have rendered at least one year of service as of December 31,
1991. 30 Said AO carried the prohibition, provided in Section 7 thereof, which reads:
Sec. 7. The productivity incentive benefits herein authorized shall be granted only for Calendar
Year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including the governing boards of governmentowned or -controlled corporations and financial institutions, are hereby strictly prohibited from
authorizing/granting productivity incentive benefits or other allowances of similar nature for
Calendar Year 1992 and future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being
undertaken by the Office of the President in coordination with the Civil Service Commission and
the Department of Budget and Management on the matter.
The formulation of the necessary implementing guidelines for Executive Order No. 486 dated 8
November 1991 establishing a performance-based incentive system for government-owned or
-controlled corporations shall likewise be included in the comprehensive study referred to in the
preceding paragraph.
On January 19, 1993, President Ramos issued AO 29 which granted productivity incentive benefits to government employees in the
maximum amount of P1,000.00 31 for the calendar year 1992 but reiterated the proscription under Section 7 of AO 268, thus:
Sec. 2. The prohibition prescribed under Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 268 is hereby
reiterated. Accordingly, all heads of government offices/agencies, including government-owned
and/or controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing boards are hereby enjoined
and prohibited from authorizing/granting Productivity Incentive Benefits or any and all similar
forms of allowances/benefits without prior approval and authorization via Administrative Order by
the Office of the President. Henceforth, anyone found violating any of the mandates in this Order,
including all officials/employees and the COA Auditor-in-Charge of such government office/agency
found to have taken part thereof, shall be accordingly and severely dealt with in accordance with
the applicable provisions of existing penal laws.
Consequently, all administrative authorizations to grant any form of allowances/benefits and all
forms of additional compensation usually paid outside of the prescribed basic salary under R.A.
No. 6758, the Salary Standardization Law, that are inconsistent with the legislated policy on the
matter or are not covered by any legislative action are hereby revoked.
The implementation of Executive Order No. 486 dated November 8, 1991, as amended by Executive
Order No. 518 dated May 29, 1992, is hereby deferred until a more comprehensive and equitable
scheme for the grant of the benefits that can be applied government-wide is formulated by the
Department of Budget and Management.
Petitioners theorize that AO 29 and AO 268 violate EO 292 and since the latter is a law, it prevails over executive issuances. Petitioners
likewise assert that AO 29 and AO 268 encroach upon the constitutional authority of the Civil Service Commission to adopt measures to
strengthen the merit and rewards system and to promulgate rules, regulations and standards governing the incentive awards system of the
civil service.
The Court is not impressed with petitioners' submission. AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over
the executive departments.
In establishing a Civil Service Commission, the 1987 Constitution delineated its function, as follows:
The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish
a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards
system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the
President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs. (Section 3, Article IX, B,
1987 Constitution)
The Commission handles personnel matters of the government. As the central personnel agency of the Government, it is tasked
to formulate and establish a system of incentives and rewards for officials and employees in the public sector, alike.
The functions of the Commission have been decentralized to the different departments, offices, and agencies of the government
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. The State shall insure and promote the Constitutional mandate
that appointment in the Civil Service shall be made only according to merit and fitness; that the
Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government shall establish a
career service, adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and
courtesy in the civil service, strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management
climate conducive to public accountability; that public office is a public trust and public officers
and employees must at all times be accountable to the people; and that personnel functions shall
be decentralized, delegating the corresponding authority to the departments, offices and agencies
where such functions can be effectively performed. (Section 1, Chapter I, Subtitle A, Title I, EO 292)
(emphasis ours)

Specifically, implementation of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System has been decentralized to the President
or to the head of each department of agency
Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. There shall be established a
government-wide employee suggestions and incentive awards system which shall be
administered under such rules, regulations, and standards as maybe promulgated by the
Commission.
In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Commission, the
President or the head of each department or agency is authorized to incur whatever necessary
expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the
government who by their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal
efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations or
who perform such other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in connection with, or
in relation to, their official employment. (EO 292) (emphasis ours)
The President is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised and implemented through him. His power
includes the control executive departments
The president shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully execute. (Section 17, Article VII, 1987 Constitution)
Control means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." 32 It has been held that "[t]he President can, by virtue of his power of
control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision, of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus, or offices under
him. He can exercise this power motu proprio without need of any appeal from any party." 33
When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from granting
incentive benefits without prior approval from him, and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the President was
just exercising his power of control over executive departments. This is decisively clear from the WHEREAS CLAUSES of AO 268 and AO
29, to wit:
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 268
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, the Productivity incentive benefits granted by the different agencies are of varying
amounts, causing dissension/demoralization on the part of those who had received less and those
who have not yet received any such benefit, thereby defeating the purpose for which the same
should be granted; and
WHEREAS, there exists the need to regulate the grant of the productivity incentive benefits or
other similar allowances in conformity with the policy on standardization of compensation
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6758;
xxx xxx xxx
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 29
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS the faithful implementation of statutes, including the Administrative Code of 1987 and
all laws governing all forms of additional compensation and personnel benefits is a Constitutional
prerogative vested in the President of the Philippines under Section 17, Article VII of the, 1987
Constitution;
WHEREAS, the Constitutional prerogetive includes the determination of the rates, the timing and
schedule of payment, and final authority to commit limited resources of government for the
payment of personnel incentives, cash awards, productivity bonus, and other forms of additional
compensation and fringe benefits;
WHEREAS, some government agencies have overlooked said Constitutional prerogative and have
unilaterally granted to their respective officials and employees incentive awards;
WHEREAS, the Offioe of the President issued Administrative Order No. 268, dated February 21,
1992, strictly prohibiting the grant of Productivity Incentive Bonus or other allowances of similar
nature for Calender Year 1992 and future years pending the issuance of the requisite authorization
by the President;
WHEREAS, notwithstanding said prohibition some government offices/agencies and governmentowned and/or controlled corporations and financial institutions have granted productivity
incentive benefits in varying nomenclature and amounts without the proper
authorization/coordination with the Office of the President;
WHEREAS, the unilateral and uncoordinated grant of productivity incentive benefits gave rise to
discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel who have
received less or have not received at all such benefits;
xxx xxx xxx
The President issued subject Administrative Orders to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent
discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by committing limited resources of

government for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The President was only exercising his power of control by
modifying the acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the
Office of the President, thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources. In the view of the President,
respondents did a mistake which had to be corrected. In so acting, the President exercised a constitutionally-protected
prerogative
The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all
executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the
power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally he controls
and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the
action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President
cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary. (Lacson-Magallanes Co.,
Inc. v. Pao, 21 SCRA 898)
Neither can it be said that the President encroached upon the authority of the Commission on Civil Service to grant benefits to government
personnel. AO 29 and AO 268 did not revoke the privilege of employees to receive incentive benefits. The same merely regulated the grant
and amount thereof.
Sound management and effective utilization of financial resources of government are basically executive functions, 34 not the
Commission's. Implicit is this recognition in EO 292, which states:
Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. There shall be established a
government-wide employee suggestions and incentive awards system which shall be
administered under such rules, regulations, and standards as maybe promulgated by the
Commission.
In accordance with rules, regulations and standards promulgeted by the Commission, the
President or the head of each department or agency is authorized to incur whatever necessary
expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the
government who by their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal
efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations, or
who perform such other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in connection with, or
in relation to their official employment. (Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Book V) (emphasis ours)
Conformably, it is "the President or the head of each department or agency who is authorized to incur the necessary expenses involved in
the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the government." It is not the duty of the Commission to fix the amount
of the incentives. Such function belongs to the President or his duly empowered alter ego.
Anent petitioners' contention that the forcible refund of incentive benefits is an unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation,
suffice it to state that "[n]ot all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be
made between its sovereign and proprietary acts (United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)." 35 The acts involved in this case are
governmental. Besides, the Court is in agreement with the Solicitor General that the incentive pay or benefit is in the nature of a bonus
which is not a demandable or enforceable obligation.
It is understood that the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections, and Office of the
Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy, are not covered by the amount fixed by the President. As explained in Bengzon vs. Drilon (208
SCRA 133):
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the
Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with
the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy,
assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by
law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as
may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100
typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to
Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty
and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence
and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions
and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the
express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system
is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We
now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless
provision.
Untenable is petitioners' contention that the herein respondents be held personally liable for the refund in question. Absent a showing of
bad faith or malice, public officers are not personally liable for damage resulting from the performance of official duties. 36
Every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge of official duties. 37 Absent any showing of bad faith or
malice, there is likewise a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. 38
In upholding the constitutionality of AO 268 and AO 29, the Court reiterates the well-entrenched doctrine that "in interpreting statutes, that
which will avoid a finding of unconstitutionality is to be preferred." 39
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for the
year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts
and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts
given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and 112056 are hereby DIMISSED, and as above ratiocinated, further
deductions from the salaries and allowances of petitioners are hereby ENJOINED.
In G.R. No. 119597, the assailed Decision of respondent Commission on Audit is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 The applicable provisions are contained in Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Title I, of Book V:
Sec. 31. Career and Personnel Development Plans. Each department or agency shall prepare a career and personnel
deveplopment plan which shall be integrated into a national plan by the Commission. Such career and personnl
development plans which shall include provisions on merit promotions, performance evaluation, in-service training,
including overseas and local scholarship and training grants, job rotation, suggestions and incentive award systems,
and such other provisions for employees' health, welfare, counseling, recreation and similar services.
Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. There shall be established a government-wide
employee suggestions and incentive awards system which shall be administered under such rules, regulations, and
standards as maybe promulgated by the Commission.
In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Commission, the President or the head of
each department or agency is authorized to incur whatever necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition
of subordinate officers and employees of the government who by their suggestions, inventions, superior
accomplishment, and other personal efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of
government operations, or who perform such other estraordinary acts or services in the public interest in connection
with, or in relation to their official employment.
Sec. 36. Personnel Relations. (1) It shall be the concern of the Commission to provide leadership and assistance in
developing employee relations programs in the department or agencies.
(2) Every Secretary or head of agency shall take all proper steps toward the creation of an atmosphere conducive to
good supervisor-employee relations and the improvement of employee morale.
2 The applicable provisions are contained in Sections 1, 2, and 7(c) of Rule X:
Sec. 1. Each department or agency of government, whether national or local, including bureaus and agencies, state
colleges and universities, and government owned and controlled corporations with original charters, shall establish its
own Department or Agency Employee Suggestions and Incentive Awards System in accordance with these Rules and
shall submit the same to the Commission for approval.
Sec. 2. The System is designed to encourage creativity, innovativeness, efficiency, integrity and productivity in the
public service by recognizing and rewarding officials and employees, individually or in groups, for their suggestions,
inventions, superior accomplishments, and othe personal efforts which contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other
improvement in government operations, or for other extraordinary acts of services in the public interest.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The incentive.awards shall consist of, though not limited to, the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Productivity Incentive which shall be given to an employee or group of employees who has exceeded their targets
or has incurred incremental improvement over existing targest.
3 Sec. 1. All agencies of the National Government, including government-owned and/or -controlled corporations and
government financial institutions, and local government units, are hereby authorized to grant productivity incentive
benefits in the maximum amount of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) each to their permanent and full-time
temporary and casual employees, including contractual personnel with employment in the nature of regular employee,
who have rendered at least one (1) year of service in the Government as of December 31, 1992.
4 Sec. 2. The prohibition prescribed under Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 268 is hereby reiterated. Accordingly,
all heads of government offices/agencies, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations, as well as their
respective governing boards are hereby enjoined and prohibited from authorizing/granting Productivity Incentive
Benefits or any and all similar forms of allowances/benefits without prior approval authorization via Administrative
Order by the Office of the President. Henceforth, anyone found violating any of the mandates in this Order, including
all officials/employees and the COA Auditor-in-Charge of such government office/agency found to have taken thereof,
shall be accordingly and severely dealt with in accordance with the applicable provisions of existing penal laws.
Consequently, all administrative authorizations to grant any form of allowances/benefits and all forms of additional
compensation usually paid outside of the prescribed baisc salary under R.A. No. 6758, the Salary Standardization Law,
that are inconsistent with th legislated policy on the matter or are not covered by any legislative action are hereby
revoked.
The implementation of Executive Order No. 486 dated November 8, 1991, as amended by executive Order No. 518 dated
May 29, 1992, is hereby deferred until a more comprehensive and equitable scheme for the grant of the benefits that
can be applied government-wide is formulated by the Department of Budget and Management.

5 Sec. 7. The productivity incentive benfits herein authorized shall be granted only for Calendar Year 1991.
Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including the governing boards of government-owned or -controlled corporations
and financial institutions, are hereby stictly prohibitde from authorizing/granting productivity incentive benefits or
other allowances of similar nature for Calendar Year 1992 and future years pending the result of a comprehensive
study being undertaken by the Office of the President in coordination with the Civil Service Commission and the
Department of Budget and Management on the matter.
The formulation of the necessary implementing guidelines for executive Order No. 486 dated 8 November 1991
establishing a performance-based incentive system for government-owned or -controlled corporations shall likewise
be included in the comprehensive study referred to in the preceding paragraph.
6 Rollo, G.R. No. 119597, p. 29.
7 Ibid., pp. 21-23.
8 Sec. 10. Rule Making Power The Secretary of Labor and Employment and the Secretary of Finance, after due
notice and hearing, shall jointly promulgate and issue within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act such rules
and regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions hereof.
9 Department of Public Services Labor Unions v. The Court of Industrial Relations, 1 SCRA 319.
10 Words and Phrases, "Proprietary Function"
11 Sec. 4, Presidential Decree No. 564.
12 Sec. 5, Presidential Decree No. 564.
13 The full text of the second general purpose reads:
(b) Develop tourist zones. To promote the development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well
defined geographic areas with potential tourism value, known oterwise as "tourist zones", wherein optimum use of
natural assets and attractions as well as existing facilities and concentration of efforts and limited resources of both
government and private sector may be effected and realized in order to generate foreign exchange as well as other
tourist receipts. Such tourist zones shall consist of substantially undeveloped areas the owership of which may be
partially or wholly acquired by the Authority or whose existing owners may choose to contibute their property into a
consortium or in a new corporation in which the Authority shall participate, which in any case shall be under the
control of the Authority as to the manner of development tobe undertaken within the zone.
14 Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) v. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 686, 696.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters", [Art. IX(B). Sec. 2(1); see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are
denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an
original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC,
G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24, 1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum
prohibiting strikes.
15 Sec. 13, Executive Order No. 180.
16 Sec. 2(1), Article IX. B, 1987 Constitution: PNOC-Energy Development Corporation v. Leogardo, 175 SCRA 26;
National Service Corporation v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 134.
17 Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the declared policy of the State to encourage higher levels of productivity,
maintain industrial peace and harmony and promote the principle of shared responsibility in the relations between
workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of
business enterprises to reasonable returns of investments and to epansion and growth, and the accordingly to provide
corresponding incentives to both labor and capital for undertaking voluntary programs to ensure greater sharing by
the workers in the fruits of their labor.
18 Sec. 4. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:
xxx xxx xxx
b) "Labor-Management Committee" refers to anegotiating body in a business enterprise composed of the
representatives of labor and management created to establish a productivity incentives program, and to settle
disputes theefrom in accordance with Section 9 hereof.
19 Sec. 5. Labor-Management Committee.
a) xxx xxx xxx
b) In business enterprises with duly recognized or certified labor organizations, the representatives of labor shall be
those designated by the collective bargaining agent(s) of the bargaining unit(s).
c) In business enterprises without duly recognized or certified labor organizations, the representative of labor shall be
elected by at least a majority of all rank-and-file employees who have rendered at least six (6) months of continuous
service.
20 Sec. 6. Productivity Incentives Program.

a) xxx xxx xxx

b) Productivity agreements reache by the parties as provided in this Act shall supplement existing collective
bargaining agreements.
c) If, during the existence of the productivity incentives program or agreement, the employees will join or form a union,
such program or agreement may, in addition to the terms and conditions agreed upon by labor and management, be
integrated in the collective bargaining agreement that may be entered into between them.
21 Sec. 7. Benefits and Tax Incentives.
a) xxx xxx xxx
b) Any strike of lockout arisingfrom any violation of the productivity incentives program shall suspend the effectivity
thereof pending settlement of such strike or lockout: Provided, That the business enterprise shall not be deemed to
have forfeited tax incentives accrued prior to the date of occurrence of such strike or lockout, and the workers shall
not be required to reimburse the productivity bonuses already granted to them under the incentive program. Likewise,
bonuses which have already accrued before the strike or lockout shall be paid the worker within six (6) months from
their accrual.
xxx xxx xxx
22 Sec. 9. Disputes and Grievances. Whenever disputes, grievances, or other matters arise from the interpretation
or implementation of the productivity incentives program, the labor-management committee shall meet to resolve the
dispute, and may seek the assistance of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and
Employment for such purpose. Any dispute which remains unresolved within twenty (20) days from the time of its
submission to the labor-management committee shall be submitted for voluntary arbitration in line with the pertinent
provisions of the Labor Code, as amended.
The productivity incentives program shall include the name(s) of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary
arbitrators previously chosen and agreed upon by the labor-management committee.
23 Paras v. Commission on Elections, 264 SCRA 54.
24 Cabada v. Alunan III, 260 SCRA 838.
25 Sec. 29, Presidential Decree No. 564.
26 Teoxon v. Member of the Board of Administrators, 33 SCRA 585.
27 Sec. 6, Article XVIII. 1987 Constitution.
28 Sec. 12. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Prescribe, amend and enfore rules and regulatios for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and
other pertinent laws;
xxx xxx xxx"
29 Sec. 2. Administrative Order No. 268.
30 Sec. 1. Administrative Order No. 268
31 Supra, footnote 3.
32 Mondano v. Silvosa, etc. et al., 97 Phil. 148.
33 Echeche v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 584, citing Oliveros-Torre v. Bayot, 58 SCRA 272, and Ang-Angco v.
Castillo, et al., 118 Phil. 1468.
34 These are found in Book IV of Executive Orde No. 292 whose applicable provisions follows:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State that the Department of Finance shall be primarily
responsible for the sound and efficient management of the financial resources of the Government, its subdivisions,
agencies and instrumentalities. (Title II)
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. The national budget shall be formulated and implemented as an instrument of national
development, reflective of national objectives and plans, supportive of and consistent with the socio-economic
development plans and oriented towards the achievement of explicit objectives and expected results, to ensure that
the utilization of funds and operations of government entities are conducted effectively; formulated within the context
of a regionalized governmental structure and within the totality of revenues and other receipts, expenditures and
borrowings of all levels of government-owned or controlled.
35 M.H. Wylie v. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357.
36 Yulo v. Civil Service Commission, 219 SCRA 478, citing Mabutol v. Pascual, 124 SCRA 867.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93237 November 6, 1992

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC) and JUAN A. ALEGRE, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr. Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH telegrams through petitioner RCPI's facilities in Taft Ave., Manila at
9:00 in the morning of 17 March 1989 to his sister and brother-in-law in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-law in Espiritu, Ilocos Norte, with the
following identical texts:
MANONG POLING DIED INTERMENT TUESDAY 1

Both telegrams did not reach their destinations on the expected dates. Private respondent filed a lettercomplaint against the RCPI with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for poor service, with a
request for the imposition of the appropriate punitive sanction against the company.
Taking cognizance of the complaint, NTC directed RCPI to answer the complaint and set the initial hearing of
the case to 2 May 1989. After two (2) resettings, RCPI moved to dismiss the case on the following grounds:
1. Juan Alegre is not the real party in interest;
2. NTC has no jurisdiction over the case;
3. the continued hearing of the case violates its constitutional right to due process of law.

