Bill of Rights Q&A 2003

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BILL OF RIGHTS
Q. How is the Bill of Rights strengthened in the 1987
Constitution? (Bar Question)
A. There are several ways in which the Bill of Rights is
strengthened in the 1987 Constitution.
1. New rights are given explicit recognition such as, the
prohibition against detention by reason of political beliefs
and aspirations. The waiver of Miranda rights is now
required to be made in writing with the assistance of
counsel. The use of solitary, incommunicado and secret
detention places is prohibited, while the existence of
substandard and inadequate penal facilities is made the
concern of legislation.
There is also recognition of the right of
expression, an express prohibition against the use of
torture, a mandate to the State to provide compensation
and rehabilitation for victims of torture and their families.
2. Some rights have been expanded. For instance, free
access to courts now includes access to quasi-judicial
bodies and to adequate legal assistance.
3. The requirements for interfering with some rights have
been made more strict. For instance, only judges can now
issue search warrants or warrants of arrest. There must be
a law authorizing the Executive Department to interfere
with the privacy of communication, the liberty of abode,
and the right to travel before these rights may be impaired
or curtailed.
4. The Constitution now provides that the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
suspend the right to bail, thus resolving a doctrinal dispute
of long standing.
5. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the proclamation of martial law have been
limited to 60 days and are now subject to the power of
Congress to revoke. In addition, the Supreme Court is
given the jurisdiction, upon the petition of any citizen to
determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the proclamation of martial law.
6. The Supreme Court is empowered to adopt rules for the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
7. Art. II, Sec. 11 commits the State to a policy which
places value on the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
8. A Commission on Human Rights is created.
9. Under Art. XVI,Sec. 5(2) the State is mandated to
promote respect for the peoples rights among the
members of the military in the performance of their duty.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS
permit and shipping documents. The vessel and its
cargo were held and a warrant of Seizure and
Detention was issued after due investigation. In the
course of the forfeiture proceedings, the ship captain
and the ships resident agent executed sworn
statements before the Custom legal officer admitting
that contraband cargo were found aboard the vessel.
The shipping lines object to the admission of the
statements as evidence contending that during their
executions, the captain and the shipping agent were
not assisted by counsel, in violation of due process.
Decide. (Bar Question)
A. The admission of the statements of the captain and the
shipping agent as evidence did not violate due process
even if they were not assisted by counsel. In Feeder
International Line Ltd. V C.A, 197 SCRA 842, it was held
that the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due
process in forfeiture proceedings since such proceedings
are not criminal in nature.
Q. LOI No. 869 which prohibited the use of motor
vehicles with the H and EH license plates on
weekends and holidays was questioned on the ground
that they were denied the right to use their car on
such days and violated the due process clause and
equal protection clause as other motor vehicles were
not banned on such days. Decide.
A.Due process cannot be invoked, because LOI 869 is an
exercise of the police power of the State. It seeks to
conserve the use of energy resources because of the
spiraling prices of petroleum products. Equal protection
does not require adherence to the all-or-nothing policy.
Whether or not other measures should have been adopted
is left to the policy discretion of the political branches.
(Bautista VS Juinio, 127 SCRA 329)
Q. A complaint was filed by intelligence agents of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) against
Stevie, a German national, for his deportation as an
undesirable alien. The Immigration Commissioner
directed the Special Board of Inquiry to conduct an
investigation. At the said investigation, a lawyer from
the Legal Department of the BID presented as
witnesses the three intelligence agents who filed the
complaint. On the basis of the findings, report and
recommendation of the Board of Special Inquiry, the
BID Commissioners unanimously voted for Stevies
deportation.
Stevies
lawyer
questioned
the
deportation order:
1)
DUE PROCESS
Q. The members of a union barricaded the gates of the
court in order to press the court to render judgment in
their favor. In case the court renders a judgment in
their favor, do you think there was deprivation of the
right to due process? Why?
A.Yes, because the decision was the result of a mob
where there was no independent judgment. (Nestle Phils.
VS NLRC). In a similar decision, the requirement of due
process would likewise be violated. This is especially so if
the publicity is focused on the guilt of the accused.
(Martelino VS Alejandro, 32 SCRA 106)
Q. The S/S Masoy of Panamanian registry, while
moored at the South Harbor, was found to have
contraband goods on board. The Customs team found
out that the vessel did not have the required ships
2)
On the ground that Stevie was denied

due
process
because
the
BID
Commissioners
who
rendered
the
decision were not the ones who received
the evidence, in violation of the He who
decides must hear rule. Is he correct?
On the ground that there was a violation
of
due
process
because
the
complainants, the prosecutor and the
hearing officers were all subordinates of
the BID Commissioners who rendered
the deportation decision. Is he correct?
(Bar Question)
A.
1) No, Stevie is not correct, As held in Adamson
& Adamson, Inc VS Amores, 152 SCRA 237, as
administrative due process does not require that the actual
taking of testimony or the presentation of evidence before
the same officer who will decide the case.
In American Tobacco Co. V Director of
Patents, 67 SCRA 287, the Supreme Court has ruled that
so long as the actual decision on the merits of the cases is
made by the officer authorized by law to decide, the power
Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA
BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and
DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.
2
to hold a hearing on the basis of which his decision will be
made can be delegated and is not offensive to due
process. The court noted that: AS long as a party is not
deprived of his right to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported
by the evidence in record, there is no question that the
requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. In
short, there is no abrogation of responsibility on the part of
the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with
and is made by said officer. It is however, required that to
give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose
of making determinations upon evidence the officer who
makes the determinations must consider and appraise the
evidence which justifies them.
2) No, Stevie was not denied due process simply
because the complainants, the prosecutor, and the hearing
officers were all sunbordinates of the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. In accordance
with the ruling in Erlanger & Galinger, Inc VS Court of
Industrial Relations, 110 Phil 470,the findings of the
subordinates are not conclusive upon the Commissioners,
who have the discretion to accept or reject them. What is
important is that Stevie was not deprived of his right to
present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof, the decision is supported by substantial evidence,
and the Commissioners acted on their own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the case, and did not
simply accept the views of their subordinates in arriving at
a decision.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Q. Sec. 89, RA 6975 creating the PNP provides for
compulsory retirement at the age of 56. It provides
however, that the members of the INP who were
absorbed by the PNP shall retire at the age of 60
during the 4-year transitory period. Some members of
the PC who were absorbed by the PNP and who
reached 56 received notices of retirement. They
challenged Sec. 89 as violative of the equal protection
clause since it applies only to the PNP. Decide.
A.The contention is not correct because there is a
substantial distinction between them and the members of
the INP. Under the laws enforced before RA 6975,
members of the PC were already retirable at the age of 60.
The transitory period of 4 years is intended to give them
(INP members) a breathing space to enable them to plan
for their retirement, which would be earlier than what was
provided by the old law. (Napolcom VS De Guzman, 48
SCAD 205, February 9, 1994)
Q. RA 7354, otherwise known as the Philippine Postal
Corporation withdrew the franking privilege of the
Courts, while retaining the same insofar as the
Executive and Legislative Branches were concerned.
It was questioned as violative of the equal protection
clause. Is the contention correct? Why?
A. Yes. In Philippine Judges Association VS Prado, 46
SCAD 225, Nov. 11, 1993, it was said that the judiciary
needs the franking privilege. And it cannot be understood
why, of all the departments of the government, it is the
judiciary that has been denied the franking privilege while
extending it to others less deserving. The argument that
the franking privilege of the judiciary must be withdrawn
because of the considerable volume of mail from it is selfdefeating. If the problem is the loss of revenues from the
franking privilege, the remedy, it seems is to withdraw it
altogether from all agencies of the government, including
those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by
retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others,
especially where there is no substantial distinction

between those favored, which may or may not need it at
all, and the judiciary, which needs it.
Q. X was sentenced to a penalty of 1 year and 5
months of prision correccional and to pay a fine of
P8,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
solvency. After serving his prison term, X asked the
Director of Prisons whether he could already be
released. X was asked to pay the fine of P5,000.00
and he said he could not afford it, being an indigent.
The Director informed him he has to an additional
prison term at the rate of one day per eight pesos in
accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code.
The lawyer of X filed a petition for habeas corpus
contending that the further incarceration of his client
for unpaid fines violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. Decide.(Bar Question)
Alternative Answers:
1) The petition should be granted, because
article 39 of the RPC is unconstitutional. In
Tate V Short, 401 US 395, the United States
Supreme Court held that imposition of
subsidiary imprisonment upon a convict who
is too poor to pay a fine violates equal
protection, because economic status cannot
serve as a valid basis for distinguishing the
duration of the imprisonment between a
convict who is able to pay the fine and a
convict who is unable to pay it.
2) On the other hand, in United States ex rel.
Privitera VS Kross, 239 F Supp 118, it was
held that the imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment for inability to pay a fine does
not violate equal protection, because the
punishment should be tailored to fit the
individual, and equal protection does not
compel
the
eradication
of
every
disadvantage caused by indigence. The
decision was affirmed by the US Circuit
Court of Appeals in 345 F2d 533, and the US
Suprme Court denied the petition for
certiorari in 382 US 911. This ruling was
adopted by the Illinois SC in People V
Williams.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Q. Some police operatives, acting under a lawfully
issued warrant for the purpose of searching for
firearms in the House of X located at No. 10 Shaw
Boulevard, Pasig, Metro Manila, found, instead of
firearms, ten kilograms of cocaine.
1) May the said police operatives lawfully
seize the cocaine? Explain your answer.
2) May X successfully challenge the legality
of the search on the ground that the
peace officers did not inform him about
his right to remain silent and his right to
counsel? Explain your answer.
3) Suppose the peace officers were able to
find unlicensed firearms in the house in
an adjacent lot, that is, No. 12 Shaw
Boulevard, which is also owned by X. May
they lawfully seize the said unlicensed
firearms? Explain your answer. (Bar
Question)
A. 1) Yes, the police operatives may lawfully seize the
cocaine, because it is an item whose possession is
prohibited by law, it was in plainview and it was only
inadvertently discovered in the course of a lawful search.
The possession of cocaine is prohibited by Sec. 8 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. As held Magoncia V Palacio, 80
3
Phil 770, an article whose possession is prohibited by law
may be seized without the need of any search warrant if it
was discovered during a lawful search. The additional
requirement laid down in Roan VS Gonzales, 145 SCRA
687 that the discovery of the article must have been made
inadvertently was also satisfied in this case.
2) No, X cannot successfully challenge the legality of the
searcvh simply because the peace officers did not inform
him about his right to remain silent and his right to
counsel. Sec. 12(1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice.
As held in People VS Dy, 158 SCRA 111, for this
provision to apply, a suspect must be under investigation.
There was no investigation involved in this case.
3) The unlicensed firearms stored at 12 Shaw Boulevard
may lawfully be seized their possession is illegal. As held
in Magoncia V Palacio, 80 Phil 770, when an individual
possesses contraband (unlicensed firearms belong to this
category), he is committing a crime and he can be
arrested without a warrant and the contraband can be
seized.
Alternative Answer:
In accordance with the rulings in Uy Keytin V
Villareal, 42 Phil 886 and People V Sy Juco, 64 Phil
667, the unlicensed firearms found in the house at 12
Shaw Boulevard may not be lawfully seized, since they
were not included in the description of the articles to be
seized by virtue of the search warrant. The search warrant
described the articles to be seized as firearms in the
house of X located at 10 Shaw Boulevard.
Q. An informant apprised Sgts. Sudiacal and Ahamad
of the presence of a drug pusher at the corner of 3 rd
St, and Rizal Avenue, Olongapo City. Responding to
the information, they, together with Capt. Castillo,
gave the informant marked money to but marijuana.
The informant now turned poseur-buyer, returned with
two sticks of marijuana. Capt. Castillo again gave said
informant marked money to purchase marijuana. The
informant poseur-buyer thereafter returned with
another two sticks of marijuana. The police officers
then proceeded to the corner of 3 rd St. and Rizal
Avenue and effected the arrest of the appellant which
was questioned as unconstitutional. Rule on the
contention.
A.The arrest was legal because the arresting officers had
personal knowledge of the facts implicating the appellant
with the sale of the marijuana to the informant-poseur
buyer. The arrest therefore, was legal and the consequent
search which yielded 20 sticks of marijuana was lawful for
being incident to a valid arrest.
The fact that the prosecution failed to
prove the sale of marijuana beyond reasonable doubt
does not undermine the legality of the appellants arrest.
It is not necessary that the crime should
have been established as fact in order to regard the
detention as legal. The legality of detention does not
depend upon the actual commission of the crime, but upon
the nature of the deed when such characterization may
reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to
whom the law at the moment leaves the decision on the
urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen.
The obligation to make an arrest by
reason of a crime does not presuppose as a necessary
requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable
existence of a crime.

