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Running head: 7 DAY WAR

7 Day War:

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7 DAY WAR

The 7 day war that happened between the Israelis and Egypt in 1973 between was a war that
terribly surprised the latter. The attack not only put the security of Israel in Jeopardy but also its
survival. However, by the time the war was over Israel had turned the tables and had placed both
Cairo and Damascus under threat. Nevertheless, even in the aftermath the sense of shock that
rocked the country was still evident. In the minds of the military and political leaders of Israel it
was supposed to be invincible. The purpose of this paper is to prove that lack and misuse of
intelligence was the reason the Arab countries were so successful in the assault.
In the victory that Israel had in 1967 she extended her borders to the West Bank, Golan Heights
as well as Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. The Arabs wanted these lands back and were ready
to fight for it as, indeed, they did. These Arab countries then formed a coalition through which
they pushed their agenda of reclaiming their land and even considered going to war. Although
Israel knew of these plans the gravity of the situation was not clear. One morning during a
religious event in Israel the Arabs attacked in a style that took the latter in overwhelming
surprise. Although Israeli later on won the war, the attack showed how unprepared Israel was.
After the conflict that the two countries had in 1967 Israeli had updated its intelligence levels to
include electronic eavesdropping and early warning station in areas that enable Israeli to observe
the Egyptian forces on the other side. The Israeli Defense Force also had drones that were handy
in monitoring and photographing the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordan troops. By the mid of 1973 the
Israeli military knew the exact plans that the Arabs had concerning war. They knew that Egyptian
second and third armies would try crossing the Suez Canal from Sinai and the strategy they had
of taking over Sharm el-Sheikh. However the Israelis never believed that the Arabs would
seriously go into war.

7 DAY WAR

The reason why the Israelis did not use the information that they had about the Arabs and their
plans was because of a concept that was in the country. As a result of the crushing defeat that the
Arabs experienced in the 1967 battle, Israelis believed that the latter were weak and could not be
able to manage another battle (Bar-Joseph, 2005). Therefore Israel understood the aggressive
intentions as hullabaloo that was as a result of their previous war and as a future that could never
be.
Arabs also denied Israel critical intelligence both politically as well as militarily and this worked
to the formers advantage. The then Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, had made frequent
remarks about attacking Israel and he called 1971 the year of decision. When the year went by
without the president doing anything it was clear that it was a case of the crying wolf. The
Israelis thus did not think anything of it when he repeated the remarks in both 1972 and 1973.
When Israel was alerted of his plans, they interpreted it as false alarms although they were really
happening at the time. What is more, there were a number of Egyptian ministers that showed
peaceful intentions in dealings that involved the western countries throughout most of that year.
The government then gave cadets reports instructing the ones in military colleges to go back and
resume their courses while other military men were given the go ahead to attend the pilgrimage
in Mecca. The Egyptian media also reported the demobilization of over 20000 reservists. Before
their attack, the Egyptians deployed special quad troops alongside the canal to move without
their helmets, shirts or weapons and to swim, hang out fishing lines and spend their days eating
oranges (Shalev v, 2010). The Israeli defense force was utterly fooled by these antics which
painted a picture of a relaxed country and military.

7 DAY WAR

The real plans were carried out in ways that ensure the Israeli intelligence would not be aware.
For one, only a few people in the Egyptian and Syrian sides knew of the war before the 1st of
October, 5 days before the war. As a matter of fact, a vast majority of the Egyptian and Syrian
troops knew of the attack an hour or two before the actual assault was carried out. The Egyptian
and Syrians were very aware of the Israelis interception capabilities that they stopped using
telephones, radio-telephones or cables completely. The Egyptians and Syrians also did not put a
lot of effort and time in fooling the Israeli Intelligence services. In fact, they anticipated the
Israelis to know of their plans 6 days before its implementation. This helped the Arabs be careful
and accurate in planning and Israelis never knew of the plan until events started unfolding.
After the war the failure that intelligence had in the war was still in the memory of many Israelis.
There were lessons as well as disciplinary action that members of the intelligence community
received for their bad work. When Israel later invaded Lebanon, Intelligence was at par and as a
result the war went on more swiftly than the 1973 one.
References
Bar-Joseph, U. (2005). The watchman fell asleep: The surprise of Yom Kippur and its sources.
Albany: State University of New York Press.
Shalev v, A. (2010). Israel's intelligence assessment before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling
deception and distraction. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.