RCPI likewise moved for deferment of scheduled hearings until final determination of its motion to dismiss.
On 15 June 1989, NTC proceeded with the hearing and received evidence for private respondent Juan Alegre.
On 3 October 1989, RCPI's motion to dismiss was denied, thus:
The herein complainant is the husband of the sender of the "rush" telegram that respondent
allegedly failed to deliver in a manner respondent bound itself to undertake, so his legal interest
in this administrative case cannot be seriously called in question. As regards the issue of
jurisdiction, the authority of the Commission to hear and decide this case stems from its power
of control and supervision over the operation of public communication utilities as conferred upon
it by law.
Besides, the filing of a motion to dismiss is not allowed by the rules (Section 1, Rule 12, Rules
of Practice and Procedures). Following, however, the liberal construction of the rules,
respondent (sic) motion shall be treated as its answer or be passed upon after the conclusion of
the hearing on the merits. . . . 3
Hearings resumed in the absence of petitioner RCPI which was, however, duly notified thereof. On 27
November 1989, NTC disposed of the controversy in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Commission finds respondent administratively
liable for deficient and inadequate service defined under Section 19(a) of C.A. 146 and hereby
imposes the penalty of FINE payable within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof in the aggregate
amount of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) for:
1. Rush Telegram sent to Valencia, Bohol on March 17, 1989 and received on March 21, 1989
3 days x P200.00 per day = P600.00
2. Rush Telegram sent to Espiritu, Ilocos Norte on March 17, 1989 and received on March 20,
1989

2 days x P200.00 per day = P400.00

Total = P1,000.00
ENTERED. November 27, 1989. 4
A motion for reconsideration by RCPI reiterating averments in its earlier motion to dismiss was denied for lack of
merit; 5 hence, this petition for review invoking C.A. 146 Sec. 19(a) which limits the jurisdiction of the Public
Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) to the fixing of rates. RCPI submits that its position finds support in
two (2) decided cases 6 identical with the present one. Then Justice (later Chief Justice) Fernando writing for the
Court stated:
. . . There can be no justification then for the Public Service Commission imposing the fines for
these two petitions. The law cannot be any clearer. The only power it possessed over radio
companies, as noted was the (sic ) fix rates. It could not take to task a radio company for
negligence or misfeasance. It was bereft of such competence. It was not vested within such
authority. . . .
The Public Service Commission having been abolished by virtue of a Presidential Decree, as
set forth at the outset, and a new Board of Communications having been created to take its
place, nothing said in its decision has reference to whatever powers are now lodged in the latter
body. . . . . . . (Footnotes omitted)
Two (2) later cases, 7 adhering to the above tenet ruled:
Even assuming that the respondent Board of Communications has the power of jurisdiction over
petitioner in the exercise of its supervision to insure adequate public service, petitioner cannot
be subjected to payment of fine under sec. 21 of the Public Service Act, because this provision
of the law subjects to a fine every public service that violates or falls (sic) to comply with the
terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions and regulations of the
Commission. . . . .
The Office of the Solicitor General now claims that the cited cases are no longer applicable, that the power and
authority of the NTC to impose fines is incidental to its power to regulate public service utilities and to supervise
telecommunications facilities, which are now clearly defined in Section 15, Executive Order No. 546 dated 23
July 1979: thus:
Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall exercise the following functions:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Establish, prescribe and regulate the areas of operation of particular operators of the public
service communications;
xxx xxx xxx
h. Supervise and inspect the operation of radio stations and telecommunications facilities.
Regulatory administrative agencies necessarily impose sanctions, adds the Office of the Solicitor General. RCPI
was fined based on the finding of the NTC that it failed to undertake adequate service in delivering two (2) rush
telegrams. NTC takes the view that its power of supervision was broadened by E. O. No. 546, and that this
development superseded the ruling in RCPI vs. Francisco Santiago and companion cases.
The issues of due process and real parties in interest do not have to be discussed in this case. This decision will
dwell on the primary question of jurisdiction of the NTC to administratively impose fines on a telegraph company
which fails to render adequate service to a consumer.
E. O. 546, it will be observed, is couched in general terms. The NTC stepped "into the shoes" of the Board of
Communications which exercised powers pursuant to the Public Service Act. The power to impose fines should
therefore be read in the light of the Francisco Santiago case because subsequent legislation did not grant
additional powers to the Board of Communications. The Board in other words, did not possess the power to
impose administrative fines on public services rendering deficient service to customers, ergo its successor
cannot arrogate unto itself such power, in the absence of legislation. It is true that the decision in RCPI vs.
Board of Communications seems to have modified the Santiago ruling in that the later case held that the Board
of Communications can impose fines if the public service entity violates or fails to comply with the terms and
conditions of any certificate or any order, decision or regulation of the Commission. But can private respondent's
complaint be similarly treated when the complaint seeks redress of a grievance against the company? 8 NTC has

no jurisdiction to impose a fine. Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission (G. R. No. L-27250, 21 January 1987, 147 SCRA 269) says so
categorically.
Verily, Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Service Act, vested in the Public
Service Commission jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other
properties.
xxx xxx xxx
The act complained of consisted in petitioner having allegedly failed to deliver the telegraphic message of private respondent to
the addressee in Madrid, Spain. Obviously, such imputed negligence has nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of
the very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.
Moreover, under Section 21 of C. A. 146, as amended, the Commission was empowered to impose an administrative fine in
cases of violation of or failure by a public service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders,
decisions or regulations of the Commission. Petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor
conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the
Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded.
No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the Solicitor General's Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The
Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power to impose administrative fines on public service utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which have
failed to render adequate service to consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of the supervisory and regulatory power of the agency. There
appears to be no alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in administrative law that:
Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and powers of administrative
agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the
legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective . . . (Globe Wireless
case, supra).
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction of the NTC to render it. The temporary restraining
order issued on 18 June 1990 is made PERMANENT without prejudice, however, to the filing by the party aggrieved by the conduct of RCPI, of the
proper action in the proper forum. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Medialdea, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987
ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in his capacity as General
Manager of the National Housing Authority, THE HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his
capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant and VIRGILIO A. YUSON, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:
By virtue of a Contract to Sell dated 18 August 1970, Jose Hernando acquired prospective
and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in
Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation.
On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to private
respondent Virgilio Yuson. The transfer was embodied in a Deed of Assignment and
Substitution of Obligor (Delegacion), executed with the consent of Antipolo Realty, in which
Mr. Yuson assumed the performance of the vendee's obligations under the original contract,
including payment of his predecessor's installments in arrears. However, for failure of
Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under
Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period
up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments
falling due thereafter Clause 17 reads:
Clause 17. SUBDIVISION BEAUTIFICATION. To insure the beauty of the
subdivision in line with the modern trend of urban development, the SELLER
hereby obligates itself to provide the subdivision with:
a) Concrete curbs and gutters
b) Underground drainage system
c) Asphalt paved roads
d) Independent water system
e) Electrical installation with concrete posts.
f) Landscaping and concrete sidewall
g) Developed park or amphi-theatre
h) 24-hour security guard service.
These improvements shall be complete within a period of two (2) years from
date of this contract. Failure by the SELLER shall permit the BUYER to
suspend his monthly installments without any penalties or interest charges until
such time that such improvements shall have been completed. 1
On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the
subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson
replied that he would conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of the representation in the notice.

In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its request that Mr. Yuson resume payment of his monthly installments, citing
the decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25 October 1976 in Case No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs.
Conrado S. Reyes, respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the
Contract to Sell executed by and between the lot buyers and the respondent." In addition, a formal demand was made for full and immediate payment
of the amount of P16,994.73, representing installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the period while the improvements were
being completed i.e., between September 1972 and October 1976.
Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo
Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson.
Aggrieved by the rescission of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before public respondent NHA through a lettercomplaint dated 10 May 1977 which complaint was docketed in NHA as Case No. 2123.
Antipolo Realty filed a Motion to Dismiss which was heard on 2 September 1977. Antipolo Realty, without presenting any evidence, moved for the
consolidation of Case No. 2123 with several other cases filed against it by other subdivision lot buyers, then pending before the NHA. In an Order
issued on 7 February 1978, the NHA denied the motion to dismiss and scheduled Case No. 2123 for hearing.
After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell under the following conditions:
l) Antipolo Realty Corporation shall sent [sic] to Virgilio Yuzon a statement of account for the monthly amortizations from
November 1976 to the present;
m) No penalty interest shall be charged for the period from November 1976 to the date of the statement of account; and
n) Virgilio Yuzon shall be given sixty (60) days to pay the arrears shown in the statement of account. 2

Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting: (a) that it had been denied due process of law
since it had not been served with notice of the scheduled hearing; and (b) that the jurisdiction to hear and decide
Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not in the NHA, since that complaint involved the
interpretation and application of the Contract to Sell.
The motion for reconsideration was denied on 28 June 1978 by respondent NHA General Manager G.V. Tobias,
who sustained the jurisdiction of the NHA to hear and decide the Yuson complaint. He also found that Antipolo
Realty had in fact been served with notice of the date of the hearing, but that its counsel had failed to attend the
hearing. 3 The case was submitted for decision, and eventually decided, solely on the evidence presented by the
complainant.
On 2 October 1978, Antipolo Realty came to this Court with a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-49051. Once more, the jurisdiction of the NHA was
assailed. Petitioner further asserted that, under Clause 7 of the Contract to Sell, it could validly terminate its
agreement with Mr. Yuson and, as a consequence thereof, retain all the prior installment payments made by the
latter. 4
This Court denied certiorari in a minute resolution issued on 11 December 1978, "without prejudice to
petitioner's pursuing the administrative remedy." 5 A motion for reconsideration was denied on 29 January 1979.
Thereafter, petitioner interposed an appeal from the NHA decision with the Office of the President which, on 9
March 1979, dismissed the same through public respondent Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave. 6
In the present petition, Antipolo Realty again asserts that, in hearing the complaint of private respondent Yuson
and in ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties, the NHA had not only acted on a
matter beyond its competence, but had also, in effect, assumed the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial
functions which the NHA was not authorized to perform.
We find the petitioner's arguments lacking in merit.
It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers
and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to
administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations
Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction, 7 basically because the need for special competence and
experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character
and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and
clogged. In Spouses Jose Abejo and Aurora Abejo, et al. vs. Hon. Rafael dela Cruz, etc., et al., 8 the Court,
through Mr. Chief Justice Teehankee, said:
In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in administrative
commissions and boards the power to resolve specialized disputes in the field of labor (as in
corporations, public transportation and public utilities) ruled that Congress in requiring the
Industrial Court's intervention in the resolution of labor management controversies likely to
cause strikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to be exclusive, although it did not so
expressly state in the law. The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious
doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy

involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the
regulatory statute administered" (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc.,
94 Phil, 932, 941 [1954]).
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or
commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine
promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in
case of grave abuse of discretion has become well nigh indispensable. Thus, in 1984, the Court
noted that 'between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakeable
trend has been to refer it to the former, "Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view
that unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocably, the choice should fall on fan
administrative agency]" ' (NFL v. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419, 428, citing precedents). The Court in
the earlier case of Ebon vs. De Guzman (113 SCRA 52, 56 [1982]), noted that the lawmaking
authority, in restoring to the labor arbiters and the NLRC their jurisdiction to award all kinds of
damages in labor cases, as against the previous P.D. amendment splitting their jurisdiction with
the regular courts, "evidently, . . . had second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters and
the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that setup would mean
duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and possible conflicting findings and conclusions
by two tribunals on one and the same claim."
In an even more recent case, Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. National Housing Authority, et al., 9 Mr. Justice Gutierrez,
speaking for the Court, observed that:
There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative
agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise.
The very definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial
powers. The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies
recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for
technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by
regular courts.
In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is
defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may
exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering
such agency. 10 In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of
private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the
determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts.
Thus, the extent to which the NHA has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must be determined by referring to the terms of Presidential Decree
No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Decree." 11 Section 3 of this statute provides as follows:
National Housing Authority. The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade
and business in accordance with the provisions of this decree (emphasis supplied)
The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the NHA are indicated in the second and third preambular paragraphs
of the statute which provide:
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have
reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water
systems lighting systems and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by
unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from
liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent
purchasers for value . (emphasis supplied)
Presidential Decree No. 1344 12 clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following
quite specific terms:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided
for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of
the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices:
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub- division lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (emphasis supplied.)

The substantive provisions being applied and enforced by the NHA in the instant case are found in Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 957 which
reads:
Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for
the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the
owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or
condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at
his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization and interests but excluding delinquency interests, with
interest thereon at the legal rate. (emphasis supplied.)
Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete certain specified improvements in the subdivision within the specified period of two
years from the date of the execution of the Contract to Sell, petitioner was not entitled to exercise its options under Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence,
petitioner could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment payments made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. Indeed,
under the general Civil Law, 13 in view of petitioner's breach of its contract with private respondent, it is the latter who is vested with the option either
to rescind the contract and receive reimbursement of an installment payments (with legal interest) made for the purchase of the subdivision lot in
question, or to suspend payment of further purchase installments until such time as the petitioner had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. The NHA
was therefore correct in holding that private respondent's prior installment payments could not be forfeited in favor of petitioner.
Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of
the Contract to Sell between the parties. Such reinstatement is no more than a logical consequence of the NHA's correct ruling, just noted, that the
petitioner was not entitled to rescind the Contract to Sell. There is, in any case, no question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was
legally empowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting parties under the law administered by it and under the respective agreements,
as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed.
We turn to petitioner's assertion that it had been denied the right to due process. This assertion lacks substance. The record shows that a copy of the
order denying the Motion to Dismiss and scheduling the hearing of the complaint for the morning of 6 March 1978, was duly served on counsel for
petitioner, as evidenced by the annotation appearing at the bottom of said copy indicating that such service had been effected. 14 But even if it be
assumed, arguendo, that such notice had not been served on the petitioner, nevertheless the latter was not deprived of due process, for what the
fundamental law abhors is not the absence of previous notice but rather the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 15 In the instant case, petitioner
was given ample opportunity to present its side and to be heard on a motion for reconsideration as well, and not just on a motion to dismiss; the claim
of denial of due process must hence sound even more hollow. 16
We turn finally to the question of the amount of P16,994.73 which petitioner insists had accrued during the period from September 1972 to October
1976, when private respondent had suspended payment of his monthly installments on his chosen subdivision lot. The NHA in its 9 March 1978
resolution ruled that the regular monthly installments under the Contract to Sell did not accrue during the September 1972 October 1976 period:
[R]espondent allowed the complainant to suspend payment of his monthly installments until the improvements in the subdivision
shall have been completed. Respondent informed complainant on November 1976 that the improvements have been
completed. Monthly installments during the period of suspension of payment did not become due and demandable Neither did
they accrue Such must be the case, otherwise, there is no sense in suspending payments. If the suspension is lifted the debtor
shall resume payments but never did he incur any arrears.
Such being the case, the demand of respondent for complainant to pay the arrears due during the period of suspension of
payment is null and void. Consequently, the notice of cancellation based on the refusal to pay the s that were not due and
demandable is also null and void. 17
The NHA resolution is probably too terse and in need of certification and amplification. The NHA correctly held that no installment payments should
be considered as having accrued during the period of suspension of payments. Clearly, the critical issue is what happens to the installment payments
which would have accrued and fallen due during the period of suspension had no default on the part of the petitioner intervened. To our mind, the
NHA resolution is most appropriately read as directing that the original period of payment in the Contract to Sell must be deemed extended by a
period of time equal to the period of suspension (i.e., by four (4) years and two (2) months) during which extended time (tacked on to the original
contract period) private respondent buyer must continue to pay the monthly installment payments until the entire original contract price shall have
been paid. We think that such is the intent of the NHA resolution which directed that "[i]f the suspension is lifted, the debtor shall resume payments"
and that such is the most equitable and just reading that may be given to the NHA resolution. To permit Antipolo Realty to collect the disputed amount
in a lump sum after it had defaulted on its obligations to its lot buyers, would tend to defeat the purpose of the authorization (under Sec. 23 of
Presidential Decree No. 957, supra) to lot buyers to suspend installment payments. As the NHA resolution pointed out, [s]uch must be the case,
otherwise, there is no sense in suspending payments." Upon the other hand, to condone the entire amount that would have become due would be an
expressively harsh penalty upon the petitioner and would result in the unjust enrichment of the private respondent at the expense of the petitioner. It
should be recalled that the latter had already fulfilled, albeit tardily, its obligations to its lot buyers under their Contracts to Sell. At the same time, the
lot buyer should not be regarded as delinquent and as such charged penalty interest. The suspension of installment payments was attributable to the
petitioner, not the private respondent. The tacking on of the period of suspension to the end of the original period precisely prevents default on the
part of the lot buyer. In the words of the NHA resolution, "never would [the buyer] incur any arrears."
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The NHA decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and clarified as providing for the
lengthening of the original contract period for payment of installments under the Contract to Sell by four (4) years and two (2) months, during which
extended time private respondent shall continue to pay the regular monthly installment payments until the entire original contract price shall have
been paid. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 26-29, Annex "D" of Petition.
2 Rollo, p. 20, Annex "A" of Petition.
3 Ibid, pp. 21-22, Annex "B" of Petition.
4 Clause 7 provides: "In case the BUYER fails to satisfy any monthly installments, or any other payments herein agreed upon,
he is granted a month of grace within which to make the retarded payment, it is understood, however, that should the month of

grace herein granted to the BUYER expire, without the payments corresponding to both months having been satisfied, an
interest of 12% per annum will be charged on the amounts he should have paid; it is understood further, that should a period of
60 days elapse, to begin from the expiration of the month of grace herein mentioned, and the BUYER has not paid all the
amounts he should have paid, with the corresponding interest, up to that date, the SELLER has the right to declare this contract
cancelled, ex parte, and of no effect, and as consequence thereof, the SELLER may dispose of the parcel or parcels of land
covered by this contract, without notice to the BUYER, in favor of other persons, as if this contract had never been entered into.
In case of such cancellation of this contract, all the amounts paid in accordance with this agreement, together with all the
improvements made on the premises, shall be considered as rents and charges paid for the use and occupation of the abovementioned premises, and as payment for the damages suffered by failure of the BUYER to fulfill his part of this agreement, and
the BUYER hereby renounces all his right to demand or reclaim the return of the same and obliges himself to peacefully and
immediately vacate the premises and deliver the same to the SELLER without delay.
5 Rollo of G.R. No. 49051, p. 63.
6 Rollo, pp. 23-25, Annex "C" of Petition.
7 See, e.g., National Federation of Labor v. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419 (1984) and Philex Mining Corporation v. Reyes, 118 SCRA
602 (1982).
8 G.R. No. L-63558, promulgated 19 May 1987; underscoring supplied.
9 G.R. No. L-48672, promulgated 31 July 1987; underscoring supplied.
10 See, in this connection, DMRC Enterprises v. Este del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc., 132 SCRA 293 (1984); Union Glass and
Container Corporation v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 126 SCRA 31 (1983); and Philex Mining Corporation v. Reyes,
supra.
11 Promulgated on 12 July 1976.
12 Promulgated on 2 April 1978.
13 Articles 1191 and 1169, Civil Code.
14 Rollo of G.R. No. 49051, p. 58; Annex "A" of Comment.
15 Manuel v. Villena, 37 SCRA 745 (1971) and Asprec v. Itchon, 16 SCRA 921 (1966).
16 See, BLTB Co. v. Cadiao, 22 SCRA 987 (1968).
17 Rollo, p. 20; underscoring supplied.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 137473

August 2, 2001

ESTELITO V. REMOLONA, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The present petition seeks to review and set aside the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals dated
July 31, 19981 upholding the decision of the Civil Service Commission which ordered the dismissal of
petitioner Estelito V. Remolona (Remolona) from the government service for dishonesty, and the
Resolution dated February 5, 19992 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Records show that petitioner Estelito V. Remolona is the Postmaster at the Postal Office Service in
Infanta, Quezon, while his wife Nery Remolona is a teacher at the Kiborosa Elementary School.
In a letter3 dated January 3, 1991, Francisco R. America, District Supervisor of the Department of
Education, Culture & Sports at Infanta, Quezon, inquired from the Civil Service Commission (CSC) as
to the status of the civil service eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who purportedly got a rating of 81.25% as
per Report of Rating issued by the National Board for Teachers.4 Mr. America likewise disclosed that
he received information that Mrs. Remolona was campaigning for a fee of P8,000.00 per examinee for
a passing mark in the teacher's board examinations. -On February 11, 1991, then CSC Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomas issued an Order directing CSC
Region IV Director Bella Amilhasan to conduct an investigation on Mrs. Remolona's eligibility, after
verification from the Register of Eligibles in the Office for Central Personnel Records revealed "that
Remolona's name is not in the list of passing and failing examinees, and that the list of examinees for
December 10, 1989 does not include the name of Remolona. Furthermore, Examination No. 061285 as
indicated in her report of rating belongs to a certain Marlou C. Madelo, who took the examination in
Cagayan de Oro and got a rating of 65.00%."5
During the preliminary investigation conducted by Jaime G. Pasion, Director II, Civil Service Field
Office, Lucena City, Quezon, only petitioner Remolona appeared. He signed a written statement of
facts6 regarding the issuance of the questioned Report of Rating of Mrs. Remolona, which is
summarized in the Memorandum7 submitted by Director Pasion as follows:
"3.1 That sometime in the first week of September, 1990, while riding in a Kapalaran Transit
Bus from Sta. Cruz, Laguna on his way to San Pablo City, he met one Atty. Hadji Salupadin
(this is how it sounded) who happened to be sitting beside him;
3.2 That a conversation broke out between them until he was able to confide his problem to
Atty. Salupadin about his wife having difficulty in acquiring an eligibility;
3.3 That Atty. Salupadin who represented himself as working at the Batasan, offered his help
for a fee of P3,000.00;
3.4 That the following day they met at the Batasan where he gave the amount of P2,000.00,
requirements, application form and picture of his wife;
3.5 That the following week, Thursday, at around 1:00 P.M., they met again at the Batasan
where he handed to Atty. Salupadin the amount of P1,000.00 plus P500.00 bonus who in turn
handed to him the Report of Rating of one Nery C. Remolona with a passing grade, then they
parted;

3.6 That sometime in the last week of September, he showed the Report of Rating to the
District Supervisor, Francisco America who informed her (sic) that there was no vacancy;
3.7 That he went to Lucena City and complained to Dr. Magsino in writing . . . that Mr.
America is asking for money in exchange for the appointment of his wife but failed to make
good his promise. He attached the corroborating affidavits of Mesdames Carmelinda Pradillada
and Rosemarie P. Romantico and Nery C. Remolona x x x;
3.8 That from 1986 to 1988, Mr. America was able to get six (6) checks at P2,600.00 each plus
bonus of Nery C. Remolona;
3.9 That Mr. America got mad at them. And when he felt that Mr. America would verify the
authenticity of his wife's Report of Rating, he burned the original."
Furthermore, Remolona admitted that he was responsible in acquiring the alleged fake eligibility, that
his wife has no knowledge thereof, and that he did it because he wanted them to be together. Based on
the foregoing, Director Pasion recommended the filing of the appropriate administrative action against
Remolona but absolved Mrs. Nery Remolona from any liability since it has not been shown that she
willfully participated in the commission of the offense.
Consequently, a Formal Charge dated April 6, 1993 was filed against petitioner Remolona, Nery C.
Remolona, and Atty. Hadji Salupadin for possession of fake eligibility, falsification and dishonesty. 8 A
formal hearing ensued wherein the parties presented their respective evidence. Thereafter, CSC
Regional Director Bella A. Amilhasan issued a Memorandum dated February 14, 19959 recommending
that the spouses Estelito and Nery Remolona be found guilty as charged and be meted the
corresponding penalty.
Said recommendation was adopted by the CSG which issued Resolution No. 95-2908 on April 20,
1995, finding the spouses Estelito and Nery Remolona guilty of dishonesty and imposing the penalty
of dismissal and all its accessory penalties. The case against Atty. Hadji Salupadin was held in
abeyance pending proof of his identity.10 In its Resolution No. 96551011 dated August 27, 1996, the
CSC, acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Remolona, absolved Nery
Remolona from liability and held that:
"Further, a review of the records and of the arguments presented fails to persuade this
Commission to reconsider its earlier resolution insofar as Estelito Remolona's culpability is
concerned. The evidence is substantial enough to effect his conviction. His act of securing a
fake eligibility for his wife is proved by substantial evidence. However, in the case of Nery
Remolona, the Commission finds her innocent of the offense charged, for there is no evidence
to show that she has used the fake eligibility to support an appointment or promotion. In fact,
Nery Remolona did not indicate in her Personal Data Sheet that she possesses any eligibility. It
must be pointed out that it was her husband who unilaterally worked to secure a fake eligibility
for her.
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied insofar as respondent
Estelito Remolona is concerned. However, Resolution No. 95-2908 is modified in the sense
that respondent Nery Remolona is exonerated of the charges. Accordingly, Nery Remolona is
automatically reinstated to her former position as Teacher with back salaries and other
benefits."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision dismissing the petition for review
filed by herein petitioner Remolona. His motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was likewise
denied. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred:
"1. in denying petitioner's motion for new trial;
2. in holding that petitioner is liable for dishonesty; and