The twenty sticks of marijuana are
admissible in evidence and the trial courts finding that the
appellant is guilty of possession is correct. (People VS
Ramos June 4, 1990)
Q. In an application for a search warrant, it was
admitted that the questions propounded in the
supposed to be searching questions were pre-typed,
that the only participation of the applicant for search
warrant was to subscribe before the judge.
Rule on the validity of the search warrant.
A. The search warrant is void because the rule that the
judge must conduct searching questions and answers
before the issuance of the warrants were not complied
with. (Peudon VS CA, Nov. 16, 1990). In fact, in Roan VS
Gonzales, Nov. 25, 1986, it was said that the depositions
must be taken and attached to the record.
Q. Mayor Antonio Sanchez was arrested 46 days after
the commission of the alleged rape, etc. against Mary
Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez and
Sarmenta. He was arrested before warrants were
issued. Rule on the validity of his arrest.
A. The arrest is illegal because the police officers who
arrested him were not present when he allegedly
participated in the rape and killing. They had no personal
knowledge of the alleged criminal liability of Mayor
Sanchez but merely relied on the sworn statements of two
witnesses. Since he was arrested 46 days after the
commissions of the crimes in question, it could not be said
that he had just committed a crime at the time of the
arrest. (Sanchez VS Demetriou Nov. 19, 1993)
Q. Cong. Francisco Aniag, Jr. was one of those who
were issued firearms by the House of Representatives.
Pursuant to the Gun Ban issued by COMELEC, the
Sergeant-at-arms of the House wrote him a letter
requesting the return of the guns. So he immediately
instructed his driver to get the guns from his house at
Valle Verde and return the same. He complied, but
immediately, a checkpoint was established outside of
the Batasan Complex some 20 meters away from the
entrance. When the driver approached the checkpoint,
the car was searched and the police found the guns at
the compartment, placed in a bag. He was
apprehended. He was charged before the Quezon City
Prosecutors Office, but it was dismissed. The Law
Department of the COMELEC, however, recommended
the prosecution of the driver and Aniag for violation of
the Omnibus Election Code. They questioned the
manner by which the search was conducted, as it was
without any warrant. Decide.
A. The search was not valid. There was no evidence to
show that the policemen were impelled to put up the
checkpoint because of a confidential report leading them
to reasonably believe that certain motorists were engaged
in gunrunning, etc. There was no indication from the
package or behavior of Aniags driver that could have
triggered the suspicion of the policemen, hence, the
search was not valid and the firearms obtained cannot be
admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. (Aniag VS
COMELEC Oct. 7, 1994)
Q. Pursuing reports that great quantities of prohibited
drugs are being smuggled at nighttime through the
shores of Cavite, the Southern Luzon Command set
up checkpoints at the end of the Cavite coastal road to
search passing motor vehicles. A 19 year old boy, who
finished fifth grade, while driving, was stopped by the
authorities at the checkpoint. Without any objection
from him, his car was inspected, and the search
yielded marijuana leaves hidden in the trunk
compartment of the car. The prohibited drug was

promptly and the boy was brought to the police
station for questioning.
1) Was the search without warrant legal?
2) Before interrogation, the policeman on
duty informed the boy in English that he
does have a right to remain silent and
the right to counsel. However, there was
no counsel available as it was midnight.
He declared orally that he did not need
any lawyer as he was innocent, since he
was only bringing the marijuana leaves to
his employer in Quezon City and was not
a drug user. He was charged with illegal
possession of prohibited drugs. Is his
waiver of the right to counsel valid? (Bar
Question)
and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.

(People VS Leila Johnson, December 18, 2000)
A. 1) No, the search was not valid, because there was no

probable cause for conducting the search. As held in
Almeda Sanchez VS US, 413 US 268, while a moving
vehicle can be searched without a warrant, there must still
be probable cause. In the case in question, there was
nothing to indicate that marijuana leaves were hidden in
the trunk of the car. The mere fact that the boy did not
object to the inspection of the car does not constitute
consent to the search. As ruled in People V Burgos, 144
SCRA 1, the failure to object to a warrantless search does
not constitute consent, especially in the light of the fact.
A.
a.
Alternative Answer:
1) Yes. The requirement of probable cause differs
from case to case. In this one, since the police
agents are confronted with large scale smuggling
of prohibited drugs, existence of which is of public
knowledge, they can set up checkpoints at
strategic places, in the same way that of in a
neighborhood a child is kidnapped, it is lawful to
search cars and vehicles leaving the
neighborhood or village. This situation is also
similar to warrantless searches of moving
vehicles in custom area, which searches have
been upheld. (Papa V Mago, 22 SCRA 857). The
rule is based on practical necessity.
2) NO, the waiver of the right to counsel is not valid,
since it was not reduced in writing and made in
the presence of counsel. Under Section 12(1),
Art. III of the Constitution to be valid, the waiver
must be made in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
Q. Do the ordinary right against unreasonable
searches and seizures apply to searches
conducted at the airport pursuant to routine
airport security procedures?
A.No. Persons may lose the protection of the search and
seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to
the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures. Passengers
attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through
metal detectors; their carry on baggage as well as
checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans.
Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to
determine what the objects are. Travelers are often
notified through airport public address systems, signs and
notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to
search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are
found, such would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches
Q. X was arrested for and charged with Robbery. X

posted bail in order to be released temporarily. During
trial and before entering his plea, X raised objections
regarding the legality of his arrest for robbery. The
prosecution, however, claims that the posting of the
bail bond was tantamount to an effective waiver of the
latters right to question the legality of the arrest.
a. Did the posting of the bail bond by X
amount to a waiver of the right to
question the legality of his arrest?
b. Was there a waiver of the right to
question the legality of the arrest if the
same was made after entering a plea.
b.
No. There was no waiver of the right to question the

legality of his arrest. Under Rule 114, Sec. 26 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, an application
for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest provided he raises
them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve
the matter as early as practicable but not later than
the start of the trial of the case.
Yes. X will be estopped from questioning the illegality
of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court by entering a plea of not guilty
and by participating in the trial. Under the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure when the accused
enters his plea he waives the right to question the
legality of his arrest.
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS
Q.Andrea and Monica had confrontation in the latters
office. Andrea secretly taped the conversation. The
conversation between them bordered on humiliating
and vexing the personality and dignity of Monica for
which she filed a civil case for damages. During the
hearing Andrea produced the recorded tape to prove
that Monica indeed insulted her. Monica, in a
countersuit filed a criminal case against Andrea for
violation of RA 4200 which prohibits and penalizes
wire tapping and other violations of private
communication. Andrea moved to dismiss the criminal
case on the ground that the allegations do not
constitute an offense and that the taping of
conversation between the parties is not covered by
RA 4200. The trial court granted said motion which
decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Andrea elevated the case to the Supreme Court on
Certiorari. Is Andrea liable for violation of RA 4200?
Decide.
A.Yes. Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally
prohibits any person, not authorized by all the parties to
any private conversation, to secretly tape record any
communication by means of a tape recorder.
Congressional records support the view that the intention
of the lawmakers in enacting RA 4200 is to make illegal
any unauthorized tape recording of private conversation or
communication taken by either of the parties themselves
or third persons. (Ramirez VS CA 248 SCRA 590)
Q. The police had suspicions that Juan Samson,
member of the subversive New Proletarian Army, was
using the mail for propaganda purposes in gaining
new adherents to its cause. The Chief of Police of
Bantolan, Lano Del Sur ordered the Postmaster of the
town to intercept and open all mail addressed to and
coming from Juan Samson in the interest of the
5
national security. Was the order of the Chief of police
valid? (Bar Question)
Suggested Answer:
No, the order of the Chief of Police is not valid
because there is no law which authorizes him to order the
Postmaster to open the letters addressed to and coming
from Juan Samson. An official in the Executive
Department cannot interfere with the privacy of
correspondence and communication in the absence of a
law authorizing him to do so or a lawful order of the court.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Q. The Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC) was required by the
MTRCB to submit to it for review the video tapes for
its programs. The MTRCB disapproved the tapes on
the ground that they attacked the Catholic religion.
The INC contended that requiring it to submit
videotapes for review by the Board violated freedom
of speech and freedom of religion. Whom would you
sustain, the MTRCB or the INC.
A. The MTRCB. The video tapes can be submitted for
review. The right to act on ones belief can be subject to
regulation. The public broadcast involve the realm of
action. Television reaches even children. However, the
showing of the video tapes cannot be prohibited. There is
no clear and present danger of a substantial evil which the
state has a right to prevent. (Iglesia Ni Cristo VS CA, 259
SCRA 529)
Q. Distinguish content-based restrictions on free
speech from content-neutral restrictions, and give
example of each.
A.Content-based restrictions are imposed because of the
content of the speech and are, therefore, subject to the
clear-and-present danger test. For example, a rule such as
that involved in Sanidad VS Comelec (181 SCRA 529),
prohibiting columnists, commentators and announcers
from campaigning either for or against an issue in a
scrutiny. These restrictions are censorial and therefore
they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional invalidity.
In addition, they will be tested for possible overbreadth
and vagueness.
Content-neutral restrictions on the other hand, like Sec.
11(b) of RA No. 6646, which prohibits the sale or donation
of print space and air time to political candidates during
the campaign period are not concerned with the content of
the speech. These regulations need only a substantial
government interest to support them. A deferential
standard for review will suffice to test their validity. The
clear-and-present danger rule is inappropriate as a test for
determining the constitutional validity of laws, like Sec. 11
(b) of RA No. 6646, which are not concerned with the
content of the political ads but only with their incidents. To
apply the clear-and-present danger test to such regulatory
measure would be like using a sledgehammer to drive a
nail when regular hammer is all that is needed. The
Supreme Court applied the OBrien Test in the case of
SWS VS Comelec, May 5, 2001.
The test for this difference in the level of
justification for the restriction of speech is that contentbased restrictions distort public debate, have improper
motivation, and are usually imposed because of fear of
how people will react to a particular speech. No such
reasons underlie content-neural regulations, like regulation
of time, place and manner of holding public assemblies
under BP Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
Q. A. The Comelec promulgated a resolution requiring
all newspaper to give free print space within their

area of publication known as Comelec Space to
enable the candidates to make their qualifications and
other information relatives to the candidates. Is such a
resolution valid? Explain.
B. Would your answer be the same if the
resolution required broadcast media to give
free airtime for the same purpose? Explain.
A.
A.
The resolution is invalid because the COMELEC

cannot procure print space without paying just
compensation therefore. (Philippine Press Institute
VS Comelec, 244 SCRA 272)
B. No. The resolution this time is constitutional, even as
it provides that airtime may be procured by the
COMELEC free of charge, the same being an
exercise of the plenary police power of the State to
promote general welfare. In truth, radio and television
broadcasting companies, which are given franchises,
do not own the airwaves and frequencies through
which they transmit their broadcast signals and
images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere
privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably
be burdened with the performance by the grantee of
some form of public service. Such regulation of the
use and ownership of telecommunications systems is
in the exercise of the plenary police power of the
state for the general welfare.
It is a fallacy that broadcast media are entitled to
the same treatment under the free speech guarantee of
the Constitution as the print media. There are important
differences in the characteristics of the two media which
justify their differential treatment for free speech purposes.
Because of the unique and pervasive influence of the
broadcast media, the freedom of television and radio
broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the
freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
(TELEBAP VS Comelec, April 21, 1998)
Q. The Comelec issued an order prohibiting the
conduct of exit poll survey by mass media by
confidentiality asking randomly selected voters whom
they have voted for immediately after they have cast
their ballot, as the same violates the principle of ballot
secrecy. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. questioned the
validity of the Comelec Order on constitutional
grounds. Decide.
A. The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to
avoid vote buying through voter identification. This result
cannot, however, be achieved merely through voters
verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollsters of whom
they have voted for. In exit polls, the contents of the official
ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the
revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not
compulsory but voluntary. Voters may choose not to reveal
their identities.
An absolute prohibition would be unreasonably
restrictive, because it effectively prevents the use of exit
poll data not only for election day projections, but also for
long term research. The Comelec concern with the
possible non-communicative effect of exit polls-disorder
and confusion in the voting centers does not justify a total
ban on them. The holding of exit polls and the
dissemination of their results through mass media
constitute an essential part of freedom of speech and of
the press. (ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. VS Comelec,
323 SCRA 811)
Q. Congress passes a law prohibiting television
stations from airing any commercial advertisements
which promotes tobacco or in any way glamorizes the
consumption of tobacco products.