3. in sustaining the dismissal of the petitioner for an offense not work connected in relation to
his official position in the government service."
The main issue posed for resolution is whether a civil service employee can be dismissed from the
government service for an offense which is not work-related or which is not connected with the
performance of his official duty. Remolona likewise imputes a violation of his right to due process
during the preliminary investigation because he was not assisted by counsel. He claims that the extrajudicial admission allegedly signed by him is inadmissible because he was merely made to sign a blank
form. He also avers that his motion for new trial should be granted on the ground that the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case before the Regional Office of the CSC was not
forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Finally, he pleads that the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of all
benefits is too harsh considering the nature of the offense for which he was convicted, the length of his
service in government, that this is his first offense, and the fact that no damage was caused to the
government.
The submission of Remolona that his alleged extra-judicial confession is inadmissible because he was
not assisted by counsel during the investigation as required under Section 12 paragraphs 1 and 3,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution deserves scant consideration.
The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal
case under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who
had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to
elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of such investigation. Therefore, the
exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made
in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.12
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may
not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to
represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with
counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of
counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260
(otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on discipline) of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987). Thus, the right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative
investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that
merit disciplinary measure against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating
authority is not part of a criminal prosecution.13
In the case at bar, Remolona was not accused of any crime in the investigation conducted by the CSC
field office. The investigation was conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the facts and whether
there is a prima facie evidence sufficient to form a belief that an offense cognizable by the CSC has
been committed and that Remolona is probably guilty thereof and should be administratively charged.
Perforce, the admissions made by Remolona during such investigation may be used as evidence to
justify his dismissal.
The contention of Remolona that he never executed an extra-judicial admission and that he merely
signed a blank form cannot be given credence. Remolona occupies a high position in government as
Postmaster at Infanta, Quezon and, as such, he is expected to be circumspect in his actions specially
where he is being administratively charged with a grave offense which carries the penalty of dismissal
from service.
Remolona insists that his dismissal is a violation of his right to due process under Section 2(3), Article
XI (B) of the Constitution which provides that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause." Although the offense of dishonesty is punishable under the

Civil Service law, Remolona opines that such act must have been committed in the performance of his
function and duty as Postmaster. Considering that the charge of dishonesty involves the falsification of
the certificate of rating of his wife Nery Remolona, the same has no bearing on his office and hence, he
is deemed not to have been dismissed for cause. This proposition is untenable.
It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first
offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292.
And the rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of
the performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer
or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of
character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government
cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well,
because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts
of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the
office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence
and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed
and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private life of an employee
cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or
employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service.14
The principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the
punishment of such officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation
of the public's faith and confidence in the government.15
The general rule is that where the findings of the administrative body are amply supported by
substantial evidence, such findings are accorded not only respect but also finality, and are binding on
this Court.16 It is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the
credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency
on the sufficiency of evidence.17 Thus, when confronted with conflicting versions of factual matters, it
is for the administrative agency concerned in the exercise of discretion to determine which party
deserves credence on the basis of the evidence received.18 The rule, therefore, is that courts of justice
will not generally interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that
their action may amount to an excess of jurisdiction.19
We have carefully scrutinized the records of the case below and we find no compelling reason to
deviate from the findings of the CSC and the Court of Appeals. The written admission of Remolona is
replete with details that could have been known only to him. No ill-motive or bad faith was ever
imputed to Director Pasion who conducted the investigation. The presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed remains unrebutted.
The transmittal of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the formal hearing before the CSC
is entirely a matter of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. Revised Administrative Circular
No. 1-95 of this Court clearly states that in resolving appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, it is within
the discretion of the Court of Appeals to have the original records of the proceedings under review
transmitted to it.20 Verily, the Court of Appeals decided the merits of the case on the bases of the
uncontroverted facts and admissions contained in the pleadings filed by the parties.
We likewise find no merit in the contention of Remolona that the penalty of dismissal is too harsh
considering that there was no damage caused to the government since the certificate of rating was
never used to get an appointment for his wife, Nery Remolona. Although no pecuniary damage was
incurred by the government, there was still falsification of an official document that constitutes gross
dishonesty which cannot be countenanced, considering that he was an accountable officer and
occupied a sensitive position.21 The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility
in the public service.22
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De
Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Melo, Panganiban, Buena, JJ ., on official leave.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J ., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 159647 April 15, 2005
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioners,
vs.
CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The 20 percent discount required by the law to be given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not merely a
tax deduction from the gross income or gross sale of the establishment concerned. A tax credit is used
by a private establishment only after the tax has been computed; a tax deduction, before the tax is
computed. RA 7432 unconditionally grants a tax credit to all covered entities. Thus, the provisions of
the revenue regulation that withdraw or modify such grant are void. Basic is the rule that
administrative regulations cannot amend or revoke the law.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the August
29, 2002 Decision2 and the August 11, 2003 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP
No. 67439. The assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. No
costs."4
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA narrated the antecedent facts as follows:
"Respondent is a domestic corporation primarily engaged in retailing of medicines and other
pharmaceutical products. In 1996, it operated six (6) drugstores under the business name and style
Mercury Drug.
"From January to December 1996, respondent granted twenty (20%) percent sales discount to qualified
senior citizens on their purchases of medicines pursuant to Republic Act No. [R.A.] 7432 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. For the said period, the amount allegedly representing the 20%
sales discount granted by respondent to qualified senior citizens totaled P904,769.00.
"On April 15, 1997, respondent filed its Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 1996 declaring
therein that it incurred net losses from its operations.
"On January 16, 1998, respondent filed with petitioner a claim for tax refund/credit in the amount of
P904,769.00 allegedly arising from the 20% sales discount granted by respondent to qualified senior
citizens in compliance with [R.A.] 7432. Unable to obtain affirmative response from petitioner,
respondent elevated its claim to the Court of Tax Appeals [(CTA or Tax Court)] via a Petition for
Review.
"On February 12, 2001, the Tax Court rendered a Decision5 dismissing respondents Petition for lack
of merit. In said decision, the [CTA] justified its ruling with the following ratiocination:

x x x, if no tax has been paid to the government, erroneously or illegally, or if no amount is due and
collectible from the taxpayer, tax refund or tax credit is unavailing. Moreover, whether the recovery of
the tax is made by means of a claim for refund or tax credit, before recovery is allowed[,] it must be
first established that there was an actual collection and receipt by the government of the tax sought to
be recovered. x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
Prescinding from the above, it could logically be deduced that tax credit is premised on the existence
of tax liability on the part of taxpayer. In other words, if there is no tax liability, tax credit is not
available.
"Respondent lodged a Motion for Reconsideration. The [CTA], in its assailed resolution,6 granted
respondents motion for reconsideration and ordered herein petitioner to issue a Tax Credit Certificate
in favor of respondent citing the decision of the then Special Fourth Division of [the CA] in CA G.R.
SP No. 60057 entitled Central [Luzon] Drug Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
promulgated on May 31, 2001, to wit:
However, Sec. 229 clearly does not apply in the instant case because the tax sought to be refunded or
credited by petitioner was not erroneously paid or illegally collected. We take exception to the CTAs
sweeping but unfounded statement that both tax refund and tax credit are modes of recovering taxes
which are either erroneously or illegally paid to the government. Tax refunds or credits do not
exclusively pertain to illegally collected or erroneously paid taxes as they may be other circumstances
where a refund is warranted. The tax refund provided under Section 229 deals exclusively with
illegally collected or erroneously paid taxes but there are other possible situations, such as the refund
of excess estimated corporate quarterly income tax paid, or that of excess input tax paid by a VATregistered person, or that of excise tax paid on goods locally produced or manufactured but actually
exported. The standards and mechanics for the grant of a refund or credit under these situations are
different from that under Sec. 229. Sec. 4[.a)] of R.A. 7432, is yet another instance of a tax credit and
it does not in any way refer to illegally collected or erroneously paid taxes, x x x."7
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed in toto the Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) ordering petitioner to issue
a tax credit certificate in favor of respondent in the reduced amount of P903,038.39. It reasoned that
Republic Act No. (RA) 7432 required neither a tax liability nor a payment of taxes by private
establishments prior to the availment of a tax credit. Moreover, such credit is not tantamount to an
unintended benefit from the law, but rather a just compensation for the taking of private property for
public use.
Hence this Petition.8
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
"Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent may claim the 20% sales discount as a
tax credit instead of as a deduction from gross income or gross sales.
"Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent is entitled to a refund."9
These two issues may be summed up in only one: whether respondent, despite incurring a net loss,
may still claim the 20 percent sales discount as a tax credit.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
Sole Issue:

Claim of 20 Percent Sales Discount

as Tax Credit Despite Net Loss
Section 4a) of RA 743210 grants to senior citizens the privilege of obtaining a 20 percent discount on
their purchase of medicine from any private establishment in the country.11 The latter may then claim
the cost of the discount as a tax credit.12 But can such credit be claimed, even though an establishment
operates at a loss?
We answer in the affirmative.
Tax Credit versus
Tax Deduction
Although the term is not specifically defined in our Tax Code,13 tax credit generally refers to an
amount that is "subtracted directly from ones total tax liability."14 It is an "allowance against the tax
itself"15 or "a deduction from what is owed"16 by a taxpayer to the government. Examples of tax credits
are withheld taxes, payments of estimated tax, and investment tax credits.17
Tax credit should be understood in relation to other tax concepts. One of these is tax deduction -defined as a subtraction "from income for tax purposes,"18 or an amount that is "allowed by law to
reduce income prior to [the] application of the tax rate to compute the amount of tax which is due."19
An example of a tax deduction is any of the allowable deductions enumerated in Section 3420 of the
Tax Code.
A tax credit differs from a tax deduction. On the one hand, a tax credit reduces the tax due, including - whenever applicable -- the income tax that is determined after applying the corresponding tax rates to
taxable income.21 A tax deduction, on the other, reduces the income that is subject to tax22 in order to
arrive at taxable income.23 To think of the former as the latter is to avoid, if not entirely confuse, the
issue. A tax credit is used only after the tax has been computed; a tax deduction, before.
Tax Liability Required
for Tax Credit
Since a tax credit is used to reduce directly the tax that is due, there ought to be a tax liability before
the tax credit can be applied. Without that liability, any tax credit application will be useless. There
will be no reason for deducting the latter when there is, to begin with, no existing obligation to the
government. However, as will be presented shortly, the existence of a tax credit or its grant by law is
not the same as the availment or use of such credit. While the grant is mandatory, the availment or use
is not.
If a net loss is reported by, and no other taxes are currently due from, a business establishment, there
will obviously be no tax liability against which any tax credit can be applied.24 For the establishment to
choose the immediate availment of a tax credit will be premature and impracticable. Nevertheless, the
irrefutable fact remains that, under RA 7432, Congress has granted without conditions a tax credit
benefit to all covered establishments.
Although this tax credit benefit is available, it need not be used by losing ventures, since there is no tax
liability that calls for its application. Neither can it be reduced to nil by the quick yet callow stroke of
an administrative pen, simply because no reduction of taxes can instantly be effected. By its nature, the
tax credit may still be deducted from a future, not a present, tax liability, without which it does not
have any use. In the meantime, it need not move. But it breathes.
Prior Tax Payments Not
Required for Tax Credit

While a tax liability is essential to the availment or use of any tax credit, prior tax payments are not.
On the contrary, for the existence or grant solely of such credit, neither a tax liability nor a prior tax
payment is needed. The Tax Code is in fact replete with provisions granting or allowing tax credits,
even though no taxes have been previously paid.
For example, in computing the estate tax due, Section 86(E) allows a tax credit -- subject to certain
limitations -- for estate taxes paid to a foreign country. Also found in Section 101(C) is a similar
provision for donors taxes -- again when paid to a foreign country -- in computing for the donors tax
due. The tax credits in both instances allude to the prior payment of taxes, even if not made to our
government.
Under Section 110, a VAT (Value-Added Tax)- registered person engaging in transactions -- whether
or not subject to the VAT -- is also allowed a tax credit that includes a ratable portion of any input tax
not directly attributable to either activity. This input tax may either be the VAT on the purchase or
importation of goods or services that is merely due from -- not necessarily paid by -- such VATregistered person in the course of trade or business; or the transitional input tax determined in
accordance with Section 111(A). The latter type may in fact be an amount equivalent to only eight
percent of the value of a VAT-registered persons beginning inventory of goods, materials and
supplies, when such amount -- as computed -- is higher than the actual VAT paid on the said items.25
Clearly from this provision, the tax credit refers to an input tax that is either due only or given a value
by mere comparison with the VAT actually paid -- then later prorated. No tax is actually paid prior to
the availment of such credit.
In Section 111(B), a one and a half percent input tax credit that is merely presumptive is allowed. For
the purchase of primary agricultural products used as inputs -- either in the processing of sardines,
mackerel and milk, or in the manufacture of refined sugar and cooking oil -- and for the contract price
of public work contracts entered into with the government, again, no prior tax payments are needed for
the use of the tax credit.
More important, a VAT-registered person whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may,
under Section 112(A), apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate for the amount of creditable
input taxes merely due -- again not necessarily paid to -- the government and attributable to such sales,
to the extent that the input taxes have not been applied against output taxes.26 Where a taxpayer
is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales and also in taxable or exempt sales, the amount
of creditable input taxes due that are not directly and entirely attributable to any one of these
transactions shall be proportionately allocated on the basis of the volume of sales. Indeed, in availing
of such tax credit for VAT purposes, this provision -- as well as the one earlier mentioned -- shows that
the prior payment of taxes is not a requisite.
It may be argued that Section 28(B)(5)(b) of the Tax Code is another illustration of a tax credit
allowed, even though no prior tax payments are not required. Specifically, in this provision, the
imposition of a final withholding tax rate on cash and/or property dividends received by a nonresident
foreign corporation from a domestic corporation is subjected to the condition that a foreign tax credit
will be given by the domiciliary country in an amount equivalent to taxes that are merely deemed
paid.27 Although true, this provision actually refers to the tax credit as a condition only for the
imposition of a lower tax rate, not as a deduction from the corresponding tax liability. Besides, it is not
our government but the domiciliary country that credits against the income tax payable to the latter by
the foreign corporation, the tax to be foregone or spared.28
In contrast, Section 34(C)(3), in relation to Section 34(C)(7)(b), categorically allows as credits, against
the income tax imposable under Title II, the amount of income taxes merely incurred -- not necessarily
paid -- by a domestic corporation during a taxable year in any foreign country. Moreover, Section
34(C)(5) provides that for such taxes incurred but not paid, a tax credit may be allowed, subject to the
condition precedent that the taxpayer shall simply give a bond with sureties satisfactory to and
approved by petitioner, in such sum as may be required; and further conditioned upon payment by the
taxpayer of any tax found due, upon petitioners redetermination of it.
In addition to the above-cited provisions in the Tax Code, there are also tax treaties and special laws
that grant or allow tax credits, even though no prior tax payments have been made.

Under the treaties in which the tax credit method is used as a relief to avoid double taxation, income
that is taxed in the state of source is also taxable in the state of residence, but the tax paid in the former
is merely allowed as a credit against the tax levied in the latter.29 Apparently, payment is made to the
state of source, not the state of residence. No tax, therefore, has been previously paid to the latter.
Under special laws that particularly affect businesses, there can also be tax credit incentives. To
illustrate, the incentives provided for in Article 48 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1789, as amended
by Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 391, include tax credits equivalent to either five percent of the net value
earned, or five or ten percent of the net local content of exports.30 In order to avail of such credits
under the said law and still achieve its objectives, no prior tax payments are necessary.
From all the foregoing instances, it is evident that prior tax payments are not indispensable to the
availment of a tax credit. Thus, the CA correctly held that the availment under RA 7432 did not require
prior tax payments by private establishments concerned.31 However, we do not agree with its finding32
that the carry-over of tax credits under the said special law to succeeding taxable periods, and even
their application against internal revenue taxes, did not necessitate the existence of a tax liability.
The examples above show that a tax liability is certainly important in the availment or use, not the
existence or grant, of a tax credit. Regarding this matter, a private establishment reporting a net loss in
its financial statements is no different from another that presents a net income. Both are entitled to the
tax credit provided for under RA 7432, since the law itself accords that unconditional benefit.
However, for the losing establishment to immediately apply such credit, where no tax is due, will be an
improvident usance.
Sections 2.i and 4 of Revenue
Regulations No. 2-94 Erroneous
RA 7432 specifically allows private establishments to claim as tax credit the amount of discounts they
grant.33 In turn, the Implementing Rules and Regulations, issued pursuant thereto, provide the
procedures for its availment.34 To deny such credit, despite the plain mandate of the law and the
regulations carrying out that mandate, is indefensible.
First, the definition given by petitioner is erroneous. It refers to tax credit as the amount representing
the 20 percent discount that "shall be deducted by the said establishments from their gross income for
income tax purposes and from their gross sales for value-added tax or other percentage tax
purposes."35 In ordinary business language, the tax credit represents the amount of such discount.
However, the manner by which the discount shall be credited against taxes has not been clarified by
the revenue regulations.
By ordinary acceptation, a discount is an "abatement or reduction made from the gross amount or value
of anything."36 To be more precise, it is in business parlance "a deduction or lowering of an amount of
money;"37 or "a reduction from the full amount or value of something, especially a price."38 In business
there are many kinds of discount, the most common of which is that affecting the income statement39
or financial report upon which the income tax is based.
Business Discounts
Deducted from Gross Sales
A cash discount, for example, is one granted by business establishments to credit customers for their
prompt payment.40 It is a "reduction in price offered to the purchaser if payment is made within a
shorter period of time than the maximum time specified."41 Also referred to as a sales discount on the
part of the seller and a purchase discount on the part of the buyer, it may be expressed in such
terms as "5/10, n/30."42
A quantity discount, however, is a "reduction in price allowed for purchases made in large quantities,
justified by savings in packaging, shipping, and handling."43 It is also called a volume or bulk
discount.44

A "percentage reduction from the list price x x x allowed by manufacturers to wholesalers and by
wholesalers to retailers"45 is known as a trade discount. No entry for it need be made in the manual or
computerized books of accounts, since the purchase or sale is already valued at the net price actually
charged the buyer.46 The purpose for the discount is to encourage trading or increase sales, and the
prices at which the purchased goods may be resold are also suggested.47 Even a chain discount -- a
series of discounts from one list price -- is recorded at net.48
Finally, akin to a trade discount is a functional discount. It is "a suppliers price discount given to a
purchaser based on the [latters] role in the [formers] distribution system."49 This role usually involves
warehousing or advertising.
Based on this discussion, we find that the nature of a sales discount is peculiar. Applying generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in the country, this type of discount is reflected in the income
statement50 as a line item deducted -- along with returns, allowances, rebates and other similar
expenses -- from gross sales to arrive at net sales.51 This type of presentation is resorted to, because the
accounts receivable and sales figures that arise from sales discounts, -- as well as from quantity,
volume or bulk discounts -- are recorded in the manual and computerized books of accounts and
reflected in the financial statements at the gross amounts of the invoices.52 This manner of recording
credit sales -- known as the gross method -- is most widely used, because it is simple, more convenient
to apply than the net method, and produces no material errors over time.53
However, under the net method used in recording trade, chain or functional discounts, only the net
amounts of the invoices -- after the discounts have been deducted -- are recorded in the books of
accounts54 and reflected in the financial statements. A separate line item cannot be shown,55 because
the transactions themselves involving both accounts receivable and sales have already been entered
into, net of the said discounts.
The term sales discounts is not expressly defined in the Tax Code, but one provision adverts to
amounts whose sum -- along with sales returns, allowances and cost of goods sold56 -- is deducted
from gross sales to come up with the gross income, profit or margin57 derived from business.58 In
another provision therein, sales discounts that are granted and indicated in the invoices at the time of
sale -- and that do not depend upon the happening of any future event -- may be excluded from the
gross sales within the same quarter they were given.59 While determinative only of the VAT, the latter
provision also appears as a suitable reference point for income tax purposes already embraced in the
former. After all, these two provisions affirm that sales discounts are amounts that are always
deductible from gross sales.
Reason for the Senior Citizen Discount:
The Law, Not Prompt Payment
A distinguishing feature of the implementing rules of RA 7432 is the private establishments outright
deduction of the discount from the invoice price of the medicine sold to the senior citizen.60 It is,
therefore, expected that for each retail sale made under this law, the discount period lasts no more than
a day, because such discount is given -- and the net amount thereof collected -- immediately upon
perfection of the sale.61 Although prompt payment is made for an arms-length transaction by the
senior citizen, the real and compelling reason for the private establishment giving the discount is that
the law itself makes it mandatory.
What RA 7432 grants the senior citizen is a mere discount privilege, not a sales discount or any of the
above discounts in particular. Prompt payment is not the reason for (although a necessary consequence
of) such grant. To be sure, the privilege enjoyed by the senior citizen must be equivalent to the tax
credit benefit enjoyed by the private establishment granting the discount. Yet, under the revenue
regulations promulgated by our tax authorities, this benefit has been erroneously likened and confined
to a sales discount.
To a senior citizen, the monetary effect of the privilege may be the same as that resulting from a sales
discount. However, to a private establishment, the effect is different from a simple reduction in price
that results from such discount. In other words, the tax credit benefit is not the same as a sales

discount. To repeat from our earlier discourse, this benefit cannot and should not be treated as a tax
deduction.
To stress, the effect of a sales discount on the income statement and income tax return of an
establishment covered by RA 7432 is different from that resulting from the availment or use of its tax
credit benefit. While the former is a deduction before, the latter is a deduction after, the income tax is
computed. As mentioned earlier, a discount is not necessarily a sales discount, and a tax credit for a
simple discount privilege should not be automatically treated like a sales discount. Ubi lex non
distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law does not distinguish, we ought not to
distinguish.
Sections 2.i and 4 of Revenue Regulations No. (RR) 2-94 define tax credit as the 20 percent discount
deductible from gross income for income tax purposes, or from gross sales for VAT or other
percentage tax purposes. In effect, the tax credit benefit under RA 7432 is related to a sales discount.
This contrived definition is improper, considering that the latter has to be deducted from gross sales in
order to compute the gross income in the income statement and cannot be deducted again, even for
purposes of computing the income tax.
When the law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means that the
amount -- when claimed -- shall be treated as a reduction from any tax liability, plain and simple. The
option to avail of the tax credit benefit depends upon the existence of a tax liability, but to limit the
benefit to a sales discount -- which is not even identical to the discount privilege that is granted by law
-- does not define it at all and serves no useful purpose. The definition must, therefore, be stricken
down.
Laws Not Amended
by Regulations
Second, the law cannot be amended by a mere regulation. In fact, a regulation that "operates to create a
rule out of harmony with
the statute is a mere nullity";62 it cannot prevail.
It is a cardinal rule that courts "will and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon
a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it x x x."63 In the scheme of judicial tax
administration, the need for certainty and predictability in the implementation of tax laws is crucial.64
Our tax authorities fill in the details that "Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide."65 The regulations these authorities issue are relied upon by taxpayers, who are certain that
these will be followed by the courts.66 Courts, however, will not uphold these authorities
interpretations when clearly absurd, erroneous or improper.
In the present case, the tax authorities have given the term tax credit in Sections 2.i and 4 of RR 2-94 a
meaning utterly in contrast to what RA 7432 provides. Their interpretation has muddled up the intent
of Congress in granting a mere discount privilege, not a sales discount. The administrative agency
issuing these regulations may not enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers; it
cannot engraft additional requirements not contemplated by the legislature.67
In case of conflict, the law must prevail.68 A "regulation adopted pursuant to law is law."69 Conversely,
a regulation or any portion thereof not adopted pursuant to law is no law and has neither the force nor
the effect of law.70
Availment of Tax
Credit Voluntary
Third, the word may in the text of the statute71 implies that the
availability of the tax credit benefit is neither unrestricted nor mandatory.72 There is no absolute right
conferred upon respondent, or any similar taxpayer, to avail itself of the tax credit remedy whenever it

chooses; "neither does it impose a duty on the part of the government to sit back and allow an
important facet of tax collection to be at the sole control and discretion of the taxpayer."73 For the tax
authorities to compel respondent to deduct the 20 percent discount from either its gross income or its
gross sales74 is, therefore, not only to make an imposition without basis in law, but also to blatantly
contravene the law itself.
What Section 4.a of RA 7432 means is that the tax credit benefit is merely permissive, not imperative.
Respondent is given two options -- either to claim or not to claim the cost of the discounts as a tax
credit. In fact, it may even ignore the credit and simply consider the gesture as an act of beneficence,
an expression of its social conscience.
Granting that there is a tax liability and respondent claims such cost as a tax credit, then the tax credit
can easily be applied. If there is none, the credit cannot be used and will just have to be carried over
and revalidated75 accordingly. If, however, the business continues to operate at a loss and no other
taxes are due, thus compelling it to close shop, the credit can never be applied and will be lost
altogether.
In other words, it is the existence or the lack of a tax liability that determines whether the cost of the
discounts can be used as a tax credit. RA 7432 does not give respondent the unfettered right to avail
itself of the credit whenever it pleases. Neither does it allow our tax administrators to expand or
contract the legislative mandate. "The plain meaning rule or verba legis in statutory construction is
thus applicable x x x. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation."76
Tax Credit Benefit
Deemed Just Compensation
Fourth, Sections 2.i and 4 of RR 2-94 deny the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain.
Be it stressed that the privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but
rather from the private establishments concerned. Accordingly, the tax credit benefit granted to these
establishments can be deemed as their just compensation for private property taken by the State for
public use.77
The concept of public use is no longer confined to the traditional notion of use by the public, but held
synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public convenience.78 The
discount privilege to which our senior citizens are entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by the general
public to which these citizens belong. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed
part of the gross sales of the private establishments concerned, were it not for RA 7432. The
permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private
property for public use or benefit.
As a result of the 20 percent discount imposed by RA 7432, respondent becomes entitled to a just
compensation. This term refers not only to the issuance of a tax credit certificate indicating the correct
amount of the discounts given, but also to the promptness in its release. Equivalent to the payment of
property taken by the State, such issuance -- when not done within a reasonable time from the grant of
the discounts -- cannot be considered as just compensation. In effect, respondent is made to suffer the
consequences of being immediately deprived of its revenues while awaiting actual receipt, through the
certificate, of the equivalent amount it needs to cope with the reduction in its revenues.79
Besides, the taxation power can also be used as an implement for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain.80 Tax measures are but "enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal sanctions"81 and
"clearly imposed for a public purpose."82 In recent years, the power to tax has indeed become a most
effective tool to realize social justice, public welfare, and the equitable distribution of wealth.83
While it is a declared commitment under Section 1 of RA 7432, social justice "cannot be invoked to
trample on the rights of property owners who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to
protection. The social justice consecrated in our [C]onstitution [is] not intended to take away rights
from a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto."84 For this reason, a just

compensation for income that is taken away from respondent becomes necessary. It is in the tax credit
that our legislators find support to realize social justice, and no administrative body can alter that fact.
To put it differently, a private establishment that merely breaks even85 -- without the discounts yet -will surely start to incur losses because of such discounts. The same effect is expected if its mark-up is
less than 20 percent, and if all its sales come from retail purchases by senior citizens. Aside from the
observation we have already raised earlier, it will also be grossly unfair to an establishment if the
discounts will be treated merely as deductions from either its gross income or its gross sales. Operating
at a loss through no fault of its own, it will realize that the tax credit limitation under RR 2-94 is
inutile, if not improper. Worse, profit-generating businesses will be put in a better position if they avail
themselves of tax credits denied those that are losing, because no taxes are due from the latter.
Grant of Tax Credit
Intended by the Legislature
Fifth, RA 7432 itself seeks to adopt measures whereby senior citizens are assisted by the community as
a whole and to establish a program beneficial to them.86 These objectives are consonant with the
constitutional policy of making "health x x x services available to all the people at affordable cost"87
and of giving "priority for the needs of the x x x elderly."88 Sections 2.i and 4 of RR 2-94, however,
contradict these constitutional policies and statutory objectives.
Furthermore, Congress has allowed all private establishments a simple tax credit, not a deduction. In
fact, no cash outlay is required from the government for the availment or use of such credit. The
deliberations on February 5, 1992 of the Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting on Social Justice,
which finalized RA 7432, disclose the true intent of our legislators to treat the sales discounts as a tax
credit, rather than as a deduction from gross income. We quote from those deliberations as follows:
"THE CHAIRMAN (Rep. Unico). By the way, before that ano, about deductions from taxable income.
I think we incorporated there a provision na - on the responsibility of the private hospitals and
drugstores, hindi ba?
SEN. ANGARA. Oo.
THE CHAIRMAN. (Rep. Unico), So, I think we have to put in also a provision here about the
deductions from taxable income of that private hospitals, di ba ganon 'yan?
MS. ADVENTO. Kaya lang po sir, and mga discounts po nila affecting government and public
institutions, so, puwede na po nating hindi isama yung mga less deductions ng taxable income.
THE CHAIRMAN. (Rep. Unico). Puwede na. Yung about the private hospitals. Yung isiningit natin?
MS. ADVENTO. Singit na po ba yung 15% on credit. (inaudible/did not use the microphone).
SEN. ANGARA. Hindi pa, hindi pa.
THE CHAIRMAN. (Rep. Unico) Ah, 'di pa ba naisama natin?
SEN. ANGARA. Oo. You want to insert that?
THE CHAIRMAN (Rep. Unico). Yung ang proposal ni Senator Shahani, e.
SEN. ANGARA. In the case of private hospitals they got the grant of 15% discount, provided that, the
private hospitals can claim the expense as a tax credit.
REP. AQUINO. Yah could be allowed as deductions in the perpetrations of (inaudible) income.
SEN. ANGARA. I-tax credit na lang natin para walang cash-out ano?

REP. AQUINO. Oo, tax credit. Tama, Okay. Hospitals ba o lahat ng establishments na covered.
THE CHAIRMAN. (Rep. Unico). Sa kuwan lang yon, as private hospitals lang.
REP. AQUINO. Ano ba yung establishments na covered?
SEN. ANGARA. Restaurant lodging houses, recreation centers.
REP. AQUINO. All establishments covered siguro?
SEN. ANGARA. From all establishments. Alisin na natin 'Yung kuwan kung ganon. Can we go back
to Section 4 ha?
REP. AQUINO. Oho.
SEN. ANGARA. Letter A. To capture that thought, we'll say the grant of 20% discount from all
establishments et cetera, et cetera, provided that said establishments - provided that private
establishments may claim the cost as a tax credit. Ganon ba 'yon?
REP. AQUINO. Yah.
SEN. ANGARA. Dahil kung government, they don't need to claim it.
THE CHAIRMAN. (Rep. Unico). Tax credit.
SEN. ANGARA. As a tax credit [rather] than a kuwan - deduction, Okay.
REP. AQUINO Okay.
SEN. ANGARA. Sige Okay. Di subject to style na lang sa Letter A".89
Special Law
Over General Law
Sixth and last, RA 7432 is a special law that should prevail over the Tax Code -- a general law. "x x x
[T]he rule is that on a specific matter the special law shall prevail over the general law, which shall
be resorted to only to supply deficiencies in the former."90 In addition, "[w]here there are two statutes,
the earlier special and the later general -- the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter
provided for in the special -- the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption
that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general,91 one as a general law of
the land, the other as the law of a particular case."92 "It is a canon of statutory construction that a later
statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect
the special provisions of such earlier statute."93
RA 7432 is an earlier law not expressly repealed by, and therefore remains an exception to, the Tax
Code -- a later law. When the former states that a tax credit may be claimed, then the requirement of
prior tax payments under certain provisions of the latter, as discussed above, cannot be made to apply.
Neither can the instances of or references to a tax deduction under the Tax Code94 be made to restrict
RA 7432. No provision of any revenue regulation can supplant or modify the acts of Congress.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 125629 March 25, 1998

MANUEL C. SUNGA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND B. TRINIDAD, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to annul
and set aside, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division in Sunga v.
Trinidad, SPA No. 95-2131 dismissing the petition for disqualification against private
respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 promulgated
3 November 1988, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 2050-A promulgated 8 August
1990, and 30 July 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 17 May 1996
Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division.
Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the
Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the 8 May 1995 elections. Private respondent
Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a candidate for re-election in the same
municipality.
On 22 April 1995 Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint2 for disqualification
against Trinidad, accusing him of using three (3) local government vehicles in his campaign,
in violation of Sec. 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as
amended). On 7 May 1995, Sunga filed another letter-complaint3 with the COMELEC
charging Trinidad this time with violation of Sec. 261, par. (e) (referring to threats,
intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion) of the Omnibus Election Code, in addition to
the earlier violation imputed to him in the first letter-complaint. This was followed by an
Amended Petition4 for disqualification consolidating the charges in the two (2) letterscomplaint, including vote buying, and providing more specific details of the violations
committed by Trinidad. The case was docketed as SPA No. 95-213.
In a Minute Resolution dated 25 May 1995,5 the COMELEC 2nd Division referred the
complaint to its Law Department for investigation. Hearings were held wherein Sunga
adduced evidence to prove his accusations. Trinidad, on the other hand, opted not to submit
any evidence at all.
Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes,
while Sunga trailed second.
On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad. However,
notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad was proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting Sunga to
file another motion to suspend the effects of the proclamation. Both motions were not acted
upon by the COMELEC 2nd Division.
On 28 June 1995 the COMELEC Law Department submitted its Report6 to the COMELEC
En Banc recommending that Trinidad be charged in court for violation of the following penal
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code: (a) Sec. 261, par. (a), on vote buying; (b) Sec. 261,

par. (e), on threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion; and, (c) Sec. 261, par.
(o), on use of any equipment, vehicle owned by the government or any of its political
subdivisions. The Law Department likewise recommended to recall and revoke the
proclamation of Ferdinand B. Trinidad as the duly elected Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan; proclaim
Manuel C. Sunga as the duly elected Mayor; and, direct Sunga to take his oath and assume
the duties and functions of the office.
The COMELEC En Banc approved the findings of the Law Department and directed the filing
of the corresponding informations in the Regional Trial Court against Trinidad. Accordingly,
four (4) informations7 for various elections offenses were filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The disqualification case, on the other hand, was referred to the
COMELEC 2nd Division for hearing.
On 2 May 1996 Sunga filed a Second Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and Annul the
Proclamation with Urgent Motion for Early Resolution of the Petition. But in its 17 May 1996
Resolution, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petition for disqualification, holding in
its Resolution No. 2050 that
1. Any complaint for disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of
the grounds specifically enumerated under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,
filed directly with the Commission before an election in which respondent is a
candidate, shall be inquired into by the Commission for the purpose of determining
whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed . . . .
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may
motu propio, or on motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law
Department of the Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its
exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal
infractions of the election
laws . . . .
2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in
relation to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate
who has already been proclaimed as a winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification
case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law
Department of this Commission.
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the
respondent candidate, the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a
disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary
investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department
makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed
with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of
the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is
pending and said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence
of guilt is strong.
As interpreted in the case of Silvestre v. Duavit, SPA 94-003, Resolution No. 2050
provides for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case in three cases: (1) The
disqualification case was filed before the election but remains unresolved until after the
election; (2) The disqualification case was filed after the election and before the
proclamation of winners; and (3) The disqualification case was filed after election and
after proclamation.
If the instant case is deemed to have been filed upon receipt by the COMELEC of the
letter-complaint on April 26 1995, it nevertheless remained pending until after the
election. If it is deemed to have been filed upon filing of the amended petition on 11
May 1995, it was clearly filed after the election. In either case, Resolution No. 2050
mandates the dismissal of the disqualification case.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the COMELEC En Banc, Sunga filed
the instant petition contending that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition for disqualification in that: first, Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 requires the
COMELEC to resolve the disqualification case even after the election and proclamation, and
the proclamation and assumption of office by Trinidad did not deprive the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction; second COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is null and void as it contravenes Sec. 6
of R.A. No. 6646; third, the fact that COMELEC authorized the filing of four (4) informations
against private respondent for violation of the penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
shows more than sufficient and substantial evidence to disqualify Trinidad, and he should
have been so disqualified; and fourth, since Trinidad was a disqualified candidate, it is as if
petitioner was the only candidate entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.
In his 17-page Comment and Manifestation dated 3 December 1996, the Solicitor General
concurred with petitioner's arguments.
Private respondent, on the other hand, postulates inter alia that Sunga's letters-complaint of
22 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 were not petitions for disqualification because no filing fee was
paid by Sunga; the letters-complaint were never docketed by the COMELEC; and, no
summons was ever issued by the COMELEC and private respondent was not required to
answer the letters-complaint. It was only on 13 May 1995 when petitioner filed the so-called
Amended Petition, docketed for the first time as SPA No. 95-213. Thus, the COMELEC
correctly dismissed the disqualification case for having been filed only after the 8 May 1995
elections and the proclamation of private respondent on 10 May 1995, pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050.
COMELEC filed its Comment on 21 April 1997 relying heavily on Resolution No. 2050 and
the Silvestre v. Duavit8 ruling in support of the dismissal of the disqualification case. The
COMELEC insisted that the outright dismissal of a disqualification case was warranted under
any of the following circumstances: (a) the disqualification case was filed before the election
but was still pending (unresolved) after the election; (b) the disqualification case was filed
after the election but before the proclamation of the winner; and, (c) the disqualification case
was filed after the election and after the proclamation of the winner.
The issue in this case is whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the disqualification case against private respondent Trinidad.
The petition is partly meritorious.
We find private respondent's arguments on the propriety of the letters-complaint puerile.
COMELEC itself impliedly recognized in its Resolution that the petition was filed before the 8
May 1995 election in the form of letters-complaint, thus
This case originally came to the attention of this Commission on 26 April 1995 in a
form of letter from petitioner accusing respondent of utilizing government properties in
his campaign and praying for the latter's immediate disqualification. Another letter
dated 7 May 1995 and addressed to the COMELEC Regional Director of Region II
reiterated petitioner's prayer while alleging that respondent and his men committed
acts of terrorism and violated the gun ban. Finally, on 11 May 1995, an Amended
Petition was filed with the Clerk of Court of the Commission containing substantially
the same allegations as the previous letters but supported by affidavits and other
documentary evidence.
That the Amended Petition was filed only on 11 May 1995, or after the elections, is of no
consequence. It was merely a reiteration of the charges filed by petitioner against private
respondent on 26 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 or before the elections. Consequently, the
Amended Petition retroacted to such earlier dates. An amendment which merely supplements
and amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to the date of the
commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations which expired
after the service of the original complaint. 9

The fact that no docket fee was paid therefor was not a fatal procedural lapse on the part of
petitioner. Sec. 18, Rule 42, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides, "If the fees
above described are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they
are paid and may dismiss the action or proceeding." The use of the word "may" indicates that
it is permissive only and operates to confer a discretion on the COMELEC whether to
entertain the petition or not in case of non-payment of legal fees. That the COMELEC acted
on and did not dismiss the petition outright shows that the non-payment of fees was not
considered by it as a legal obstacle to entertaining the same. Be that as it may, the
procedural defects have been cured by the subsequent payment of docket fees, and private
respondent was served with summons, albeit belatedly, and he submitted his answer to the
complaint. Hence, private respondent has no cause to complain that no docket fee was paid,
no summons served upon him, or that he was not required to answer.
Neither do we agree with the conclusions of the COMELEC. We discern nothing in
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 declaring, ordering or directing the dismissal of a
disqualification case filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the
election. What the Resolution mandates in such a case is for the Commission to refer the
complaint to its Law Department for investigation to determine whether the acts complained
of have in fact been committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. The findings of the
Law Department then become the basis for disqualifying the erring candidate. This is totally
different from the other two situations contemplated by Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a
disqualification case filed after the election but before the proclamation of winners and that
filed after the election and the proclamation of winners, wherein it was specifically directed by
the same Resolution to be dismissed as a disqualification case.
Moreover, Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v. Duavit infringes on Sec. 6 of RA
No. 6646, 10 which provides:
Sec. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong (emphasis supplied).
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of
the disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word
"shall" signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive
duty which must be enforced.11 The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no
discretion but to proceed with the disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in
providing for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case which remains unresolved after
the election, Silvestre v. Duavit in effect disallows what RA No. 6646 imperatively requires.
This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced
and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings
of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect harmony with
statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect. By
such interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself cannot be
limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot
amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an
interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A candidate
guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the
dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply because the investigating body was
unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses were
indeed committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant
would need to do is to employ delaying tactics so that the disqualification case based on the

commission of election offenses would not be decided before the election. This scenario is
productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the law.
The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor did not
divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually
decide the disqualification case. In Aguam v. COMELEC12 this Court held
Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is
with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The
fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the
exercise of such power. It of course may not be availed of where there has been a
valid proclamation. Since private respondent's petition before the COMELEC is
precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that
inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to
COMELEC . . . Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded from
challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office
thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the
candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not
signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a
separate investigation.
It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well as electoral aspects. Its
criminal aspect involves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused candidate.
Like in any other criminal case, it usually entails a full-blown hearing and the quantum of
proof required to secure a conviction is beyond reasonable doubt. Its electoral aspect, on the
other hand, is a determination of whether the offender should be disqualified from office. This
is done through an administrative proceeding which is summary in character and requires
only a clear preponderance of evidence. Thus, under Sec. 4 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, petitions for disqualification "shall be heard summarily after due notice." It is the
electoral aspect that we are more concerned with, under which an erring candidate may be
disqualified even without prior criminal conviction.13
It is quite puzzling that the COMELEC never acted on Sunga's motion to suspend the
proclamation of Trinidad. The last sentence of Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 categorically declares
that the Commission may order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate sought to
be disqualified whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. And there is not a scintilla of
doubt that the evidence of Trinidad's guilt was strong as shown in the Report and
Recommendation of the COMELEC Law Department
Parenthetically, there is merit to petitioner's petition against the respondent for
disqualification for the alleged commission of election offenses under Sec. 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, such as use of armed men and act of terrorism, intimidation
and coercion of voters, massive vote-buying and others, duly supported by affidavits of
witnesses and other documents. Consequently, the petitioner's evidence supporting
the disqualification of respondent remain unrebutted simply because respondent has
expressly waived his right to present evidence in SPA No. 95-213 in his Manifestation
and objection to the presentation of evidence in SPA No. 95-213 dated 16 June 1995,
thus the waiver is the intentional relinquishing of a known right of respondent
TRINIDAD.
In fact, on the basis of this Report and Recommendation the COMELEC directed the filing of
four (4) criminal informations against Trinidad before the Regional Trial Court, an indication
that there was indeed prima facie evidence of violation of election laws.
However, Sunga's contention that he is entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of
the Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the event that Trinidad is disqualified finds

no support in law and jurisprudence. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes is later disqualified for the office to which he was elected does not entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a disqualified person may not be valid to install the winner
into office or maintain him there. But in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a
contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere
belief that the candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.14
Sunga totally miscontrued the nature of our democratic electoral process as well as the
sociological and psychological elements behind voters' preferences. Election is the process
of complete ascertainment of the expression of the popular will. Its ultimate purpose is to give
effect to the will of the electorate by giving them direct participation in choosing the men and
women who will run their government. Thus, it would be extremely repugnant to the basic
concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of whom have positively declared through their
ballots that they do not choose him.15
While Sunga may have garnered the second highest number of votes, the fact remains that
he was not the choice of the people of Iguig, Cagayan. "The wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now
only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of
votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected."16 In Aquino v. COMELEC,17 this Court made the following
pronouncement:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the voter. The second placer is just that, a
second placer. He lost the election. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality
of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in
a field which excludes the disqualified candidate; the conditions would have
substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such
circumstances.
Also, what Sunga wants us to do is to disregard the express mandate of Sec. 44, RA No.
7160,18 which provides in part
Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor,
Vice-Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the Governor or
Mayor, the Vice-Governor or Vice-Mayor concerned shall become the Governor or
Mayor . . .
For purposes of this chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office . . . .
This provision is echoed in Art. 83 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal, thus admits no room for
interpretation but merely application. This is the basic legal precept. Accordingly, in the event
that Trinidad is adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy will be created for failure of
the elected mayor to qualify for the said office. In such eventuality, the duly elected vicemayor shall succeed as provided by law.19
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 17 May 1996 and 30 July 1996
Resolutions of the COMELEC are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. COMELEC is ordered to

REINSTATE SPA No. 95-213, "Manuel C. Sunga v. Ferdinand B. Trinidad," for

disqualification, and ACT on the case taking its bearings from the opinion herein expressed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92646-47 October 4, 1991
AUGUSTO TOLEDO, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Toledo & Toledo for petitioner.
Itaas-Fetalino, Limare and Huerta for CSC.