This legislation was passed in response to

findings by the Department of Heath about the
alarming rise in lung disease in the country. The World
Health Organization has also reported that US tobacco
companies have shifted marketing efforts to the Third
World due to dwindling sales in the health-conscious
American market.
Cowboy Levys, a jeans company, recently
released an advertisements featuring model Richard
Burgos wearing Levys jackets and jeans and holding
a pack of Marlboro cigarettes.
The Asian Broadcasting Network (ABN), a
privately owned television station, refuses to air the
advertisements in compliance with the law.
a) Assume that such refusal abridges the
freedom of speech. Does the constitutional prohibition
against the abridgement of freedom of speech apply
to act done by ABN, a private corporation? Explain.
b) May Cowboy Levys, a private corporation
invoke the freedom of speech guarantee in its favor?
Explain.
c) Regardless of your answer above decide
the constitutionality of the law in question. (Bar
Question)
A. a) The constitutional prohibition against the freedom of
speech does not apply to ABN, a private corporation. As
stated in Hudgens VS National Labor Relations Board,
424 US 507,the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by the
government.It does not therefore apply against private
parties.
Alternative Answer:
Since ABN has a franchise, it may be considered
an agent of the government by complying with the law and
refusing to air the advertisement, it alined itself with the
government. Thus it rendered itself liable for a lawsuit
which is based on abridgement of the freedom of speech.
Under Art. 32 of the Civil Code, even private parties may
be liable for damages for impairment of the freedom of
speech.
b) Cowboy Levys may invoke the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of speech in its favor. In First National Bank
of Boston VS Bellotti, 435 US 765, it was ruled that this
guarantee extends to corporations. In Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy VS Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. 425 US 748, it was held that this right
extends to commercial advertisements. In Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. VS Capulong, 160 SCRA 861, the
Supreme Court held that even if the production of a film is
a commercial activity that is expected to yield profits, it is
covered by the guarantee of freedom of speech.
c) The law is constitutional. It is valid exercise of police
power, because smoking is harmful to health. In Posadas
de Puerto Rico Associates Vs Tourism Company Of
Puerto Rico, 478 US 328, it was ruled that a law
prohibiting certain types of advertisements is valid if it was
adopted in the interest of the health, safety, and welfare of
the people. In Capital Broadcasting Company VS
Mitchell, 333 F Supp 582, a law making it unlawful to
advertise cigarettes on any medium of electronic
communication was upheld. The United States Supreme
Court summarily sustained this ruling in Capital
Broadcasting Company VS Acting Attorney General,
405 US 1000. The law in question was enacted on the
basis of the legislative finding that there is a need to
protect public health, because smoking causes lung
diseases. Cowboy Levys has not overthrown this finding.
RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS
Q. The Labor Code prohibits managerial employees

from joining, assisting or forming any labor
organization.
Does
this
contravene
the
constitutional right to form associations? Justify
your answer.
A.No. The right guaranteed in Art. III, Sec. 8 is subject to
the condition that its exercise should be for purposes
not contrary to law. There is a rational basis for
prohibiting managerial employees from forming or
joining labor organization. Because if these managerial
employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union,
the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the
Union in view of evident conflict of interest. The union
can also become company-dominated with the presence
of managerial employee in the Union membership.
(UPSU VS Laguesma, March 25, 1998)
Q. Under the Barangay Election Act (BP222) political
parties were prohibited from participating in the
barangay elections. It was challenged on the ground
of violation of the right to form associations not
contrary to law. Was the contention proper? Why?
A. No, because the right to form associations is not
absolute or illimitable, as it is subject to the most
pervasive and dominant police power. It can be
regulated to serve appropriate and important public
interest. The law was designed to insulate the barangay
from the divisive effects of partisan political campaign
and the danger of disenabling the barangay officials
from efficiently performing their duties as agents of a
neutral community. (Oceania VS Comelec, 127 SCRA
404)
Q. In their vain efforts to obtain benefits they were
demanding, the teachers staged a series of
demonstrations before the DECS and Congress.
Administrative charges were filed. Several of them
were dismissed due to their failure to obey the
return-to-work order from the DECS. Can the
teachers stage mass walk-outs or strike? Why?
A. No. In MPSTA, et al. VS Laguio, GR No. 95445;
Alliance of Concerned Teachers VS Carino GR No.
95590, the Supreme Court said that employees in the
public service, unlike those in the private sector do not
have the right to strike, although guaranteed the right to
self-organization, to petition the Congress for better
employment terms and conditions and to negotiate with
appropriate government agencies for the improvement
of such working conditions as are to be fixed by law.
In Samahang Manggagawa ng Rizal
Park, VS NLRC GR No. 94372, it was said that
although the NPDC employees are allowed under the
1987 Constitution to organize and join unions of their
choice, there is as yet no law allowing them to strike. In

case of a labor dispute between the employees and the
government, Sec. 15 of Executive Order No. 180 dated
June 1, 1987 provides that the Public Sector Labor
Management Council, not the DOLE shall hear the
dispute.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Q. X, a court stenographer, a member of the Seventh
Day Adventists, requested for exemption from work
on Saturday because she has to accommodate her
religious needs. If you were the judge, would you
grant it? Why?
A. Yes, because that is part of the exercise of the
freedom of religion, subject to the condition that she
should make up. (Adm. Matter No. 88-2-5546-RTC,
Exemption from Duty on Rotation on Saturday, June 2,
1988)
1.
A religious organization has a weekly

television program. The program presents
and propogates its religious, doctrines, and
compares their practices with those of
other religions.
As the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) found as
offensive several episodes of the program
which attacked other religions, the MTRCB
required the organization to submit its
tapes for review prior to airing.
The religious organizations brought the
case to court on the ground that the action
of the MTRCB suppresses its freedom of
speech and interferes with its right to free
exercise of religion. Decide. (Bar Question)
Suggested Answer:
The religious organization cannot invoke
freedom of speech and freedom of religion as grounds
for refusing to submit the tapes to the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board for Review
prior to airing. When the religious organization started
presenting its program over television, it went into the
realm of action. The right to act on ones religious belief
is not absolute and is subject to police power for the
protection of the general welfare. Hence the tapes may
be required to be reviewed prior to airing.
In Iglesia ni Cristo V Court of Appeals, 259
SCRA 529, the Supreme Court Held:
We thus reject petitioners postulate that its
religious program is per se beyond review by the
respondent board. Its public broadcast on TV of its
religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal
belief. Television is a medium, that reaches even the
eyes and ears of children. The court reiterates the rule
8
that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated
by the State when it will bring about the clear and
present danger of some substantive evil which the State
is duty bound to prevent, i.e.. serious detriment to the
mere overriding interest of public healyh, public morals
or public welfare.
However, the MTRCB cannot ban the tapes on
the ground that they attacked other religions. In Iglesia
ni Cristo VS C.A, the SC held:
Even a sideglance at Section 3 of PD No.
1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds to
justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioners
television program.
Moreover, the broadcast do not give rise to a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil. In this
case, it held that prior restraint on speech, including the
religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical
fears but only by the showing of a substantive and
imminent evil which has taken the reality already on the
ground.
Q. X is serving his prison sentence in
Muntinglupa. He belongs to a religious sect that
prohibits the eating of meat. He asked the Director
of Prisons that he be served with meatless diet. The
Director refused and X sued the director for
damages for violating his religious freedom. Decide.
(Bar Question)
A. Yes, the Director of Prison is liable under Art. 32 of
the Civil Code for violating the religious freedom of X.
according to the decision of the US Supreme Court in
the case of OLone V Estate of Shabazz, convicted
prisoners retain their right to free exercise of religion. At
the same time, lawful incarceration brings about
necessary limitations of many privileges and rights
justified by the considerations underlying the penal
system. In considering the appropriate balance between
these two factors, reasonableness should be the test.
Accommodation to religious freedom can be made if it
will not involve sacrificing the interest of security and it
will have no impact on the allocation of the resources of
the penitentiary. In this case, providing X with a
meatless diet will not create a security problem or
unduly increase the cost of food being served to the
prisoners. In fact, in the case of Olone, it was noted that
the Moslem prisoners were being given a different meal
whenever pork would be served.
Alternative Answer:
The suit should be dismissed. The free
exercise clause of the Constitution is essentially a
restraint on governmental interference with the right of
individuals to worship as they please. It is not a mandate
to the state to take positive, affirmative action to enable
the individual to enjoy his freedom. It would have been

different had the Director of Prisons prohibited meatless
diets in the penal institution.
LIBERTY OF ABODE
Q. PCGG sequestered two government firms on the
basis of the claim that the Marcoses owned 60% of
the shares of stocks. It also issued an order
prohibiting the petitioners from leaving the country
as they were preventing or obstructing the
operation of the company. Was the order proper?
Why?
A. The petitioners right to travel has been impaired.
Since PCGG has already taken over the companies,
their operation can no longer be obstructed. If
petitioners were obstructing the operations of the
companies, it would be better that they be out of the
country. The right to travel is guaranteed to all residents
irrespective of nationality. (Kant Kwong VS PCGG,
Dec. 7, 1987)
Q. Juan Casanova contracted Hansens disease
(leprosy) with open lesions. A law requires that
lepers be isolated upon petition of the City Health
Officer. The wife of Juan Casanova wrote a letter to
the City Health Officer to have her formerly
philandering husband confined in some isolated
leprosarium. Juan Casanova challenged the
constitutionality of the law as violating his liberty of
abode. Will the suit prosper? (Bar Question)
Suggested Answer:
No, the suit will not prosper.
Section 6, Article III of the Constitution
provides:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court.
The liberty of abode is subject to the police
power of the State. Requiring the segregation of lepers
is a valid exercise of police power. In Lorenzo V
Director of Health 50 Phil 595, the SC held:
Judicial notice will be taken of the fact that
leprosy is commonly believed to be an infectious
disease tending to cause one afflicted with it to be
shunned and excluded from society, and that
compulsory segregation of lepers as a means of
preventing the spread of the disease is supported by
high scientific authority.
Q. The military commander in charge of the
operation against rebel groups directed the
inhabitants of the island which would be the target
of attack by government forces to evacuate the area
and offered the residents temporary military hamlet.
9
Can the military commander force the
residents to transfer their places of abode without a
court order? Explain. (Bar Question)
A. No, the military commander cannot compel the
court order. Under Sec. 6, Art. III of the Constitution, a
lawful order of the court is required before the liberty of
abode and of changing the same can be impaired.
Suggested Answer:
Yes, the military commander can compel the
court order. If there is no reasonable time to get a court
order and the change of abode is merely temporary,
because of the exigency, this exercise of police power
may be justified.
Q. Mr. Esteban Krony, a Filipino citizen, is arrested
for the crime of smuggling. He posts bail for his
release. Subsequently, he jumps bail and is about to
leave the country when the Department of Foreign
Affairs cancels his passport. He sues the DFA,
claiming violation of his freedom to travel citing the
new provision in the Bill of Rights of the 1987
Constitution, to wit: Neither shall the right to travel
be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health, as may be
provided by law.
Decide the Case. (Bar Question)
A. The case should be dismissed. Any person under an
order of arrest is under restraint and therefore he can
not claim the right to travel. If he is admitted to bail his
freedom of movement is confined within the country.
Therefore, if he subsequently jumps bail, he cannot
demand passport which in effect will facilitate his escape
from the country, he is in fact liable to be arrested
anytime. Indeed, the right to travel under the
Constitution presupposes that the individual is under no
restraint such as that which would follow from the fact
that one has a pending criminal case and has been
placed under arrest.
HABEAS CORPUS
Q.A) When may the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus be suspended?
B) If validly declared, what would be the full
consequences of such suspension? (Bar Question)
A.A)Under Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended
when there is an invasion of rebellion and public safety
require it.
B)According to Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially
charged with rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly

connected with invasion. Any person arrested or
detained should be judicially charged within three days.
Otherwise, he should be released. Moreover, under
Section 13, Art. III of the Constitution, the right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended.
Q. Is the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas
corpus
a
political
or
justiciable
controversy? Why?
A. It is a justiciable controversy. The Constitution
authorizes the courts to review on the basis of an
appropriate action, the factual basis for the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Q. A while serving imprisonment for estafa, upon
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and
Parole, was granted pardon by the President on
condition that he should not against violate any
penal law of the land. Later, the board of Pardons
and Parole recommended to the President the
cancellation of the Pardon granted him because A
had been charged with estafa on 20 counts and was
convicted of the offense charged although he took
an appeal therefrom which was still pending. As
recommended, the President canceled the pardon
he had granted to A. A was thus arrested and
imprisoned to serve the balance of his sentence in
the first case. A claimed in his petition for habeas
corpus filed in court that his detention was illegal
because he had not yet been convicted by final
judgment and was not given a chance to be heard
before he was recommitted to prison.
Is As argument valid? (Bar Question)
A. The argument of A is not valid. As held in Torres V
Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272, a judicial pronouncement
that a convict who was granted a pardon subject to the
condition that he should not again violate any penal law
is not necessary before he can be declared to have
violated the condition of his pardon. Moreover, a hearing
is not necessary before A can be recommitted to prison.
By accepting the conditional pardon, A agreed that the
determination by the President that he violated the
condition of his pardon shall be conclusive upon him
and an order for his arrest should at once issue.
Q. Joy, an RTC stenographer, retired at the age of
65. She left unfinished the transcription of her notes
in a criminal case which was on appeal. The Court
of Appeals ordered Joy to transcribe her notes. She
refused to comply with the order reasoning that she
was no longer in the government service. The CA
declared Joy in contempt of court and she was
incarcerated. Joy filed a petition for habeas corpus
arguing that her incarceration is tantamount to
10
illegal detention and to require her to work sans
compensation would be involuntary servitude.
Decide. (Bar Question)
A. Joy can be incarcerated for contempt of court for
refusing to transcribe her stenographic notes. As held in
Aclaracion Vs Gatmaitan 64 SCRA 132, her
incarceration does not constitute illegal detention. It is
lawful, because it is the consequence of her
disobedience of the court order. Neither can she claim
that to require her to work without compensation is
tantamount to involuntary servitude. Since courts have
the inherent power to issue such orders as are
necessary for the administration of justice, the Court of
Appeals may order her to transcribe her stenographic
notes even if she is no longer in the government service.
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Q. May the Executive Secretary, upon petition of a
citizen, be ordered to give access to the names of
executive officials holding multiple positions in
government, copies of their appoinments, and a list
of the recipient of luxury vehicles seized by the
Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacanang?
A. Yes. The limitation on the right to information on
matters of public concern are embodied in the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA 6713). It provides that in the
performance of their duties, all public officials and
employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the
public within 15 working days from receipt thereof and to
ensure the accessibility of all public documents for
inspection by the public within reasonable working
hours, subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality.
(Gonzalez VS Narvasa, August 14, 2000)

essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order.
Q. A government circular prohibits the paymasters
from giving the salaries of teachers to other persons
than the payees. It was questioned on the ground of
violation of the non-impairment clause. Is the
contention proper? Why?
A. No, because the creditors can still collect through
other means. Salary which is not yet delivered to a
teacher is still government money and cannot be
assigned without the consent of the State.
Q. X is indebted to the PNB. He is a holder of
backpay certificate by virtue of RA No. 897. He
offered to pay it to the PNB which refused to accept,
claiming impairment of contract as he agreed to pay
in cash. Is the contention proper? Why?
A. No, PNB cannot refuse, RA No. 897 makes it an
obligation for all government entities to accept the
backpay certificate for the payment of obligations. There
is no impairment of obligations of contracts.
However,
for
non-governmental
agencies, they cannot be compelled to accept,
otherwise, there would be impairment of obligations of
contracts. (Florentino Vs PNB, April 28, 1956)
Q. Respondent filed an action to prohibit petitioner
from foreclosing a mortgage upon his property.
Upon his motion, the court authorized him to post a
bond and in fact, ordered the cancellation of the
mortgage. Is the order proper? Why?
A. No, because it violates the constitutional prohibition
against impairment of contracts. The substitution of the
mortgage with a surety bond would effect a change of
the terms and conditions of mortgage. (Ganzon VS
Inserto 123 SCRA 713)
NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
Q. Does the imposition of the VAT upon sales and
leases of real estate entered into before the
effectivity of the E-VAT Law violate the rule against
non-impairment of contracts? Why?
A. No, because the law did not impair or effect a change
in the rights of the parties with respect to each other. A
tax measure which affects the relationship between one
of the parties to the contracts as taxpayers and the
government does not impair the obligation of contracts.
In Tolentino VS Sec. Of Finance, it was said that it is
enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot,
through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the
exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only
are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the
obligations as between parties, but the reservation of
RIGHTS WHILE UNDER INVESTIGATION

Q. X, Y, Z were charged with murder. The evidence
was their extra-judicial confession to the mayor
when they visited him. They even showed the car of
the victim which they sliced off from his head. Is the
evidence admissible? Why?
A. Yes, the extra-judicial confession is admissible
because they were not under investigation. They were
merely bragging which was indicative of voluntariness.
Since the confession was verbally made, the only way
to prove it is by the testimony of the person who heard
it.
11
Q. When the accused was picked up as he was
coming out of the communal bathroom and wearing
a t-shirt covered with bloodstains which he tried to
cover with his hands, he suddenly broke down and
knelt before Sgt. Marante and confessed that he
killed Jennie Banguis. Is the testimony of Sgt.
Marante that the accused confessed the killing,
admissible in evidence? Why?
A. Yes, it is a competent evidence to link him to the
killing. The declaration of an accused expressly
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged may be
given in evidence against him. (Sec. 29, Rule 130 Rules
of Court). There is compliance with the constitutional
procedures on custodial investigation elicited through
questioning, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
the accused orally admitted having slain the victim.
(Aballe VS People, 183 SCRA 196)
Q. At what stage of the police line-up does the
suspect need the assistance of a counsel? Why?
A. The moment there is a move or urge to investigate to
elicit admission or confession, or even plain information,
which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time
from the suspect, he should be assisted by counsel
unless there is a written waiver aided by counsel.
Q. A was suspected of having killed B. Is A entitled
to his rights under RA No. 7438 and the constitution
if he is invited to shed light on the offense? Why?
A. Yes, Under Sec. 2, last paragraph of RA No. 7438, as
used in the law custodial investigation shall include the
practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the inviting officer for any violation of the law.
RIGHT TO BAIL
Q. An accused filed a motion for bail before he was
actually placed under arrest. He failed to appear at
the hearing as he was confined at a hospital. Can he
be granted bail? Why?
A. Yes, because at that point, he can be considered as
being constructive and legally under custody. And
because of this peculiar circumstances, he is deemed to
have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of
the law and necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial
court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. It must
be stressed that the counsel made it known to the court
during the hearing for bail that the accused could not
personally appear as he was then confined at a named
hospital for acute custochrondritis and could not then

obtain medical clearance to leave
(Doctrine of Constructive Custody)
the
hospital.
Q. The accused was required to post P1.9 million

cash bond. The court refused to accept the bail
bond. What is the effect of the actions of the judge?
Why?
A. The actions of the judge constitute violation of the
accuseds right to bail, because the amount is
excessive.
Q. Why cannot the RTC grant bail while the case is
pending preliminary investigation by the MTC?
A. The MTC is still conducting preliminary investigation,
hence, the RTC has not yet acquired jurisdiction. It
cannot therefore, entertain the petition for bail, as there
is no information filed in the RTC yet.
Q. X posted bail, but he jumped bail. What is its
effect? Why?
A. An accused who jumped bail waived his right to be
present. He cannot offer a justifiable reason for his nonappearance during the trial. Hence, after trial in
absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and
promulgation may be made by simply recording the
judgment in the criminal docket with a copy served on
the counsel, provided that notice requiring him to be
present at the promulgation is served on the bondsman,
or warden and counsel.
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
Q. In his erxtrajudicial confession executed before
the police authorities, Jose Walangtakot admitted
killing his girlfriend in a fit of jealousy. This
admission was made after the following answer and
question to wit:
T- Ikaw ay may karapatan pa rin kumuha ng
serbisyo ng isang abogado para makatulong mo sa
imbestigasyong ito at kung wala kang makuha, ikaw
ay aming bibigyan ng libreng abogado, ano ngayon
and iyong masasabi?
S- Nandiyan naman po si Fiscal (point to
Assistant Fiscal Aniceto Malaputo) kaya hindi ko na
kinakailangan and abugado.
During
the trial, Jose Walangtakot
repudiated his confession contending that it was
made without the assistance of counsel and
therefore inadmissible in evidence. Decide. (Bar
Question)
A. The confession of Jose Walangtakot is inadmissible
in evidence. The warning given to him is insufficient. In
accordance with the ruling in People V Duero, 104
12
SCRA 379, he should have been warned also that he
has the right to remain silent and that any statement he
makes may be used as evidence agaist him. Besides,
under Art. III, Sec. 12(1) of the Constitution, the counsel
assisting a person being investigated must be
independent. Assistant Fiscal Malaputo could not assist
Jose Walangtakot. As held in People V Viduya, 189
SCRA 403, his function is to prosecute criminal cases.
To allow him to act as defense counsel during custodial
investigations would render nugatory the constitutional
rights
of the accused during custodial investigation.
What the Constitution requires is a counsel who will
effectively undertake the defense of his client without
any conflict of interest. The answer of Jose indicates
that he did not fully understand his rights. Hence, it
cannot be said that he knowingly and intelligently
waived those rights.
Q. An information for parricide was filed against
Danny. After the NBI found an eyewitness to the
commission of the crime, Danny was placed in a
police line-up where he was identified as the one
who shot the victim. After the line-up, Danny made a
confession to a newspaper reporter who interviewed
him.
1) Can Danny claim that his identification
by the eyewitness be excluded on the
ground that the line-up was made
without benefit of his counsel?
2) Can Danny claim that his confession
be excluded on the ground that he was
not afforded his Miranda rights? (Bar
Question)
A.
1) No, the identification of Danny, a private
person, by an eyewitness during the line-up cannot be
excluded in evidence. In accordance with the ruling in
People VS Hatton, 201 SCRA 1 the accused is not
entitled to be assisted by counsel during a police lineup, because it is not part of custodial investigation.
Alternative Answer:
Yes, in United States Vs Wade, 338 US 218
(1967) and Gilbert V California, 338 US 263 (1967), it
was held that on the basis of the Sixth, rather than the
Fifth Amendment (equivalent to Art. III, Sec. 14(2) rather
than Sec. 12 (1), the police line-up is such a critical
stage that it carries potential substantial prejudice for
which reason the accused is entitled to the assistance of
Counsel.
0
2) No, Danny cannot ask that his confession to
a newspaper reporter should be excluded in evidence.
As held in People VS Bernardo, 220 SCRA 31, such as
admission was not made during a custodial interrogation
but a voluntary statement made to the media.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Q. A and B were charged with violation of RA No.
3019. The court rendered judgement convicting A.
on petition to the Supreme Court, A claims that she
has been deprives of her constitutional right to
counsel because at the time of his proceedings, her
counsel was suspended from the practice of law.
After the suspension of her lawyer, however, other
lawyers represented her at the time her first counsel
withdrew his appearance, all evidence had already
been presented. A did not present evidence for her
defense. Was A denied of her right to counsel under
the Constitution?
A. No, As claim that she was not adequately
represented by counsel at the trial due to the
suspension from the practice of law of her counsel is
untenable. Despite the suspension of her first counsel,
she was still represented by other lawyers. All evidence
had been presented with A being represented by
counsel. It is just that A opted not to present any
evidence for her defense relying on what she perceived
to be glaringly weak prosecution evidence. There is no
denial of the right to counsel in this case. (Dans VS
People, January 29, 1998)
Q. 1) A, as a suspect in a murder case was not
represented by counsel during the question and
answer stage. However, before he was asked to
sign his statements to the police investigator, the
latter provided A with a counsel, who happened to
be at the police station. After conferring with A, the
counsel told the police investigator that A was ready
to sign the statements.
Can the statements of A be presented in
court as his confession? Explain.
2) On the first day of the trial of a rape-murder case
where the victim was a popular star, over a hundred
of her fans rallied at the entrance of the courthouse,
each carrying a placard demanding the conviction
of the accused and the imposition of the death
penalty on him. The rally was peaceful and did not
disturb the proceedings of the case.
a) Can the trial court order the dispersal of
the rallyist under pain of being punished for
contempt of court, if they fail to do so? Explain.
b) If instead of a rally, the fans of the victim
wrote letters to the newspaper editors demanding
the conviction of the accused, can the trial court
punish them for contempt? Explain. (Bar Question)
A. 1) No, the statements of A cannot be presented in
court as his confession. He was not assisted by counsel
during the actual questioning. There is no showing that
the lawyer who belatedly conferred with him fully
explained to him the nature and consequences of his
13
confession. In People Vs Compil, 244 SCRA 135, the
Supreme Court held that the accused must be assisted
by counsel during the actual questioning and the belated
assistance of counsel before he signed the confession
does not cure the defect.
Alternative Answer:
Yes, the statements of A can be presented in
court as his confession. As held in People Vs Rous,
242 SCRA 732, even if the accused was not assisted by
counsel during the questioning, his confession is
admissible if he was able to consult a lawyer before he
signed.
2) a) Yes, the trial court can order the dispersal of the
rally under pain of being cited for contempt. The
purpose of the rally is to attempt to influence the
administration of justice. As stated in People Vs Flores,
239 SCRA 83, any conduct by any party which tends to
directly or indirectly impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice is subject to the contempt
powers of the court.
b) No, the trial court cannot punish for contempt the
fans of the victim who wrote letters to the newspaper
editors asking for the conviction of the accused. Since
the letters were not addressed to the judge and to the
publication of the letters occurred outside the court, the
fans cannot be punished in the absence of a clear and
present danger rule to the administration of justice. In
Cabansag VS Fernandez, 102 Phil 152, it was held
that a party who wrote to the Presidential complaints
and Action Committee to complain about the delay in the
disposition of his case could not be punished for
contempt in the absence of a clear and present danger
to the fair administration of justice.
SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL
Q. A and B were charged with libel. On October 18,
1988, they filed a motion to quash. The prosecution
was given 15 days to file an oppositions, but failed
to do so despite extensions. On August 30, 1991,
the trial court dismissed the case on the ground of
delay in the prosecution of the case which violated
the right to speedy trial. Is the action of the court
proper? Why?
A. Yes. The failure of the prosecution to file its
opposition for more than two years violated the right of
the accused to speedy trial. (Bangas VS RTC of Pasig,
October 1, 1993)