PARAS, J.:p
Petitioner Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec Chairman Ramon Felipe as Manager of the Education and Information Department
of the Comelec, on May 21, 1986. At the time of his appointment, petitioner, having been born on July 8, 1927 was already more than fifty-seven (57)
years old. It was the first time petitioner joined the government service as he was then engaged in active private practice prior to said appointment.
Petitioner's appointment papers, particularly Civil Service Form No. 333 and his oath of office were endorsed by the Comelec to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC, for brevity) on June 11, 1986, for approval and attestation. However, no prior request for exemption from the provisions of Section
22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP, for brevity) was secured. Said provision prohibits the appointment
of persons 57 years old or above into the government service without prior approval by the Civil Service Commission (CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 5, Series of 1983).
Petitioner officially reported for work and assumed the functions of his office on June 16, 1986.
On January 29, 1989, public respondent Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority required under Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP, and
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1983 issued Resolution No. 2066, the pertinent portion of which is hereinbelow quoted, to wit:
WHEREAS, for the validity then of the appointment of Atty. Toledo as Manager of the Education and Information Department it
was necessary that not only must prior authority from the Civil Service Commission be obtained considering that he was more
than fifty-seven (57) years old at the time, it must as well be shown that (a) the exigencies of the service so required, (b) Atty.
Toledo possesses special qualification not possessed by other officers or employees in the Commission, and (c) the vacancy
cannot be filled by promotion of qualified officers or employees in the Commission;
WHEREAS, there is nothing in the 120 File of Atty. Toledo that indicates that such authority was even obtained from the Civil
Service Commission or from the President of the Philippines; moreover, conditions (a), (b) and (c) stated in the immediately
preceding clause did not then exist;
WHEREAS, the appointment then of Atty. Toledo was made in violation of law and pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of the Civil
Service Rules on Personnel Action, the appointment was void from the beginning.
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved, as it is hereby resolved, to DECLARE as VOID from the beginning the appointment of Atty.
Augusto Toledo as Manager of the Education and Information Department of this Commission. (pp. 49-50, Rollo)
Petitioner appealed the foregoing Comelec Resolution No. 2066 to public respondent CSC on February 4, 1989.
On July 12, 1989, public respondent CSC promulgated Resolution No. 89-468 which disposed of the appeal, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to declare, as it hereby declares the appointment of
Augusto V. Toledo as Manager, Information and Education Department, Commission on Elections, there being no basis in law,
merely voidable and not void ab initio. Hence, Atty. Toledo is considered a de facto officer from the time he assumed office on
June 16, 1986, until and up to the promulgation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2066 on January 29, 1989. (pp. 35-36, Rollo)
Unable to obtain a reconsideration from the aforesaid Resolution, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari.
It is first contended by petitioner that CSC Resolution No. 89-468 is without legal basis because the CSRPAP is invalid and unenforceable for not
having been published in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation as required under Section 9(b) of P.D. 807. This being the
case, petitioner argues that the requirement of prior CSC authority to appoint persons 57 years or older under Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP has
not "become effective" and cannot be invoked against him.
It will be recalled that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act No. 2260) took effect on June 19, 1959. That act, among other things, established a
Civil Service Commission one of the functions of which was, "with the approval by the President, to prescribe, amend, and enforce suitable rules and
regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of ... the Civil Service Law," said rules "to become effective thirty days after publication in the Official
Gazette" [Sec. 16 (e)].
The Commission subsequently adopted and promulgated rules intended to carry the law into effect, known as the Revised Civil Service Rules. Those
rules were published in the supplement to Vol. 58, No. 49 of the Official Gazette, dated December 3, 1962.

Section 5, Rule VI of those Revised Civil Service Rules provided that:

SEC. 5. No person shall be appointed or reinstated in the service if he is already 57 years old, unless the President of the
Philippines, President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as
the case may be, determines that he possesses special qualifications and his services are needed.
It is worthy of note, however, that the statute itself (RA 2260) contained no provision prohibiting appointment or reinstatement in the Government
service of any person who was already 57 years old, or otherwise requiring that some limitation as regards to age be placed on employment in the
Government service. This prohibition was purely a creation of the Civil Service Commission.
On October 6, 1975, pursuant to the 1973 Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 807 was issued by President Marcos, establishing "an independent
Civil Service Commission." The decree, known as the "Civil Service Decree of the Philippines," repealed or accordingly modified all laws, rules, and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent" with its provisions (Sec. 59), although it declared that "the former Civil Service Commission created under
Republic Act No. 2260, as amended, and as organized under the Integrated Reorganization Plan may serve as the nucleus of the Civil Service
Commission" (Fourth Whereas Clause, Preamble). Like RA 2260 which it superseded, PD 807 empowered the Commission to "prescribe, amend,
and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Decree," and also provided that said "rules and regulations
shall become effective thirty (30) days after publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation."
The new Civil Service Commission adopted "rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions" of the Civil Service Decree on November 20,
1983. The rules were named, "Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies" (CSRPAP). Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP is substantially
the same as Section 5, Rule VI of the quondam "Revised Civil Service Rules" and it reads as follows:
SEC. 22. No person shall be appointed, reinstated, or re-employed in the service if he is already 57 years old, unless the
President, or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in the case of employees in the judiciary, determines that he possesses
special qualifications urgently needed by the hiring agency.
Omitted, it will be observed, was reference to the "President of the Senate" and the "Speaker of the House of Representatives," both of whom were
expressly mentioned in the counterpart provision in the former rules (Section 5, Rule VI, supra).
Noteworthy, too, is that there is no provision at all in PD 807 dealing in any manner with the appointment, reinstatement or re-employment in the
Government service of any person already 57 years or any particular age, for that matter. Again, the provision regarding persons 57 years of age was
purely a creation of the Commission, having no reference to any provision in the decree intended to be implemented.
It was this provision of the CSRPAP (Sec. 22, Rule III) which was applied to Toledo. According to the CSC, since prior authority for Toledo's
appointment had never been obtained indeed, it would appear that the appointment papers were not transmitted by the COMELEC to the CSC
until February, 1989 at which time Toledo's appointment was "approved as permanent" by the Executive Director of said CSCthe appointment had
to be struck down.
Now, these rules and regulations (CSRPAP) were never published either in the Official Gazette or any newspaper of general circulation, at least as of
the time that Section 22, Rule III thereof was applied to Toledo to the latter's prejudice. As much was admitted by the Chairman of the Commission,
Hon. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas in a letter written by her to Toledo dated February 2, 1989. In that letter, the Chairman stated that (a) the Commission
had "no record of the publication of said Rules ("Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies") in newspapers of general circulation" although said Rules
were "published and distributed by the National Media Production Center in 1975," and that (b) only "the Rule on Promotion embodied in CSC
Resolution No. 83-343 repealing Rule V of the said Rules was published on August 15, 1983 in Volume 79 No. 33 of the Official Gazette" (Annex I,
petition). The lack of publication is also attested by the Director of the National Printing Office who, in a Certification issued by him on January 30,
1989, stated that "the RULES ON PERSONNEL ACTIONS AND POLICIES' promulgated on November 20, 1975 by the Civil Service Commission
implementing Presidential Decree No. 807 was not submitted to this office for publication" (Annex J, petition).
The Revised Civil Service Rules implementing R.A. No. 2260 cannot be considered valid and effective after RA 2260 was repealed and superseded
by PD 807. PD 807 was obviously intended to take the place of RA 2260. In all matters dealt with by both laws, the provisions of PD 807 were
obviously intended to be controlling. So, also, the rules promulgated by the Civil Service Commission to carry the provisions of PD 807 into effect
were meant to supersede or take the place of the rules implementing RA 2260. In other words, PD 807 and the CSRPAP were intended to make RA
2260 and its implementing rules functus officio, render them without force and effect except only as regards any provision, if at all, not dealt with by
PD 807 or the CSRPAP.
Now, it may reasonably be assumed that the law-making authority at the time, the President, was aware of the provision on 57-year old persons in the
Revised Civil Service Rules promulgated under RA 2260. Yet when he promulgated PD 807 the President did not see fit to incorporate therein any
provision regarding 57-year old persons or for that matter, to prescribe any age beyond which persons could become ineligible for appointment,
reintatement or re-employment. This surely is an indication of an intention not to continue the provision in effect.
In any event, the provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service Rules (under said RA 2260) cannot be accorded validity. As already
pointed out, it is entirely a creation of the Civil Service Commission, having no basis in the law itself which it was meant to implement. It cannot be
related to or connected with any specific provision of the law which it is meant to carry into effect, such as a requirement, for instance, that age should
be reckoned as a factor in the employment or reinstatement of an individual, or a direction that there be a determination of some point in a person's
life at which he becomes unemployable, or employable only under specific conditions. It was therefore an unauthorized act of legislation on the part of
the Civil Service Commission. It cannot be justified as a valid exercise of its function of promulgating rules and regulations for that function, to repeat,
may legitimately be exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect; and since there is no prohibition or restriction on
the employment of 57-year old persons in the statuteor any provision respecting age as a factor in employmentthere was nothing to carry into
effect through an implementing rule on the matter.
The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or
execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it. "By its administrative regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended; said regulations
'cannot amend an act of Congress.' " (Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, 33 SCRA 585, 589
[1970], citing Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 [1960]; see also, Animos v. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214, 223-224 [1989] in turn
citing Teoxon).
The considerations just expounded also conduce to the conclusion of the invalidity of Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP. The enactment of said
section, relative to 57-year old persons, was also an act of supererogation on the part of the Civil Service Commission since the rule has no relation
to or connection with any provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect. The section was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a
mode of carrying it into effect.
Apart from this, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the application to Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason that said
rules were never published, as is admitted on all sides. The argument that the CSRPAP need not be published, because they were "a mere
reiteration of existing law" and had been "circularized," flies in the teeth of the explicit and categorical requirement of PD 807 that rules and
regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Decree shall become effective thirty (30) days after publication in the Official Gazette or in any

newspaper of general circulation. Moreover, the CSRPAP cannot properly be considered a mere reiteration of existing law, for as already discussed,
the implementing rule governing 57-year old persons is invalid and cannot in any sense be considered "existing law."
Assuming without conceding that the rule regarding employment of 57-year old persons is valid and enforceable, it can only apply, according to its
express terms, to employees under the supervision of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or of the President of the Philippines, these two being
the only officials mentioned as having to give consent to the employment of said persons. It cannot be construed as applying to employees over
whom neither the President nor the Chief Justice exercises supervision, such as the Senate or the House of Representatives, or the COMELEC or
other Constitutional Commissions.
One last word. There is absolutely no question about the fact that the only reason for Toledo's separation from the service was the fact that he was
already more than 57 years old when he was invited to work in the COMELEC by its former Chairman, but through no fault of his own, not all the
conditions for his employment appear to have been satisfied. There is no question that it was not Toledo's fault that his papers were tardily submitted
to the Civil Service Commission and approval of his appointment was made only by the Executive Director of the Commission and not by the
Chairman thereof (to whom the function of the President of approving appointments like those of Toledo had been delegated under LOI 47, CSC
Memo Circular No. 5, Series of 1983). There is no question, too, that he was actively engaged in law practice when taken into the COMELEC. There
is absolutely no question about the fact that he was otherwise a competent and efficient officer of the COMELEC and had not given the remotest
cause for dismissal. These are equitable considerations proscribing application to him of the provision in question, assuming its validity, or impelling
at least a restrictive application thereof so that it may not work to his prejudice.
Premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., concur in the result.
Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 97419 July 3, 1992

GAUDENCIO T. CENA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and THE HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission,
respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
May a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of
government service, be allowed to continue in the service to complete the
15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the benefits of an
old-age pension under Section 11 par. (b) of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977? This is the issue raised before this Court by
petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, a Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila.
The facts are not disputed.
Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena entered the government service on November 16, 1978 as Legal Officer II of the Law Department of Caloocan City
where he stayed for seven (7) years until his transfer on November 16, 1986 to the Office of the Congressman of the First District of Caloocan City
where he worked for only three (3) months, or until February 15, 1987, as Supervising Staff Officer.
On July 16, 1987, he was appointed as Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila, the position he held at the time he reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years on January 22, 1991. By then, he would have rendered a total government service of 11 years, 9 months and
6 days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, he requested the Secretary of Justice, through Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with full benefits of oldage pension under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146.
The LRA Administrator, for his part, sought a ruling from the Civil Service Commission whether or not to allow the extension of service of petitioner
Cena as he is covered by Civil Service Memorandum No. 27, series 1990. In his 2nd Indorsement dated August 6, 1990, the LRA Administrator
observed that if petitioner's service as of January 22, 1991 of 10 years, 6 months and 6 days (should be 11 years, 9 months and 6 days) would be
extended to 15 years, he would have to retire on April 15, 1994 at the age of 68 years.
On July 31, 1990, the Civil Service Commission denied petitioner Cena's request for extension of service in its CSC Resolution No. 90-681, declaring
therein, that Mr. Cena shall be considered retired from the service on January 22, 1991, the date when he shall reach the compulsory retirement age
of
sixty-five (65) years, unless his retention for another year is sought by the head of office under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990.
Petitioner Cena filed a motion for reconsideration. On October 17, 1990, the Civil Service Commission set aside its CSC Resolution No. 90-681 and
allowed Gaudencio Cena a one-year extension of his service from January 22, 1991 to January 22, 1992, citing CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27,
series of 1990, the pertinent of which reads:
1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for
retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period not exceeding one (1) year.
On January 22, 1991, petitioner's second motion for reconsideration was denied in its CSC Resolution No. 91-101.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari alleging that the Civil Service Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion when it granted
the extension of petitioner's service as Registrar of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila, for a period of only one (1) year pursuant to CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, instead of three (3) years and three (3) months to complete the 15-year service requirement for his retirement with full
benefits as provided under Section 11, par. (b) of Presidential Degree No. 1146, otherwise known as the Revised Government Service Insurance Act
of 1977.
Petitioner contends that reliance of the Commission on par. (1) of Memorandum Circular No. 27 allowing an extension of service of a compulsory
retiree for a period not exceeding one (1) year is both erroneous and contrary to the "benevolent and munificent intentions" of Section 11 of P.D.
1146. Petitioner points out that par. (b), Section 11 of P.D. No. 1146 does not limit nor specify the maximum number of years the retiree may avail of
to complete the 15 years of service.
The Solicitor-General agrees with petitioner Cena. He argues that the questioned provision being generally worded, Section 11 par. (b), P.D. 1146
has general application, thus respondent CSC has no authority to limit through CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 the privilege under said section to
government employees who lack just one year to complete the 15-year service requirement.
The Civil Service Commission, however, contends that since public respondent CSC is the central personnel agency of the government, it is vested
with the power and authority, among others, to grant or allow extension of service beyond retirement age pursuant to Section 14 par. (14), Chapter 3,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). In interpreting Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146, public
respondent CSC contends that the phrase "Provided, That if he has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to
complete the fifteen years", is qualified by the clause: "Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities," which means that the extension of
service must be first authorized by the Commission, as the appropriate authority referred to in Section 11, par. (b), P.D. 1146, before the service of a
compulsory retiree (one who has already reached age of 65 years with at least 15 years of service) can be extended.

We grant the petition.

Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (November 24, 1987) cannot be interpreted to authorize
the Civil Service Commission to limit to only one (1) year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of
65 without having completed 15 years of service, when said limitation his no relation to or connection with the provision of the law supposed to be
carried into effect.
Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides thus:
Sec. 12. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including extension of service
beyond retirement age;
As a law of general application, the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot authorize the modification of an express provision of a special law (Revised
Government Service Insurance of 1977). Otherwise, the intent and purpose of the provisions on retirement and pension of the Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977 (P.D. 1146) would be rendered nugatory and meaningless.
Section 11 paragraph (b) of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 expressly provides, thus:
Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension. (a) Old-age pension shall be paid to a member who:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an employee of sixty-five years
of age with at least fifteen years of service: Provided, That if he has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed to
continue in the service to complete the fifteen years. (Emphasis supplied)
Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or establishing retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the
persons intended to be benefited thereby. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency,
security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced (Bautista vs. Auditor General, 104 Phil 428; Ortiz vs. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. L-78957, June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 812).
The Court stated in Abad Santos vs. Auditor General, 79 Phil. 176, that a pension partakes of the nature of "retained wages" of the retiree for a
double purpose: (1) to entice competent men and women to enter the government service, and (2) permit them to retire from the service with relative
security, not only for those who have retained their vigor, but more so for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident.
We have applied the liberal approach in interpreting statutes creating pension or establishing retirement plans in cases involving officials of the
Judiciary who lacked the age and service requirement for retirement. We see no cogent reason to rule otherwise in the case of ordinary employees of
the Executive Branch, as in the case of petitioner Cena, who has reached 65 but opted to avail of the statutory privilege under Section 11 par. (b) of
P.D. 1146 to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement in order to avail of old-age pension.
In Re: Application for Gratuity Benefits of Associate Justice Efren I. Plana, Adm. Matter No. 5460, En Banc Resolution, March 24, 1988, the Court,
applying the liberal approach, ruled that Justice Plana, who at the time of his courtesy resignation on March 25, 1986 lacked a few months to meet
the age requirement for retirement under the law, is entitled to full retirement benefits under R.A. 910 because his accrued leave credits would have
entitled him to go on leave until beyond the age requirement for retirement.
The above ruling of the Court was reiterated in Re: Application for Retirement under Rep. Act No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B. Britanico of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, Adm. Matter No. 6484 Ret., May 15, 1989. By liberally interpreting Section 3 of R.A. 910, as amended, in favor of the
persons intended to be benefited by them, the Court also allowed the conversion of the application for disability retirement of Justice Ruperto Martin
under said Section 3 of R.A. 910, as amended (10-year lump sum without the lifetime annuity) into an application for voluntary retirement under
Section 1
(5-year lump sum with lifetime annuity) eleven years after his disability retirement was approved on January 10, 1978 (In Re: Application for Life
Pension under Rep. Act 910. Ruperto G. Martin, applicant, 187 SCRA 477). The ten-year lump sum which he had received was considered by the
Court as payment under Section 1 of the five-year lump sum, to which he was entitled, and of his monthly pensions for the next five years.
However, the Court pointed out in Re: Gregorio G. Pineda, Adm. Matter No. 2076-RET., July 13, 1990, and its six (6) companion cases, 187 SCRA
469, that when the Court allows seeming exceptions to fixed rules for certain retired Judges or Justices, there are ample reasons behind each grant
of an exception. The crediting of accumulated leaves to make up for lack of required age or length of service is not done indiscriminately. It is always
on case to case basis.
There is thus no justifiable reason in not allowing ordinary employees in the Executive Branch on a case to case basis, to continue in the service to
complete the 15-year service requirement to avail of the old-age pension under Section 11 of P.D. 1146. By limiting the extension of service to only
one (1) year would defeat the beneficial intendment of the retirement provisions of P.D. 1146.
In resolving the question whether or not to allow a compulsory retiree to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service, there must be
present an essential factor before an application under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 may be granted by the employer or government office
concerned. In the case of officials of the Judiciary, the Court allows a making up or compensating for lack of required age or service only if satisfied
that the career of the retiree was marked by competence, integrity, and dedication to the public service (Re: Gregorio Pineda, supra). It must be so in
the instant case.
It is interesting to note that the phrase "he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years" found in Section 11 (b) of P.D.
1146 is a reproduction of the phrase in the original text found in Section 12 (e) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended, otherwise known as the
"Government Service Insurance Act" approved on November 14, 1936. There is nothing in the original text as well as in the revised version which
would serve as the basis for providing the allowable extension period to only one (1) year. There is likewise no indication that Section 11 par. (b) of
P.D. 1146 contemplates a borderline situation where a compulsory retiree on his 65th birthday has completed more than 14, but less than 15 years of
government service., i.e. only a few months short of the 15-year requirement which would enable him to collect an old-age pension.
While it is true that the Administrative Code of 1987 has given the Civil Service Commission the authority "to take appropriate action on all
appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement age", the said provision cannot be

extended to embrace matters not covered by the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (Sto. Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil.
376, 382, "citing 12 C.J. 845-46). The authority referred to therein is limited only to carrying into effect what the special law, Revised Government
Insurance Act of 1977, or any other retirement law being invoked provides. It cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle
that administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People vs. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450;
Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December
29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The pronouncement of the Court in the case of Augusta Toledo vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 92646-47, October 4, 1991, squarely
applies in the instant case. We declared in the case of Toledo that the rule prohibiting 57-year old persons from employment, reinstatement, or
re-employment in the government service provided under Section 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies (CSRPAP)
cannot be accorded validity, because it is entirely a creation of the Civil Service Commission, having no basis in the law itself which it was meant to
implement and it cannot be related to or connected with any specific provision of the law which it is meant to carry into effect. The Court, speaking
thru Justice Edgardo L. Paras, stated, thus:
The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law
into effect or execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it. "By its administrative regulations, of course, the law itself can
not be extended; said regulations cannot amend an act of Congress." (Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators,
Philippine Veterans Administration, 33 SCRA 585, 589 [1970], citing Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 [1960]; see also, Animos
v. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214, 223-224 [1989] in turn citing Teoxon).
The considerations just expounded also conduce to the conclusion of the invalidity of Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP. The
enactment of said section, relative to 57-year old persons, was also an act of supererogation on the part of the Civil Service
Commission since the rule has no relation to or connection with any provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect. The
section was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. (Emphasis supplied)
The governing retirement law in the instant case is P.D. 1146 otherwise known as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." The rule
on limiting to only one (1) year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but has less
than 15 years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 s. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relation to
or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a
mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146.
As a matter of fact, We have liberally applied Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 in two (2) recent cases where We allowed two employees in the
Judiciary who have reached the age of 65 to continue in the government service to complete the 15-year service requirement to be entitled to the
benefits under P.D. 1146.
In a resolution dated January 23, 1990 in A.M. No. 87-7-1329-MTC, We allowed Mrs. Florentina J. Bocade, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Dagami, Leyte, who at the time she reached the age of 65 years on October 16, 1987 had only 10 years of government service, to continue her
services until October 10, 1992. Thus, she was given a period of 5 years, to complete the
15-year service requirement to be entitled to the retirement benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146. The Court observed that Mrs. Bocade is
still performing her duties without any adverse complaints from her superior and that she is physically fit for work per report of the Medical Clinic.
The Court, in a resolution dated April 18, 1991, in A.M. No. 91-3-003-SC.-Re: Request for the extension of service of Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco,
allowed Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco, Budget Officer V, Budget Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the Supreme Court to continue her
services until February 10, 1995. She was granted a period of 3 years, 10 months and 13 days because she has to her credit only 11 years, 1 month
and 17 days of government service at the time she reached the age of 65 years on March 29, 1991 in order that she be entitled to the retirement
benefits under P.D. No. 1146.
It is erroneous to apply to petitioner Cena who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government service, Section 12, par. (b) of P.D. 1146
which provides that "a member who has rendered at least three (3) years but less than 15 years of service at the time of separation shall, . . . upon
separation after age sixty, receive a cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service."
The applicable law should be Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which allows him to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days to complete the 15-year
of service consistent with the beneficial intendment of P.D. 1146 and which right is subject to the discretion of the government office concerned.
Section 12 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 does not apply to the case of herein Cena, because he opted to continue in the service to complete the 15-year
service requirement pursuant to Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146. The completion of the 15-year service requirement under Section 11 par. (b)
partakes the nature of a privilege given to an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but has less than 15 years of
service. If said employee opted to avail of said privilege, he is entitled to the benefits of the old-age pension. On the other hand, if the said employee
opted to retire upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of 65 years although he has less than 15 years of service, he is entitled to the benefits
provided for under Section 12 of P.D. 1146 i.e. a cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service.
The right under Section 11, par. (b) is open to all employees similarly situated, so it does not offend the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
the law. There is nothing absurd or inequitable in rewarding an employee for completion of the 15-year service beyond the retirement age. If he would
be better off than the one who has served for 14 years but who is separated from the service at the age of 64, it would be only just and proper as he
would have worked for the whole period of 15 years as required by law for entitlement of the old-age pension. Indeed, a longer service should merit a
greater reward. Besides, his entitlement to the old-age pension is conditioned upon such completion. Thus, if the service is not completed due to
death or incapacity, he would be entitled to the benefit under Section 12, par. (b), i.e. cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation
for every year of service.
Finally, in view of the aforesaid right accorded under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146, petitioner Cena should not be covered by Memorandum
Circular No. 65 issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig on June 14, 1988. Memorandum Circular No. 65 allowing retention of service
for only six (6) months for "extremely meritorious reasons" should apply only to employees or officials who have reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 years but who, at the same time, have completed the 15-year service requirement for retirement purposes. It should not apply to employees
or officials who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who opted to avail of the old-age pension under par. (b), Section 11 of
P.D. 1146, in which case, they are allowed, at the discretion of the agency concerned, to complete the 15-year service requirement.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) of the Department of Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner
Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government service to complete the 15-year service so that he may retire with full
benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J.: concurring:

I concur in the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Leo D.
Medialdea, with a slight modification. The majority opinion
would vest upon the Land Registration Authority "the
discretion to allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his
eleven (11) years, nine (9) months and six (6) days of
government service to complete the fifteen (15) years service
so that he may retire with full benefits under Section 11 par.
(b) of P.D. 1146" (decision, p. 16). A reading of the cited
provision of law which reads as follows:
Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate
authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an
employee of sixty-five years of age with at least
fifteen years of service: Provided, That if he has less
than fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed to
continue in the service to complete the fifteen years.
would indicate, in my opinion, that the government employee
who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age but has rendered
less than fifteen (15) years of service, has THE RIGHT to
continue in the service to complete fifteen (15) years, and that
the government office or agency where he is employed cannot
but allow the exercise of such right of the subject employee. In
short, the employing government office or agency must allow
the government employee who has reached sixty-five (65)
years of age, but has rendered less than fifteen (15) years of
service, the opportunity to complete the fifteen (15) years of

service in order to enjoy the benefits of old-age pension. It

follows from this that if such government employee is no
longer fit to complete the remainder of the fifteen (15) year
service (after reaching age 65), he should be terminated for
cause, after appropriate proceedings, otherwise, he has the
right to continue in the service for purposes of completing his
fifteen (15) years of service.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.: dissenting:
The issue raised in this petition for review of the Resolution
No. 90-935 dated October 17, 1990 of the Civil Service
Commission, is whether the government service of petitioner
Gaudencio Cena as Registrar of Deeds for Malabon, Metro
Manila, may be extended for a period of one (1) year only
(from January 22, 1991 up to January 22, 1992) and not for as
long as necessary to enable him to complete 15 years service
so that he may retire with full benefits.
After a careful consideration of related provisions of the
retirement laws, I submit that inasmuch as P.D. No. 1146 is
silent on the matter, the Civil Service Commission, pursuant to
the authority granted to it in the Administrative Code of 1987,
"to take appropriate action on . . . all personnel matters in the
Civil Service, including extension of service beyond retirement
age" (paragraph 14, Section 12, Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V), appropriately promulgated Memorandum Circular
No. 27, Series of 1990, limiting the extension of service to "not
exceeding one year." The pertinent provisions of the circular
are quoted below:
1. Any request for the extension of service of
compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen (15)
years service requirement for retirement shall be
allowed only to permanent appointees in the career
service who are regular members of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be
granted for a period not exceeding one (1) year.
2. Any request for the extension of service of
compulsory retiree to complete the fifteen (15) years

service requirement for retirement who entered the

government service at 57 years of age or over upon
prior grant of authority to appoint him or her, shall no
longer be granted.
3. Any request for the extension of service to
complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement
for retirement shall be filed not later than three (3)
years prior to the date of compulsory retirement.
4. Any request for the extension of service of a
compulsory retiree who meets the minimum number
of years of service for retirement purposes may be
granted for six (6) months only with no further
extension. (pp. 64-65, Rollo; emphasis supplied.)
The maximum allowable extension of "not exceeding one
year" fixed in paragraph 1 of CSC Memorandum Circular No.
27 is reasonable, just, and consistent with the general rule
that "retirement shall be automatic and compulsory at the age
of 65 years" (Sec. 12[e], Com. Act 186).
I believe that Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146
contemplates a borderline situation where a compulsory
retiree on his 65th birthday has completed more than 14, but
less than 15, years of government service, or a few months
short of the 15-year requirement which would enable him to
collect an old-age pension. Pursuant to the beneficent
objectives of our retirement laws, said retiree may be granted
an extension of not more than one year to enable him to
complete 15 years of government service and receive full
retirement benefits including old-age pension which,
otherwise, he would not be entitled to receive. Such extension
will enable him to retire after his 65th birthday, but before he
attains 66 years of age, hence, still within the mandatory
retirement age of 65 years fixed by law, for as a matter of fact,
one is 65 years old upon reaching his 65th birthday until the
eve of his 66th.
Since Cena, on his 65th birthday, had rendered service to the
government for a total of only 11 years, 9 months and 6 days,

he is not entitled to an extension of his service to complete 15

years for it would illegally and unreasonably stretch his
retirement age beyond his 68th birthday, or long after he shall
have ceased to be 65 years old.
As Cena would not be able to complete 15 years of
government service even if he were given a one-year
extension of service, paragraph 1 of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 27 may not be availed of by him. The applicable
legal provision to him would be paragraph (b), Section 12 of
P.D. 1146 which provides that "a member who has rendered
at least three (3) years but less than 15 years of service at the
time of separation shall, . . . upon separation after age sixty, **
receive a cash payment equivalent to 100% of his average
monthly compensation for every year of service." He is not
entitled to an old-age pension, length of service being the
determinant of whether or not a retired employee would be
entitled to such pension.
The petitioner's theory that a compulsory retiree (one who is
65 years old) should be allowed an extension of his service for
any number of years to complete the 15-year-service
requirement under Section 11(b), P.D. 1146, can produce
absurd and inequitable results. An employee who has
rendered only 3 years of government service at the age of 65
can have his service extended for 12 years and finally retire at
the age of 77 and receive a life pension, while one who has
served for 14 years, but whose service is terminated by death
or incapacity at the age of 64, will only receive a cash gratuity
equivalent to one month pay for every year of service in the
government, without a life pension, under "Section 12,
paragraph (b), P.D. No. 1146.
Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil
Service Commission that extending the service of compulsory
retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium
to late-comers in the government service and in effect
discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger
age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank
employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of

qualified young civil service applicants who have already

passed the various government examinations but must wait
for jobs to be vacated by "extendees" who have long passed
the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of
their government service to complete 15 years so they may
qualify for old-age pension.
While I agree with the stand of the Civil Service Commission
that an extension of service may not exceed one year, I do not
agree with the grant to Cena of a service extension of one (1)
year from January 23, 1991, or until January 22, 1992 under
paragraph 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 27 for that
paragraph should apply to a compulsory retiree who needs an
extension of "not exceeding one year" (Cena needs more than
3 years) to complete the 15-year-service requirement for oldage pension benefits. There is no point in granting to a 65year-old retiree a one-year extension of service, if, anyway, as
in Cena's case, the extension will not enable him to complete
15 years of government service. Applicable to Cena is
paragraph (b), Section 12 of P.D. 1146 which provides that "a
member who has rendered . . . less than 15 years of service
upon separation after age sixty, (shall) receive a cash
payment equivalent to 100% of his average monthly
compensation for every year of service."
I therefore vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari.
ROMERO, J.: dissenting:
I adopt the arguments in the dissenting opinion of my
esteemed colleague, J. Carolina Grio-Aquino, which are at
once logical and reasonable even as it takes into account the
sociological implications of a contrary ruling. At the same time,
I add my own.
J. Aquino's interpretation is in consonance with the spirit of
practically all existing retirement laws fixing the compulsory
retirement age of government employees at sixty-five. The
precursor of Presidential Decree No. 1146, Commonwealth
Act No. 186, explicitly provided that retirement should be
"automatic and compulsory at the age of sixty-five years." The

phrase "automatic and compulsory" with reference to the

retirement age of sixty-five years had been retained in
subsequent amendatory laws, specifically Republic Act Nos.
660, 728 and 3096.
The word "compulsory" should be understood in its legal
signification: involuntary or forced in contradistinction to
voluntary. Considering the use of the word "compulsory" in connection with age sixty-five, the same
1

word in Sec. 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 should refer only to the specified retirement age and not to the fifteen-year
service mentioned therein. This paragraph merely cites one class of prospective retirees which would be eligible
to receive old-age pension and that is, those who have reached the age of sixty-five years while at the same
time having to their credit "at least fifteen years of service." That this is the intendment of the law is borne out by
the succeeding proviso that contemplates the possibility that the same sixty-five year old may have served "less
than fifteen years of service."
Moreover, to interpret the law as meaning that the age limit and the fifteen-year length of service should concur
before a government employee is allowed the old-age pension may well give rise to a situation wherein a person
who enters government service a year before reaching age sixty-five would have to wait until he is seventy-nine
years old to be entitled to the old-age pension provided for in P.D. No. 1146, which is an absurdity. Hence, to
give substance to the real signification of the law, the proviso in Sec. 11 (b) which states that a government
employee who has "less than fifteen years of service, . . . shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete
the fifteen years," should contemplate a situation wherein the employee has only a minimal period of time left to
complete the fifteen-year period. What this minimal period is, the Civil Service Commission has correctly
declared to be "not exceeding one year." Otherwise, the government may well be saddled with a corps of civil
servants that may be regarded graphically as liabilities instead of assets.
Moreover, encouraging the retention of employees well beyond the age of sixty-five years would, in effect, swell
the numbers of the qualified but unemployed many who, even now, face the bleak prospect of being edged out
of the labor market by those who can but offer to the government and the people their diminishing physical and
mental vitality.
Attention should be called to the fact that the dissenting opinion is in consonance with the present policy on
retirement as well as trends being laid down by the other branches of the government on the matter.
For instance, there are bills now pending in Congress that seek to lower the compulsory retirement age of the
bureaucracy. House Bill No. 33769 sponsored by Congressman Roco and other Congressmen would lower it
from sixty-five to sixty. 2
Its counterpart bill in the Senate, S. No. 561 whose author is Senator Tamano, likewise would amend the
present law by lowering the compulsory age of retirement to sixty. 3
House Bill No. 25903 earlier authored by Congressmen Monfort and Estrella would further reduce the
compulsory retirement age to fifty-six in order to give the young retirees the opportunity to engage in gainful
employment or otherwise utilize their skills and experiences while they are still relatively strong.
Along the same line of thinking, the proposed Civil Service Code would set the compulsory age of retirement at
sixty.
On the specific issue of whether a compulsory retiree who has not served fifteen years should be allowed an
extension for as long as necessary to enable him to complete the fifteen years of service required for entitlement
to a life pension (which is the position of the petitioner) or just a maximum period of "not exceeding one year" as
fixed in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 which is supported by the dissenting opinion, it is worthwhile calling
attention to Memorandum Circular No. 65 4 issued by Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. Amending
Memorandum Circular No. 163 dated March 5, 1968, it categorically states:
Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not
be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention
shall not exceed six (6) months.
According to the ponencia, this Circular "should apply only to employees or officials who have reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years but who, at the same time, have completed the 15-year service
requirement for retirement purposes." A close reading of the title of Memorandum Circular No. 65, as well as the
relevant provision quoted above, leaves no room for ambiguity or interpretation inasmuch as there is no phrase

that qualifies the scope of the law to those employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65
years "but who, at the same time, have completed the
15-year service requirement for retirement purposes." To read into the Memorandum Circular this qualifying
phrase is to unduly expand the coverage of the law to cases not intended by the Office of the Executive
Secretary.
The ponencia proffers the argument that since the Court has allowed the officials and employees of the
Judiciary who have reached the compulsory age of retirement but lacked the fifteen-year service requirement to
continue working until they complete said period, there is "no cogent reason to rule otherwise in the case of
ordinary employees of the Executive Branch as in the case of petitioner Cena". But there is a cogent reason
Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, being an employee of the Land Registration Authority under the Department of
Justice, falls under the Executive Department. Accordingly, Memorandum Circular No. 65 quoted in the above
preceding paragraph which allows a retention or extension of only six months and this, only for "extremely
meritorious reasons" should be applicable to his case.
Needless to say, it would conduce to sound management practice in the government if this rule could be
rationalized and applied uniformly to all government employees, with the exceptions provided by law.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J.: concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Leo D. Medialdea, with a slight modification. The majority
opinion would vest upon the Land Registration Authority "the discretion to allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to
extend his eleven (11) years, nine (9) months and six (6) days of government service to complete the fifteen
(15) years service so that he may retire with full benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146" (decision, p.
16). A reading of the cited provision of law which reads as follows:
Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for
an employee of sixty-five years of age with at least fifteen years of service: Provided, That if he
has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete
the fifteen years.
would indicate, in my opinion, that the government employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age but
has rendered less than fifteen (15) years of service, has THE RIGHT to continue in the service to complete
fifteen (15) years, and that the government office or agency where he is employed cannot but allow the exercise
of such right of the subject employee. In short, the employing government office or agency must allow the
government employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age, but has rendered less than fifteen (15)
years of service, the opportunity to complete the fifteen (15) years of service in order to enjoy the benefits of oldage pension. It follows from this that if such government employee is no longer fit to complete the remainder of
the fifteen (15) year service (after reaching age 65), he should be terminated for cause, after appropriate
proceedings, otherwise, he has the right to continue in the service for purposes of completing his fifteen (15)
years of service.
GRIO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
The issue raised in this petition for review of the Resolution No. 90-935 dated October 17, 1990 of the Civil
Service Commission, is whether the government service of petitioner Gaudencio Cena as Registrar of Deeds for
Malabon, Metro Manila, may be extended for a period of one (1) year only (from January 22, 1991 up to January
22, 1992) and not for as long as necessary to enable him to complete 15 years service so that he may retire
with full benefits.
After a careful consideration of related provisions of the retirement laws, I submit that inasmuch as P.D. No.
1146 is silent on the matter, the Civil Service Commission, pursuant to the authority granted to it in the
Administrative Code of 1987, "to take appropriate action on . . . all personnel matters in the Civil Service,
including extension of service beyond retirement age" (paragraph 14, Section 12, Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V), appropriately promulgated Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, limiting the extension of
service to "not exceeding one year." The pertinent provisions of the circular are quoted below:
1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen (15)
years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the

career service who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
and shall be granted for a period not exceeding one (1) year.
2. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retiree to complete the fifteen (15)
years service requirement for retirement who entered the government service at 57 years of age
or over upon prior grant of authority to appoint him or her, shall no longer be granted.
3. Any request for the extension of service to complete the fifteen (15) years service
requirement for retirement shall be filed not later than three (3) years prior to the date of
compulsory retirement.
4. Any request for the extension of service of a compulsory retiree who meets the minimum
number of years of service for retirement purposes may be granted for six (6) months only with
no further extension. (pp. 64-65, Rollo; emphasis supplied.)
The maximum allowable extension of "not exceeding one year" fixed in paragraph 1 of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 27 is reasonable, just, and consistent with the general rule that "retirement shall be automatic and
compulsory at the age of 65 years" (Sec. 12[e], Com. Act 186).
I believe that Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146 contemplates a borderline situation where a compulsory
retiree on his 65th birthday has completed more than 14, but less than 15, years of government service, or a few
months short of the 15-year requirement which would enable him to collect an old-age pension. Pursuant to the
beneficent objectives of our retirement laws, said retiree may be granted an extension of not more than one year
to enable him to complete 15 years of government service and receive full retirement benefits including old-age
pension which, otherwise, he would not be entitled to receive. Such extension will enable him to retire after his
65th birthday, but before he attains 66 years of age, hence, still within the mandatory retirement age of 65 years
fixed by law, for as a matter of fact, one is 65 years old upon reaching his 65th birthday until the eve of his 66th.
Since Cena, on his 65th birthday, had rendered service to the government for a total of only 11 years, 9 months
and 6 days, he is not entitled to an extension of his service to complete 15 years for it would illegally and
unreasonably stretch his retirement age beyond his 68th birthday, or long after he shall have ceased to be 65
years old.
As Cena would not be able to complete 15 years of government service even if he were given a one-year
extension of service, paragraph 1 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 may not be availed of by him. The
applicable legal provision to him would be paragraph (b), Section 12 of P.D. 1146 which provides that "a
member who has rendered at least three (3) years but less than 15 years of service at the time of separation
shall, . . . upon separation after age sixty, ** receive a cash payment equivalent to 100% of his average monthly
compensation for every year of service." He is not entitled to an old-age pension, length of service being the
determinant of whether or not a retired employee would be entitled to such pension.
The petitioner's theory that a compulsory retiree (one who is 65 years old) should be allowed an extension of his
service for any number of years to complete the 15-year-service requirement under Section 11(b), P.D. 1146,
can produce absurd and inequitable results. An employee who has rendered only 3 years of government service
at the age of 65 can have his service extended for 12 years and finally retire at the age of 77 and receive a life
pension, while one who has served for 14 years, but whose service is terminated by death or incapacity at the
age of 64, will only receive a cash gratuity equivalent to one month pay for every year of service in the
government, without a life pension, under "Section 12, paragraph (b), P.D. No. 1146.
Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending the service of
compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the government
service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion
of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of qualified young
civil service applicants who have already passed the various government examinations but must wait for jobs to
be vacated by "extendees" who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of
their government service to complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age pension.
While I agree with the stand of the Civil Service Commission that an extension of service may not exceed one
year, I do not agree with the grant to Cena of a service extension of one (1) year from January 23, 1991, or until
January 22, 1992 under paragraph 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 27 for that paragraph should apply to a
compulsory retiree who needs an extension of "not exceeding one year" (Cena needs more than 3 years) to
complete the 15-year-service requirement for old-age pension benefits. There is no point in granting to a 65year-old retiree a one-year extension of service, if, anyway, as in Cena's case, the extension will not enable him
to complete 15 years of government service. Applicable to Cena is paragraph (b), Section 12 of P.D. 1146 which
provides that "a member who has rendered . . . less than 15 years of service upon separation after age sixty,
(shall) receive a cash payment equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of
service."

I therefore vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari.

ROMERO, J.: dissenting:
I adopt the arguments in the dissenting opinion of my esteemed colleague, J. Carolina Grio-Aquino, which are
at once logical and reasonable even as it takes into account the sociological implications of a contrary ruling. At
the same time, I add my own.
J. Aquino's interpretation is in consonance with the spirit of practically all existing retirement laws fixing the
compulsory retirement age of government employees at sixty-five. The precursor of Presidential Decree No.
1146, Commonwealth Act No. 186, explicitly provided that retirement should be "automatic and compulsory at
the age of sixty-five years." The phrase "automatic and compulsory" with reference to the retirement age of
sixty-five years had been retained in subsequent amendatory laws, specifically Republic Act Nos. 660, 728 and
3096.
The word "compulsory" should be understood in its legal signification: involuntary or forced in contradistinction
to voluntary. 1 Considering the use of the word "compulsory" in connection with age sixty-five, the same word in
Sec. 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 should refer only to the specified retirement age and not to the fifteen-year service
mentioned therein. This paragraph merely cites one class of prospective retirees which would be eligible to
receive old-age pension and that is, those who have reached the age of sixty-five years while at the same time
having to their credit "at least fifteen years of service." That this is the intendment of the law is borne out by the
succeeding proviso that contemplates the possibility that the same sixty-five year old may have served "less
than fifteen years of service."
Moreover, to interpret the law as meaning that the age limit and the fifteen-year length of service should concur
before a government employee is allowed the old-age pension may well give rise to a situation wherein a person
who enters government service a year before reaching age sixty-five would have to wait until he is seventy-nine
years old to be entitled to the old-age pension provided for in P.D. No. 1146, which is an absurdity. Hence, to
give substance to the real signification of the law, the proviso in Sec. 11 (b) which states that a government
employee who has "less than fifteen years of service, . . . shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete
the fifteen years," should contemplate a situation wherein the employee has only a minimal period of time left to
complete the fifteen-year period. What this minimal period is, the Civil Service Commission has correctly
declared to be "not exceeding one year." Otherwise, the government may well be saddled with a corps of civil
servants that may be regarded graphically as liabilities instead of assets.
Moreover, encouraging the retention of employees well beyond the age of sixty-five years would, in effect, swell
the numbers of the qualified but unemployed many who, even now, face the bleak prospect of being edged out
of the labor market by those who can but offer to the government and the people their diminishing physical and
mental vitality.
Attention should be called to the fact that the dissenting opinion is in consonance with the present policy on
retirement as well as trends being laid down by the other branches of the government on the matter.
For instance, there are bills now pending in Congress that seek to lower the compulsory retirement age of the
bureaucracy. House Bill No. 33769 sponsored by Congressman Roco and other Congressmen would lower it
from sixty-five to sixty. 2
Its counterpart bill in the Senate, S. No. 561 whose author is Senator Tamano, likewise would amend the
present law by lowering the compulsory age of retirement to sixty. 3
House Bill No. 25903 earlier authored by Congressmen Monfort and Estrella would further reduce the
compulsory retirement age to fifty-six in order to give the young retirees the opportunity to engage in gainful
employment or otherwise utilize their skills and experiences while they are still relatively strong.
Along the same line of thinking, the proposed Civil Service Code would set the compulsory age of retirement at
sixty.
On the specific issue of whether a compulsory retiree who has not served fifteen years should be allowed an
extension for as long as necessary to enable him to complete the fifteen years of service required for entitlement
to a life pension (which is the position of the petitioner) or just a maximum period of "not exceeding one year" as
fixed in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 which is supported by the dissenting opinion, it is worthwhile calling
attention to Memorandum Circular No. 65 4 issued by Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. Amending
Memorandum Circular No. 163 dated March 5, 1968, it categorically states:
Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not
be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention
shall not exceed six (6) months.