The other accused claimed that he was deprived of
his right to be present (the one who jumped bail). Is
the contention correct? Why?
A. No, it is devoid of merit. The right referred to is
personal to the accused who jumped bail. In fact, he has
already testified, hence, trial proceeded without violating
his right to be present.
Q. A was presented as a witness. Substantially, the
witnesses had already been cross-examined. The
cross-examination was not completed, say, because
A died. Should the testimony be deleted from the
record? Why?
A. No, for as long as it has already covered the material
points touched upon in the direct examination, the
testimony should be allowed to remain. If the failure to
cross-examine is without his fault, the testimony can be
stricken off the record. If it is attributable to him, it is
waived.
COMPULSORY PROCESS
Q. Due to the failure of the witness to appear despite
notice, the judge ordered the
waiver of the
testimony. Was the act of the Judge proper? Why?
A. No, because he should have taken effective measure
like the arrest of the witness in order to compel his
appearance.
TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
Q. Suppose the accused could not be located and
the information was published in a newspaper of a
general circulation and thereafter arraigned in
absentia, did the court act correctly? Why?
A. No, arraignment in absentia is not proper because it
needs the personal appearance of the accused.
Arraignment is the indispensable means of bringing the
accused in court. Failure to arraign is violative of the due
process of law clause and the right to be informed of the
nature of the accusation against him.
Q. What are the effects of the waiver of the right to
appear by the accused?
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
A. The effects are:

1. there is a waiver of the right to present evidence
2. the prosecution can present evidence if accused
fails to appear
3. the court can decide without accuseds evidence
Q. One of the accused jumped bail after testifying,

hence, he was tried in absentia for a capital offense.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
14

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Q. A was represented by a lawyer who abandoned

him when he went to the U.S.A. without informing
him. He failed to present evidence as he was
abandoned. Can the case be reopened? Why?
A. Yes, because he was deprived of the right to counsel.
The negligence of the lawyer deprived him of the right to
present evidence.
Q. X was charged for having raped a woman once.
Can he be convicted of two rapes if the woman
testified to that effect? Why?
A. No, because that would be a deprivation of his right
to be informed of the nature of the accusation against
him.
Q. Is the parading by the President of suspects in
the commission of crimes apprehended by law
enforcement agencies constitutional?
Q:The privilege of self-incrimination must be timely

invoked, otherwise it is deemed waived.
(a) In a civil case, the plaintiff called the defendant a
hostile witness and announced that the defendant
would be asked incriminating questions in the direct
examination. When should the defendant invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination?
(b) In a criminal case, the prosecution called the
accused to the witness stand as the first
witness in view of certain facts admitted by the
accused at the pre-trial. When should the
accused invoke the privilege against selfincrimination?
(c) In an administrative case for malpractice and
the cancellation of license to practice medicine
filed against C, the complainant called C to the
witness stand. When should C invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination?
A:
A. No. parading subjects the suspects to trial by

publicity which could influence the administration of
justice to the prejudice of the said suspects, in violation
of their rights to due process and to an impartial trial
under Art. III, Sec. 14 (1) and (2) of the Constitution.
Moreover, a criminal suspect is presumed innocent
under Art. III, Sec. 14 (2) of the Constitution and is,
therefore, not legally guilty of a crime unless proven
beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal proceedings.
Q. Is the disqualification provided in Sec. 40 (e)
Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political
cases here or abroad violative of the right to be
presumed innocent?
A. The disqualification in question does not, in reality,
involve the issue of presumption of innocence. Elsewise
stated, one is not disqualified because he is presumed
guilty by the filing of an information or criminal complaint
against him. He is disqualified because he is fugitive
from justice, i.e., he was not brought within the
jurisdiction of the court because he had successfully
evaded arrest, or if he was brought within the jurisdiction
of the court and was tried and convicted, he has
successfully evaded service of sentence because he
had jumped bail or escaped. The disqualification then is
based on his flight from justice. In the face of the settled
doctrine that flight is an indication of guilt, it may even
be truly said that it is not the challenged disqualifying
provision which overcomes the presumption of
innocence but rather the disqualified person himself who
has proven his guilt. (Marquez Jr. VS Comelec, 243
SCRA 538)
(a) As held in Bagadiong v. De Guzman, 94

SCRA 906, the defendant should take the
witness stand and object when a question
calling for an incriminating question is
propounded. Unlike in proceedings which are
criminal in character in which the accused can
refuse to testify, the defendant must wait until a
question calling for an incriminating answer is
actually asked. (Suarez v. Tongco, 2 SCRA
71)
(b) As held in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24
SCRA 663, in a criminal case the accused may
altogether refuse to answer any question,
because the purpose of calling him as a
witness for the prosecution has no other
purpose but to incriminate him.
(c) As in a criminal case, C can refuse to take the
witness stand and refuse to answer any
question. In Pascual v. Board of Medical
Examiners, 28 SCRA 344, it was held that an
administrative case for malpractice and
cancellation of the license to practice medicine
is penal in character, because of an
unfavorable decision would result in the
revocation of the license of the respondent to
practice medicine. Consequently, he can refuse
to take the witness stand.
Q: An outgoing letter written by a prisoner was
opened and inspected by the warden . It contains
admissions or self-incriminating statements. Is the
letter admissible in evidence?
A: Yes. It is admissible. It is within the power of the
warden to restrict the flow of communication in and out
15
of the prison in order to enforce security and order in
prison. It is a valid exercise of police power.
Q: A driver was caught violating traffic regulations and
appears to be drunk. Can he be compelled by the
police to take a breathalyzer test?
A: Yes. The prohibition against self-incrimination is a
prohibition against physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from him, and not an exclusion
of body as evidence. The breathalyzer test does not
compel the driver to produce testimonial evidence.
Q. Congress is considering a law against drunken
driving. Under the legislation, police authorities may
ask any driver to take a breathalyzer test, wherein
the driver exhales several times into a device which
can determines whether he was driving under the
influence of alcohol. The result of the test can be
used in any legal proceedings against him .
Furthermore, declaring that the issuance of the
drivers license gives rise only to a privilege to drive
a motor vehicles on public roads, the law provides
that a driver who refuses to take the test shall be
automatically subjected to a 90 days suspension of
his drivers license.
Cite 2 possible constitutional objections to
this law. Resolve the objections and explain
whether any such infirmities can be cured. (Bar
Question)
A. Possible objections to the law are that requiring a
driver to take a breathalyzer test will violate his
rights against self-incrimination, that providing for
the suspension of his drivers license without any
hearing violates due process, and that the
proposed law will violate the rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures, because it
allows police authorities to require a driver to take
the breathalyzer test even if there is no probable
cause.
Requiring a driver to take a breathalyzer
test does not violate his right against selfincrimination, because he is not being compelled
to give testimonial evidence. He is merely being
asked to submit to a physical test. This is not
covered by the constitutional guaranty against
self-incrimination. Thus, in South Dakota VS
Neville 459 US 553, it was held for this reason that
requiring a driver to take a blood-alcohol test is valid.
As held in Mackey VS Montryn, 443 US 1,
because of compelling government interest and safety
along the street, the license of a driver who refuses to
take the breathalyzer may be suspended immediately

pending a post- suspension hearing, but there must
be a provision for a post-suspension hearing.
Thus, to save the proposed law from
unconstitutionality on the ground of denial of due
process it should provide for an immediate hearing
upon suspension of the drivers license.
The proposed law violates the right against
unreasonable search and seizures. It will
authorized police authorities to stop any driver and
ask him to take the breathalyzer test even in the
absent of the probable cause.
IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION
Q: Discuss the types of Immunity Statutes.
A: Immunity statutes may be generally classified into
two: one, which grants use of fruit immunity; and the
other, which grants what is known as transactional
immunity.The distinction between the two is as
follows:Use immunity prohibits use of witness
compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in
connection with the criminal prosecution of the
witness. On the other hand, transactional immunity
grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an
offense to which his compelled testimony relates.
(Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 [1985]) An
example of transactional immunity is Art. XIII, Section
18(8) which refers to immunity that may be granted by
the Commission on Human Rights to any person
whose testimony or whose possession of documents
or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it
or under its authority, which makes the witness
immune from criminal prosecution for an offense to
which his compelled testimony relates.
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
Q: Asian Transmission Corp. is an export oriented
company employing 350 workers. The workers
declared a strike. After the case was certified to the
NLRC, the latter issued a return-to-work order under
pain of separation. The workers contended that the
order was violative of the no involuntary servitude
clause of the Constitution. Rule on the contention of
the workers and explain.
A: The order of the NLRC is not violative of the no
involuntary servitude clause because it is anchored on
its authority to assume jurisdiction over cases which
affect national interest like export oriented industries.
The return-to-work order not so much confers a right
16
as it imposes a duty; while as a right it may be waived,
it must be discharged as a duty even against the
workers will. Returning to work is not a matter of
option or involuntariness but of obligation. The worker
must return to his job together with his co-workers so
the operations of the company can be resumed and it
can continue serving the public and promoting its
interests. That is the real reason such return can be
compelled. It is not violative of the right against
involuntary servitude.
(Sarmiento vs. Tuico, 162
SCRA 676 (1988) citing Kaisahan ng mga
Manggagawa ng Kahoy vs. Gotamco Sawmills, 80
Phil. 521).
Q:
State the concept of cruel or unusual
punishment.
A: A punishment is not cruel or unusual or
disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless
it is a barbarous one unknown to law or wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the community. (Legarda
vs. Valdez, 1 Phil.146). That the penalty is out of
proportion to the crime does not warrant the
declaration of unconstitutionality of the law on the
ground that it is cruel or unusual. The fact that the
punishment authorized by the statute is severe
does not make it cruel or unusual. In People vs.
Dela Cruz, 92 Phil. 900, it was said that it is the
form of punishment as fixed in antiquity and not the
severity of the same that makes it cruel and
unusual penalty. Likewise, in People vs. Padua, 133
SCRA 1, it was said that punishment is cruel when
it involves torture or lingering death. (See also
People vs. Camano, 115 SCRA 688. )
Q: X was charged with malversation for
misappropriating P21,940.70 and sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of eleven years and one day
to sixteen years and one day. He argued that the
penalty is oppressive since the same was based on
the amount misappropriated and the value of the
money has greatly depreciated since 1932. Is the
contention correct? Why?
A: No. Assuming arguendo that inflation has in effect
made more severe the penalty for malversing
P21,940.70, the remedy cannot come from the court
but from Congress. The court can intervene and strike
down a penalty as cruel, degrading, or inhuman only
when it has become so flagrantly oppressive and so
wholly disaproportionate to the nature of the offense as
to shock the moral senses.( People vs. Dionisico, 22
SCRA 1299; People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647; U.S. vs.
Borromeo, 23 Phil. 297). Considering that malversation
of public funds by a public officer is a betrayal of the

public trust, the penalty imposed is not so
disproportionate to the crime committed as to shock
the moral sense. (People vs. Agbanlog, 41 SCAD 704,
G.R. No. 105907, May 24, 1993; Agbanlog vs. People,
41 SCAD 704)
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Q. A Pajero driven by Joe sideswiped a motorcycle
driven by Nelson resulting in damage to a
motorcycle and injuries to Nelson. Joe sped on
without giving assistance to Nelson. The Fiscal
filed two informations against Joe, to wit: (1)
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with physical injuries under Art. 365 of
RPC, and (2) abandonment of ones victim under
paragraph 2, Art. 275 before the MTC.
Joe was arraigned, tried and convicted for
abandonment of ones victim in the MTC. He
appealed to the RTC. It was only a year later that
he was arraigned in the reck;less imprudence
charge before the RTC. He pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, the RTC affirmed the
decision of the MTC relative to the abandonment of
ones victim charge. Joe filed a petition for review
before the Court of Appeals, invoking his rights
against double jeopardy, contending that the
prosecution under Art. 275 of the RPC is a bar to
the prosecution for negligence under Art. 365 of
the same code. Decide. (Bar Question)
A. Joe cannot claim that his conviction for the
abandoning his victim in violation of Art. 275 of the
RPC is a bar to his prosecution for negligence under
Art. 365 of the RPC. As held in Lamera VS CA, 198
SCRA 186, there is no double jeopardy because these
two offenses are not identical. Reckless imprudence is
a crime falling under the chapter on criminal
negligence, while abandonment of ones victim is a
crime falling under crime against security. The former
estimated by means of culpa, while the latter is
committed by means of dolo. Failure to help ones
victim is not an offense by itself nor an element of
reckless imprudence. It merely increases the penalty
by one degree.
Q: When will dismissal give rise to double jeopardy?
A: (1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to
evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution
has rested; or based on insufficiency of evidence.
(People v. City Court of Silay)
(2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of
the accused, because of the denial of his right to
speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute.
( Esmena v. Pogoy)
17
Q: When can the People or the prosecution

appeal?
A:
1. When the accused has waived or is estopped from
invoking his right against double jeopardy.
2. When the prosecution is denied due process of
law.
3. When the dismissal or acquittal is made with grave
abuse of discretion.
Q: When is the accused deemed to have waived or
is estopped from invoking double jeopardy?
A:
1. The dismissal is induced by the accused or his
counsel; and
2. such dismissal must not be on the merits and must
not necessarily amount to an acquittal. (People v.
Salico)
Q. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila

approved an ordinance (No. 1000) prohibiting the
operation in the streets within the city limits of
taxicab units over 8 years old from year of
manufacture. The imposable penalty for violation
thereof is a fine of P4,000 or imprisonment for one
year upon the erring operator. Thereafter and while the
city ordinance was already in effect, Congress enacted
a law (RA# 500) prohibiting the operation in the streets
of cities throughout the country of taxicab units beyond
10 years old. The imposable penalty for violation
thereof is the same as in Ordinace #1000. A, an
owner/operator of a taxicab unit operating in the City of
Manila, was charged with violation of the city
ordinance. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty,
where upon, trial was set five days thereafter. For
failure of the witnesses to appear at the trial, the City
court dismissed the case against A. The City
Prosecutor of Manila forthwith filed another information
in the same court charging A with violation of R.A.
#500 for operating the taxicab unit subject of the
information in the first case. The accused moved to
dismiss the second case against him invoking double
jeopardy.
A: If I were the judge, I would grant the motion. The
dismissal of the first case for failure of the
witnesses to appear terminated the first jeopardy.
As held in Caes vs. IAC 179 S 54, the dismissal of
a case for failure of the witnesses for the
prosecution to appear constitutes an acquittal. The
acquittal of A for violation of Ordinance #1000 bars
his prosecution for violation of RA #500. Under Sec.

21, Art. III of the Constitution, if an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either bars another prosecution for the same
act.
Q: Accused was charged with qualified
seduction before the Municipal Court. He
pleaded not guilty when arraigned. The
prosecution presented evidence, then the
defense presented its evidence. When the
defense was about to rest its case, the
prosecution moved that accused be made to
answer to a charge of rape since the evidence
submitted indicated that rape was committed.
The case was dismissed. Six(6) counts of rape
were filed. He pleaded not guilty, but the cases
were dismissed provisionally for the delays
made by the prosecution. It was reconsidered,
hence, a petition for certiorari was filed. The
basic issue was whether the accused can,
under the circumstances, invoke double
jeopardy?
A: No, because the dismissal of the information
before the MTC was to pave the way for the filing of
the proper offense of rape. The MTC had no
jurisdiction to try the offense of rape at it is within
the province of the RTC to take cognizance of.
Moreover, the dismissal of the qualified seduction
case was provisional and with the consent of the
accused. (Gonzales vs. CA, 51 SCAD 510, G.R.
No. 108811, May 31, 1994).
Q: Suppose a case is remanded for further
proceedings, can the accused plead double
jeopardy?Why?
A: No, because the decision was declared void. He
was never put to jeopardy of conviction in the case.
(Combate vs. San Jose, Jr.,April 15, 1988)
Q: If a case is dismissed before the prosecution
could finish presenting its evidence or it is preemptively dismissed, and the appellate court
remands the case for further hearing or trial, can
the accused invoke double jeopardy? Why?
A: No, because the remand of the case for further
hearing or trial is merely a continuation of the first
jeopardy and does not expose the accused to a
second jeopardy. When the court pre-emptively
dismissed the case, it violated the fundamental right of
the accused to due process. With such violation, its
orders are therefore null and void and cannot
constitute a proper basis for a claim of double
jeopardy. (Paulin, et al. vs. Gimenez, et al., G.R. No.
103323, Jan. 21, 1993;citing People vs. Bocar; People
18
vs. Albano, supra; Saldana vs. CA, 190 SCRA 396
[1990]).
Q: A was charged with an offense. Upon his
motion, the case was dismissed. Can he invoke
double jeopardy in case he is charged with the
same case?Why?
A: No.As a rule, he cannot invoke double jeopardy
because when he moved for the dismissal, he waived
the right to interpose it. He prevented the State from
presenting evidence and the court from pronouncing
his guilt or innocence. 9People vs. Tagle, 105 Phil.
126; People vs. Gines, et al., G.R. No. 83463, May 27,
1991).
Q: Suppose in the question above, the accuse
invoked the right to speedy trial, can he invoke
double jeopardy in case he is charged again?Why?
A: Yes, by way of exception to the rule. (People vs.
Robles, 105 SCRA 1016).
Q: A case of grave threats was filed against Dr. and
Mrs. Paulin. Charges for grave threats and oral
defamation were filed against Barangay Captain
Mabuyo, before the Municipal Court of Talisay, Cebu.
The cases were jointly tried and on June 13, 1990, the
Court dismissed the case filed by Mabuyo on motion of
the accused Paulin. The dismissal was due to
procedural ground that the proper charge was not filed
which should have been disturbance of public
performance under Art. 153, RPC. A motion for
reconsideration was filed which was granted. Accused
invoked the principle of double jeopardy, contending
that the granting of the motion for reconsideration put
him in double jeopardy. Is the contention correct?
Why?
A: No, because the dismissal of the case was with
the express consent of the accused. 9People vs.
Gines, 197 SCRA 481 [1991]). Where the dismissal
was ordered upon motion or with the express
consent of the accused, he is deemed to have
waived his protection against double jeopardy.
(Paulin, et al. vs. Hon. Celso Gimenez, et al., G.R.
No. 103323, Jan. 21, 1993).
The dismissal in this case was made at a time
when the prosecution still had to present several
witnesses, where the order of dismissal was issued
at a time when the case was not ready for trial and
adjudication, the order is null and void. (People vs.
Pamitan, 30 SCRA 98 [1969]).
In People vs. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166(1985), it
was said that the prosecution was denied due

process as it never had the chance to offer its
evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of
Court in view of the trial courts order of dismissal.
The trial court was thereby ousted from its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process by aborting its right to
complete the presentation of its evidence and,
therefore, the first jeopardy had not been
terminated. (Paulin, et al. vs. Hon. Celso M.
Gimenez, et al., G.R. No. 103323, Jan. 21, 1993;
citing People vs. Albano, 163 SCRA 511 [1988]).
Q: Cannot the accused in the above-entitled
case contend that since the case was governed
by the Rules on Summary Procedure and all the
affidavits have already been submitted, the
dismissal
amounted
to
acquittal
after
consideration of the merits of the prosecutions
evidence?Explain.
A:No. Submission of affidavits to the court does not
warrant the inference that the prosecution had
already finished presenting its evidence because
the affiants are still required to testify and affirm the
contents thereof, otherwise, these affidavits cannot
serve as competent evidence for the prosecution. In
fact, under Sec. 14 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure, the witness who sybmitted affidavits
may be subjected to cross-examination. Should the
affiants fail to testify, their affidavits shall not be
considered as competent evidence for the party
presenting the affidavit. (Paulin, et al. vs. Gimenez,
et al., G.R. No. 103323, Jan. 21, 1993).
Q: If the case has been unduly prolonged and if the
accused moves to dismiss on the ground of violation of
his right to speedy trial, there would be double
jeopardy. Is the rule absolute?Why?
A: No, because there are exceptions to the said rule,
as:
(1)
(2)
when the delay was caused by the accused. It

would be a mockery of justice to allow him to
benefit out his wrongdoing or tactical
maneuvers. (People vs. Jardin, 124 SCRA
167).
When he agreed to a provisional dismissal
even if he invoked speedy trial. (People vs.
Gines, May 27, 1991).
Q: Four (4) criminal cases were filed against the

accused. During the trial on January 24, 1966, or after
eleven (11) years, accused was ready. There was no
appearance for the prosecution, hence, on motion of
the accused, the cases were dismissed provisionally.
On motion for reconsideration, the cases were
19
reinstated. Accused moved to reconsider on the
ground of double jeopardy. It was denied, hence, a
petition for certiorari before the SC was filed. Rule on
the petition.
A: The petition will prosper. There is double

jeopardy even if the dismissal was provisional in
character and even upon motion of the accused if
he invokes the right to speedy trial. Dismissal after
eleven years is equivalent to acquittal. There was
unreasonable delay. (People vs. Baldjay, 113 SCRA
284).
Q: Can the accused invoke double jeopardy in case

the information is dismissed on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction?Explain.
A: No, the
jurisdiction
vs. Galano,
No. 88232,
jeopardy.
dismissal on the ground of lack of

is not equialent to acquittal. (People
75 SCRA 193; People vs. Eduarte, G.R.
Feb. 26, 1990). He was never put to
Q: A case for libel was dismissed for the failure of the

complainant to prosecute, due to his failure to appear.
It was shown however that he was in Manila
recuperating from the second eye operation after his
left eye was removed. The motion for reconsideration
asking that the case be reinstated was denied on the
ground of double jeopardy. Is the denial proper?