According to the ponencia, this Circular "should apply only to employees or officials who have reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years but who, at the same time, have completed the 15-year service
requirement for retirement purposes." A close reading of the title of Memorandum Circular No. 65, as well as the
relevant provision quoted above, leaves no room for ambiguity or interpretation inasmuch as there is no phrase
that qualifies the scope of the law to those employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65
years "but who, at the same time, have completed the
15-year service requirement for retirement purposes." To read into the Memorandum Circular this qualifying
phrase is to unduly expand the coverage of the law to cases not intended by the Office of the Executive
Secretary.
The ponencia proffers the argument that since the Court has allowed the officials and employees of the
Judiciary who have reached the compulsory age of retirement but lacked the fifteen-year service requirement to
continue working until they complete said period, there is "no cogent reason to rule otherwise in the case of
ordinary employees of the Executive Branch as in the case of petitioner Cena". But there is a cogent reason
Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, being an employee of the Land Registration Authority under the Department of
Justice, falls under the Executive Department. Accordingly, Memorandum Circular No. 65 quoted in the above
preceding paragraph which allows a retention or extension of only six months and this, only for "extremely
meritorious reasons" should be applicable to his case.
Needless to say, it would conduce to sound management practice in the government if this rule could be
rationalized and applied uniformly to all government employees, with the exceptions provided by law.
Footnotes
GRIO-AQUINO, J.: concurring:
** Separation at age sixty-five is separation "after age sixty."
ROMERO, J.: dissenting:
1 8 Words and Phrases 465 and 15A C.J.S. 312 both citing State v. Bradley, 230 P. 2d 216,
220.
2 The pertinent provision is reproduced below:
(INTRODUCED BY CONGRESSMEN ROCO, BAUTISTA, SR., PONCE DE LEON, BELTRAN,
JR., MONFORT, CONGRESSWOMAN PLAZA (C), CONGRESSWOMEN JAVIER (R),
BANDON, JR., ANIAG, JR., CONGRESSWOMEN COSETENG, LOBREGAT,
CONGRESSMEN DANS, MITRA, DRAGON, BACALTOS, MONTEJO, MIRAN, VALDEZ,
MASKARINO, TY, PUZON, CALINGASAN, PALACOL, DOMINGUEZ, ROMERO, YULO,
MENDIOLA, DIMAPORO (M.A.B.), NAVARRO, SR., ROXAS, JR., CONGRESSWOMAN
RAYMUNDO, CONGRESSMEN GILLEGO, MARTINEZ, JR., TIROL, BORJAL, LACSON,
DUREZA, DEL MAR, BAGATSING (A), ESTRELLA (E), CONGRESSWOMEN ALMARIO,
LABARIA, CONGRESSMEN WEBB, NOGRALES, SINGSON (L.) AND VILLAREAL, SR. PER
COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 1318)
"Sec. 11. Conditions for [Old-Age Pension] OPTIONAL AND COMPULSORY RETIREMENT.
(a) [Old-Age pension] OPTIONAL RETIREMENT shall be [paid] AVAILABLE to a member who:
(1) Has at least [fifteen] TWELVE years of service;
(2) Is at least [sixty] FIFTY-FIVE years of age; and
(3) Is [separated from] LEAVING the service.
(b) [Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities,] R
Retirement shall be compulsory for an employee at [sixty-five] SIXTY years of age with at least
[fifteen] TWELVE years of service: Provided, That, if he has less than [fifteen] TWELVE years of
service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the [fifteen] TWELVE years:
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT ALL SERVICES RENDERED IN THE GOVERNMENT
IRRESPECTIVE OF STATUS OF APPOINTMENT DULY ACCREDITED SHALL BE COUNTED
AS GOVERNMENT SERVICE FOR RETIREMENT UNDER THIS ACT; PROVIDED,
FURTHER, THAT ALL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES WHO, AT THE TIME OF THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT, ARE SIXTY-ONE YEARS OF AGE AND ABOVE SHALL RETIRE
UNDER THE FOLLOWING PHASES:

(1) THOSE WITHIN THE AGES OF SIXTY-FOUR TO SIXTY-FIVE YEARS OLD SHALL BE
RETIRED ON THE FIRST YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ACT;
(2) THOSE WITHIN THE AGES OF SIXTY-TWO TO SIXTY-THREE YEARS OLD SHALL BE
RETIRED ON THE SECOND YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION; AND
(3) THOSE SIXTY-ONE YEARS OF AGE SHALL BE RETIRED ON THE THIRD YEAR OF
IMPLEMENTATION,
"PROVIDED, FINALLY, THAT PAYMENT OF ALL RETIREMENT BENEFITS TO A RETIREE
SHALL BE MADE IN LUMP-SUM AND PAID NOT LATER THAN THE EFFECTIVITY DATE OF
HIS RETIREMENT."
3 The pertinent provision runs thus:
"Sec. 11. Condition for Old-Age Pension.
(a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid to a member who:
(1) has at least [fifteen] TWENTY years of service;
(2) is at least [sixty] FIFTY-FIVE years of age; and
(3) is separate from the service.
(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for
an employee at [sixty-five] SIXTY years of age with at least [fifteen] TWENTY years of service;
Provided, That if he has less than [fifteen] TWENTY years of service he shall be allowed to
continue in the service to complete the (fifteen) TWENTY years."
4 This Circular states:
"MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 65
FURTHER AMENDING CIRCULAR NO. 163, DATED MARCH 5, 1968, AS AMENDED,
PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THE RETENTION IN THE SERVICE OF PERSONS WHO
HAVE REACHED THE COMPULSORY RETIREMENT AGE OF 65 YEARS.
WHEREAS, this Office has been receiving requests for reinstatement and/or retention in the
service of employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, despite the
strict conditions provided for in Memorandum Circular No. 163, dated March 5, 1968, as
amended.
WHEREAS, the President has recently adopted a policy to adhere more strictly to the law
providing for compulsory retirement age of 65 years and, in extremely meritorious cases, to limit
the service beyond the age of 65 years to six (6) months only.
WHEREFORE, the pertinent provision of Memorandum Circular No. 163 on the retention in the
service of officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years,
is hereby amended to read as follows
Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65
years shall not be retained in the service; except for extremely meritorious
reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months.
All heads of departments, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities of the government including
government-owned or controlled corporations, are hereby enjoined to require their respective
offices to strictly comply with this circular.
This Circular shall take effect immediately.
By authority of
the President
(Sgd.)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA,
GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLO DEL
ROSARIO, accused-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellant.
Rustics F. de los Reyes, Jr. for appellees.

AQUINO, J.:t.hqw
This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh
water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries
Commission.
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino
and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of
Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.
It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted
to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor
banca, equipped with motor; with a generator colored green with attached dynamo colored
gray or somewhat white; and electrocuting device locally known as sensored with a
somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire
attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or
equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its
cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace" (Criminal Case No. 5429).
Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution
appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case
No. SC-36). The case is now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution under Republic
Act No. 5440.
The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an
obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and
that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances.
The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the
executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.
As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the
use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing.
Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous
substance in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five
thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years.

It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing."
Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters.
The order is quoted below: +.wph!1
SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL WATERS +.wph!1
OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No. 3512, the
following rules and regulations regarding the prohibition of electro fishing in all waters of the
Philippines are promulgated for the information and guidance of all concerned.+.wph!1
SECTION 1. Definition. Words and terms used in this Order 11 construed
as follows:
(a) Philippine waters or territorial waters of the Philippines' includes all waters of
the Philippine Archipelago, as defined in the t between the United States and
Spain, dated respectively the tenth of December, eighteen hundred ninety eight
and the seventh of November, nineteen hundred. For the purpose of this order,
rivers, lakes and other bodies of fresh waters are included.
(b) Electro Fishing. Electro fishing is the catching of fish with the use of
electric current. The equipment used are of many electrical devices which may
be battery or generator-operated and from and available source of electric
current.
(c) 'Persons' includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee.
(d) 'Fish' includes other aquatic products.
SEC. 2. Prohibition. It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in
electro fishing or to catch fish by the use of electric current in any portion of the
Philippine waters except for research, educational and scientific purposes which
must be covered by a permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources which shall be carried at all times.
SEC. 3. Penalty. Any violation of the provisions of this Administrative
Order shall subject the offender to a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos
(P500.00) or imprisonment of not extending six (6) months or both at the
discretion of the Court.
SEC. 4. Repealing Provisions. All administrative orders or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Administrative Order are hereby revoked.
SEC. 5. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect six (60)
days after its publication in the Office Gazette.
On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the
recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 841, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro
fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963).
Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by
the amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as
rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water."

The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that electro fishing is
punishable under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section 76 thereof), which
provides that any other violation of that law "or of any rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or
in t for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court."
That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order No. 84
imposes a fm of not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro fishing, which amount
the 83. It seems that the Department of Fisheries prescribed their own penalty for swift fishing
which penalty is less than the severe penalty imposed in section 76 and which is not
Identified to the at penalty imposed in section 83.
Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on 83, then the
crime of electro fishing would be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior court
(Sec. 44 [f], Judiciary Law; People vs. Ragasi, L-28663, September 22,
We have discussed this pre point, not raised in the briefs, because it is obvious that the crime
of electro fishing which is punishable with a sum up to P500, falls within the concurrent
original jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the Court of First instance (People vs. Nazareno,
L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531 and the cases cited therein).
And since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial
capital, the order of d rendered by that municipal court was directly appealable to the Court,
not to the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Sec. 45 and last par. of section 87 of the
Judiciary Law; Esperat vs. Avila, L-25992, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596).
It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no appellate jurisdiction over the
case. Its order affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal is void for lack of motion. This
appeal shall be treated as a direct appeal from the municipal court to this Court. (See People
vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67).
In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 were not
issued under section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as indicated above, punishes fishing by
means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance. This contention is not well-taken because,
as already stated, the Penal provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that electro
fishing is penalized as a form of fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance
under section 11.
The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh
water fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under section 4 of the
Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of
the Fisheries Law and the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and
regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for
the development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the declared
national policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic
Act No. 3512), and (4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other
violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall
subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not
more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court."
As already pointed out above, the prosecution's reference to section 83 is out of place
because the penalty for electro fishing under Administrative order No. 84 is not the same as
the penalty fixed in section 83.
We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries
Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.

The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro
fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect
could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing;
(2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal
taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish
caught, and (6) other violations.
Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in
punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category
of "other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty
next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed
in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and
regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition
of the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11
Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32).
Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban
against electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The amendment created the
impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in marine
waters. That circumstances strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms
of electro fishing.
However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the
Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because
Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees
affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269),
expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas.
That decree provides: +.wph!1
SEC. 33. Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic
products. It shall he unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause
to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine
waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the
use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of
Section 3 hereof: ...
The decree Act No. 4003, as amended, Republic Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512 and 3586,
Presidential Decrees Nos. 43, 534 and 553, and all , Acts, Executive Orders, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with it (Sec. 49, P. D. No. 704).
The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear
recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law. It is an
admission that a mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing.
Note that the definition of electro fishing, which is found in section 1 (c) of Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84 and which is not provided for the old Fisheries Law, is now found
in section 3(d) of the decree. Note further that the decree penalty electro fishing by
"imprisonment from two (2) to four (4) years", a punishment which is more severe than the

penalty of a time of not excluding P500 or imprisonment of not more than six months or both
fixed in section 3 of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84.
An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies
and, in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of
Natural Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that he ex his authority in
penalizing electro fishing by means of an administrative order.
Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds
it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex
situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should
conform to the standards that the law prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125;
Director of Forestry vs. Mu;oz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs.
Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712).
The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a
particular statute (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S.
506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6).
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle
of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers.
Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest
are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law"
Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; People vs. Rosenthal and Osme;a, 68 Phil. 328).
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must
be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying
into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be
extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of
Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office,
L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969,
29 SCRA 350).
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending
or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of
Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal
Revenue vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil.
Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making
powers. Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the Secretary "shall from time to time
issue instructions, orders, and regulations consistent" with that law, "as may be and proper to
carry into effect the provisions thereof." That power is now vested in the Secretary of Natural
Resources by on 7 of the Revised Fisheries law, Presidential December No. 704.
Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Co of Fisheries "to prepare and execute
upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, forms instructions,
rules and regulations consistent with the purpose" of that enactment "and for the
development of fisheries."
Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "the Department Head shall
have the power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit do so, all rules, regulates, orders,
memorandums, and other instructions, not contrary to law, to regulate the proper working and
harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his

Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to
matters under the jurisdiction of said Department; but none of said rules or orders shall
prescribe penalties for the violation thereof, except as expressly authorized by law."
Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the force
of law (Valerie vs. Secretary of culture and Natural Resources, 117 Phil. 729, 733; Antique
Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco, L- 20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316). As he exercises the rulemaking power by delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should not
transcend the bound demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power; otherwise, he
would be improperly exercising legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of
the lawmaking body.
Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution."
As noted by Justice Fernando, "except for constitutional officials who can trace their
competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public office must be in the statute relied
upon a grant of power before he can exercise it." "department zeal may not be permitted to
outrun the authority conferred by statute." (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Santiago, L-29236, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493, 496-8).
"Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority
conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and
compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so
because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes,
objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of
carrying out the law are oftentimes left to the administrative agency entrusted with its
enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a
delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law." The
rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in
Victories Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement
said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms
and provisions of the basic law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091).
This Court in its decision in the Lim case, supra, promulgated on July 26, 1960, called the
attention of technical men in the executive departments, who draft rules and regulations, to
the importance and necessity of closely following the legal provisions which they intend to
implement so as to avoid any possible misunderstanding or confusion.
The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the
government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation
constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the
provisions of the law (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 124).
In other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute
a crime punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and by virtue of the latter (People
vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125, 1132).
It has been held that "to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is
a power vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body
or agency" (1 Am. Jur. 2nd, sec. 127, p. 938; Texas Co. vs. Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527).
In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with
the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not
expressly punish electro fishing.

The instant case is similar to People vs. Santos, 63 Phil. 300. The Santos case involves
section 28 of Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 2 issued by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the aforementioned section 4 of the Fisheries
Law.
Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not licensed under the Fisheries Law and
under the said administrative order may fish within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands
and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military reservations
authorities of the United States only upon receiving written permission therefor, which
permission may be granted by the Secretary upon recommendation of the military or naval
authorities concerned. A violation of the proviso may be proceeded against under section 45
of the Federal Penal Code.
Augusto A. Santos was prosecuted under that provision in the Court of First Instance of
Cavite for having caused his two fishing boats to fish, loiter and anchor without permission
from the Secretary within three kilometers from the shoreline of Corrigidor Island.
This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit boats not subject to license from
fishing within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which
jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without
permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon recommendation of
the military and naval authorities concerned.
As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned in section 28 of the administrative order,
the promulgation of that provision by the Secretary "is equivalent to legislating on the matter,
a power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being expressly reserved" to
the lawmaking body. "Such an act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power
conferred upon the Secretary but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not
have, and therefore" the said provision "is null and void and without effect". Hence, the
charge against Santos was dismiss.
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make
ranks and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be
confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only
the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it.
(Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 Second 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130).
Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards
authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of
administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with
the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power but
constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate (State vs. Miles, Wash. 2nd 322,
105 Pac. 2nd 51).
In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order
is one which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body,
and the order will be scrutinized with special care. (State vs. Miles supra).
The Miles case involved a statute which authorized the State Game Commission "to adopt,
promulgate, amend and/or repeal, and enforce reasonable rules and regulations governing
and/or prohibiting the taking of the various classes of game.
Under that statute, the Game Commission promulgated a rule that "it shall be unlawful to
offer, pay or receive any reward, prize or compensation for the hunting, pursuing, taking,
killing or displaying of any game animal, game bird or game fish or any part thereof."
Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a sporting goods store, regularly offered a ten-down cash prize to
the person displaying the largest deer in his store during the open for hunting such game

animals. For that act, he was charged with a violation of the rule Promulgated by the State
Game Commission.
It was held that there was no statute penalizing the display of game. What the statute
penalized was the taking of game. If the lawmaking body desired to prohibit the display of
game, it could have readily said so. It was not lawful for the administrative board to extend or
modify the statute. Hence, the indictment against Miles was quashed. The Miles case is
similar to this case.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of appellate
jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in
Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and Guerrero, JJ., concur.1wph1.t
Fernando and Antonio, JJ., took no part.
Guerrero, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 131457

August 19, 1999

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B.

BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D.
GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the pending incidents before us, namely, respondents' and intervenors' separate motions
for reconsideration of our Resolution dated November 17, 1998, as well as their motions to refer this
case to this Court En banc.
Respondents and intervenors jointly argue, in fine, that our Resolution dated November 17, 1998,
wherein we voted two-two on the separate motions for reconsideration of our earlier Decision or April
24, 1998, as a result of which the Decision was deemed affirmed, did not effectively resolve the said
motions for reconsideration inasmuch as the matter should have been referred to the Court sitting en
banc, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution. Respondents and intervenors also
assail our Resolution dated January 27, 1999, wherein we noted without action the intervenors'
"Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc" filed on
December 3, 1998, on the following considerations, to wit:
the movants have no legal personality to further seek redress before the Court after their motion
for leave to intervene in this case was denied in the April 24, 1998 Decision. Their subsequent
motion for reconsideration of the said decision, with a prayer to resolve the motion to the Court
En Banc, was also denied in the November 17, 1998 Resolution of the Court. Besides, their
aforesaid motion of December 3, 1998 is in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration
which is a forbidden motion (Section 2, Rule 52 in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure). The impropriety of movants' December 3, 1998 motion becomes all
the more glaring considering that all the respondents in this case did not anymore join them
(movants) ill seeking a reconsideration of the November 17, 1998 Resolution.1
Subsequently, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their "Motion For
Reconsideration Of The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For Referral Of The Case To This
Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A Restraining Order)" on December 3,
1998, accompanied by a "Manifestation and Motion"2 and a copy of the Registered Mail Bill3
evidencing filing of the said motion for reconsideration to this Court by registered mail.1wphi1.nt
In their respective motions for reconsideration, both respondents and intervenors pray that this case be
referred to this Court en banc. They contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration
(of the Decision dated April 24, 1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to
carry a decision, i.e., three, was not met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be decided
by this Court en banc, relying on the following constitutional provision:
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members.

When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.4
A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the intention of the framers to
draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are
"decided" while matters, which include motions, are "resolved". Otherwise put, the word "decided"
must refer to "cases"; while the word "resolved" must refer to "matters", applying the rule of reddendo
singula singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section
4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution where these words appear.5
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en
banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not
apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of "case" and not
"matter". The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition
of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the
case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by
the division and the losing party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve
the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision
which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for
its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost.
The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling
of this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.
It is the movants' further contention in support of their plea for the referral of this case to the Court en
banc that the issues submitted in their separate motions are of first impression. In the opinion penned
by Mr. Justice Antonio M. Martinez during the resolution of the motions for reconsideration on
November 17, 1998, the following was expressed:
Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no extraordinary
import to merit the attention of the Court En Banc. Specifically, the issue of whether or not the
power of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the DAR is
no longer novel, this having been decided by this Court in the case of Province of Camarines
Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals wherein we held that local government units need not obtain the
approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
The dispositive portion of the Decision in the aforecited case states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province
of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondent's property (b) orders the trial
court to suspended the exportation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of
Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert
or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
xxx

xxx

x x x(Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a unanimous vote of all
five (5) members of the Second Division of this Court, Stated otherwise, this Second Division
is of the opinion that the matters raised by movants are nothing new and do not deserve the
consideration of the Court en banc. Thus, the participation of the full Court in the resolution of
movants' motions for reconsideration would be inappropriate.6
The contention, therefore, that our Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not dispose of the earlier
motions for reconsideration of the Decision dated April 24, 1998 is flawed. Consequently, the present
motions for reconsideration necessarily partake of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration
which, according to the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to Rule 52,
Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is prohibited.

True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertain a second motion for reconsideration,
such as where there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Even then, we have ruled that such second
motions for reconsideration must be filed with express leave of court first obtained.7 In this case, not
only did movants fail to ask for prior leave of court, but more importantly, they have been unable to
show that there are exceptional reasons for us to give due course to their second motions for
reconsideration. Stripped of the arguments for referral of this incident to the Court en banc, the
motions subject of this resolution are nothing more but rehashes of the motions for reconsideration
which have been denied in the Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be sure, the allegations contained
therein have already been raised before and passed upon by this Court in the said Resolution.
The crux of the controversy is the validity of the "Win-Win" Resolution dated November 7, 1997. We
maintain that the same is void and of no legal effect considering that the March 29, 1996 decision of
the Office of the President had already become final and executory even prior to the filing of the
motion for reconsideration which became the basis of the said "Win-Win" Resolution. This ruling,
quite understandably, sparked a litany of protestations on the part of respondents and intervenors
including entreaties for a liberal interpretation of the rules. The sentiment was that notwithstanding its
importance and far-reaching effects, the case was disposed of on a technicality. The situation, however,
is not as simple as what the movants purport it to be. While it may be true that on its face the
nullification of the "Win-Win" Resolution was grounded on a procedural rule pertaining to the
reglementary period to appeal or move for reconsideration, the underlying consideration therefor was
the protection of the substantive rights of petitioners. The succinct words of Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban are quoted in the November 17, 1998 opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, viz.: "Just as a
losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case."8
In other words, the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested appurtenant rights
to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of Bukidnon and other parts of the country
who stand to be benefited by the development of the property. The issue in this case, therefore, is not a
question of technicality but of substance and merit.9
Before finally disposing of these pending matters, we feel it necessary to rule once and for all on the
legal standing of intervenors in this case. In their present motions, intervenors insist that they are real
parties in interest inasmuch as they have already been issued certificates of land ownership award, or
CLOAs, and that while they are seasonal farmworkers at the plantation, they have been identified by
the DAR as qualified beneficiaries of the property. These arguments are, however, nothing new as in
fact they have already been raised in intervenors' earlier motion for reconsideration of our April 24,
1998 Decision. Again as expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, intervenors, who are
admittedly not regular but seasonal farmworkers, have no legal or actual and substantive interest over
the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to own the land. Rather, their right is limited only to a
just share of the fruits of the land.10 Moreover, the "Win-Win" Resolution itself states that the qualified
beneficiaries have yet to be carefully and meticulously determined by the Department of Agrarian
Reform.11 Absent any definitive finding of the Department of Agrarian Reform, intervenors cannot as
yet be deemed vested with sufficient interest in the controversy as to be qualified to intervene in this
case. Likewise, the issuance of the CLOA's to them does not grant them the requisite standing in view
of the nullity of the "Win-Win" Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null
and void.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the following incidents, namely: intervenors' "Motion For
Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc," dated December 3, 1998;
respondents' "Motion For Reconsideration Of The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For
Referral Of The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A
Restraining Order)," dated December 2, 1998; and intervenors' "Urgent Omnibus Motion For The
Supreme Court Sitting En Banc To Annul The Second Division's Resolution Dated 27 January 1999
And Immediately Resolve The 28 May 1998 Motion For Reconsideration Filed By The Intervenors,"
dated March 2, 1999; are all DENIED with FINALITY. No further motion, pleading, or paper will be
entertained in this case.
SO ORDERED.

Melo, J., please see separate opinion.

Puno, J., in the result. I maintain my original position that the case should go to CA for further
proceedings.
Mendoza, J., in the result.

Separate Opinions
MELO, J., separate opinion;
On the merits, I still maintain my vote with Mr. Justice Puno that this case should be referred to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
Since what is now before us is a second motion for reconsideration, which under the rules is generally
proscribed, the majority deemed it pertinent to limit its resolution in regard to cogent procedural
points.
At the outset, I wish to point out that inasmuch as I am bound to abide by the Court En Banc's
Resolution No. 99-109-SC dated January 2, 1999, which settled the issue of an even (2-2) vote in a
division, I am constrained to vote with the majority in denying all of the subject motions in the abovecaptioned case. Nevertheless, I wish to express my views on this issue and put them or record, so, in
the event that the Court decides to open and re-discuss this issue at some future time, these
consideration may be referred to.
I continue to have some reservations regarding majority's position regarding an even (2-2) vote in a
division, due to the following considerations:
By mandate of the Constitution, cases heard by a division when the required majority of at least 3
votes in the division is not obtained are to be heard and decided by the Court En Banc. Specifically,
Paragraph 3, Section 4, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall e decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority
of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon,
and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such members. When the required number
is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed by the
court sitting en banc.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission disclose that if the case is not decided in a
division by a majority vote, it goes to the Court En Banc and not to a longer division. Moreover, the
elevation of a case to the Banc shall be automatic. Thus,
MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, may I ask some questions for clarification.
MR. PRESIDENT: Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO: Under these provisions, there are 3 kinds of divisions: one would be a
division composed of 3 justices in which case there will be 5 divisions; another division is
composed of 5 justices each, in which case there will be 3 divisions; and the other is composed
of 7 members each, in which case, there will be 2 divisions.
Let us take the smallest division of 3 and the vote is 2-1. So, it is less than 3 votes. Should it
immediately go to the court en banc of 15 justices or should it first go to a bigger division?
MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.

MR. RODRIGO: They immediately go to the court en banc?

MR. SUAREZ: Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: Is that automatic? Let us say that in the division of 3, the vote is 2-1,
automatically it goes to the court en banc?
MR. SUAREZ: Yes, because the required number of 3 is not obtained. So, this last phrase
would operate automatically "WHEN THE REQUIRED NUMBER IS NOT OBTAINED,
THE CASE SHALL BE DECIDED EN BANC."
xxx

xxx

xxx

(V Record 635, Oct. 8, 1986)

Explicit, therefore, is the requirement that at least 3 members must concur in any case or matter heard
by a division. Failing thus, or, when the required number of 3 votes is not obtained, the case or matter
will have to be decided by the Court En Banc.
In a situation where a division of 5 has only 4 members, the 5th member having inhibited himself or is
otherwise not in a position to participate, or has retired, a minimum of 3 votes would still be required
before there can be any valid decision or resolution by that division. There may, then, be instances
when a deadlock may occur, i.e., the votes tied at 2-2. It is my humble view that under the clear and
unequivocal provisions of the 1986 Constitution, if the required majority is not reached in a division,
the case should automatically got to the Court En Banc.
A distinction has been made between "cases" and "matters" referred to in the above-quoted
constitutional provision. "Cases" being decided, and "matters" being resolved. Only "cases" are
referred to the Court En Banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained
Matters" are not referred anymore.
I regret I cannot square with such position.
The majority view is that "cases" would only refer to deliberations at first instance on the merits of a
case filed with the Court, and other deliberations, such as motions, including motions of
reconsideration, are "matters" to be resolved. To give flesh to this distinction, it is cited that if a tie
occurs in the voting on motions for reconsideration, the decision which already been passed stands.
This is not true all the time. It may be true only in original cases, as opposed to appealed cases, filed
with the Court. However, because of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to only original cases which
are taken cognizable of by this Court are those wherein it has exclusive jurisdiction. But, invariably,
these cases are all required by the Constitution to be heard by the Court En Banc. so, there will be no
instance when a division will be ever taking cognizance of an original actions filed with this Court.
It may be noted that cases taken cognizable of by the divisions are either petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 or petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, under Rule 65. Under
Rule 45, appeal by way of petition for review on certiorari is not a matter of right. Thus, should there
be a tie in the voting on deliberation of a "case" by the division, although apparently no action is
passed, a decision may still be rendered the petition is thereby DENIED due course, and it is
forthwith DISMISSED. This is definitely in consonance with the majority's line of reasoning in the 2-2
vote on motions for reconsideration. But why is it that, the 2-2 vote in the deliberation of the "case" at
the first instance should still be referred to the Court En Banc? The reason is simple. Because the
express provision of the Constitution requires a vote of at least three justices for there to be a valid and
binding decision of the Court. But, why do we not apply the same rule to motions for reconsideration?
Even on this score alone, it is my view that, in all instances, whether it be in the deliberations of a case
at first instance or on a motion for reconsideration, a division having a 2-2 vote cannot pass
action.1wphi1.nt

I submit that the requirement of 3 votes equally applies to motions for reconsideration because the
provision contemplates "cases" or "matters" (which for me has no material distinction insofar as
divisions are concerned) heard by a division, and a motion for reconsideration cannot be divorced from
the decision in a case that it seeks to be reconsidered. Consequently, if the required minimum majority
of 3 votes is not met, the matter of the motion for reconsideration has to be heard by the Court En
Banc, as mandated by the Constitution (par. 3, Sec. 4, Art. VIII). To say that the motion is lost in the
division on 2-2 vote, is to construe something which cannot be sustained by a reading of the
Constitution. To argue that a motion for reconsideration is not a "case" but only a "matter" which does
not concern a case, so that, even through the vote thereon in the division is 2-2, the matter or issue is
not required to elevated to the Court En Banc, is to engage in a lot of unfounded hairsplitting.
Furthermore, I humbly submit that the theory of leaving the issue hanging on a 2-2 vote or any even
vote may be sustained only in cases where there is no recourse to a higher assemblage.
In the Court of Appeals, for instance, an even vote in a division of 5 (2-2, with 1 abstaining) would
result in the motion not being carried, but only because there is and there cannot be recourse to the
Court of Appeals En Banc which, does not act on judicial matters. In a legislative body, an even vote
results in the failure of the proposition, only because there is no higher body which can take over. In
our own Court En Banc, if there voting is evenly split, on a 7-7 vote with 1 slot vacant, or with 1
justice inhibiting or disqualifying himself, the motion shall, of course, not be carried because that is the
end of the line.
But in the situation now facing us, the even vote is in a division, and there being recourse to the Court
En Banc, and more so, this being expressly directed by the Constitution, the matter of the motion for
reconsideration should, by all means, be decided by the Court En Banc.

Footnotes

Rollo, p. 1310. References to the Rollo pages are omitted.

Rollo, p. 1313.

Rollo, p. 1319.

Art. VIII, Section 4 (3).

See Article VIII, Section 15; Article XVIII, Section 12 to 14.

Rollo, pp. 1243-1244: emphasis omitted.

Ortigas and Company Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Tirso Velasco, et al., 254 SCRA 234 (1996).

Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 50, 56 (1996).

Opinion of Justice Martinez, November 17, 1998, p. 10.

10

Ibid., pp. 12-13, citing the Constitution, Article XIII, Section 4, and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Reviewer-Primer, Third Edition (1997), p. 441.
11

Ibid., p. 13.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 106296 July 5, 1996

ISABELO T. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:p
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the present petition is partially granted. The questioned Orders and writs directing (1) "reinstatement" of
respondent Isabelo T. Crisostomo to the position of "President of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines", and (2) payment
of "salaries and benefits" which said respondent failed to receive during his suspension insofar as such payment includes those
accruing after the abolition of the PCC and its transfer to the PUP, are hereby set aside. Accordingly, further proceedings
consistent with this decision may be taken by the court a quo to determine the correct amounts due and payable to said
respondent by the said university.
The background of this case is as follows:
Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC), having been appointed to that position by the President of
the Philippines on July 17, 1974.
During his incumbency as president of the PCC, two administrative cases were filed against petitioner for illegal use of government vehicles,
misappropriation of construction materials belonging to the college, oppression and harassment, grave misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty. The
administrative cases, which were filed with the Office of the President, were subsequently referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation.
Charges of violations of R.A. No. 3019, 3(e) and R.A. No. 992, 20-21 and R.A. No. 733, 14 were likewise filed against him with the Office of
Tanodbayan.
On June 14, 1976, three (3) informations for violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019, as amended) were filed
against him. The informations alleged that he appropriated for himself a bahay kubo, which was intended for the College, and construction materials
worth P250,000.00, more or less. Petitioner was also accused of using a driver of the College as his personal and family driver. 1

On October 22, 1976, petitioner was preventively suspended from office pursuant to R.A. No. 3019, 13, as
amended. In his place Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as officer-in-charge on November 10, 1976, and
then as Acting President on May 13, 1977.
On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, CONVERTING THE
PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES,
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS CURRICULAR OFFERINGS.
Mateo continued as the head of the new University. On April 3, 1979, he was appointed Acting President and on
March 28, 1980, as President for a term of six (6) years.
On July 11, 1980, the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment acquitting petitioner of the charges
against him. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Isabelo T. Crisostomo, not guilty of the violations
charged in all these three cases and hereby acquits him therefrom, with costs de officio. The
bail bonds filed by said accused for his provisional liberty are hereby cancelled and released.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and under which the accused has been suspended by this
Court in an Order dated October 22, 1976, said accused is hereby ordered reinstated to the
position of President of the Philippine College of Commerce, now known as the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, from which he has been suspended. By virtue of said
reinstatement, he is entitled to receive the salaries and other benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against
him.

The bail bonds filed by the accused for his provisional liberty in these cases are hereby
cancelled and released.
SO ORDERED.
The cases filed before the Tanodbayan (now the Ombudsman) were likewise dismissed on August 8, 1991 on
the ground that they had become moot and academic. On the other hand, the administrative cases were
dismissed for failure of the complainants to prosecute them.
On February 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for execution of the judgment,
particularly the part ordering his reinstatement to the position of president of the PUP and the payment of his
salaries and other benefits during the period of suspension.
The motion was granted and a partial writ of execution was issued by the trial court on March 6, 1992. On March
26, 1992, however, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as acting president of the PUP,
following the expiration of the term of office of Dr. Nemesio Prudente, who had succeeded Dr. Mateo. Petitioner
was one of the five nominees considered by the President of the Philippines for the position.
On April 24, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, through respondent Judge Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, issued another
order, reiterating her earlier order for the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of PUP president. A writ of
execution, ordering the sheriff to implement the order of reinstatement, was issued.
In his return dated April 28, 1992, the sheriff stated that he had executed the writ by installing petitioner as
President of the PUP, although Dr. Gellor did not vacate the office as he wanted to consult with the President of
the Philippines first. This led to a contempt citation against Dr. Gellor. A hearing was set on May 7, 1992. On
May 5, 1992, petitioner also moved to cite Department of Education, Culture and Sports Secretary Isidro Cario
in contempt of court. Petitioner assumed the office of president of the PUP.
On May 18, 1992, therefore, the People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (CA G.R.
No. 27931), assailing the two orders and the writs of execution issued by the trial court. It also asked for a
temporary restraining order.
On June 25, 1992, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining petitioner to cease and
desist from acting as president of the PUP pursuant to the reinstatement orders of the trial court, and enjoining
further proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. VI-2329-2331.
On July 15, 1992, the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, 2 the dispositive portion of
which is set forth at the beginning of this opinion. Said decision set aside the orders and writ of reinstatement
issued by the trial court. The payment of salaries and benefits to petitioner accruing after the conversion of the
PCC to the PUP was disallowed. Recovery of salaries and benefits was limited to those accruing from the time
of petitioner's suspension until the conversion of the PCC to the PUP. The case was remanded to the trial court
for a determination of the amounts due and payable to petitioner.
Hence this petition. Petitioner argues that P.D. No. 1341, which converted the PCC into the PUP, did not abolish
the PCC. He contends that if the law had intended the PCC to lose its existence, it would have specified that the
PCC was being "abolished" rather than "converted" and that if the PUP was intended to be a new institution, the
law would have said it was being "created." Petitioner claims that the PUP is merely a continuation of the
existence of the PCC, and, hence, he could be reinstated to his former position as president.
In part the contention is well taken, but, as will presently be explained, reinstatement is no longer possible
because of the promulgation of P.D. No. 1437 by the President of the Philippines on June 10, 1978.
P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only changed, the former Philippine College of Commerce into what is now
the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in the same way that earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had converted
what was then the Philippine School of Commerce into the Philippine College of Commerce. What took place
was a change in academic status of the educational institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the change in its
name, the expansion of its curricular offerings, and the changes in its structure and organization.
As petitioner correctly points out, when the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization
and to replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so. He cites the following examples:
E.O. No. 709:
1. There is hereby created a Ministry of Trade and Industry, hereinafter referred to as the
Ministry. The existing Ministry of Trade established pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 721 as
amended, and the existing Ministry established pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 488 as
amended, are abolished together with their services, bureaus and similar agencies, regional
offices, and all other entities under their supervision and control.

E.O. No. 710:

1. There is hereby created a Ministry of Public Works and Highways, hereinafter referred to as
the Ministry. The existing Ministry of Public Works established pursuant to Executive Order No.
546 as amended, and the existing Ministry of Public Highways established pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 458 as amended, are abolished together with their services, bureaus
and similar agencies, regional offices, and all other entities within their supervision and control. .
..
R.A. No. 6975:
13. Creation and Composition. -- A National Police Commission, hereinafter referred to as the
Commission, is hereby created for the purpose of effectively discharging the functions
prescribed in the Constitution and provided in this Act. The Commission shall be a collegial
body within the Department. It shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) regular
commissioners, one (1) of whom shall be designated as Vice-Chairman by the President. The
Secretary of the Department shall be the ex-officio Chairman of the Commission, while the ViceChairman shall act as the executive officer of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. - Upon the effectivity of this Act, the present
National Police Commission, and the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police shall
cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary, which is the nucleus of the integrated Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police, shall cease to be a major service of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. The Integrated National Police, which is the civilian component of the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police, shall cease to be the national police force
and in lieu thereof, a new police force shall be established and constituted pursuant to this Act.
In contrast, P.D. No. 1341, provides:
1. The present Philippine College of Commerce is hereby converted into a university to be
known as the "Polytechnic University of the Philippines," hereinafter referred to in this Decree
as the University.
As already noted, R.A. No. 778 earlier provided:
1. The present Philippine School of Commerce, located in the City of Manila, Philippines, is
hereby granted full college status and converted into the Philippine College of Commerce,
which will offer not only its present one-year and two-year vocational commercial curricula, the
latter leading to the titles of Associate in Business Education and/or Associate in Commerce,
but also four-year courses leading to the degrees of Bachelor of Science in Business in
Education and Bachelor of Science in Commerce, and five-year courses leading to the degrees
of Master of Arts in Business Education and Master of Arts in Commerce, respectively.
The appellate court ruled, however, that the PUP and the PCC are not "one and the same institution" but "two
different entities" and that since petitioner Crisostomo's term was coterminous with the legal existence of the
PCC, petitioner's term expired upon the abolition of the PCC. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals
took into account the following:
a) After respondent Crisostomo's suspension, P.D. No. 1341 (entitled "CONVERTING THE
PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY, DEFINING
ITS OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING
ITS CURRICULAR OFFERINGS") was issued on April 1, 1978. This decree explicitly provides
that PUP's objectives and purposes cover not only PCC's offering of programs "in the field of
commerce and business administration" but also "programs in other polytechnic areas" and "in
other fields such as agriculture, arts and trades and fisheries . . ." (section 2). Being a university,
PUP was conceived as a bigger institution absorbing, merging and integrating the entire PCC
and other "national schools" as may be "transferred" to this new state university.
b) The manner of selection and appointment of the university head is substantially different from
that provided by the PCC Charter. The PUP President "shall be appointed by the President of
the Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary of Education and Culture after
consultation with the University Board of Regents" (section 4, P.D. 1341). The President of
PCC, on the other hand, was appointed "by the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Board of Trustees" (Section 4, R.A. 778).

c) The composition of the new university's Board of Regents in likewise different from that of the
PCC Board of Trustees (which included the chairman of the Senate Committee on Education
and the chairman of the House Committee on Education, the President of the PCC Alumni
Association as well as the President of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines). Whereas,
among others, the NEDA Director-General, the Secretary of Industry and the Secretary of Labor
are members of the PUP Board of Regents. (section 6, P.D. 1341)
d) The decree moreover transferred to the new university all the properties including "equipment
and facilities:"
". . . owned by the Philippine College of Commerce and such other National
Schools as may be integrated . . . including their obligations and appropriations
. . ." (sec. 12; emphasis supplied) 3
But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an existing institution and to create a new one. New course
offerings can be added to the curriculum of a school without affecting its legal existence. Nor will changes in its
existing structure and organization bring about its abolition and the creation of a new one. Only an express
declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will.
The Court of Appeals also cites the provision of P.D. No. 1341 as allegedly implying the abolition of the PCC
and the creation of a new one - the PUP - in its stead:
12. All parcels of land, buildings, equipment and facilities owned by the Philippine College of
Commerce and such other national schools as may be integrated by virtue of this decree,
including their obligations and appropriations thereof, shall stand transferred to the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, provided, however, that said national schools shall continue to
receive their corresponding shares from the special education fund of the
municipal/provincial/city government concerned as are now enjoyed by them in accordance with
existing laws and/or decrees.
The law does not state that the lands, buildings and equipment owned by the PCC were being "transferred" to
the PUP but only that they "stand transferred" to it. "Stand transferred" simply means, for example, that lands
transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to the PUP as the new name of the institution.
But the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of president of the PUP could not be ordered by the trial court
because on June 10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437 had been promulgated fixing the term of office of presidents of state
universities and colleges at six (6) years, renewable for another term of six (6) years, and authorizing the
President of the Philippines to terminate the terms of incumbents who were not reappointed. P.D. No. 1437
provides:
6. The head of the university or college shall be known as the President of the university or
college. He shall be qualified for the position and appointed for a term of six (6) years by the
President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary of Education and Culture
after consulting with the Board which may be renewed for another term upon recommendation
of the Secretary of Education and Culture after consulting the Board. In case of vacancy by
reason of death, absence or resignation, the Secretary of Education and Culture shall have the
authority to designate an officer in charge of the college or university pending the appointment
of the President.
The powers and duties of the President of the university or college, in addition to those
specifically provided for in this Decree shall be those usually pertaining to the office of the
president of a university or college.
7. The incumbent president of a chartered state college or university whose term may be
terminated according to this Decree, shall be entitled to full retirement benefits: provided that he
has served the government for at least twenty (20) years; and provided, further that in case the
number of years served is less than 20 years, he shall be entitled to one month pay for every
year of service.
In this case, Dr. Pablo T. Mateo Jr., who had been acting president of the university since April 3, 1979, was
appointed president of PUP for a term of six (6) years on March 28, 1980, with the result that petitioner's term
was cut short. In accordance with 7 of the law, therefore, petitioner became entitled only to retirement benefits
or the payment of separation pay. Petitioner must have recognized this fact, that is why in 1992 he asked then
President Aquino to consider him for appointment to the same position after it had become vacant in
consequence of the retirement of Dr. Prudente.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by SETTING ASIDE the questioned orders of
the Regional Trial Court directing the reinstatement of the petitioner Isabelo T. Crisostomo to the position of

president of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines and the payment to him of salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during his suspension in so far as such payment would include salaries accruing after March
28, 1980 when petitioner Crisostomo's term was terminated. Further proceedings in accordance with this
decision may be taken by the trial court to determine the amount due and payable to petitioner by the university
up to March 28, 1980.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, J., took no part.
Footnotes
* The original title of this case, "Hon. Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 46,
Manila, Elmer R. Melgas, as Sheriff IV of Manila and Isabelo T. Crisostomo, petitioners, v. The Court of
Appeals and the People of the Philippines, respondents," has been changed by omitting the names of
the first two petitioners who were merely nominal parties in the Court of Appeals.
1 Judgment in CCC-VI-2329-2331, pp. 2-3.
2 Per Justice Lorna Lombos-De la Fuente, chairman, and concurred in by Justices Cesar D. Francisco
and Cancio C. Garcia, members.
3 Rollo, p. 148, Decision, p. 4.