Q: X was charged with the crime of homicide. Upon

arraignment, he pleaded guilty. He was allowed
however, to present evidence to show mitigating
circumstances. When he testified, he interposed selfdefense because there was strangling. He also
invoked voluntary surrender. He was acquitted, hence,
the prosecution appealed. The accused invoked that
the appeal would place him in double jeopardy. Is the
contention valid? Why?
A: No, because the acquittal was void. A plea of

guilt is an unconditional admission of guilt. It
forecloses the right to defend himself. The court
has no other alternative except to impose the
penalty fixed by law. The testimony to prove
mitigating circumstances could not be taken to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Due to the assertion of self-defense, the trial court
should have taken his plea anew and proceede to
trial. In deciding on the merits, the court erred in
the procedure and deprived the prosecution of its
day in court. His testimony on self-defense vacted
his former plea of guilty and yet, a valid plea is a
condition for double jeopardy to exist. (People vs.
Balisacan, G.R. No. L-26376, august 31, 1966).
Q: The accused requested the judge to wait for his

lawyer when asked to present evidence. The judge
considered it an assault on the dignity of the court,
hence, he dismissed the case. Was the dismissal
valid? Why?
A: No. The allegation of double jeopardy is

unmeritorious, because the case was dismissed
upon motion with the consent of the accused. For
double jeopardy to attach, the general rule is that
the dismissal of the case must be without the
express consent of the accused.
A: No, because it violated the right of the accused

to due process. Double jeopardy would not attach
since the dismissal was without due process. If
there was assault on the dignity of the court, then,
contempt could have been proper. (Serino vs.
Zosa, 40 SCRA 433).
In People vs. Quizada, it was said that there

are only two occasions when double jeopardy will
attach even if the motion to dismiss the case is
made by the accused himself. The first is where
the ground is insufficiency of evidence of the
prosecution; and the second is when the
proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in
violation of the right to speedy trial. In the instant
case, the case was merely 8 months old. This
period is not such an extended , prolonged or
lengthy duration as to cause capricious and
negatious delay. (People vs. Gines, et al., G.R. No.
83463, May 27, 1991).
Q: After the acquittal of the accused in the killing of

Ninoy Aquino, the SC created an ad hoc committee
(Vasquez Committee) which recommended the retrial
of the case because the former trial was scripted,
stage-managed, a moro-moro, hence, the State was
denied due process. Double jeopardy was invoked by
the accused. Was the invocation of double jeopardy
proper?Why?
A: No, the re-opening of the case did not amount

to double jeopardy because the Sandiganbayan
20
proceeding was sham and a mock trial. The State
was denied due process and double jeopardy
cannot be invoked in criminal cases where there
was denial of due process. (Galman vs. SB, 144
SCRA 43).
Q: In a criminal case where A was charged, the same

was dismissed. Can the State appeal? Are there
exceptions?
A: No, because the appeal would palce the

accused in double jeopardy.
There are however, exceptions to the rule

such as when
(1) the dismissal is made upon motion or with the
express consent of the defendant;
(2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon
consideration of the evidence or the merits of
the case; and
(3) the question to be passed upon by the
appellate court is purely legal so that should
the dismissal be found incorrect, the case
would have to be remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings, to determine
the guilt or innocence of the dfendant. (Paulin,
et al. vs. Gimenez, et al., G.R. No. 103323, Jan.
21, 1993; citing People vs. Villalon, 192 SCRA
521(1990).
Q: After the prosecution rested its case, the accused

filed a demurrer to evidence. Would double jeopardy
be a valid defense if he is charged for the same
offense?Why?
A: Yes, because the dismissal of a case on

demurrere ro evidence or insufficiency of evidence
is a dismissal on the merits, amounting to
acquittal. Double jeopardy would attach. (People
vs. Silay, 74 SCRA 247(1976); People vs. Francisco,
128 SCRA 110).
Q: Suppose the accused filed a motion to quash and

the court granted it, can he invoke double jeopardy if
he is charged with the same offense?Why?
A: No, because it was with his express consent
and instance. There was a waiver of his right
against double jeopardy for he prevented the court
from rendering a judgment of acquittal or

conviction. The dismissal was not based on the
merits. (Ceniza vs. People, 159 SCRA 16; Milo vs.
Salanga, 152 SCRA 113).
Q: After having pleaded not guilty to a case of grave

coercion, the accused was ready to be tried. The
prosecution asked for postponements thrice. The
accused moved to dismiss and it was granted. Twentyone days later, the prosecutor moved for revival, It was
granted. Accused invoked double jeopardy. Was the
revival a situation where accused was placed in double
jeopardy?Why?
A: Yes, because there was violation of his right to

speedy trial .Although the dismissal was
provisional in character, it amounted to acquittal.
(Esmena vs. Pogoy, 102 SCRA 861).
Q: Accused was charged with estafa under Art. 315 of

the Revised Penal Code. Would his being charged
under BP 22 amount to double jeopardy?Why?
A: No, because the two are distinct offenses.

Deceit and damage are essential elements in a
charge under Art. 315, RPC;not in BP 22; mere
issuance of the check gives rise to prosecution
under BP 22; not in Art. 315, RPC; the drawer may
be convicted of violation of BP 22 even if there is a
pre-existing contractual relationship; not in the
Penal Code. Prosecution for the same act is not
prohibited. What is prohibited is prosecution for
the same offense. (Nierras vs. Dacuycuy, G.R. Nos.
59568-76, Jan. 11, 1990; People vs. Miraflores, 115
SCRA 570; People vs. Militante, 117 SCRA 910)
This is true also in illegal recruitment where here
the accused can likewise be charged with estafa. A
single act may violate two statutes. If each statute
requires proof on additional element which the
other does not, an acquittal or conviction under
either statute does not bar prosecution under the
other. Damage is essential in estafa, but not in
illegal recruitment. (People vs. Manungas, 49
SCAD 376, G.R. Nos. 91552-55, March 10, 1994;
People vs. Turda, 53 SCAD 91, G.R. Nos. 97044-46,
July 6, 1994.
Q: Accused Tiozon was charged and convicted for

violation of P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of
firearms, for having in his possession and control one .
38 cal. Revolver which was used to shoot one
Leonardo Bolima. Later, he was charged with the
crime of murder for the killing of Leonardo Bolima. In
21
his defense, he interposed his constitutional right
against double jeopardy. Is the defense valid? Why?
A: No, because the killing of a person with the use

of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate
prosecution for (a) violation of Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1866 and (b) violation of either Art. 248 or Art
249 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused
cannot plead one as a bar to the other. The rule
against double jeopardy cannot be invoked
because the first is punished by a special law,
while the second, homicide or murder, is punished
by the Revised Penal Code. It is a cardinal rule that
the protection against double jeopardy may be
invoked only if the second prosecution is for the
same offense or identical offenses. (People vs.
Ticzon, 198 SCRA 368; People vs. Deunida, 49
SCAD 859, G.R. Nos. 105199-200, March 28, 1994;
People vs. Fernandez, 57 SCAD 481, G.R. No.
113474, Dec. 13, 1994).
Q: Eliseo Soriano issued a postdated check which was

dishonored when presented for payment. He was
charged with two(2) separate offenses for violation of
B.P. 22 and estafa. The charge under B.P. 22 was
dismissed for being fatally defective. He was, however
convicted of estafa. On appeal, he was acquitted. The
State appealed by way of a petition for certiorari and
mandamus. The alleged defect in the information
under B.P. 22 was the failure to state that the accused,
as drawer of the check at the time of issue, knew of
the insufficiency of funds in the bank for payment upon
its presentation. Is the court correct? Why?
A: No. The interpretation is erroneous, the makers

knowledge of insufficiency of his funds is legally
presumed from the dishonor of his check for
insufficiency of funds.
Although its decision is erroneous, that

decision may not be annulled or set aside because
it amounted to a judgment of acquittal. The State
may not appeal that decision for it would place the
accused twice in double jeopardy for punishment
for the same offense in violation of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
(People vs. Hon. Laggui, et al., G.R. Nos. 76262-63,
March 16, 1989).
Q: What is meant by the same offense for purposes

of double jeopardy?

A: Same offense means:

(1) the very same offense; or
(2) attempt or frustration of an offense; or
(3) that which necessarily includes or is included
in the offense charged in the former complaint
or information.
Q: What is the test in determining whether the former
complaint or information charges the same offense?
A: The test is whether the evidence to prove the

same or the two are the same. Or, if the elements
or ingredients in the former constitute the latter or
vice versa.
Q: X was charged with frustrated homicide. He

pleaded not guilty. Victim died later, hence, he was
charged again with homicide. He pleaded in a motion
to quash, double jeopardy. Is the contention correct?
Why?
A: No, because the second offense was not yet

existing at the time of the first prosecution. There
was no possibility for him to be convicted for a
non-existing crime as it merely supervened after
his indictment for the offense of frustrated
homicide. (People vs. Melo).
Q: A was charged with slight physical injuries. He

pleaded not guilty. Can he invoke double jeopardy if he
is charged with serious physical injuries?Why?
A: No, because the deformity did not exist and
could not have existed at the same time of the first
information. (People vs. Adil, 76 SCRA 462).
Q: Mr. Y was charged with less serious physical
injuries. He was convicted, but later on, he was
charged with serious physical injuries. Can he invoke
double jeopardy? Why?
A: Yes, because there was no new supervening
event. The deformity was already existing at the
time of his conviction for less serious physical
injuries. With proper medical examination, the
deformity could have been detected. (People vs.
Yorac, 42 SCRA 230).
22
Q: Two informations were filed against Mr. G for (1)
Violation of Section 7 of R.A. No. 3060, punishing a
person who exhibits any motion picture in a theater,
public place without such picture being duly passed by
the Board of Motion Pictures (Criminal Case No.
147347 Case No. 1 for easy reference); (2) Violation
of Art. 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing
those who in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any
other place open to public view, shall exhibit indecent
or immoral plays, acts, or shows. (Criminal Case No.
143748 Case No. 2 for easy reference.)
When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty to both
cases on May 31, 1972, and November 15, 1972.
Later, he moved for leave to withdraw his plea of not
guilty in Criminal Case No. 2, without substituting or
entering another plea. On December 27, 1972, he
moved to quash the information in Case No. 2 on the
ground of double jeopardy due to the pendency of
Case No. 1 containing the same allegations.
On Jan. 20, 1973, the judge dismissed Case
No. 2 over the objections of the Fiscal.
On Feb. 7, 1973, the accused changed his plea
of not guilty to guilty in case No. 1 and was fined
P600.00.
On Feb. 10, 1973, the Fiscal moved for a
reconsideration of the dismissal of Case No. 2 which
motion was denied. Republic elevated the case to the
Supreme Court on certiorari. Issue: Will the accused be
placed in double jeopardy if Case No. 2 is reinstated?
A: No, he will not be placed in double jeopardy
because the elements of the two offenses are
different.
R.A. No. 3060 punishes any person who
exhibits any motion picture which has not
previously passed by the Board of Censors for
Motion Pictures. It is malum prohibitum where
criminal intent need not be proved.
Art. 210 (3) of the RPC punishes a person
who exhibits indecent or immoral plays, acts,
shows, not just motion pictures. Art. 201 (3) is
malum in se,
where criminal intent is an
indespensible ingredient.
Because of the differences in elements and
nature, there is no identity of the offenses involved

for which legal jeopardy in one may be invoked in
the other. The evidence required to prove one
offense is not the same evidence required to prove
the other.
Emphasizing the absence of double
jeopardy, the SC said: It is a cardinal rule that the
protection against double jeopardy may be invoked
only for the same offenses. Any single act may
offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision
requires proof of an additional fact or element which
the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a
dismissal of the information under one does not bar
prosecution under the other. x x x Phrased
elsewhere, where two different laws define two
crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no
obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although
both offenses arise from the same facts, each crime
involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other. (People vs. City
Court of Manila, 154 SCRA 175 [1987]).
Q: X was charged for violation of an ordinance which

prohibits installation of electrical devices or contraptions
without permit. He filed a Motion to Quash on the
ground of prescription which was granted. Fourteen (14)
days later, the fiscal filed a theft case against him. He
filed a motion to quash invoking double jeopardy. Will
the motion prosper?Why?
A: Yes, there is double jeopardy because the
dismissal on the ground of prescription amounted
to acquittal. One was a means of committing the
other. ( People vs. Relova)
BILL OF ATTAINDER
Q: state the constitutional provision prohibiting the
passage of a bill of attainder and ex post facto law.
A: No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be
enacted. (Art. III, Sec. 22, 1987 Constitution)
Q: The Philippines and Australia entered into an
Extradition Treaty providing that extradition may be
granted irrespective of when the offense was
23
committed provided that such offense is an offense
penalized under the laws of the requesting State.
Pursuant to such treaty, Paul Joseph Wright was
sought to be extradited for having committed certain
offenses in Australia, but he contended that since he
committed the offenses before the treaty became
effective, retroactivity would be violative of the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law. Is
his contention valid? Why?
A: No, because the prohibition against the passage
of ex post facto law applies only to criminal
legislation which affects the substantial rights of
the accused. The treaty is neither a piece of
criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural
statute. It merely provides for the extradition of
persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a
crime which offense or crime was already
committed or consummated at the time the treaty
was ratified. (Wright vs. CA, et al ., 54 SCAD 406,
G.R. No. 113213, aug. 15, 1994).
Q: In Wright vs. CA, et al., 235 SCRA 341, it was
contended by the person sought to be extradited that
the phrase wanted for prosecution means that a
person should have a criminal case pending before a
competent court of the requesting State. Is the
contention correct?Why?
A: No, otherwise it would stretch the meaning of
the phrase beyond the intention of the States,
because the treaty provisions merely require a
warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant.
Furthermore, the Charge and Warrant of Arrest
Sheets attest to the fact that he is not only wanted
for prosecution, but has in fact, absconded to
evade arrest and criminal prosecution. To limit the
interpretation to persons charged with an
information or complaint renders the Treaty
ineffective over individuals who absconded for the
purpose of evading arrest and prosecution.
Q: X was charged with illegal recruitment before the
effectivity of P.D. 2018 penalizing illegal recruitment on
a large scale. Can this Decree be used to penalize X?
Why?
A: No, because it would become retroactive which
would violate the constitutional prohibition against
the enactment of ex post facto law. (People vs.
Taguba, 47 SCAD 172, G.R. Nos. 95207-17, Jan. 10,
1994).

CITIZENSHIP
Q: When does an administrative proceeding on
citizenship acquire res judicata effect?
A: Administrative proceeding on citizenship
acquire res judicata
effect if the following
requisites concur:
(1)Citizenship is resolved as a material issue in the
controversy;
(2)After
a
full
blown
hearing;
(3) Active participation of the Solicitor General or
his
representative;
(4) The finding of his citizenship is affirmed by the
Supreme Court (Burca V Republic , June 16, 1973)
Q. Rosebud was born of Filipino parents. Upon
reaching the age of majority she became a naturalized
citizen in another country. Later, she required
Philippine Citizenship. Could Rosebud regain her
status as a natural born Filipino citizen? Would your
answer be the same whether she reacquires his
Filipino citizenship by repatriation or by act of
Congress? Explain.
A. Rosebud can regain her status as a natural born
citizen by repatriating. Since repatriation involves
restoration of a person to citizenship previously
lost by expatriation and Rosebud was previously a
natural born citizen, in case she repatriates she
will be restored to her status as a natural born
citizen. (Bengzon III V HRET, May 7, 2001). If she
reacquired her citizenship by an act of Congress,
she will not be a natural born citizen since she
reacquired
her
citizenship
by
legislative
naturalization.
Q. What are the instances when a citizen of the
Philippines may possess dual citizenship considering
the citizenship clause (Article IV) of the Constitution?
A. (1) Those born of Filipino fathers/mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus
soli.
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino
mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
24

fathers country such children are citizens of that

country.
all contests relating to the election returns and

qualifications of their respective members.
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the

latters country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to
have renounced Philippine Citizenship. (Mercado
Vs Manzano, 307 SCRA 630)
(2) Yes, Y is a Filipino citizen. More than that he is a

natural born citizen of the Philippines qualified to
become a Senator. Since Y is an illegitimate child of a
Filipino mother, he follows the citizenship of his mother.
He need not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority as held In re Mallare, 59 SCRA 45.
In Osias V Antonio, Electoral case No. 11, August 6,
1971, the Senate Electoral Tribunal held that the
illegitimate child of an alien father and a Filipino
mother is a Filipino citizen and is qualified to be a
Senator.
Q. B, an Indian national, was naturalized as a Filipino

citizen in accordance with CA 473, as amended. As an
effect of Bs naturalization, his wife and minor children
were derivatively naturalized. Three years after his
naturalization, B returned to his native India and
established residence there. Bs wife and children were
left in the Philippines. Under the law, Bs establishing
a residence in any foreign country within 5 years is a
ground for denaturalization. Would Bs wife and minor
children also lose their Filipino Citizenship?
A. No. it is only when the ground for
denaturalization affects the intrinsic validity of the
proceedings does it divest the wife and children of
their derivative naturalization. Under the law, these
are when (1) the naturalization certificate was
obtained fraudulently or illegally, and (2)
naturalization was obtained through invalid
declaration of intention.
If the ground is personal to the person
naturalized, such as in this case, the wife and children
shall retain their Filipino citizenship.
Q. Y was elected Senator in the May 1987 national
election. He was born out of wedlock in 1949 of an
American father and a naturalized Filipina mother. Y
never elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority.
(1) Before what body should T, the losing candidate
question the election of Y? State the reasons for
your answer.
(2) Is Y a Filipino citizen? Explain your answer. (Bar
Question)
A. (1) T, the losing candidate, should question the
election of Y before the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
because the issue involved is the qualification of Y
to be a Senator. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution provides that, The Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
Q. (1) Lily Teh arrived in Manila on one of her regular

tours to the Philippines from Taipeh. She met Peter
Go, a naturalized Filipino citizen. After a whirlwind
courtship, Lily and Peter were married at the San
Agustin Church. A week after the wedding, Lily The
petitioned in administrative proceedings before
immigration authorities to declare her a Filipino citizen
stating that she had none of the disqualifications
provided in the Revised Naturalization Law. The jilted
Filipino girlfriend of Peter Go opposed the petition
claiming that Lily Teh was still a minor who had not
even celebrated her 21st birthday, who never
resided in the Philippines except during her oneweek visit as tourist from Taipeh during the
Chinese New Year, who spoke only Chinese, and
who had radical ideas like advocating unification
of Taiwan with mainland China. Lily Teh , however,
swore that she was renouncing her Chinese
allegiance and while she knew no Filipino customs
and traditions as yet, she evinced a sincere desire
to learn and embrace them. Would Lily The
succeed in becoming a Filipino Citizens through
her marriage to Peter Go? Explain.
(2) A child was born to a Japanese father and a
Filipina mother. Would he be eligible to run for the
position of member of the House of Representative
upon reaching the age of 25 years old? (Bar
Question)
A. (1) Yes, Lily The ipso facto became a Philippine

Citizen upon her marriage to Peter Go, who is a
Philippine Citizen provided, she possesses none
of the disqualifications laid down in Sec. 4 of the
Revised Naturalization Law. According to the
ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao VS Commissioner of
Immigration, 41 SCRA 292, an alien woman who
marries a Filipino husband ipso facto becomes a
Filipino Citizen without having to posses any of
25
the qualifications prescribed in Sec. 2 of the
Revised
Naturalization
Law
provided
she
possesses none of the disqualifications set forth
in Sec. 4 of the same law. All of the grounds
invoked by the former girlfriend of Peter Go for
opposing the petition of Lily, except for the last
one, are qualifications, which Lily need not
possess. The fact that Lily is advocating the
unification of Taiwan with mainland China is not a
ground for disqualification under Sec. 4 of the
Revised Naturalization Law.
(2) The child can run for the House of
Representatives provided upon reaching the age
of majority he elected Philippine Citizenship.
Under sec. 6, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, to
qualify to be a member of the House of
Representative one must be a natural born
Philippine Citizen. According to Sec. 1(3), Art. IV of
the Constitution, children born before January 17,
1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are
Philippine Citizens.
Q. X, was born in the US of a Filipino father and a

Mexican mother, he returned to the Philippines when
he was 26 years old carrying an American passport
and he was registered as an alien with the Bureau of
Immigration. Was X qualified to run for membership in
the House of representatives in the 1995 elections?
Explain. (1996 Bar Question)
A. Depends in the circumstances.

If X was an illegitimate child, he is not qualified
to run for the House of Representatives. According to
the case In Re Mallare, 59 SCRA 45, an illegitimate
child follows the citizenship of the mother. Since
the mother of X is a Mexican, he will be a Mexican
citizen, if he is an illegitimate child even if his
father is a Filipino.
If X is a legitimate child, he is a Filipino citizen.
Under Sec. 2(2), Art. IV of the Constitution, those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines are
Filipino Citizens. Since X was born in the US, which
follows jus soli, X also is an American citizen. In
accordance with Aznar VS COMELEC, 185 SCRA
703, the mere fact a person with dual citizenship
registered as an alien with the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation does not necessarily
mean that he is renouncing his Philippine Citizenship.
Likewise, the mere fact that X used an American
passport did not result in the lose of his Philippine
citizenship. As held in Kawakita VS US, since a
person with dual citizenship has the rights of
citizenship in both countries, the use of a passport

issued by one country is not inconsistent with his
citizenship in the other country.
Q. Julian Hortal was born of Filipino parents. Upon

reaching the age of majority, he became a naturalized
citizen in the other country. Later, he reacquired
Philippine Citizenship. Could Hortal regain his status
as natural born Filipino Citizen? Would your answer
be the same whether he reacquires his Filipino
Citizenship by repatriation or by act of Congress?
Explain. (1999 Bar Question)
A. First Alternative Answer:

Julian Hortal can regain his status as a
natural born citizen by repatriating. Since
repatriation involves restoration of a person to
citizenship previously lost by expatriation and
Julian Hortal was previously a natural born citizen,
in case he repatriates he will be restored to his
status as a natural born citizen. If he acquired his
citizenship by an act of Congress, Julian Hortal
will not be a natural born citizen, since he acquired
his citizenship by legislative naturalization.
Second Alternative Answer:

Julian Hortal cannot regain his status as a
natural born citizen by repatriating. He had to
perform an acts to acquire his citizenship, i.e.,
repatriation. Under Sec. 2, Art. IV of the
Constitution, natural born citizens are those
citizens from birth without having to perform an
act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. If he
reacquired his citizenship by an act of Congress,
Julian Hortal will not be a natural born citizen
since he reacquired his citizenship by legislative
naturalization.
Q. What are the effects of marriages of:

1.
2.
A citizen to an alien
an alien to a citizen on their spouses and
children? Discuss. (1999 Bar Question)
A. 1. According to Sec. 4, Art. IV of the

Constitution, Filipino Citizens who marry aliens
retain their citizenship unless by their act or
omissions they are deemed to have renounced it
under the law.
2. According to Moya Lim VS Commissioner of
Immigration, under Sec. 15 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, a foreign woman who marries a
26

Filipino Citizen becomes a Filipino Citizen

provided
she
possesses
none
of
the
disqualification for naturalization. A foreign man
who marries a Filipino Citizens does not acquire
Philippine Citizenship. However, under Sec. 3 of
the Revised Naturalization Act, in such a case the
residents requirement for naturalization shall be
reduced from ten to five years. Under Sec. 1(2), Art.
IV of the Constitution, the children of an alien and
a Filipino citizens are citizens of the Philippines.

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1

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

On the ground that Stevie was denied

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

compartment of the car. The prohibited drug was

and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.

A. 1) No, the search was not valid, because there was no

Q. X was arrested for and charged with Robbery. X

No. There was no waiver of the right to question the

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

The resolution is invalid because the COMELEC

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

This legislation was passed in response to

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

Q. The Labor Code prohibits managerial employees

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

A religious organization has a weekly

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

RIGHTS WHILE UNDER INVESTIGATION

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

Q. The accused was required to post P1.9 million

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

A. The effects are:

Q. One of the accused jumped bail after testifying,

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

Q. A was represented by a lawyer who abandoned

Q:The privilege of self-incrimination must be timely

A. No. parading subjects the suspects to trial by

(a) As held in Bagadiong v. De Guzman, 94

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Q: When can the People or the prosecution

Q. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila

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when the delay was caused by the accused. It

Q: Four (4) criminal cases were filed against the

A: The petition will prosper. There is double

Q: Can the accused invoke double jeopardy in case

dismissal on the ground of lack of

Q: A case for libel was dismissed for the failure of the

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Q: X was charged with the crime of homicide. Upon

A: No, because the acquittal was void. A plea of

Q: The accused requested the judge to wait for his

A: No. The allegation of double jeopardy is

A: No, because it violated the right of the accused

In People vs. Quizada, it was said that there

Q: After the acquittal of the accused in the killing of

A: No, the re-opening of the case did not amount

Q: In a criminal case where A was charged, the same

A: No, because the appeal would palce the

There are however, exceptions to the rule

Q: After the prosecution rested its case, the accused